Civil Liberties and the Mass Media under Martial Law in the Philippines

Author(s): David A. Rosenberg

Source: Pacific Affairs , Winter, 1974-1975, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter, 1974-1975), pp. 472-
484
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia

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 Civil Liberties and the Mass Media under
Martial Law in the Philippines
David A. Rosenberg

IN THE TWO YEARS since the declaration of martial law in the Philippines,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his supporters have often argued
that the loss of civil liberties is the necessary price Filipinos must pay for
social order and economic progress.1 It is even fashionable nowadays for
government officials to disparage the relevance of liberal democracy to
fundamental Philippine problems. Peter Kann of the Wall Street Journal
has written that "the code words now seem to be 'effective administration'
and of course 'economic development.' . . . It's almost as if these worthy
aims are considered these days to be incompatible with civil liberties and
the right to vote."2 If the loss of civil liberties is only temporary, many
Filipinos apparently are willing to pay the price. But after two years of
martial law, we may ask how long is "temporary"? What has been gained
by the curtailment of civil liberties? Any analysis of these questions ought
to begin by examining the government's argument that it was indeed
necessary to suspend civil liberties in order to implement basic reforms.
This article examines this proposition with regard to one of the most basic
of civil liberties in the Philippines, freedom of the press.
Few Philippine institutions have been transformed as drastically as the
mass media. Before martial law was declared, the Philippine press was
widely regarded as one of the freest in Asia. Since then, the press and all
other mass communications media have been put under the strict control
of the Marcos government. Why was it necessary to suspend freedom of the
press? What necessary reforms were hindered by the "Old Society" press?
Do these changes justify the loss of civil liberties?
On the eve of martial law, government-media relations were highly
unstable and polarized. Journalists themselves disagreed on the proper role
of the press. Many advocated the freedom of the press as a fundamental

1 This article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Associa-
tion for Asian Studies, Boston, March I974.
2 Peter R. Kann, "The Philippines Without Democracy: A Critique," Wall Street Journal.
Also reprinted in The Philippine Times, May 3I, I974, p. 5.

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 Civil Liberties and the Mass Media

civil liberty; others emphasized the social responsibility of the press as an

instrument for national development. The former advocates were confronted
with a number of problems. A variety of structural factors limited the press
to a relatively small, upper-class, urban audience. This market was insuffi-
cient to sustain an independent media industry. Moreover, most publishers
had other economic interests. Journalists were often under-trained and under-
paid. It was extremely difficult for most reporters to survive solely on their
newspaper salaries. Newspapermen were susceptible to or attracted to other
pursuits, including national politics, where the prevailing style of com-
munication further impeded objective reporting. Substantial efforts at in-
ternal reform had been made by the Philippine Press Institute through
training programs, research, and the establishment of a press council, but
far more programs were necessary in order to have a significant impact on
the quality of the news profession. The increasing threat of intervention on
the freedom of the press did create pressure for internal reform, but not
enough to preserve institutional autonomy.
Other journalists were highly critical of the "unbridled freedom of the
press." They complained about the tendencies of the press toward divisive
and irresponsible exposes, scandalizing and hyper-expressiveness. Some news-
papermen began organizing a "Second Propaganda Movement," that would
commit the press and other media to the service of national unity and
development. Others actually called for the government to nationalize the
press. Unbridled freedom, they argued, often ended up as "national self-
flagellation," "a reminder of our colonial mentality," and a "disgrace to the
nationalist sensibilities."
President Marcos capitalized on this lack of consensus by accusing the
press of "fomenting disorder" and "harboring communists and communist
sympathizers." His accusation resulted in vitriolic countercharges in the
columns of the major dailies. Eddie Monteclaro, president of the National
Press Club and secretary-general of the Movement of Concerned Citizens
for Civil Liberties, protested the administration's charges and called for a
mass rally in Plaza Miranda on Thursday, September 2l, 1972. The MCCCL
was an ad hoc coalition of over thirty civic, religious, labor, student, teacher,
and political activist groups formed to protest the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus a year earlier. The MCCCL's chairman was Senator Jose
Diokno and the principal speaker at the rally was Senator Aquino, the
chief surviving Marcos opponent in the Liberal Party. One after another,
the speakers accused the President of attempting foreign intervention in the
economy, of raising domestic prices and of attempting to capture the press.
About 30,000 people attended the rally, which had national radio, television,

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 Pacific Affairs

and press coverage. That night, the martial law decree was enacted, and the
first major action of President Marcos was to shut down every major news-
paper, radio and television station. Foreign news agencies and cable and
telegraph offices were also closed. Many journalists were arrested, including
several of the most prominent in the country. Freedom of the press came
to a very abrupt end.
Only one newspaper, one television station, and the government-owned
radio station were permitted to resume operations in order to broadcast the
President's announcement of Proclamation No. io8i, the declaration of
martial law. Among other things, it provided the "general orders for the
Government to control media and other means of dissemination of informa-
tion." Initially, this control over the country's media was exercised by a
small committee, consisting of three representatives from the Malacanfang
Press Office and three representatives from the Department of National
Defense. Co-chairmen of the committee were Press Secretary Tatad and
Defense Secretary Enrile. Enforcement was entrusted to a group of Army
officers in the military's Office of Civil Relations.
The harsh treatment of the media was widely noted by foreign observers.
Though many were willing to give President Marcos the benefit of the doubt
in his handling of domestic violence, very few approved of his treatment
of the news media.
Why did he resort to such drastic measures? Undoubtedly, he was in-
furiated with some newspapermen and their lack of restraint in criticizing
him. Marcos said that he had "tried all the other means" before giving up
his attempt to reform the "old society" press.3 As for the mass arrest of his
outspoken critics, he explained to foreign newsmen that: "We did not pick
them up on mere mischievousness or vengeance or vindictiveness . . . they
were locked up, not because they were critical of me but because they
participated in a conspiracy, a conspiracy of the communist party and . . .
we got the goods on them."4 Hence, the first official rationale for the sharp
curtailment of freedom of the press was that the media had been infiltrated
and subverted by communist propagandists. In a speech to army officials
Marcos explained that:

The enemy uses the weapons of modern revolution, the media-newspapers, tele-
vision, and radio-to promote anything that assaults and destroys the foundation
of society. Therefore the commander-in-chief must meet this threat not only with

3 Henry Hayward, "Ban Dims Vitality of Philippine Press," Christian Science Monitor,
October 27, I972, pp. I, 4.
4 "NBC-TV Presents Marcos on F.M.," Ningas-Cogon, October, I972, pp. I4, I5, 24, 25.

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 Civil Liberties and the Mass Media

modern artillery, tanks, bullets, and rifles, but with the most sophisticated
weapons of preventive operations, of even media.
This is the rationale for the arrest of some in media who participated in sub-
version by allowing consciously or unconsciously the printing, publication, dis-
semination, and spreading of stories to undermine the system in which we live;
strengthened the morale, or gave aid and comfort to the enemy.5

Such broad charges-against conscious or unconscious participation in

subversion-invited skepticism. Marcos, however, promised that the im-
prisoned newsmen would receive a fair trail and that newspapers which
did not participate "openly and frankly in subversion, or participated least,
or without malice . . . would be permitted to operate later on."6 Yet none of
the newsmen ever had a trial of any kind, nor were formal charges ever
made against any of them. Marcos did, however, accuse the press specifically
of publishing "rumor-mongering, inflammatory, and libelous news-items and
commentaries." It can probably be admitted that there were in fact many
"rumor-mongering, inflammatory, and libelous" journalists in the Philip-
pines, but those who landed in jail were generally among the most re-
spected and most professionally responsible in the country. They were both
influential and critical. These journalists did not accept the administration's
claim that communist terrorists, or the Huks or the New People's Army
were responsible for the bombings, or for the attempted assassination of
Secretary Enrile, or for the mass assassination attempt on the Liberal Party
leadership in Plaza Miranda the previous year.
To date, the government has offered very little evidence to support its
claim that communist subversion and conspiracy necessitated the end of
freedom of the press. The charges are seldom heard nowadays. It is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that the wholesale suppression of the press and the
rapid arrest of Joaquin Roces, Maximo Soliven, Theodore Locsin, Napoleon
Rama and others was a punitive action against hostile publishers and out-
spoken political enemies. The primary reason they were arrested was to
silence their expected criticism of the declaration of martial law. It is sig-
nificant that only one major publisher was arrested at the outset of martial
law, Joaquin Roces, the only publisher for whom newspaper work was a
central concern and not a sideline. He was the one who had most to lose
from the end of the freedom of the press, and consequently, he was the
strongly opposed to President Marcos's policies. This was not the case with
Elizalde, Menzi, Soriano, or Lopez. Their other political, economic, and
managerial resources are still considerable. Towards these powerful families,

5 "Every Citizen Has a Right," Philippine Daily Express, September 28, I972, p. 6.
6 Ibid.

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 Pacific Affairs

President Marcos had adopted a two-fold policy: secure their compliance

with the provisions of the New Society or else reduce their economic and
political influence.
This leads to the second official rationale for the termination of press
freedom. It was deemed necessary to dismantle the oligarchic structure of the
"old society" media and to create government-supervised "new society"
media. The old society press was "too sick to heal"; it was "beyond reform,"
said President Marcos, and had to be replaced completely. Official interven-
tion was alleged to be necessary because "the old freedom of the press
meant nothing more than the freedom of the elite few to impose their ideas
and their rule on the rest of the citizenry."7 Under the new society, said
Primitivo Mijares, "press freedom is for the people and not for a few self-
anointed publishers, who are in the business and not in the vocation of
media."8 These were the reasons why it was necessary to break up the
structure of ownership of the old media, explained Secretary Tatad. "It is
also the reason why the government has initiated the launching of com-
munity newspaper networks all over the country. Eventually, all the people
will be reading newspapers which they themselves owned and put out."
In practice, it has not worked out this way. All prospective media owners
or managers must be approved by the Media Advisory Council and au-
thorized by the President. Every prospective media employee must secure a
work permit and a security clearance from the military. Those journalists
who were under suspicion of subversion must also report periodically to the
army and refrain from communicating with foreign correspondents.
Clearly, there is a discrepancy between official policy and the emerging
system of government control of the media. The discrepancy can be ex-
plained through three factors. First, the initial policy of the martial law
government was very harsh because Marcos was not at all secure in his new
position of power, as was most obviously demonstrated in the wholesale
closings and arbitrary arrests of publishers and' journalists known to be
hostile to Marcos. This attitude was also sustained by army officers who felt
that the media were directly responsible for the growing discontent of past
years.Y? Marcos responded to these views by placing the job of censorship in
the army's Office of Civil Relations. The army has remained sensitive to any
adverse publicity.

7"The Purpose of Man," Philippine Daily Express, May 20, I973, p. 6.

8 Primitivo Mijares, "Freedom Not for Publishers," IPI Report, July-August, I973, p. 7.
9 Francisco S. Tatad, speech to the Symposium on Philippine Development, Hyatt Regency,
Manila, June 28, I973.
10 For further details, see T. J. S. George, "Media Moderation," Far Eastern Economic
Review, December 2, I972, p. I4.

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 Civil Liberties and the Mass Media

The spread of rumors has exacerbated the government's insecurity. Un-

derstandably, when all the media are being very closely watched by the
government, people will begin to speculate, to listen to, and even to believe,
what they hear by way of rumor. But the new martial law regime was
extremely disturbed by adverse rumors. Rumors and the spreading of rumors
were not only banned, but were decreed subversive, ipso facto. Brigadier-
General Fidel Ramos, chief of the Philippine Constabulary, declared that:
"Rumor-mongers and those who thrive on fishing out false information
inimical to the public welfare or that would tend to make the people unduly
worried or jittery will be arrested and detained."1 In this instance, the
rumors alleged that the constabulary was conducting house-to-house night-
time searches in various "zones" around Manila, a practice reminiscent of
the Japanese Occupation. Subsequently, the rumors were confirmed, but
not in the Philippine news media."2 In another instance, Baldomero Olivera,
a veteran newspaperman and founder of the Philippine News Service, was
arrested and detained for two months for delivering some offhand, humorous
comments about President and Mrs. Marcos. He was charged but never tried
for "spreading rumors. "13
Second, as his position strengthened, Marcos attempted to provide an
appearance of normality and calm in the news media, especially to foreign
correspondents. He has made several tactical concessions to placate foreign
press criticism. Marcos, Enrile, and Tatad all had occasion to meet with
delegations from the International Press Institute, and after each meeting a
few more journalists were released from detention.'4 The first major inter-
views that Marcos granted after the declaration of martial law were with
foreign correspondents from Newsweek and NBC. In general, control over
foreign news correspondence has not been as strict as control over domestic
news. This appears to be primarily a policy of default; the government
cannot prevent critical reporting by foreign newsmen. One notable attempt
to harass and discredit Maurice Zeitlin, AP bureau chief in Manila, for his
reporting on the Jolo battle, proved futile in the face of international press
reaction.`5 However, the government can prevent critical foreign news from

11 Times-journal, October 27, I972.

12 Henry S. Hayward, "Night Raid In Manila," Christian Science Monitor, reprinted in
The Philippine Times, December I5, I972, p. 5.
13 "Ex-Press Sec'y Is Detained for Spreading Rumor," Philippine Times, March 3I, I974,
p. I.

14 These negotiations are detailed in "News of the World's Press: The Philippines," IPI
Report, February, I973, p. 2.
15 "Probe of Foreign Newsman Quashed," Philippine Times, March 3I, I974, p. i. The
incident is further documented in Editor and Publisher, March I5, I974.

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 Pacific Affairs

being distributed within the Philippines. Articles have been censored and
periodicals have been banned frequently under martial law.'6
In order to further provide an aura of legitimacy for his policy toward
the media, President Marcos has occasionally permitted a certain degree
of domestic criticism of his administration. A month before the constitutional
referendum of January, I973, he lifted the martial law restrictions of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press. He ordered his departments of Informa-
tion, Defense, and Justice to:

see to it that all media give an opportunity to those opposing and favoring the
ratification of the new constitution to meet face to face in formal debate. You
will direct that all printing presses print all forms of propaganda whether in
favor or against the new constitution and see to it that all military personnel
allow their open and free discussion.17

Criticism of the proposed constitution did indeed arise, in great volume.

In addition, several petitioners, including Eddie Monteclaro, the president
of the old National Press Club, asked the Supreme Court to stop the plebis-
cite on the new charter on grounds that it was undemocratic, improperly
drafted, confusing, contradictory, dictatorial, and could not be properly
considered until full civil liberties were restored. This was a very strong
indictment of the martial law regime and could not be tolerated by Marcos.
The petitioners' presentations were barred from publication; the plebiscite
was postponed; and harsh restrictions on public debate were re-instituted.
Shortly thereafter, Marcos abandoned the idea of a plebiscite in favor of
"citizen assemblies." The assemblies provided "a pressured and manipulated
expression of opinion,"'8 which Marcos used as justification for declaring
the new constitution ratified. Subsequently, the Supreme Court dismissed
the petitioners' complaints as "moot."
The President's tolerance of criticism turned out to be very limited and
brief. His repressive reaction created an atmosphere of fear and mute
compliance in the media. Very few journalists are now willing to report
anything that could be construed as critical, even when given official sanc-
tion, for fear of reprisal.
Third, as he achieved some measure of voluntary compliance within the
media, Marcos attempted to weaken the influence of his political opponents.

16 For a sample listing of censored news, see the Philippine Times, March 3I, I974, p. 5;
and June I5, I974, p. 5.
17 Tillman Durdin, "Manila Suspends Curbs on Debating New Constitution," New York
Times, December 2I, I972, p. 3.
18 Tillman Durdin, "Marcos Gets His Kind of Democracy," New York Times, January 2I,
I973.

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 Civil Liberties and the Mass Media

These attempts are certainly not limited to the mass media, but are clearly
evident in that area. The initial pattern of arrests and closings cannot be
wholly explained in terms of a communist conspiracy or an oligarchic
conspiracy. None of the detained newspapermen was specifically accused or
tried for conspiracy. What they had most in common was their known
criticism of the Marcos Administration. It can be speculated that the major
reason why so many of these people were arrested in the first place was to
provide Marcos with something to bargain with in order to force them to
cooperate with his martial law regime. Marcos bargained with the press in
the same manner that he bargained with the Church, the Federation of
Free Farmers, the Sugar Lobby, and other powerful groups in the country.
Those who cooperated-Andre and Jose Soriano, Hans Menzi-were per-
mitted to resume their activities. Those who did not-Eugenio Lopez, Sr. and
Jr., and Joaquin Roces-were subjected to further harassment and dispos-
session of their interests. In the euphemistic words of the President, "They
have rejected their responsibility to assist in land reform and to remedy other
injustices."19
One cannot help being skeptical about Marcos's motives. Though several
of the elite families remain secure under martial law rule, those who have
been the target of Marcos's actions-Lopez, Osmena, and Aquino-are all
old political enemies. Members of each clan are still under arrest on charges
of plotting the assassination of the Marcos family. Marcos has utilized
martial law to dismantle their economic interests and put an end to this old
feud in the oligarchy. For example, friends of the president are taking con-
trol of the idle Lopez media facilities. The government is also removing
Meralco, the Manila Electric Company, from Lopez ownership. In summary,
the official rationales for government control of the media-to remove sub-
versive communist influence and to remove oligarchic vested interest-have
not been applied consistently. Major discrepancies remain between official
policy and actual government measures, and they can best be explained
by the efforts of the President to strengthen his position in power and
weaken the influence of his political opponents.
The most important changes in the news media under martial law are
evident in the regulations of the Department of Public Information. Order
No. i requires all Philippine news media to "print and broadcast accurate,
objective, straight news reports of positive national value, consistent with
the efforts of the government to meet the dangers and threats that oc-
casioned the proclamation of martial law and the efforts to achieve a 'new

19 Jack Foisie, "Marcos Stripping Power of Richest Families," Los Angeles Times, April 19,
1973, PP. 1, 14.

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 Pacific Affairs

society.' "20 The news media were prohibited from carrying "any editorial
opinion, commentary, comments or asides, or any kind of political, unau-
thorized, or objectionable advertising." The new regulations also expressly
prohibited:

a. Materials that tend to incite or otherwise inflame people or individuals against

the government or any of its duly constituted authorities.
b. Materials that undermine the people's faith and confidence in the government
or any of its instrumentalities.
c. Materials that are seditious, not based on facts, or otherwise without definitely
established and well-identified verifiable sources, or based on mere allegation or
conjecture.
d. Materials that downgrade or jeopardize the military or the law enforcement
authorities, their work and their operations.
e. Materials that abet, glorify, or sensationalize crime, disorder, lawlessness,
violence.
f. Materials that destroy or tend to destroy public morals as well as morale.
g. Materials that foment opinions and activities contrary to law.
h. Materials that sow or generate fear, panic, confusion, ignorance and vulgarity
among the people.

Some of the regulations were particularly vague; for example, "No

foreign dispatch will be filed from the Philippine which impugns, discredits,
questions or criticizes any positive effort of the government." It was further
provided that "These rules may be amended or modified, without prior
notice." The effect of such drastic censorship was to eliminate almost all
news, except for official releases and statements.
Do these drastic changes constitute "necessary reforms" of the Philippine
news media? While they may have been considered necessary to strengthen
government control, they can hardly be called reforms. The basic changes
intended by the Marcos government were aimed at the media owners who
had previously been hostile to Marcos. Their congressional franchises were
cancelled and Marcos declared that he would no longer tolerate private
monopoly in media ownership.2'
The first fatality of the new policy was the Manila Times Publishing
Company, principally owned by Joaquin Roces, which sent out termination
notices to its i6oo employees. One of the largest and most respected news
organizations in Asia was thus formally dissolved by its management. A
similar fate met the Manila Chronicle, owned by Eugenio Lopez, an indus-
trialist, and Fernando Lopez, the former Vice-President; the Philippines

20 Department of Public Information Order No. I, Manila, September 25, I972.

21 "Manila Dooms Some Papers, Networks," New York Times, November 3, I972, p. 6

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 Civil Liberties and the Mass Media

Herald, owned by the Soriano family; and the Evening News, owned by
the Elizalde family.
The decree also created the Mass Media Council, chaired by the Secre-
tary of Public Information and the Secretary of National Defense. Its
executive secretary was retired Brigadier-General Ceferino Carreon. How-
ever, the basic structure of government control remained as before. The
Mass Media Council was authorized to review applications for permission
to operate any mass media, but only the President could certify the authority
to publish. Domestic news media were permitted to publish editorials and
opinion columns, but only after consulting with the Department on who
would write the commentaries.
The establishment of the Mass Media Council was an attempt to restore
some semblance of normality to the mass media. Appearances, however, were
deceptive. After forty-one days, the censorship of foreign dispatches had
been lifted, but a set of vague guidelines remained. Publications which the
military regarded as subversive or conspiratorial had been permanently
banned. By the end of I972, only three newspapers had been allowed to
resume or start publication: The Philippines Daily Express, The Times-
Journal, and the Bulletin Today. All were very reluctant to risk printing
any possible offensive news or commentary. They were given certificates
of authority to publish because-in the words of one official-"they've agreed
to write positive news."22 It had been expected that Marcos would relax his
harsh policy towards the media, but there was little evidence of any lib;
eralization from the Mass Media Council.
By the end of I972, President Marcos had weathered the storm of protest,
both domestic and foreign. Attention was turned towards another basic
change in the news media. The Department of Public Information was
reorganized to coordinate the Presidential Information Office, a Bureau of
Broadcast and a national news service. Information Secretary Tatad re-
quested the peso equivalent of about I7 million dollars for the entire
operation. A considerable portion of this was intended to absorb some of
the many journalists who had been unemployed since the beginning of
martial law. A number of regulatory committees were created within the
department: the Bureau of Standards for Mass Media; the Bureau of Na-
tional and Foreign Information; the Bureau for Research, Evaluation, and
Special Operations; and several others. The department became the major
manufacturer of news, press releases, books, radio and television programs,

22 "Foreign Correspondents Face Censorship Perils," New Orleans Times-Picayune, January

7, I973, p. 36.

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 Pacific Affairs

and even an LP album, "No Shade But Light" (a recording of excerpts of

Presidential speeches). It has been suggested that this proliferation of mass
media agencies has resulted in bureaucratic rivalries and clashes. The lasting
overall impression, however, is that the government has been successful in
eliminating the previous freedom of the press with a tolerable degree of
foreign criticism and with an increasing amount of domestic compliance.
Within one year, conditions were favorable for Marcos to remove the
news media from direct government supervision by the military. On May
II, I973, he abolished the Mass Media Council and created instead the
Media Advisory Council, composed of representatives of the media and
headed by the president of the National Press Club. In Presidential Decree
No. i9i, Marcos took note that, under his martial law rule, the mass media
"have shown willingness to institute a, system of self-regulation and internal
discipline within their ranks to the end that no part of media may ever
again, consciously or unconsciously, engage or take part in any conspiracy
against the Government." Failure to do so would again bring government
intervention, he noted. The media were to become "an effective instru-
ment in the attainment of social change."23
While direct government supervision of the mass media was removed,
substantial indirect supervision remained. The Media Advisory Council
could review licenses to operate media, but they were only valid with the
President's approval. The Council could issue guidelines and rules for the
mass media, but again, they required the consent of the President who
could also appoint his own representatives to the panel. Finally, all news
media employees had to secure work permits (only granted after a security
clearance from the military) and to sign an "instrument of adherence"
pledging "wholehearted support" of the regulations.
Despite various cosmetic efforts, the Media Advisory Council lacks
credibility as an independent, civilian, self-regulatory agency of the mass
media. There continue to be frequent incidents of prior censorship, arbitrary
dismissals, and other forms of government intervention. Other than in ap-
pearances, the system of strict government control of the media has changed
little during martial law rule.
Much has been said in praise of various improvements made in the
Philippines since martial law began. The New Society press, however, is
praised only by its chief architects and beneficiaries. Most foreign observers
regard the status of the media as one of the most unfortunate aspects of

23 Presidential Decree No. i9i, Manila, May II, 1973.

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 Civil Liberties and the Mass Media

martial law. A delegation from the Press Foundation of Asia concluded

that:

The Philippine Government's actions against the mass media have no parallel
in the whole of Asia. A complete shutdown of media has not been attempted in
Park Chung Hee's Korea, Ayub Khan's Pakistan, Thanarat's Thailand, Sukarno's
Indonesia, or Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore.
The Philippines remains denied of all civil liberties, its freedom of all educa-
tion and the leaders of its mass media are in prison without any trial.
The Philippine mass media, once considered the freest in Asia, have been
suppressed to the point of death; the most well-known and established among
them have no chance of reappearance; and this country of 39 million people is
being fed on only propaganda bulletins, which are financed and operated by
President Marcos' own friends and subordinates.24

Investigators for the International Press Institute found that the surviving
media were "virtually unreadable."

Press, radio and television are so pathetically emasculated that they make
totalitarian government organs like Pravda, Iztestia and Radio Peking, Franco's
party organs, or the mouthpieces of other dictatorships across the continents look
comparatively red-blooded.25

The Philippine media have virtually nothing but praise for the Marcos
administration. On such occasions as the President's birthday or the an-
niversary of martial law, the praise becomes almost hero worship.26 "One
of the biggest problems facing President Marcos," writes Sydney Schanberg
of the New York Times, "is that its publicity machine has consistently
claimed too much for it." Every day, the headlines proclaim "revolutionary
reforms and economic miracles." with "an apocalyptic ring, as if the mere
words have transformed society that very moment.'"7
Foreign observers are not alone in criticizing the Philippine news media.
Marcos and his chief policy-makers have provided perhaps the most sig-
nificant criticism, indicating that the press should be less sycophantic and
offer some realistic criticism of government policy.28 Information Secretary

24 T. J. S. George, "The Party's Over," Far Eastern Economic Review, November i8, 1972,
p. 14.
25 Rohan Rivett, "Anaemic Manila Press Makes Izvestia Look Red-Blooded," IPI Report,
April, 1973, p. 9.
26 On both occasions, the Times-journal issued special supplements filled with laudatory
articles on "Marcos the Revolutionary," "The Young Ferdinand, Reminiscences of a Minor
Prophet," "The Charismatic Leader," and an editorial, "Counting our Blessings." See the
Times-lournal issues of September ii, 1973 and September 21, 1973.
27 Sydney H. Schanberg, "FM's Thorn: His Publicity Machine," New York Times. Also
reported in the Philippine Times, July 15-30, p. 20.
28 Ibid.

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 Pacific Affairs

Tatad also complains that the Philippine press is "exclusively conformist....

(It) went from too much criticism in the old society to excessive, incom-
petent praise" in the new society?' Former columnist and ex-ambassador
J. V. Cruz also criticizes the present media as "crassly commercial" and "a
national scandal and disgrace."30 Through their own criticisms, Marcos,
Tatad, and Cruz have undermined the official rationale for ending freedom
of the press. The news media now lack both credibility and legitimacy.
The editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review has pointed out that
such official criticism never faces up to the basic issues of censorship: the
suppression of legitimate dissent, the all-time low in the credibility of the
present media, the detention of journalists and the creation of a new press
oligarchy, in which the new press "barons" are related or close to the presi-
dential palace. "The Filipinos have sacrificed their free press," he wrote, for
the promise of reform. But was it indeed necessary to suspend civil liberties
in order to implement basic reforms? So far, he concluded, "the trade-off
has been a disaster."31
After two years of martial law, the curtailment of civil liberties seems
less temporary than before. There is still no freedom of the press, no freedom
of speech, no freedom of assembly, no freedom from arbitrary arrest, and no
guarantee of a fair trial. Press freedoms have been restored only to the
extent necessary to avoid the appearance of complete subservience. As one
presidential spokesman declared, "there will never again be any doubt as to
where the ultimate power rests."132 The continued absence of freedom of the
press and other civil liberties provides strong evidence that the Marcos
government is still more concerned with strengthening its powers than
implementing basic reforms.

Middlebury College, Vermont, August 1974

29 Bernando Ronquillo, "Cloud Over the Sunshine Press," Far Eastern Economic Review,
April i6, 1973, p. 25.
30Derek Davies, "Traveller's Tales," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 1974, p. 23.
31 Ibid.
32 E. Aguilar Cruz, "Responsible Press Gets Recognition," Times-journal, May 14, 1973,
P. 4.

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