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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2016 > July 2016 Decisions > G.R. No.

204693, July 13, 2016 - GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, Petitioner, v. GUAGUA
NATIONAL COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR UNION AND GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES
NON-TEACHING AND MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION, Respondents.:

G.R. No. 204693, July 13, 2016 - GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, Petitioner, v.
GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR UNION AND GUAGUA NATIONAL
COLLEGES NON-TEACHING AND MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION, Respondents.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 204693, July 13, 2016

GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, Petitioner, v. GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES

FACULTY LABOR UNION AND GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES NON-TEACHING
AND MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the September 26, 2012 Decision1 and
December 3, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 120669,
which respectively denied for lack of merit the Petition for Certiorari filed therewith by
petitioner Guagua National Colleges (GNC) and the motion for reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

GNC is an educational institution located in Sta. Filomena, Guagua, Pampanga. On the

other hand, respondents Guagua National Colleges Faculty Labor Union (GNCFLU) and
Guagua National Colleges Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor Union (GNCNTMLU)
were the bargaining agents for GNC's faculty members and non-teaching and
maintenance personnel, respectively.

Beginning 1994 until their present dispute, the parties concluded their Collective
Bargaining Agreements (CBA) without issue as follows: (1) CBA effective June 1, 1994
to May 31, 1999 (1994-1999 CBA), 3 the economic provisions of which were
renegotiated on November 3, 1997 for years 1997-1999; 4 (2) CBA effective June
1,1999 to May 31, 2004,5 the economic provisions of which were renegotiated on July
4, 2002 for years 2002-2004;6 and, (3) CBA effective June 1, 2004 to May 31,
2009.7 The aforementioned CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU without
distinction.

Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-out" clause under Section 17
thereof which likewise provides for mechanism for grievance resolution and voluntary
arbitration. This provision was considered carried over in the subsequent CBAs. 8 chanrobleslaw

On April 3, 2009, the Presidents of both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU, wrote the President
of GNC, Atty. Ricardo V. Puno (Atty. Puno), to inform him of the former's intention to
open the negotiation for the renewal of the then existing CBA which would expire on
May 31, 2009.9 Attached to the said letter was respondents' proposal for the next
CBA10 which was received by GNC on even date. 11 chanrobleslaw

Instead of serving upon respondents a reply/counter-proposal within 10 days from its

receipt of respondents' proposal, GNC wrote respondents on May 11, 2009 calling for a
meeting at 10:00 a.m. of May 15, 2009 regarding CBA negotiations. While the said
meeting took place and was attended by panel members from GNC, GNCFLU and
GNCNTMLU, no agreement was reached except that GNC would notify respondents of
the next negotiation meeting. However, what respondents later received from GNC's
Corporate Secretary, Atty. Ricardo M. Sampang (Atty. Sampang) was not a notice of
meeting but a letter dated May 27, 2009 which, among others, stated that the
"management is not inclined to grant the economic/monetary-related proposals in
[respondents'] letter of April 3, 2009." 12 chanrobleslaw

Still, respondents on June 1, 2009, requested for a conference with GNC to discuss the
ground rules.13 GNC granted respondents' request and scheduled a meeting at 1:00
p.m. of June 11, 2009 at the GNC boardroom.14 Although respondents described GNC
as "non-committal" during the meeting, they nevertheless reckoned thereon the start of
the negotiation proper between the parties.

As to the events that transpired thereafter, the parties have conflicting claims.

While GNC asserted in general terms that the parties exchanged proposals and counter-
proposals in the months that followed,15 respondents, on the other hand, detailed the
negotiations that allegedly ensued between the parties, 16 to wit: (1) another meeting
was held on June 16, 2009 but since GNC at that time still did not have any
reply/counter-proposal to respondents' proposal, it asked for three weeks to submit the
same; (2) in their July 10, 2009 meeting, GNC failed to submit its purported counter-
proposal; (3) in the meeting of July 31, 2009, Cita Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the school
treasurer and a member of the management panel, discussed with respondents some of
the economic items in respondents' proposal, particularly those relating to longevity
pay, birthday gift, family assistance, medical check-up and clothing allowance; (4) the
parties discussed further on longevity pay and family assistance benefit in the August
11, 2009 meeting. They also talked about an increase in rice subsidy; (5) in the August
17, 2009 meeting, Rodriguez stated that based on GNC's Faculty Manual of 2008,
longevity pay shall be given according to the number of years of service and shall be
deemed as loyalty pay. The parties then agreed to an increase of P5.00 in the longevity
pay previously being given; (6) in the following meeting of August 24, 2009, Rodriguez
announced the increased benefits included in the new CBA, to wit: loyalty pay, cash
gift, rice subsidy, birthday gift and clothing allowance. Rodriguez likewise confirmed the
grant of a Union Office at the 3rd floor of Goseco Building in GNC. However, respondents'
demand for an increased signing bonus of P100,000.00 for each union (previously given
at P50,000.00 each union) remained unsettled. Nevertheless, the parties agreed to
further discuss the matter; (7) on September 23, 2009, respondents submitted to GNC
a draft of the CBA containing all the benefits agreed upon. GNC requested that some
revisions be made thereon; (8) Atty. Sampang called for a meeting on October 9, 2009.
In the said meeting, the parties reviewed all the benefits agreed on. Rodriguez then
stated that the signing of the next CBA may take place the following meeting; (9) on
October 15,2009, respondents submitted to Atty. Sampang the agreed terms of the
CBA which already contained the revisions requested by GNC and the P100,000.00
signing bonus for each union. The document according to them was by then ready for
signing; (10) respondents made several follow-ups with both Atty. Sampang and
Rodriguez regarding the signing of the CBA but to no avail; (11) respondents received
from Atty: Sampang, through a letter17 dated December 21, 2009, GNC's counter-
proposal.18 Respondents were surprised since they thought all along that all matters,
except for some details on the signing bonus, were already settled. Besides, the three-
week period previously requested by GNC within which to submit its counter-proposal
had long lapsed; (12) Atty. Sampang requested respondents to attend a meeting with
Atty. Puno on January 5, 2010. Despite Atty. Puno's presence in the school premises,
he did not, however, face respondents' representatives who waited for him for a
considerable length of time; (13) in view of the foregoing, respondents were
constrained to write Atty. Puno on January 8, 2010.19 They stressed that while they
have been bargaining in good faith, it was otherwise on the part of GNC. Respondents
thus expressed their belief that the parties have already reached an impasse. They
therefore asked GNC to respond to their letter and therein state its stand as to whether
a third party is needed to assist them in threshing out their differences. As respondents
did not get any reply from GNC, they filed on February 3, 2010 a preventive mediation
case with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). 20 chanrobleslaw

Proceedings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board

Again, the parties differ in their account of what transpired before the NCMB.

Respondents alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties finally agreed
on the details regarding the grant of signing bonus. Hence, they undertook to compose
the final draft of the 2009-2014 CBA which it submitted to the NCMB on May 14, 2010
and copy furnished GNC on May 21, 2010.21 Respondents likewise averred that the
parties already agreed to schedule the signing of the said CBA on May 28, 2010. To
their dismay, however, no signing of the CBA took place. Instead, Atty. Sabino Jose M.
Padilla III (Atty. Padilla) appeared before the NCMB on behalf of GNC and requested for
10 days or until June 7, 2010 within which to submit GNC's Comment/Counter-Proposal
to the "Union[s'] CBA draft." Although disappointed that Atty. Padilla merely referred to
the supposed "final draft" of the parties as the "Union[s'] CBA draft," respondents
agreed to the period requested by GNC to give the latter time to go over it.
Respondents, however, manifested that they would want the parties to meet again on
June 1, 2010. Come the said date, no one appeared on behalf of GNC. Thus,
respondents filed on the same day a Notice of Strike 22 charging GNC with bad faith
bargaining, violation of its duty to bargain, gross violations of the provisions of the CBA,
and gross and blatant diminution of benefits. Subsequent to this, GNC allegedly stopped
the grant of certain benefits to its employees.

GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation meetings with the NCMB,
respondents submitted several CBA drafts for its consideration. Upon its receipt on May
21, 2010 of another draft CBA23 from respondents under cover letter dated May 20,
2010,24 it decided to secure the services of Atty. Padilla to assist it in its negotiations
with respondents. Hence, on May 28, 2010, Atty. Padilla appeared before the NCMB and
asked for 10 days to submit GNC's comment/counter-proposal to the purported draft
CBA of respondents. However, on June 1, 2010, respondents filed a notice of strike.

In view of the notice of strike, the NCMB called for a conciliation conference on June 4,
2010 which was later set for continuation on June 9, 2010. Meanwhile on June 7, 2010,
GNC filed with the NCMB its counter-proposal25  to respondents' purported final CBA
cralawred

draft.

Subsequently during the June 9, 2010 conference, GNC filed a Motion to Strike Out
Notice of Strike and to Refer Dispute to Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration
Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 26 It invoked the "no-strike, no lock-
out" clause and the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provision of the
parties' existing CBA which was carried over from their 1994-1999 CBA and the CBAs
subsequent thereto. According to it, the four grounds cited by respondents in their
notice of strike, i.e., bad faith bargaining, violation of the duty to bargain, gross
violation of the provisions of the CBA, and gross and blatant diminution of benefits, all
come within the definition of "grievance" under their CBA, hence, not strikeable.

In the afternoon of the same day, respondents conducted their respective Strike Votes
wherein majority voted in favor of a strike.27 They then informed the NCMB of the strike
vote results on June 21, 2010.28 chanrobleslaw

Since the NCMB had not yet acted upon GNC's Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and
to Refer Dispute to Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration Pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement despite the looming strike of respondents, GNC urged
the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. 29 It
specifically prayed in its letter of June 24, 2010 that the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, pursuant to Article 263(g)30 of the Labor Code "assume jurisdiction over
the labor dispute between GNC and the Unions, i.e., GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU[,] in
order to enjoin the intended strike x x x and thereafter direct the parties to submit the
dispute to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provisions of the CBA." 31 chanrobleslaw

In an Order32 dated June 28, 2010, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, after
finding the subject labor dispute as one affecting national interest, assumed jurisdiction
over the case; certified the same to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
for immediate compulsory arbitration; and, accordingly enjoined the intended strike.

Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

In their Position Paper,33 respondents recounted that GNC at the plant level had already
failed to reply or furnish them a timely counter-proposal. While GNC asked for three
weeks to submit its counter-proposal in the meeting of June 16, 2009, no such counter-
proposal was submitted. Instead, GNC opted to orally discuss with respondents the
terms of the CBA. Yet, after the conduct of a series of meetings/negotiations and at a
time when the parties had already substantially agreed on the terms of the new CBA,
respondents received from Atty. Sampang on December 21, 2009 GNC's counter-
proposal to respondents' purported "latest proposal." Respondents denied the existence
of any "latest proposal" which requires a "counter-proposal" from GNC. And even
assuming that said counterproposal is GNC's answer to the proposal they furnished it at
very outset, the same was already belatedly submitted not only because the period to
serve a reply/counter-proposal had long lapsed, but also since all matters were already
substantially agreed upon by the parties. This explains why at that point, respondents
were already following up the signing of the CBA.

The same goes true in the NCMB level. Respondents averred that the parties had
already come into agreement regarding the signing bonus after several
mediation/conciliation meetings held therein. But when they undertook to draft the CBA
containing the terms agreed upon by the parties and submitted the same to the NCMB,
Atty. Padilla suddenly entered the picture and submitted a counterproposal to what he
referred to as the "Union[s'] CBA draft" when in fact, the same was actually the parties'
final draft. Respondents thus argued that GNC clearly committed an unfair labor
practice by bad faith bargaining. In addition, respondents averred that GNC, without
notice, stopped the release of benefits to its employees.
For its part, GNC called attention to the fact that when it requested the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute, it also prayed that the
same be ordered submitted to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration
provided for under the parties' CBA. It stressed that its participation in the compulsory
arbitration proceeding should therefore not be construed as a waiver of its position that
jurisdiction over the dispute rests with the voluntary arbitrator in view of the parties'
agreement in the CBA, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, and of the Court's
ruling in University of San Agustin Employees' Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals.34 chanrobleslaw

As to the charge of unfair labor practice on account of its alleged bad faith bargaining
and violation of duty to bargain, GNC argued that the same is belied by the fact that
since the very beginning, the parties were negotiating. This continued during the
mediation and conciliation proceedings before the NCMB. And had not for respondents'
impatience which caused them to file a notice of strike, such negotiations would have
progressed. To GNC, respondents' move of filing a notice of strike was uncalled for and
was only intended to compel GNC to hastily concede to their proposals. What
respondents refused to see, however, was GNC's critical financial status that hindered it
from readily agreeing with their economic proposals.

GNC likewise denied the allegation that it stopped the release of benefits to its
employees. It explained that its Protégé Program 35 was only subjected to stricter
implementation guidelines but not stopped; that its employees received their uniforms;
and that it could not have stopped the grant of pilgrimage or excursion benefits since
no such benefit was provided for in their previous CBAs. What was actually provided
therein was the conduct of an annual retreat which was already held in December 2009
at the GNC campus; that as to rice subsidy, the same is granted on a best effort basis
and only when savings are generated; and that it had always endeavored to provide, to
the best of its ability, the rice subsidy benefits to its employees. In fact, rice subsidy
was last given in December 2009; and, that since the management was not generating
savings from its operations, no rice subsidy has been released thereafter. GNC asserted
that it had been explaining these to the respondents but the latter would just not listen.

The NLRC rendered a Decision36 on March 31,2011.

As to GNC's contention that jurisdiction over the dispute rests on the voluntary
arbitrator, the NLRC had this to say:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

GNC prays that [w]e dismiss the labor dispute for lack of jurisdiction and direct the
parties to resolve their differences through the grievance machinery provided for by
their CBA and eventually, resolve it under voluntary arbitration. They aver that x x x
the failure or refusal of the NCMB and thereafter, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to enforce the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration x x x
[allowed] the unions to circumvent the CBA and their agreement to resolve conflicts
through voluntary arbitration by the simple [expedient] of filing a notice of strike. We
completely disagree.

When GNC filed their petition for assumption of jurisdiction[,] they prayed that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"x x x. . .the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment, pursuant to Article 263 (g)
of the Labor Code, assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute between GNC and the
Unions, i.e. GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU[,] in order to enjoin the intended strike, or to
order the immediate return to work of strikers if a strike has taken place, and
thereafter direct the parties to submit to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration provisions of the CBA."

The June 28, 2010 Order of the Secretary granted the assumption of jurisdiction of the
labor dispute and certified the same to this Commission for compulsory arbitration. In
effect, the Order denied GNC's plea to submit the dispute to the parties' grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration. Article 263 (g) does not encompass referral of the
labor dispute in an industry imbibed with national interest to grievance machinery or
voluntary arbitration. In the absence of a timely reconsideration or proof that GNC had
exercised

available remedy in law, the Order now stands beyond reproach. In Union of Filipro
Employees v. NLRC x x x, the Supreme Court ruled: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"When sitting in a compulsory arbitration certified to by the Secretary of Labor, the

NLRC is not sitting as a judicial court but as an administrative body charged with the
duty to implement the order of the Secretary. Its function only is to formulate the
terms and conditions of the CBA and cannot go beyond the scope of the order.
Moreover, the Commission is further tasked to act within the earliest time possible and
with the end in view that its action would not only serve the interests of the parties
alone, but would also have favorable implications to the community and to the
economy as a whole. This is the clear intention of the legislative body in enacting Art.
263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 27 of RA 6175." x x x

Corollary thereto, as an implementing body, [o]ur authority does not include the power
to amend the Secretary's Order. To accede to a referral of the labor dispute to the
grievance machinery and ultimately to voluntary arbitration is equivalent to amending
said Order, x x x37

The NLRC thus upheld its jurisdiction over the case, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Secretary is explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly.
Inevitably, this authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute must include and
extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which
the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction x x x. It is the declared policy of this
Commission that in certified labor disputes for compulsory arbitration, We must ensure
and maintain industrial peace based on social justice and national interest by having a
full, complete and immediate settlement or adjudication of all labor disputes between
the parties, as well as issues that are relevant to or incidents of the certified issues.
Under Section 3, par. (b), Rule VIII of our 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

"(b) All cases between the same parties, except where the certification order specifies
otherwise, the issues submitted for arbitration which are already filed or may be filed,
and are relevant to or are proper incidents of the certified case, shall be considered
subsumed or absorbed by the certified case, and shall be decided by the appropriate
Division of the Commission.

Subject to the second paragraph of Section 4 of Rule IV, the parties to a certified case,
under pain of contempt, shall inform their counsels and the Division concerned of all
cases pending with the Regional Arbitration Branches and the Voluntary Arbitrators
relative or incident to the certified case before it."

Plaintly, [o]ur jurisdiction in this certified case extends to all other issues between the
parties so long as they are relevant and germane in the resolution of the main labor
dispute. Our rules, under pain of contempt, require consolidation of all cases pending
with [o]ur Regional Arbitration Branches or with any Voluntary Arbitrator and consider
them included or absorbed in the certified case to be able to completely and finally
settle it. The intention of the law is an immediate and complete resolution of a labor
dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest. In this certified case, We
are called to exercise [o]ur judgment and adjudicate the labor dispute in accordance
with the Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. This Commission will not
recuse from this responsibility for want of jurisdiction. 38

Anent the merits of the case, the NLRC held that based on the totality of conduct of
GNC, it was guilty of bad faith bargaining and therefore committed an unfair labor
practice. This was on account of GNC's submission of a counterproposal despite the
parties already having reached an agreement regarding the terms of the CBA. To the
NLRC, the belated submission of GNC's counterproposal was intended to evade the
execution of the CBA. With respect to GNC's alleged withdrawal of employees' benefits,
the NLRC ruled that pursuant to Article 253 of the Labor Code, the parties have the
duty to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of their existing agreement within 60 days prior to the expiration thereof
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. The NLRC, thus, held that GNC
failed to abide by this duty when it discontinued the release of benefits pending the
conclusion of a new CBA. Finally, pursuant to General Milling Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,39 the NLRC deemed it proper to declare the final draft submitted by
respondents to the NCMB as the parties' CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to May
31,2014.

The NLRC ultimately ruled as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEFORE, considering [o]ur foregoing disquisitions, [w]e find Guagua National Colleges
(GNC) to have committed an unfair labor practice by violating the statutory duty to
bargain collectively in good faith. We [o]rder that the final CBA draft submitted by the
unions to GNC and NCMB x x x be the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
parties for the period June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014 with the parties free to renegotiate
the economic provisions not later than May 31,2012 in accordance with Article 253-A of
the Labor Code. Lastly, We further [o]rder that the benefits agreed on by the parties as
of August 24, 2009 be given retroactive effect to June 1, 2009.
 
SO ORDERED.40

Since GNC's Motion for Reconsideration41 thereto was denied for lack of merit in the
NLRC Resolution42 dated May 25, 2011, it sought recourse from the CA through a
Petition for Certiorari.43 chanrobleslaw

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision44 dated September 26, 2012, the CA did not find any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of NLRC in issuing its assailed orders. Hence, it denied the
Petition for lack of merit. GNC filed a Motion for Reconsideration 45 thereto which,
however, was likewise denied in the Resolution 46 dated December 3, 2012.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS XXX COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND IRREVERSIBLE

ERROR WHEN, IN ITS DECISION DATED 26 SEPTEMBER 2012 AND RESOLUTION DATED
3 DECEMBER 2012, IT DISMISSED [GNC's] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION[,] RESPECTIVELY[,] FOR LACK OF MERIT, THEREBY
AFFIRMING THE DECISION DATED 31 MARCH 2011 AND RESOLUTION DATED 25 MAY
2011 OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION XXX 47

Essential to the determination of the issue raised is the resolution of the following:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 1. Whether the subject labor dispute should have been ordered submitted to
voluntary arbitration by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the
parties' CBA and not certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration;

2. Whether GNC is guilty of bad faith bargaining and thus violated its duty to
bargain;

3. Whether the final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB was correctly
declared to be the parties' CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014.

Our Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment

correctly certified the subject labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.

GNC asserts that it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction over the grounds
cited by respondents in their notice of strike in view of Section 17 of the parties' 1994-
1999 CBA. The said provision contains the agreement of the parties on a "no strike, no
lock-out" policy and on grievance resolution and voluntary arbitration which was carried
over to their subsequent CBAs up to the existing one. According to GNC, respondents
should not have filed a notice of strike in view of such "no-strike, no lock-out" clause
and also since respondents' grounds for strike are within the scope of "grievance" to be
resolved in accordance with the said Section 17. It argues that respondents, by the
simple expedient of filing a notice of strike, were able to circumvent the "no strike, no
lock-out" clause and the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provision of
their CBA.

Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no lock-out" policy and to
resolve their disputes through grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. Despite
these, respondents were justified in filing a notice of strike in light of the facts of this
case. It is settled that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the CBA "may [only] be
invoked by [an] employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is
conducted to force wage or other agreements from the employer that are not mandated
to be granted by law. It [is not applicable when the strike] is grounded on unfair labor
practice."48 Here, while respondents enumerated four grounds in their notice of strike,
the facts of the case reveal that what primarily impelled them to file said notice was
their perception of bad faith bargaining and violation of the duty to bargain collectively
by GNC - charges which constitute unfair labor practice under Article 248(g) of the
Labor Code.49 chanrobleslaw

To recall, respondents acted prudently when they filed a preventive mediation case the
first time that GNC refused to acknowledge at the plant level that the parties already
agreed on the terms of their incoming CBA. However, GNC again rebuffed that the
parties had already entered into an agreement when respondents submitted the
purported final CBA draft of the parties to the NCMB. Hence, respondents cannot be
faulted into believing that GNC was bargaining in bad faith and had no genuine
intention to comply with its duty to bargain collectively since it denied arriving at an
agreement with respondents not once but twice. This belief in good faith prompted
them to file a notice of strike. Clearly, respondents' intention was to protest what they
perceived to be acts of unfair labor practice on the part of GNC through the exercise of
their right to strike enshrined in the Constitution and not to circumvent the "no strike,
no lock-out" clause and the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provision of
the CBA.

GNC relies heavily on University of San Agustin50 According to it, the facts therein are
similar if not identical to the facts of the present case. Hence, the Court's ruling in the
said case squarely applies here.

In University of San Agustin, the University of San Agustin (the University) and the
University of San Agustin Employees' Union (Union) entered into a five-year CBA in
2000. Complementary to the economic provisions of the said CBA is Section 3, Article 8
thereof which provides for salary increases for school years 2000-2003. Such salary
increases shall take the form of either lump sum or a percentage of the tuition
incremental proceeds (TIP). Moreover and just like in the present case, the parties' CBA
therein contained a "no strike, no lock-out" clause, a grievance machinery procedure,
and a voluntary arbitration mechanism.

When the parties were renegotiating the economic provisions of their CBA, they could
not agree on the manner of computing the TIP. In view of this impasse, the Union
declared a bargaining deadlock. When the Union filed a Notice of Strike before the
NCMB, the University opposed the same by filing a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike
and to Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration invoking the "no strike, no lock-out"
clause of their CBA. The NCMB, however, failed to resolve the said motion. The parties
then jointly requested the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute. When the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction, it
proceeded to hear and decide on the dispute. Eventually, a Decision was rendered
wherein the economic issues over which the parties had a deadlock in the collective
bargaining were resolved, among others.

The CA, on certiorari petition, found merit in the University's argument that the
Secretary of Labor abused his/her discretion in resolving the economic issues on the
ground that the same were proper subject of the grievance machinery as embodied in
the parties' CBA. Accordingly, the said court directed the parties to submit the
economic issues to voluntary arbitration.

This Court affirmed the CA's ruling based on the following ratiocinations:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We xxx find logic in the CA's directive for the herein parties to proceed with voluntary
arbitration as provided in their CBA. As we see it, the issue as to the economic benefits,
which included the issue on the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees, is
one that arises from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA. To be sure, the
parties' CBA provides for a grievance machinery to resolve any 'complaint or
dissatisfaction arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and those
arising from the interpretation of enforcement of company personnel policies.'
Moreover, the same CBA provides that should the grievance machinery fail to resolve
the grievance or dispute, the same shall be 'referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator for
arbitration and final resolution.' However, through no fault of the University these
processes were not exhausted. It must be recalled that while undergoing preventive
mediation proceedings before the NCMB, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock,
filed a notice of strike and thereafter, went on strike. The University filed a  Motion to
Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration but the
motion was not acted upon by the NCMB. As borne by the records, the University has
been consistent in its position that the Union must exhaust the grievance machinery
provisions of the CBA which ends in voluntary arbitration.

The University's stance is consistent with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code, as
amended which respectively provide[s]: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrators. - The

Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation
or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the
immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a collective bargaining
agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the collective bargaining
agreement. For purposes of this Article, gross violations of a collective bargaining
agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of
Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance
machinery or voluntary arbitration provided in the collective bargaining agreement.

Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all
other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

The grievance machinery and no strike, no lockout provisions of the CBA forged by the
University and the Union are founded on Articles 261 and 262 quoted above. The
parties agreed that practically all disputes - including bargaining deadlocks - shall be
referred to the grievance machinery which ends in voluntary arbitration. Moreover, no
strike or no lockout shall ensue while the matter is being resolved.

The University filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute to
Voluntary Arbitration precisely to call the attention of the NCMB and the Union to the
fact that the CBA provides for a grievance machinery and the parties' obligation to
exhaust and honor said mechanism. Accordingly, the NCMB should have directed Hie
Union to honor its agreement with the University to exhaust administrative grievance
measures and bring the alleged deadlock to voluntary arbitration. Unfortunately, the
NCMB did not resolve the University's motion thus paving the way for the strike on
September 19, 2003 and the deliberate circumvention of the CBA's grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration provisions.

As we see it, the failure or refusal of the NCMB and thereafter the [Secretary of Labor
and Employment] to recognize, honor and enforce the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration provisions of the parties' CBA unwittingly rendered said provisions,
as well as Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code, useless and inoperative. As here, a
union can easily circumvent the grievance machinery and previous agreement to
resolve differences or conflicts through voluntary arbitration through the simple
expedient of filing a notice of strike. On the other hand, management can avoid the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provisions of its CBA by simply filing a
notice of lockout.51

It must be noted that under the facts of University of San Agustin, the dispute between
the parties primarily involved the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees
- one which clearly arose from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA.
Pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code,52 such a grievance falls under the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
Even if otherwise, the dispute would still fall under the said jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 26253 of the same Code since the parties agreed in their CBA that practically all
disputes, including bargaining deadlock, shall be referred to grievance machinery that
ends in voluntary arbitration.
It can safely be concluded, therefore, that the clear showing of the voluntary
arbitrator's jurisdiction over the parties' dispute in University of San Agustin is the
underlying reason why the Court upheld the CA's directive for the parties to proceed to
voluntary arbitration in accordance with their CBA. After all, it is the declared policy of
the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of voluntary arbitration as a mode of
settling labor or industrial disputes.54
chanrobleslaw

Contrary to GNC's contention, however, there is a marked difference between the facts
of University of San Agustin  and of the present case which makes the ruling in the
former inapplicable to the latter. Unlike in University of San Agustin, the main cause of
the dispute between the parties in this case, i.e., GNC's alleged commission of unfair
labor practice, did not arise from the interpretation or implementation of the parties'
CBA, or neither from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Hence, it does not fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators under the aforementioned Article 261. Be
that as it may, GNC argues that since the grounds cited by respondents in their notice
of strike come within the scope of "grievance" under the grievance resolution and
voluntary arbitration provision of the parties' CBA, the same is cognizable by the
voluntary arbitrator. Otherwise stated, since the parties allegedly agreed to submit a
dispute of this kind to their CBA's grievance resolution procedure which ends in
voluntary arbitration, it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction in view of
Article 262 of the Labor Code.

The grievance resolution and arbitration provision of the parties' CBA provides in
part, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

17. Grievance Machinery

The parties hereto agree on the principle that all disputes between labor and
management may be settled through friendly negotiations, that the parties have the
same interest in the continuity of work until all matters in dispute shall have been
discussed and settled in a manner to the mutual benefit of the parties herein, that an
open conflict in any form involves losses to the parties, hence, all efforts must be
exerted to avoid such an open conflict. In the furtherance of the foregoing principle, the
parties agree to establish a procedure for the adjustment of any grievance to provide
the widest opportunity for discussion of any dispute, request or complaint and establish
the procedure for the processing and settlement of grievances.

A grievance is defined as any protest, misunderstanding or difference of opinion or

dispute affecting the COLLEGE and the UNION or affecting any employee covered by
this Agreement with respect to:

1. Meaning, interpretation, implementation or violation of any of the

provisions of this Agreement;
2. Any matter directly relating or affecting the terms and conditions of
employment including all personnel policies;
3. Dismissal, suspension and/or any other disciplinary action;
4. Any other matter or dispute which may arise and is not settled by means
other than the grievance machinery.

x x x x55

Plainly, a charge of unfair labor practice does not fall under the first three definition of
grievance as above-quoted. Neither can it be considered as embraced by the fourth
which at first blush, appears to be a "catch-all" definition of grievance because of the
phrase "[a]ny other matter or dispute". It has been held that while the phrase "all other
labor dispute" or its variant "any other matter or dispute" may include unfair labor
practices, it is imperative, however, that the agreement between the union and the
company states in unequivocal language that the parties conform to the submission of
unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration. 56 It is not sufficient to merely say that
parties to the CBA agree on principle that "all disputes" or as in this case, "any other
matter or dispute", should be submitted to the grievance machinery and eventually to
the voluntary arbitrator. There is a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that
unfair labor practices should be resolved in the ultimate by the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators since the same fall within a special class of disputes that
are generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter by express
provision of the law.57 "Absent such express stipulation, the phrase 'all disputes' [or
"any other matter or dispute" for that matter] should be construed as limited to the
areas of conflict traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, i.e.,
disputes relating to contract-interpretation, contract-implementation, or interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies. [Unfair labor practices cases] - not
falling within any of these categories - should then be considered as a special area of
interest governed by a specific provision of law." 58 chanrobleslaw

In trie absence here of an express stipulation in the CBA that GNC and respondents
agreed to submit cases of unfair labor practice to their grievance machinery and
eventually to voluntary arbitration, jurisdiction over the parties' dispute does not vest
upon the voluntary arbitrator. The reason behind the ruling in University of San
Agustin is therefore not attendant in this case and so does not find any application
here. As it stands, the parties' dispute which centers on the charge of unfair labor
practice is the proper subject of compulsory arbitration. In fact, GNC itself
acknowledged in its June 24, 2010 letter to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
that a charge of unfair labor practice in a notice of strike is ordinarily certified for
compulsary arbitration.59 chanrobleslaw

GNC further avers that under the parties' CBA, there are only two instances where
compulsory arbitration may be resorted to, to wit: (1) at the grievance machinery level,
if respondents are not satisfied with GNC's decision on a grievance; and, (2) at the
voluntary arbitration level, when the parties cannot agree on the third member of the
Arbitration Committee. GNC thus contends that submission of the parties' dispute to
compulsory arbitration is but another violation of their agreement embodied in the CBA.

The argument is specious.

As expounded by both the NLRC and the CA, the Secretary of Labor and Employment's
certification for compulsory arbitration of a dispute over which he/she has assumed
jurisdiction is but an exercise of the powers granted to him/her by Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code as amended. "[These] powers x x x have been characterized as an exercise
of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the
Secretary exercises these powers, he[/she] is granted 'great breadth of discretion' to
find a solution to a labor dispute." 60 The Court therefore cannot subscribe to GNC's
contention since to say that compulsory arbitration may only be resorted to in instances
agreed upon by the parties would limit the power of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to certify cases that are proper subject of compulsory arbitration. The
great breadth of discretion granted to the Secretary of Labor and Employment for
him/her to find an immediate solution to a labor dispute would unnecessarily be
diminished if such would be the case.

In view of the above discourse, the Court finds that the Secretary of Labor and
Employment correctly certified the parties' dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.

GNC engaged in bad faith bargaining

and thus violated its duty to bargain.

GNC insists that it is not guilty of bad faith bargaining nor did it commit any violation of
its duty to bargain by pointing out that it consistently engaged in negotiations with the
respondents both at the plant and NCMB levels. It underscores that following its
submission of a counter-proposal to the NCMB, it even manifested that it was willing to
negotiate on a marathon basis. This negates any ill will, bad faith, fraud or conduct
oppressive to labor on its part. In any case, there is no truth to respondents' assertion
that the parties have already reached an agreement when GNC submitted a counter-
proposal. Hence, it cannot be said that GNC engaged in dilatory tactics to avoid the
signing of the CBA since there was yet no final agreement to speak of. GNC likewise
justifies its submission of counter-proposal asserting that the same was necessary in
view of the chronic financial situation of GNC, the need to conclude a separate CBA for
GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU, and in order to introduce thereon improved provisions for the
mutual benefit of the parties.

The duty to bargain collectively is defined under Article 252 of the Labor Code to, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain

collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement
with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreements and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by
either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make
any agreement. (Emphasis supplied)

"It has been held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory
duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case. There is
no per se  test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be
drawn from the facts."61 "The effect of an employer's or a union's actions individually is
not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions,
considered as a whole x x x"62 chanrobleslaw

Here, the collective conduct of GNC is indicative of its failure to meet its duty to bargain
in good faith. Badges of bad faith attended its actuations both at the plant and NCMB
levels.

At the plant level, GNC failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of serving a
reply/counter-proposal within 10 calendar days from receipt of a proposal, 63 a fact
which by itself is already an indication of lack of genuine interest to bargain. 64 Then, it
led respondents to believe that it was doing away with the reply/counter-proposal when
it proceeded to just orally discuss the economic terms. After a series of negotiation
meetings, the parties finally agreed on the economic terms which based on the records
was the only contentious issue between them. In fact, in their meeting of August 24,
2009, Rodriguez, in her capacity as member of the management panel, already
announced the included under the CBA for 2009-2014.65 She then stated that the
signing thereof would be underway. In the days that followed, however, GNC ignored
the follow-ups made by respondents regarding the signing. It then suddenly capitalized
on the fact that it had not yet submitted a reply/counter-proposal and thereupon served
one upon respondents despite the parties already having reached an agreement.

It could not be any clearer from the above circumstances that GNC has no genuine
intention to comply with its duty to bargain. It merely went through the motions of
negotiations and then entered into an agreement with respondents which turned out to
be an empty one since it later denounced the same by submitting a reply/counter-
proposal. Worse, when respondents tried to clear out matters with the GNC President
through their letter of January 8, 2010, GNC did not even bother to respond.

To persuade the Court that no agreement has yet been reached by the parties, GNC
refers to the minutes of the October 9, 2009 meeting indicating that the economic
benefits were still to be discussed with the President of GNC. GNC takes this to mean
that the economic benefits were at that time still subject to the approval of the GNC
President and, hence, not yet final. The Court, however, notes that GNC conveniently
disregarded not only the previous minutes of the parties' meetings but also the other
significant portions of the October 9, 2009 minutes it alluded to. The minutes of the
meeting held on August 24, 2009 clearly shows that Rodriguez categorically announced
and enumerated all the benefits "given by the school in the CBA 2009-2014." 66 Plainly,
this means that the announced benefits were already approved by GNC. On the other
hand, the minutes of the meeting on October 09, 2009 states in full:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

III. [Ms. Rodriguez] cited all the benefits of the permanent faculty and covered
employees granted in the previous CBAs.

She requested to [sum] up all these benefits and privileges including the [additional
benefits] acquired on this present CBA [which shall] be discussed with the President, so
next time we will be on the signing.67 (Emphasis supplied)

Nowhere from the afore-quoted minutes of the meeting can it be deduced that the
terms of the CBA is still subject to the approval of the GNC President. There is no clear
showing that the purpose of discussing the economic benefits with him is to secure his
approval thereto. If at all, the purported discussion appears to be a mere formality
since the signing of the CBA was not made dependent to the result of the discussion
with him. As can be seen, the statement that "next time they will be on the signing" is
clearly unqualified. Indubitably, indications lead to the conclusion that the parties
already agreed on the terms of the CBA and it was only the execution thereof that
needs to be done.
Anent GNC's claim that it was suffering from financial difficulties which according to it
was one of the reasons why it saw the need to submit a counterproposal, suffice it to
say that GNC should have squarely raised this early on in the negotiations, After all, the
employer's duty to negotiate in good faith with its employees consists of matching the
latter's proposals, if unacceptable, with counter-proposals, and of making every
reasonable effort to reach an agreement. 68 There must be common willingness among
the parties to discuss freely and fully their respective claims and demands and, when
these are opposed, to justify them on reason. 69 However, instead of laying all its card
on the table, GNC for reasons only known to it, chose to forego the opportunity of
discussing its claimed financial predicament with respondents as shown by the
following: (1) GNC did not submit a reply/counter-proposal within 10 calendar days
from its receipt of respondents' proposed CBA on April 3, 2009 as required by law; (2)
while it later manifested through a letter dated May 27, 2009 that it is not inclined to
grant the economic provisions in respondents' proposal, it did not fully discuss or
explain to respondents its claimed opposition; (3) Atty. Sampang did not make good on
the promise he made in the meeting of June 16, 2009 that GNC would submit its
counter-proposal to respondents' economic provisions with the corresponding
explanation;70 and, (4) as shown by the minutes of the meetings, the members of the
management panel simply made general statements that GNC was having financial
difficulties but failed to elaborate on the same. As it is, GNC allowed itself to go through
the process of negotiating with respondents without fully discussing its financial status
and despite this, knowingly entered into an agreement with them. It cannot, therefore,
be allowed to later interpose an opposition to the terms of the CBA based on financial
incapacity by belatedly submitting a counter-proposal, which from the circumstances, is
an obvious attempt to stall what would have been the last step of the process - the
execution of the CBA. The Court cannot be expected to affix its imprimatur to such a
dubious maneuver.71 chanrobleslaw

With respect to GNC's assertion that its submission of a counter-proposal was also
impelled by the need to conclude a separate CBA for GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU and to
improve certain provisions, records reveal that during the negotiations at the plant
level, GNC did not at all entertain this idea. This explains why the matter was not
brought to fore during the negotiations therein. The idea was only introduced to GNC by
Atty. Padilla when the former asked him to evaluate the final draft of the CBA submitted
by respondents to the NCMB. Eventually, the same was used as a ground for GNC's
opposition to the said final draft as contained in the counter-proposal that GNC
submitted to the NCMB. The matter, however, loses its significance in the light of the
Court's succeeding discussion as to the inopportune submission of the said counter-
proposal.

The over-all conduct of GNC at the plant level, without a doubt, illustrates bad faith
bargaining. And as already stated, this display of bad faith continued evenattheNCMB.

True, GNC participated in the conciliation meetings in the NCMB. In fact, the minutes of
the proceedings would show that the parties were able to settle certain matters about
the signing bonus.72 Further, during the April 15, 2010 conciliation/meeting, it was
agreed that respondents will come up with the "final draft" of the parties to be
submitted to the NCMB and copy furnished GNC. 73 Respondents complied with the said
undertaking such that the minutes of the May 14, 2010 conciliation/meeting reveals
that the only thing left for the parties to do was to go over the details of the final draft
of the CBA for fine-tuning. 74 chanrobleslaw

However, GNC again engaged itself in the scheme of denying that the parties have
already reached an agreement. It denies that the draft submitted by the respondents to
the NCMB was the parties' final draft. It instead asserts that the document was merely
respondents' draft which was still subject to GNC's consideration. The Court, however,
finds no merit in this assertion since as shown above, the minutes of the proceedings
before the NCMB reveal otherwise.

As proof of its claimed faithful intention to comply with its duty to bargain, GNC asserts
that it even manifested before the NCMB that it was willing to negotiate on a marathon
basis following its submission of a counter-proposal. Suffice it to say, however, that
such manifestation, as well as the said counterproposal, already came too late in the
day since at that point there already exists a "final draft" submitted by the respondents
in accordance with the understanding reached by the parties in the
conciliation/meetings conducted by the NCMB.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that GNC engaged in bad faith bargaining and
by the same violated its duty to bargain collectively as mandated by law.

Before turning to. the next issue, however, the Court finds proper to pass upon the
matter of GNC's unilateral withdrawal of employee's benefits as found by the NLRC.
GNC laments that while it squarely raised this matter before the CA, the said court
ignored the same.

Guided by the basic rule that he who alleges must prove, 75 the Court finds that
respondents failed to substantiate its claim that GNC unilaterally stopped the release of
certain benefits to its employees. All that respondents advanced were bare allegations
without any proof. On the other hand, GNC was able to show that benefits such as
clothing benefit76 and annual retreat were already extended to its employees. The
protege benefit, although subjected to stricter implementation guidelines, was likewise
still in efifect.77 And while rice assistance was last given in December 2009, the grant of
the same was shown to be on a best effort basis. Notably, respondents were not able to
refute GNC's explanation. Thus, the Court finds the charge of unilateral withdrawal of
benefits against GNC without basis. Be that as it may, let it be made clear that this
does not have any effect and therefore does not change the finding that GNC
committed a violation of its duty to bargain as extensively discussed above.

The final CBA draft submitted by

respondents to the NCMB was correctly
imposed by the NLRC as the parties'
CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to
May 31, 2014.

In the cases of Kiok Lay,79Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment80, and General Milling Corporation,81 the Court unilaterally imposed upon
the employers the CBAs proposed by the unions after the employers were found to
have violated their duty to bargain collectively. This is on the premise that the said
employers, by their acts which bespeak of insincerity, had lost their statutory right to
negotiate or renegotiate the terms and conditions contained in the unions' proposed
CBAs.
Here, the Court finds nothing wrong in the pronouncement of the NLRC that the final
CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB should serve as the parties' CBA for
the period June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014. More than the fact that GNC is the erring
party in this case, records show that the said draft is actually the final CBA draft of the
parties which incorporates their agreements. Indeed and as held by the NLRC, fairness,
equity and social justice are best served if the said final CBA draft shall govern their
industrial relationship.

All told, the Court finds that the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and denied
GNC's Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September

26,2012 and Resolution dated December 3,2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 120669 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion,  and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J.,  on official leave.

Endnotes:

1
 CA rollo, pp. 683-709; penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and
concurred in by Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Angelita A. Gacutan.

2
 Id. at 741.

3
 Records, pp. 76-88.

4
 Id. at 91.

5
 Id. at 92-95.

6
 Id. at 96-97.
7
 Id. at 98-102.

8
 This is in view of the following clauses in the parties' subsequent CBAs, to wit: (1) In
the CBA for 1999- 2004, "[Terms of the previous CBA-June 1, 1994-May 31, 1999
which were not touched or covered by die current CBA - 1999-2004 is still honored and
become part and parcel of the latter," id. at 94; and, (2) In the CBA for 2004-2009,
"Matters contained in the previous CBA, which were not touched or covered by the
current CBA are still honored and become part and parcel of the latter," id. at 102.

9
 Id. at 103.

10
 Id. at 104-106.

11
 Id. at 103.

12
 Id. at 107.

13
 Id. at 108.

14
 Id. at 109.

15
 Position Paper for Guagua National Colleges, id. at 140-160.

16
 [Respondents'] Position Paper, id. at 49-74.

17
 Id. at 112.

18
 Id. at 113-119.

19
 Id. at 121-123.

20
  Id. at 124-125.
21
 [Respondents'] Position Paper, id. at 49-74 at 64.

22
 Id. at 169-170.

23
 Id. at 208-224.

24
 Id. at 207.

25
cralawred  Id. at 227-223.

26
 Id. at 11-16.

27
 Id. at 8-10.

28
 Id. at 6-7.

29
 Id. at 167-168.

30
 Article. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts.

xxxx

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or
lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken
place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees
shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek
the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as
well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
In line with the national concern for and the highest respect accorded to the right of
patients to life and health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar medical
institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all serious efforts, not only
by labor and management but government as well, be exhausted to substantially
minimize, if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and health, through the
exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and by management to
lockout. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals,
clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out
employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other
health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted,
as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of
its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout.
In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately
assume, within twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a
strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to
comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary
action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out
employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal
prosecution against either or both of them.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded
from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national
interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such
labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

31
 Records, p. 168.

32
 Id. at 35-38.

33
 Id. at 49-74.
34
 520 Phil. 400 (2006).

35
 Otherwise known as Child or Dependent Scholarship Privilege.

36
 Id. at 319-343; penned by Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro and concurred in
by Presiding Commissioner Benedicto R. Palacol and Commissioner Isabel G.
Panganiban-Ortiguerra.

37
 Id. at 332-334; italics and underscoring in the original; citations omitted.

38
 Id. at 330-332; italics and underscoring in the original.

39
 467 Phil. 125 (2004).

40
 Records, pp. 342-343.

41
 Id. at 345-360.

42
 Id. at 374-376.

43
 CA rollo, pp. 3-50.

44
 Id. at 683-709.

45
 Id. at 711-727.

46
 Id. at 741.

47
Rollo, p. 22.

48
  A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation, 612 Phil. 1093,
1103 (2009).

49
 ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be unlawful for an employer
to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
xxxx
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
xxxx

50
 Supra note 34.

51
 Id. at 413-415; citations omitted.

52
 Article. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.  -
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred
to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be
treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement; For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement.
xxxx

53
 Article. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel
of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all
other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

54
 Sec. 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution; Article 211 of the Labor Code.

55
 Records, p. 83.

56
Vivero v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 158,169 (2000), citing San Miguel Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 325 Phil 401 (1996).

Art. 217 of the Labor Code provides in part:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide x x x the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (1) Unfair labor practices cases;

xxxx

58
Vivero v. Court of Appeals, supra note 56 at 170.

59
 Records, p. 168. GNC stated, viz.: "Finally, although there is a charge of unfair labor
practice in the Unions' Notice of Strike, which matter should ordinarily be certified
for compulsory arbitration, the records will indubitably show - apart from the
baselessness of the charge - that the proximate cause of the labor dispute is the
parties['] differences in collective bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)

60
Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. SCP Employees Union-National Federation of
Labor Unions, 574 Phil. 716, 732 (2008).

61
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 346 Phil. 524, 534 (1997).

62
 Id

63
 Article 250 of the Labor Code provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Article 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be

observed in collective bargaining:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice;
xxxx

64
General Milling Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39 at 135.

65
 See Minutes of the Meeting, records, p. 312

66
 Id.

67
 Id. at 313.

68
  Herald Delivery Carriers Union v. Herald Publication, Inc., 154 Phil. 662, 669 (1974)

69
 Id.

70
 Records, p. 307.

71
Kiok Loy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 225 Phil. 138, 146(1986).

72
 Minutes dated March 29,2010, CA rollo, p. 358.

73
 Minutes dated April 15,2010, id. at 359,

74
 Minutes dated May 14,2010, id at 361.

75
Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank, 724 Phil. 453,454 (2014).

76
 Records, pp. 244-245.

77
 Id. at 242-243.

78
 Id. at 250.

79
 Supra note 71.
80
 G.R. No. 91915, September 11, 1992, 213 SCRA 759.

81
 Supra note 39.

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July-2016 Jurisprudence                 

 G.R. No. 210878, July 07, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
JONALYN ABENES Y PASCUA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 202015, July 13, 2016 - ANTONIO VALEROSO AND ALLAN LEGATONA,
Petitioners, v. SKYCABLE CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 204620, July 11, 2016 - ROWENA A. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. INTEGRATED
PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. AND KATHERYN TANTIANSU, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 204750, July 11, 2016 - SUSAN D. CAPILI, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 205753, July 04, 2016 - ROSA PAMARAN, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS,
THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVE, ROSEMARY P. BERNABE, Petitioners, v. BANK OF
COMMERCE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 200042, July 07, 2016 - FELIZARDO T. GUNTALILIB, Petitioner, v. AURELIO
Y. DELA CRUZ AND SALOME V. DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016 - GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION),
Respondents.; G.R. No. 220953 - BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIRST DIVISION), Respondent.
 G.R. No. 205951, July 04, 2016 - UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 213660, July 05, 2016 - DR. WENIFREDO T. OÑATE, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
 A.M. No. P-14-3213 [Formerly A.M. No. 12-5-91-RTC], July 12, 2016 - ACCREDITED
LOCAL PUBLISHERS: THE WEEKLY ILOCANDIA INQUIRER, THE NORLUZONIAN
COURIER, THE AMIANAN TRIBUNE, THE WEEKLY CITY BULLETIN, THE NORTHERN
STAR, THE WEEKLY BANAT, THE NORTH LUZON HEADLINE, THE REGIONAL DIARYO,
AND HIGH PLAINS JOURNAL ILOCANDIA, Complainants, v. SAMUEL L. DEL ROSARIO,
CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 33, BAUANG, LA UNION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 193584, July 12, 2016 - HAMBRE J. MOHAMMAD, Petitioner, v. GRACE
BELGADO-SAQUETON, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR IV, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. XVI, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 212206, July 04, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
GABBY CONCEPCION Y NIMENDA AND TOTO MORALES, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 213847, July 12, 2016 - JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 213568, July 05, 2016 - ALICIA P. LOGARTA, Petitioner, v. CATALINO M.
MANGAHIS, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 209264, July 05, 2016 - DAMASO T. AMBRAY AND CEFERINO T. AMBRAY,
JR., Petitioners, v. SYLVIA A. TSOUROUS, CARMENCITA AMBRAY-LAUREL, HEDY
AMBRAY-AZORES, VIVIEN AMBRAY-YATCO, NANCY AMBRAY-ESCUDERO, MARISTELA
AMBRAY-ILAGAN, ELIZABETH AMBRAY-SORIANO, MA. LUISA FE AMBRAY-ARCILLA, AND
CRISTINA AMBRAY-LABIT, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 208353, July 04, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
STEVE SIATON Y BATE, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 212337, July 04, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
BELTRAN FUENTES, JR. Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 220978, July 05, 2016 - CENTURY PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner, v. EDWIN
J. BABIANO AND EMMA B. CONCEPCION, Respondents.
  G.R. No. 203179, July 04, 2016 - TECHNO DEVELOPMENT & CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. VIKING METAL INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 205728, July 05, 2016 - THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY
THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA AND THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION
OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 204693, July 13, 2016 - GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, Petitioner, v.
GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR UNION AND GUAGUA NATIONAL
COLLEGES NON-TEACHING AND MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 213279, July 11, 2016 - C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., BLUE
OCEAN SHIP MANAGEMENT, LTD., AND/OR WILLIAM S. MALALUAN, Petitioners, v.
WILLIAM C. ALIVIO, Respondent.
 A.M. No. MTJ-16-1869, July 27, 2016 - MARIE CHRISTINE D. BANCIL, Complainant,
v. HONORABLE RONALDO B. REYES, PRESIDING JUDGE OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF SAN JUAN CITY, BRANCH 58, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 220449, July 04, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RUSGIE
GARRUCHO Y SERRANO, Appellant.
 A.C. No. 10631, July 27, 2016 - ERNESTO B. BALBURIAS, Complainant, v. ATTY.
AMOR MIA J. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 208264, July 27, 2016 - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. RICO
C. MANALASTAS, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 206649, July 20, 2016 - FOREST HELLS GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY RAINIER L. MADRID, IN A DERIVATIVE CAPACITY AS SHAREHOLDER
AND CLUB MEMBER, Petitioner, v. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., AND FIL-ESTATE
GOLF DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 203657, July 11, 2016 - AILEEN ANGELA S. ALFORNON, Petitioner, v.
RODULFO DELOS SANTOS AND EDSEL A. GALEOS, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 206690, July 11, 2016 - BARRIO FIESTA RESTAURANT, LIBERTY ILAGAN,
SUNSHINE ONGPAUCO-IKEDA AND MARICO CRISTOBAL, Petitioners, v. HELEN C.
BERONIA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 189878, July 11, 2016 - WILSON FENIX, REZ CORTEZ AND ANGELITO
SANTIAGO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
  G.R. No. 181375, July 13, 2016 - PHIL-NIPPON KYOEI, CORP., Petitioner, v.
ROSALIA T. GUDELOSAO, ON HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN
CHRISTY MAE T. GUDELOSAO AND ROSE ELDEN T. GUDELOSAO, CARMEN
TANCONTIAN, ON HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN CAMELA B.
TANCONTIAN, BEVERLY B. TANCONTIAN, AND ACE B. TANCONTIAN, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 208086, July 27, 2016 - FLORENCIO MORALES, JR., Petitioner, v.
OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, ATTY. AGNES VST DEVANADERA, ATTY.
MIGUEL NOEL T. OCAMPO, ATTY. JOYCE MARTINEZ-BARUT, ATTY. ALLAN S. HILBERO,
AND ATTY. EDIZER J. RESURRECION, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 215192, July 27, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.
BERNABE M. BARTOLINI, Appellant.
 G.R. No. 204873, July 27, 2016 - ESTHER PASCUAL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 204899, July 27, 2016 - HEIRS OF BABAI GUIAMBANGAN, NAMELY, KALIPA
B. GUIAMBANGAN, SAYA GUIAMBANGAN DARUS, NENENG P. GUIAMBANGAN, AND
EDGAR P. GUIAMBANGAN, Petitioners, v. MUNICIPALITY OF KALAMANSIG, SULTAN
KUDARAT, REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR ROLANDO P. GARCIA, MEMBERS OF ITS
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN, AND ITS MUNICIPAL TREASURER, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 205010, July 18, 2016 - PETRON GASUL LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION AND
TOTALGAZ LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioners, v. ELENA LAO, IMELDA LAO,
POMPIDOU GOLANGCO, JEREMY WILSON GOLANGCO, CARMEN CASTILLO, AND/OR
OCCUPANTS OF BAGUIO GAS CORPORATION, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 180060, July 13, 2016 - SPOUSES AUGUSTO AND NORA NAVARRO,
Petitioners, v. RURAL BANK OF TARLAC, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 194121, July 11, 2016 - TORRES-MADRID BROKERAGE, INC., Petitioner, v.
FEB MITSUI MARINE INSURANCE CO., INC. AND BENJAMIN P. MANALASTAS, DOING
BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF BMT TRUCKING SERVICES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 200352, July 20, 2016 - MARY JUNE CELIZ, Petitioner, v. CORD
CHEMICALS, INC., LEONOR G. SANZ, AND MARIAN ONTANGCO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 210715, July 18, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RUSTICO YGOT Y REPUELA, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 221636, July 11, 2016 - LAND BANK PHILIPPINES, OF THE Petitioner, v.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MANUEL BOLAÑOS, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 189312, July 28, 2016 - FE B. SAGUINSIN, Petitioner, v. AGAPITO LIBAN,
CESARIO LIBAN, EDDIE TANGUILAN, PACENCIA MACANANG, ISIDRO NATIVIDAD,
TIMMY SIBBALUCA AND ISIDRO SIBBALUCA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 201436, July 11, 2016 - SPOUSES MAMERTO AND ADELIA* TIMADO,
Petitioners, v. RURAL BANK OF SAN JOSE, INC., TEDDY MONASTERIO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ITS PRESIDENT/MANAGER, AND ATTY. AVELINO SALES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 198925, July 13, 2016 - SPOUSES ARCHIBAL LATOJA AND CHARITO
LATOJA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE ELVIE LIM, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 1,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BORONGAN, EASTERN SAMAR, ATTY. JESUS APELADO,
REGISTER OF DEEDS, BORONGAN, EASTERN SAMAR, ALVARO CAPITO, AS SHERIFF,
BRANCH 2, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BORONGAN, EASTERN SAMAR, AND TERESITA
CABE, REPRESENTED BY ADELINA ZAMORA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 195641, July 11, 2016 - TARCISIO S. CALILUNG, Petitioner, v.
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RP TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., RENATO L.
PUNZALAN AND JOSE MANALO, JR., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 212346, July 07, 2016 - RICHARD V. FUNK, Petitioner, v. SANTOS
VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., FEDERICO O. ESCALER, JOSE M. ZARAGOZA,
DOMINGO L. MAPA, ERNESTO C. PEREZ AND ARISTON ESTRADA, SR., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 195147, July 11, 2016 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
 G. R. No. 188283, July 20, 2016 - CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., Petitioner, v.
SPOUSES ARNULFO AND EVELYN FUENTEBELLA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 219627, July 04, 2016 - NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES POWER CORPORATION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 187400, July 13, 2016 - FELICISIMO FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES DANILO AND
GENEROSA VITUG- LIGON, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ISAAC AND CONCEPCION RONULO
Respondents.
 A.C. No. 11078, July 19, 2016 - VERLITA V. MERCULLO AND RAYMOND VEDANO,
Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 211028, July 13, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
JONATHAN ARCILLO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 191442, July 27, 2016 - THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALFONSO LISTA, IFUGAO,
REPRESENTED BY CHARLES L. CATTILING, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL MAYOR
AND ESTRELLA S. ALIGUYON, IN HER CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL TREASURER, Petitioner,
 v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL FORMER SIXTH DIVISION AND SN ABOITIZ
POWER-MAGAT, INC.., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 206927, July 13, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
DARIUS RENIEDO Y CAUILAN, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016 - LUZ S. ALMEDA, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 G.R. Nos. 205963-64, July 07, 2016 - AMANDO A. INOCENTES, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. ROLAND B. JURADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
CHAIRPERSON, SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, HON. CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, AS COMPLAINANT; AND HON. FRANCIS
H. JARDELEZA, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), IN ITS CAPACITY AS
COUNSEL FOR THE PEOPLE, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 205839, July 07, 2016 - LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
NARCISO L. KHO, Respondent.; G.R. No. 205840 - MA. LORENA FLORES AND
ALEXANDER CRUZ, Petitioners, v. NARCISO L. KHO, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 206888, July 04, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.
MARITESS CAYAS Y CALITIS @ "TETET", Appellant.
 G.R. No. 204222, July 04, 2016 - NEPTUNE METAL SCRAP RECYCLING, INC.,
Petitioner, v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 191492, July 04, 2016 - PATRICIA SIBAYAN REPRESENTED BY TEODICIO
SIBAYAN, Petitioner, v. EMILIO COSTALES, SUSANA ISIDRO, RODOLFO ISIDRO, ANNO
ISIDRO AND ROBERTO CERANE., Respondents.
 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3907-RTJ], July 26, 2016 -
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner,
v. JUDGE ROLANDO G. MISLANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 167, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, PASIG CITY, RESPONDENT.; A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372 [FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. No.
11-3736-RTJ] - HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), REPRESENTED BY ATTY.
JOSE ROBERTO F. PO, Petitioner, v. JUDGE ROLANDO G. MISLANG, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 167, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 210192, July 04, 2016 - ROSALINDA S. KHITRI AND FERNANDO S. KHITRI,
Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J, July 26, 2016 - RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST
 COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON.
SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO G. ROSARIO.
 G.R. No. 200537, July 13, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RODRIGO QUITOLAY BALMONTE, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 183934, July 20, 2016 - ERNESTO GALANG AND MA. OLGA JASMIN CHAN,
Petitioners, v. BOIE TAKEDA CHEMICALS, INC. AND/OR KAZUHIKO NOMURA,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 183645, July 20, 2016 - HEIRS OF GAMALIEL ALBANO, REPRESENTED BY
ALEXANDER ALBANO AND ALL OTHER PERSON LIVING WITH THEM IN THE SUBJECT
PREMISES, Petitioners, v. SPS. MENA C. RAVANES AND ROBERTO RA VANES,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 212426, July 26, 2016 - RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA,
FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A.
AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA,
EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND
TEDDY CASIÑO, Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, Respondents.;
G.R. No. 212444 - BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES, AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT
TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY
RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY
SATURNINO OCAMPO, AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN,
RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G.
BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY
VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL
ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE
UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE,
 AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY
FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA,
Respondents.; KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER
LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT
FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA,
VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., Petitioners-In-
Intervention,; RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., Petitioner-In-Intervention.
 G.R. No. 208527, July 20, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ARDO BACERO Y CASABON, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 190408, July 20, 2016 - BENJIE B. GEORG REPRESENTED BY BENJAMIN C.
BELARMINO, JR., Petitioner, v. HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 215764, July 13, 2016 - RICHARD K. TOM, Petitioner, v. SAMUEL N.
RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 10944, July 12, 2016 - NORMA M. GUTIERREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ELEANOR A. MARAVILLA-ONA. Respondent.
 G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016 - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND HON. RICARDO BLANCAFLOR, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016 - PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A.
CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent.
 G.R. No. 206054, July 25, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. MINNIE
TUMULAK Y CUENCA, Appellant.
 G.R. No. 206906, July 25, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.
FLORDILINA RAMOS, Appellant.
 G.R. No. 217999, July 26, 2016 - TERESITA P. DE GUZMAN, IN HER CAPACITY AS
FORMER GENERAL MANAGER; BERNADETTE B. VELASQUEZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS
FINANCE MANAGER; ATTY. RODOLFO T. TABANGIN, ATTY. ANTONIO A. ESPIRITU,
 ATTY. MOISES P. CATING, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
BAGNIO WATER DISTRICT (BWD) BOARD OF DIRECTORS; AND SONIA A. DAOAS AND
ENGR. FELINO D. LAGMAN, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS INCUMBENT MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CENTRAL OFFICE,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO, COMMISSIONER
JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., COMMISSIONER HEIDI MENDOZA, AND NILDA B. PLARAS,
DIRECTOR IV, COMMISSION SECRETARY, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 213598, July 27, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
MERCELITA1 ARENAS Y BONZO @ MERLY, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
EDILBERTO PUSING Y TAMOR, Accused-Appellant.
 A.M. No. P-16-3471 (Formerly A.M. No. 15-06-197-RTC), July 26, 2016 - OFFICE OF
THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JOHN REVEL B. PEDRIÑA, CLERK III,
BRANCH 200, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 199151-56, July 25, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, LT. GEN. LEOPOLDO S. ACOT, B/GEN.
ILDEFONSO N. DULINAYAN, LT. COL. SANTIAGO B. RAMIREZ, LT. COL. CESAR M.
CARINO, MAJ. PROCESO T. SABADO, MAJ. PACQUITO L. CUENCA, 1LT. MARCELINO M.
MORALES, M/SGT. ATULFO D. TAMPOLINO, REMEDIOS "REMY" DIAZ, JOSE GADIN, JR.,
GLENN ORQUIOLA, HERMINIGILDA LLAVE, GLORIA BAYONA AND RAMON BAYONA JR.,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 190158, July 20, 2016 - HEIRS OF LIBERATO CASTILLEJOS AND RURAL
BANK OF AGOO, LA UNION, Petitioners, v. LA TONDEÑA INCORPORADA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 208837, July 20, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
DONNA RIVERA Y DUMO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 210801, July 18, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ALVIN CENIDO Y PICONES AND REMEDIOS CONTRERAS Y CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 213529, July 13, 2016 - JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. HON.
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, PROSECUTOR GENERAL CLARO ARELLANO, AND SENIOR
DEPUTY STATE PROSECUTOR THEODORE M. VILLANUEVA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH
150, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), ARTURO F. LUY, GERTRUDES K.
LUY, ANNABELLE LUY-REARIO, AND BENHUR K. LUY, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 215340, July 13, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
GLORIA CAIZ Y TALVO, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 202514, July 25, 2016 - ANNA MARIE L. GUMABON, Petitioner, v.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 192477, July 27, 2016 - MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v.
FELICIDAD VILLAMENA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 210606, July 27, 2016 - GRACE PARK* INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
AND WOODLINK REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. EASTWEST BANKING
CORPORATION, SECURITY BANKING CORPORATION, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION,
REPRESENTED BY THE TRUSTEE AND ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF EASTWEST BANKING
CORPORATION TRUST DIVISION, EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EX-
OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN, EDRIC
C. ESTRADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF IV OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016 - SULPICIO LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. NAPOLEON
SESANTE, NOW SUBSTITUTED BY MARIBEL ATILANO, KRISTEN MARIE, CHRISTIAN
IONE, KENNETH KERRN AND KARISNA KATE, ALL SURNAMED SESANTE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 199180, July 27, 2016 - THELMA RODRIGUEZ, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND,
Petitioners, v. SPOUSES JAIME SIOSON AND ARMI SIOSON, ET AL., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 181335, July 27, 2016 - MARIO SALUTA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 5951, July 12, 2016 - JUTTA KRURSEL, Complainant, v. ATTY. LORENZA A.
ABION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 218665, July 20, 2016 - JULIUS BAUTTSTA, ARSENIO LARANANG,
REYNALDO BALDEMOR, MANAYAN, NORMA FLORES, CONSUELO ESTIGOY, CARMELITA
VALMONTE, SIMEON MARTIN, MAGDALENA GADIAN, JOSE GINNO DELA MERCED,
JOVEN SILAN, JR., JULIO DIAZ, GIDEON ACOSTA, AND WENCESLA BAUTISTA,
Petitioners, v. LT. COL. BENITO DONIEGO, JR., LT. COL. ALFREDO PATARATA, AND
MAJOR GENERAL GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 9492, July 11, 2016 - PLUTARCO E. VAZQUEZ, Complainants, v. ATTY.
DAVID LIM QUECO KHO, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 6387 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3001], July 19, 2016 - GABINO V.
TOLENTINO AND FLORDELIZA C. TOLENTINO, Complainants, v. ATTY. HENRY B. SO
AND ATTY. FERDINAND L. ANCHETA, Respondents.
  G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016 - DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A.
"DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner, v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016 - JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR.
GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners, v. LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 213601, July 27, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
FRANKIE GERERO, ROLITO GERERO Y ARMIROL, CHRISTOPHER GERERO, ALFIE
ESPINOSA Y MENDEZ AND RENATO BARTOLOME Y JAIME, ACCUSED, ROLITO GERERO
Y ARMIROL, ALFIE ESPINOSA Y MENDEZ AND RENATO BARTOLOME Y JAIME, Accused-
Appellants.
 G.R. No. 217381, July 20, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
VICENTE R. SALVADOR, Accused-Appellant.
 A.C. No. 7072, July 27, 2016 - VIRGILIO D. MAGAWAY AND CESARIO M. MAGAWAY,
Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIANO A. AVECILLA, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 212615, July 19, 2016 - LEODEGARIO A. LABAO, JR., Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND LUDOVICO L, MARTELINO, JR., Respondents.; G.R.
NO. 212989 - SHARON GRACE MARTINEZ-MARTELINO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND VICE MAYOR JOSE O. ALBA, JR., Respondent.
 G.R. Nos. 194763-64, July 20, 2016 - WILFRED GACUS YAMSON, ASSISTANT
GENERAL MANAGER A, REY CAÑETE CHAVEZ, DEPARTMENT MANAGER C, ARNOLD
DOMINGO NAVALES, DEPARTMENT MANAGER C, ROSINDO JAPAY ALMONTE, DIVISION
MANAGER C, ALFONSO EDEN LAID, ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER A, AND WILLIAM
V. GUILLEN, DEPARTMENT MANAGER C, (ALL OF) DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT,
BAJADA, DAVAO CITY, Petitioners, v. DANILO C. CASTRO AND GEORGE F. INVENTOR,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 210710, July 27, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
LUISITO GABORNE Y CINCO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 209271, July 26, 2016 - INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION
OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, INC., Petitioner, v. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA
(PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA
(MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG,
LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY, MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO
MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO KIAT, JR.,
 ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON,
MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, AND EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, RESPONDENTS. CROP
LIFE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner-In-Intervention.; G.R. NO. 209276 -
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY AND THE FERTILIZER AND
PESTICIDE AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT
SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO
CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR, ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA HI,
CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOHOY
MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY ROQUE,
JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S.
HAGEDORN, AND EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, RESPONDENTS. CROP LIFE PHILIPPINES,
INC., Petitioner-In-Intervention.; G.R. NO. 209301 - UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
LOS BAÑOS FOUNDATION, INC.,. Petitioner, v. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA
(PHILIPPINES) MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA
(MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG,
LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN, ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO
MODINA, DAGOHOY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO KIAT, JR.,
ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN. ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON,
MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, AND EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondents.; G.R.
NO. 209430 - UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LOS BAÑOS, Petitioner, v.
GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA
PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG), REP. TEODORO CASINO, DR. BEN
MALAYANG III, DR. ANGELINA GALANG, LEONARDO AVILA III, CATHERINE UNTALAN,
ATTY. MARIA PAZ LUNA, JUANITO MODINA, DAGOROY MAGAWAY, DR. ROMEO
QUIJANO, DR. WENCESLAO KIAT, JR., ATTY. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FORMER SEN.
ORLANDO MERCADO, NOEL CABANGON, MAYOR EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, AND
PROMULGATED: EDWIN MARTHINE LOPEZ, Respondent.
 A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, July 26, 2016 - RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE
VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS
COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; A.M.
NO. 12-9-5-SC - RE: COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY OF COURT OF APPEALS
JUSTICE ANGELITA A, GACUTAN; A.M. NO. 13-02-07-SC - RE: REQUEST OF COURT OF
 APPEALS JUSTICE REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR- FERNANDO THAT HER SERVICES AS MTC
JUDGE AND AS COMELEC COMMISSIONER BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF HER JUDICIAL
SERVICE AND INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION/ADJUSTMENT OF HER LONGEVITY
PAY., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 202050, July 25, 2016 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY AND PNOC
DOCKYARD & ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. KEPPEL PHILIPPINES
HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 210991, July 12, 2016 - DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION
(FORMERLY DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES) DULY REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF OPERATING
OFFICER, LORENZO C. FORMOSO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. MA.
GRACIA M. PULIDO TAN, CHAIRPERSON AND HON. HEIDI L. MENDOZA,
COMMISSIONER, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 10117, July 25, 2016 - IN RE: RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 14, 2013 OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA- PRESENT: GR.CV NO. 94656, v. ATTY. GIDEON D.V.
MORTEL, Respondent.

Copyright © 1995 - 2021 REDiaz

GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR

UNION & GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES NON-TEACHING & MAINTENANCE LABOR
UNION, GR No. 204693, 2016-07-13
Facts:
GNC is an educational institution
On the other hand, respondents Guagua National Colleges Faculty Labor Union (GNCFLU)
and Guagua National Colleges Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor Union (GNCNTMLU)
were the bargaining agents for GNC's faculty members and non-teaching and maintenance
personnel, respectively.
the parties concluded their Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) without issue
The aforementioned CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU without distinction.
Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-out" clause under Section 17
thereof which likewise provides for mechanism for grievance resolution and voluntary
arbitration. This provision was considered carried over in the subsequent CBAs.
On April 3, 2009, the Presidents of both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU... inform him of the
former's intention to open the negotiation for the renewal of the then existing CBA which
would expire on May 31, 2009.
which was received by GNC on even date
GNC wrote respondents... calling for a meeting... regarding CBA negotiations... no
agreement was reached except that GNC would notify respondents of the next negotiation
meeting.
However, what respondents later received from GNC's... was not a notice of meeting but a
letter dated May 27, 2009 which, among others, stated that the "management is not inclined
to grant the economic/monetary-related proposals in [respondents'] letter of April 3, 2009."...
respondents submitte... the agreed terms of the CBA which already contained the revisions
requested by GNC and the P100,000.00 signing bonus for each union. The document
according to them was by then ready for signing; (10) respondents made several follow-ups
with both Atty. Sampang and Rodriguez regarding the signing of the CBA but to no avail;
(11) respondents received from Atty: Sampang, through a letter[17] dated December 21,
2009, GNC's counter-proposal.[18] Respondents were surprised since they thought all
along that all matters, except for some details on the signing bonus, were already settled.
Again, the parties differ in their account of what transpired before the NCMB.Respondents
alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties finally agreed on the details
regarding the grant of signing bonus.
GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation meetings with the NCMB,
respondents submitted several CBA drafts for its consideration.
GNC filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer Dispute to Grievance
Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.[26] It
invoked the "no-strike, no lock-out" clause and the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration provision of the parties' existing CBA which was carried over from their 1994-
1999 CBA and the CBAs subsequent thereto
In the afternoon of the same day, respondents conducted their respective Strike Votes
wherein majority voted in favor of a strike
Since the NCMB had not yet acted upon GNC's Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to
Refer Dispute to Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration Pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement despite the looming strike of respondents, GNC urged the Secretary
of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.[... the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, after finding the subject labor dispute as one affecting national interest,
assumed jurisdiction over the case; certified the same to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for immediate compulsory arbitration;
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission
As to the charge of unfair labor practice on account of its alleged bad faith bargaining and
violation of duty to bargain, GNC argued that the same is belied by the fact that since the
very beginning, the parties were negotiating. This continued during the mediation and
conciliation proceedings before the NCMB. And had not for respondents' impatience which
caused them to file a notice of strike, such negotiations would have progressed. To GNC,
respondents' move of filing a notice of strike was uncalled for and was only intended to
compel GNC to hastily concede to their proposals. What respondents refused to see,
however, was GNC's critical financial status that hindered it from readily agreeing with their
economic proposals.
When GNC filed their petition for assumption of jurisdiction
[,] they prayed that:
.the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment,... order to enjoin the intended strike, or
to order the immediate return to work of strikers if a strike has taken place, and thereafter
direct the parties to submit to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provisions
of the CBA."... the Order denied GNC's plea to submit the dispute to the parties' grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration. Article 263 (g) does not encompass referral of the labor
dispute in an industry imbibed with national interest to grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitration. In the absence of a timely reconsideration or proof that GNC had
exercisedavailable remedy in law, the Order now stands beyond reproach.
The NLRC thus upheld its jurisdiction over the case,... (b) All cases between the same
parties, except where the certification order specifies otherwise, the issues submitted for
arbitration which are already filed or may be filed, and are relevant to or are proper incidents
of the certified case, shall be considered subsumed or absorbed by the certified case, and
shall be decided by the appropriate Division of the Commission.
Plaintly, [o]ur jurisdiction in this certified case extends to all other issues between the parties
so long as they are relevant and germane in the resolution of the main labor dispute.
The intention of the law is an immediate and complete resolution of a labor dispute in an
industry indispensable to the national interest. In this certified case, We are called to
exercise [o]ur judgment and adjudicate the labor dispute in accordance with the Order of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. This Commission will not recuse from this
responsibility for want of jurisdiction.[38]
Anent the merits of the case, the NLRC held that based on the totality of conduct of GNC, it
was guilty of bad faith bargaining and therefore committed an unfair labor practice. This was
on account of GNC's submission of a counterproposal despite the parties already having
reached an agreement regarding the terms of the CBA
Ruling of the Court of Appeals... he CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of NLRC in issuing its assailed orders.
Issues:
Essential to the determination of the issue raised is the resolution of the following:Whether
the subject labor dispute should have been ordered submitted to voluntary arbitration by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the parties' CBA and not certified to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration; Whether GNC is guilty of bad faith bargaining and thus
violated its duty to bargain;Whether the final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the
NCMB was correctly declared to be the parties' CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to May 31,
2014.
Ruling:
Our RulingThe Petition has no merit.The Secretary of Labor and Employmentcorrectly
certified the subject labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsoryarbitration.
GNC asserts that it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction over the grounds cited
by respondents in their notice of strike in view of Section 17 of the parties' 1994-1999 CBA.
NC relies heavily on University of San Agustin[50] According to it, the facts therein are
similar if not identical to the facts of the present case. Hence, the Court's ruling in the said
case squarely applies here.
It must be noted that under the facts of University of San Agustin, the dispute between the
parties primarily involved the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees - one
which clearly arose from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA. Pursuant to Article
261 of the Labor Code,[52] such a grievance falls under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Even if otherwise, the
dispute would still fall under the said jurisdiction pursuant to Article 262[53] of the same
Code since the parties agreed in their CBA that practically all disputes, including bargaining
deadlock, shall be referred to grievance machinery that ends in voluntary arbitration.It can
safely be concluded, therefore, that the clear showing of the voluntary arbitrator's
jurisdiction over the parties' dispute in University of San Agustin is the underlying reason
why the Court upheld the CA's directive for the parties to proceed to voluntary arbitration in
accordance with their CBA. After all, it is the declared policy of the State to promote and
emphasize the primacy of voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor or industrial
disputes.[54]Contrary to GNC's contention, however, there is a marked difference between
the facts of University of San Agustin and of the present case which makes the ruling in the
former inapplicable to the latter. Unlike in University of San Agustin, the main cause of the
dispute between the parties in this case, i.e., GNC's alleged commission of unfair labor
practice, did not arise from the interpretation or implementation of the parties' CBA, or
neither from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Hence, it
does not fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel
of voluntary arbitrators under the aforementioned Article 261.
Plainly, a charge of unfair labor practice does not fall under the first three definition of
grievance as above-quoted. Neither can it be considered as embraced by the fourth which
at first blush, appears to be a "catch-all" definition of grievance because of the phrase "[a]ny
other matter or dispute".
There is a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that unfair labor practices should be
resolved in the ultimate by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators since the
same fall within a special class of disputes that are generally within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter by express provision of the law.
"Absent such express stipulation, the phrase 'all disputes' [or "any other matter or dispute"
for that matter] should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict traditionally within the
jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators
GNC engaged in bad faith bargainingand thus violated its duty to bargain.
Here, the collective conduct of GNC is indicative of its failure to meet its duty to bargain in
good faith. Badges of bad faith attended its actuations both at the plant and NCMB levels.At
the plant level, GNC failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of serving a
reply/counter-proposal within 10 calendar days from receipt of a proposal,[63] a fact which
by itself is already an indication of lack of genuine interest to bargain.[64] Then, it led
respondents to believe that it was doing away with the reply/counter-proposal when it
proceeded to just orally discuss the economic terms. After a series of negotiation meetings,
the parties finally agreed on the economic terms which based on the records was the only
contentious issue between them.
In the days that followed, however, GNC ignored the follow-ups made by respondents
regarding the signing. It then suddenly capitalized on the fact that it had not yet submitted a
reply/counter-proposal and thereupon served one upon respondents despite the parties
already having reached an agreement.
It could not be any clearer from the above circumstances that GNC has no genuine
intention to comply with its duty to bargain. It merely went through the motions of
negotiations and then entered into an agreement with respondents which turned out to be
an empty one since it later denounced the same by submitting a reply/counter-proposal.
the minutes of the meeting... so next time we will be on the signing
The final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB was correctly imposed by the
NLRC as the parties' CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014.
In the cases of Kiok Lay,[79] Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment[80], and General Milling Corporation,[81] the Court unilaterally imposed upon
the employers the CBAs proposed by the unions after the employers were found to have
violated their duty to bargain collectively
Here, the Court finds nothing wrong in the pronouncement of the NLRC that the final CBA
draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB should serve as the parties' CBA for the period
June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2014. More than the fact that GNC is the erring party in this case,
records show that the said draft is actually the final CBA draft of the parties which
incorporates their agreements.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September
26,2012 and Resolution dated December 3,2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
120669 are AFFIRME