Social Science Perspectives
Social Science Perspectives
While institutions tend to appear to people in society as part of the natural, unchanging landscape of
their lives, study of institutions by the social sciences tends to reveal the nature of institutions as social
constructions, artifacts of a particular time, culture and society, produced by collective human choice,
though not directly by individual intention. Sociology traditionally analyzed social institutions in terms of
interlocking social roles and expectations. Social institutions created and were composed of groups of
roles, or expected behaviors. The social function of the institution was executed by the fulfillment of
roles. Basic biological requirements, for reproduction and care of the young, are served by the
institutions of marriage and family, for example, by creating, elaborating and prescribing the behaviors
expected for husband/father, wife/mother, child, etc.[citation needed]
The relationship of the institutions to human nature is a foundational question for the social sciences.
Institutions can be seen as "naturally" arising from, and conforming to, human nature—a fundamentally
conservative view—or institutions can be seen as artificial, almost accidental, and in need of
architectural redesign, informed by expert social analysis, to better serve human needs—a
fundamentally progressive view. Adam Smith anchored his economics in the supposed human
"propensity to truck, barter and exchange". Modern feminists have criticized traditional marriage and
other institutions as element of an oppressive and obsolete patriarchy. The Marxist view—which sees
human nature as historically 'evolving' towards voluntary social cooperation, shared by some anarchists
—is that supra-individual institutions such as the market and the state are incompatible with the
individual liberty of a truly free society.
Economics, in recent years, has used game theory to study institutions from two perspectives. Firstly,
how do institutions survive and evolve? In this perspective, institutions arise from Nash equilibria of
games. For example, whenever people pass each other in a corridor or thoroughfare, there is a need for
customs, which avoid collisions. Such a custom might call for each party to keep to their own right (or
left—such a choice is arbitrary, it is only necessary that the choice be uniform and consistent). Such
customs may be supposed to be the origin of rules, such as the rule, adopted in many countries, which
requires driving automobiles on the right side of the road.
Secondly, how do institutions affect behaviour? In this perspective, the focus is on behaviour arising
from a given set of institutional rules. In these models, institutions determine the rules (i.e. strategy sets
and utility functions) of games, rather than arise as equilibria out of games. Douglass North argues, the
very emergence of an institution reflects behavioral adaptations through his application of increasing
returns.[27] Over time institutions develop rules that incentivize certain behaviors over others because
they present less risk or induce lower cost, and establish path dependent outcomes. For example, the
Cournot duopoly model is based on an institution involving an auctioneer who sells all goods at the
market-clearing price. While it is always possible to analyze behaviour with the institutions-as-equilibria
approach instead, it is much more complicated.[citation needed]
In political science, the effect of institutions on behavior has also been considered from a meme
perspective, like game theory borrowed from biology. A "memetic institutionalism" has been proposed,
suggesting that institutions provide selection environments for political action, whereby differentiated
retention arises and thereby a Darwinian evolution of institutions over time. Public choice theory,
another branch of economics with a close relationship to political science, considers how government
policy choices are made, and seeks to determine what the policy outputs are likely to be, given a
particular political decision-making process and context. Credibility thesis purports that institutions
emerge from intentional institution-building but never in the originally intended form.[28] Instead,
institutional development is endogenous and spontaneously ordered and institutional persistence can
be explained by their credibility,[29] which is provided by the function that particular institutions serve.
In history, a distinction between eras or periods, implies a major and fundamental change in the system
of institutions governing a society. Political and military events are judged to be of historical significance
to the extent that they are associated with changes in institutions. In European history, particular
significance is attached to the long transition from the feudal institutions of the Middle Ages to the
modern institutions, which govern contemporary life.