SET 4 CASE # 37 AGCAOILI VS FARINAS G.R NO.

232395 JULY 03,

2018
The Antecedents
On March 14, 2017, House Resolution No. 882 was introduced by respondent Fariñas,
along with Representatives Pablo P. Bondoc and Aurelio D. Gonzales, Jr., directing
House Committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, pertaining to the use by the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on locally
manufactured virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other than that provided for by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7171. The "whereas clause" of House Resolution No. 882
states that the following purchases by the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte of
vehicles in three separate transactions from the years 2011 to 2012 in the aggregate
amount of P66,450,000.00 were in violation of R.A. No. 7171 as well as of R.A. No.
9184 and Presidential Decree (P.O.) No. 1445:
a. Check dated December 1, 2011, "to cash advance the amount needed for the
purchase of 40 units Mini cab for distribution to the different barangays of Ilocos Norte
as per supporting papers hereto attached to the amount of ...." EIGHTEEN MILLION
SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP18,000,000.00);
b. Check dated May 25,2012, "to cash advance the amount needed for the purchase of
5 units Buses as per supporting papers hereto attached to the amount of ..." FIFTEEN
MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP15,300,000.00), which were all
second hand units; and
c. Check dated September 12, 2012, "to cash advance payment of 70 units Foton Mini
Truck for distribution to different municipalities of Ilocos Norte as per supporting papers
hereto attached in the amount of ...." THIRTY TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (PhP32,550,000.00).[9]
On April 6, 2017 were individually sent to petitioners for them to attend as resource
persons the initial hearing on House Resolution No. 882 scheduled on May 2, 2017. In
response, petitioners sent similarly-worded Letters dated April 21, 2017 asking to be
excused from the inquiry pending official instructions from co-petitioner Marcos as head
of the agency.
On May 2, 2017 hearing, a subpoena ad testificandum was issued by co-respondent
House Committee.
On May 3, 2017 directing petitioners to appear and testify under oath at a hearing set
on May 16, 2017.[12] Likewise, an invitation was sent to co-petitioner Marcos to appear
on said hearing.[13]
Since the subpoena was received by petitioners only one day prior to the scheduled
hearing, petitioners requested that their appearance be deferred to a later date to give
them time to prepare. In their letters also, petitioners requested clarification as to what
information co-respondent House Committee seeks to elicit and its relevance to R.A.
No. 7171 Co-petitioner Marcos, on the other hand, submitted a Letter  dated May 15,
2017 seeking clarification on the legislative objective of House Resolution No. 882 and
its discriminatory application to the Province of Ilocos Norte to the exclusion of other
virginia-type tobacco producing provinces.
On May 16, 2017 Petitioners failed to attend the hearing scheduled. As such, the House
Committee issued a Show Cause Order; 
In response to the Show Cause Order, petitioners reiterated that they received the
notice only one day prior to the scheduled hearing date in alleged violation of the three-
day notice rule under Section 8 of the House Rules Governing Inquiries. Co-petitioner
Marcos, on the other hand, reiterated the queries she raised in her earlier letter.
On May 29, 2017, all the petitioners appeared It is at this point of the factual narrative
where the parties' respective interpretations of what transpired during the May 29, 2017
begin to differ.
On one hand, petitioners allege that at the hearing of May 29, 2017, they were
subjected to threats and intimidation. According to petitioners, they were asked
"leading and misleading questions" and that regardless of their answers, the same
were similarly treated as evasive.
Specifically, Jambaro claims that because she could not recall the transactions Fariñas
alluded to and requested to see the original copy of a document presented to her for
identification, she was cited in contempt and ordered detained Allegedly, the same
inquisitorial line of questioning was used in the interrogation of Gaor. When Gaor
answered that she could no longer remember if she received a cash advance of
P18,600,000.00 for the purchase of 40 units of minicab, Gaor was likewise cited in
contempt and ordered detained.
The same threats, intimidation and coercion were likewise supposedly employed on
Calajate when she was asked by Fariñas if she signed a cash advance voucher in the
amount of P18,600,000.00 for the purchase of the 40 units of minicabs. When Calajate
refused to answer, she was also cited in contempt and ordered detained.
Similarly, when Battulayan could no longer recall having signed a cash advance
voucher for the purchase of minicabs, she was also cited in contempt and ordered
detained.
Agcaoili, Jr. was likewise cited in contempt and ordered detained when he failed to
answer Fariñas's query regarding the records of the purchase of the vehicles. Allegedly,
the same threats and intimidation were employed by Fariñas in the questioning of
Tabulog who was similarly asked if she remembered the purchase of 70 mini trucks.
When Tabulog replied that she could no longer remember such transaction, she was
also cited in contempt and ordered detained.
On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioners were evasive in answering
questions and simply claimed not to remember the specifics of the subject transactions.
According to respondents, petitioners requested to be confronted with the original
documents to refresh their memories when they knew beforehand that the Commission
on Audit (COA) to which the original vouchers were submitted could no longer find the
same.
On May 30, 2017, petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondent
House Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General Detabali before the CA. The CA
scheduled the petition for hearing on June 5, 2017 where the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) entered its special appearance for Detabali, arguing that the latter was
not personally served with a copy of the petition. On June 2, 2017, the CA in its
Resolution issued a writ of Habeas Corpus ordering Detabali to produce the bodies of
the petitioners before the court.
On June 5, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. Instead, the Deputy Secretary General
of the House of Representatives appeared to explain that Detabali accompanied several
members of the House of Representatives on a Northern Luzon trip, thus his inability to
attend the scheduled hearing. A motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus was also
filed on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the petition.
On June 6, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion for Provisional Release based on petitioners'
constitutional right to bail. Detabali, through the OSG, opposed the motion.
On June 8, 2017, Detabali again failed to attend. On June 9, 2017, the CA issued a
Resolution  denying Detabali's motion to dissolve the writ of Habeas Corpus and
granting petitioners' Motion for Provisional Release upon posting of a bond. Accordingly,
the CA issued an Order of Release Upon Bond. Attempts to serve said Resolution and
Order of Release Upon Bond to Detabali were made but to no avail.
On June 20, 2017, the House of Representatives called a special session for the
continuation of the legislative inquiry. July 25, 2017 a subpoena ad testificandum was
issued to compel co-petitioner Marcos to appear.
On June 20, 2017 hearing, House Committee unanimously voted to issue a Show
Cause Order against the three Justices of the CA's Special Fourth Division, directing
them to explain why they should not be cited in contempt by the House of
Representatives. The House of Representatives was apparently dismayed over the
CA's actions in the Habeas Corpus Petition, with House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez
quoted as calling the involved CA Justices "mga gago" and threatening to dissolve the
CA. Disturbed by this turn of events, the involved CA Justices wrote a letter dated July
3, 2017 addressed to the Court En Banc deferring action on certain pending
motions and administratively referring the same to the Court for advice and/or
appropriate action.
Meanwhile, in the Habeas Corpus Petition, Detabali moved for the inhibition of CA
Justices Stephen Cruz and Nina Antonio-Valenzuela while CA Justice Edwin Sorongon
voluntarily inhibited himself.]
On July 13, 2017 and while the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before the CA,
petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos filed the instant Omnibus Petition.
On July 25, 2017 During the congressional hearing which petitioners and co-petitioner
Marcos attended, and while the present Omnibus Petition is pending final resolution by
the Court, respondent House Committee lifted the contempt order and ordered the
release of petitioners. Consequently, petitioners were released on the same date.
[45]
 Respondent House Committee held the continuance of the legislative hearings on
August 9, 2017 and August 23, 2017.]
On August 31, 2017, the CA issued a Resolution in the Habeas Corpus Petition
considering the case as closed and terminated on the ground of mootness
Issues;
1. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition which seeks the release of petitioners
from detention was rendered moot by their subsequent release from detention?
2. Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction over the Habeas Corpus Petition
then pending before the CA?
3. Whether or not the subject legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882 may be
enjoined by a writ of prohibition?
4. Whether or not the instant Omnibus Petition sufficiently states a cause of action for
the issuance of a writ of Amparo?]
Ruling
We dismiss the Omnibus Petition.
The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty was devised as a "speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal." Under the Constitution, the privilege of the
writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion
when the public safety requires it.
As to what kind of restraint against which the writ is effective, case law deems any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action as sufficient. Thus, as provided in the
Rules of Court under Section 1, Rule 102 thereof, a writ of Habeas Corpus "shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto."
On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 102:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ
is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Accordingly, a Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly
deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court because
since then, the restraint has become legal. In the case of Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce
Enrile, the Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of mootness
considering the filing of an information before the court. The court pronounced that
since the incarceration was now by virtue of a judicial order, the remedy of habeas
corpus no longer lies. In the case of  Duque v. Capt. Vinarao the Court held that a
petition for habeas corpus can be dismissed upon voluntary withdrawal of the petitioner.
Also in the case of Pestaño v. Corvista, it was pronounced that where the subject
person had already been released from the custody complained of, the petition
for habeas corpus then still pending was considered already moot and academic and
should be dismissed. This pronouncement was carried on in Olaguer v. Military
Commission No. 34, where the Court reiterated that the release of the persons in
whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the
petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. Thus, with the
subsequent release of all the petitioners from detention, their petition for habeas
corpus has been rendered moot. The rule is that courts of justice constituted to pass
upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are
involved and thus, will not determine a moot question as the resolution thereof will be of
no practical value.
Far compelling than the question of mootness is that the element of illegal deprivation of
freedom of movement or illegal restraint is jurisdictional in petitions for habeas corpus.
Consequently, in the absence of confinement and custody, the courts lack the power to
act on the petition for habeas corpus and the issuance of a writ thereof must be refused.
Any lingering doubt as to the justiciability of the petition to assume jurisdiction over
the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA is ultimately precluded by the CA Resolution
considering the petition closed and terminated. With the termination of the Habeas
Corpus Petition before the CA, petitioners' plea that the same be transferred to this
Court, or that the Court assume jurisdiction thereof must necessarily be denied.
II.
Respondents principally oppose co-petitioner Marcos' petition for prohibition on the
ground that a writ of prohibition does not lie to enjoin legislative or quasi-legislative
actions. In the case of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association and The Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee.
Contrary to respondents' contention, nowhere in The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee did the Court finally settle that prohibition does not lie against legislative
functions. The import of the Court's decision in said case is the recognition of the
Constitutional authority of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and provided that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Thus, if these
Constitutionally-prescribed requirements are met, courts have no authority to prohibit
Congressional committees from requiring the attendance of persons to whom it issues a
subpoena.
On the other hand, the Court's pronouncement in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association should be taken in its proper context. The principal relief sought by
petitioners therein was the invalidation of the implementing rules issued by the National
Government Center Administration Committee pursuant to its quasi-legislative power.
Hence, the Court therein stated that prohibition is not the proper remedy but an ordinary
action for nullification, over which the Court generally exercises not primary, but
appellate jurisdiction.
In any case, the availability of the remedy of prohibition for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Legislative and Executive branches has been categorically affirmed by the Court
in Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, thus:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to
raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials. (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
The above pronouncement is but an application of the Court's judicial power which
Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution defines as the duty of the courts of justice (1) to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and (2) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Such innovation under the 1987 Constitution later on
became known as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction" and "expanded jurisdiction,"
respectively.
While the requisites for the court's exercise of either concept of jurisdiction remain
constant, note that the exercise by the Court of its "expanded jurisdiction" is not limited
to the determination of grave abuse of discretion to quasi-judicial or judicial acts, but
extends to any act involving the exercise of discretion on the part of the government.
Indeed, the power of the Court to enjoin a legislative act is beyond cavil as what the
Court did in Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees on Public
Information, et al. when it enjoined therein respondent committees from conducting an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the notorious "Hello Garci" tapes for failure to comply with
the requisite publication of the rules of procedure.
Co-petitioner Marcos failed to
show that the subject legislative
inquiry violates the Constitution or
that the conduct thereof was
attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction
While there is no question that a writ of prohibition lies against legislative functions, the
Court finds no justification for the issuance thereof in the instant case.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
expressly provided by the Constitution under Section 21, Article VI thereof, which
provides:
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such
inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis ours)
Although expansive, the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not without limitations. Foremost, the inquiry must be in furtherance of a
legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation, and as such, "investigations conducted
solely to gather incriminatory evidence and punish those investigated" should
necessarily be struck down. Further, the exercise of the power of inquiry is
circumscribed by the above-quoted Constitutional provision, such that the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. It is jurisprudentially settled that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights
must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled
to testify against one's self.
In this case, co-petitioner Marcos primordially assails the nature of the legislative inquiry
as a fishing expedition in alleged violation of her right to due process and to be
discriminatory to the Province of Ilocos Norte. However, a perusal of the minutes of
legislative hearings so far conducted reveals that the same revolved around the use of
the Province of Ilocos Norte's shares from the excise tax on locally manufactured
virginia-type cigarettes through cash advances which co-petitioner Marcos herself
admits to be the "usual practice" and was actually allowed by the Commission on Audit
(COA). In fact, the cause of petitioners' detention was not the perceived or gathered
illegal use of such shares but the rather unusual inability of petitioners to recall the
transactions despite the same having involved considerable sums of money.
Like so, co-petitioner Marcos' plea for the prevention of the legislative inquiry was
anchored on her apprehension that she, too, will be arrested and detained by House
Committee. However, such remains to be an apprehension which does not give cause
for the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition. Consequently, co-petitioner
Marcos' prayer for the ancillary remedy of a preliminary injunction cannot be granted,
because her right thereto has not been proven to be clear and unmistakable. In any
event, such injunction would be of no useful purpose given that the instant Omnibus
Petition has been decided on the merits.
III.
The Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo
The filing of the petition for the
issuance of a writ of Amparo
before this Court while the Habeas
Corpus Petition before the CA was
still pending is improper
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of Amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz, et
al. v. Hon. Judge Del Rosario, et al., thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no
point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of Amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security
— the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect — is immediately in
danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal
bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal
case (Italics in the original)
While there is no procedural and legal obstacle to the joining of a petition
for habeas corpus and a petition for Amparo, the peculiarity of the then pendency
of the Habeas Corpus Petition before the CA renders the direct resort to this
Court for the issuance of a writ of Amparo inappropriate.
The privilege of the writ of
Amparo is confined to instances
of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof
Even if the Court sets aside this procedural faux pas, petitioners and co-petitioner
Marcos failed to show, by prima facie evidence, entitlement to the issuance of the writ.
Much less have they exhibited, by substantial evidence, meritorious grounds to the
grant of the petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the writ of Amparo provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al. the Court
categorically pronounced that the Amparo Rule, as it presently stands, is confined to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof, and
jurisprudentially defined these two instances, as follows:
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the
other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups
or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law. (Citations omitted)
The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and is
as statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R. A. No. 9851. In the case of  Navia, et al. v.
Pardico, the elements constituting "enforced disappearance," are enumerated as
follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the Amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.
In Lozada, Jr., et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., the Court reiterates that
the privilege of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or
a private individual.
Here, petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos readily admit that the instant Omnibus
Petition does not cover extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof. Thus, on this ground alone, their petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo is
dismissible.
Despite this, petitioners insist that their rights to liberty and security were violated
because of their unlawful detention. On the other hand, co-petitioner Marcos seeks the
protective writ of Amparo on the ground that her right to liberty and security are being
threatened by the conduct of the legislative inquiry on House Resolution No. 882. But
even these claims of actual and threatened violations of the right to liberty and security
fail to impress.
To reiterate, the writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee the (1) right to
life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to
security.
Here, it appears that petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos even attended and
participated in the subsequent hearings on House Resolution No. 882 without any
untoward incident. Petitioners and co-petitioner Marcos thus failed to establish that their
attendance at and participation in the legislative inquiry as resource persons have
seriously violated their right to liberty and security, for which no other legal recourse or
remedy is available. Perforce, the petition for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo must be dismissed.
IV.
Congress' Power to Cite in Contempt
and to Compel Attendance of Court Justices
It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the events surrounding the filing of the
present Omnibus Petition bear the unsavory impression that a display of force between
the CA and the Congress is impending. Truth be told, the letter of the CA Justices to the
Court En Banc betrays the struggle these CA Justices encountered in view of the
Congressional power to cite in contempt and consequently, to arrest and detain. These
Congressional powers are indeed awesome. Yet, such could not be used to deprive the
Court of its Constitutional duty to supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of
their official duties. The fact remains that the CA Justices are non-impeachable officers.
As such, authority over them primarily belongs to this Court and to no other.
To echo the Court's ruling in Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez:[134]
The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
It is this very principle of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined under the
Constitution that urges the Court to carefully tread on areas falling under the sole
discretion of the legislative branch of the government. In point is the power of legislative
investigation which the Congress exercises as a Constitutional prerogative.
Concomitantly, the principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic
postulates for exempting the Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for
excluding the Judiciary's privileged and confidential documents and information
from any compulsory processes which very well includes the Congress' power of inquiry
in aid of legislation Such exemption has been jurisprudentially referred to as judicial
privilege as implied from the exercise of judicial power expressly vested in one Supreme
Court and lower courts created by law.
However, as in all privileges, the exercise thereof is not without limitations. The
invocation of the Court's judicial privilege is understood to be limited to matters that are
part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of the
Members' adjudicatory functions and duties. For the guidance of the bench, the Court
herein reiterates its Per Curiam Resolution dated February 14, 2012 on the production
of court records and attendance of court officials and employees as witnesses in the
then impeachment complaint against former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, insofar as
it summarized the documents or communications considered as privileged as follows:
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the
Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's session on acts done material
to pending cases, except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the
raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court (IRSC);
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases
and matters pending before the Court;
(3) Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature, in particular,
documents and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative
process, i.e, notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations, and similar papers;
(4) Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in
the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even
after their term of office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that
cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been
made available by the court to the general public.
xxxx
By way of qualification, judicial privilege is unavailing on matters external to the
Judiciary's deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties. Justice Antonio T. Carpio
discussed in his Separate Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution, by way of example,
the non-confidential matters as including those "information relating to the commission
of crimes or misconduct, or violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or any violation
of a law or regulation," and those outside the Justices' adjudicatory functions such as
"financial, budgetary, personnel and administrative matters relating to the operations of
the Judiciary."
As a guiding principle, the purpose of judicial privilege, as a child of judicial power, is
principally for the effective discharge of such judicial power. If the matter upon which
Members of the Court, court officials and employees privy to the Court's deliberations,
are called to appear and testify do not relate to and will not impair the Court's
deliberative adjudicatory judicial power, then judicial privilege may not be successfully
invoked.
The Court had occasion to illustrate the application of the rule on judicial privilege and
its qualifications to impeachment proceedings as follows:
[W]here the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice may be
called as a witness in the impeachment of another Justice, as bribery is a matter
external to or is not connected with the adjudicatory functions and duties of a
magistrate. A Justice, however, may not be called to testify on the arguments the
accused Justice presented in the internal debates as these constitute details of the
deliberative process.[139]
Nevertheless, the traditional application of judicial privilege cannot be invoked to defeat
a positive Constitutional duty. Impeachment proceedings, being sui generis,[140] is a
Constitutional process designed to ensure accountability of impeachable officers, the
seriousness and exceptional importance of which outweighs the claim of judicial
privilege.
To be certain, the Court, in giving utmost importance to impeachment proceedings even
as against its own Members, recognizes not the superiority of the power of the House of
Representatives to initiate impeachment cases and the power of the Senate to try and
decide the same, but the superiority of the impeachment proceedings as a
Constitutional process intended to safeguard public office from culpable abuses. In the
words of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereneo in her Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution, the matter of impeachment is of such paramount
societal importance that overrides the generalized claim of judicial privilege and as
such, the Court should extend respect to the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court
and give it wide latitude in favor of its function of exacting accountability as required by
the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other
issues raised in the Omnibus Petition.
WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Petition is DISMISSED.