9/14/21, 7:29 PM G.R. No.

L-14722

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Republic of the Philippines

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14722             May 25, 1960

IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-appellee.

Agustin C. Bagasao for appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the registration case pending
before the same court covering the property described therein be given due course and that defendants be
ordered to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of
limitations. The reasons advanced are: the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of registration or
issuance of patent over the property was issued "sometime on September 12, 1953 or thereabout", while the
transfer certificate of title covering the same was issued on September 16, 1953. The present action which calls
for the cancellation of said decree and title has, therefore, been filed after the elapse of more than four years,
which cannot be done, because the title has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court
sustained this motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence the present appeal.

Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, with improvements thereon, situated in San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and
against the whole world and up to the present time he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof; that
said lot is at present the subject of registration proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration
Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238; that sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands,
without exercising due care, and in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not complied with the knowledge
that defendants had not complied with the requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a homestead
patent in their favor as a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in their name by the register of
deeds; that said title was procured by defendants through frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they
knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a
patent covering said land because it is a private property of plaintiff. For these reasons, plaintiff prays that said
decree and title be cancelled.

Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141),
provides:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceeding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

In the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly,
with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act
No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court — an application therefor
being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act
No. 141). Thus, the following is what this Court said on the matter:

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question
openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880,
that is, for about forty-five years. ... When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of
said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors
for thirty-forty years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish
pond when he sold it on December 13, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. ... In favor of Valentin Susi,
there is, moreover the presumption juris et de jure established paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied
with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with
a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not
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9/14/21, 7:29 PM G.R. No. L-14722
only a right to grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under
the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela
Razon did not thereby acquire any right. (Emphasis supplied)

Such is the situation in which the plaintiff claims to be in his complaint. He alleges that he is the owner in fee simple
of the lot in question, with the improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and that he has been
in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and that up to
the present time he is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof. He further claims that said lot is present
the subject of a registration proceeding pending in the same court, known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C.
Cad. Record No. N-12238. If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot
by a grant of the State, it follows that the same had ceased to be part of the public domain and had become
private property and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead
patent and the original certificate of title covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the
defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a
decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of
the decree,1 which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and
has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case
outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It would have been more proper for the court to deny
the motion on the ground that its object does not appear to be indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as
was done by the trial court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
No costs.

Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Sorsogon vs. Makalintal, 80 Phil., 259; 45 Off. Gaz., 3819; See also G. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Quirino
Bolaños, 95 Phil., 106; Aguilar, et al. vs. Caoagdan, et al., 105 Phil., 661; 56 Off. Gaz. (28) 4546; Henderson
vs. Garrido, et al., G.R. No. L-4913, December 28, 1951.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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