Optimizing Fire and Gas

System Design Using the

ISA Technical Report
ISA TR 84.00.07

EDWARD MARSZAL
President and CEO
SRINIVASAN GANESAN
Standards MENA Region Manager
Certification
Education & Training
ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA
Publishing
Conferences & Exhibits (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Presenter Introduction

• Edward M. Marszal, PE, ISA84 Expert

• President, Kenexis
• 20 Years Experience
• ISA Author “SIL Selection”
• ISA Committees - S84, S91, S18,
S84 WG7 Fire and Gas
• ISA Safety Division Past Director
• ISA Fellow
• AIChE, NFPA Member
• BSChE, Ohio State University
ISA84 Expert
Title

 Introduction
 Main Topics
• ‘Basis of Safety’
• Prescriptive v. Performance Basis
• FGS Design Lifecycle
• Performance Target Selection
• Detector Coverage Verification

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
‘Basis of Safety’ for FGS

• All critical instrumentation / control systems require 
a ‘basis of safety’
• specify adequate equipment selection and design 
• specify functional testing requirements
• For fire and gas systems ‘basis of safety’ are 
developed in two ways:
• Prescriptive ‘Basis of Safety’, 
NFPA/EN standards, etc.
• Performance Basis / Risk Assessment

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Prescriptive Standards in FGS Design

• Well‐established guidance for 
design of detection and 
mitigation systems
• Provide detailed requirements for  basis of
safety for most types of FGS function
• Do not provide detailed requirements for fire and gas 
detection in chemical processing areas
• Allow for performance based alternatives to be used 
(where appropriate)
• Generally not specific to chemical processing

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Performance-Based Standards
• ISA TR 84.07 Provides guidance for FGS design in 
accordance with the principles of ISA84 / IEC61511
• Specify and Verify Performance Targets
• Availability 
(equivalent to SIL)
• Detector Coverage
• Written specifically for 
process industry
• Not intended as 
replacement for
prescriptive design;
intended as supplement

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Fire and Gas Design Lifecycle

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Typical Workflow for FGS Design
Identify Requirement
for FGS

Design Specification

Develop FGS Philosophy

Procedure Development

FGS Zone Definition

Construction, Installation,
And Commissioning
Determine FGS
Performance Requirements
PSAT

Verify Detector Coverage

Operation, Maintenance
and Testing
Verify FGS Availability

Management of Change
Modify Design
(if required)

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Fire and Gas Performance Targets

Input Task Tools Deliverable

PFD
P&ID FGS
FGS Zone Definition FGS Zone List
Plot/Deck Plan Toolkit
Cause-and-Effect

FGS Philosophy Determine FGS FGS FGS Design Basis

& Procedure Performance Requirements Toolkit Report

Verify Detector Coverage Effigy™ FGS Detector

Mapping Report

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Risk Modeling Requirements

• Desire a Risk Model that is sensitive to:

– Detector Coverage
– FGS System Probability of Failure on Demand
• Analysis Considerations include:
– Hydrocarbon Processing Equipment
– Fire and Gas Consequences
– Release Likelihood
– Level of Human Occupancy of Zone
– Ignition Probabilities
– Production Value for Process

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Performance Target Determination

• Two Common 
Approaches
– Semi‐Quantitative 
(Similar to LOPA)

– Quantitative Risk 
Analysis (QRA)

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Fully Quantitative Approach
• Targets calculated through rigorous modeling 
of hazards
• Consequence characterized by 
dispersion/consequence modeling
• Release likelihood characterized by equipment 
failure database
• Mitigating factors characterized by site specific 
factors
• Calculated risk compared against tolerability 
criteria
• Design criteria are iteratively modified in order 
to achieve the tolerable risk target 
• Analysis based on Scenario Coverage and safety 
availability

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
 Hazard Scenario Identification

• Hazard scenarios should include general release / fire

scenarios
– Identify all credible release scenarios, including:
– Vessels, process piping, flanges, instruments,
wellheads, pumps, compressors, heat
exchangers, launchers/receivers, risers and
pipelines
• Identify specific factors effecting release scenario
– Hole size, location, orientation, phase, toxicity (H2S),
occupancy
• Result should be a detailed list of release scenarios with
enough detail to undertake consequence and likelihood
analysis
• Identify potential incident outcomes:
– Jet fire, Flash Fire, …..
ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
 Likelihood Analysis

• Based on Historical Offshore Data:

– Offshore Release Statistics, 2001. UK Health
& Safety Exec.
– PARLOC 2001: The update of Loss of
Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines. UK
Health & Safety Exec.
• Sensitive to hole size distribution
• Sensitive to Equipment Type

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Fully-Quantitative Method
 Risk Integration – Event Tree
Residual FGS
Release Detected? FGS Effectiveness Residual Fire Effectiveness Frequency
Early Ignition? ("Detector Coverage") ("PFD") Delayed Ignition? Detected ("PFD") (1/year)

Success 9.10E-06
Yes 0.9
0.85
Failure 1.01E-06
Yes 0.1
0.04
No 1.78E-06
0.15

Success 2.18E-04
0.9

Yes Success 7.43E-07

0.85 0.9
Release Yes
2.97E-04 0.85 Failure 8.25E-08
Yes 0.1
0.04

Estimated Risk is Failure

No
0.15
1.46E-07

0.1
greater than No
0.96
2.33E-05

performance No
0.96
Success
0.9
1.31E-06

target, adjust Yes

0.85 Failure 1.46E-07
Yes 0.1

parameters to 0.04
No 2.57E-07
No 0.15
achieve targets 0.15
No 4.11E-05
0.96
Total 2.97E-04

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Fully-Quantitative Method
Semi-Quantitative Approach
• Team‐Based approach employing calibrated 
risk assessment tables
• Risk factors qualitatively ranked by team
• Likelihood
• Consequence
• Mitigating factors
• Selected categories determine the “zone grade”
• Zone grade defines geographic coverage and safety 
availability

Grade Level of Risk Detection Coverage FGS Safety Availability

A High Risk 0.90
0.95 (High SIL 1 Equivalent)
B Medium Risk 0.80
0.90 (SIL 1 Equivalent)
C Low Risk 0.60
0.90 (SIL 1 Equivalent)

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Calibration

• Parameters and
performance target
calibrated by full
QRA of typical
zones
• Safety Availability
and Geographic
Coverage Set

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Extents of Graded Areas
• Define extents of area the overall zone that are 
required to be covered by fire and gas detection
• Limits analysis to location where risk is high
• Function of process equipment with potential to leak 
and process conditions
• Similar to electrical area classification

Grade C Grade B Grade A

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Verifying FGS Detector Coverage

Input Task Tools Deliverable

FGS Philosophy Determine FGS FGS FGS Design
& Procedure Performance Requirements Toolkit Basis Report

FGS Philosophy
& Procedure
Verify Detector Coverage Effigy™ FGS Detector
Mapping Report

FGS FGS Availability

Verify FGS Availability
Toolkit Report

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Why Verify Detector Coverage?
• Failure of Fire and Gas System to Function
are related to one of two Mechanisms:
• Inadequate Coverage - Failure to detect hazard
due to inadequate sensor type, number and/or
location
• Inadequate Availability - Failure of component
hardware to function as intended

• Proposed detector layout should be

assessed to ensure adequate coverage:
• The coverage footprint is sufficient to provide the
required hazard alarms and control actions
• Detector views are not impeded by pipework, cable
trays and other obstruction
The Maginot Line
HSE Statistics Indicate that 36% of Major Gas Release in North Sea Offshore 
Installations are Not Detected by Gas Detection Systems

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Verifying Detector Coverage for Process Areas
• Two methods of coverage verification are defined by ISA TR
84.07:
• “Detector Geographic Coverage – The fraction of the geometric area
(at a given elevation of analysis) of a defined monitored process area
that, if a release were to occur in a given geographic location, would
be detected by the release detection equipment considering the
defined voting arrangement.”
• “Detector (Scenario) Coverage – The fraction of the release scenarios
that would occur as a result of the loss of containment from items of
equipment of a defined and monitored process area that can be
detected by release detection equipment considering the frequency
and magnitude of the release scenarios and the defined voting
arrangement.”

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
FGS Detector Mapping Assessment
• Detector Performance characterized
based on data from FM approval
testing

• Detector Coverage calculated based

50 % 75 % 100 %

on 3-dimensional modeling Sensitivity Sensitivity Sensitivity

• Achieved coverage is compared

against performance target

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
FGS Detector Mapping Assessment
Geographic Fire Detector Coverage Scenario-Based Geographic Risk

Geographic Gas Detector Coverage Scenario-Based Coverage

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Verifying FGS Availability

Input Task Tools Deliverable

FGS Detector FGS Detector
Verify FGS Availability Effigy™
Locations Mapping Report

FGS FGS Availability

FGS List Verify FGS Availability
Toolkit Report

FGS FGS Performance

Modify Design (if required)
Toolkit Specifications

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Parameters Impacting Availability
Implementation Phase

Design Specification • Prepare detailed design

documents based on FGS
Procedure Development
SRS
Construction, Installation,
And Commissioning
• Verify and validate prior to
startup
PSAT
• Perform ongoing maintenance
Operation, Maintenance and testing as required
and Testing
• MOC is important! Many plant
Management of Change
changes impact coverage

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013
Questions?

ISA Automation Conference 2013- EMEA (Dammam, Saudi Arabia) – December 10-12, 2013