SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA

AND NIGER REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (2009-2015)

BY

ABBAS AYODELE TAIWO

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, NIGERIA

NOVEMBER, 2016

i
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA
AND NIGER REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (2009-2015)

BY

ABBAS AYODELE TAIWO B.SC INT’L RELATIONS (OAU, IFE) 2008,

MASTERS IN INT’L AFFAIRS & DIPLOMACY (ABU) 2012
P13SSPS9014

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE

STUDIES, AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.PHIL) INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA,
NIGERIA

NOVEMBER, 2016
 DECLARATION
I declare that this dissertation entitled “Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for
Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations (2009-2015)” has been carried out by me in the
Department of Political Science and International Studies. The information derived from the
literature has been duly acknowledged in the text and a list of references provided. No part of
this dissertation was previously presented for another degree or diploma in this or any other
institution.

Abbas Ayodele TAIWO

Signature Date
 CERTIFICATION
This dissertation entitled “Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria and
Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations (2009-2015)” by ABBAS AYODELE TAIWO meets
the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in
International Relations of the Ahmadu Bello University, and is approved for its contribution
to knowledge and literary presentation.

Prof. Hudu Ayuba Abdullahi

Chairman, Supervisory Committee Signature (Date)

Dr. Umar Mohammed Kao‟je

Member, Supervisory Committee Signature (Date)

Dr. Aliyu Yahaya

Head of Department Signature (Date)

Prof. Kabir Bala

Dean, School of Postgraduate Studies Signature (Date)
 DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to Almighty Allah my Creator for His Inspiration and Mercy over
me.
 AKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I give praise and thanks to Almighty Allah for His Inspiration and Blessing over me and for
making the completion of this dissertation successful.

I am highly grateful to my amiable supervisors, Professor Hudu Ayuba Abdullahi and Dr.
Umar Mohammed Kao‟je for their encouragement and efforts in ensuring the successful
completion of this dissertation.

My appreciation also goes to Professor Kayode Omojuwa, Dr. Yusufu Yakubu, Professor
Rauf Ayo Dunmoye, Professor Paul Pinder Izah, Dr. Mohammed Faal, Dr. Edgar
Agubamah,Dr. Audu Jacob, Dr. David Moveh, Dr. Aliyu Yahaya, Dr. Tafida, Mallam Garba
Aminu and all the lecturers and members of staff in the Department of Political Science and
International Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria for their immense contribution
towards the success of my studies.

I express my gratitude to the officials of the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja
particularly the Ambassador and First Counsellor in person of Ibrahim Traore, the Academic
Attache, the officials of the West African Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Abuja, particularly the Assistant Director; Nasiru Waje, First Secretary James Dung Pam,
Officials of European Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, particularly
Olufemi Olafeso, Adekunle Okunade, Dr. Fred Aja Agwu; Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs, Lagos, the Head of Department, Political Science, University of Maiduguri, Dr.
Ibrahim Umara, the Garrison Commander, 7 Division Nigerian Army, Maiduguri, the
Chairman Borno State Emergency Management Agency Ahmed Satomi and his predecessor
Grema Terab, Sector 5 Commander Civilian Joint Task Force Baba Kura, the Pressure Group
leader, Maina Soroa, Diffa, Niger Republic Mahamadou Buhari Ismaeel for the warm
reception given to me and for granting me the audience to conduct the interview used for the
accomplishment of this dissertation.

Special thanks to my good friends Usman Mohammed, Musa Damboa, brother Zakariya
Muhideen, Dr. Kilani Muhideen and all members of their families for accommodating me in
Maiduguri and Abuja respectively in the course of my field work for the dissertation.

I thank my late father Mr. Taiwo Hassan for the great role he played towards my studies.
May Allah grant him paradise (Ameen). Special thanks to my wonderful Mum Mrs. Caroline
Kofoworola, my sister Mrs. Taohid Ramat, and all members of my family for their support
and prayer in ensuring the success of my studies, may Allah reward them abundantly.

This acknowledgement would be incomplete without appreciating someone who is very dear
and precious to me for her tremendous support, and prayer towards my success; my wife -
Lateefah. I thank you very much. May Allah crown your efforts with success.

I say a very big thank to all my course mates, my friends Sanni Kazeem, Wasiu Marshal, Bro.
Muhideen, Abdullahi Labo, Lawal Akibu, well wishers and those who in one way or the
other contributed towards the completion of this dissertation. I pray Almighty Allah will bless
you all.
 ABSTRACT
This study examines the Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria-Niger
Republic Diplomatic Relations. The dissertation deploys the linkage theory to posit in its key
argument that there is a connection between the spread of Boko Haram insurgency from
Nigeria to Niger Republic and the responses of the two countries toward each other in
tackling the insurgency collectively. Data were collected basically from in-depth interview
from the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, West African Affairs Division of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja and analysed thematically as they relate to the
research objectives by qualitative data analysis. It was discovered that despite the spread of
Boko Haram insurgency and the challenges encountered in the course of fighting the
insurgency, the fight against the insurgents has strengthened diplomatic relations between
the two countries. Nigeria and Niger Republic through joint military operation
coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force comprising the Lake Chad Basin
Commission Countries have come together to fight the insurgency. The study strongly
recommends creating a permanent joint military operation on the borders of the two
countries to end Boko Haram insurgency.
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Meaning

AAFC Allied Armed Forces of the Community

ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative

AFISMA Africa led International Support Mission in Mali

AU African Union

CAEC Central Africa Economic Commission

CJTF Civilian Joint Task Force

CBN Central Bank of Nigeria

CEAO Communaute Economique de l‟ Afrique de l‟ Ouest

EAC East African Community

ECA Economic Commission for Africa

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group

EU European Union

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission

MSC Mediation and Security Council

MNJTF Multinational Joint Task Force

MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali

MOSOP Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

NSA National Security Adviser

NEPU Northern Elements Progressive Union

NNJC Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission

NIIA Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

OAU Organisation of African Unity

OCAM Organisation Commire Africaine et Malgache

OAS Organisation of American State

PDP People Democratic Party

PMAD Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence

RIFU Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit

SADC Southern African Development Community

SALWs Small Arms Light Weapons

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organisation

UDEAO Customs Unions of West African States

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title............................................................................................................................................i

Declaration................................................................................................................................ii

Certification..............................................................................................................................iii

Dedication.................................................................................................................................iv

Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................v

Abstract....................................................................................................................................vi

List of Abbreviations...............................................................................................................vii

Table of Contents......................................................................................................................ix

Appendices…..........................................................................................................................xiii

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 : General Background...........................................................................................................1

1.2 : Statement of Research Problem..........................................................................................4

1.3 : Aim and Objectives of the Study......................................................................................4

1.4 : The Significance of the Study............................................................................................5

1.5 : Research Assumptions........................................................................................................5

1.6 : Scope and Limitations of the Study...................................................................................5

1.7 : Organization of Chapters...................................................................................................6

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 : Introduction….....................................................................................................................7

2.2 : Socio-Cultural Dimension of Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations....................7

2.3 : Nigeria and Niger Republic Relations- Consolidation of National Power and Sovereignty,

their Political Interactions within Africa, Attitudes toward each Others, and their Interactions

within UN.................................................................................................................................8

2.3.1 : Nigeria‟s Attitude towards Niger Republic during the Period the Niger‟s Opposition
Leader-Djibo Bakary was trying to overthrow Diori Hamani‟s regime..................................14

2.3.2 : Niger‟s Attitude towards Nigeria during Nigeria‟s Civil War…...................................16

2.3.3 : Niger‟s Attitude towards Nigeria over Dialogue with South Africa, and in the Ghana-

Nigeria Tension over Leadership Tussle in Africa..................................................................17

2.3.4 : Nigeria and Niger Republic Voting Patterns in the United Nations….........................18

2.4 : Economic Dimension of Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations..........................19

2.4.1 : Aid Relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic......................................................22

2.4.2 : Industrial Cooperation between Nigeria and Niger…....................................................23

2.5 : Security Matters in ECOWAS….....................................................................................26

2.5.1 : Security..........................................................................................................................26

2.5.2 : Collective Security.........................................................................................................28

2.5.3 : ECOWAS Collective Security.......................................................................................32

2.6 : Insurgency........................................................................................................................37

2.6.1 : Nigeria‟s Security Challenge.......................................................................................43

2.7 : Boko Haram in Perspective.............................................................................................44

2.7.1 : Relational or Vengeance Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency..............................46

2.7.2 : The Political Feud Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency........................................47

2.7.3 : Socio-Economic Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency...........................................51

2.7.4 : The Conspiracy Perspective.........................................................................................57

2.7.5 : Theocratic Perspective..................................................................................................59

2.8 : The Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Regional Security.......................................63

2.8.1 : The Effects of Insurgency on International Relations.................................................68

2.8.2 : Regional and International Response to Boko Haram Insurgency...............................70

2.9 : Theoretical Framework....................................................................................................71

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 : Introduction…..................................................................................................................75
3.2 : Study Area........................................................................................................................75

3.3 : Population of the Study....................................................................................................77

3.4 : Sources of Data Collection…..........................................................................................78

3.5 : Instrument of Data Collection…......................................................................................79

3.6 : Sampling Procedures.........................................................................................................80

3.7 : Sampling Techniques........................................................................................................80

3.8 : Validation of the Instruments used for the Study............................................................81

3.9 : Reliability of the Instruments used for the Study...........................................................81

3.10 : Data Transcription and Analysis....................................................................................81

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO

HARAM INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC

RELATIONS

4.1 : Introduction…...................................................................................................................83

4.2 : Perception of Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria and Niger

Republic by Respondents.........................................................................................................83

4.3 : Perception of Respondents on the Closure of Borders by Nigeria with Niger

Republic...................................................................................................................................90

4.4 : Perception of the Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for the Diplomatic Relations

between Nigeria and Niger Republic by Respondents…........................................................91

4.5 : Security Cooperation between Nigeria and Niger in Combating Boko Haram Insurgency

Perceived by Respondents…....................................................................................................97

4.6 : Research Findings..........................................................................................................102

4.7 : Discussion of Findings…................................................................................................102

4.8 : Verification of Assumptions…......................................................................................105

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 : Summary.........................................................................................................................106
5.2 : Conclusion…...................................................................................................................107

5.3 : Recommendations….......................................................................................................107

5.4 : Contributions to Knowledge...........................................................................................108

REFERENCES......................................................................................................................109
 APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Questions Asked From the Respondents.............................................................................121

APPENDIX B

List of Person(s) Interviewed...............................................................................................122

xiii
 CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Background

Boko Haram originally known as Jama‟atu Alhlissunnah Lidda‟awati wal Jihad (Followers

of the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad for Propagation of Islam and Jihad) (Adamu, 2012)

or the Yusuffiya Movement came into limelight in July 2009 during the administration of the

late President Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua following a deadly clash which erupted between the

movement and the security forces over the violation of the law on the use of crash helmet by

the movement in Maiduguri, Borno State. The deadly clash left several of the Boko Haram

members dead. Prior to that incident, Boko Haram had existed peacefully in Borno State

preaching against Western values that contradicted their belief. The pervasive corruption,

inequality, injustice, unemployment, immorality believed to have been caused by the

infiltration of Western values into the country influenced Boko Haram and its adherents.

Their campaign against aspects of Western schooling earned them the name “Boko Haram”-

a Hausa word which means Western knowledge is false (Adamu, 2012) contrary to the

media‟s interpretation of the word as Western education is sinful or forbidden. The anti

Western posture of the Boko Haram led to more confrontations between the government and

the movement. Boko Haram was briefly curtailed by the Nigerian security forces in July

2009. The virtual destruction of the Yusufiyya Movement by the Nigerian security forces in

July 2009 and the death of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, drove the movement underground

for almost six months (Hajeej, 2011). The killing of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram‟s

leader, perceived as an injustice by the movement was believed to have radicalised and

emboldened them to carry out more deadly attacks in the country. In 2010, they began a

systematic insurgency against security forces- the police and the army as well as those who

collaborated with the security forces leading either to their capture, or shooting (Hajeej,

1
2011). The Boko Haram insurgents metamorphosed from the use of simple weapons like

sticks, clubs, machetes, cutlasses, to sophisticated weapons like guns, rockets, and

improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for their operations. From January 2010 to June 2011,

they carried out more than 20 documented attacks which included shootings, bombings,

including suicide bombing (Hajeej, 2011).

The insurgents eventually extended their activities to the neighbouring states of Nigeria,

Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The capability of Boko Haram to attack the neighbouring states

of Nigeria in the Lake Chad region became serious concern to the West and Central African

Sub-regions and Africa in general. It was in realisation of the dangers Boko Haram posed to

the African continent that the African Union acting under the clause of collective security as

ratified by the United Nations Charter of 1945 authorised the Multinational Joint Task Force

(MNJTF) to fight the Boko Haram insurgents collectively through the Lake Chad Basin

Commission States comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon plus Benin Republic.

In the contemporary world, insurgency is not restricted to a country. Apart from the spill over

effects it could have on other countries, it could also influence the behaviour of a state

towards another state which may cause diplomatic row between them. For example, Kenyan

government blamed Eritrea for supplying arms to al-Shabaab-a Somali insurgent group that

had claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks in the Kenyan territory over the

country‟s deployment of troops to fight the insurgents in Southern Somalia. That intensified

diplomatic row between the two countries. In 2010, Kenya‟s Foreign Affairs Minister, Moses

Wetangular summoned Eritrean Ambassador to Kenya over his country‟s supply of arms to

al-Shabaab, a claim the Eritrean government denied (Lough, Sheik, 2011). Similarly, cross-

borders attacks by insurgent groups between Indian and Pakistan have also intensified

diplomatic row between the two countries. India blamed Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)-a group it

claimed has closed ties to Pakistani intelligence of carrying out several attacks in Uri in
India-administered Kashmir. Pakistan in turn accused India of colluding with insurgents and

separatists to cause mayhem in the province of Balochistan, Pakistan (Kugelman, 2016) and

so forth.

Nigeria and Niger Republic have had over five decades of diplomatic relations and share

common historical and cultural affinities particularly in the north-eastern and north-western

parts of Nigeria and south-eastern part of Niger. Looking at Nigeria-Niger diplomatic

relations with regard to Boko Haram insurgency, the activities of the insurgents could affect

the diplomatic relations between the two countries. For example, if the Boko Haram

insurgents operating in Nigeria are using Niger Republic as hide-out. Nigeria would not be

able to fight them in Niger‟s territory without the cooperation of Niger Republic because it is

against international law to encroach on the territory of another state. If the cooperation is not

forthcoming, Nigeria could blame Niger for allowing the insurgents to use its territory as

hide-out. This could cause a diplomatic row between the two countries. Similarly, the closure

of borders by Nigeria with Niger Republic in the course of fighting Boko Haram insurgency

and the escalation of the insurgency to Niger Republic could also trigger off a negative

reaction from Niger. Moreover, the accusation against the Nigerian soldiers that unlike their

Nigerien counterparts were running away from the battle against Boko Haram insurgents by

Niger‟s Ministry of Defence and the reaction of Nigerian Military in February 2015 raise

concerns about the commitment and behaviour of the two countries toward each other in

combating the insurgency. The former Director of Defence Information, Nigerian Army;

Major General Chris Olukolade while reacting to the accusation, denounced it and described

the Nigerien soldiers as looters and accused them of providing fighters to Boko Haram (Ibeh,

2013). Therefore, it is imperative to examine the security implications of Boko Haram

insurgency for Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations.

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

This study examines the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and

Niger Republic diplomatic relations-security cooperation between them in combating Boko

Haram insurgency with a view to examining whether the activities of the insurgents have

affected the diplomatic ties between the two countries or not. In order to address this

problem, the study provides research questions below:

(i) What are the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger?

(ii) Why did Nigeria close its borders with Niger Republic in the course of fighting the

insurgency?

(iii) How has the Boko Haram insurgency affected Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic

relations?

(iv) What security framework did Nigeria and Niger Republic adopt in combating Boko

Haram insurgency?

1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to examine the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for

Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations.

The specific objectives of the study are:

(i) To examine the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger.

(ii) To examine why Nigeria closed its borders with Niger Republic in the course of fighting

the insurgency.

(iii) To examine how the Boko Haram insurgency has affected Nigeria-Niger Republic

diplomatic relations.

(iv) To identify the security framework Nigeria and Niger Republic adopted in combating

Boko Haram insurgency.

1.4 The Significance of the Study

This study provides an in-depth understanding of the security implications of Boko Haram

insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic diplomatic relations and serves as future reference

for further studies on the topic.

1.5 Research Assumptions

This study establishes the following Assumptions:

(i) Boko Haram insurgency has altered the security situation between Nigeria and Niger

Republic.

(ii) Nigeria closed its borders with Niger Republic for allowing Boko Haram insurgents to

use its territory as hide-out.

(iii) The activities of Boko Haram has caused diplomatic row between Nigeria and Niger

Republic.

(iv) Nigeria and Niger Republic did not adopt a common security framework in combating

Boko Haram insurgency.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study covers a period between 2009 and 2015. The period is very significant because it

captures the escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency from Nigeria‟s territory to Niger

Republic and its security implications for the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

However, the study also makes reference to vital issues relating to the work before and after

the period under study.

The major limitation of the research was the delay encountered in getting the audience of the

respondents due to bureaucracy at the Embassy of the Republic of Niger and Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja. However, this did not affect the quality of the research

because through patience, perseverance and consistency the researcher was eventually
granted the permission to conduct the interview which helped tremendously in achieving the

objectives of the research.

1.7 Organisation of Chapters

This study is organised into five chapters. Chapter one focuses on the general background,

statement of research problem, research questions, aims and objectives of the study, research

assumptions, the scope and limitations of the study. Chapter two reviews relevant literature

on the dimensions of Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations, ECOWAS collective

security, insurgency, causes of insurgency, Boko Haram insurgency and its regional

implications in a thematic order. Chapter two also looks at the linkage theory as the

theoretical framework of the study and the relevance of the theory to the topic under study.

Chapter three focuses on the methodology used to carry out the research. Chapter four

presents and analyses data on the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for

Nigeria and Niger Republic diplomatic relations. It also discusses the research findings and

verifies the assumptions posed in chapter one. Chapter five contains the summary,

conclusion, recommendations, references and appendices.

 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

In order to examine the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger

Republic diplomatic relations, this chapter reviews relevant and related literature on socio-

cultural ties, political and economic dimensions of diplomatic relations between Nigeria-

Niger Republic since independence-1960, it conceptualises security, collective security,

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) collective security, insurgency,

Boko Haram insurgency and the effects of the insurgents on regional security in a thematic

order. It also looks at the linkage theory as the theoretical framework and the relevance of the

theory to the topic under study.

2.2 Socio- Cultural Dimension of Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations

Nigeria and the Republic of Niger share common historical affinity and development. To

Boureima (1997) apart from attaining independent status the same year-1960, both have

boundaries cutting across each other‟s territorial land mark. In fact, the two countries have

their political boundaries arbitrarily and artificially redrawn by colonialists. Furthermore,

they both have ethnic affinity that is, Hausa, Fulani, Dendi, Buduma, Dulani, Shuwa and

Kanuri. They had both been bound together too by the influence of Islam as reflected in the

prosecution and outcome of Shehu Usman Danfodio‟s Jihad. It is within this context that

Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations can better be understood and situated. Some people from

the Nigerian states bordering Niger that is, Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Borno, Kebbi and Yobe

can trace their maternal or paternal lineages to Niger Republic. Likewise a number of people

from the neighbouring region of the Niger Republic have their roots in Nigeria. The

relationship that existed and still exists among the people of the two countries is manifested

through inter-marriages and trade. There have also been free movements of people and goods
between the two countries even before the inception of ECOWAS (Asiwaju and Barkindo,

1993). The level of cordiality is greatly influenced by the fact that Nigeria particularly the

northern beliefs, economic and socio-cultural affinities tally with those of Niger and cannot

be separated. The two countries have thus continued to work together towards enhancing the

aspirations that bind them together (Boureima, 1997). As a matter of fact, since 1970 when

the late Hamani Diori attended the Argungu Fishing Festival in Nigeria and subsequently

when his family spent holidays with Gowon‟s family at Dodan Barracks, highly placed

officials of the two states have participated in each other cultural festivals (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.3 Nigeria and Niger Republic Relations- Consolidation of National Power and

Sovereignty, their Political Interactions within Africa, Attitudes toward Each Others,

and their Interactions within UN

Nwokedi (1992) in his work titled: “Nigeria and Niger: The Mechanisms of Compatibility

and Consensus” explained in details the relationships between Nigeria and Niger Republic

since independence, the consolidation of national power and sovereignty. The relationships

between Nigeria and Niger at the early years of independence were at best, correct as the

political leadership in the two state devoted much time to the consolidation of their national

power and sovereignty. In Nigeria, the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, had the

most challenging task of building a consensus within a Federal Constitution from its disparate

ethnic groups which constitute the country. In Niger Republic the President Hamani Diori,

who had been aided to office by the colonial establishment saw his power contested by his

main rival, Djibo Bakary (Chaffard, 1967). Thus, the correct bilateral relations between

Nigeria and Niger were also characterised by instances of benign neglect as the two states

looked inward (Nwokedi, 1992).

If the foreign policies of the two states were conceptualised at this period as consisting of

three major concentric circles then similarities existed in their patterns of foreign policy

behaviour. For both Nigeria and Niger, the inner most of the concentric circles represented

the priority relations with erstwhile colonial powers and with their zones of influence. Thus,

there were Britain and the Commonwealth for Nigeria, and France and Francophone Africa

for Niger. Bilateral relations between the two states were subsumed under the layer

framework of their inter-African relations which constituted the second concentric circle. The

third concentric circle was made up of their interactions within the United Nations as well as

with other states or areas not covered by the preceding circles (Nwokedi, 1992).

Ahmad (1984) in his work titled: Political and Diplomatic Interactions between Nigeria and

Niger wrote that in terms of intra-African relations, Niger policies fall in line with those of

Nigeria. On the contrary, on international issues outside Africa, Niger‟s policy is guided by

her own national interests, no matter if it comes in conflict with Nigeria‟s foreign policy

preferences.

On African unity according to him, the two countries were united about African unity. By the

end of 1960, most of the French African colonies as well as Nigeria had become sovereign

and began to address their minds more seriously to African problems. Niger, as one of the

Francophone African countries, attended the Brazzaville Conference in December 1960 to

discuss the Congo situation. The Conference achieved nothing except the inception of a

moderate and pro-French African bloc which came to be known as the Brazzaville group and

supported Kasavubu, the first President of the independent Congo, in his conflict with the

country‟s Premier, Patrice Lumumba. In 1960, independent African states were divided into

two blocs when the Casablanca Conference repudiated Kasavubu and supported Lumumba‟s

cause. Nigeria, Liberia and Sudan were left as middle-roaders. To bridge the gulf that had

taken place between the two groups, Nigeria spearheaded a campaign to arrange a conference
of heads of African states and Malagasy. Niger was one of the heads of the members of the

Brazzaville group that had been won over by Nigeria and it subsequently participated in the

Monrovia Conference held in May 1961. The Conference was not attended by the states of

the Casablanca bloc. Various resolutions passed by the Monrovia Conference reflected the

principles which Nigeria had vigorously advocated. The Conference rejected the idea of a

political union of African states. Nigeria‟s stand on this point had been unequivocal.

Speaking on this question at the Addis Ababa Conference, in 1960, the Nigerian delegate

Alhaji Maitama Sule said: “We must not be sentimental: we must be realistic. It is for this

reason that we would like to point out that at this moment the idea of forming a union of

African States is pre-mature. On the other hand, we do not dispute the sincerity and indeed

the good intentions of those peoples who advocated it. But we feel that such a move is too

radical-perhaps too ambitious to be of any lasting benefit” (Thompson, 1969).

The Monrovia Conference, however, allowed African states to form a voluntary union with

other states, if they so wished. The Conference agreed to establish a commission of technical

experts to work out plans for cooperation in economic, educational, cultural, scientific and

technical fields. On the eve of the foreign minister‟s conference held before the Addis

Ababa summit of 1963, four different attitudes to African unity had emerged. Libya, Sudan

advocated for a single African Charter on the lines of Atlantic Charter to which all African

states could subscribe. The second view advocated for a loose association of African states

to be set up within the framework of an all-African organisation. The third group was of the

opinion that it was too early to talk of organic unity, because what the situation called for

was economic cooperation among African countries. Nigeria, Ethiopia and some members

of the Brazzaville group advocated for a step by step approach for African unity through

regional organisations. The fourth view, advocated by Ghana and other Casablanca
members, aimed at bringing about a real and organic unity among the continental states

(Cervenka, 1969).

The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), approved at the Addis Ababa

summit in 1963, was a victory for the Nigerian view of African unity. This feeling of

success was echoed by Justice Elias when he said:

The new Charter is substantially the same as the Lagos

Charter (December 1962) as a close study of both
documents would really show. The new organisation, it is
important to emphasise, is essentially the same as the one
outline in Monrovia and affirmed in Lagos (Elias, 1965).

The Republic of Niger endorsed the views held by Nigeria and by implication accepted its

leadership role, as did many states who had accepted the invitation and participated in the

Monrovia and Lagos Conferences. That Niger‟s attitude towards African unity was in

agreement with Nigeria was reflected in the speech of Hamani Diori, President of Niger, at

the Addis Ababa summit. He urged African nations to suppress their differences and become

united. He declared his support for an African Charter which should respect the sovereignty

of each state and disallow interference in the internal affairs of others (African Diary, June

1963). In fact, respect for sovereignty and non-interference are two basic principles of

Nigerian foreign policy and they found a place in the Monrovia, Lagos and OAU Charters.

The two countries, Niger and Nigeria, held identical views on the question of African unity

and agreed to adopt a cautious and gradual approach towards achieving it. Both had rejected

the idea of a cohesive political union of African states, both had proclaimed at the Monrovia

Conference a non-political but functional approach, and both resisted institutionalisation in

African Relations beyond the barest minimum and were vehemently opposed to the creation

of supra-national decision making pan-African bodies. These they regarded as incompatible

with state sovereignty. The Nigerian leaders believed that African unity could be best attained

through functional cooperation in various fields such as transport, trade, communication,

currency, education and science. Prime Minister Balewa emphasised this theme at the OAU

Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos in 1964:

We in Nigeria believe that by taking genuine political steps in the

economic, educational, scientific cooperation and by trying first
to understand ourselves we should get nearer towards the solution
of the problems and establish unity and cohesion (African Diary
April, 1964).

Niger‟s policy was in harmony with Nigeria and there seemed to be no misgivings about it.

In pursuit of this policy both countries have taken many steps. To improve economic

cooperation, trade and customs agreements were signed between them. In 1962, the Chad

Basin Commission was formed to develop Lake Chad for irrigation and power producing

purposes with Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon as members. By 1964, the River Niger

Commission was set-up which, besides Niger and Nigeria comprised Benin, Cameroon,

Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Upper Volta (Ahmad, 1984).

The tendency by both states to maintain privileged relations with their different colonial

masters was quite understandable but in the case of Niger the quest for Francophone

solidarity had other explanations. It has often been argued that France‟s desire to encourage

diverse institutional networking between states that used to be members of its colonial

possessions in Africa was to preserve these as its privileged zone of influence on the

continent. It has since been established that with the disintegration of France‟s two

conglomerate possessions in Africa- Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF) and Afrique

Occidentale Francaise (AOF) the encouragement of Francophone solidarity was

hypothetically an insurance for Niger, for example, against territorial, political and cultural

incursions from countries such as Nigeria (Nwokedi, 1992).

The establishment of the Conseil de l‟Entente to which Niger belongs was, on the one hand, a

manifestation of the close personnel ties and a convergence in the political and ideological

beliefs between Felix Houphouet Boigny and his counterparts from Niger, Benin, Togo and
Burkina Faso. This organisation was used on the one hand, as a machine de guerre against the

federative inclination of Senegal‟s former President Leopold Sedar Senghor and Kwame

Nkrumah‟s revolutionary fervour. It could therefore be argued that to the extent that both

Nigeria and Niger sought close identification with colonially inspired organisations their

bilateral relations suffered an unintended neglect (Nwokedi, 1992). Niger‟s apprehensions of

Nigeria as is evident from Diori Hamani‟s statement according to Nwokedi (1985) are not

altogether justified. Nigeria did not share Nkrumah‟s revolutionary immediate unification

approach to African unity- a prospect that would have affected the national sovereignties. It

worked for the gradualist approach to continental unity as was to be enshrined in the Charter

of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Moreover, Nigeria has been one of the African

States that scrupulously adhere to the 1964 OAU declaration on the intangibility of inherited

boundaries in Africa. According to Hamani:

Do not be surprised if we are swallowed up by Nigeria. Our

national routes are directed through Nigeria. Our cattle are
exported to Nigeria and many of our people come from there. If
we are swallowed up, it will be as much your fault for leaving us
alone as it is ours (West Africa 7 July, 1972).

Nevertheless, Nigeria‟s decision to break diplomatic relations with France in 1961 over the

country‟s atomic test in the Sahara and to prevent French aircraft and merchant vessels from

overflying its airspace and calling at its port respectively left Niger in a precarious

predicament. Although this Nigerian action against France did not come within the framework

of its bilateral relations with Niger, it had consequences for this country which depended then

almost entirely on Nigeria port facilities, roads and railway for its export and import of goods.

It was pressure from Niger, among other neighbours which induced Nigeria to lift the

restrictions placed on French aircraft and vessels (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.3.1 Nigeria’s Attitude towards Niger Republic during the Period the Niger’s

Opposition Leader- Djibo Bakary was Trying to Overthrow Diori Hamani’s Regime

Nwokedi (1992) stated that the activities of certain political groups in Nigeria, especially

Aminu Kano‟s Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) had security implications for

Nigeria-Niger relations during the period Djibo Bakary was trying to overthrow President

Diori Hamani in Niger. Djibo Bakary, a leading Niger‟s politician had been largely favoured

to win the pre-independence election but owing to his radical bent and indeed his close

association with Sekou Toure of Guinea, the colonial authority, turned the tables against him

as Diori Hamani was elected (Chaffard, 1967). Djibo Bakary whose political base was the

Hausa speaking districts of Niger Republic went underground as he sought to redress his

electoral fortune through an extra constitutional method. Bakary was first supported by Benin

(Dahomey) Republic which had axes to grind with Niger over the unceremonious expulsion

of its nationals from that country and over the inconsequential Lete Island on the River Niger.

As Benin‟s support waned, Bakary found support from NEPU, whose members share similar

cultural affinity and ideological purity with Bakary‟s Sawaba Party. Using Kano as a base,

Sawaba elements infiltrated easily back into Niger where they caused disaffection against

Diori Hamani. It was quite obvious that Sawaba‟s activities in Nigeria had the blessing of

neither the Northern Regional government nor the Federal government. No wonder then that

this party was banned by the Federal government in 1964. But its activities had served to raise

the security consciousness of Niger Republic as its national power and sovereignty were being

consolidated (Nwokedi, 1992).

Ahmad (1984) stated that during the two decades of the Nigeria-Niger relationship, there

could have been no better opportunity for Nigeria to extend her territorial boundaries rather

than supporting the banned Sawaba Party and its leader, Djibo Bakary, when he was trying to

overthrow Diori Hamani‟s regime. As early as 1958, Djibo Bakary, the leader of the majority
party in the Territorial Assembly of Niger, had announced that Sawaba Party would vote

„No‟ in the ensuing referendum for the establishment of the Franco-Africa Community. He

said Niger would become independent and then join, not the community, but the Association

of Free States without prejudice to a possible future federation with Nigeria (Mortimer, 1969).

This was an opportunity for Nigeria leaders to annex Niger Republic by supporting Djibo

Bakary Sawaba‟s leader with money and weapons. Nigeria in line with her foreign policy

principle accepted the colonial boundaries between the two countries and advocated for non-

interference in the internal affairs of another state. This principle helped develop fraternal

relations between the two states. Nigeria‟s weak neighbours in general and Niger in particular

must have felt a sense of security. In line with this principle, Nigerian government refused to

give any verbal and material support to Sawaba. Djibo Bakary was reported to have requested

Nigeria for support but Prime Minister Balewa turned a deaf ear to the request. Alhaji Shehu

Shagari the former president, who was then Minister of Economic Development, happened to

meet Bakary in 1960 in Bamako. Djibo assured Shagari that once he got power, Niger would

federate with Nigeria (Alhaji Shehu Shagari, 1978). Later, when Shagari personally conveyed

Bakary‟s message to the Prime Minister (PM), the PM replied:

It is premature for Nigeria to start encouraging dissident

groups in the neighbouring countries. We do not want to
offend our neighbours. Nigeria has had enough problems
herself (Alhaji Shehu Shagari, 1978).

President Diori Hamani of Niger felt greatly indebted to Nigerian leaders for their policy

towards Sawaba. Seven years later, the Civil War in Nigeria provided an opportunity to Diori

to reciprocate this gesture of goodwill. Whereas Niger‟s efforts at consolidating its national

power and sovereignty were yielding positive result thanks to the series of bilateral and

multilateral agreements which it signed with France and other French-speaking African
countries, Nigeria‟s efforts proved more difficult as the country suffered two successful coups

d‟ etat in 1966 alone before sliding into a civil war in 1967 (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.3.2 Niger’s Attitude towards Nigeria during Nigeria’s Civil War

The Republic of Niger thought itself duty-bound to reciprocate the goodwill gesture earlier

extended to it by Nigeria in Sawaba‟s case. President Diori in considering the Nigerian crisis

had to bear in mind the land-locked Niger‟s dependence on Nigerian railways as its vital link

with the sea. He could ill afford to alienate Nigeria because of his country‟s proximity to and

economic ties with Nigeria. The economic aspect aside, the President was fully aware that as

fellow Muslims, the people of Niger had a natural affection and attachment to the people of

the Northern Nigeria; they also claimed the same ethnic origin. While Niger openly supported

Nigerian cause and condemned the secession, it was for her own national interest that she

took an active part in the peacemaking efforts to bring an end to the tragic and serious

situation in Nigeria (Ahmad, 1984). The outbreak of the Civil War adversely affected Niger‟s

foreign trade as it could no longer export its produce mainly groundnut through, or received

its imports from the Port-Harcourt harbour in the South East of Nigeria (Africa Research

Bulleting 30 June 1968). Although an alternative arrangement was made for Niger to channel

its foreign trade through the ports of Lagos and Cotonou, these were definitely longer, riskier

and costlier routes. According to Nwokedi (1992) the foregoing consideration coupled with

the dense socio-cultural and economic relations between Nigeria and Niger no doubt

influenced Niger‟s Government in not just supporting the Federal Government of Nigeria, but

in working for a quick return to normalcy in Nigeria. Firstly, Niger was a member together

with Cameroon, Zaire and Ethiopia of the ad-hoc committee of the Organisation of African

Unity (OAU) which was charged with the responsibility for resolving the Nigerian crises. It

was at the meeting of this committee held in Niamey in July 1968 that General Gowon then

Nigeria‟s Head of State and Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu the leader of the secessionist Biafra
were able to put in personal appearance. Secondly, apart from peace brokerage, Niger

according to General Olusegun Obasanjo purchased arms and ammunition on her (Nigeria‟s)

behalf from countries that would not sell direct to Nigeria (Obasanjo, 1980).

Nwokedi (1992) stated that as a matter of fact, Niger‟s total support for Nigeria‟s territorial

integrity and national unity was not a straight forward matter for that country as it seems. It

was a courageous decision. In spite of Diori‟s flimsy proposal in 1961 to form a Nigeria-

Niger political union, his apprehensions of Nigerian economic and demographic size were

common knowledge. It was these apprehensions which induced first, Felix Houphouet

Boigny, and later General Charles De Gualle at the prompting of the Ivorian leader to seek to

dismember Nigeria by supporting Biafra during the Civil War (Baker, 1970). The personal

and official ties between Diori Hamani and Felix Houphouet-Boigny were quite close; the

former was the leader of Niger‟s section of the latter‟s Rassemblement Democratique

Africain. In the course of the war, Diori Hamani was the President of the influential

Francophone body, Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) (Bach, 1978). It

was therefore both ironical and remarkable that Niger, one of the intended beneficiaries of a

positive outcome from the Ivorian and French pro-Biafra stance was doggedly in support of

the Federal Government of Nigeria. This was a realistic stance because a successful Biafra

would never have offered land-locked Niger an access to the sea. Before the Nigerian Civil

War came to an end in 1970, Nigeria and Niger had reached some agreements such the trade

agreement of 1969 whose faithful implementation would be expected to increase the value of

their bilateral transactions (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.3.3 Niger’s Attitude towards Nigeria over Dialogue with South Africa, and in the

Ghana-Nigeria Tension over Leadership Tussle in Africa

Regarding dialogue with South Africa, Ivory Coast President Houphouet suggested in

October 1970 that dialogue could be used to persuade South Africa to abandon her apartheid
policy. This proposal infuriated General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria, Mobutu of Congo, and

Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Ivorian President won the support of Ghana, Mali, Benin and so

forth. Relations between Nigeria and Niger were more strengthened. Diori was not able to

condemn Houphouet openly because of his personal friendship with him. In order not to

annoy Nigeria, Niger abstained from voting on the declaration rejecting the dialogue proposal

(Ahmad, 1984). In the Ghana-Nigeria tension over leadership tussle on the continent of

Africa, Niger rejected Ghana‟s policies and supported Nigeria morally, politically and

diplomatically. Niger accused Ghana of supplying material support to the Sawaba party to

overthrow the government of Niger in 1963 (Ahmad, 1984).

2.3.4 Nigeria and Niger Republic Voting Patterns in the United Nations

According to Ahmad (1984), in the United Nations, Niger pursued an independent line.

Niger‟s voting pattern in some issues in the United Nations showed that on international

questions her behaviour was determined by domestic interests and dependence on France for

economic assistance. Niger voted with the United States against the People Republic of

China‟s (PRC‟s) membership. Contrary to Niger‟s policy, Nigeria supported PRC‟s

representation in the UN and voted against the United States‟ resolution. Niger and Nigeria

were also committed to the struggle against the racist policies of South Africa by supporting

the expulsion of South Africa from the UN. The voting attitude of Nigeria and Niger on

resolutions relating to the Middle East wars and Palestine questions present a different picture

of the relationship between the two countries. Before 1966, Nigeria‟s behaviour was not

sympathetic to the Arab cause; Prime Minister Balewa‟s policy was neutrality. On seventeen

occasions when votes were taken at the UN, Nigeria voted six times for pro-Arab resolution,

four times favoured neither Arabs nor Israel and abstained seven times. The pro-Arab

resolutions supported by Nigeria, dealt with the plight of Palestinian refugees. However,

Nigeria‟s attitude changed after the Civil War. Israel was reported to have supported the
cause of the Biafra rebels while the Arab world strongly supported the Nigerian government.

Egypt supported Nigeria materially by sending pilot and arms. Nigeria then realised that her

true friends were those who upheld Nigerian unity. This led to a change in its Middle East

policy in favour of the Arab. On the other hand, Niger supported the Arab cause all along,

and condemned Israel‟s forcible occupation of Arab land. After the Civil War, Nigeria joined

hands with Niger and began to vote in favoured of the Palestinian right of self determination

(Ahmad, 1984).

2.4 Economic Dimension of Nigeria-Niger Republic Diplomatic Relations

Nigeria and Niger Republic by both design and sheer coincidence are very important

commercial partners whose economies complement (Nwokedi, 1992). It could therefore be

asserted that each state has a large stake in ensuring that the other maintains a more or less

healthy economy. This is a critical component in the search for mutual security. All the

same, these efforts have not completely dissipated Niger‟s apprehensions of Nigeria

(Nwokedi, 1992). With the problem of consolidation of national power and sovereignty

resolved in both Nigeria and Niger Republic as it appeared their bilateral relations seemed-set

to attain new heights. At the local level, trade flourishes between Nigeria and Niger Republic

particularly through border markets at Ilela, Jibia, Mai Aduwa, Garki, Maigatari, etc. The

agreement that ushered in a trade treaty and later on, Joint Commission for Cooperation

between the two states was designed to address not only the disparities in their policies which

encouraged unwholesome trade practices across their international frontiers but also to boost

trade. Although smuggling across the 1,600 kilometres long border which separate Nigeria

and Niger has been as old as the states themselves, it was the latter‟s deliberate use of pricing

policy to attract Nigerian groundnuts that was significant. Groundnut was then Niger‟s major

export produce and therefore, its main foreign exchange earner (Nwokedi, 1992). According

to David Collins, the four districts of Maradi, Tessaoua; Metameye and Magaria, each of
which has a southern border with Nigeria accounted for the purchase of over ninety percent

of Niger‟s commercial groundnut crop destined for the European market (Collin, 1984). This

pricing policy was reflected in both the subsidy to groundnut farmers and in the relatively

higher purchase price and other inducements which the Niger government offered to sellers.

Because Nigeria was a larger groundnut producer than Niger and counted on other cash

crops, both the Northern Regional Government and its agent, the Marketing Board, seemed

more or less nonchalant about the cross-border commerce that led to loss of revenue.

According to Collins the very low producer prices offered in the late 1960s and early 1970s

in Nigeria and the continued weakness of the Nigerian pound relative to CFA franc combined

to produce a situation where Niger enjoyed the best of both worlds: a competitive producer

price in the border areas, a socially desirable rise in the producer price, and the accumulation

of large surpluses from its groundnut trading operations (Collins, 1984).

Indeed, this kind of attitudes was symptomatic of the gross neglect which befell Nigeria‟s

agricultural sector when petroleum gained prominence and predominance in the export

profile as from the early 1970s. However, it should not be assumed that smuggling is a uni-

directional phenomenon because there are other aspects to it such as the case of cattle

smuggling into Nigeria from Niger. With the decline in Nigeria‟s groundnut production in

the early 1970s as a result of the nation‟s unprecedented oil revenue, cattle from Niger to

Nigeria became the major object of illegal cross-border commerce (Nwokedi, 1992). Since

the 1980s Nigerian traffickers have specialised in smuggling into Niger petroleum products

and consumer goods as they seek to exploit the disparity in the exchange rate between the

CFA Franc and the Naira. This phenomenon as well as the influx of West African nationals

into Nigeria was said to have been partly responsible for Nigeria‟s sudden decision in

1984 to shut all its international borders thereby affecting adversely trade relations with its

neighbours (The Guardian March 7, 1990).

The 1969 trade set the formal framework for Nigeria-Niger trade relations (Africa Research

Bulletin Economic, September 30, 1969). As is customary with such agreements, the two

states granted each other the most-favoured-nation status in all matters affecting import and

export trade with the exception of non-area origin products and other concessions or

exemptions which either party would have granted to adjacent countries or to fellow

members of a Customs Union, Free Trade Area or a Monetary Zone existing or yet to be

established (Nwokedi, 1982). At this point in time Niger belonged to the Customs Unions of

West African States (UDEAO) and to the Franc Zone Monetary Arrangement. As a member

of the Conseil de l„Entent, Niger boycotted in 1968, a meeting sponsored by the Economic

Commission for Africa (ECA) which Nigeria supported for discussions on the possible

creation of an all-embracing West African Economic Community (Nwokedi, 1992).

Moreover, the agreement granted transit rights within each other‟s territory as well as the use

of ports facilities for landlocked Niger. Goods to be traded ranged from agricultural produce

to manufactured products. Whereas Nigeria was to supply Niger with about seventeen

manufactured products and purchase five of such goods from Niger, the latter would sell

about twelve agricultural produce and eight semi-manufactured products to Nigeria and

receive, in return, five respectively of the same categories of goods from Nigeria. Payment

for these various goods was to be made in mutually agreed convertible currencies through the

normal banking channels (Nwokedi, 1982). This agreement came into force in 1970. Both

countries decided in November of the same year during Diori Hamani‟s official visit to

Nigeria, to establish a Joint Commission for Co-operation within which framework their

bilateral relations would henceforth be addressed. The Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for

Co-operation (NNJC) was the first of such Commission between Nigeria and other countries

to have it permanent Headquarters built at Niamey and manned by an international staff

headed by a Senior Nigerian government functionary. Its establishment reflects the

importance of the trade relations between both countries (Nwokedi, 1992).

2.4.1 Aid Relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic

In terms of aid relations between the two countries, aid as instrument of foreign policy

became prominent in Nigeria‟s African diplomacy as from the early 1970. This was a logical

consequence of its newly found oil wealth. Most aid was in the form cash grants which were

quite often misused by the recipient states and was not always intended to secure political,

economic and security advantages for Nigeria in the recipient nation (Nwokedi, 1992).

Nevertheless, in spite of the strongly humanitarian dimension to Nigeria‟s aid to Niger there

is no doubt whatsoever that they are equally intended to promote their search for

compatibility and consensus with the diverse security framework for their interactions.

Nigeria‟s aid to Niger has sought mainly to guarantee food security to this drought stricken

country. Apart from bringing immediate relief to Nigeriens, the drought aid has always been

intended to help Niger rehabilitate both its livestock and agriculture whose product finds

ready market in Nigeria. It can be assumed; in addition, that the success attained in these

areas would help keep Nigeriens at home instead of their mass exodus as has often been the

case, to Nigeria in search of relief and security (Nwokedi, 1992).

Besides relief assistance Nigeria has accorded other forms of aid to Niger Republic. The first

is about road construction which is designed to facilitate their commercial exchanges. In

1978, for example, Nigeria officially handed over to Niger Republic a double-carriage bridge

built at a cost of 668, 000 Naira and which links the two countries. On that occasion the

Nigerian Minister of Works and Housing General M. Shuwa recalled that in 1974 the

Nigerian government had similarly handed over to Niger, the road which it built to Illela-

Nigeria and Birni-Nkoni-Niger (Federal Ministry of Information, 1978). These gestures no

doubt encouraged Seyni Kountche to request Nigeria during his official visit to Lagos in
November 1980 to help his country finance the Zinder-Agaden section of the so-called

Uranium highway (Le Sahel Niamey, 14 November, 1980). Furthermore, scholarships have

been awarded to Nigeriens to study in Nigerian Universities in keeping with the Cultural and

Technical agreement which the two states signed in December 1976. On a non official level,

Nigeriens from Maradi and Zinder districts attend Koranic schools in Sokoto and Kano

(Bach, 1984).

2.4.2 Industrial Cooperation between Nigeria and Niger

There is also significant industrial cooperation between Nigeria and Niger. In January 1972

Nigeria agreed to supply about 30,000 kilowatts of electric power to Niger from its Kainji

dam. The construction of the grid through the 600 kilometres separating Kainji from Niamey

and the greater part of which runs through Nigerian territory facilitated Nigeria‟s

electrification programme (West Africa No 2849, 21 January 1972). The success of this

scheme no doubt influenced the two states to reach agreement in 1988 to construct a 132

kilovolt power extension project from Katsina-Nigeria to Maradi in Niger Republic (The

Guardian 29 April, 1988). It is significant that has gone ahead in spite of Niger‟s decision to

proceed with the construction of the Kandadji dam over the River Niger (West Africa No

3762 25 September 1989).

As part of their industrial cooperation, Nigeria invested directly in Niger‟s mining sector.

Nigeria‟s participation in Niger‟s iron ore and phosphate mining is well within its overall

objective of solidifying intra-ECOWAS links. At the same time Nigeria needs Niger‟s iron

ore and phosphate for its Ajaokuta Steel Complex and fertiliser plant at Kaduna respectively.

The objective of Nigeria‟s interest in Niger‟s uranium industry is not clear (Nwokedi, 1992).

Indeed, by a 16 percent interest in Niger‟s uranium industry for which it paid an initial sum

of

1.6 million naira (Federal Ministry Information New Release, 1977), Nigeria was merely
responding to Niger‟s request to have an African finance capital represented in an industry
where Western-French, Japanese, West Germany and British capital predominates (Nwokedi,

1992).

Nigeria and Niger have encouraged the development of other infrastructures which should

enhance their search for compatibility and consensus. An air services agreement exists

between the two countries and direct telephone links were established between Niamey,

Lagos and Kaduna and between Katsina and Maradi as part of their common neighbouring

link project (West Africa No 3713, 10 October 1998).

There is no doubt whatsoever that Nigeria and Niger have endeavoured to institutionalise

their bilateral relations through the establishment of a Joint Commission. Nigeria has offered

assistance to Niger by way of loans, grants and direct investment in the latter‟s economy.

Thus, their economic relations, especially trade links, are particularly important. This is not

obscure, however, other relations which have consequence for their bilateral relations

(Nwokedi, 1992).

Niger policy towards Nigeria has been rather ambivalent at times. It seeks close cooperation

with Nigeria at the same time as it seeks Francophone solidarity as an insurance against a

spurious Nigerian hegemony. Diori insisted that it would be unrealistic for any West African

Economic grouping to exclude Nigeria from membership. Yet, he took his country into the all

Francophone Communaute Economique de L‟Afrique de L‟Ouest (CEAO) and went ahead

to become its first president despite the largesse which his country derived from Nigeria‟s

spraying diplomacy in support of ECOWAS (Ojo, 1980). Niger‟s close relations with France

and with other Francophone African States were instrumental in its joining the CEAO. France

remains Niger‟s largest aid donor and it best economic partner. Yet, once Franco-Nigerien

relations experienced difficulties in the 1970s it was first to Canada and later to Libya that

Niger turned to in order to counter-balance French predominance. Diori Hamani‟s insistence

on breaking French monopoly on Niger‟s uranium which included the fixing of its selling

price contributed to France‟s reluctance to save his regime from collapse (Higgoty and

Fuglestad, 1978). Part of the disenchantment with Niger‟s first President might have been the

nature of the wide range relations he established with Colonel Gaddafi. Apart from a military

agreement between Libya and Niger which was signed in March 1974, economic, cultural

and technical conventions were also signed between the two states, in one breath a joint bank

and a joint company for the exploitation of livestock and meat were established. Libya

encouraged Niger to adopt an arabisation policy in which the language would co-exist with

French as language of instruction in Nigerien schools. The point is that Niger preferred Libya

to Nigeria in this countervailing diplomacy whose aspects threatened both the Hausa

language project Nigeria had with Niger and Nigeria‟s vital economic interests in that

country (Nwokedi, 1992). Although Seyni Kountche went ahead to downgrade his country‟s

military relations with France and abrogated the Negro-Libyan treaty, his room for

manoeuvre was slim. While Libyan troops occupied Chad, Colonel Gaddafi proclaimed

himself the protector of the Toureg population part of who inhabit Northern Niger

(Langellier, 1987) Nigerian response in the early 1980s to the Libyan presence in Chad which

threatened Niger‟s security was, on a bilateral basis (Nwokedi, 1992). Furthermore, Nigeria

examined in what way Niger‟s diversification of its access to the sea through Benin Republic

and Cote d‟ Ivoire affected the intensity of their bilateral relations. Assurances from Nigeria

to Niger on this score would include avoiding a situation as was the case in 1977, where

Nigeria muscled its way to a UN Security Council seat at the expense of Niger which has

been endorsed earlier for that position by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). To be

sure, Nigeria-Niger bilateral relations are not altogether exclusive of their other multilateral

linkages. Thus, the Kamudugu-Yobe irrigation projects within which the two states have

undertaken under the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and other projects
within the Niger Basin Authority are bound to affect their bilateral relations (Nwokedi,

1992).

The cordiality of relationship between Nigeria and Niger Republic is informed by the forces

of history and other aspects of their socio-cultural norms, and values. This is extended to the

military aspect of their relations. Military cooperation between Nigeria and Niger Republic is

an attempt by the two countries to control illegal activities within and around their border

posts (Boureima, 1997). The activities or menace of drug trafficking, prevention and

detection of crimes, repatriation of criminals and their loots among others have all made the

issue of military cooperation necessary today. In spite of the fact that there is yet to be a

coherent and finalised military pact between Nigeria and Niger, through mutual trust,

understanding and consensus they have been able to cooperate militarily with each other.

This form of military cooperation is however fluid (Boureima, 1997).

2.5 Security Matters in ECOWAS

2.5.1 Security

Security matters in ECOWAS can better be comprehended when the term security and

collective security are understood. There is no consensus among scholars on the meaning of

security. To Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2011), security is generally linked with the

improvement of threats to cherished principles, particularly the survival of groups,

individuals or objects in the future. Accordingly, concern for survival entails a preoccupation

with security (Art, 1993).

Security is “Survival-Plus” and the world “plus” could be understood from the standpoint of

being able to enjoy some freedom from life-determining threats and some life choices (Booth,

2007).
Security is not an independent concept. It is always related to individual or societal system

(Brauch, 2003). Nye averred that based on the assumptions of the realist theory of

international relations that security is the dominant concern for states, that force is the major

instrument that governments preserve their unity as they interact with one another-security is

achieved once threats to security can be prevented or at least managed (Nye, 1988).

Lippman based the security of a nation in terms of its core values. He believed that, a state is

secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes

to avoid war and is able, if challenged to maintain them by victory in such a war (Lippman,

1943). The protection of a nation‟s core values from threats constitutes a state‟s national

security. National security is tantamount to national interest (Morgenthau, 1948). For

Okorofor, Nzenwa, and Oti (2012), national security can be described as the sum of the

efforts, energy, intelligence, commitment and the use of institutions and their products to

enforce and ensure adequate protection of interest, people and properties of a nation. It also

involves the overall protection of a nation‟s integrity and sovereignty through the use of

economic resources, diplomacy, power projection and political power.

Mcsweeney (1999) unlike the state centric definition of security opined that security should

accord priority to human beings since without reference to humans, security is of no value.

Contrary to the realist theory, social constructivism perceives security as resulting from the

interactions of various actors, with societal values and identities shaping these relations. Once

the perception of security has changed, and the fear of one another is overcome, security is

achieved (Ulusoy, 2003).

Security can only be achieved by combined efforts (Booth, 1999). In this perspective,

security entails that a certain level of trust between actors needs to be achieved by sharing

commitments. The common security approach reflects this: International security must rest
on a commitment to joint survival rather than on the threat of mutual destruction (Palme,

1982).

In Mc Namara view, the security of any nation or entity does not lie on its military

preparedness alone. Security is not force though it may involve it, security is not traditional

military activity though it may encompass it; security is not military hardware though it may

include it, security is development and without development, there can be no security

(McNamara, 1968).

The various perspectives of security given above indeed give insight into the word security.

Security is very vital to human survival and the development of the society. Nothing

meaningful can be achieved in a chaotic and violence environment. Thus, if Nigeria and

Niger Republic are facing serious security challenges threatening their national interests

along their borders from the insurgents or armed bandits, it can affect their trade relationships

and impede growth and development in the two countries. For them to solve this common

problem there is the need for the two states to collaborate through collective security

mechanism.

2.5.2 Collective Security

The growing concern for peace and security has necessitated states to protect themselves

either on individual or collective basis in the international system. The contemporary

international system does not encourage isolationism. It is characterised by interdependence

among states. States come together in order to solve their common political, economic and

security problems. This has led to the increase in the establishment of many international

organisations across the world such as the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN),

African Union (AU), Organisation of American State (OAS), Arab League, South East Asia

Treaty Organisation (SEATO), European Union (EU), Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) and so forth to promote their interests, peace and security at the

global, regional and sub-regional levels.

Wight (1996) argued: “If there is an international society, then, there is an order of some kind

to be maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of collective interest and

security acquires a broad meaning- it be enjoyed or pursued in common.” According to

Abdullahi (2014) the world is concerned about security, be it on individual basis or

collectively. The continent of Africa has witnessed various types of crises such as militancy,

religious crisis, insurgencies, political, and economic conflicts, territorial disputes and so

forth. Some of the conflict ridden zones are Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic

of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Central Africa Republic, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria and so

forth. Scholars have given reasons for the causes of conflicts on the continent of Africa. The

continent is confronted by lots of security problems occasioned by cultural, political and

socio-economic conditions. The crises across the continent have necessitated the need for

collective security and collective action among the countries in the continent in order to

resolve the conflicts under the umbrella of national, sub-regional, regional and Global levels

respectively (Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju, 2011).

Collective Security therefore, is a strategy adopted by members of international system to

collectively restrain the use of force among its members. The principle stipulates that

members would take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats

to peace and for the suppression of aggressive acts and breaches of the peace (Omede, 2004).

Apart from its being instrumental to the establishment of regional security arrangement, the

collective security concept has also been adopted in many instances around the world to

maintain international peace and security, a responsibility which is generally referred to as

peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace support and in some instances peace enforcement

operations (Omede, 2004).

The United Nations Charter (1945) in maintaining international peace and security takes

collective measures to acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and this can be done

either by the Security Council of the United Nations or the regional and sub-regional

collective security bodies. Chapter VII of the UN Charter in article 39-50 provides for

Collective defence. Also, chapter VIII of the same Charter in articles 52-54 makes provision

for the creation of regional and sub-region collective security arrangements.

Asogwa (1999), in his own contribution to the concept of collective security viewed it as a

system of world order in which aggression by any state will be met by a collective response.

It is a system which could be global or regional in which all member countries insure each

other against every member, no state is singled out in advance as the enemy and each might

be an aggressor in the future.

Orakhelashvili (2011) described collective security as a collective action in response to a

collectively identified threat. Multiple regional arrangements have been established to

compensate for the insufficiency of the United Nations by providing a regional capability to

deal with regional crisis. According to Orakhelashvili the process of multiplying institution

raised the question on how and in what manner these institutions are supposed to co-habit

within the same international legal system. While acknowledging the position of

Orakhelashvili on the concept of collective security, his question is already addressed by

Article 52 of the UN Charter which provides the legal basis for the establishment of regional

institutions. The United Nations Charter provides the framework for the existence of a

regional security organisation. It approves their formation provided their actions and

activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It further

states it can use the arrangement or agencies for enforcement activities where necessary and

the Security Council shall be informed at all times of activities undertaken or in

contemplation under the regional arrangement or agencies for the maintenance of

international peace and security (Article, 52-54, United Nations Charter, 1945).

This could be reiterated that the concern and interest of the United Nation regional action for

peace and security was considerably heightened by the incessant intra-state conflicts which in

most cases were limited in geographical scope. It is in accordance with the global purposes

and the principles of the United Nations that the Security Council had over the years

encouraged the formation and also supported the activities of such regional organisations like

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The priority

accorded these regional organisations was the task of preventing, containing and reconciling

conflicts within their respective regions (Omede, 2004).

Kelsen (2001), said collective security is usually distinguished as the security of states in

their relations to other states, sometimes called international security, from individual

security as the security of individual human beings in their mutual, inter individual relations.

It is imperative to note that unilateral use of force is an action that is not authorised by a

competent representative of the international community, whereas collective security is an

action that is authorised by a competent organ of the international community and used on

behalf of the latter (Abass, 2012).

Onoja (1998) looked at collective security from the perspective of aggression. To him

aggression is the root cause of international conflicts and that it is precisely because of

aggression that the idea of collective security came into existence. He opined that Iraq‟s

attack on Kuwait could be regarded as a threat to peace and international security and that

the US and its allies acted lawfully and legally for and on behalf of other states when they

attacked Iraq with the ultimate aim of preventing it from committing further acts of
aggression. Onoja did not acknowledge that the US and its allies intervened in Iraq in order to

safeguard their interests in the region and wage war against potential enemies in the region.

Johnson and Niemeyer (1954) looked at concept of collective from a different perspective. To

them the idea seems unnatural because a system of independently conceived national security

policies implies the expectation of war as a dominant factor. But recent activities of these

bodies show that nation states are no longer at war with each other, that internal conflicts like

in the case of Liberia are mostly the problem.

Kolb (2007) stated that collective security seems too rational an abstract construct to fit

political realities. That in reality state interest and position do not suit collective security

requirements conceptually and that collective security is one of those things which are

eminently reasonable but cannot be fully realised.

The contemporary world is interconnected. If there is any aggressive act or conflict in a

country and is not quickly brought under control, it may affect other states in the international

system. Regardless of the opinion of any scholar or analyst on the concept of collective

security, there is the need for states in the international system to come together under a

platform or an organisation to prevent aggression from any state and solve their security

challenges collectively.

2.5.3 ECOWAS Collective Security

The ECOWAS collective security mechanism came into being with the adoption by member

states of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution,

Peacekeeping and Security on December 10, 1999 in Lome-Togo (Abdullahi, 2014). The

mechanism can be regarded as the organisation‟s constitution on collective security in the

West African sub-region (Ibrahim, 2008). This mechanism in the opinion of Ladan (2009)

“In science, it can be described as ground-breaking legislation on collective security within

the West African sub-region”. It is the mechanism that controls the activities of the

ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Article 17 of the Mechanism

establishes it as one of the supporting organs to assist the Mediation and Security Council

(MSC) which has been designated with great powers to act on behalf of the Authority of

Heads of State and Government. The funding of any mission is done by its member states,

with the mechanism providing for such funds to be part of the organisation‟s annual budget

(Ladan, 2009).

Prior to the adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict

Prevention, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999, attempts had been made toward

collective security through the signing of the Protocol on Non-aggression pact in Lagos in

1978, and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD) in Freetown in 1981.

Abdullahi (2014) stated that the West African leaders recognised the fact that economic

integration was not enough to move the region forward, but that addressing security problems

that threatened the economic growth itself was paramount. This is because security problems

of various member states start as internal struggle that escalate across the state to

neighbouring states. This early recognition that the success of an insurgent or revolutionary

movement in one country is bound to spread to other states led to the signing of a Non-

aggression pact in Lagos, Nigeria in 1978. That was the first step towards collective security

in West Africa. The Protocol on Non-aggression only addressed the issue of giving open

support to the various rulers in power by other rulers against their opponents. The treaty

failed to address the issue of various insurgent movements that were threatening most of the

regimes internally (Khobe, 2000). The fact that the Non-aggression Treaty did not provide

mutual security against the threats of internal insurrection, led the Member States of

ECOWAS, prodded by Nigeria and Ghana to negotiate and sign the Protocol on Mutual

Assistance in Defence (PMAD) in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 29 May, 1981 (Khobe, 2000).
To Abdullahi (2014) that was the second Mechanism aiming at collective security in the West

African sub-region. The Protocol provides for a non-standing military force to be used to

render mutual military aid and assistance to a member state that falls to a victim of external

aggression. Article 4 (b) of this protocol provides the actual purpose of its creation that is, for

a collective response where a member state falls a victim of internal armed conflict

engineered and supported actively by external forces and which is likely to endanger the

peace and security of other member states (Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence, 1989).

Article 18 (2) states that member states are not entitled to military intervention in internal

armed conflict that poses no danger to other states and does not have external support. That in

order to secure military assistance, from ECOWAS, the president of affected state must write

to chairperson of ECOWAS requesting formally for its assistance. Once received, such a

letter serves as signal for the military force of the community to be placed on an emergency

footing. In Chapter V, Articles 13 and 14 of the protocol states how the nature and

composition of the military force should be (Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence,

1989).

The military force was known as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). Each

state was required to earmark units from its national armed forces that in an emergency

would be placed at the services of the community. The AAFC was to be under the command

of a force commander who is appointed by the Chairman of the Community on

recommendations of the Defence Council of the Community, which consists of the Ministers

of Defence and foreign affairs of member states ( Khobe, 2000).

According to the Protocol, the AAFC would be used in two situations; first where two

member states are in conflict, the community will interpose the AAFC between them as a

peacekeeping force. Second where a member state is the victim, of internal armed conflict

supported from outside and its Head of State has requested military assistance from the
community in writing, then the AAFC will be sent as an intervention force (Khobe, 2000).

Although the protocol was invoked with respect to the Liberian war of 1989/90, the AAFC

never came into being as the protocol envisaged. Rather a smaller group of ECOWAS sates

put together an intervention force known as ECOMOG (Khobe, 2000).

Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2011) while examining the formation of (ECOWA) and its

mandates stated that ECOWAS was originally established as a regional economic grouping

with the specific aim of establishing customs union and establishing a common market. Years

after, its scope expanded beyond just achieving economic integration to security management

in the West African Sub-region. African leaders have collaborated in areas such as conflict

prevention, management, resolution, and peace-building, control of the proliferation of Small

Arms Light Weapons (SALWs), containment of refugee crisis, war against money laundering

and terrorism (Alli, 2010).

Similarly, Ladan (2009), stated that though ECOWAS was mainly created for the economic

integration of member states, it later had to adopt Protocols to extend the scope of its

activities to cover collective security and mutual defence of the region adding that this

collective security role was to be tasted through the deployment of a West African Peace

Keeping Operation in Liberia and later in countries like Sierra-Leone, Guinea Bissau and

Cote d‟Ivoire.

The decision to set-up ECOMOG was informed by the principles that regional stability,

unity, mutual trust and good neighbourliness was necessary for achieving the ultimate

ECOWAS‟ goal of a harmonious and united West Africa (Omede, 2012).

Khobe (2000), while trying to justify the West African Peace Keeping Operation averred:

West Africa is a hot bed for political, economic and social agitation that resulted in the

growth of insurgent and revolutionary movements supported largely by the economically

marginalized youth and estranged members of the elite. The problem of multi ethnic nature of

member states‟ struggles for power and economic privileges and more led to the formation of

ECOWAS Monitoring group (ECOMOG).

The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone was the first of such action by a sub-

regional organisation in Africa, relying principally on its own men, money and military

material. It was also the first time the United Nation (UN) had sent military observers to

support an already established sub-regional force (Adekeye, 2004).

Ladan (2009) stated that some shortcomings affected the ECOMOG operation in Liberia. The

first according to him was the lack of legal basis for the operation ab initio. This is because

the treaty establishing ECOWAS did not provide for a collective security or peacekeeping

role; it was merely for economic integration.

There was also the question of neutrality, because the peacekeeping force was seen as a

mercenary and an invasion, thus denting a cardinal principle of peacekeeping under

international law (Ladan, 2009). The involvement of General Ibrahim Babangida the then

Head of State of Nigeria who was believed to be a friend of Samuel Doe made the ECOMOG

operation in Liberia to appear one sided. However, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia

helped in maintaining peace in the country. It ended the violence in the country. ECOWAS

has earned respect for its conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism.

ECOWAS has achieved success in resolving security issues at the sub-regional level. As a

result of this, it was believed that a broader organisation would be able to address the security

issues in Africa (Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju, 2011).

Sesay and Akonai (2010) averred that unlike the ECOWAS, the East African Community

(EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) did not help much in their

own sub-regional crises, such as during the violence in Kenya over election disputes, and
during the simmering one in Zimbabwe, respectively. They further argued that a major

challenge to the effectiveness of the regional organisations is lack of consensus over what to

do.

In Africa, the task to tackle security challenges in the continent fell on the defunct

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU). Until recently, the OAU

Charter prevented the organisation from intervening in the internal conflicts of African states

(Bujra, 2002). One of the mandates of the AU as contained in its Constitutive Act is to

promote peace, security, and stability in the continent. The peace and Security Council (PSC)

formed by the AU is collective security arrangement of the organisation (Folarin, Ajayi and

Olarewaju, 2011). Apart from the collective security arrangement by the sub-regional and

regional organization, efforts have also been made by the superpowers to ensure stability in

the world. This is as a result of the protection of their interests in the areas (Folarin, Ajayi and

Olarewaju, 2011). Imobighe (2010) mentioned that technological backwardness and the need

for regime security and preservation of military and autocratic governments are reasons for

reliance on external security forces. Relevant example in this regard is the African Crisis

Response Initiative (ACRI). The US proposed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)

purposely for training African Crisis Response Force, provides logistics and funds.

2.6 Insurgency

In order to have a better understanding of Boko Haram insurgency, there is the need to look

at global perspective of insurgency-meaning, causes, types, objectives and their mode of

operations among scholars, commentators and analysts. There are divergent opinions among

scholars, commentators and analysts about the meaning, causes, types, objectives and mode

of operations of insurgency in the world. According to Fafowora (2012) insurgencies go back

to times of antiquity, as far back as the old civilizations of the Greek city state and the Roman
Empire when the rulers of these ancient civilisations often had to face the challenge of

insurgencies, insurrections and revolts. The main aim of insurgencies has always been the

overthrow of the established order and its replacement by new social and political order. It is

for this reason that insurgents take up arms to overthrow those in power. Ultimately, both the

Greek and Roman Empires fell as a result of these rebellions and insurrection and external

attacks. New states replaced them in a situation that has been described by historians as the

rise and fall of great states and Empires in modern era. The objectives of modern insurgencies

remain the same, the overthrow of the existing order and its replacement by a new order or

government.

Evans and Newnham (1997) viewed insurgency as an armed insurrection or rebellion against

an established system of government in a state. If the violent challenge by the insurgents is

forcefully resisted by the incumbents civil or internal war situation will result. Such outcomes

lead to protracted violence between the parties.

Kwanashie (2012) also viewed insurgency as a rebellion against a constituted authority when

those taking part in the rebellion are not recognised as belligerents. To him, there are

different forms of rebellion. It could be riot or uprisings or political actions to undermine the

state. It could be violent or non-violent. Method of insurgency includes various forms of

subversion and armed conflict.

Nwala (2012) on the other hand said not all rebellions are insurgencies because there have

been several cases of non-violent rebellions, using civil resistance. Mahatma Gandhi‟s non-

violent political resistance against British colonialism in India as well as the Civil Rights

Movement of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. against racism in America, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah‟s

Movement of Positive Action against British colonialism in Ghana are classic cases of non-

violent rebellions that cannot be classified as insurgencies.

Evans and Newnham (1997) identified two types of insurgencies- centripetal and centrifugal

insurgencies. Centripetal insurgencies seek to replace the incumbent regime with a system of

government more conducive to the interests and inclinations of the insurgents. Typical within

this category are movements for the independence of colonial peoples and territories which

seek via the insurgency to end formal colonial control. Because colonial systems relied upon

coercion rather than consent as their principal means of social control, even a fairly low level

of insurgent violence will be perceived by the authorities as a threat which has to be resisted.

Centripetal insurgency is also a typical form of violent opposition to authoritarian regimes

within states that are formally independent. In this sense the term is isomorphic with the idea

of revolution although not all revolutions take the form of insurgencies, of course.

Centrifugal insurgencies, on the other hand, are aimed at secession from the incumbent state

and the formation of a new entity. In this present system centrifugal insurgencies are likely to

be associated with the expression of ethnic nationalism. Although less common historically

than centripetal insurgencies, contemporary instances such as Eritrea and South Sudan show

the salience of this category. According to them, individuals and groups are recruited into

insurgency movements by two principal appeals: To their sense of ethnic identity and to their

political allegiance. These two appeals may fuse. Insurgencies proceed by using the strategy

of unconventional warfare, including guerrilla war, particularly in their earlier stages.

Centripetal insurgencies normally move beyond this guerrilla mode in their later stages when

it becomes necessary physically to liberate areas of the disputed territory from the control of

the incumbents. Eventually the violence may become essentially conventional if there is no

short cut available to removing the last vestiges of the status quo. In all cases insurgency

situations are paradigm instances of the Clausewitzian tradition of viewing the military

instrument as the means of achieving political goals.

Scholars have identified different factors as possible causes of insurgency. In the opinion of

Fafowora, (2012) global insurgencies are deeply rooted in the history of the various states

involved. They are reflection of the history and the political and economic systems of the

states affected by insurgencies, terrorism and other forms of political violence.

Nwala (2012) identified the following as causes of insurgency- injustice such as denial of

rights, inequality, persecution, discrimination, marginalization; illegitimacy of the regime

when it comes to power through seizure of power, electoral fraud, tyranny and abuse of

power and denial of human rights, corruption; longing for freedom and self-determination;

poverty especially when the regime is deemed to be weak and incomplete and incapable to

protect the poor masses in the midst of plenty; weak government; ideological (religious,

ethnic and political factors) influences; the militarization of the society due to long reign of

the military as well as the proliferation of insurgency and terrorism in the contemporary

world etc.

Mackinlay (2002) distinguished between lumpen, clan, popular and global insurgency

arguing that insurgency could be driven by greed, grievances or both. kilcullen (2005) stated

that there is one set of insurgents who take the entire world, rather than one country, as the

field for insurgency, and who seeks in the name of global jihad to overthrow the existing

international order. There are also separate insurgencies rooted in local grievances and

middle layer insurgents who glom onto local insurgencies globalize them. Carol (2012)

argued that all insurgencies regardless of the regional, religious, or cultural commonalities

have roots in local political failings. According to Carol al-Qaeda, as the benefactor of the

global insurgency has become a decentralized network that only expands when a local

grievance allows dissents and political subversive to take up the al-Qaeda‟s banner in their

local cause (Abdullahi, 2015).

Muzan (2014) in his work titled: “Insurgency in Nigeria: Addressing the Causes as Part of the

Solution” attributed the cause of insurgency to political alienation. According to him conflict

and strife usually result where an individual is denied the freedom to participate in the

political decision making processes of the society. Man, being a political animal, always sees

himself as such and as being free to engage in politics, formally or informally. Nonetheless,

he may withdraw tactically, strategically or voluntarily for psychological or other reasons

where the prevailing conditions are not conducive to his participation in the political process.

In this latter circumstance of withdrawal, especially where it is involuntary, he is said to be

politically alienated from society. Political alienation of the individual person or of a group or

segment of society breeds conflict and unrest. Political alienation or contempt can be

manifested by both the rich and the poor in some instances, simultaneously. Situation of this

type occurred in the petroleum-producing regions and elsewhere in Nigeria. He cited the

Ogoni situation at the inception or formative period of the Movement for the Survival of the

Ogoni People (MOSOP), as a prime example. It is reported that MOSOP was initially, and

has in fact continued to be, a mass movement of the Ogoni People of the Niger Delta oil-

producing area with a membership consisting of both the elite and the masses of the Ogoni

people. Political alienation resulting in this type of unity of purpose and resolve between the

rich and the poor becomes more formidable and intractable for any government, since it

makes it more difficult for the government to penetrate the movement and possibly break the

rank and file.

Muzan (2014) further identified the growth of social class awareness and desire for equality

as another factors causing insurgency. Social class awareness and consciousness have the

potential for conflict generation. A society where the middle class is small with an equally

small or smaller upper and a robust lower class is prone to dangerous conflict. Such a society

is usually characterised by great instability. This is because the lower class looks at the upper
class with envy. Similarly, inequality results in bitterness, and bitterness generates envy and

hate. This is across the political spectrum at the national, state and local levels. To him, there

is no African state which does not have a social class structure in which the lower class is

bloated, the middle class a mere shoestring and the upper class one big, fat head. The middle

class in any society is usually the natural medium of effective communication, contact and

information transmission between the lower and upper classes. Where this wire of

transmission is too thin, fragile or non-existent, a given society is inviting turbulent mass

action, a revolution. The Niger Delta, the settler situations in Jos and perhaps, the Boko

Haram movement all evoke issues of inequality in Nigeria.

Muzan (2014) also identified discrimination in the distribution of political and socio-

economic goods to the population of a country as another cause of insurgency. This type of

discrimination often results in deprivation of basic infrastructural amenities and diminished

opportunities for employment, particularly at the upper echelons of governance and economic

activities. Ethnic minorities are often victims of this type of discrimination and it has often

led to movements of terrorism and insurgency. This type of discrimination was the primary

motive force behind the realignment of the erstwhile warring forces of the Ijaw, Itselkiri and

Urhobo in Warri against the Federal Government of Nigeria.

He posited that the prevalence of poverty makes it easier for extremist groups to mobilise

disenchanted mobs in pursuit of their own political goals. There is the added factor of youth

unemployment, especially within the growing stratum of university graduates. When people

are pushed to the lowest levels of desperation and hopelessness, they can fall easy prey to

religious demagogues who offer them a sense of belonging.

2.6.1 Nigeria’s Security Challenge

According to Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2011), the general security challenges prevalent

in Africa are also observable in Nigeria. The security of the Nigerian people is endangered by

poverty, hunger, unemployment, health hazards, environmental degradation, and depletion of

ozone layer, ethno-religious conflicts, political assassinations, militancy, poor governmental

policies and ecological problems affecting food security. In addition to the above, Nigeria is

experiencing a host of other challenges such as increase in cross-border crimes, including

illegal oil theft and piracy, drug trafficking, modern day slavery and trafficking in persons,

corruption, lack of development, poor security network, infrastructural challenges, inequality

in the sharing of resources, illiteracy, proliferation of small arms and light weapon, money

laundering and illicit arms transfer, which all pose threat to national security (Onuoha and

Ezirim, 2013).

Ecological activities by both man and non-human that result in natural disaster, such as

erosion, volcanic eruption and earthquakes, do not respect state boundaries. In Nigeria, the

Niger Delta is the most susceptible region to ecological challenges. It is the region mostly

challenged by the non-human threats to security. The Niger Delta is considered the wealth-

hub of Nigeria. It is endowed with crude that fetches Nigeria about 90% of its external

revenue. Despite the wealth of the region however, it is grossly underdeveloped and most of

the people are poor and live in abject poverty (Akpobibibo, 2004).

Worst still, the activities of the multinationals, such as the flaring of gas and oil spillages

have destroyed the means of livelihood of the people. Their farmland have become so spoiled

and the soils bad for agricultural activities. The contaminated atmosphere has brought untold

critical health hazards and untold hardships (Ogundiya, 2009). More worrisome has been the

collusion between the Federal Government, community leaders and the oil companies in the
exploitation and neglect of the people‟s plight. According to Ogundiya (2009), there are

about 150 groups that claim to be voicing the desire of the people. The movement for the

emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is the most dreaded of the militant groups. Some of

the strategies they use include kidnapping and hostage taking of expatriates and top Nigerian

officials, vandalisation of pipelines, bunkering, sabotage of company properties etc. The

struggles for justice earned activist such as Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other Ogoni leaders‟

death sentences from a military leader, General Sani Abacha. Since then, the hitherto

peaceful struggle has taken a violent dimension.

According to Folarin, Ajayi and Olarewaju (2011), following the Niger Delta militancy has

been the increasing attack of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the dangerous

dimensions this has taken. The advent of Boko Haram group changed the content, context

and texture of national insecurity. While the militants in the Niger Delta operated mostly

within that region, the Boko Haram has earmarked the whole of the country as their terrain.

However, most of their operations have been in the northeast of Nigeria. This has resulted to

loss of lives and property, increase in refugee crisis, humanitarian crisis, flight of investors

and investments, closure of schools, to mention just a few. Boko Haram has spread to the

neighbouring countries of Nigeria; Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

2.7 Boko Haram in Perspective

Boko Haram insurgency has generated the concern of scholars, commentators, policy makers

and analysts over the last five years because of its security implications to Central and West

African Sub-regions, Africa and the world in general.

The causes of extremism and outright acts of terror have been linked to a number of factors,

which include the culture of militarism that has its antecedents in military rule, failure of the

state and its institutions, economic disempowerment of the people, politics of exclusion,
failed political leadership and the poor immigration policy and watch, which have caused

porous borders and inflow of illegal migrants from other countries, as well as free flow of

arms into the country (Ibrahim and Igbuzor, 2002: Alli, 2010).

According to Adibe (2014), a better and more comprehensive view of the Boko Haram and

Ansaru phenomena in Nigeria and the sub-region is to see them as symptoms of the crisis in

Nigeria‟s nation-building processes. While the bombings, kidnappings, and other unsavoury

acts linked to the sects are condemnable, it is important to underscore that Boko Haram is

only one of the several groups in the country that purvey terror and death because there is an

increasing tendency to discuss the spate of insecurity in the country as if it all began and

ended with Boko Haram or as if without Boko Haram Nigeria would be a tranquil place in

which to live.

There is everywhere in the country a pervasive sense of what the German-American political

theorist Hannah Arendt called the “banality of evil” (Arendt, 1963). Her argument is that the

great evils in history are not executed by fanatics or sociopaths but rather by ordinary people

who accept the premises of their actions and therefore participate in them on the grounds that

those heinous actions were normal. This is the so-called notion of normalising the

unthinkable or the routinization of evil. This argument captures an important element of what

is happening throughout Nigeria: Violent armed robberies across the entire country,

kidnapping especially in the southeast, turf war by militarised cults and gangs in Bayelsa, and

senseless intra-and inter-communal warfare are all increasingly common (Adibe, 2011). The

crisis in Nigeria‟s nation building mixes with the crisis of underdevelopment creates an

existentialist crisis for many Nigerians. For many young people, a way of resolving the

consequent sense of alienation is to retreat from the Nigeria project the idea of fashioning a

nation out of the disparate nationalities that make up the country and instead construct

meanings in primordial identities, often with the Nigerian state as the enemy.
This perspective on Boko Haram fails to acknowledge the fact that in-spite of the crisis

facing Nigeria in the task of nation‟s building, Boko Haram has proved to be the deadliest

insurgents taking over some local government areas in north-eastern part of the country in

April 2015. Nigeria fought a Civil War and emerged from it stronger. The Niger-Delta

militancy though affected the Nigerian economy did not lead to the seizure of the country‟s

territory in the area. It was however, curtailed to some extent with the declaration of amnesty

for the militants unlike the Boko Haram that has defied negotiation and amnesty. Similarly,

there are some countries in West Africa like Benin, Togo, Ghana and so forth composed of

multiplicity of ethnic nationalities that are not witnessing insurgency like the Nigeria‟s case.

2.7.1 Relational or Vengeance Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency

Relational or vengeance perspective of Boko Haram insurgency attempts to provide

explanation for violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political,

economic, religious and historical relationships between such groups. The belief is that

cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between

individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past

history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes,

racial intolerance and discrimination, (Faleti, 2006). The difference in value invariably

creates the “We” and “Others” dichotomy: “The fact that „others‟ are perceived as different

makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of values. This disrupts the

flow of communication between us and them and to that extent, twists perceptions that we

have about each other”.

The state and other members of Nigerian society who are targets of Boko Haram‟s violence

may indeed find it difficult to understand the sect‟s penchant for blood-letting. On the one

hand, the former group becomes in this context the “We” and all efforts are being to secure it

from savagery of the “Others”, the Boko Harm members. On the other hand, the latter group
bond either by the common purpose of fighting the “unbelievers” or feeling of deprivation or

both sees the remaining member of the Nigerian society as the “Others”. In the circumstance

mutual antagonism existed and can be violently expressed. On the part of Boko Haram,

killing of a member by government security forces the “Other” attracts reprisals from it, the

“We”. The retaliatory attacks against Muslims in the Gonin Gora area of Kaduna state by an

irate mob following the multiple suicide attacks on churches in the state on Sunday June 17

2012, also highlights the vengeance thrust of the “We” and “Others” psychology. In this

instance, the avengers, presumably Christians now constituted the “We” while Muslims

became the “Others” (Alozieuwa, 2012). The establishment of Alfurgan Islamic School,

solely dedicated to the teaching of ethic opposed to Western civilisation in Jalingo, capital of

Taraba state (ACSRT Journal, 2011), exemplified an effort to institutionalise the “We” and

“Others” dichotomy.

The dimension of Boko Haram above ignores the fact that difference in cultural values; the

establishment of “We and Others” are not peculiar to Nigeria. It is found in Cameroon, Niger,

Chad, Togo, Benin and so many states in the region and it has not resulted to insurgency like

Boko Haram.

2.7.2 The Political Feud Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency

The political feud perspective is premised primarily on the argument that the extra-judicial

killing of the leadership of Boko Haram in 2009 could have triggered a violent confrontation

with the state. The severity that the violence has now assumed was the fallout of a fierce

political battle in 2011. According to Omotosho (2014) Boko Haram sect engaged in their

militant activities as a reaction to perceived or real loss of power by Northern elites. That is,

there are some disenchanted politicians behind the scene who instigated and supported the

Boko Haram in an attempt to use it to either hold on to power or to destabilise the new

civilian government (Abdu, 2008). Agwu (2013) stated that the politicisation of Boko Haram
insurgency assumed a naked dimension within the context of the April 2011 Presidential

election, the suggestion that the Boko Haram was the response of the North to the arms-

twisting, the reneging from the zoning arrangement in the People‟s Democratic Party (PDP),

and the hijacking of the Presidency by Goodluck Jonathan, when the North was supposed to

be allowed to finish its second term that the illness and eventual demise of President Musa

Yar‟Adua denied that geopolitical zone. It was against this background that the late National

Security Adviser (NSA), Andrew Owoye Azazi, used the platform of the South-South

Economic Forum in Asaba to admit that the national security challenge in the Boko Haram

was actually provoked by the PDP‟s decision to torpedo its internal zoning arrangement (The

Guardian April 28, 2012). The outcry at the time resonated around forcing Jonathan to give

up his 2011 presidential ambition to allow for a return of power to the north pitted some

formidable political forces in the north against similar forces in the south especially from

Jonathan minority ethnic Ijaw nationality of Southern Nigeria who saw in Jonathan‟s

ambition an opportunity to placate the restive region over perceived decades of political and

economic marginalization in the Nigerian union. The post 2011 election violence in part of

the north, therefore, did not only symbolize a rejection of the poll‟s results and or Goodluck

Ebele Jonathan presidency, but was also a precursor to the current mayhem ( Azazi, 2012).

Like Azazi, Sam Omatseye (2012) advised that the declaration of a state of emergency would

not end the insurgency, as it ought to have been declared on economic team, which needs to

take a course on the Nigerian economy, with emphasis „on the Karl Polanyi school of

economic anthropology that emphasises society…‟ should get to the root, using consultation,

friendship with those aggrieved over zoning and the last election held in 2011 (Omatseye,

2012). According to Agwu (2013) by implication, Omatseye‟s view here is that the essence

of Boko Haram movement is political, a reaction against the People Democratic Party (PDP)

and the entire southern Nigerian political elites and their accomplices in the north that
abandoned the zoning arrangement with the foisting of President Jonathan, as distinct from

the religious form (between Muslims and Christians) that the expression of the movement‟s

anger has taken.

However, this interpretation is not new in the Nigerian scholarly and political thinking, for it

has often been said that contrary to the generally held view, the dynamics of conflicts in

Nigeria is not necessarily engendered by its multi-ethnicity, but by specific structural and

systemic factors embedded in the very process of national political development (Kalu,

2009). In other words Agwu pointed out: whereas the capture of political power (political

contradiction) and the consequent control and distribution of state resources (economic

contradiction) are the essence or scientific causes of conflicts in the Nigerian political system.

These conflicts find expression or manifestation in ethnic and religious forms. It is this kind

of thinking that has brought about the not infrequent declaration by Nigerian leaders after the

country‟s spasmodic bouts of inter-ethnic and sometimes intra-ethnic mayhem that the

conflicts are neither ethnic nor religious, even when what is usually concretely observable are

religious, ethnic and sometimes intra-ethnic confrontations. This is the dialectics of form and

essence into which the Boko Haram syndrome has often tended to draw some analysts.

For Ohaeri, there can be no doubt that the Boko Haram issue and the post-election violence in

the North are clearly reactions to perceived or real loss of power by an elite stratum that is

predominantly „Northern‟ even if the leading figures in this agenda do not necessarily count

religious piety among their greatest attributes. He further argued that, the emergence of Boko

Haram insurgency is a clear manifestation of contest over raw political power- who lost

power, who won power, and who wants power back. The processes that threw up President

Goodluck Jonathan as the candidate of this elite stratum were intimately bound up with the

political crisis that gripped the northern political class (Ohaeri, 2011).
In a similar dimension, Tieku (2012) argued further that the spread of Boko Haram has

political undertone. He averred: “There is also a widespread idea that the agreement on

rotating the Nigerian presidency between Christians and Muslims has been broken. Late

President Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua was a Muslim that succeeded former President Olusegun

Obasanjo and he was supposed to serve two terms. When Yar‟Adua died, President Jonathan

succeeded him and dismantled that gentleman‟s agreement on rotating the presidency in

Nigeria. The northern elite are extremely unhappy with this. He maintained: “The northern

elites are using the Boko Haram‟s activities as a mobilising tool to create insecurity for the

Nigerian government. According to him, Boko Haram‟s refusal to reveal its identity and

table its grievances actually erodes the relevance of the previous explanation of the crisis in

favour of the political feud perspective, whether in terms of Herskovits suggestion that while

the original core of the group remains active, criminal gangs have adopted the name Boko

Haram to claim responsibility for attacks when it suit them.

Omotosho (2014) stated that Boko Haram became highly politicised and used in the contest

for power between different group of elites purporting to represent one religious or the other,

especially within the context that Sharia has gained popularity among the masses of Northern

Nigeria (Abdu, 2008). It should be noted that, the Boko Haram sect maintain close

connections to political entrepreneurs in the Northern parts of the country. On assumption of

office, some governors presented Sharia as a panacea to the socio-economic problems. This is

similar to the argument that, the problems are as a result of governance devoid of the fear of

God, and under Sharia, governance and power will be in the name of God and the overall

interest of the people. Power will therefore be exercised according to the tenets of Islam and

in the interest of all citizens (Kukah, 1993; Kenny, 2004). The Boko Haram insurgency can

be argued to have emerged as a result of the abandoned Sharia project by some northern

Nigerian Governors. It should be noted that, when the northern Governors introduced the
Sharia legal systems in their states, the Boko Haram leaders thought that the „Sharia

governors‟ were truly interested in the practice of Sharia, but when the governor recklessly

abandoned the Sharia and the political dividends had been reaped by the Governors, the

Islamists started all manners of projects considered best for deepening Islamic traditions in

northern Nigeria (Albert, 2008).

The weakness of those attributing political feud to the cause of Boko Haram insurgency could

be situated in the fact that none of the arrested Boko Haram members has provided

substantial evidence that the insurgency is used by certain northern elements in order to

dominate the political affairs of Nigeria. They have also not provided enough evidence

against former Jonathan‟s administration in order to perpetuate himself in power beyond

2015. If truly the northern political elites want to make the country ungovernable for

Jonathan, the Boko Haram might not concentrate their attacks in the north killing their

brothers and sisters and destroying the economy of the area.

2.7.3 Socio-Economic Perspective of Boko Haram Insurgency

On the other hand, some scholars ascribed socio-economic dimension to the cause of Boko

Haram insurgency. The Socio-economic perspective of conflict attributes social conditions

to the cause of conflict. This is based on the human need theory of social conflict which

states that all humans have basic needs which they seek to meet and their inability to meet

these needs leads to conflict. This theory is similar to the frustration aggression theory of

violence, which posits that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dougherty

and Pfaltzgrate Jr, 1990: 266). Ted Gurr (1970) deprivation theory explains why the youths

are always taking to violence. “Aggression is always a consequence of frustration” and

“frustration always lead to aggression” (Leeds, 1978). “The poor are led to violence owing

to their relative deprivation and needs” (Odumosu, 1999). Insecurity, terrorism, conflicts and

violence are caused by the high poverty rate in most societies (Gurr, 1970 and Burton,
1997). Human needs theorists such as Burton (1990) and Maslow (1943) would argue that

one of the primary causes of the protracted conflicts in Nigeria is the people‟s drive to meet

their unmet needs. Those who have sought to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon within

this framework point out that, despite a per capita income of $2,700 before the rebasing of

the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and an impressive annual GDP growth rate for over a

decade, the north has one of the poorest populations in Nigeria (Adibe, 2014).

According to Omotosho (2014), Boko Haram sect symbolises people‟s anger and rejection of

their socio-economic condition and an attempt to fashion out a system that will give them a

sense of belonging. The failure of the state and those associated with it to cater for

fundamental needs and aspirations translate into material deprivation and alienation which

made the people to begin to question prevailing ideas and institutions that directly affect them

(Sheme, 2011; Marama, 2011). Furthermore, the excessive urban and rural abject poverty,

while excessive wealth lies in the hands of a few aristocrats and the vicious cycle of national

underdevelopment has in turn cultivated fundamentalism among the poor. However, the root

of the rise and agitation of the Boko Haram in the Northern parts of the country is the failure

of government to propel modernisation in order to deliver its promises of improvement to the

mass of ordinary people within the present political dispensation (Omotosho, 2014). Boko

Haram insurgency carries within it the disillusionment with progress and the disenchantments

of the first twelve years of our democratic dispensation (Ohaeri, 2011).

Tieku (2012) while contributing to the socio-economic perspective on the cause of Boko

Haram in addition to the political perspective he gave as reason for the spread of Boko Haram

insurgency went further and asserted: “Boko Haram is usually conceptualized as a religious

movement but it has strong social and economic undertones. That is part of the reasons why it

has attracted so much attention. There is so much discontent in Nigeria‟s society and to some

extent; Boko Haram is feeding on this. Its message is also resonating because there is a
broader feeling among some Nigerians that society would be better off with going back to the

old days of the Sokoto Caliphate. This segment thinks that moral decay, as well as economic

problems, would be resolved because the Caliphate and the Islamic Shariah promoted Zakat-a

tenet of Islam that wealth has to be shared. This segment thinks that inequality and gross

disparity between the rich and poor in Nigeria could be dealt with through an Islamic

government.

Similarly, Awoyemi (2012) affirmed the socio-economic perspective on the rise of Boko

Haram. He stated: „‟Boko Haram phenomenon has a deep economic root more than any

other perspectives from which the investigating intelligence can suggest‟‟. These realities are

much more obvious in rural areas. A factual indicator is the result of the Harmonized Nigeria

Living Standard Survey published by the National Bureau of Statistic in 2012 which showed

that the North scored badly and accounted for the large proportion of Nigerians living in

poverty. Others have contended that violence in the north is orchestrated by the betrayal of

peoples‟ trust in government. The low level of government presence provided criminals and

terrorists a platform to launch insurrection being witnessed across northern Nigeria

(Benjamin et al, 2012).

According to Agwu (2013) since the advent of Boko Haram insurgency some policymakers,

commentators and analysts hold that the problem of Boko Haram insurgency has so much to

do with infrastructural decay, unemployment, poverty and lack of education. Former

President Goodluck Jonathan himself admitted in the height of the Boko Haram attacks that

military confrontation alone would not eliminate terror attacks and that an enabling

environment for young people to find job was also an imperative measure (ThisDay January

27, 2012). He stated that the Obama‟s administration also shared this materialistic sentiment

of Boko Haram insurgency. According to him when Johnnie Carlson, the US Assistant

Secretary of State for Africa, spoke at the Washington Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, his view was that: “Nigerians are hungry for progress and improvement in their lives,

but northern Nigerians feel this need most acutely. Life in Nigeria may be tough for many,

but life in the north is grim for almost all. Public opinion polls and news reports suggest there

is a strong sentiment throughout the country but especially in the north that government is not

on the side of the people and their poverty is a result of government neglect, corruption, and

abuse” (Nigerian Tribune April 11, 2012). Adamu Ciroma, said that the operations of the sect

were related to poverty and other things affecting the well-being of the ordinary people,

things like the problem of education, health and agriculture, most of which had been severely

ignored, particularly by the state governments in the Nigerian federation (The Nation April 3,

2012). The Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima, spoke in the same vein when he

attributed the Boko Haram to the grievances of the poor against previous leaders for failure to

provide basic social amenities such as potable water, electricity and healthcare in the state

and across the northern part of the country (The Guardian April 21, 2012). The former

Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, blamed the Boko Haram

on the regional imbalance in revenue allocation, saying that there is clearly a link between the

very uneven nature of distribution of resources and the rising level of violence, and insisting

that when you look at the figures and look at the size of the population in the north, you can

see that there is a structural imbalance of enormous proportion. Those states simply do not

have enough money to meet basic needs while some states have too much money (ThisDay

January 28, 2012). Shehu Sani also held the materialistic view of the emergence of the sect,

arguing that there is disparity between northern and southern part of Nigeria, and this has left

northerners poorer and more economically disadvantaged making the region prone to the

growth of extremist ideas (MacDougall, 2012).

Haruna (2012) recounted former President Clinton‟s account in his autobiography „My

Life‟ of the mid-1960s riots in the United States and the conclusions of the Otto Kerner-led

Commission of Enquiry instituted by President Lyndon Johnson that the riots were the result

of police racism and brutality and the absence of economic and educational opportunities for

blacks, with the verdict: According to Agwu (2013), Haruna substituted America‟s racial

differences with Nigeria‟s regional differences and stated that Kerner‟s commission might

as well have been talking about present-day Nigeria. Agwu stated that when later the

governors of the entire 19 northern states demanded that the revenue allocation formula be

reviewed urgently because a situation where a state like Niger State, for instance, got

between N4.2bn and 4.5bn as monthly allocation whereas some other states received 20

times that amount was grossly unfair (The Punch February 24, 2012), it became clear that

there may be geopolitical conclusion on Sanusi‟s viewpoint. He averred that the governors

of the South- South states were quick to denounce the association of Boko Haram

phenomenon with the country‟s derivation fund, pointing out that even the prevailing 13

percent derivation revenue allocation formula is meagre, and insisting that there should be

an upward review of the whole principle as well as the introduction of the fiscal federalism

in Nigeria (The Guardian March 15, 2012). Agwu stated that whereas Sanusi and by

implication, the 19 northern governors may be selling a decoy to the populace with their

dialectical materialist thesis on the Boko Haram, the ultimate implication of Haruna‟s

exegesis was the transcendence of the material determinant rather than the millenarian.

According to Agwu the dialectical materialistic sentiment also resonated in the Nigerian

Institute of International Affairs‟ (NIIA) Fourth Brainstorming Session on “Current Security

Challenges in Nigeria” that was held in its Conference Chambers on Friday, September 9,

2011. One of the conclusions of the participants is that if Nigeria can fix its infrastructures,

the economy, provide job for the teeming jobless population and provide education, among
others, the tide of terrorism and the local al-Qaeda‟s onslaught will be minimized or even

completely eradicated. In the same vein, the Seven-Man Presidential Committee on Security

Challenges in the North-East, where the problem of the Boko Haram was more acute,

submitted that the insecurity resulted from the failure to deliver services in the wake of huge

resources accruing to governments, the inability of the Federal Government to complete

useful/ crucial projects that have high development impacts (The Punch September, 2011).

Agwu on the other hand stated that the dialectical materialist definitely is an undue

politicisation or trivialisation of a serious problem, the same pattern of responses that led to

the worsening or degeneration of the extremism-related insecurity in Nigeria to this

unfortunate level. Much as socio-economic factors are relevant in the explanation of

problems like this, they should not be made fetish of, for such dialectic materialistic

approach does not in any way explain why, for instance, despite the United States‟

prosperity, some cases of local adherence to the al-Qaeda still evolve on the country‟s soil

(the New York Times December 19, 2011).

Herskovits (2012: 16) also argued along the line of materialistic causation of Boko Haram.

While writing in the New York Times asserted: It was clear in 2009, as it is now, that the

root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty

and hopelessness. Influential Nigerians from Maiduguri where Boko Haram is centre,

pleaded with Jonathan‟s government in June and July not to respond to Boko Haram with

force alone.

The socio-economic perspective above provides useful explanations and understanding of the

Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It cannot be ignored. Whatever factors adduced for the

causes of Boko Haram insurgency by any objective analyst, the pervasive poverty, and

unemployment in the country make the youths to be willing tools in the insurgents‟

operations.
The weakness of the perspective of Boko Haram above is that poverty and unemployment are

not limited to the northern part of Nigeria. We also have poverty in other countries of West

Africa like, Togo, Benin, the Gambia, and Guinea etc and yet it has not resulted to Boko

Haram-like insurgency. It also fails to explain how Boko Haram acquired expensive weapons

to facilitate its operations within Nigeria‟s and Niger‟s territories. If truly Boko Haram is

poverty induced, where are the insurgents getting their funds, recruitment, and other logistics

for their activities? While this explanation cannot be ignored it has also not provided

sufficient explanation for the causes of Boko Haram.

2.7.4 The Conspiracy Perspective

The conspiracy perspective attempting to explain the Boko Haram insurgency can be marked

into two broad categories: one focussing on machinations of internal factors, the other on

external actors. Internal factors are related to political feud perspective explained in this

work. It may include the disgruntle northern power elites who, having lost power, are bent on

bringing down Nigeria under a southern leadership as well as the Jonathan administration

itself which may be sponsoring the insurgency in order to rally southern support behind his

administration, and there is also the perception that Boko Haram may be a secret society

controlled by some „invisible‟ hands that seek to destroy the north ahead of 2015 so as to

forestall or weaken its bid for the Presidency at that time (Adibe, 2012). Another conspiracy

is that Boko Haram is actually sponsored by the Jonathan administration to make Islam look

bad or give the impression that the north is out to pull down his administration or to make

him fail as President of the country. This would be a way for the President to mobilise the

support of his “southern and Christian brethren” behind his administration (Adibe, 2014).

External actors, on the other hand, may include powerful western states like France, United

Kingdom, United States of America, or neighbouring African States envious of Nigeria‟s

progress and stability. While corroborating the role of external forces in the protracted Boko
Haram insurgency, Ayu (2014) said the emerging economic contest over control of oil among

big political powers in West Africa “is the inconvenient truth about the insurgency in North

East Nigeria.” Ayu (2014:4) argued that:

Boko Haram has no clear or coherent message. They

indiscriminately attack Christians, western institutions, such as
schools, Muslims alike. It is made up Nigerians and a large
number of Chadians from the Chadian Provinces of Lac and
Hadjer Lamis. These two Chadian states share a long border with
north-eastern Nigeria around Lake Chad region and provide Boko
Haram with trained Chadian fighters.

He went further and stated: “Two things about this area are central to understanding the Boko

Haram phenomenon. First and important is that the Lake Chad Basin is estimated to have a

reserved of 2.32billion barrels of oil and 14.65 trillion cubic feet of gas flows underground

across the countries sharing the Lake Chad Basin. These are Nigeria, Chad, Niger and

Cameroon. Using 3 Drilling, it is believed that Chad is not only tapping oil within its territory,

but also from Nigeria to push up its production level.”

Boko Haram insurgency is delaying the exploration and production of oil on the Lake Chad

side of Nigeria to the advantage of Chad and a few other stakeholders. Prominent

businessmen and politicians in both Nigeria and Chad, in association with French companies,

have invested heavily in the Chadian oil industry, and as a result, benefits from Boko

Haram‟s destabilization of the north-eastern part of Nigeria. It is widely believed that it is

they who are the principal financiers and arms suppliers to Boko Haram (Ayu, 2014).

Like Ayu, Alhaji Maitama Sule described the activities of the sect as the handiwork of some

fifth columnists, both local and foreign, that are bent on destabilising or dismembering

Nigeria (Sunday Mirror April 29, 2012).

This dimension of Boko Haram insurgency could be criticised because up till date 2016, none

of the arrested Boko Haram members has confessed that the insurgency is used by certain

elements in the north in order to dominate the political affairs of Nigeria. Similarly, none of
the arrested members of the group has indicted former President of Nigeria Goodluck

Jonathan of using the sect in order to cling on to power beyond 2015. None of their video

postings on the YouTube and the press released by the insurgents supports the claim of the

external forces in the destabilisation of Nigeria for economic advantage.

2.7.5 Theocratic Perspective

Lengmang (2011) on the other hand, adopted a theocratic perspective for the explanation of

Boko Haram insurgency. He corroborated the allegation that some segments of the northern

Muslim population may be unhappy with the compromise of the state-level Sharia co-existing

side by side with a secular federal system. This segment may arguably be small; they are

increasingly becoming radicalized and more willing to periodically express themselves

through violence. Lengmang attributed resentment to the Sharia co-existence with secular

federal system to the view by many northerners that western education is incapable of

stimulating meaningful development and prosperity in the region, and so shares the fallacy of

western education being incompatible with Islam.

According to Omotosho (2014) Boko Haram insurgency in the northern parts of Nigeria

cannot be divulged from religion in the country. According to him the politics of religion and

Islamic insurgency in the northern parts of Nigeria centre on the nature of the states,

especially its secular tradition and legal framework. The contention is that, the Islamic

fundamentalist believes that there is no separation of the sacred and the profane and the legal

system that governs them. These Muslim actors have found a linkage between Nigeria secular

state and Christianity and has vehemently opposed it and demanded an Islamic state based on

Sharia Law (Elaigwu and Galadima, 2003; Abdu, 2008)

Every religion has a unique way of responding to different issues involving God, the Boko

Haram insurgency is a protest and an opposition towards any form of power that is not

guided
by a divine scripture (Egwu, 2001). Boko Haram insurgents are motivated by the neo-

imperialism as well as the liberal underpinning of Western culture which is threatening the

tradition and also prioritising the individual over the basic tenets of Islam. The Boko Haram

insurgency in Northern Nigeria shows that the upswing of Islamism notwithstanding all the

international dimensions cannot be comprehended without a consideration of the disastrous

social and political situation in the country (Agbo, 2011b; Sheme, 2011). The Boko Haram

sect move against everything considered to be „Western‟. Furthermore, the gerontocratic rule

and the continued contempt of Islamic tenets by an oligarchy courted by the West will

definitely lead to a much stronger proliferation of armed uprisings in different parts of the

country (Awosusi, 2011).

Mehrdad Mozayyan traced the rise of radicalism to Iranian revolution and anti western

sentiments in the Middle East. According to him the Iranian revolution that ushered in a

widespread rejectionist philosophy, changed the Muslims‟ view of themselves and their

position in the world, as well as their approaches to daily life and politics. The anti western

feelings in the Middle East claims that it brought a corruption influence (Mozayyan, 2009).

Reinares (BBC, 2006) argued that political influence such events in Afghanistan, Iraq, and

the Middle East generally; Chechnya, Bosnia, etc could motivate Jihadists (BBC online,

2006). For Boko Haram sect, the inspiration derived from Afghanistan, for instance, may not

be limited only to the victory of the Mujahedeen over the Soviet, but rather symbolises the

triumph of Islam over secularity. It derives essentially from the fact that the victory was

scored with the primitive and improvised arms (Mazayyan, 2009) as compared to the modern

weapons of the Soviets. Boko Haram started its campaign of terror in Nigeria with

comparatively primitive weapons but it has moved to improvised explosive devices (IEDS)

and chaos in Libya has been of great value in terms of weapons and training, (Reuters, 2012).
Even if some truth exists in the dialectical materialist explanation of the phenomenon of the

Boko Haram in Nigeria, this would still not diminish the sect members‟ primary millenarian

motivation as people committed to the propagation of the Prophet‟s teachings and Jihad (the

New York Time, December 19, 2011).

Agwu (2013) opined thus, the socio-economic or even the political explanation of the

incidence of al-Qaeda franchise (the Boko Haram) in Nigeria is far from viable. This terror is

international in character, and it is unmistakably fuelled by the sentiment that is inherent in

the clash of civilisations. Samuel Huntington has contended that „so long as Islam remains

Islam which it will and the West remain the West which is more dubious according to Agwu,

this fundamental conflict between the great civilizations and ways of life will continue to

define their relations (Huntington, 1996: 212). And in this conflict, terrorism must continue to

count because it is one between the strong and the weak in which the West possesses the

nuclear weapons and terrorism has the reputation of being the weapon by which the weak

compensate for conventional inferiority (Huntington, 1996: 187). The theory of the clash of

civilisations in this matter thrives on the assumption by the proponents of terror that Western

civilisation has taken over the world and is entrenching injustices. Thus, they take up arms

and use every conceivable accoutrement of modern Western civilisation, the refined science

and technology, to drive the violence. One of the illustrations of the use of these modern

implements being the 9/11 attacks in the United States, in which the terrorist attackers flew

airplanes into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (Agwu, 2013).

This clash of civilisations thesis on modern international insurgency in general and its variant

or franchise in the Sahel region and tropical Africa in particular was vindicated in the wake of

the UN bombing in Nigeria when the Boko Haram within the context of its war against the

enemies of Islam (National Mirror September, 2011) declared that it bombed the UN because

the UN is an ally of the US, a country that it alleged is an enemy of Islam (The Vanguard
August 28, 2011). In fact, the extremist sect declared that it had former President Olusegun

Obasanjo within its firing range on September 15, 2011, when he visited Borno State to

attempt to initiate negotiations with Babakura Fuggu, the in-law of the slain Mohammed

Yusuf, but only spared his life because „Obasanjo was good to us‟, having tolerated the

Sharia movement during his presidency (The Vanguard January 24, 2012).

As an al-Qaeda franchise in Nigeria, it is difficult to explain the activities of the Boko Haram

outside the context of the al-Qaeda mindset, which is by mere reference to the country‟s

domestic socio-economic and political conditions. This is particularly because Nigeria‟s

home-grown terror group, the Niger Delta militants for instance, do not have any suicidal

bent or inclination. The Niger Delta militants never did suicidal bombings, not even the

Maitasine group in some northern Nigerian states in the early 1980s. They all love life and

live it to the fullest (Agwu, 2013). The advent of contemporary suicide bombing is essentially

the handiwork of the al-Qaeda and its associates that seek millenarian goals. The suicide

terrorist tactic is never deterred by any secular compensation or deprivation because its

practitioners are driven by a fierce loyalty to their peculiar small band or community, and an

ideology that seeks ethereal honour. In other words, they seek martyrdom, even though they

are never isolated martyrs (Richardson, 2006).

Boko Haram does not possess the coherent religious ideology and justification to impose

Sharia in Nigeria because they evolved from attacking Christians to attacking Muslims as

well over the last five years. This perspective does not explain why states like Kwara, Sokoto,

Kebbi, Oyo, Osun states in Nigeria mostly populated by Muslims are not facing insurgency

as witnessed in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. Similarly, there are no Boko Haram-like

insurgents in some countries in West Africa like Gambia, Senegal, and Guinea with a very

large Muslim population. All the perspectives of Boko Haram indeed give insight into the

causes of Boko Haram and its escalation into a regional threat. Their criticisms are not meant
to discard them but to subject them to test in order to advance the frontiers of knowledge on

the topic under study.

2.8 The Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Regional Security

Insurgents have caused lots of damage to the African continent over the decades. Some

insurgent groups in the continent include the Central Africa Republic‟s Seleka coalition, the

Tuareg rebels in Mali, Somali pirates, National Liberation Force in Burundi, Congolese

Revolutionary Forces (DR Congo), Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, West Sid Boys

(Sierra Leone) the Lord‟s Resistance Army (Uganda), and the Boko Haram in Nigeria among

others (The Punch, 2013).

In Central Africa Republic, a ragtag army ousted President Francois Bozize from power in

2013. Bozize himself had in 2003 seized power after a successful rebellion. In Democratic

Republic of Congo, the late Laurent Kabila ousted one of Africa‟s longest serving dictators,

Mobutu Sese Seko, from power in 1997 after a protracted Bush war. But his benefactors,

Rwanda and Uganda, sponsored a counter insurgency that killed him. However, his son,

Joseph Kabila, succeeded him, though his government is being hobbled by truculent political

waves. Cote d‟Ivoire managed to survive a war to restore democracy after the then President,

Laurent Gbagbo, manipulated the electoral process and held on to power despite his defeat in

a presidential election. France, Nigeria and the ECOWAS military forces had to step in. Mali

would have capitulated to the insurgents but for the intervention of a multi-lateral coalition

led by France. After two months under superior fire power, the insurgents were pushed to the

desert and mountainous fringes. The rebels exerted their own authority in northern Mali by

issuing, security passes or travel documents to residents and officials, stamped in the name of

„‟Azawad Republic‟‟ (The Punch, 2013).

In Nigeria, the senseless carnage caused by Boko Haram in Borno State, Yobe State, and

other parts of the North has attracted international condemnation. The Governor of Borno

State Shettima (2016) while speaking at the First National Economic Forum organised by the

Nation in Lagos stated “In financial terms, up to $6 billion (N2trillion) has gone down the

drain, about 20,000 people killed and two million others displaced in Borno”. He said the

$6billion losses do not include losses incurred by local and international businesses located in

the capital city, Maiduguri. He said before the insurgency, a branch of the one of the tier one

banks in Maiduguri was processing a billion naira daily, the biggest cash centre in the

country.

Boko Haram‟s brazen attacks and open identification with the al-Qaeda are surely a source of

concern for Nigeria, Africa and the rest of the world. In fact, the US General Ham of the

Africom was reported to have lamented that a coordination of efforts between the al-Qaeda in

the Maghreb (AQIM) and the Boko Haram, even in loose partnership with the al-Shabab,

would be the most dangerous thing to happen not only to Africans, but to us as well (The

Guardian August 18, 2011).

According to Bekele (2015) since 2009, and increasingly since mid 2013, the Boko Haram

has carried out several hundreds of attacks against civilian and civilian‟s structures in

schools, market places and places of worship. An estimated 3,750 civilians were killed by

Boko Haram in 2014, in what like amounts to crimes against humanity. The group has also

abducted hundreds of women and girls and forcefully conscripted young men and boys.

Nearly one million people have been displaced by the fighting within Nigeria and across its

borders.

Boko Haram attacked villages in Cameroon, and kidnapped businessmen, religious

representatives, and tourists, holding them for ransom. During an attack on February 4, 2015,

in the town of Fokotol, Boko Haram allegedly killed scores of people, burned Churches and
Mosques, and used civilians as shields. On February 8, 2015, the group abducted numerous

civilians from a bus taking people to a local market. Some were reportedly later killed

(Bekele, 2015).

Like Bekele, Onuoha (2014), in his book titled: “A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone- Boko

Haram Transnational Reach and Regional Responses” gave a detailed analysis of the effects

of Boko Haram on Nigeria and its neighbouring states. According to him Boko Haram poses

security threat to several bordering countries in the sub-region, notably Cameroon, Chad, and

Niger, by organising direct attacks on their soil. Cameroon has hitherto been the main stage

for planning cross-border attacks which increased at a time of growing counter activities by

the Cameroonian government. In May 2014, suspected Boko Haram militants attacked a

Chinese work site in northwest Cameroon, killing at least one soldier and abducting 10

Chinese workers. Chad and Niger are also facing threat of instability and insecurity deriving

from attacks by Boko Haram militants. On the activities of Boko Haram insurgency on Niger,

he stated that in Niger‟s eastern Diffa Region, there was a violent incident in May 2014

between Nigerien forces and suspected Boko Haram insurgents, with at least a dozen of Boko

Haram members being arrested. Some were arrested after they attacked an army patrol in the

region of Diffa. These cross-border attacks reveal a web of an originally Nigeria-based

insurgency and how it has become a vector of insecurity in neighbouring countries. He

affirmed Boko Haram has spread its insurgency beyond Nigeria and has grown into a

regional threat. Thus, he recommended that the disturbing trend required an effective strategy

and a swift implementation to contain the transnational reach of Boko Haram.

Onuoha (2014) observed further that Boko Haram‟s regional security implication manifests

in the transnational consequences of the growing violence for humanitarian, economic and

diplomatic stability in the countries. It has created dire humanitarian situation. According to

the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), no
fewer than 6 million residents of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States have been directly

affected by Boko Haram attacks. Increasing violence perpetrated by Boko Haram has created

a huge number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, a number that is growing

with each passing attack. According to the UNOCHA, nearly 300,000 people in Adamawa,

Borno, and Yobe States- 70 percent of them women and children-have fled their homes early

2013. The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) put the

figure of IDPs in Nigeria at a more than 650,000, with a majority of them staying with

families in other parts of Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 14 March, 2014). The majority

victims are predominantly the most vulnerable of the society-children and women many of

whom have been orphaned and widowed as a result of the activities of the insurgents.

These numbers exclude those that have fled as refugees across Nigeria‟s borders, to

proximate villages in neighbouring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The UNHCR estimated that

over 60, 000 Nigerians sought refuge in neighbouring countries in May 2013. For instance,

there are about 40,000 Nigerian refugees in Niger Republic and about 28,000 in Cameroon

with majority coming from bordering communities. Many of those refugees fled without any

food or water, thereby intensifying the strain on scarce resources and social services of the

host communities (Onuoha, 2014).

Boko Haram violence has led to the destruction of health facilities in the north-eastern states

of Nigeria, forcing health workers to either flee or shut down clinics. This in turn has

compelled residents to seek refuge and medical attention in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger,

thereby adding to the pressure on limited health facilities in the communities. Added to this is

the problem of worsening food insecurity caused by the destruction of livelihoods and social

support systems, bombing of infrastructures, displacement of farmers and pillaging of

livestock and foodstuff. A big majority of farmers in the north had been displaced by Boko

Haram‟s violence just before the start of the 2014 planting season. Owing to worsening
insecurity, farmers are no longer able to cultivate their lands or harvest their products for fear

of being attacked by Boko Haram members. Also, cattle herders and households have lost

their livestock to Boko Haram pillaging, further compounding the situation of severe food

insecurity (Onuoha, 2014).

Onuoha (2014) ascribed the cost of transportation of goods and services in the sub-region to

insecurity occasioned by Boko Haram. Additional cost increases the cost of doing business

services, products and food prices in the sub-region. Furthermore, cross-border abductions by

Boko Haram, for instance, have scared off potential tourists in the far northern region of

Cameroon, leading to a sharp drop in customs revenues for the Central African Country.

Overall, the violence has severely impacted the local economy of the sub-region, as well as

the well-being of the economies of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin among other

countries, which are tied to the Nigerian economy.

Another implication of Boko Haram according to Onuoha (2014) concerns Nigeria‟s ability

to continue to play the vital role of a regional stabilizer in West Africa, including sustaining

her contributions to peace support operations worldwide. Since the attainment of

independence in 1960, Nigeria‟s diplomatic and military leadership has helped to resolve

major political and security crises in West Africa from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises

in the 1990s to the political instability in Guinea, Niger, Cote d‟Ivoire, and Mali (Sherman,

2013). In fact, Nigeria deployed about 12,000 troops within the framework of the ECOWAS

monitoring Group‟s (ECOMOG) missions and spent well over $10billion. Nigeria also

committed about $34million to the deployment of troops and logistics support to the African-

led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and pledged an additional $5million in

further assistance for the stabilisation of Mali. To Onuoha, while Nigeria deploys more

human and material resources to address the Boko Haram insurgency, her capacity to

contribute to regional and international security as well as stability is gradually being eroded.
For example, Nigeria which had consistently ranked as the fourth largest contributor to UN

peace operations behind India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and also as the largest contributor

among African countries, has since December 2011 lost that position to Ethiopia due to the

imperative of addressing internal security challenges. Pressing demand for troops at home to

help combat the Boko Haram insurgency and other internal security challenges contributed to

Nigeria‟s withdrawal of some of her troops in July 2013 from the United Nations

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

These developments reveal how the insurgency is gradually diminishing the contributions

Nigeria makes to regional security therefore supporting the conclusion of Sherman that

“Nigeria cannot fully achieve its potential as a stable regional leader until Nigeria

successfully overcomes the challenge of Boko Haram” (Sherman, 2013). This poses a serious

dilemma to ECOWAS. The worst case scenario will be a situation where Boko Haram‟s

growing attacks exploit Nigeria‟s sensitive religious and ethnic backgrounds to plunge the

country into anarchy or possible implosion. As the world‟s 7th most populous country,

Nigeria‟s implosion would lead to a regional destabilization as the wave of refugee flows

would sweep across the neighbouring countries. More so, ECOWAS will suffer the absence

of a regional security stabiliser in the event of eruption of political crisis in any of its member

states (Onuoha, 2014).

2.8.1 The Effects of Insurgency on International Relations

Looking at the effects of insurgency on international relations, Agwu said insurgency

obstructs Africa‟s international relations in the sense that it breeds distrust between and

among states that had not developed some fully functional mutual confidence-building

measures that dispel all suspicions that one or more of them in a terror-infested

neighbourhood is a culprit in the sponsor of the malaise. Africa‟s porous border is a major

antithesis in the fight against terror; it has tended to contaminate the relationships between
states, that is, the international relations on the continent (Agwu, 2013). The porosity of most

of the borders in the continent was orchestrated by the colonial experience that unilaterally

imposed them. Thus, the arbitrary colonial territorial arrangements culminated, for instance in

the partition of Borno people between Nigeria, Niger, and Chad, the Kebbi people between

Nigeria and Niger and so forth (The Guardian February 11, 2012). These have constituted the

trans-border that straddle countries and make dealing with the influx of aliens, smuggling of

goods and arms, a nightmare. The former spokesperson of the Nigerian Immigration

Services, Joachin Olumba in 2012, emphasised the challenge posed by the trans-border

communities when he reiterated: “The problem is the fact of historical and cultural links

between Nigeria and our neighbours. The relationship that has existed over the years among

those who come from border areas is historical. You find situations where Yoruba exists in

Benin Republic, then Hausa/Fulani in Niger Republic. These people have lived in border

towns for so long” (The Nation February 7, 2012). The border town dwellers with common

ethnic characteristics mix so easily and make it difficult for security agencies to isolate the

aliens, especially the illegal ones among them. In this situation, the borders can never be

made impregnable as they should be. Worse still, the security agencies at the Nigerian

borders, for instance, lack the vital or critical resources to function and the equipment and

sundry logistics to do effective border patrol Agwu (2013).

According to Agwu (2013) the declaration of a state of emergency and the closure of

Nigeria‟s borders with those neighbouring African countries that are contiguous to the

most affected states of the Nigerian federation were actions that partly emanated from the

belief that Boko Haram foot soldiers were infiltrating the country from such Nigerian

neighbours. These desperate measures perfectly illustrate how insurgency contaminates

orderly border controls and thereby contributes in the disruption of Africa‟s international

relations. In taking those actions, President Jonathan was understandably conscious of the
fact that Nigeria was breaching its international obligation under ECOWAS Protocol on

Free Movement of Persons and that the actions would hurt the weak economies of these

neighbours that are actually dependent on Nigeria for a lot of their needs (The Guardia

January 1, 2012).

2.8.2 Regional and International Response to Boko Haram Insurgency

According to Onuoha (2014) ECOWAS adopted a Political Declaration and Common

Position against Terrorism in 2013, which provides for regional Counter Terrorism and an

Implementation Plan to help member states combat terrorism. ECOWAS faces several

challenges in combating Boko Haram threat. Tactically and operationally there is very little

the ECOWAS can do, since it is only as strong as its member states. It lacks both intelligence

architecture and an operational standby force it could use in counter-terrorism operations. Its

programmes and activities are largely influenced by donor funding and priorities, further

limiting what it can do regarding combating Boko Haram. In addition, it cannot effectively

ring fence Nigeria for the purposes of curtailing Boko Haram‟s transnational operations,

given that Nigeria‟s neighbours such as Chad and Cameroon do not belong to the regional

organisation. Nigeria signed bilateral agreements on security with her neighbouring countries

and engaged joint operations with Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin focusing on efforts to

restore security along the borders by employing the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

on the Lake Chad Basin (Onuoha, 2014). MNJTF was established in July 1988 as a joint

operation made up of soldiers from Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to ensure security within their

common borders and engender international cooperation. It commenced operation in

September 1988 after a tripartite agreement was reached by the heads of State of the three

countries but went almost moribund afterwards. It was however resuscitated in April 2012,

and its mandate expanded to include the fight against the activities of Boko Haram. Since

then, the MNJTF has been battling the insurgents, especially in the Lake Chad area. In July
2014, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria agreed to speed up the creation of 2, 800 strong

regional force to tackle the Boko Haram insurgents to which each member will contribute

700 troops. The initiative is in line with the action plan defined at the Paris Summit and the

follow-up meeting on June 12 2014, in London aimed at strengthening regional cooperation

in the fight against insurgency (Onuoha, 2014).

According to Onuoha (2014), Nigeria‟s neighbours have also taken unilateral measures to

shore up security against Boko Haram‟s infiltration and operations in their territory, while

collaborating with Nigeria in some areas. Niger strategy has been to stop Boko Haram from

crossing into its territory rather than to confront them openly.

The literature on Boko Haram insurgency are extensive and inexhaustible but from those that

were reviewed above, little or no attention is given to the security implications of the

insurgency particularly for the formal diplomatic relations between Niger and Nigeria. The

spread of the insurgency from Nigeria to Niger Republic, the influx of refugee and

humanitarian crises between the countries and the actions taken by both countries in fighting

the insurgency would have impacts on their diplomatic relations. Thus, the study addresses

the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations in

order to fill the existing gap in the literature on the topic.

2.9 Theoretical Framework

This study employs linkage theory as the theoretical framework and guide for the

understanding of the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger

Republic diplomatic relations.

The original proponent of the linkage theory is James Rosenau. According to Evans and

Newnham (1997) linkage ideas were first advanced in a significant way in the 1960s by

Rosenau (1969). Other writers Leary (1969) in his work entitled “Domestic Politics and the
International System”, Bamgbose (2013) and so forth buttressed the position of Rosenau that

is, a linkage between domestic politics and international politics.

(i) The basic assumption of the linkage theory is that hard and fast boundaries cannot be

drawn between, for instance, domestic policy and foreign policy (Evans and Newnham,

1997).

(ii) It peeps into the perennial problems relating to the connection between domestic politics

and foreign policy by taking the sphere of national and international politics as interacting

system (Bamgbose, 2013).

(iii) It denotes any behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another

(Rosenau, 1969).

To Adelusi (2008) the initial and the terminal stages of linkage described as “inputs” and

“output” are differentiated according to their origin within the state or within its external

environment. The input and output are linked together by three major types of linkage

namely; the penetrative, the reactive and the Emulative.

The penetrative linkage occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in the

political process of another. For example, the activities of the Cuban forces in Angola and

Libyan soldiers in Chad. Others are staff of international organisations, the diplomatic agents,

foreign aid missions and representative of multinational corporations getting involved in

domestic political process. Penetrative linkage is followed by reactive linkage which involves

a response and adjustment to polity output emanating from elsewhere. Thus, during the June

12 annulment of election in Nigeria, the United States reacted by suspending non-

humanitarian assistance to Nigeria (Bamgbose, 2013). In the same vein, during the Middle

East War in 1973, the Arab Oil States imposed embargo on supply of oil to the United States.

This prompted the European Community to issue a declaration that recognised the rights of

the Palestinians. The third is emulative linkage which is established when the input takes the
same form as the output. For instance, it is observed that most of the things done by

developing countries relating to political, social and economic are the same with what exist in

developed polities. For example, the Nigerian Presidential System of Government was

fashioned after that of the United States (Bamgbose, 2013).

In international relations the term linkage is used in two senses: first in foreign policy

analysis, second in diplomacy. Analytically, linkage theory argues that hard and fast

boundaries cannot be drawn between, for instance, domestic policy and foreign policy.

Foreign policy is a boundary problem in the sense that there is a lack of clarity about where

the boundary should be. Through a system that communication theorists would call a

feedback loop events internally influence events externally and vice versa (Evans and

Newnham, 1997). The idea of the state as clearly defined unit is seen to be redundant as a

result of, among other things, the erosion of the concept of external sovereignty because of

the linkage between national systems and other actors. State actors are seen as being

penetrated to such an extent that they often cease to be effective operative units.

Linkage may often be used in the diplomatic sense where during negotiations one side may

seek to link concessions in one field for those in another. For example, in the Helsinki Accord

process western negotiators specifically linked arms control measures to human rights issues

in their dealings with the Soviet Union. In southern Africa in the 1980s US negotiator Dr.

Chester Crocker successfully connected the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with

the retreat of the South Africans from Namibia, thus paving the way for Namibian

independence in 1990 (Evans and Newnham, 1997).

The major weakness of the theory is over-generalisation as it states that any behaviour that

originates in one system is reacted to in another.

Despite the weakness, the theory is relevant to the research. The area of the theory that is

relevant to the research is the reactive linkage which involves a response and adjustment to
polity output emanating from elsewhere as explained above. Hard and fast boundaries cannot

be drawn between the spread of Boko Haram insurgency from Nigeria to Niger and Niger‟s

reaction towards Nigeria in fighting the insurgency. The same Boko Haram insurgents

operate in both countries. The insurgents not only constitute security threat to Nigeria but

also to Niger Republic. Due to this, the two countries have found it necessary to collaborate

and solve their joint problem. Therefore, there is a connection between the spread of Boko

Haram insurgency between the two countries and their behaviours and reactions toward each

other in tackling the insurgency collectively.

 CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Research Methodology is the systematic procedure used in carrying out an investigation on a

given phenomenon. This chapter outlines the methods and procedures employed in achieving

the objectives of the study. It also outlines the location of the study area, sources of data and

techniques of data collection, sampling procedures, sampling technique and technique of data

analysis.

3.2 Study Area

The study area is Nigeria and Niger Republic. Nigeria was colonised by Britain. Nigeria got

her independence on First of October, 1960. The population of the country is 140 million

according to the 2006 Census. Nigeria is made up 36 States and is very rich in mineral

resources such as petroleum, coal, bitumen, and cash crops such as cocoa, coffee, palm oil

and so forth. Nigeria shares borders with Niger Republic in the north-western and north-

eastern zones of the country. Boko Haram insurgents mostly affected Nigeria‟s borders with

Niger in the north-eastern part of the country that is, Borno and Yobe states. Borno State is

the most affected state by the insurgency. Borno State is sharing border with Diffa Region of

Niger through Damasak the headquarters of Mobbar Local Government Area of the state.

Niger Republic was colonised by France. Niger attained her independence in 1960. The

population of the country is 11,666,000 (2005 estimate, www.infoplease.com, 2015). Niger is

made up 7 Administrative Regions and is very rich in uranium and noted for the production

of crops such as groundnuts, millet and animals such as goats, sheep and cattle for export.

Niger shares borders with Nigeria in the south-eastern part of the country. The area mostly

affected by the activities of Boko Haram is Diffa which is one of 7 Administrative Regions of

the Republic of Niger. Diffa is sharing border with Borno and Yobe States.
Chart 1

Map of Nigeria showing the border towns-Kannamma in Yobe State, Damasak in Borno
State with Diffa region of Niger. The areas mostly affected by Boko Haram insurgency
between the two countries (Source: www.westafricainsight.org May Edition, 2014).

Chart 2

A Map showing Diffa Subdivision in Diffa region of Niger and Borno State, Nigeria where
Boko Haram insurgents mostly carry out their operations (Source: BBC, 2015).
3.3 Population of the Study

The Population of Nigeria is 140 million according to 2006 Census while that of Niger is

11,666,000 (2005 estimate, www.infoplease.com, 2015). Security and diplomacy are issues

of interstate relations that cannot be left in the hand of anybody except those saddled with the

responsibility for managing such relations for their countries. Thus, the sample population is

12 consisting of Assistant Director and First Secretary- the West Africa Affairs Division

(WAAD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, First Counsellor- Embassy of the Republic

of Niger, Abuja, security agents and experts. 12 respondents were interviewed at the end of

the field work. The researcher did not visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Niger because

the First Counsellor-the Deputy Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja

officially provided the answers to the questions raised in the in-depth interviews.

Furthermore, apart from the data collected from the in-depth interview conducted with the

Assistant Director and First Secretary-WAAD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, two

officials of the European Affairs Divisions -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria who were

privy to some of the security summits on Boko Haram insurgency responded to the questions

in the in-depth interview. Other stakeholders were the military officer-7 Division, Nigerian

Army, Maiduguri, the Police Public Relations Officer- Borno State Command, Sector 5

Commander-Borno State Civilian Multinational Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), the former

and the 2016 State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Chairman-Maiduguri, Borno

State, a security expert and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger.

The justification for the sample population was based on the objectives of the research. The

sample population are officials of the institutions of the area of study who have access to

facts, information, and evidence very useful in answering our research questions. For

example, the Assistant Director and the First Secretary; West Africa Affairs Division are

officers in the department that coordinates how Boko Haram‟s activities affect Nigeria-Niger
relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria. The two Foreign Officers; European

Affairs Division -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, were privy to some of the security

summits on Boko Haram insurgency. The First Counsellor- Embassy of the Republic of

Niger is the Deputy Ambassador. He also coordinates the effects of Boko Haram insurgency

on Nigeria and Niger Republic. Other stakeholders like the military officer-7 Division,

Nigerian Army, Maiduguri, the Police Public Relations Officer- Borno State Command,

Sector 5 Commander- Borno State Civilian Multinational Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), are

all involved in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency. The Security forces coordinate their

operations in the area of resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria with

State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Chairman-Maiduguri who is in charge of

internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps and responds to emergency situations including

the distribution of relief materials to Nigerians who are taking refuge in Diffa, and Maine

Soroa, Niger Republic. He was also privy to some of the security summit on Boko Haram

insurgency. The youths in Diffa Region of Niger supply the security forces with vital

information on the activities of Boko Haram in their areas.

The information from the West Africa Affairs Division, European Affairs Division-Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, the military, the police

and State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) represent official views while those

from the Civilian JTF- Borno State, the youth leader from Diffa Region of Niger and the

security expert represent non official views. The two views corroborate each other and help

to achieve the aim and objectives of the study.

3.4 Sources of Data Collection

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data were collected

mainly from the field work through in-depth interview from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Nigeria, Abuja, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, and stakeholders like the

military and the police forces, expert in the field of security and strategic studies and Nigeria-

Niger relations, the Civilian Multinational Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), and a youth

leader, Diffa Region of Niger.

The secondary data were collected from relevant documents, textbooks and journals on

Nigeria-Niger Republic relations, Boko Haram insurgency and its security implications for

the diplomatic ties between the two countries from the Nigerian Institute of International

Affairs, Lagos, Embassy of the Republic of Niger, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Nigeria, Abuja. Others were newspapers, magazines, published and unpublished works

relevant to the topic under study and the internet. The reason for the combination of the two

sources was based on the need for one to complement the other in order to achieve the

objectives of the study.

3.5 Instrument of Data Collection

This study used in-depth interview and discussion to collect data from the respondents.

In-depth Interview

This study used structured interview to collect data on the security implications of Boko

Haram insurgency for Nigeria-Niger Republic diplomatic relations from the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, military personnel,

the Police, Civilian JTF, security expert and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger Republic.

Data were also collected from official documents and publications relevant to the topic under

study from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Embassy of the Republic of

Niger, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Abuja. The data collected were synthesised

and inferences were drawn to respond to our research questions.

3.6 Sampling Procedures

Data were collected mainly from the stakeholders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Nigeria, Abuja, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, the security agents-the military

and the police forces, expert in the field of security, strategic studies and Nigeria-Niger

relations, the Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), and a youth leader, Diffa Region of

Niger. The selection of these institutions was based on the objectives of the research. They

are institutions of the area of study that have access to facts, information, and evidence very

useful in answering our research questions. Data were also collected from the related

documents and publications to complement the data from the in-depth interview conducted.

3.7 Sampling Techniques

The research purposively selected the respondents, that is, meeting the representatives of the

area of study, specialists and experts with access to information, facts and evidence useful in

answering our research questions. They included the First Counsellor, Embassy of the

Republic of Niger, the Assistant Director and First Secretary-the West Africa Affairs

Division, and two officials of the European Affairs Divisions -Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Nigeria who were privy to some of the security summits on Boko Haram insurgency. Data

were also collected from other stakeholders like the military personnel; Seven Division,

Nigerian Army-Maiduguri, the Police, Civilian JTF, security expert and a youth leader, Diffa

Region of Niger Republic affected by the activities of Boko Haram. Data were also collected

from the related documents and publications from the Nigerian Institute of International

Affairs, Lagos, Embassy of the Republic of Niger, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Nigeria, Abuja to complement the data from the in-depth interview conducted.
3.8 Validation of the Instruments used for the Study

The validation of the instrument used for the study was done by meeting experts in

qualitative research before going to the field work to look at the questions in the in-depth

interview and ensure that responses to them would generate sufficient answers to the research

questions. The researcher also consulted his supervisors before going to the field work to

conduct the in-depth interview.

3.9 Reliability of the Instruments used for the Study

For testing of reliability, a pre-field work in-depth interview was conducted with experts in

security and diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic as pilot study before

going to the field work to interview the stakeholders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Nigeria, Abuja, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, the military and the police

forces, Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF), and a youth leader, Diffa Region of Niger

Republic.

3.10 Data Transcription and Analysis

The relevance of data transcription and analysis is to transcribe raw data collected into an

instrument for analysis. Before the interview was conducted, those to be interviewed were

contacted and informed about the purpose of the research and why they were selected for the

interview. The interview was recorded through a tape recorder after obtaining the permission

of the respondents.

After that, the transcription starts with the first reading of the note that was transcribed from

the interviews. The second reading was to identify the main themes in the data in accordance

with the research problem under study and objectives. The third and final reading was to

identify new themes and relevant quotes in the themes identified.

The in-depth interviews were thematically analysed as they relate to the objectives of the

research by qualitative data analysis and deductions were drawn from them to answer the

research questions.
 CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM

INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses data collected from the field work. The in-depth

interviews conducted were tape-recorded and transcribed. The views of the respondents were

thematically analysed as they relate to the research objectives by qualitative data analysis to

answer the research questions. This is then followed by the research findings and verification

of assumptions posed in chapter one.

4.2 Perception of Security Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for Nigeria and

Niger Republic by Respondents

From the in-depth interview conducted with specialists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Nigeria, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger; Abuja, majority of the respondents said:

“Boko Haram insurgency has altered the security architecture between Nigeria and Niger

Republic.” They stated that the two countries had not experienced Boko Haram-like

insurgency before. The respondents stated that the kind of security challenges that existed

along their borders before the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency were smuggling and

armed banditry which did not degenerate to insurgency like the Boko Haram. Similarly, the

Niger-Delta insurgency in Nigeria and the rebellion against the central government in Niger

did not degenerate to cross border insurgency like the Boko Haram. Other said: “It has led to

the displacement of people along the border areas and the disruption of commercial activities

between the countries. From their responses, it can be inferred that Boko Haram insurgency

has altered the existing security situation between the two countries. Today, the same Boko
Haram insurgents operate in Nigeria and Niger Republic and cause lots of damage to the two

countries.

This is supported by a respondent who said: “Boko Haram insurgency causes general state of

insecurity in Nigeria and Niger by carrying out cross-border operations between them which

has resulted to loss of lives and property, displacement of people and influx of refugees from

Nigeria to Niger Republic.” The insecurity caused by Boko Haram insurgency has adversely

affected farming activities along the border towns between the two countries. People have

abandoned their farming activities and relocated to safe zones because of the danger of being

attacked by Boko Haram insurgents (Interview, 2016).

The view above is further corroborated by an informant who stated: “The lack of security in

the border areas as a result of Boko Haram activities has badly affected the food production.”

It has restricted the movement of people, goods, and services in the areas. He said that before

the emergence of Boko Haram, the people of Niger used to cross the contiguous border towns

of Nigeria to farm and transact businesses without much stress, without fear of being attacked

or killed by insurgents. They used to take their machines to Kanamma in Nigeria which is

about 16km from Maine Soroa, Diffa Region of Niger Republic to sell their products or buy

Nigerian made products and bring them to Niger. Even in the night, Nigeriens used to enter

Geidam and buy different items and return to Niger Republic in peace. The security agents

would not bother about the Economic Community of West African States‟ (ECOWAS‟)

passport once identity card was shown to them; they would allow people to move across the

border. All these have stopped due to insecurity caused by Boko Haram insurgency. The

security situation has changed, people are now afraid of their lives and property. Some have

abandoned their homes for safety elsewhere (Interview, 2016).

Furthermore, a respondent asserted: “The disruption of economic activities and displacement

of people across Nigeria‟s borders with Niger are manifestations of the insecurity caused by

Boko Haram operations.”

He stated: “The insecurity caused by Boko Haram insurgency has resulted to disruption of the

economic activities between the border towns in Borno State, Yobe State and Diffa Region of

Niger. He said no business can thrive in an atmosphere of violence. The activities of Boko

Haram make the areas unsafe for businesses and farming activities.”

To buttress the view above an informant stressed:

Boko Haram activities have created security problems and

resulted to the total closure of the roads from Maiduguri to
Niger‟s border that always witness movement of trucks, cars, and
lorries carrying made in Nigerian products to Niger and in return
coming back to Nigeria with goods produced from Niger which
claimed up to about 35 to 40 percent of the volume of trade
between them (Interview, 2016).

The above is a confirmation of the Linkage theory used as the theoretical framework in this

research. There is a linkage between Boko Haram insurgency and the step taken by the

Nigerian government in closing its borders with Niger Republic and the reaction of Niger to

Nigeria in combating the insurgency collectively because it jeopardises their common

interests.

In corroboration of the above, a respondent averred: “Due to the closure of the roads, the

trade relationship between Nigeria and Niger particularly the informal trade has been badly

affected at Damasak, Mobbar Local Government area of Borno State axis and Diffa Region

of Niger Republic.” This has led to trade diversion, that is, the continuity of economic

activities in the same location with different direction. Those people in Maiduguri, Borno

State who are going for trade activities in Niger have diverted their trade because of lack of

safety to lives and property. They now leave Borno territory and move to Yobe State. From

Yobe State, they move from Geidam or Kanamma, following the Diffa axis and come
northwards deep into the territory of Niger. They then engage in trade activities and then

cross back again. The same thing is happening to those goods that are coming from or going

out from Chad to Nigeria or from Nigeria to Chad. They have also diverted their trade

activities following the Yobe axis to Geidam to Niger Republic into Republic of Chad due to

lack of security. The difficulty and the colossal reduction in the volume of trade between

Nigeria and Niger and the reliance of Niger on Nigerian infrastructural facilities make life

very uneasy for the people in the south-eastern region of Niger that border the Lake Chad

Basin (Interview, 2016).

In a similar dimension, an informant stressed that the essence of economic development

could not be isolated from peace and security. He said: “If there is no security within Nigeria

and Niger, the rate of growth and development would reduce because development cannot

take place in an atmosphere of insecurity. Due to insecurity, there is restriction in the

movement of people, goods and services between the two countries” (Interview, 2016).

By extension, Boko Haram insurgency constitutes security threat to the Lake Chad Basin

region. This is buttressed by an informant who said: “Boko Haram poses serious security

threat to the region by carrying out cross-border attacks in the area. The insurgency which

started in Nigeria has spread to the neighbouring countries-Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

Boko Haram insurgency in the region has led to the destruction of lives and property; put a

halt to the agricultural activities, irrigation and water project in the Lake Chad region”

(Interview, 2016).

This is also in line with the submission of Onuoha (2014) in chapter two of this work that

Boko Haram poses security threat to several bordering countries in the sub-region, notably

Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, by organising direct attacks on their soil.

This is further buttressed by an informant who stated: “Boko Haram insurgency affects

movement of people, goods and services which is so sensitive and central to the other parts of

the Lake Chad Basin region.” The activities of the insurgents have great effects on the West

and Central African Sub-regions that rely on Nigeria-the economic hub of both West and

Central African states particularly the states that are landlocked and rely on Nigeria‟s

facilities for transportation of their goods and services both imports and exports. For instance,

Maiduguri is the landline and life- line of both Chad and Niger. Most of the goods that are in

Maiduguri are exported to these countries and once there is security problem there, definitely

it would have effect on them especially by the step taken by the Nigerian government in

closing the borders. The fierce engagement between the Nigerian Armed Forces and the

insurgents has led to retreat, reconfiguration, metamorphosis and conscription of other who

may not necessarily belong to the insurgents to be possible conscripted into it and once this

type of thing exists within Nigerian borders and considering the socio-historical ties between

the north-eastern region, West and Central African sub-regions, it would lead to security

conundrum in the region (Interview, 2016).

Similarly, the Lake Chad region is known for its farming and business activities. A lot of

activities take place between Nigeria and Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Central African Republic,

Gabon, up to Sudan. Chad Basin where a lot of farming and business activities take place is

no more as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. A lot of businessmen lost their

investments and jobs as a result of the insurgency in the area. The insurgency has scared

foreigners away from Borno State. Gone are the days when the citizens of the neighbouring

countries come to Maiduguri to transact businesses. Chadians, Nigeriens came to Maiduguri

to buy food items like grains, clothing, fuels, cement and so forth. Now they are afraid to

come to Maiduguri while Nigerians are afraid to go to their countries due to insecurity along

the border areas. The cement exportation in Maiduguri is one of the biggest routes to Chad.
Chad with the recent oil boom is into construction of lots of infrastructures most especially in

the state capital and other parts of the country. The cement importation from Maiduguri axis

to Chad has come to a standstill due to insurgency (Interview, 2016).

Some respondents said: “The alteration of security equation in the Lake Chad is a

manifestation of insecurity occasioned by the activities of Boko Haram in the region.” This

view is supported by the interview conducted with an informant who said: “Boko Haram

insurgency has redefined regional security in the Lake Chad region. The Lake Chad is a

fringe that demarcates the West and Central Africa and a region of common socio-cultural

and historical linkage between the Lake Chad side of Nigeria, Lake Chad side of Niger, Lake

Chad side of Cameroon, Lake Chad side of Chad down to Sudan and Central Africa.” The

insurgency has also redefined regional integration in West Africa. Hitherto, there was a sort

of developmental regionalism; economic regionalisation particularly with respect to

facilitating cross-border movement and cross-border trade in West African Sub-region. At the

time ECOWAS was formed, the West African sub-region was not challenged by serious

security threat. The issue of joint military operation did not come into fore. Issue of joint

military operation came into fore when there were crises in Liberia and Sierra-Leone. Even in

Sierra-Leone and Liberia, Nigeria contributed 85 to 90% of the military to ECOWAS Cease-

Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in the countries. The crisis in Liberia and

Sierra-Leone were only domiciled within their own territories. It did not spill over to other

territories like the way Boko Haram insurgency has spread across both West and Central

African Sub-regions. The insurgency has changed the security equation between Nigeria and

Niger and the Lake Chad region.

To this effect, an informant while assessing the existing insurgencies and crises in the Lake

Chad region asserted: “There is element of insurgency in Niger especially the armed rebellion

that is fighting the central government. In Chad, there was never central government until the
emergence of Idriss Deby as the President of the country. The history of the Republic of

Chad is characterised by armed rebellion with one guerrilla leader pushing out another

guerrilla leader and it was with the emergence of Idriss Deby as the President that Chad has a

semblance of a unified military Armed Forces.

The Central African Republic is still in crisis. In Sudan, there is armed insurgency against the

government in Darfur and before there was the issue of South Sudan. And within South

Sudan even though they are now independent, there is a factional fighting in the country.

Democratic Republic Congo (DR) and Congo Brazzaville are still part of the Lake Chad

Basin. They are observer nations even though they belong to the Congo Basin region. There

is crisis in Congo (DR) particularly the movement of intra-armed militia that have no border

like Boko Haram that cross over to Congo (DR) down to Uganda, up to Sudan, down to

Central African Republic and Chad. These are parallel lines of security conundrum that have

permeated from one region to another, from country to another and there is a tendency of

interface between the armed insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria and armed insurgency of

these countries (Interview, 2016).

From the above, it can be inferred that Boko Haram insurgency has redefined the security

situation between Nigeria and Niger. The insurgents cause insecurity which negatively affects

all spheres of lives in terms of trans-human and commercial activities in Nigeria, Niger and

the Lake Chad region. The activities of the insurgents cause death and destruction of property

in the study area. This creates displacement and fear among the people particularly the

residents of the border towns. This therefore, shows that Boko Haram insurgency has become

regional insurgency and changed the existing security situation between Nigeria and Niger

Republic and the Lake Chad region as a whole.

4.3 Perception of Respondents on the Closure of Borders by Nigeria with Niger

Republic

Majority of the respondents said that the closure of borders by Nigeria was meant to curtail

Boko Haram activities within Nigeria and prevent them from escaping to Niger after

attacking the country and not because Niger Republic supported the insurgents or allowed

them to use its territory as hide-out. Other opined that it was meant to prevent the infiltration

of Boko Haram insurgents from Niger Republic.

Based on the responses of the respondents, it could be inferred that the essence of the closure

of borders by Nigeria was to curtail Boko Haram insurgents within the country and prevent

them from escaping to Niger. This view is supported by a respondent who said that Nigeria

closed its borders with Niger because it discovered that when the insurgents struck in the

north-eastern part of Nigeria they escaped to Niger and other neighbouring states. The

Nigerian government closed the borders in order to forestall this.

The view above is further supported by an informant who asserted that the closure of borders

by Nigeria with Niger was meant to control the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria and to

prevent the insurgents from running to Niger Republic through the borders areas for

protection. He stated further that the closure of borders by Nigeria adversely affected cross

border trade and movement of people across the two countries and was in breach of

ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons across the sub-region.

The above is in line with the submission of Agwu (2013) in chapter two of this study that the

declaration of a state of emergency and the closure of Nigeria‟s borders with those

neighbouring African countries that are contiguous to the most affected states of the Nigerian

federation were actions that partly emanated from the belief that Boko Haram foot soldiers

were infiltrating the country from such Nigerian neighbours. These desperate measures
perfectly illustrate how insurgency contaminates orderly border controls and thereby

contributes in the disruption of Africa‟s international relations. In taking those actions,

President Jonathan was understandably conscious of the fact that Nigeria was breaching its

international obligation under ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and that the

actions would hurt the weak economies of these neighbours that are actually dependent on

Nigeria for a lot of their needs (The Guardia January 1, 2012).

Despite this, the closure of borders by Nigeria was not specifically targeted at Niger

Republic. It was meant to bolster security in the border areas, block supply line to Boko

Haram insurgents and ultimately to defeat them. Moreover, the two countries now see Boko

Haram insurgents as their common enemy that must be dealt with collectively because the

insurgency has also spread to Niger (Interview, 2016). This is in tandem with the linkage

theory as explained in chapter two of this study. There is a connection between the Boko

Haram insurgency and the responses of the two countries toward each other in fighting the

insurgency collectively.

4.4 Perception of the Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency for the Diplomatic

Relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic by Respondents

Majority of the respondents said: “The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has deepened

diplomatic ties between Nigeria and Niger Republic.” Few respondents said: “It has led to

misinterpretation of Nigeria‟s Government action, and distrust between the two nations.”

From their responses, it can be inferred that the fight against Boko Haram insurgency has

strengthened formal diplomatic relations between the two countries instead of causing

diplomatic row between them.

In corroboration of the view above, an informant stated: “The relation between the two

countries is further strengthened because there is political will and cooperation between

Nigeria and Niger to end Boko Haram insurgency." The view above is also supported by an

interview conducted with a respondent who stated: “Boko Haram insurgency has not strained

Nigeria-Niger diplomatic relations.” It has actually helped to strengthen their relationships

because there are collaborations between the two states through the Multinational Joint Task

Force (MNJTF) to fight the insurgency. Apart from the collaboration through the MNJTF,

there has also been assistance from Niger in terms of intelligence sharing with Nigeria. Niger

Republic has assisted the Nigerian security agencies with intelligent reports that have worked

in curtailing the insurgency in both countries.

Moreover, Boko Haram insurgency mostly affected Nigeria‟s borders in Borno and Yobe

States with Niger Republic through Diffa Region. The insurgency has not seriously affected

Nigeria‟s borders with Niger in Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Sokoto States.

The economic activities in the areas have continued unabated unlike the borders in Borno and

Yobe States with Diffa Region that have been badly affected by the insurgents (Interview,

2016).

Another informant asserted: The activities of Boko Haram across Nigeria‟s and Niger‟s

borders have not really affected negatively the formal relations between Nigeria and Niger.

He based his assertion on the collaboration between the two countries and the assistance

Nigeria gave to Niger for the conduct of the February 2016 election in the country.

In the election conducted in Niger Republic in February 2016,

Nigeria assisted Niger with logistics, financial support and
security (Interview, 2016).

The presence of a high-level delegation of the Nigerian Government led by the Vice

President- Professor Yemi Osinbajo at the inauguration of President Mahamadous Issoufou

for a second term in Niamey, Niger Republic is a confirmation of the assertion above.

Professor Osinbajo (quoted in the Daily Trust, April 4 2016: 4) said that President Buhari

could not attend the ceremony because he was in Washington DC, United States, for the 4th

Nuclear Security Summit. He stated: “As you know, Niger is an important partner and also an

important ally in the war against terrorism and also we are good neighbours. Mahamadous

investiture has great significance because first, Nigeria understands President Issoufou well.

He is an old hand, and Nigeria has worked well with him as a partner. So, his re-election

brings continuity and it is good for the fight against Boko Haram and insurgency in general.”

He stressed: “Nigeria holds the Nigerien President in high esteem. He is an old friend of

President Buhari. The Nigerien President‟s inauguration is also an opportunity to honour a

strong ally and to reinforce all our important diplomatic and military ties.”

Niger‟s resolve to support Nigeria towards eradicating Boko Haram insurgency, was

contained in President Issoufou‟s inaugural address (quoted in the Daily Trust, April 4 2016:

4). He stated that the current security challenge transcended boundaries. He reiterated his

country‟s commitment to join force with Nigeria and other neighbours in the fight against

insurgency at the sub-regional level. He noted that defeating Boko Haram has several

benefits, particularly for the economic integration of the region. He expressed optimism that

defeating insurgency would facilitate trade between Niger and Nigeria.

The cordiality of relationship between Nigeria and Niger is further supported by another

informant who stressed that Nigeria bilateral relations with Niger since independence- 1960

have been cordial. He stated: There has not been any incidence of serious disagreement

between the two countries because Nigeria and Niger see each other as brothers. Apart from

the fact that they have common border spanning about 1500km, they have cultural affinity,

the same people found in Nigeria are also found in Niger Republic such as Kanuri, Hausa,

and Fulani. People on both sides of the borders intermarry. That strengthens the relationship
between the two countries. Apart from cultural affinities, Nigeria also has bilateral economic

relations with Niger under the auspices of the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for

Cooperation (NNJC).

There have also been high-level visits from both countries.

Nigerian President has visited Niger Republic and Niger‟s
President has also visited Nigeria. After the inauguration of
General Muhammadu Buhari as the President of Nigeria, the
first country he visited was Niger to strengthen Nigeria‟s
relations with Niger in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency
(Interview, 2016).

The view above is further corroborated by an informant who stated: At the state level, the

Borno state government has cordial relations with the Niger‟s government. They share ideas

on how to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency. There is collaboration and cooperation

between the Nigerian Civilian Joint Task Force and some youth leaders in Diffa Region of

Niger Republic on how to tackle the insurgency and how to camp the refugees on both sides

of the countries. The Nigerien youth leaders used to come to Maiduguri for meeting. Some of

the people of Damasak, Mobbar and Abadam Local Government Areas of Borno State who

were displaced by the activities of Boko Haram and sought refuge in Niger because of their

proximity to Niger‟s region of Diffa and Maina Soroa are being taken care of by the Borno

State Government with the cooperation of the government of Niger (Interview, 2016).

Echoing similar view, an informant said: The relations between the two countries have been

cordial to the extent that Nigeria supplies Niger with light. Nigeriens come to Nigerian

Defence Academy, Kaduna and Command and Staff College, Jaji for military training. On

security issue along their borders, he said: “Nigeria has not had serious border problem with

Niger like the case of Cameroon. Armed banditry used to be the security challenge along

Nigerian borders with Niger Republic before the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in

2009 which has posed serious security threat to the two countries and the region as a whole.”
The two countries are sharing military intelligence in their quest to defeat the insurgents

through the joint military operation formed by the Lake Chad Basin Commission tagged

“Multinational Joint Task Force” to put an end to Boko Haram insurgency (Interview, 2016).

In 2015, there was an accusation and counter accusation between Niger‟s Defence Ministry

and Nigerian military in the course of fighting Boko Haram insurgency. The Niger‟s Defence

Ministry accused Nigerian military of running away from the battle field. The accusation was

rejected by the then Director of Defence information; Major General Chris Olukolade (Ibeh,

2015). A respondent asserted that the accusation has no negative consequence on Nigeria-

Niger formal diplomatic relations. He buttressed his view by the closer cooperation that has

continued to exist between them in the battle against the insurgents. He averred that it was as

a result of lack of political will and commitment on the part of Nigerian government that

warranted such an accusation. He buttressed his point and stated: For the whole of Baga

town, Ngala, Gworza, Abadam in Borno State, and about 16 local government areas in the

state to be under the control of Boko Haram, something must have gone wrong. If the most

powerful armed forces in the black world were running away from Boko Haram insurgents,

something untoward must have happened. The scenario generally is not because of lack of

capability or cowardice of the Nigerian military. It is because they might not be given order

to stand there and protect and even if they were given the order, they were not supplied with

enough military equipment to fight. If a soldier is given nine bullets against the enemy with

hundreds of bullets, the nine bullets would always be for self-protection not to fight the

enemy. To him in warfare, the defence of a fighter is basic requirement followed by

protection of high valued assets such as machine guns, attack helicopters and military tanks.

All these are of high values that should be protected and if given adequate protection, it

would not fall into the hand of the enemy. The combined armed forces of Niger, Chad, and

Cameroon are not a match to the Nigerian military capability. With the new administration of
President Muhammadu Buhari, the situation on the frontline has changed for better and the

level of cooperation between the two countries has improved in tackling the insurgency

collectively (Interview, 2016).

On the other hand, a respondent stated: “Boko Haram insurgency has led to distrust between

Nigeria and Niger Republic.”

The view above is supported by an informant who asserted: “When looking at the fact that

the Boko Haram insurgents have their base in Nigeria and that Nigeria should take urgent

step to curb the activities of the insurgents by extension to stop their spill over to Niger.

Seeing Boko Haram as a Nigerian problem by Niger shows some elements of

misinterpretation of actions" (Interview, 2016).

In the same vein, when there is no clarity of any action taken by a particular state in the fight

against Boko Haram insurgency, the other state might misinterpret it and take steps that

would actually lead to the clarification of the issue. For instance, before the initiative of right

of hot pursuit which allows a country to pursue a criminal beyond its border contrary to

international law which does not allow that, if the insurgents operating in Nigeria run to

Niger Republic, Nigeria would not be able to pursue them without the permission of Niger.

This area could actually lead to friction and distrust between the two countries if the

understanding is not there (Interview, 2016).

This is similar to the position of Agwu (2013) in chapter two of this research that insurgency

obstructs Africa‟s international relations in the sense that it breeds distrust between and

among states that had not developed some fully functional mutual confidence-building

measures that dispel all suspicions that one or more of them in a terror-infested

neighbourhood is a culprit in the sponsor of the malaise. Africa‟s porous border is a major
antithesis in the fight against terror; it has tended to strain the relationships between states,

that is, the international relations on the continent.

Furthermore, the influx of refugees from Nigeria to Niger as a result of Boko Haram

insurgency could put pressure on the economy of Niger Republic and impact negatively on

the relations between the two countries if not properly handled (Interview, 2016).

It can be deduced that despite the level of misinterpretation and distrust envisaged by the

respondents between Nigeria and Niger Republic over Boko Haram insurgency, the

relationship between them has not been strained. The two countries have realised that the

insurgents constitute threat to their common goals. Instead of the activities of the insurgents

causing diplomatic row between them, the two countries have come together to fight the

insurgency.

4.5 Security Cooperation between Nigeria and Niger in Combating Boko Haram

Insurgency Perceived by Respondents

From the interview conducted majority of the respondents stated: “Nigeria and Niger have

common security cooperation in fighting Boko Haram insurgency.” Other respondents stated:

“The two countries fight Boko Haram insurgents by general consensus.” Therefore, it can be

deduced that the two countries have common security cooperation in fighting Boko Haram

insurgency.

This view is supported by an informant who asserted that Boko Haram as a transnational

insurgent group might not be well appreciated by Niger initially when it started in Nigeria.

Overtime, the fight against the insurgents has led to more security cooperation between the

two countries. Insurgency is a global phenomenon that is not restricted to one country and not

defined by geographical border. Niger Republic through the numerous security summits like

the Paris and London Summits in 2014 that were organized to nip the insurgency in the bud
has come to the realisation that it must work and cooperate with Nigeria to tackle the menace

of the insurgents. During the Paris and London Summits in 2014 which were extended to the

neighbouring countries of Nigeria, the leaders resolved to fight the insurgents collectively.

Initially, the Cameroonian President Paul Biya was not cooperating but through the effort of

President Francois Hollande-the French President, Paul Biya attended the conference in Paris

in which all of them pledged their common cooperation to ensure that Boko Haram is tackled

collectively. These were the events which gave birth to Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit

(RIFU), and the resuscitation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with the

mandate to fight the insurgency. Cameroon was expressing reservation on the fact that it

wanted to go solo in curbing the activities of Boko Haram but along the line there was an

agreement that it should be a joint task force of all the states involved so that there would be

clarity of purpose.

Through Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU) an initiative

of the neighbouring countries affected by the activities of Boko
Haram, Niger Republic and Nigeria have been cooperating to
fight the insurgency. The right to hot pursuit that is, the right of a
country to pursue a criminal beyond its boundary to the other side
was put in place to tackle Boko Haram insurgency (Interview,
2016).

Nigeria and Niger are cooperating bilaterally to see that the Boko Haram insurgency is

brought to an end (Interview, 2016).

This is in tandem with the submission of Onuoha (2014) in chapter two of this study that

Nigeria signed bilateral agreements on security with her neighbouring countries and engaged

in joint operations with Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin focusing on efforts to restore

security along the borders by employing the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) on the

Lake Chad Basin.

Furthermore, another informant said that the effects of Boko Haram activities forced the

government of Niger to actively participate in containing the activities of the Boko Haram

insurgency. Niger is one of the leading partners in the Multinational Joint Task Force

(MNJTF) that helped Nigeria to capture some of the territories under the control of Boko

Haram in 2015 in Abadam, Mobbar, and some parts of Kukawa and Guzamala Local

Government of Areas of Borno State. He stated: “There are also Chad, Cameroon and

Republic of Benin which by proxy affected by the insurgency taking part in the joint

military operation against Boko Haram in the region.” Their participation in the

Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is predicated on regional security paradigm, that is,

if your neighbour is in a crisis and you do not act, there is the tendency that the crisis would

spread to your area. That makes Benin Republic to engage in pre-empting activities by

helping to bolster security operation in the Lake Chad region (Interview, 2016).

In the same vein, a respondent while responding to the security cooperation between Nigeria

and Niger in the fight against Boko Haram said: Nigeria and Niger share security intelligence

and cooperate militarily in fighting the insurgency. Niger has close communication and

cooperation with Nigeria within the auspices of Lake Chad. If Boko Haram members are

being chased from Nigerian territory by the Nigerian troops and they run to the borders of

Niger, they would meet the Nigerien troops there. Similarly, when the Nigerian Air Force

make a surveillance, if the area is identified as the territory of Niger, it would be

communicated to the Republic of Niger that the fleeing Boko Haram are there regrouping.

The Nigerien Army may give them the mandate to fire or they would say they are coming to

do it. Some military operations are conducted under the Multinational Joint Task Force

(MNJTF) while some are acting within their own military jurisdiction. The troops of Niger

were no longer in the areas it helped Nigeria to liberate in Damasak, Mobbar and Abadam

local government areas of Borno State. The Nigerian troops are in charge there. But there are
certain areas of patrol by the troops of Niger that have blocked supplies line for free

movement, for free ride to the Boko Haram insurgents as a result of the intensity of security

cooperation and collaboration between the two countries (Interview, 2016).

The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has brought about a rebirth of a new beginning, a

new era of collaborative effort towards fighting insurgency between the two countries. This

may ultimately lead to the formation of a standing army aimed at containing any sort of

insecurity within the Lake Chad Basin Region (Interview, 2016).

If Boko Haram is left alone to Nigeria; there is a tendency of Boko Haram activating the

remnant of rebel elements in Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Sudan.

The operation of the Multinational Joint Task Force has largely been effective and successful.

The security atmosphere being presently experienced in 2016 cannot be compared with that

of the past two years or early 2015 (Interview, 2016).

A respondent while examining the similarity between ECOMOG in West Africa and

Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Region, stressed that just as we have

economic integration accentuated by free movement of goods and services until the

emergence of ECOMOG that changed and added to the objectives of the ECOWAS as

military operation in the sub-region the same is applicable to the Lake Chad Basin Region.

Joint military operation was virtually non-existent. Lake Chad is a region that comprises the

countries that share the conventional water resources and it was one of the oldest regional

organisations in Africa. The Lake Chad Basin Region was formed for agricultural and

irrigation purposes and also to give accurate information to other member countries in terms

of over flooding. If the water of the river over flow its bank or exceeded their storage

capacity, it will definitely lead to flooding in the region. Boko Haram insurgency has added

to the objectives of the Lake Chad Basin region. The region has never experienced Boko

Haram-like insurgency apart from the territorial domiciled remnant of armed elements. But
with Boko Haram insurgency, the same Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria operate in Niger,

Chad, and Cameroon. That has led to regionalisation of Boko Haram phenomenon. That also

added like ECOMOG in West African Sub-region in the Lake Chad Basin Commission the

Multinational Joint Task Force with a mandate to combat the insurgency. It seems 70% of the

attention of Lake Chad Basin Commission has now shifted from agricultural production,

water resources utilisation to security and that is why President Muhammadu Buhari called

for harmonisation of policy between ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central

African States (ECCAS). Nigeria happens to be in the centre. One part belongs to West

Africa, the other part belong to the Central Africa. Unless and until these security, economic

and cultural activities are harmonised, Nigeria is always to be on the brink and on the fence

of not even determining where it should belong to (Interview, 2016).

From the above, it can be inferred that Nigeria and Niger have common security cooperation

in combating the insurgency. That emphasises the importance of the linkage theory as

explained in chapter two of this research. The need to defeat the insurgents has redefined

their attitudes toward each other to cooperate security-wise and combat the insurgency

collectively.

It can also be inferred from the above that insecurity occasioned by Boko Haram has changed

the security atmosphere in the Lake Chad region. As a result of this, the Lake Chad Basin

Commission Countries have come together to combat the insurgency through the

Multinational Joint Task Force. This is because if Boko Haram insurgency is allowed to

thrive in the region without appropriate response to their activities, it would jeopardise their

common interests and make the region to become a base for Boko Haram to carry out their

nefarious activities across the region, Africa and the world at large.
4.6 Research Findings

The following research findings are derived logically from the data collected and analysed

above.

i. Boko Haram insurgency has redefined the security situation between Nigeria and Niger

Republic.

ii. The closure of borders by Nigeria was not targeted at Niger but to prevent the insurgents

from escaping to the country after attacking Nigeria.

iii. The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has strengthened diplomatic relations between

Nigeria and Niger Republic instead of causing diplomatic row between them.

iv. It can be deduced that Nigeria and Niger have joint security cooperation coordinated by

the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram insurgency.

4.7 Discussion of Findings

The following highlights and discusses the research findings in order to test the assumptions

posed in chapter one of this study.

The First Finding: Boko Haram insurgency has redefined the security situation between

Nigeria and Niger Republic.

Discussion: From the above, it can be deduced that Boko Haram insurgency disrupts the

peace and security along the border towns in the north-eastern part of Borno State, Yobe

State of Nigeria and Diffa Region of Niger Republic thereby leading to death, destruction of

property, displacement of people and influx of refugees across both countries. The insurgency

also affects the volume of trade between the two countries. Nigeria and Niger have not

witnessed this type of Boko Haram insurgency before- an insurgent group operating in both

countries. The internal rebellion against the central government in Niger Republic was

domiciled within the country. The Niger Delta insurgency in Nigeria has also not spread to
Niger. Today, the same Boko Haram insurgents operating in Nigeria operate in Niger

Republic. That has altered the security situation between them and raised their level of

security consciousness along their borders. They are now working together to defeat Boko

Haram insurgents because the insurgents pose threat to their common interests.

The Second Finding: The closure of borders by Nigeria was not targeted at Niger but to

prevent the insurgents from escaping to the country after attacking Nigeria.

Discussion: The closure of borders by Nigeria was meant to bolster security in the border

areas, block supply line to Boko Haram insurgents and defeat the insurgents. Even though it

affected cross border trade and movement between them, it was not specifically targeted at

Niger Republic. With the spread of the insurgency to Niger, the two countries have come

together to fight the insurgents their common enemy.

The Third Finding: The fight against Boko Haram has strengthened diplomatic relations

between Nigeria and Niger Republic instead of causing diplomatic row between them.

Discussion: Boko Haram insurgency spread from Nigeria to Niger Republic. Despite this and

the challenges encountered in the fight against the insurgency by the two countries, the

formal diplomatic relations between them continue to be strengthened. Nigeria is not blaming

Niger Republic and Niger Republic is not blaming Nigeria on account of Boko Haram

insurgency at the formal diplomatic level. The two countries realise that Boko Haram

insurgency constitutes dangers to their common interests. As a result of that, instead of Boko

Haram insurgency causing diplomatic row between them, it further strengthens their relations

and brings them together to fight the insurgency.

The Fourth Finding: It can be deduced that Nigeria and Niger Republic have joint security

cooperation coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram

insurgency.

Discussion: The insurgency has destabilised the security and peaceful atmosphere of Nigeria

and Niger. Due to this, the two countries have come together to fight the insurgents because if

Boko Haram insurgents are allowed to thrive in Nigeria, it would jeopardise the security of

Niger Republic and the Lake Chad region as a whole. The Lake Chad Basin is noted for its

agricultural activities such as crop farming, fishing, livestock breeding and irrigation. All

these activities have stopped due to the activities of Boko Haram. The Lake Chad Basin

region has not experienced this type of Boko Haram-like insurgency before. The armed

rebellion against the central governments in Niger, Chad, conflicts in Congo (DR) and Congo

Brazzaville were domiciled within their respective countries. They did not spread to other

countries in the region like the way Boko Haram insurgency is spreading. Today, the same

Boko Haram insurgents which started in Nigeria operate in Niger Republic, Chad, and

Cameroon. This could activate the remnants of armed gangs in the sub-regions and make the

areas ungovernable and bases for their insurgent activities in Africa and the world at large.

The need to maintain security in the region has shifted the attention of the Lake Chad Basin

Commission Countries from agricultural activities and water resources utilisation to security

because without security, no meaningful development can take place in the region. The Lake

Chad Basin Commission Countries are now combating Boko Haram insurgency through the

Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with the headquarters in N‟Djamena comprising

Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon plus Benin Republic.

4.8 Verification of Assumptions

The following research findings establish the validity or the invalidity of the assumptions

posed in chapter one:

The First Research Finding: Boko Haram insurgency has redefined the security situation

between Nigeria and Niger Republic validates the first assumption in chapter one-Boko

Haram insurgency has changed the security situation between Nigeria and Niger Republic.

The Second Finding: The closure of borders by Nigeria was not targeted at Niger but to

prevent the insurgents from escaping to the country after attacking Nigeria invalidates the

second assumption in chapter one-Nigeria closed its borders with Niger Republic for

allowing Boko Haram insurgents to use its territory as hide-out.

The Third Finding: The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has strengthened diplomatic

relations between Nigeria and Niger Republic instead of causing diplomatic row between

them invalidates the third assumption in chapter one-the activities of Boko Haram has caused

diplomatic row between Nigeria and Niger Republic.

The Fourth Findings: Nigeria and Niger Republic have joint security cooperation

coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram insurgency

invalidates the fourth assumption-Nigeria and Niger did not adopt a common security

framework in combating Boko Haram insurgency.

 CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

This study examines the security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and

Niger Republic diplomatic relations. Data were collected basically from the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, the Embassy of the Republic of Niger, Abuja, military personnel,

the Police, Civilian JTF, security experts and a youth leader in Diffa Region of Niger

Republic affected by the activities of Boko Haram through in-depth interview, documents,

published and unpublished works and the internet. The data were thematically analysed as

they relate to the objectives of the research by qualitative data analysis and deductions were

drawn from them to answer the research questions.

Boko Haram insurgency which began in Nigeria escalated and extended its operations to

Niger Republic and the neighbouring states of Nigeria. Boko Haram affects the security of

the two countries by carrying out cross-border operations in both countries. Consequent upon

this, Nigeria and Niger have intensified their efforts to end the insurgency collectively. If

Boko Haram is allowed to operate freely without being checked and nipped in the bud, it

would jeopardise the security of not only Nigeria and Niger but also the entire Lake Basin

region and Africa as whole.

The research revealed that Boko Haram insurgency has altered the security situation between

Nigeria and Niger Republic and the Lake Chad region in general. The fight against Boko

Haram insurgency has strengthened diplomatic relations between the countries instead of

causing diplomatic row between them. The research also revealed that Nigeria and Niger

have a common security framework coordinated by the Multinational Joint Task Force to

fight Boko Haram insurgency.

5.2 Conclusion

In this research, it was established that Boko Haram insurgency has altered the security

situation between Nigeria and Niger particularly in the north-eastern part of Nigeria and Diffa

part of Niger Republic. The data analysed indicated that the fight against Boko Haram

insurgency has solidified diplomatic relations between the two countries despite the fact that

the insurgency has spread across both countries. The two countries have synergised their

efforts to fight Boko Haram insurgency through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

instead of engaging in a blame game about the spread of the insurgency. The research further

shed more lights on the security conundrum created by the Boko Haram insurgents in the

Lake Chad region thereby shifting the attention of the countries in the region from

agricultural production to security issue. The policy option for the government is that with the

devastating security impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria, Niger and the Lake Chad

region, it is imperative for Nigeria and Niger and the Lake Chad Basin Commission

Countries to have a permanent joint military operation to boost the security architecture of the

region and end Boko Haram insurgency.

5.3 Recommendations

In order to end Boko Haram insurgency, it is recommended that:

(i) Nigeria and Niger Republic should establish a permanent joint military operation along

their borders to end Boko Haram insurgency.

(ii) There should be more security meeting between the security chiefs of the two countries to

enhance their level of cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency.

(iii) Nigeria and Niger Republic should demarcate their borders properly to prevent borders

infiltration by Boko Haram insurgents.

(iv) The Economic Community of West African States and Economic Community of Central

African States should adopt a unanimous military strategy in terms of intelligence sharing,

logistics and equipment to end Boko Haram insurgency in the region.

5.4 Contributions of the Research to Knowledge

The study established that:

(i) Boko Haram insurgency has redefined security situation between Nigeria and Niger

Republic and the Lake Chad region in general.

(ii) The fight against Boko Haram insurgency has strengthened diplomatic relations between

Nigeria and Niger Republic despite the fact that the insurgency has spread across both

countries.
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 APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES
AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA, NIGERIA

STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS ON THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY FOR NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC FORMAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Dear Respondents,
I am a postgraduate student of the Department of Political Science and
International Studies conducting a research on the Security Implications of Boko Haram for
Nigeria and Niger Republic formal diplomatic relations.
Please, kindly respond to these questions as objective as possible. Your responses will
be treated as confidential and will not be used for any other purposes outside of the research
objective and will not be transferred to a third party.
Thank you.
Abbas Ayodele Taiwo
M.Phil. International Relations
P13SSPS9014
1. What is your name sir?

2. What is your position?

3. How long have you been in this office?

4. What is your view about Boko Haram insurgency?

5. What are the security effects of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria and Niger?

6. What were the reasons why Nigeria closed its borders with Niger Republic?

7. What are the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on the formal diplomatic relationship

between Nigeria and Niger?

8. What are the security mechanisms put in place by Nigeria and Niger in combating Boko

Haram insurgency?
 APPENDIX B

SERIAL NAME POSITION DATE OF

NUMBER INTERVIEW
1 Ibrahim Traore First Counsellor, the Embassy of the 21th March,
Republic of Niger, Abuja 2016
2 Mahamadous Youth Leader, Maina Soroa, Diffa, Niger 10th March
Buhari Ismaeel Republic 2016

3 James Dung Pam First Secretary, West African Affairs 8th March,
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016
Abuja
4 Dr. Ibrahim Umara Security Expert, Maiduguri, Borno State 23rd February,
2016

5 Baba Kura Sector 5 Commander, Borno State 21st

Civilian Joint Task Force February,
2016
6 Lit. Col. P.U Nnaji 7 Division, Nigerian Army, Maiduguri 22nd
February,
2016
7 ASP Isuku Victor Police, Public Relations Officer, 19th February,
Maiduguri Borno State 2016
8 Ahmed Satomi Chairman Borno State Emergency 19th February,
Management Agency 2016

9 Waje Nasiru Assistant Director, West African Affairs 15th January

Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016
Abuja
10 Adekunle Okunade Foreign Officer 1, European Affairs 15th January
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016
Abuja
11 Olafeso Olufemi Foreign Officer 1, European Affairs 12th January
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016
Abuja
12 Grema Terab Former Chairman Borno State 26th January
Emergency Management Agency 2016