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Gretchen - Calcidius in Plato

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CALCIDIUS ON P LATO’ S T I M A E U S

This is the ﬁrst study to assess in its entirety the fourth-century Latin
commentary on Plato’s Timaeus by the otherwise unknown
Calcidius, also addressing features of his Latin translation. The ﬁrst
part examines the authorial voice of the commentator and the overall
purpose of the work; the second part provides an overview of the key
themes; and the third part reassesses the commentary’s relation to
Stoicism, Aristotle, potential sources, and the Christian tradition.
This commentary was one of the main channels through which the
legacy of Plato and Greek philosophy was passed on to the Christian
Latin West. The text, which also establishes a connection between
Plato’s cosmology and Genesis, thus represents a distinctive cultural
encounter between the Greek and the Roman philosophical tradi-
tions, and between non-Christian and Christian currents of thought.

gretchen reydams-schils is a Professor within the Program of

Liberal Studies and a Fellow of the Medieval Institute at the University
of Notre Dame, Indiana. She holds concurrent appointments in
Classics, Philosophy, and Theology. Her areas of specialization are
the traditions of Platonism and Stoicism and she is the author of
Demiurge and Providence: Stoic and Platonist Readings of Plato’s
Timaeus (1999) and The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and
Affection (2005). She is also the editor of Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural
Icon (2003), Thinking Through Excerpts: Studies on Stobaeus (2011), and
Pouvoir et puissances chez Philon d’Alexandrie (2016).

GRETCHEN REYDAMS-SCHILS
University of Notre Dame, Indiana

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108420563
doi: 10.1017/9781108354745
© Gretchen Reydams-Schils 2020
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2020
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd, Padstow Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
names: Reydams-Schils, Gretchen, J., author.
title: Calcidius on Plato’s Timaeus : Greek philosophy, Latin reception, and Christian contexts
/ Gretchen Reydams-Schils, University of Notre Dame, Indiana.
description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University
Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
identifiers: lccn 2019060024 (print) | lccn 2019060025 (ebook) | isbn 9781108420563
(hardback) | isbn 9781108354745 (ebook)
subjects: lcsh: Calcidius. In Platonis Timaeum commentarius. | Plato. Timaeus.
classification: lcc b387.c343 r49 2020 (print) | lcc b387.c343 (ebook) | ddc 113–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019060024
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isbn 978-1-108-42056-3 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of
URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.

gretchen reydams-schils is a Professor within the Program of

GRETCHEN REYDAMS-SCHILS
University of Notre Dame, Indiana

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

gretchen reydams-schils is a Professor within the Program of

GRETCHEN REYDAMS-SCHILS
University of Notre Dame, Indiana

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

Acknowledgments page vii

List of Abbreviations ix

Introduction: Beyond the Calcidius Pass 1

part one
1 An Authorial Voice 9
2 How to Read Plato’s Timaeus 21
3 The Coherence of the Commentary 37

part two
4 Time and the Universe 49
5 On Soul and Souls (1): The World Soul 59
6 On Soul and Souls (2): The Human Soul and Its Relation
to the World Soul 71
7 God and Gods 85
8 Providence and Fate 99
9 Matter and Evil 118
10 Matter, Being, and Form 128

Conclusion: Who Is Calcidius? 216

Bibliography 221
Index Locorum 233

Slow academia, not hurried along by grant proposals for multi-year pro-
jects, or other extraneous considerations. On February 2, 1991 (it says on
the flyleaf) I bought a copy of Waszink’s edition of Calcidius’ work in one
of the second-hand bookstores in Berkeley – I forgot which one. It was the
first relatively expensive scholarly work I bought for myself. I was
approaching my Ph.D. exams at the end of that spring semester, and in
the process of coming up with a dissertation topic. Ultimately, the final
chapter of the published version of the revised dissertation was devoted to
Calcidius (Reydams-Schils 1999). But I could not let go of the work
because it had raised so many issues worth pursuing – or at least, so
I thought.
Thus for the next twenty years or so I kept returning to Calcidius to
explore further one aspect or another of the commentary and the
Platonism it represents. As I say in the book, since Waszink’s monumental
edition our scholarly understanding of the commentary tradition in
Antiquity has deepened considerably, there has been a revival of interest
in the philosophical currents from the first century BCE to the end of
the second century CE, and our understanding of what it meant to be
a Christian in the fourth century CE has also been considerably enriched.
Without these broader scholarly developments, this book would not have
been possible. In the early stages of the project I also benefited greatly from
exchanges of ideas with David Sedley, John Dillon, Carlos Lévy, Stephen
Gersh, and Anna Somfai, and at a later stage from crucial interactions with
Charlotte Köckert, Béatrice Bakhouche, John Magee, Christina Hoenig,
and George Karamanolis. The last four were present at a workshop on
Calcidius I organized at the University of Notre Dame in the spring of
2015. I am deeply grateful to Philippe Hoffmann for having given me the
opportunity to deliver a series of four seminars on Calcidius at the École
Pratiques des Hautes Études in Paris in the spring of 2004. Some of the
material presented in this book was developed during multiple research
vii

LS A. A. Long and D. Sedley (eds.), The Hellenistic Philosophers.

2 vols. Cambridge University Press, 1987
SVF H. F. A. von Arnim. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. 4 vols.
Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1924

It would be difﬁcult to overestimate the importance of Calcidius’ work on

Plato’s Timaeus, which consists of a partial Latin translation and
commentary.1 So many links in the extensive commentary tradition of
the Timaeus are no longer extant. We have snippets from Crantor, a mere
allusion (and a highly debated one at that) to a possible commentary by
Posidonius,2 part of a translation by Cicero, allusions to Adrastus’ com-
mentary, a commentary by Theon of Smyrna that deals only with the
mathematical issues, and a mere shadow of Porphyry’s commentary, to
name but some. Because of these lacunae Calcidius’ work becomes all the
more valuable.
Moreover, Calcidius presents one of those very rare cases of a Latin
philosophical commentary. As the knowledge of Greek started to wane at
the end of Antiquity, Calcidius became one of the main channels through
which Plato’s legacy was transmitted to the Middle Ages.3 Indeed, his work
is one of the four master-texts of that era, as Édouard Jeauneau points out
(1975: 30), together with Boethius’ On the Consolation of Philosophy,
Macrobius’ commentary on Cicero’s Dream of Scipio, and Martianus
Capella’s On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury. In the subsequent
tradition Plato at times elided Calcidius’ authorship altogether, and the
work came to be seen as simply presenting Plato’s views.
Given the translation and commentary’s important role in the Middle
Ages, Calcidius has been studied mostly by medievalists. The work, how-
ever, also presents a very distinctive and rich cultural encounter not only
between the Latin and the Greek philosophical traditions, but also between
so-called “paganism” and Christianity. My main purpose, therefore, is to

1
The translation goes up to 53c and the commentary covers the section from 31c to 53c.
2
Posidonius F85 Kidd. For a list of commentaries on the Timaeus, see Krause 1904: 46–54; Baltes and
Dörrie 1993: 48–54, 162–224.
3
Dutton 2003; see also Lemoine 1997. For a succinct overview of the reception history of the work in
Late Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and beyond, see Bakhouche 2011 I:47–67.

4
Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, ed. J. H. Waszink, Corpus Platonicum Medii
Aevi, Plato Latinus 4 (Leiden and London 1962; revised version 1975). All references to Calcidius are
to this edition, to the chapters, and in some cases also to the page and line numbers. Bakhouche 2011
has a slightly revised text, with translation, a long introduction, and extensive notes. Bakhouche’s
work is now the best instrument for an initial approach to the text. Moreschini 2003 provides
a translation in Italian, and notes; Magee 2016 provides the ﬁrst full translation in English. Detailed
analyses of sub-treatises of the commentary have been written by van Winden (1959, on matter,
reprinted in 1965, with supplementary notes), den Boeft (1970, on fate), and (1977, on demons).
5
For a good overview see Bakhouche 2011 I: 7–13.
6
On this point, he is followed by Moreschini 2003: xxxi–xxxix.

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Introduction 3
Two examples should suffice here to demonstrate the risks inherent in
overlooking the nature of the work.7 The first of these examples is an
instance of uncritically treating Calcidius’ commentary as a source book.
Relatively recently a number of scholars have used Calcidius as evidence
for an account of Stoic psychology that allegedly differs from the stan-
dard model described elsewhere.8 According to the standard account, the
ruling principle (hēgemonikon), the five senses, speech, and reproduction
are assigned to the soul, whereas other functions such as nutrition and
growth are assigned to the “nature” level of a living being (LS 53). (The
Stoics posit a scale of nature consisting of cohesion in inanimate things,
nature in plants, soul in animals, and rational soul in humans, LS 47.)
Calcidius (ch. 220), by contrast, is said by these scholars to provide
testimony that Chrysippus also attributed the lower functions of growth
and nutrition to the soul. In response to this assumption, one can state,
first, that it is not always easy to distinguish between a literal quotation
and an interpolation by the author quoting the material – a problem that
is common to many sources of this type.
The second and more serious objection is that Calcidius’ wording may
not actually bear out this interpretation (232.19–233.6). He progresses from
the (elsewhere attested) eight parts of the soul – the ruling part, the five
senses, speech, and reproduction – to the claim that these parts of the soul
“extend throughout the whole body and fill all its parts in every quarter with
the vital breath; they regulate and control” the body “with innumerable and
diverse powers (. . . reguntque et moderantur innumerabilibus diuersisque
uirtutibus . . .): nourishment, growth, locomotion, sensory equipment, and the
impulse to action (nutriendo, adolendo, mouendo motibus localibus, instruendo
sensibus, compellendo ad operandum; trans. Magee, emphasis added).”9 All
this claim need imply is that the soul of humans and animals can also make
use of the powers belonging to the level of nature as instruments to guide the
organism as a whole, not that these lower powers actually belong to the soul
itself. All functions of an organism presumably are subsumed under the
coordinating direction of the governing principle, without being controlled
directly by the soul.
The third and most important objection, however, is that if one looks at
the sub-treatise on the human soul as a whole (chs. 213–235),10 it becomes

7
As van Winden already pointed out, 1959: 9–10; see also Macías Villalobos 2015: 12–13.
8
Tieleman 1996: 96–101, reviewed by Reydams-Schils 2004; Powers 2012: 258–260; on this issue see
also Reydams-Schils 2006 and Ju 2007.
9
All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from Magee 2016.
10
See also sections 6.3 and 12.2 in this study.

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4 Introduction
apparent that Calcidius works with some kind of master-list that integrates
as many features of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic psychology as possible,
in order to underscore the view he himself endorses, which posits both a life
principle and a principle of reason within the soul. He has harmonized his
rendering of the different positions by inserting into each elements of the
others. Thus, I would argue, the list of nutrition, growth, locomotion,
sensation, and impulse in the testimony of Chrysippus’ view of the human
soul is an interpolation (by Calcidius or his source) with Peripatetic over-
tones, and we should handle the testimony with great caution.
If this ﬁrst example pertains to our use of Calcidius as a quarry for older
views, a second example can serve as a cautionary tale against using a text’s
reception as a window into its interpretation. It is common knowledge that
in late eleventh- and twelfth-century medieval readings of Plato’s Timaeus,
the question of how the triad God, Mind, and World Soul aligns with the
Trinity comes to the fore. In particular, the claim that the World Soul is
the equivalent of the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity becomes
a commonplace, only to be hotly contested.11 Yet there is no trace of this
view to be found in Calcidius’ commentary. An interpretive move, or
a series of such moves, must have been made both to enhance Plato’s
alleged compatibility with the Christian perspective and to insert material
from Calcidius into this Christian framework in such a way as to serve, or
at least not contradict, this purpose.12 Such a picture of the transmission of
ideas appears less strange if we keep in mind the traditional methods of
reading and commenting on texts through excerpting, summarizing, or
compiling series of nested notes. The latter are the so-called glosses, which,
in some cases, could constitute stand-alone commentaries in their own
right (as with the famous examples of Bernard of Chartres’ and William of
Conches’ glosses on the Timaeus). Inevitably, such compilations obscure
the lines of continuity in the accounts from which they derive their
material. In this case the chain of notes masks the fact that Calcidius
himself does not establish such a connection between the World Soul
and the Holy Spirit.
It is high time, then, to bring Calcidius’ translation and commentary
into the purview of the commentary tradition in Antiquity and to examine

11
Kobusch 2005: 249–250, with bibliography; Speer 2005: 222–226; Dronke 2008: x–xi; Gersh
2010: 897.
12
For instance, in his Glosae super Platonem, ch. 71, 124.13–14 Jeauneau, William of Conches states that
“some” (quidam) equate the World Soul qua spirit with the Holy Spirit, a position which he himself,
as he states here, neither rejects nor supports (quod nec negamus modo, nec afﬁrmamus); see also ch.
74. For William’s position on this claim in his other writings, see the notes ad loc.

An Authorial Voice

Calcidius is a highly self-assured author who reﬂects on the relation

between his translation and commentary, and who clearly positions him-
self vis-à-vis potential rivals and the preceding tradition. These features of
the work provide us with our first insights into its overall purpose.
Calcidius uses the stock theme of the obscurity of philosophical texts to
define his role more clearly, building on the fact that the problem of
obscurity would be even worse for someone reading Plato’s Timaeus in
a Latin translation. He is also aware that by sharing this knowledge with an
audience of relative beginners (though his addressee would not necessarily
fall into that category), he is running counter to an established practice of
the philosophical schools. Moreover, Plato, as he represents him, appears
to be in need of a rescue operation, to undo damage inflicted not only by
philosophers representing other currents of thought, but also by those who
claim to have been his followers in the Platonist tradition.

1.1 On Obscurity
Commentators on philosophical texts in Antiquity faced a double
bind. First, they had to be careful not to diminish the reputation of
the thinker whose work they were elucidating – why, after all, would
a text need a commentary, if it were not because of inherent deﬁcien-
cies? Second, they could not afford to insult the intelligence of their
addressees, and, through the addressees, that of their potential broader
audience.1 We can observe these issues being addressed throughout the
commentary tradition. In his work Calcidius solves this problem by
inserting a mini-treatise on the issue of “obscurity” (obscuritas, ch. 322)
into his handling of the admittedly thorny topic of prime matter

1
This chapter is a revised version of Reydams-Schils 2007b: sections I.i and ii (303–310).

2
For analyses of common practices in commentaries and their prefaces, cf. I. Hadot, Hoffmann, and
P. Hadot 1990: 113–122. For an English summary, cf. I. Hadot 1991; see also Mansfeld 1994. In his
treatment of obscurity, however (see especially his ch. 5), Mansfeld does not include this passage from
Calcidius. See also I. Hadot 1996; Praechter 1990; Westerink 1990. For a succinct rendering of the
topos in the tradition of commentaries on Aristotle, see Barnes 1992. See also Karamanolis 2006:
204–205.
3
See also ch. 326, in which Calcidius claims that Plato “in order to dissipate any cloudiness attaching to
this point of natural obscurity, casts the light of a brilliant illustration upon” matter (ut omne nubilum
naturalis discuteret obscuritatis adhibito splendore illustris exempli); chs. 345–346.
4
Cicero, Fin. 2.15; the best parallel for Calcidius’ treatment of obscurity is in Galen’s compendium of
the Timaeus, 1.14–16 Kraus-Walzer; see also his In fract. comm. 18.2, 319.7ff. Kühn.
5
There also circulated compendia versions of the Timaeus, as in the text published by Stover 2016: esp.
20–22.

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1.1 On Obscurity 11
notes, requires a thorough preliminary training in the sciences, or in what
he calls artiﬁciosa ratio, that is, in arithmetic, geometry, music, and
astronomy. Thus, Calcidius invokes the less damning aspect of
his second cause of obscurity, namely the audience’s lack of familiarity
with certain topics, and by implication the third cause, the degree of
difﬁculty of the topic. His approach to the Timaeus invites comparison
with the opening remarks in Theon of Smyrna’s account of the mathema-
tical knowledge one needs in order to follow Plato’s arguments (Rer.
math., second century CE). Theon states that he wrote his work on behalf
of those who had not been trained since childhood in the mathematical
sciences required both to understand Plato’s work and to gain access to
other forms of knowledge. As Ilsetraut Hadot (2005: 70) has pointed out,
this recognition of the problem by Theon and Calcidius attests to the fact
that, in their respective periods, an education in mathematics was not to be
taken for granted.
In the Preface to his commentary Calcidius addresses the opacity of the
Timaeus along with other standard topics such as the purpose of the work,
and its division into chapters. He alludes to Plato’s staging of the exchange
and gives reasons for his choice of characters, though without deploying
a symbolic interpretation. These points follow the older of two versions of
the introductory schema for interpreting Plato’s and Aristotle’s work (the
so-called “prolegomena” schema, Mansfeld 1994), which is also employed
in such texts as the Christian Origen’s Preface to his commentary on the
Song of Songs.6
Yet despite the real challenges presented by the Timaeus, Calcidius
notes, Plato himself does attempt to make things easier for his readers.
Like earlier interpreters, going back to Speusippus and Xenocrates,7
Calcidius holds that Plato uses temporal language for the process of
ordering the world merely to convey the world’s eternal dependence on
a higher cause.8 Given that people have an easier time grasping a causal
relation if it is cast in the language of “before” and “after,” as in the relation
between a father and son (ch. 26), Calcidius claims that Plato applies such
language for pedagogical purposes (τρόπος or χάριν διδασκαλίας, as this is
called in the Greek tradition). Similarly, Calcidius points out, Plato uses
a mode of direct speech when the Demiurge addresses the younger gods
(41a7–d3) to give his audience a break from abstract discourse, to allow for
6
Cf. also Dillon 1999; Porphyry In Cat. 55.3–57.15 Busse; Anon. in Tht. 1.1–4.27 Diels and Schubart;
Origen, Cant. 61–88 Baehrens; Macrobius, In Somn. 1.4.1.
7
Cf. Baltes 1976–1978; Speusippus F41, 61, 72 Tarán; Xenocrates F54, 68 Heinze.
8
See also ch. 4 in this study.

9
This is the main approach of Hoenig 2013, 2018a: 442–447, and 2018b: 160–214. Bakhouche 2011 I:
27–30, 105–124 provides a detailed analysis of Calcidius’ method of translation (surveying also the
previous secondary literature on the topic), in comparison with Cicero’s. She arrives at the
conclusions that Calcidius translates as an exegete, implying that his translation serves the com-
mentary, and that there is no evidence to suggest that Calcidius relied on the previous Latin
translation by Cicero. For an analysis of Calcidius’ translations of Greek poetry (including
philosophical texts), see Bertolini 1990: 104–109.
10
Dutton 2003: 189; Somfai 2004: 206–208; Hoenig 2018b: 168–177, who also draws on Calcidius’
rendering of εἰκὼς μῦθος as mediocris explanatio.
11
As Hoenig, forthcoming a, has pointed out, ch. 349 of the commentary echoes the image from the
Republic of emerging from the cave, from the darkness of ignorance into the light of truth.
12
See also chs. 15 and 16 in this study.

1.2 Sharing Knowledge

In the polished rhetoric of the dedicatory letter, as one would expect,
Calcidius extols his addressee’s capacities, and modestly devalues his own
(see also ch. 119), no doubt to avoid insulting Osius, as I pointed out
above.13 The argument of the dedicatory letter hinges on the theme of
friendship. Like virtue, friendship makes the impossible feasible. And its
requirement of generosity (generosa magnanimitas) also demands that one
give one’s very best to a friend, even if a request seems daunting. One could
easily be lulled by the rhetorical commonplaces of this letter into dismiss-
ing it as an ornament.
Yet, apart from the fact that rhetoric is rarely ornamental, what seems in
the letter, at ﬁrst glance, to be a rather commonplace reference to generosity
immediately acquires a sharp edge and polemical tone in the Preface,
revealing a tension that provides valuable information about Calcidius’
position in the Platonist tradition. The Timaeus, Calcidius here claims,
appears to have been composed for an audience of specialists in the sciences.
But those very same specialists refuse to share the advantage of their knowl-
edge with others, a detestable lack of generosity he blames on a malicious and
unfortunate invidiousness. Calcidius does not mince his words: “Although
they had an obligation to share with others the extraordinary light of their
knowledge, acting under the detestable restraints of an infelicitous ill will
they kept back for themselves the outpouring of bountiful happiness” (Quos
cum oporteret tantam scientiae claritudinem communicare cum ceteris, infelicis
inuidiae detestabili restrictione largae beatitudinis fusionem incommunicabilem
penes se retinuerunt, Preface ch. 3). Unlike those specialists, we are meant to
infer from the preceding dedicatory letter, Calcidius will share whatever he

13
Curtius 1948: 93 calls this the topos of “affected modesty” (“affektierte Bescheidenheit”).

1.3 Plato, Platonists, and Others

In Calcidius’ eyes Plato is gifted with a “divine combination of ingenuity and
wisdom” (pro ingenii prudentiaeque diuinitate, ch. 257; see also ch. 302). Plato
represents the culmination of all philosophy not only because he holds the
14
On the obligation to share one’s knowledge, see also Seneca, Ep. 6.4.
15
As in Minucius Felix, Oct. 5.4, 8; Celsus in Origen, C. Cels. 3.44, 55.
16
See, for instance, Origen, C. Cels., the opening move of Celsus’ criticism of the Christians, 1.1, 1.3
(with a reference to the Pythagoreans).
17
Cf. Mansfeld 1994: 13, 159–160; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5 and 7 passim; Origen, Princ. 4.2–3;
Philoc. 1.14–21 (see also 2.3); for Porphyry’s criticism of Origen’s hermeneutics, cf. F39 Harnack =
Eusebius, HE 6.19 = F6 Becker.
18
See also chs. 15 and 16 in this study.

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1.3 Plato, Platonists, and Others 15
truth, but also because he provides the most complete explanations of the
structure of reality.19 As we can see in other works of the Platonist tradition,
such as Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus, it was common for one
Platonist to argue against another about the correct interpretation of Plato,
often in order to resolve apparent contradictions. In the Greek commentaries
such debates could also include discussions of different versions of the text, but
not surprisingly these discussions are absent from Calcidius’ work in Latin.
Occasionally he does, however, present a range of possible interpretations. In
the key passages on the composition of the World Soul (chs. 26–31),20 for
instance, Calcidius discusses two proposals for the meaning of the notions of
“divisible” and “indivisible” Being, gives arguments for each, and then settles
on what he considers to be the right one.
Like other Platonists Calcidius also defends Plato against criticisms that
presumably come from outside the Platonic tradition. In ch. 20, for
instance, he presents an anonymous critic who objects that positing two
intermediaries between the solid bodies of ﬁre and earth (Timaeus 31b–32c)
will not work. According to Plato’s own analysis, the objection goes, the
geometrical structure of earth (cube) is mathematically incompatible with
that of ﬁre (pyramid; 54b–d), and therefore the continuity among the four
elements cannot be secured. In his response (chs. 21–22) Calcidius claims
that Plato forestalled this challenge by using the physical properties of the
elements rather than their geometrical structure to guarantee the continu-
ity among them (Somfai 2004). This solution is based on properties that
the Timaeus itself elsewhere (55e–56b; 61d6–62a5) assigns to the different
types of polyhedra that make up the elements.
Calcidius returns to the issue of the relation between the elements in the
commentary’s section on matter, this time forestalling a potential problem
not just for the continuity between the elements but for their actual trans-
formation into one another. (Continuity is presumably a necessary condi-
tion for the possibility of such transformations.) In his discussion of how the
transformation of the elements happens in matter (based on Tim. 49b–c),
Calcidius presents an argument that if earth did not change into any of the
other elements and thus would be exempt from the cycle of transformation,
this cycle would be bound to come to an end. Everything would eventually
become earth “since the other elements will be transformed into it but it will
admit of no transformation into any of them” (ch. 324, siquidem cetera in
19
Cf. also Plutarch, De def. or. 435F–436A and Aulus Gellius Noct. Att. 9.5.7 = Taurus T14 Petrucci,
discussed in Petrucci 2018: 15–16; on this topic see also Reydams-Schils 2006: 184–186, and, for the
general background in Middle Platonism, Boys-Stones 2018: ch. 1.
20
See also section 5.1 in this study.

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16 An Authorial Voice
ipsam conuertentur, ipsa autem in nihil eorum habebit conuersionem). Here
Calcidius changes tack by claiming that Plato made a distinction between
what actually happens, that earth does change into the elements, and what
appears to be the case, that earth cannot do so. Given that proof is based on
observation, and earth has never been observed to turn into water or any of
the other elements, Calcidius avers, Plato did not want to undermine the
reliability of sense-perception. This latter claim is a ﬁrst indication that
“doxastic reason,” i.e. opinion based on sense-perception, does not have an
irredeemably low epistemological status in Calcidius’ interpretation of the
Timaeus.21
In this case Calcidius’ response relies on an implied tension between the
way things appear at the level of sensible reality, and their structure at
a deeper level of analysis. But when Plato himself returns to the topic of the
structure of the elements (53c), he says the exact opposite: it is precisely the
mathematical structure of earth, which eludes observation, that accounts
for its incompatibility with the other elements, whereas at the level of
appearance all four elements seem to turn into one another. Plato now
states explicitly that this appearance is wrong (54b: οὐκ ὀρθῶς
φανταζόμενα). Calcidius’ translation and commentary come to a stop
before this passage, so we do not know how he would have addressed
these claims in a more detailed analysis. But in what we do have, we can see
how an Aristotelian method of “saving the phenomena” (that is, of coming
up with explanations that can also account for the way things appear) could
be retrojected onto Plato.22
It is striking that in his attempts to defend Plato and what he sees as the
correct interpretation of the Timaeus, Calcidius does not make a strong
distinction between Platonists (thinkers who would consider themselves
direct followers of Plato), and thinkers belonging to other schools of
thought, but rather tends to lump them together under a generic label
such as “the ancients” (ch. 29: a veteribus). Calcidius is remarkably con-
sistent in his cold attitude towards Plato’s successors. At the end of the sub-
treatise on demons, for instance, he states that most of the followers of
Plato (and even some other thinkers who could be aligned with him, such
as Pythagoras) mistakenly hold the view that the demons, good and bad,
are merely human souls that have been liberated from the body (ch. 136).

21
See also sections 6.3 and 6.4 in this study.
22
For the echoes of Aristotle in ch. 324, see Bakhouche 2011 II: 868, based on van Winden 1959:
180–181; for Aristotle’s overall function in the commentary, see also ch. 11 in this study.

23
Nam cum ille perfectam rationem attulerit docueritque tam ipsam causam uidendi quam cetera
quae causam sequuntur atque adiuuant et sine quibus non potest uisus existere, . . .
24
. . . iuniores sumptis ex plena sententia partibus de isdem partibus tamquam de uniuersitate
senserunt proptereaque, ut qui uera dicant, merito mouent; sed quia nulla partis perfectio est,
aliquatenus succidunt, ut exposita Platonis sententia res ipsa monstrabit.
25
. . . iuniores philosophi, ut non optimi heredes paternum censum in frustra dissipantes, perfectam
atque uberem sententiam in mutilas opiniunculas ceciderunt.
26
On the issue of Calcidius’ sources, see chs. 13 and 14 in this study.

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18 An Authorial Voice
philosophers’ piecemeal method, both Middle Platonist authors use the
image of Pentheus’ body being torn limb from limb and scattered.27
Whereas Atticus applies the image to emphasize Plato’s superiority over
his predecessors (F1 des Places), Numenius brandishes it as a weapon
against Plato’s successors in the Academy (the generations of Platonists
who in their quarrels, he claims, ruined Plato’s legacy) in a treatise called, in
case we would miss the point, “On the Stand-Off between Plato and the
Academics” (Περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀκαδημαικῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαστάσεως,
F24-28 des Places). In his invective, Numenius also emphasizes the con-
nections between Plato and Pythagoras, lampoons the shameful behavior
of other schools, and shames the Platonists by pointing to the unity in the
Epicurean ranks. Numenius, however, still had some respect for the ﬁrst
generations of Platonists, notably for Speusippus and Xenocrates, and if
Nemesius’ rendering is accurate, could even bring himself to cite
Xenocrates (F4b des Places = Nemesius 2. 17–19). Not so Calcidius.
Of course, being aware of the potential gap between Plato and his
interpreters could also have its exegetical advantages. Calcidius establishes
a direct connection between himself and Plato; unlike Boethius, for
instance, in his work on Aristotelian logic, Calcidius never mentions
a tradition of commentators (commentatores).28 Forging this direct con-
nection with Plato himself allows Calcidius to make some very astute
observations, such as the claim, which he repeats twice, that Plato himself
did not use the term hulē to designate the receptacle, or third ontological
principle (278.1–2; 309.4–6).29 In drawing our attention to this point, he
does better than many an ancient reader, and even later scholars. The
insight, however, does not prevent Calcidius himself from rendering hulē
in his own famous translation in the commentary as silva: he is always
commenting both on the Timaeus itself and on a range of different
philosophical views. (For his consciously drawing attention to this transla-
tion, see ch. 123.) He does use the word receptaculum too, but for a different
purpose, as when he mentions the different parts of the body that are to
receive the different soul functions (ch. 201), or in order to describe the
function of matter (chs. 318, 344, 350).
Yet in spite of his overt polemic, Calcidius does not dismiss the Platonist
tradition entirely. He does mention both Numenius and Philo of

27
Cf. also Philo of Alexandria, Congr. 150 (but on the relation between philosophy and the particular
sciences); Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.13.57.1–6; cf. also Strom. 6.7.55.3. Cicero, Fin. 1.72 makes
a similar point about what he claims to be the original consensus between Plato, the Old Academy,
and the Peripatetics.
28
As in Boethius, 1InDI, 2InDI, passim. 29 See also chs. 9 and 10 on matter in this study.

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1.3 Plato, Platonists, and Others 19
Alexandria – a fact that does not in itself entail that he used these authors as
direct sources. On the contrary, given that he tends to cover up his immediate
sources, his explicit mention of these two thinkers would work against the
assumption that he had direct access to them. Be that as it may, it remains
striking that he chooses to highlight thinkers who from our current (and
possibly mistaken) perspective are not part of mainstream Platonism.
In addition to mentioning Numenius and Philo of Alexandria, there
is the tantalizing possibility that Calcidius may have thought he was
quoting at least one other Platonist when he referred to an interpreta-
tion of Genesis by “Origen” (ch. 276).30 Although this claim requires
some unpacking, it goes a long way towards signaling the gulf separat-
ing our understanding of the ancient tradition and that of the ancients
themselves.
Although Waszink (1962: xi and 1972: 236) relies heavily on this
citation to build his case that Calcidius is a Christian, to claim that
only a Christian would cite the Christian Origen is a petitio principii.
Perhaps Calcidius did not realize that the Platonist and the Christian of
the same name (second to third century CE) could have been two
different people.31 If this conﬂation was a mistake, it had already been
made in Antiquity: Eusebius (HE 6.19.4–8) claims to have found it in
Porphyry (his C. Christ.), and corroborates the assumption. One possible
reason for this confusion is that the Christian “Origen” is also heavily
indebted to Platonism; he is said to have embraced “Greek” ideas on the
nature of the world and the divine, and to have had enough of
a reputation for even philosophers to cite him. The Platonist “Origen,”
for his part, is said to have had a strong interest in the Timaeus,32 and
although he reportedly left very little in writing, he composed a treatise on
demons.33 Furthermore, both the Christian and the Platonist “Origen”
allegedly had an interest in Numenius, (Neo)Pythagoreans, and Stoics –
the Christian in his now lost Stromateis.34 According to Jerome the latter
also contained material from Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. There
appears to be plenty of room for confusion, and the combined persona of
a Platonist-cum-Christian Origen could have constituted an ideal meet-
ing ground between Calcidius and his interlocutor. We need to keep in
mind too that an interest in Hebrew Scriptures is attested for other

30
On Calcidius’ use of Origen, see also sections 15.4 and ch. 16 in this study.
31
See Goulet’s groundbreaking article, 1977. 32 See e.g. Proclus, In Tim. 1, 63.21–65.3 Diehl.
33
According to Longinus at Porphyry, Plot. 20.41.
34
For the hypothesis that Origen’s Stromateis is in fact Calcidius’ main source, see Beatrice 1999.

35
See e.g., F1a, 9–10, 13, 30, 56; for an excellent discussion of the issue, see Zambon 2002: 196–204. See
also ps.-Longinus, Subl. 9.9.
36
Brisson 2002; see also section 15.3 in this study.
37
Cf. Proclus, PT 2, 31.4–22 Saffrey and Westerink. 38 See section 2.3 in this study.
39
Ch. 280, 284.1–15 in comparison with Aristotle, Met. 983b18–33, as van Winden 1959: 72 points out.
But while it is true that Calcidius’ opinor could be a rendering of Aristotle’s ἴσως, it still remains the
case that this rendering enhances the ﬁrst person voice. As John Magee pointed out to me, of the ca.
65 occurrences of opinor in the text, this is the only one to be woven into a clause; it is not merely an
interjection.

How to Read Plato’s Timaeus

So, what is it, generally speaking, that this self-conﬁdent commentator

wants to accomplish with his exposition on the Timaeus? A close examina-
tion of the commentary itself provides many indications of Calcidius’
intentions. The list of topics in the Preface announces that Calcidius’
treatment is going to be largely thematic, and the division of the different
branches of philosophy that he delineates (ch. 264) provides insights into
the overall structure of the commentary. This division also reveals what
Calcidius considers to be the main topic of the Timaeus and explains how
he views its place in a curriculum of Plato’s works, speciﬁcally in relation to
the Republic and the Parmenides. Finally, it emerges that contrary to the
Neoplatonists Calcidius endorses a hermeneutic of reading the Timaeus
sequentially, an approach that is also reﬂected in his view of the structure of
reality.1

2.1 Headings
In his Preface to his commentary, Calcidius gives a list of thematic head-
ings for the Timaeus that goes as follows:
1. The question raised ﬁrst, on the generation of the world.
2. Thereafter, on the origin of the soul.
3. Then, on harmonic modulation.
4. On numbers.
5. On the ﬁxed and wandering stars, among which are included the sun
and moon.
6. On the heaven.
7. On the four kinds of living beings: the celestial, winged, aquatic, and
terrestrial.

1
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of Reydams-Schils 2007b: sections II.i and ii.

2
In one case the heading also shows up in the mss., ch. 26: de ortu animae.

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2.1 Headings 23
continuity in the commentary, especially in the summary passages and
transitions, in which Calcidius appears to speak more in his own voice, as,
for example, in the short section of chs. 202–207 grouped together under
the heading “On the origin of the human race” (8).
If the headings were meant to provide the structure of Calcidius’
commentary, it is possible that the extant work is incomplete (Dutton
2003: 190–191). This possibility could imply either that he did not finish it
or that the remainder of the work has been lost. Calcidius indicates in his
letter to Osius that he is submitting to him a first installment (primas partes)
for his approval, and at the end of the list of headings he claims that his
“exposition of the book [i.e. Plato’s Timaeus] will treat of each of these
subjects in order” (quorum omnium singillatim secundum ordinem libri
expositio fiet). Expositio here clearly refers to his commentary.
The list of headings, however, could also refer simply to the Timaeus
itself, and Calcidius could be suggesting that the commentary as it stands
has, in fact, covered most if not all of the themes, even if not always in that
order. To support this line of reasoning, Calcidius also draws on material
from other parts of the Timaeus, beyond 53c, the point at which his own
commentary ends. For instance, in chapter 20, he alludes to the section of
the Timaeus in which geometrical solids are paired with the elements
(55d7–56c7), and chapter 211 contains clear allusions to the ending of the
Timaeus in which Plato argues for a balance between soul and body
(86c–88c).3 When he discusses the human soul, Calcidius includes infor-
mation about the lower soul parts which are made by the younger gods
(69c–72d). When discussing matter qua principle, he also mentions the
idea that matter qua necessity is the sine qua non for the structure of the
world (68e6–69a5). Moreover, Calcidius appears to insert themes such as
the relation of the universe and time (heading 14) or the intelligible god
(27) elsewhere in his commentary, thereby not adhering to the order of this
initial list.
But even if the list is meant merely as an overview of the Timaeus itself, it
already represents an interpretation of Plato’s account. It is not merely
what today we would think of as a table of contents of Plato’s work. As
Béatrice Bakhouche points out (2011 I: 22–23), Calcidius uses species as
a label for this list, not capitula, which in itself could already be indicative
of a thematic treatment. If we do not include the opening of the Timaeus,
the Atlantis story, and the opening statement of the character Timaeus’
contribution (more on this below), the list does move, generally speaking,

3
This parallel is not noted by Waszink 1962, nor by Moreschini 2003 and Bakhouche 2011.

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24 How to Read Plato’s Timaeus
through the main components of the text, beginning with a section on the
World body and Soul, then turning to the receptacle (called “matter” as
was common in the tradition), followed by some aspects of the elemental
transformations, the human soul, the human body, their afflictions, and
ending with a grand finale about the order of the universe. Nonetheless,
placing a section on time after the discussion of the receptacle/matter
cannot be mapped easily onto the Timaeus. Although one can see how
Plato’s mention of the Demiurge ordering a “preexisting” chaos (53a–b) in
that section might lead interpreters to revisit the issue of the relation
between the origin of the universe and time, the heading is clearly
a thematic insertion on the part of the commentator. Similarly, heading
19, “On the ruling principle of the vital substance,” has Stoic overtones and
reflects the distinct perspective on the human soul that Calcidius will go on
to expound in his commentary. Heading 27, “On the intelligible god,”
appears to be a kind of summary statement with a clear focus. And heading
22, “On the breeds of different peoples,” has no clear counterpart in Plato’s
account.
In sum, then, the list of headings already reflects an attempt to structure
broader thematic treatments of issues raised by the Timaeus and an inter-
vention to systematize the account. Even if Calcidius had found the list
ready-made in another work, it does not necessarily follow that there is
a single, primary source behind the commentary. On the contrary, the
discrepancies between the list and the commentary may well be indicative
of Calcidius’ own hand in the overall structuring of his material.
A thematic overview of the Timaeus would have served Calcidius’
purpose, as revealed by his commentary, in at least two distinct ways.
Given that he is not dealing with the Greek text, the κατὰ λέξιν aspect of
the commentary, which focuses on the wording of the original, is limited
and restricted mostly to lemmata from the translation or reformulations.4
Instead Calcidius favors the κατὰ ζητήματα approach, which focuses on
the issues raised by the text. Moreover, the thematic arrangement also
allows Calcidius to insert sometimes highly elaborate overviews of other
positions besides Plato’s, in so-called doxographies. But while the thematic
list of the Preface provides a better understanding of Calcidius’ under-
taking, it does not fully reveal the guiding principles and structuring
devices Calcidius uses to arrange his material, to which we turn next.

4
An exception to this general pattern is Calcidius’ overview of the different senses of the word caelum
(ch. 98), in which he pays attention to the etymology of the Greek term (ouranon) but not to its Latin
counterpart.

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2.2 The Structure of the Commentary 25
2.2 The Structure of the Commentary
In the introduction to his edition, Waszink (1962: xvii–xxxv) adopts van
Winden’s proposal for the general structure of Calcidius’ commentary.5 In
this view, the commentary hinges on a distinction derived from the Timaeus
itself (47e), between the works of reason and providence (quae prouidae
mentis intellectus instituit, 273.8–9), on the one hand, and those of necessity,
on the other (ea quae necessitas inuexit). This produces two main parts of the
commentary, following the Preface: the first comprising chs. 8–267 and
the second chs. 268–355 (end). But as van Winden and Waszink note, the
first part of the commentary is in turn divided into two parts, which they
term the generation of the world (chs. 8–118) and its further completion (chs.
119–267, or, in Waszink’s version, its condition after its generation). Thus,
this basic schema would look as follows:
A. Works of Reason and Providence (chs. 8–267)
a. Generation of the World (chs. 8–118)
b. Completion of the World (chs. 119–267)
B. Works of Necessity (chs. 268–355)
In Calcidius’ transitional paragraph (ch. 119), however, the break between
the “generation” (Aa) and “completion” of the world (Ab) is not expressed
solely in these terms.
Furthermore, in the transitional passages between A and B Calcidius
himself actually gives us another clue to the structuring devices he may
have used, in addition to the hinge phrase from the Timaeus quoted in ch.
268. This clue is provided by his division of the different fields of philo-
sophy. In ch. 264 he claims that philosophy (officium totius philosophiae)
can be exhaustively divided into theory (consideratio, which he appears to
use as an alternative to contemplatio, cf. Preface) and practical philosophy
(actus), leaving out logic. Theory in turn is divided into (1) theology
(theologia), (2) physics (naturae sciscitatio), and (3) “science” (scientia
praestandae rationis), the first of which deals with the search for the divine
and pietas, the second with the heavens and the causes of things, including
the starting points of that which has a beginning in time, and the third with
topics such as the cycles of time, numbers, and measure.
The closest parallel to Calcidius’ division is to be found in Alcinous
(Didask., chs. 3 and 7), whose divisions amount to theoretical philosophy
(theōretikē), practical philosophy (praktikē), and dialectic (dialektikē),

5
van Winden 1959: 10–23.

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26 How to Read Plato’s Timaeus
including logic in this context. Under the heading of theoretical philoso-
phy we find, as in Calcidius, (a) theology, which deals with the first causes,
the unmoving and divine (ch. 3), and the highest and most fundamental
principles (ch. 7); (b) physics, which covers the movements of the celestial
bodies, the composition of the universe (ch. 3), the nature of the whole, the
kind of living beings humans are, their place in the universe, whether there
is a divine providence, whether there are other, secondary gods, and the
nature of the rapport between humans and the gods (ch. 7); and (c)
mathematics, including sciences such as geometry and the like (ch. 3),
which examine planes and three-dimensional nature, as well as motion and
impetus (ch. 7).
Perhaps most notably, these schemes differ from the most common
division of philosophy in Antiquity (attributed even to Xenocrates,6 but
made canonical by the Stoics) into logic, ethics, and physics.7 This is the
division which Macrobius, for instance, uses in the final paragraph of his
commentary on Cicero’s Dream of Scipio. Calcidius indicates he is also
familiar with this alternative scheme (ch. 147, 185.4–5). But because such
a division overlooks the radically transcendent side of reality, Platonists
found fault with it in their ongoing squabble with the Stoics: for followers
of Plato there is something beyond the study of nature as it is captured in
physics. And thus they came up with a range of strategies to accommodate
the problem. One such strategy is to borrow Aristotle’s distinction between
practical and theoretical philosophy, and to have the latter start with
mathematics and extend beyond physics so that it also covers theology.
This is the strategy which Alcinous and Calcidius adopt. Another strategy,
the one adopted by Macrobius, is to subsume the transcendental dimension
under logic as dialectic in the Platonic sense, by establishing a connection
between logic in the more technical modes of the Peripatetic and Stoic
approach, and Platonic ontology. Or one could simply add a level of
theology as the “epoptic” kind of knowledge, which refers to the advanced
stage in a process of initiation.8 The solution Porphyry uses to arrange his
edition of Plotinus’ Enneads, also adopted by the Christian Origen,9 is
a combination of these last two strategies, producing the sequence of ethics,

6
F1 Heinze = Posidonius F88 Edelstein and Kidd.
7
One of the best papers on this topic is P. Hadot 1979.
8
Theon of Smyrna 14.18ff., I. Hadot 2005: (1) mathematics, (2) logic, politics, physics, (3) epoptic
knowledge (in the sense of Platonic dialectic); Clement, Strom. 1.28.176.1–3; Plutarch, De Is. et Os.
382D–E.
9
Cant. 75.5–27 Baehrens; see also his epGr., and Gregory Thaumaturgus, Pan. Or. 7–15, which does
include logic/dialectic, but as a propaideutic discipline; cf. Mansfeld 1994: 170.

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2.2 The Structure of the Commentary 27
physics, and “epoptic” knowledge, which is simpler than the more elaborate
scheme of Alcinous and Calcidius.
Traces of this debate on the proper division of knowledge can also be
found in Aulus Gellius’ rendering of the Pythagorean curriculum as
allegedly taught by Taurus (1.9). Here the highest step of learning, achieved
after a range of preliminary studies (his scientiae studiis ornati), is physics,
which, however, as in Stoicism, would embrace both the structure of the
universe (mundi opera) as well as its principles (principia). In this scheme,
therefore, the notion of physics itself is adjusted in order to cover a broader
range of reality.
How does the division of theoretical philosophy into mathematics,
physics, and theology help us to understand the structure of Calcidius’
commentary? We can in effect distinguish the same three nearly equal parts
in the commentary according to this division, which is “pedagogical” in the
sense that it represents a gradual progression from the most basic and
preliminary type of theoretical knowledge taught by mathematics, that is,
arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy (chs. 8–118), to physics (chs.
119–267), and all the way up to the most fundamental principles of reality.
Thus the first part of the commentary would be devoted to mathematics
(the artificiosae rationes), the first half of the second part to physics, and
the second half of the second part to theology, which Calcidius approaches
from the angle of the question of matter (chs. 268–355).
Unlike the schema proposed by Waszink and van Winden, this
structure would look as follows:
A. Mathematics and the Universe (chs. 8–118)
B. Ba. Physics (chs. 119–267)
Bb. Theology, the principles of reality (chs. 268–355)
In addition to respecting the division into a first and a second part both of
the translation and of the commentary that came down to us through the
manuscript tradition (i.e., the second part of the translation and commen-
tary starts at 39e and ch. 119), this revised schema has several interpretive
advantages: it explains why Calcidius skips Timaeus’ opening speech, helps
us to discern how Calcidius views the relation between mathematics and
philosophy, and provides a more fitting structure for the commentary.
First, Calcidius’ intention to cover theoretical philosophy in
a pedagogically motivated order accounts for his omissions not only of the
preface of the Timaeus and the Atlantis story – a move to which he himself
draws attention (ch. 4) – but also (and much more strikingly) of Timaeus’

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28 How to Read Plato’s Timaeus
opening speech. This speech can be considered a kind of philosophical
prooimion, in which Timaeus makes the key distinctions that arguably
provide the basis for his entire exposition: between Being and Becoming,
between model and copy, and between different types of discourse
(27d5–29d3). The account is one of the most widely commented-upon
passages of the Timaeus, and was in itself sufficient to trigger influential
debates about such topics as whether or not the world has a beginning in
time. Yet Calcidius omits this section without any acknowledgment, despite
including it in his translation. Waszink (1962: xviii) and van Winden (1959:
14) suggest that Calcidius left out this passage because it did not require an
explanation in mathematical terms, but this suggestion seems less plausible if
we take into account the prooimion’s highly intricate nature and its central
importance for Timaeus’ exposition.
Calcidius’ pedagogical approach to the Timaeus offers an alternative
explanation: he could not have started his commentary with Timaeus’
opening remarks because they represent too advanced a level of philo-
sophical discourse, drawing as they do on ontology. Instead, Calcidius
picks up Plato’s text at the discussion of the World body’s composition
and the elements, with a relatively basic point about mathematical
proportions and numerical analogy. He accordingly postpones the treat-
ment of themes raised in Timaeus’ introductory speech until the third
part of the commentary, though he does draw upon the fundamental
distinction between Being and Becoming already in the first part. In fact,
at one point in his commentary, Calcidius explicitly states that this is
how he is proceeding and that he is postponing the discussion of matter
(ch. 107, 156.2–3).
Here too a structural feature of the Timaeus helps to justify this exege-
tical strategy. Plato’s Timaeus makes a fresh start in discussing his princi-
ples (47e3–49a6) when he adds the “third genos,” the so-called receptacle, to
Being and Becoming, a feature of the Platonic account which Calcidius can
put to use for treating the principles in one systematic exposition in the
closing part of his commentary. In doing so, Calcidius refers back to the
distinctions from Timaeus’ prooimion in his ch. 273.
Second, one of Calcidius’ important hermeneutical choices is to treat
mathematics as the first step in the curriculum of theoretical philosophy,
rather than as a preparatory step. Whereas Theon of Smyrna gave his work
a title referring to the material with which one had to familiarize oneself
before tackling Plato’s work, Calcidius builds these expositions into an
actual commentary on one of those works. This approach stands in marked
contrast to Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus, which refers readers who

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2.2 The Structure of the Commentary 29
need more help with mathematics to an appendix, now lost.10
Consequently, the type of mathematics Proclus does include in his com-
mentary neither stands on its own nor simply precedes other forms of
knowledge, but rather simultaneously relates to physics and theology,11 to
which he also refers as philosophy and “reality” (τὰ πράγματα). Moreover,
Proclus’ higher-order mathematics – if we might call it this – clearly
functions as an ontological bridge between physics and theology, or
between sensible and intelligible reality, which would make Proclus’
sequence physics, mathematics, and theology, rather than mathematics,
physics, and theology, as in Calcidius’ division.
Third, the sequence of mathematics, physics, and theology in Calcidius’
text yields a good transition to the second part, on physics (ch. 119), in
which Calcidius briefly alludes again to his discussion of the artificiosae
rationes before moving on to the next level of discourse. He also circles back
to this theme of technical knowledge in the commentary’s concluding
section, albeit very succinctly. At the end of his exposition, Calcidius again
cleverly borrows a few words from the Timaeus in which Plato’s main
character refers to the expertise of his interlocutors: “since you are well
schooled in the fields of learning in terms of which I must of necessity
proceed with my exposition, I’m sure you’ll follow me” (53b7–c3, trans.
Zeyl). This claim echoes Socrates’ earlier point that, unlike the poets and
the sophists, Timaeus and his companions have the prerequisite knowledge
to undertake the inquiry Socrates has requested (19d–20c). So, here too
Calcidius elucidates a relation between himself as author (as a stand-in for
Timaeus), his potential rivals (those bunglers who do not know their
business), and his audience (Osius, presented as gifted) from within the
setting of the Timaeus itself. In his closing remarks Calcidius quotes the
Pythagorean Cebes to reemphasize that the curriculum of philosophy
consists of several steps culminating in its highest truth. Waszink and
van Winden, therefore, were right in noticing that Calcidius uses features
of the Timaeus as structuring devices, but his pedagogical order of inquiry
also drives the commentary. For now, we should bear in mind that
Calcidius uses the Timaeus as a vehicle for a comprehensive and step-by-
step overview of what he calls theoretical philosophy. Moreover, as
Christina Hoenig has shown, given that Calcidius considers the Timaeus
to be a discourse “on nature” (see 2.3), he translates the famous εἰκὼς μῦθος
(“likely account”) designation (which the character Timaeus applies to his

10
Festugière 1966–1968 III: 60, n. 3; Proclus, In Tim. 3, II 33.30–34.1 Diehl; see also 3, II 76.24ff.
11
See e.g. Proclus, In Tim. 3, II 218.8–20 Diehl.

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30 How to Read Plato’s Timaeus
own speech, 29c), as a mediocris explanatio, i.e. a mid-level or intermediary
account.12 This translation tells us that the commentary is not meant to
deal with the most advanced topics of theology.
Finally, when Calcidius mentions Plato’s fresh start in his discussion of
necessity at the beginning of the section on matter, from ch. 268 onwards,
he again picks up the theme of the elements with which he opened the
commentary, but this time from the point of view of the basic principles of
reality and the intelligible realm. In this case too he tells us as much. The
commentary starts with the assumption that the world is a perfect body
(ch. 8; corpus perfectum). In the section on matter, however, Calcidius says
(ch. 274) that although bodies appear to have a perfect substance
(corpora . . . perfectam uidebuntur habere substantiam) when considered by
themselves, one must dig deeper to find their true origin. So, where Plato’s
Timaeus claims that “to find the maker and father of this universe is hard
enough, and even if I succeeded, to declare him to everyone is impossible”
(trans. Zeyl, 28c3), Calcidius transposes this double challenge from the
Demiurge to matter:
Now, at first he [i.e. Plato earlier on in his exposition, which also refers to
the start of the commentary proper, ch. 8] constructed the world according
to an account which for the sake of brevity assumed the four principal
material elements. But since it is the task proper to the philosopher to
search, through the highest level of mental care and an exceptionally diligent
process of examination, all that pertains to causality, and since reason asserts
that a receptivity of matter underlies the diversity of bodies, he rightly and
reasonably determined that this line of reasoning should itself be drawn out
into the light of intelligence, and that although the task would prove extremely
difficult to grasp, to explain and teach it would nevertheless prove far more
difficult. (trans. Magee, modified, emphasis added)13

2.3 The Platonic Curriculum

The structure of philosophy as Calcidius presents it in his commentary
appears to be framed by two Platonic dialogues: the Republic and the

12
Hoenig 2013 and 2018b: 168–177.
13
Porro corpora, si per se ipsa spectentur, perfectam uidebuntur habere substantiam, sed si ad
originem eorum conuertis mentis intentionem, inuenies cuncta et eorum scatebras siluae gremio
contineri. Tunc ergo compendio principalibus materiis quattuor sumptis exaedificauerat sermone
mundum, sed quia erat philosophi proprium cuncta quae ad causam pertinent summa cura mentis et
diligentiore examine peragrare, ratio porro asserit subiacere corporum diuersitati siluae capacitatem,
recte rationabiliterque censuit hanc ipsam rationem trahendam usque ad intellegentiae lucem,
difficile opus omnino uel assequi, longe tamen difficilius declarare ac docere.

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2.3 The Platonic Curriculum 31
Parmenides. The pedagogical approach to philosophy in Calcidius’ scheme
could, of course, be derived from the educational program which Plato
develops in the Republic. In his Preface Calcidius explicitly states that he
reads the Timaeus as a sequel to the Republic. Both works treat the moral
and political dimension of justice. Whereas the Republic, Calcidius claims,
deals with “positive justice” in human matters (ch. 6: iustitia quae uersar-
etur in rebus humanis, positiua), the Timaeus deals with natural justice, in
the community of the gods (naturalis iustitia, qua diuinum genus aduersum
se utitur). The notion of the universe as a city, shared by humans and gods,
became prominent particularly with the Stoics,14 and although the Timaeus
clearly has its own ethical agenda, that agenda ultimately was understood
in a way that very much shaped the debate between Platonists and Stoics, as
I have argued elsewhere.15 Hence both Alcinous’ and Calcidius’ treatments
of physics focus on the question of divine Providence in relation to a range
of other divine entities and human beings in the ordered universe. The
Christian Origen also draws attention to the connection between physics
and ethics (Cant. 75.20–21 Baehrens), but (if the rendering in Latin is
accurate) from a noticeably more Christian perspective, claiming that
a proper knowledge of nature leads one not to use it contrary to the
purposes ordained by the divine Creator.
How does Plato’s Parmenides enter into Calcidius’ commentary? If the
Timaeus takes over where the Republic left off, the Parmenides would in
turn lift its readers to a yet higher level of discourse. He indicates that the
Parmenides deals with a higher level of reality than the Timaeus and uses
the word epoptica to refer to the former, whereas he calls the latter naturalis
(ch. 272). But epoptica – a term derived from the practice of initiation rites,
as we have seen above – is for Calcidius clearly a relative notion: thus
a discussion of demons is of a more epoptica nature than one of the physical
universe,16 just as “matter” is a more advanced topic than physical reality
(with the naturalis/rationabilis distinction, ch. 107, 156.2–3 Waszink).
Calcidius describes the Parmenides as dealing primarily with the Forms
and intelligible reality (ch. 272), addressing also such questions as the mode
of participation of sensible reality in its intelligible counterpart (ch. 335:
quatenus res existentes idearum participarent similitudinem). According to

14
On the issue of the inﬂuence of Stoicism on the commentary, see ch. 12 in this study.
15
Reydams-Schils 1999. For an ethical reading of the Timaeus, see also accounts such as Plutarch, De
tranq. anim. 477C–F.
16
Ch. 120, 165.5; ch. 127, 170.10 Waszink. As Hoenig 2018b: 201–206 points out, the focus of Calcidius’
account of the demons is on their alignment with the elements, as would beﬁt a discussion on
physics.

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32 How to Read Plato’s Timaeus
a doxographical schema of Platonist interpretations of the Parmenides
preserved by Proclus,17 Calcidius (or his source) would thus fall into the
group of thinkers who interpret the Parmenides as dealing with ontological
matters, rather than mere logic. Yet while providing an ontological reading
of the Parmenides Calcidius appears not to take his interpretation beyond
the level of intelligible reality, to the notion of a radically transcendent
One, as Proclus himself and other Neoplatonists do. This is where the
Platonist Origen comes in, as I mentioned before,18 as an earlier Platonist
whose attested position is similar to Calcidius’ own.
There is a catch, however, with assuming that Calcidius endorses
a lower-level ontological interpretation of the Parmenides: it is also possible
that he holds back because he is addressing someone who is not an
advanced student of philosophy. In doing so, he would conform to the
Neoplatonist practice of adjusting the level of his discourse to his addres-
see’s abilities, not necessarily revealing all he knows. But apart from the fact
that Calcidius would then go counter to his self-avowed principle of
sharing knowledge – which is not impossible – a closer examination of
his view of the divine reveals that he does not in fact posit an all-
transcendent highest divine principle,19 and thus this type of lower-level
ontological interpretation of the Parmenides would be consistent with the
commentary’s overall approach.
The pairing of the Timaeus and the Parmenides, from Iamblichus
onwards (second half of the third century to the fourth century CE),
occupied a crucial position in an elaborate Neoplatonist curriculum for
teaching philosophy generally and Plato’s works specifically.20 But accord-
ing to that pedagogical arrangement, the Timaeus and the Parmenides
constitute the crowning and finishing course in their respective fields: the
Timaeus in physics, and the Parmenides in theology or the highest form of
knowledge. In other words, pupils following this course of study would not
delve into the Timaeus until they had reached a very advanced level of
training. Calcidius, in contrast, uses the Timaeus as a kind of general
handbook of Platonist “theory” in a broader philosophical context, for
an addressee who has limited experience with the material. As we have seen,
his commentary orders its key themes from more preliminary to more
advanced. In addition to teaching Osius about Plato’s views, this approach

17
PT 1.32–55 Saffrey and Westerink; In Parm. 630.15–645.8 Cousin.
18 19
See section 1.3 in this study. On this issue, see ch. 7 in this study.
20
A seminal article on this topic is Festugière 1971. For a good summary see also O’Meara 2003: 61–68.

2.4 Hermeneutics and Ontology

The difference between Calcidius’ and Neoplatonist readings of the
Timaeus runs deeper still than the issue of where the Timaeus would fit
into the curriculum. Calcidius, for his part, has a strict sense of sequence
and rearranges the Timaeus so that each section of his commentary reflects
a specific step in an ascent of theoretical knowledge. In terms of herme-
neutics, however, the Neoplatonist curriculum is much more complex
because, in addition to positing a sequence, it also relies on a markedly
synoptic mode of exegesis that is, in turn, anchored in a specific worldview.
The most succinct rendering of a Neoplatonist notion that establishes
the link between hermeneutics and ontology appears in Porphyry’s
Sententiae (10): “everything is in everything, but in a mode that is proper
to the being of each” (πάντα μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ οἰκείως τῇ ἑκάστου
οὐσίᾳ).21 According to Iamblichus this principle goes back even to
21
But matters are never simple with our evidence for Porphyry’s views: Proclus criticizes Porphyry for
not following through consistently on the implications of this principle and the theory of hypostases,
at In Tim. 2, I 352.5–8, 11–16 Diehl. The notion was crucial to Proclus, see also In Parm. 965.10ff.
Cousin.

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34 How to Read Plato’s Timaeus
Numenius (ap. Stob. 1, 365.15 Wachsmuth). In ontological terms the
notion implies that in Neoplatonism each level of reality – the so-called
hypostases – reflects all the other levels but according to its own specifica-
tions. For example, the intelligible level of Nous knows not only the Forms
but also sensible reality, only not in sensible terms but in a non-sensible,
intelligible manner suited to its mode of being. In the Latin tradition
Boethius would make this formula famous in his expression that things are
known not according to their own nature, but according to the nature of
the knower.22
If we now transfer this ontological ground rule to the Neoplatonist
mode of interpreting Plato, Plato’s texts can be read as revealing the very
same feature of reality. According to the Neoplatonists any given philoso-
phical discourse is situated at a certain ontological level, but from that
specific vantage point and in its specific mode, it encompasses all of reality.
Thus, while the Timaeus’ proper domain would be physics, it can also
address issues of the physical world’s connections to the divine and
intelligible realms; the Parmenides, in turn, would have the highest level
of reality as its privileged domain but could encompass, so to speak, nature
as well. The same applies to any section within a given work. As already
mentioned, the mathematical sections of the Timaeus in Proclus’ commen-
tary point to a specific mode of existence, yet are not to be dissociated from
physics and theology. Similarly, the Atlantis myth is true both in historical
and literal terms, and in its allegorical connections to higher reality (In
Tim. 1, 77.24–80.8 Diehl). Proclus interprets even the structural features of
a Platonic dialogue in terms of the different levels of reality, so that each
work becomes a universe in its own right (In Alc. 10.3ff.; see also Anon.
Prolegomena 4 Westerink). Moreover, what pertains to the relations
between the different levels of reality and to those between philosophical
discourse and reality also pertains to intra- and inter-textual relations: every
section of Plato’s work makes sense only from the vantage point of the
work in its entirety; every work needs to be read in light of Plato’s entire
oeuvre, or even in light of all of philosophy and literature such as Homer’s
poetry.
If one turns to Calcidius’ commentary with this powerful Neoplatonist
connection between hermeneutics and ontology in mind, it becomes apparent
that he does not embrace the synoptic mode of exegesis. On the issue of the
correct way of reading the Timaeus he argues explicitly against readers who blur
the sequence of topics. Early on in the commentary, in a passage that functions

22
Cons. 5.4.24–5, 6.1; see also section 16.1 in this study.

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2.4 Hermeneutics and Ontology 35
as an important hermeneutical key to the entire exposition (chs. 29–31), he
disagrees with those who would interpret the World Soul’s composition out of
indivisible and divisible Being in terms of Form and matter.23 Calcidius prefers
the reading that indivisible Being refers to a purely noetic type of soul, and
divisible Being to a basic root-soul (anima stirpea) that is the source of life and
the inseparable companion of bodies (inseparabilis corporum comes). His
motivation for this preference is what matters here, because he argues for it
in terms of sequence. It would be absurd for Plato, Calcidius states, after having
finished his discussion of the World body and having moved on to the higher
level of soul, to retrace his steps and, given that matter is a condition for
corporeality, to return to the topic of body. The excessive emphasis in Latin on
the alleged absurdity of a meandering Plato is hard to translate:
Primo omnium praeposterum esse . . . rursum ad priorem tractatum retrorsum
iri, ut de silua et corporibus mundi formaque eorum tractatus de integro fieret et
a genitura animae recederetur.
First they held that it would be utterly backwards if . . . there should again be
a return to the earlier treatment, resulting in a renewed treatment of matter,
the bodies that make up the world, and their form, and a movement away
from the generation of the soul. (ch. 31, 80.14–18, part; trans. Magee, slightly
modified)
We can hardly miss the point that Calcidius prefers a sequential reading of
the Timaeus to a synoptic approach. A Neoplatonist reader would bring the
entire Timaeus to bear on any given section. For Calcidius, by contrast,
when one talks about body, or even more specifically, the four elements,
one focuses on issues pertaining to that topic, and when one discusses the
soul, returning to a previous level of discourse would be a sign of confusion.
Once Calcidius has moved on to the third part of his commentary, he can,
without violating his own exegetical rules, introduce matter as one of
reality’s foundational principles, both because of his pedagogical schema
and because Plato himself now introduces his “third genos,” the receptacle,
into Timaeus’ account.
Beyond his rejection of a synoptic exegesis, Calcidius does not adopt the
ontological view underpinning Neoplatonist hermeneutics either. This dif-
ference in approach becomes most explicit in his discussion of the relations
between fate, human freedom, and divine Providence (ch. 162).24 There he
tells his reader that god knows each thing according to its nature, rather than
to his own: quod deus sciat quidem omnia, sed unumquidque pro natura sua

23 24
See section 5.1 in this study. On this issue, see also sections 8.4 and 16.1 in this study.

The Coherence of the Commentary

As we have seen,1 the ﬁrst part of the commentary looks very

different from the second and third parts. It deals with the ﬁrst
step in the educational program Calcidius outlines for what he calls
“theoretical” philosophy (ch. 264) by focusing on mathematics,
music, and astronomy. The diagrams accompanying this section led
to an entire tradition of their own.2 The exposition bears a strong
resemblance to Theon of Smyrna’s work, and scholars have debated
whether Theon’s treatise On Mathematics Useful for the
Understanding of Plato and Calcidius’ commentary both go back to
a now lost commentary by the Peripatetic Adrastus.3 Although it
seems highly probable that there was a single principal source behind
this particular section, it does not immediately follow from this
hypothesis that the same would hold for the remainder of the
commentary.4 Moreover, even this ﬁrst part has features that betray
Calcidius’ own hand in the ordering of his material: it shows how he
manages both to create a coherence within this part of the commen-
tary and to anticipate topics that will be treated in the other two
parts. These topics are essential to the line of continuity that runs
through the entire commentary. As different as this part of the
commentary looks from the sections following it, Calcidius has
taken great care to weave in strands that hold together the work as
a whole.

1
See section 2.2 in this study.
2
On these topics see also van der Tak 1972; Somfai 2002 and 2005; Eastwood 2007: 313–372; and
Bakhouche 1990 and 2011 I: 78–88.
3
Cf. Waszink 1962: xxxvi–xxxviii, c; see also 1964: ch. 1, building on earlier scholarship by Hiller,
Switalski, and Borghorst; Bakhouche 2011 I: 36–37 claims that Calcidius used Theon’s work rather
than Adrastus’ commentary. For a recent reassessment of the evidence, with an emphasis on the
differences between Calcidius and Theon, see Petrucci 2012b: esp. 517–8 and 2012a.
4
On the issue of Calcidius’ sources, see chs. 13 and 14 in this study.

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38 The Coherence of the Commentary
3.1 Mathematics, the World Body, and the World Soul
Calcidius opens his commentary by explaining how the Demiurge makes the
World body, starting with fire and earth (31c). Because those elements are
solid bodies, Plato himself states, we need two intermediaries, air and water.
These four elements together are meant to be arranged in a proportional
order. Calcidius (chs. 8–22) gives both arithmetical and geometrical versions
of how such proportions could be arranged, and the latter both for plane
figures (with only one intermediary) and solids (with two intermediaries).
He ultimately opts for what he calls a continuous geometrical proportion or
analogy (ch. 16): as fire stands to air, air stands to water, and water stands to
earth (ch. 22, with an echo of the Timaeus 32b5–6) – as opposed, we can
assume, to a discontinuous proportion whereby fire merely stands to air as
water stands to earth.
But with this proposal Calcidius immediately runs into the problem of
the relation between physics and mathematics.5 In one of the chapters in
which Calcidius refers to a passage in the Timaeus that falls outside of the
frame of his commentary,6 he explains that by Plato’s own account (55–56)
the mathematical structure which the Demiurge bestows on fire (a tetra-
hedron or pyramid) has nothing in common with that of earth (a cube).
(Plato indeed claims, 54b6–d3, that fire, air, and water can change into one
another because they are made of the same right-angled scalene triangle,
the half-equilateral, whereas earth cannot partake in these transformations
because it is made of right-angled isosceles triangles.)
To address this problem of mathematical incompatibility, Calcidius
avers, Plato resorts to a scheme of physical properties, whereby each
element has three properties and shares two of these with the element
next to it in the chain: fire = sharp, rare, mobile; air = blunt, rare, mobile;
water = blunt, dense, mobile; earth = blunt, dense, immobile (derived from
Timaeus 55e–56b; 61d6–62a5).7 In this manner the continuity among the
elements would be guaranteed. But such a solution, again, arguably begs
the question of the exact relation between these properties and

5
As, for instance, per the objections Aristotle famously raised against Plato’s geometrical atomism,
Gen. corr. 1.2.316a2–4; DC 3.7–8.306a1–307b24. On this topic and the response in the Neoplatonist
tradition, see Opsomer 2012. On the broader implications of cosmic harmony here and throughout
the commentary, see Hoenig forthcoming a.
6
On this issue see also section 1.3 in this study.
7
On this topic, cf. also Waszink 1964: 74–82, whose reconstruction of the sources, however, is open to
questioning, see chs. 13 and 14 in this study. Proclus, In Tim. 3, II 39.20–41 Diehl attributes this
version to ps.-Timaeus Locrus; see also Nemesius, Nat. hom. 5.51.25–52.13; Bakhouche 2011 II:
637–638, n. 66.

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3.1 Mathematics, the World Body, and the World Soul 39
mathematical proportions. The puzzle is embedded in Plato’s account
itself, which starts out with the corporeal, visible, and tangible qualities
of the elements (30b3), and mentions traces of the elements that provide
the receptacle with physical properties independently of the mathematical
configuration bestowed by the Demiurge (52d–53a). Further complicating
this problem is the fact that Calcidius himself actually refrains from
attributing a mathematical structure either to physical things or to the
World or human soul. He says repeatedly, for instance, that the structure
of the World Soul is merely like a mathematical structure.8
At this juncture, which is not very far into the commentary (ch. 23),
Calcidius already interrupts the flow of his exposition to ask how the
ordering of the world, both body and soul, relates to time.9 He alludes
for the first time to Timaeus’ prooimion and the Demiurge’s speech. In this
context he mentions the model after which the world has been made as an
image (28b7–8 and 28c5–29a3), and states that although the world has
come into being, it will be exempt from destruction (41a7–b6; see also
32c2–3, 38b6–7; 43d6–7).
Turning next from the World body to the World Soul (ch. 26),
Calcidius first discusses the latter’s composition out of the Same, sub-
stance/essence (35a1–4; substantia, translating Plato’s ousia), and the Other.
In this context he also claims that Cicero is responsible for the translation
of ousia as essentia (ch. 27, 78.2–3). This is a difficult passage in Plato’s own
account, and we will take a closer look at Calcidius’ interpretation in the
chapter on the World Soul (ch. 5). From ch. 32 on he focuses on the
mathematics related to the structure of the World Soul, giving an analysis
of its proportional structure in terms of arithmetic (chs. 32–39, with
Pythagorean elements), music, and geometry (building on number theory,
chs. 40–50, again with Pythagorean elements, using the lambda figure to
render the structure of the soul). Of these three disciplines, he claims,
geometry is the most foundational (ch. 32, 82.2–3; though in ch. 53, he
claims numbers are most foundational). Calcidius tells his readers right
away that these proportions refer not so much to the Soul itself as to its
relation with the body (ch. 33). Via the notion of the monad he establishes
a connection between the number one (arithmetic) and the point (geo-
metry, ch. 33, 83.9–10).10 Chs. 51–55 constitute a summary statement of the
composition and functions of the World Soul in which Calcidius draws his

8 9
See also section 5.2 in this study. See ch. 4 in this study.
10
See also ch. 38, 88.1–4; 53, 102.2–4.

3.2 Coherence of the First Part of the Commentary

Despite these tensions, however, Calcidius has also clearly made an effort to
unify the commentary, both within this ﬁrst part and between it and the
remainder of his exposition. In his introductory chapters, as we have seen,12
Calcidius indicates that he wants to come to the aid especially of readers who
do not have much experience, if any, with the mathematical disciplines or the
technical forms of knowledge he has grouped under the umbrella of artiﬁciosa

11
A more detailed outline of that section can be found in Waszink’s edition 1962: xxx–xxxi, and in
Eastwood 2007: 427–432.
12
See ch. 1 in this study.

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3.2 Coherence of the First Part of the Commentary 41
ratio. He reminds us explicitly of this purpose of the commentary at the
beginning of the long excursus on the heavenly bodies: “Again, in order that
a means of understanding may be passed along to those who are inexperienced
in astronomy, those subjects which pertain to the present discussion will be
briefly and clearly explained according to their nature” (ch. 59, 106.17–19).13
Here the “clearly” (dilucide) alludes to the obscurity problem mentioned in
the introductory chapters. Moreover, as mentioned already,14 the beginning of
the second part of the commentary also refers to the artificiosae rationes and
Calcidius closes this circle by returning to this same theme at the end of the
exposition as we have it.
In order to frame the long excursus Calcidius also relies on the Timaeus
in a distinctive manner, by reusing the same passages. In the transition
chapters, chs. 52–58, he first combines two key passages (ch. 52):
(a) 36b6–c2, in which Plato describes how the Demiurge sliced the
compound of the World Soul in two along its length, created an
X-figure, and then bent back the ends to create two circles;
and, skipping a few lines (quibusdam interpositis),
(b) 37a2–b3, a recapitulation of the structure of the World Soul with its
cognition of things pertaining to the Same and the Other. (This
rendering of Plato’s account deviates enough from the original to read
more like a paraphrase – Bakhouche 2011 II: 606; see also section 5.2
in this study.)
In the subsequent chapters of the transition, Calcidius expands on both
of those core texts:
(b) is repeated and expanded first in ch. 56, to 37a2–c5, to cover the full
section on the cognitive functions of the World Soul (but, again, in
a quite abridged and simplified version compared to Plato’s original).
(a) is repeated and expanded, in ch. 58, to 36b6–d7, to include the
information that the movement of the outer circle would be the
movement of the Same, the movement of the inner circle that of the
Other; and that the sixfold division of the inner circle provides orbits
for the seven planets, which move according to different speeds.
One can easily detect the reason for Calcidius’ inversion of the passages
when he uses them the second time: the passage about the division of the
13
Rursum quo etiam expertibus astronomiae assecutio tradatur aliquatenus, ea quae ad praesentem
tractatum pertinent breuiter dilucideque, prout natura eorum est, explicabuntur.
14
See section 2.2 in this study.

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42 The Coherence of the Commentary
inner circle of the Other provides the ideal transition to the long excursus
about the heavenly bodies.
When Calcidius returns to the letter of Plato’s account, as he explicitly
announces at the start of ch. 91, he repeats the core passages for a third time,
although in this context they are no longer used to introduce his main
themes, but are fully integrated into the flow of the commentary, with
expositions and diagrams attached. And thus we now also get the passages
which he had initially left out:
36d8–e5, on how the World Soul is fitted to the World body (in ch. 98)
and
36e5–37a2, on the World Soul as incorporeal (incorporea; Calcidius’
translation has “invisible,” inuisibilis) and as the most perfect of all the
things made by the Demiurge (ch. 102).
So, in sum, he uses the same passages first to give a more systematic account
of the World Soul, then to create a transition to the excursus, and finally to
resume the thread of his commentary on Plato’s work.
In addition to relying on passages from his translation of the Timaeus to
structure his exposition, Calcidius regularly provides summary passages to
ensure that his readers are still following his main points. Chs. 51–55
constitute such a summary, followed by the transition, Chs. 56–57, to
the excursus on the heavenly bodies. In these chapters Calcidius steps away
from a detailed exposition of the structure of the World Soul to ask why
Plato would attribute such a structure to the soul of the universe and then
gives a twofold answer: the World Soul is arranged as it is so that (a) it
could know all things (cognitive aspect) and (b) it could take care of all
things (providential aspect).15 One oddity in his discussion of the soul as
a self-mover is that he simply copies a Latin version of a passage from
Plato’s Phaedrus (ch. 57, 245c5–246a2; Bakhouche 2011 II: 672–675), pre-
ceded and followed by passages from the Timaeus, so that we get three
chapters that consist almost entirely of translations of Plato. He reminds
his reader twice (ch. 51, 100.3–5; ch. 53) that so far he has discussed the
components that have gone into the structure of the World Soul (indivi-
sible and divisible Being, Same, and Other) and addressed its relation to
mathematical structures (including music).
Similarly, after the excursus on the heavenly bodies and before he picks
up the thread of Plato’s account again, in ch. 92, Calcidius briefly reminds

15
For a more detailed discussion of these two functions, see section 5.2 in this study.

3.3 Unity of the Commentary

In addition to the features that give the first part of the commentary its
internal coherence, that section of Calcidius’ work also provides important
connections with the remainder, which tie together the commentary as
a whole. For instance, as Anna Somfai (2003 and 2004: 215–216) has argued
convincingly, the continuous geometrical proportion (or “analogy”) on
which he relies in his explanation of the construction of the World body
serves as a leitmotif for Calcidius’ worldview throughout the commentary.16
This ratio resurfaces in his small treatise on demons,17 in which
Calcidius makes a similar claim about the principle of plenitude (ch.
120). In this instance he first applies the properties immortal/mortal and
patibilis/impatibilis to delineate the whole category of demons as inter-
mediary between the heavenly divine beings, who are immortal and not
liable to passions, and human beings, who are mortal and subject to
passions, indicating that the demons are immortal but liable to passions
(ch. 131; with an explicit reference to his earlier discussion of means in
relation to the World body). Next he posits a second intermediary within
the category of demons: demons assigned to ether (which in this schema,
derived from ps.-Plato, Epinomis, comes after fire) are invisible and the
least contaminated by passion; demons located in air are also invisible, but
are less pure; and finally, demons located in water are not always invisible,
can assume different shapes, and can harm human beings (they are used by
god to punish humans).

16
Christina Hoenig develops a similar argument for the notion of harmony (forthcoming a).
17
Chs. 127–136 (see especially ch. 129, 172.10–11); but also chs. 131–132. For a fuller discussion of these
passages see den Boeft 1977.

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44 The Coherence of the Commentary
But is the continuity in the commentary provided by “analogy” reason-
ing disrupted when at a later stage in his argument Calcidius returns to the
relations between the elements? In his discussion of matter he relies on
different properties from the ones he has mentioned in the first part of the
commentary. Instead of using three properties, as he had done before, he
now invokes pairs (chs. 317–318): fire is dry and hot, air is hot and wet,
water is wet and cold, and earth is cold and dry.18 Trying to reconcile these
two approaches, Somfai (2004: 216–217) makes the plausible suggestion
that the second description applies to the state of the elements “before” the
ordering influence of the Demiurge, whereas the first one represents the
outcome of this ordering influence. Finally, Calcidius returns explicitly to
the method of analogy in the concluding chapter of the extant commen-
tary, with its closing reflection on the necessity of a knowledge of the
sciences.
With the question of the relation of the world to time, after his discus-
sion of the construction of the World body, Calcidius raises an issue that is
relevant for any interpretation of the Timaeus as a whole. Which compo-
nents in the make-up of the world exist independently of one another, and
which are dependent on the ordering influence of the Demiurge? Although
the question of time pertains first and foremost to the World body and the
World Soul, each of which owes its structure to the causal agency of the
Demiurge, it is also highly relevant for the role of matter: whether or not
matter exists independently as one of the foundational building blocks of
the world is itself open to debate, as the third part of the commentary
clearly attests.19 Accordingly Calcidius builds an explicit reference to
a fuller discussion of matter into the first part of his commentary (end of
ch. 107), as a topic that would be rationabilis rather than naturalis, by
which, I submit, he means that it pertains to a higher, metaphysical, as we
would call it, reflection, according to the pedagogical program he has set
out for himself.20 The claim he makes here, that matter in itself is in no
substance because it is defined as potentiality (possibilitas), anticipates and
is in agreement with the position he will eventually endorse in the sub-
treatise on matter.

18
These are the Aristotelian properties from the tradition of interpreting Gen. corr. 2.4.
19
On the issue of matter, see chs. 10 and 11 in this study.
20
Pace Waszink 1984: 365, who claims that the term rationabilis entails that the topic would fall
outside of the scope of the commentary altogether, given that the Timaeus is a treatise on nature
(Preface ch. 6 and ch. 272). As we have seen already (section 2.3), rationabilis, like epopticus, can be
a relative notion used to indicate that one topic is on a more advanced level than another.

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3.3 Unity of the Commentary 45
But it is really in his first discussion of the composition of the World
Soul (chs. 27–31), which we will examine more closely (ch. 5), that
Calcidius creates an arc for the entire commentary. In this passage
Calcidius reports on a debate about the meaning of indivisible Being or
essence and of divisible Being, which both contribute to the construction
of the World Soul. As we have seen (section 2.4), one group of interpreters
equates indivisible Being with the Forms and divisible Being with matter.
Others, with whom Calcidius aligns himself, see indivisible Being as some
kind of higher, noetic soul, whereas they interpret divisible Being as
referring to a lower soul, an inseparable companion of bodies and a life-
principle. When Calcidius discusses Numenius’ position in greater detail
near the end of the commentary (chs. 295–299), it becomes apparent that
Numenius would fall under the heading of those who posit two primordial
souls, a higher, and a lower, evil one. In the conclusion of his exposition on
matter (ch. 352), however, Calcidius ends up parting ways with Numenius’
view that the primary cause of evil resides with the lower soul.21
Several other features of Calcidius’ discussion of the World Soul also
anticipate later parts of his commentary. For instance, his claim that the stars
are the equivalent of reason and the planets of spirit and appetite (ch. 95,
148.9–11) anticipates the connection between the World Soul and the human
soul.22 Similarly, Calcidius’ comment that the sun is like a vital principle and
the heart in the World Soul (ch. 100) does not acquire its full meaning until
we get to his sub-treatise on the human soul. In yet another example, a brief
allusion to the effect that the motions of the heavenly bodies can have on
events on earth (ch. 76), for which there is a parallel in Theon of Smyrna’s
treatise, functions as an anticipation of the sub-treatise on fate.23
The most striking foreshadowing of later sections of the commentary
occurs in a description of the role of the divine as monad, or the apex of the
lambda-figure used to render the structure of the World Soul:
[No figure is more suited than the lambda with an apex.] The point I am
making is that no shape is more suitable than this one, in which the unity
placed at the top is seen to hold the place of the summit or pinnacle, so that
through it as a kind of conduit, so to speak, a certain bountiful river, as it
were, might flow as if from the depths of the perennial fount of provident
intelligence and the unity itself be understood to be mind, intelligence, or
the craftsman god himself. For as the origin of numbers, providing from
itself being for all things and itself embracing both the simple and manifold

21 22
See ch. 13 in this study. On this issue see section 6.4 in this study.
23
Discussed in ch. 8 in this study.

24
Nullam dico esse aptiorem figuram quam est haec in qua singularitas cacumini superimposita
summitatem atque arcem obtinere consideratur, ut per eam uelut emissaculum quoddam tamquam
e sinu fontis perennis prouidae intellegentiae quasi quidam largus amnis efflueret ipsaque singular-
itas mens siue intellegentia uel ipse deus opifex intellegatur esse. Cum enim sit origo numerorum
omnibusque ex se substantiam subministret rationesque eorum tam simplices quam multiplicatas
ipsa contineat, ceteris numeris incrementis imminutionibusque mutatis atque ex propria natura
recedentibus sola inconcusso iure est atque in statu suo perseuerat semper eadem, semper immut-
abilis et singularitas semper, quem ad modum diuina omnia quae nulla temporis progressione
mutantur suntque semper impetibili felicitate.
25
Discussed more fully in ch. 7 of this study.
26
Waszink, in the note to this passage in his edition (see also Waszink 1964: 20 n. 1), claims, following
van Winden 1959: 105–106 (see also 43), that this passage shows the influence of Numenius. But as
we will see (ch. 13 in this study), this claim needs to be nuanced considerably.

Time and the Universe

Whether Plato intended the world as we know it to have had a literal

beginning constitutes one of the most important debates in Antiquity
about the Timaeus.1 That time comes about with the world, and more
precisely with the making of the heavenly bodies, does not settle this
question in the negative, because an unmeasured ﬂow or duration of some
kind would still allow for succession in terms of “before” and “after” prior to
the fully structured ﬂow of time, as Cicero’s spokesperson the Epicurean
Velleius had already stated in his De natura deorum (1.21; see also Aristotle,
Phys. 223a21–29).2 In other words there still could be some (unmeasured)
duration “before” the Demiurge turns to the task of ordering the world and
the world could have a literal beginning in that sense.
Aristotle rejected what he interpreted as Plato’s notion that time had
a beginning by coming to be together with the universe (Phys. 251b16–18;
DC 279b32–280a2). But most interpreters in Antiquity held the view that
Plato used time designations merely as an educational device in order to
talk about the eternal structure of the world.3 Plutarch and Atticus were
notable exceptions,4 and recently scholars have tried again to make the case
for an actual beginning (Sedley 2007: 98–107; Broadie 2012: 243–277).
Calcidius, so it appears, sides squarely with those who do not espouse

1
For a good overview, cf. Baltes 1976–1978. See also the broader context provided by Boys-Stones 2018:
ch. 7.
2
See also Zeyl 2000: xxiv, going back to Vlastos 1965: 409–414. Sorabji 2006: 272–275 provides
a helpful succinct overview.
3
Such a position is already attested for Speusippus (F41, 61, 72 Tarán) and Xenocrates (F54, 68
Heinze), probably coming to Plato’s rescue against a criticism such as the one leveled against him by
Aristotle (DC 1.10–12); see also section 1.1 in this study.
4
Mentioned together by Proclus, In Tim. 2, I 276.30–277.1 Diehl = Atticus F19 des Places: Plutarch
and Atticus make a distinction between unmeasured time before the ordering of the universe, and
ordered time coming about with the universe. Cf. the position which Calcidius, via Numenius,
attributes to the Pythagoras, ch. 295, 297.11–16 (discussed in ch. 13 in this study). But as Sedley 2007:
107, n. 30 has reminded us, there were other Platonists who endorsed a literal reading; see also Philo,
Aet. 13.

4.1 Translation and Commentary in Tension?

Before we turn our attention to the manner in which the commentary
addresses this question,5 however, we ﬁrst need to address an oddity in
Calcidius’ translation, which may, at ﬁrst sight, run counter to the
claim that he indeed espoused the position of an eternal world, without
beginning or end. As Alain Galonnier (2009) has noted, whereas Plato
deliberately plays on a double register of temporal and a-temporal
meanings of the same words in his initial expression of the question
(28b6–8), Calcidius in his translation has rewritten the account in an
unambiguously temporal sense.
Plato’s Greek version goes as follows:
πότερον ἦν ἀεί, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τινος
ἀρξάμενος. γέγονεν·
In Greek archē can mean both “starting point” (or “principle”) and
“beginning” in a temporal sense (just as initium in Latin can have both
temporal and a-temporal senses); similarly, gegonen (from the verb
gignesthai) can mean “has become” in a temporal sense, or, it can mean
“is in a permanent state of becoming” (Baltes 1996).
Here, by contrast, is Calcidius’ rendering in his translation:
Item mundus fueritne semper citra exordium temporis an sit originem
sortitus ex tempore, considerandum – factus est.
Also, one has to consider whether the world has always been, beyond any
beginning of time, or whether it has drawn its origin from time. It was
made.
The double mention of time (tempus) pulls the entire line clearly in the
ambit of a temporal interpretation, which carries over into the factus est.
So, are the translation, which renders the Timaeus passage in a temporal
sense, and the commentary, which argues away that temporal dimension,
pushing their readers in opposite directions, as Galonnier has suggested?

5
On this topic, see also Rudolph 2000.

4.2 Time and Causality

How, then, does Calcidius address the question of the world’s beginning in
his commentary? As mentioned already, it is the first systematic treatment
of a question that interrupts the flow of his exegesis of specific passages
about the construction of the World body. He discusses the topic of time
(chs. 23–25; Baltes 1976–1978: 172–184) to advance three reasons why the
law that generation is followed by corruption and birth by death (cum quae
fiunt quaeque nascuntur facta dissoluantur, nata occidant) does not apply to
the world,8 even though it is said to have been made, and, moreover, made
as a corporeal entity. The first reason pertains to its maker (a quo factus sit),
the second to its composition (ex quibus constet), and the third to its model
(ad quod exemplum institutus). This way of phrasing the question is in itself
still compatible with the notion that the world has a beginning in time but

6
Hoenig 2014; see also Hoenig 2018b: 181–194, which provides an overview of the terminology
pertaining to time which Calcidius uses in his translation of the Timaeus.
7
As discussed in ch. 5 in this study.
8
In his edition, Waszink (followed by Bakhouche 2003: 19) claims that this phrase is an echo of the
nature of Christ as defined by the Council of Nicaea, and hence an indication that Calcidius was
a Christian. But this is an overinterpretation: apart from the fact that there is no direct connection
between the topic at hand and the second person of the Trinity, the combination of fieri and nasci is
here the result of the structure of Calcidius’ argument, which relies on the contrast between things in
nature (which come about, nasci) and things made by god (fieri), as Baltes 1976–1978: 172, n. 327
points out (see also ch. 15 in this study). For similar language, see also Apuleius, Mund. 24.343: [the
Demiurge] . . . genitor est omnium, qui ad conplendum mundum nati factique sunt, Hoenig 2018b: 133.

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52 Time and the Universe
will go on to exist forever. Calcidius, however, opts for a radically different
approach.
In addressing his ﬁrst line of inquiry, concerning the maker of the world,
Calcidius starts from the assumption that all things that are, are works of
god, of nature, or of human beings who imitate nature. Because nature and
time coexist (par enim et aequaeuum natale naturae ac temporis), the works
of nature, which grow out of seeds, are bound by the temporal processes of
birth and decay. God, however, is outside of time altogether, and he works
not through seeds, but through a causality that answers to divine
Providence (causae . . . perspicuae diuinae prouidentiae; here the importance
of Providence in Calcidius’ worldview again asserts itself, discussed more
fully in ch. 8 in this study); his effect on the world is not temporal but
causal (origo causatiua, non temporaria). And just as god is eternal in the
sense of being outside of time altogether, so are his causes, and thus, the
argument goes, the works brought about by this type of causality, such as
the world in its entirety, are eternal too.
To register the point that divine eternity has nothing to do with time
whatsoever, Calcidius in this context already anticipates his fuller discus-
sion of time (tempus) as an image (simulacrum) of eternity (aeuum), to
which he will turn in due course (chs. 105–107). So, whereas the Timaeus
literally posits a beginning for the world, yet claims that it will go on to
exist forever, Calcidius here explicitly opts for an interpretation that makes
the world considered as a whole exempt from the process of time;9 time
applies only to processes within the world.10
Let us now return to Calcidius’ translation of the earlier passage from the
Timaeus (28b6–8), keeping in mind the solution that he has proposed in
ch. 23:
Item mundus fueritne semper citra exordium temporis an sit originem
sortitus ex tempore, considerandum – factus est.
Also, one has to consider whether the world has always been, beyond any
beginning of time, or whether it has drawn its origin from time. It was
made.
The commentary explains that the world has indeed been made, in the
sense of depending on a higher cause. But it has not drawn its origin from
time (originem sortitus ex tempore); it has a causal origin, not a temporal
9
In agreement with Baltes 1976–1978: 176–177, and pace Bakhouche 2011 II: 640–641, and 2003, who
claims that Calcidius here holds on to the notion of a beginning of the world; see also Bakhouche
2011 II: 643 n. 97, for ch. 25 discussed below.
10
See also ch. 302, about sensible things in time, and chs. 321 and 329.

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4.2 Time and Causality 53
one. Thus, considered as a whole it is beyond the condition of time
(fueritne semper citra exordium temporis).
As Christina Hoenig (2018a: 443–446) reminds us, Calcidius has actually
prepared the ground in his translation of 29b2 for his first argument against
a literal interpretation of the Timaeus in ch. 23, which relies on a distinction
between different kinds of causes. Whereas Plato underlines the impor-
tance of finding any principle/beginning (παντός, 29b2), Calcidius appears
to focus his translation on the origin of the world (by not rendering the
παντός). Moreover, whereas Plato’s original talks about the affinity of
different forms of discourse (logoi) with their subject matter, Calcidius
renders this as an affinity between different types of causes and that of
which they are the cause (causae, quae cur unaquaeque res sit ostendunt,
earundem rerum consanguineae sunt).11 His first argument for exempting the
world considered as a whole from the condition of time (ch. 23: nulla
temporis lege teneatur) relies, precisely, on the difference between the divine
causality of its maker, who stands outside of time altogether, and the type
of causality we see at work in nature.
Calcidius’ second argument (ch. 24) is more clearly derived from the
Timaeus itself (32c5–34a7), and proves only that the world will never be
destroyed (it does not focus on its origin). Given that the elements have
been completely used up in the making of the World body, there is nothing
left outside of the kosmos that could undermine its integrity. Nothing flows
in or out of the universe, Calcidius avers, and the elements are continu-
ously recycled within the kosmos, in a flux that does not undermine it
internally either (but in this context he leaves out Plato’s claims that the
world is unique, that it has a spherical shape, and that it does not need arms
or legs, nor sense-organs, given that it has no outside with which to
interact; Bakhouche 2011 II: 638–639).
The third argument (ch. 25) relies on the relation between the kosmos
and its intelligible model: the latter is outside of time, like god, and exists
eternally, and processes of the world imitate this feature of eternity by
existing through all of time (Hoenig 2014). In contrast to his earlier point
that the world as made by god is exempt from time, Calcidius here claims
that the sensible world does exist throughout time (per tempora); presum-
ably he is now considering the world from within, so to speak. The relation
between a-temporal eternity and an infinite extension of time can also be
derived directly from Plato’s account, and more specifically from his
discussion of time and eternity (37c6–38c5; hence Calcidius repeats this

11
See also Bakhouche 2011 II: 601, n. 275, with a reference to Baltes and Dörrie 1996: 358, n. 1.

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54 Time and the Universe
argument in similar terms in ch. 105). But Calcidius is explicit about
extending time into the past as much as into the future: as an image of
a-temporal eternity – that is, of the intelligible model that always is (76.6,
semper est) – the world always was, is, and will be (semper fuit est erit).12
Plato’s original here does not have “forever” (ἀεί, or an equivalent
thereof), but states that the world has been, is, and will be for all time
(38c2: διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον), a formulation that is compatible
with the idea that measured time has a definite starting point and that the
world merely has existed for as long as time has. Calcidius’ translation has
semper for the model (Plato has πάντα αἰῶνα) and per omne tempus for the
world, but his commentary uses semper for both, eliding the difference
between the two. Moreover, in Plato’s context, if we interpret the account
literally, time itself has a beginning with the making of the planets (38c4:
ἵνα γεννηθῇ χρόνος), a notion which Calcidius has omitted from his
exposition here. He does discuss the generation of time (genitura temporis)
when he gets to the relevant passage from the Timaeus in the sequence of
his commentary (ch. 108, see also ch. 101, on time being generated together
with the world, and the “indefatigable and unceasing life” of the World
Soul being “passed along,” propagata, to time and its course), but by then
he has already established that “generation” here is not to be understood in
a literal sense.
Moving from body to soul, Calcidius reinforces his point of a non-literal
interpretation of generation in the first chapter about the construction of
the World Soul (ch. 26). Whereas Plato focuses on the problem of
sequence in discussing soul after body, even though the former is more
venerable and thus “older” than the latter, Calcidius again directs his reader
immediately to the problem of generation. After establishing the connec-
tion between the “making of the world” and the “making of the soul,”
Calcidius states a general interpretive principle: the Timaeus is the only one
of Plato’s accounts in which he talks about the “generation” of eternal
things (aeternarum rerum genituras), but Plato adopts such temporal terms
merely as a concession to his audience, and thus for pedagogical reasons,
Calcidius avers.13 This pedagogical tactic is necessary, first, because some
people may think that the excellence of the god is being diminished if we
posit that some things are co-eternal with him, since we have the habit of

12
See also Philo, Aet. 53.
13
See also section 1.1 in this study. On the speciﬁc claim that Plato describes eternal things as generated
for the sake of teaching, see Taurus, as recorded in Philoponus, Aet. 6.21, 186.21–187.1; see also his
series of reasons as to why Plato would have adopted this method, 187.3–189.9. For a fresh assessment
of Taurus’ position see Petrucci 2018.

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4.2 Time and Causality 55
associating status with precedence in time, as in the case of a father and his
offspring, or of founders and their cities. These people confuse precedence
in time with the dignity of preeminence, and god is superior in virtue of the
latter, not the former. A second group of people has a tendency to ascribe
the authority over a task more to the work of hands than to a disposition of
the mind. A third group mistakenly considers divine nature to be similar to
human nature, and cannot envision anything existing that has not been
generated (or been “born”). So, to summarize Calcidius’ argument,
because of limitations in ordinary understandings of the divine, of author-
ity and preeminence, and of the possible modes of existence, Plato adopts
a discourse that would be easier to grasp on an immediately accessible level.
In this context Calcidius reminds us of the main reason why he does not
endorse the position that the world could have a beginning in time without
being liable to destruction: to be generated in this sense inevitably leads to
destruction; there are no exceptions (77.16; an echo of ch. 23, 73.7–8) –
more on this below. As we have seen, in order to be eternal the world as
a whole has to be exempt altogether from this law of temporality.
In the sub-treatise on the human soul Calcidius returns to the topic of
the “making” of soul (ch. 228): if the soul is made somehow out of
indivisible Being, divisible Being, the Same, and the Other (and this
mixture goes into the rational part of the human soul as well), would the
soul then not be a composite entity (composita/compositio)? But being
composite, he goes on, entails being generated at a certain moment in
time (quod ex aliquo initio temporis natum factumue sit; with the same use of
nasci and ﬁeri as in ch. 23), which does not apply to soul:
So when Plato says that soul came into being and was made and put together
by the craftsman god, he does not mean that it takes the starting point for its
being from a ﬁxed point in time, or that a previously nonexistent soul
subsequently began to be, but that it has a structure analogous to that
associated with coming-to-be and a process of composition; and when he
says that it is without a process of generation or composition, he explicitly
denies it any beginning point or any origin in the process of composition.
(ch. 228, 244.6–10)14
That the generation of the world should not be taken at face value is a view
Calcidius consistently adopts throughout the commentary. When he

14
Igitur cum dicit Plato natam animam et ab opiﬁce deo factam compositamque, nec ex certo tempore
initium substantiae dicit trahere nec ut, quae non fuerit ante, post esse coeperit, sed quod habeat
rationem ortus et compositionis; cum uero sine genitura et sine compositione dicit, aperte nullum ei
dat initium nec ullam originem compositionis.

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56 Time and the Universe
discusses the Demiurge’s speech to the younger gods (Timaeus 41a), he
affirms again that the younger gods made by him “do not exist by virtue of
any process of birth in time but because of the wish of the highest god,
which traverses the whole of time from its origins” (ch. 139: non enim sunt
ex ullo ortu temporario sed ex uoluntate summi dei emensa omnem temporum
antiquitatem; see also ch. 201). Whereas Plato’s point is that the
Demiurge’s will constitutes the strongest bond possible, strong enough
to prevent the younger gods’ (and by implication, the universe’s) destruc-
tion, Calcidius in his interpretation of that passage lifts the younger gods
above the framework of time altogether. Similarly, in the sub-treatise on
matter he explicitly approves of Aristotle’s notion of an eternal universe
without beginning or end, which he interprets as in perfect harmony with
Plato’s position (ch. 283).
There is a possible exception to Calcidius’ otherwise consistent position
that the universe is eternal in his discussion about the relation between
time and eternity (ch. 105), where he claims that the sensible world has
been made in a single instant (uno eodemque momento mundus exaedifica-
batur sensilis, Reydams-Schils 2010: 503). One could detect at least two
aspects to positing a starting point for the world: one, that it has
a beginning, the other, that its ordering took up a certain amount of
time in a sequential process. One can deny the second, by claiming that
the world was made all at once, while still endorsing the first, by holding
the view that the world had a beginning; Calcidius rejects both views.
Calcidius’ statement about the world being made in a single instant does
not contradict his claim about its eternity if we assume that the instant he
has in mind does not refer to a moment in time, but to the divine eternal
present, and this usage is attested for Numenius, Philo, Plutarch,
Porphyry, and later Platonists.15 It is not likely that he means at the first
moment of time, in the sense that the world came about together with time,
even though that is how the later tradition tries to reconcile his account
with Genesis (Gersh 2010: 897). First, as we have seen, for Calcidius it is
nature, as a term that encompasses processes within the world, that is
coeval with time (ch. 24, 74.3–4: par enim et aequaeuum natale naturae ac
15
Numenius F5 des Places, on Being: ἔστιν ἀεὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ὁρισμένῳ, τῷ ἐνεστῶτι μόνῳ, O’Brien 2015:
141; Philo, Opif. 13, 28; Plutarch, De E 393A–B. Porphyry and Proclus explicitly use the adjective
“non-temporal,” cf. Sent. 44: ἐν ἀδιαστάτῳ τῷ νῦν ἀχρόνῳ παραστήματι; Proclus, In Tim. 2,
I 395.10–21 Diehl (use of ἀχρόνως combined with ἀθρόως); 3, II 102.6–9 Diehl: Ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἀθρόως
πάντα καὶ διαιωνίως παράγει). See Plato, Parm. 152e. (The reference to an alleged view of Porphyry
attested in Philoponus, Aet. 6.8, 148.25–149.11, Köckert 2009: 186, is less helpful in this context,
because the examples mentioned, lightning and the snapping of fingers, clearly occur in time.) See
also Sallustius, Diis mund. 4 and 13.

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4.2 Time and Causality 57
temporis); time is an internal mechanism of the universe, but the universe
in its entirety is not bound by it. Second, Calcidius extends time infinitely
into the past as well as into the future.
Calcidius’ stance on the relation between the universe and time allows
his readers to discern which aspects of his universe he considers to be
primordial and coexisting – and grasping this point is essential to a correct
understanding of the commentary. It would not come as a surprise that he
considers the Demiurge god and the intelligible model of the universe as
primordial. But as we shall see (ch. 9 in this study), in keeping with the
Timaeus, matter is primordial as well, and thus not dependent on or
derived from any divine principle, not even in a non-temporal, causal
sense. In ch. 31 he extends his range of the fundamental principles of the
universe to include (a) both the higher, noetic soul and the lower, vital
soul, and (b) “the power of body”:
[They held that] there always existed the power of both soul and body, and
that god did not make the world from things that did not exist but rather
gave order to things that existed without order or limit, and hence that he
conferred order on things that existed rather than generated things that did
not, . . . (ch. 31, 80.21–22; trans. Magee, slightly modified)16
The Demiurge ordered the disorderly motions of the lower soul by
bringing them under the influence of intellect (in the World Soul),
Calcidius goes on to say, and he imposed order on the erratic motions
of bodies. In sum, if we translate the temporal language into causality,
as Calcidius wants his readers to do, the fact that matter and other
components of the universe existed “before” the ordering intervention
of the Demiurge means that these coexist independently with the
divine side of reality; and the intervention of the Demiurge has to
be reinterpreted as the ordered universe’s causal dependence on
a higher, divine agency.
The answer to the question how the lower soul and corporeality
relate to matter has to wait until the very end of the commentary. But
by combining information from different passages in the Timaeus
(notably 30a; 53b: the last section of this translation, and 69b–c2,
which falls outside the frame of the translation and commentary)
Calcidius has already laid the groundwork for this answer. Thus, the
claim that the Demiurge did not make the world out of things that

16
fuisse enim semper tam animae quam corporis uim nec deum ex his quae non erant fecisse mundum
sed ea quae erant sine ordine ac modo ordinasse; itaque potius ea quae existebant exornasse quam
generasse quae non erant.

On Soul and Souls (1)

The World Soul

In his rendering of the construction of the World Soul, Calcidius makes the
Timaeus more accessible to his audience and develops themes that will run
through the commentary in its entirety. As mentioned already, many
features of the World Soul as Calcidius sees it in his translation and the
ﬁrst part of his exposition come into their own only in the course of the
commentary; the connection with his mini-treatise on the human soul (chs.
213–235), which we will examine next, is particularly revealing in this respect.

5.1 Making the World Soul

After his discussion of the relation between the World Soul and time,1
Calcidius turns his attention to the making of the World Soul (chs. 27–28)
with a discussion of Being, Same, and Other (Timaeus 35a). He belongs to
a tradition that interprets the World Soul as consisting, ﬁrst, of an inter-
mediary between indivisible Being and divisible Being, second, of the Same
(as aligning with indivisible Being), and third, of the Other (as aligning
with divisible Being). Just as there are two kinds of Being, Calcidius argues,
“nature” (Plato does use φύσις here) is also dual and consists of the Same
and the Other. With regard to the latter pair he does not assume an actual
intermediary between Same and Other, but rather posits that the World
Soul has a nature that partakes of both. Hence he talks in some contexts
about the World Soul as consisting of four components (indivisible Being,
divisible Being, Same and Other; as in ch. 53, beginning and end, 54 end),
and in others, of three (Being or essence, Same and Other, as in ch. 92;
102). Calcidius’ translation reﬂects this reading, with his addition of ex
gemina biformique natura (that “nature is double,” Bychkov 1995), which is
Calcidius’ own explanation, rather than a literal translation of Plato’s
account.

1
Discussed in ch. 4 of this study.

Calcidius’ Four-Component Model

Indivisible Being Nature: Same
//
World Soul (consists of) > [intermediary Being] [partaking of]
//
Divisible Being Nature: Other

Plato’s Six-Component Model

Indivisible Being Same Other

World Soul > [intermediary] [intermediary] [intermediary]

Divisible Being Same Other

As we will see, Plato’s model is also at work in his quite complex

description of the cognitive functions of the World Soul. On the other
hand, it has to be admitted that Plato, too, privileges the use of the Same for
the intelligible realm and of the Other for the sensible realm, as when, for
instance, he calls the outer circle of the World Soul, which contains the ﬁxed
stars, the circle of the Same, and the inner one, which gets divided into seven
circles for the planets, the circle of the Other (Reydams-Schils 1999: 25–26).
But what does Plato mean by the distinction between indivisible and
divisible Being in the ﬁrst place? Here (chs. 29–31) Calcidius renders what he
calls a debate among the “ancients” (ueteres), and for now, until we address
the question of his source(s), I would like to hold on to the hypothesis that
these passages, which provide a key to the entire commentary,2 result from
his own attempt to create some kind of order among a range of views. As we

2
See also section 3.3 in this study. Parts of this chapter are derived from Reydams-Schils 2006.

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5.1 Making the World Soul 61
have seen, he presents us with two options (ch. 29). According to one
interpretation, indivisible Being would refer to the Forms, and divisible
Being to matter, as the “origin and source of bodies” (quae uelut exordium
et fons est corporum). Plutarch helps us to understand who may be behind this
interpretation: Crantor and Posidonius (with the latter we face the compli-
cation, of course, whether a Stoic can be said to have endorsed something
analogous to Platonic ideas).3
The interpretation Calcidius himself endorses, however, is that indivi-
sible Being refers to some type of radically transcendent and purely noetic
type of soul, and divisible Being to a rudimentary life force, uitalis uigor,
that is the inseparable companion of bodies, which he also calls a “root
soul” (anima stirpea):
Or by “indivisible” Being does Plato instead mean a higher level of soul which is
subject to no embodiment and whose venerable purity is inviolable by any bodily
contagion, and by “divisible” Being the soul that provides vital force not only to
all forms of animal (animalibus) but also to plants and trees, so that a third,
rational kind of soul might be blended from the two, to prevent the bodies,
namely, animals (animalia), that received life from being completely mute and
without reason, and there might additionally be a kind of animal (animantium)
which in its capacity for reason, learning, and intellect would venerate its author
in contemplating the wondrous plan and disposition of the divine work that is
the world? (ch. 29, 79.14–23; trans. Magee, slightly modified)4
The first problem which this reading raises is the status of plants: the
existence of a “root” soul would imply that plants have souls too, and the
passage just quoted might suggest as much. If that were the case, Calcidius
would not be entirely consistent: in the treatise on soul we read that only
animals have souls (ch. 225, 240.17), which would pose a problem for the
extra-corporeal and noetic soul as well.5 This oscillation reflects the

3
Plutarch, De an. procr. 1012D, 1012F, 1013B–C, 1022E, 1023B–D = Posidonius F141a Edelstein and
Kidd; cf. also the ps.-Timaeus Locrus 94a, 95e, 97e; cf. Cherniss’ notes in the Loeb edition, and
Ferrari and Baldi 2002.
4
an potius indiuiduam Plato substantiam censeat eminentiorem animam, quae nulli sit incorporationi
obnoxia cuiusque ueneranda puritas nulla corporis contagione uioletur, diuiduam uero substantiam
illam animam dicat, quae non solum cunctis animalibus sed etiam stirpibus et arboribus dat uitalem
uigorem, ut sit ex his duabus conﬂatum tertium animae genus rationabile, idcirco ne omnia muta essent
et ratione carerent quae uitam sortirentur corpora, uidelicet animalia, sed esset praeterea genus anima-
ntium huius modi, quod rationis disciplinaeque et intellectus capax diuini operis admirandam rationem
dispositionemque intellegens veneraretur mundani operis auctorem. In line with Calcidius’ use of animal
(79.17) as a term to designate “animals” as opposed to “plants” and “trees,” I translate the subsequent
animalia and animantium (79.20) also as referring to animals. The designation “living beings,” which
Magee uses, is broader because it also includes plants in Calcidius’ account, and would thus muddle the
debate on the issue whether plants have souls too (see also ch. 6 in this study).
5
On this issue see also ch. 7 in this study.

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62 Soul and Souls (1)
positions of the different schools of thought, but presumably Calcidius
could also have in mind an implicit difference between soul in the strict
sense – of animals – and soul construed in a broader sense. Moreover,
Calcidius is actually quite careful with his wording here: he says that the
lower soul bestows a vital force (vitalis vigor) not only on animals, but also
on plants and trees (see also ch. 54). It is thus reasonable to assume that
plants partake only of the lower soul, and only in a rudimentary manner at
best, below the threshold of ensouled beings.
Calcidius’ reading of the passage from the Timaeus on divisible and
indivisible Being, which also draws on a tradition of interpreting the two
kinds of soul from Plato’s Laws (896d–e), allows him to read the rapport
between the World Soul and the human soul as a very close one, a point to
which we shall return,6 and to minimize the ontological differences
between them. And with this attempt, he ﬁnds himself in excellent
Middle Platonist company. Analogous views are attested for the following:
• Plutarch: The focal text here is De animae procreatione in Timaeo
Platonis. It would appear that for Plutarch the two components that
make up the World Soul are intellect and lower soul, not higher and
lower soul. But the distinction between mind and soul for the higher
component is not always clear-cut in his writings or in the testimonies
(cf. for instance De Is. et Os., 370F; Proclus, In Tim. 3, II 153.25–154.1
Diehl, which groups Plutarch with Atticus, F35 des Places, see below).7
• Atticus: as reported by Proclus, via Porphyry’s critique, see Proclus, In
Tim. 2, I 381.26–382.12 Diehl (F23 des Places), 391.6ff., 394.9ff., 3, II
153.25–154.1 (F35 des Places).
• Galen: Compendium of the Timaeus, 4, 42–44 Kraus and Walzer.8
• Alcinous (author of Didask.): the focal texts are chs. 10 and 14, which in
this instance hinge on a distinction between potential and actual nous in
the World Soul.
• Numenius: our source for Numenius’ views on this issue is actually
Calcidius (chs. 295–299, cf. also 352; ch. 13 in this study); but see also
F44 des Places.9

6
In section 6.4 in this study. 7 On this point, see Opsomer 2001.
8
Deuse 1983: 49ff. thinks this is derived from Atticus. For the broader context, see also Boys-Stones
2018: ch. 8.
9
Cf. Phillips 2003, who takes issue with Deuse on this topic, but who overlooks the fact that in pre-
Plotinian philosophy, Numenius was not the only one to endorse the notion of an undescended,
purely noetic soul (see above).

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5.1 Making the World Soul 63
In ch. 30 Calcidius lets the proponents of the ﬁrst view, who interpret
indivisible Being as referring to the forms (intellegibilis species) and divisible
Being to matter, defend their view with the claim that Plato could not
possibly have a lower soul-principle in mind already at this point in his
account because the entities that are to receive life from this soul (animals,
trees, and the other things) do not exist yet (nondum natis – which could
either imply a literalist reading of the world’s creation or refer merely to the
order of Plato’s exposition).
Here is the full version of Calcidius’ response in which he provides the
interpretation which he endorses himself:
But those who maintained that from indivisible Being (i.e., soul which is
immune to embodiment) and another form of Being which is the insepar-
able concomitant of body (i.e., the root soul) a third kind of soul (i.e., the
rational) was formed, supported their view as follows:
(a) First, they held that it would be utterly backwards if, after the treat-
ment earlier of the constitution of the world body and the shift
thereafter to the generation of the soul which was to vivify the sensible
world, there should again be a return to the earlier treatment, resulting
in a renewed treatment of matter, the bodies that make up the world,
and their form (forma), and a movement away from the generation of
the soul.
(b) Further, they held that the claim that the root soul cannot yet exist
since the animals it was to vivify did not yet exist would be idle; for
they held that there always existed the power of both soul and body,
and that god did not make the world from things that did not exist but
rather gave order to things that existed without order or limit, and
hence that he conferred order on things that existed rather than
generated things that did not, and that by conferring intellect he
brought the disordered wanderings of soul (animi), its agitations
resembling that of waves, from a disordered tossing about to order,
and that he reined in the unstable movement of body too by a healthy
and tempered agitation and conferred upon body suitable form,
shape, and order, as he indicated earlier [30a]: he considered the fortune
of ordered things preferable to that of disordered ones.
(c) They held that this, the establishment of a soul suitable for the sensible
world, explains why its origin stems from the indivisible Being which
is mind or intellect and another form of Being which is universally
divided and distributed throughout bodies, and why it is situated
intermediate between the indivisible and divisible souls. This implies
that the soul that is immune to embodiment always stays within the
intelligible universe (in mundo intellegibili), whereas the root soul
sustains both mute and nonsentient beings. And since it was necessary

10
At uero hi qui ex indiuidua substantia, id est immuni ab incorporatione anima, item alia inseparabili
corporum comite, id est stirpea, conflatum tertiae animae genus asserebant, id est rationabile, sic
assistebant sententiae propriae: primo omnium praeposterum esse, cum de constitutione mundani
corporis in superioribus tractatum esset finitoque eo tractatu peruentum foret ad animae genituram,
quae uiuificaret sensilem mundum, rursum ad priorem tractatum retrorsum iri, ut de silua et
corporibus mundi formaque eorum tractatus de integro fieret et a genitura animae recederetur.
Deinde frustra dici animam stirpeam nondum esse posse propterea, quia quae uiuificatura erat
animalia nondum essent: fuisse enim semper tam animae quam corporis uim nec deum ex his quae
non erant fecisse mundum, sed ea quae erant sine ordine ac modo ordinasse; itaque potius ea quae
existebant exornasse quam generasse quae non erant, inordinatos quippe animi errores et agitatio-
nem fluctibus similem intellectu assignato ex inordinata iactatione ad ordinem redegisse, corporis
etiam motum instabilem salubri moderataque agitatione frenasse et eidem formam et figuram
congruam et conuenientem ornatum dedisse, ut ipse in superioribus dixit meliorem ordinatorum
fortunam inordinatis ratus. Quare cum sensili mundo conueniens anima instituatur, ortum eius ex
indiuidua una, quae mens intellectusque est, et alia, quae per uniuersa corpora diuiditur et scinditur,
prouenire eamque mediam inter indiuiduam et diuiduam animas locatam, scilicet ut immunis
quidem ab incorporatione in mundo esset intellegibili semper, stirpea mutis et item nihil sentienti-
bus opitularetur, haec uero media, quia necesse erat in mundo fore genus animalium, quod ratione
uteretur, huic eidem generi uitam et spiritum ministraret interque duas posita naturas, eandem
diuersamque, modo eiusdem naturae contemplaretur diuinitatem attollens aciem ad sublimia,
modo ad ima sedemque diuersae naturae uergens haec etiam iuxta opificis scita dispensaret
terrenisque impertiret prouidentiam.
11
See section 2.4 in this study. 12 See section 4.2 in this study.

5.2 The Role of the World Soul

Calcidius returns to the cognitive and the providential functions of the
World Soul in chs. 51–55, in which, as we have seen (ch. 3), he sums up
what he has explained so far about the structure of the World Soul and
its relation to numerical proportions. Chs. 51–52 focus on the cognitive
function: the components of the World allow it to “know all things,
both intelligible and sensible” (ch. 51, cognitricem rerum omnium, quae
sunt tam intellegibiles quam sensiles) or to “be knowledgeable of the
starting points [of all things] as well as of things that follow from those
starting points, in sum of everything that exists, and pass judgment on
all things” (ch. 52, ut et ipsorum initiorum et quae initia sequuntur et
prorsus omnium rerum existentium scia esset ac de omnibus iudicaret).
Calcidius bases this interpretation on the principle of “like being
known by like,” for which he adduces the support of Pythagoras and
Empedocles (ch. 51; Plutarch attributes this view also to Crantor, De
an. procr. 1012F–1013A).
Calcidius’ rendering of this cognitive function of the World Soul, which
as we have seen is spread out over three chapters throughout the first part of
the commentary, has greatly simplified Plato’s account through his
translation.13 Rather than assuming that he simply did not understand
this complex passage of the Timaeus, I think, again, that it would be safer to
posit that already in his translation Calcidius decided to make the Timaeus
more accessible. Calcidius reduces Plato’s account to a much simpler
binary structure according to which the World Soul with the circle of
the Same focuses on the intelligible realm, as the realm of the Same, and
with the circle of the Other focuses on the sensible realm, as the realm of
the Other. This simplification would also be in line with his earlier account
of the composition of the World Soul (cf. supra).
Let us take a closer look at how Calcidius brings about this transforma-
tion. To paraphrase, Plato’s account (37a2–c5) has these components:
(i) Whenever the World Soul comes into contact with both indivisible
and divisible Being, it is stirred throughout its entirety, and
declares sameness and difference with regard to both types of

13
Chs. 52, 56 and 103–104, see ch. 3 in this study.

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66 Soul and Souls (1)
objects; that is, Same and Other apply to both indivisible and
divisible Being.
(ii) Both types of contact, with the two objects, give rise to true accounts;
the circle of the Other, running straight, proclaims, without physical
utterance or sound, to the whole Soul similarities and differences
pertaining to the sensible realm, leading to true and firm opinions
(Reydams-Schils 1997); the circle of the Same proclaims again to the
whole Soul similarities and differences pertaining to the intelligible
realm, leading to understanding and knowledge.
So, in Plato’s account, the circle of the Same and the circle of the Other
each have their special domains, indivisible and divisible Being respec-
tively, but they nevertheless each make pronouncements of sameness and
difference about both domains to the entire World Soul.
This is how the passage is rendered in Calcidius’ translation, which is much
more succinct than Plato’s version. Again, to paraphrase:
(i) The World Soul comes into contact with indivisible and divisible
Being, and can easily discern what pertains to the Same and what
pertains to the Other; it sees the causes of all things that happen and
can gauge future events based on these (this feature of the World Soul
is clearly related to the question of whether the positions of the
heavenly bodies can be used to predict the future, see also ch. 8 in
this study).
Calcidius here omits to say that in the process of cognition Same and Other
both apply to indivisible and to divisible Being, he glosses “knowledge” as
“knowledge of all causes” (emphasizing again the notion of causality, see
ch. 4 in this study) and adds the ability to foresee the future, which is not in
Plato’s account. Similarly,
(ii) When the World Soul sees something sensory and the circle of the
Other runs correctly (with accurate results: ueridico sensu) then
correct opinions worthy of belief come about; when it focuses on
the indivisible Being and that which remains always the same, then
understanding and knowledge become firm.
The changes from Plato’s original are so numerous that we really need to
consider this rendering an interpretation rather than a translation. As his
commentary on this passage (ch. 104) confirms, he has recast the second
part of Plato’s passage so that the World Soul in its entirety becomes the
subject, and either turns towards the sensible realm, which is the realm of

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5.2 The Role of the World Soul 67
the Other (containing, in an echo of his discussion of the World body and
time, “things that are born and die, that are the result of manual labor, and
that have sense-perception,” see ch. 4 in this study), or towards the
intelligible/Same. In doing so, Calcidius also diminishes the epistemolo-
gical status of opinion. Whereas Plato emphasizes that the opinions of the
World Soul are true and ﬁrm, Calcidius states that they are worthy of
belief, and he emphasizes the gap between knowledge and opinion (ch.
104, 154.4), a gap which Plato’s version had intended to narrow. (In other
contexts, as we shall see in ch. 6 of this study, he assesses the role of opinion
more positively.)
Turning his attention from the cognitive function of the World Soul to
its second role of “caring” for the universe (ch. 54), this is how he renders
this function:
(a) [There appears to be a lacuna at the beginning of the paragraph, but
Bakhouche’s conjectures read it as echoing the ending of ch. 31, so that
the World Soul, on the one hand, venerates the divine maker of the
world (or perhaps, alternatively, the divine realm of the Same) and on
the other] offers guidance to lower things . . ., complying with the
divine commands, imparting its Providence to the things that come to
be, blessed by its likeness to eternal things based on its natural afﬁnity
to them, an aid and protectress to things subject to dissolution.
(b) The signs of this power of forethought and reasoning are apparent in
the behavior of man, who in uniquely worshipping god bestows
vigilant care upon domestic animals; and indeed, they are apparent
in the same powers of the soul as those by which the sensible world is
fostered, since in supervening upon all the vital capacities shared by
human beings, beasts, and plants, i.e., those of growth, self-
movement, appetite, and forming mental images, reason perfects
the soul that is proper to human beings such that it not only possesses
the capacity for life but is not without the capacity for choosing to live
well. And so human life is tempered by the cohabitation of the natural
and the rational soul.14

14
Haec est illa rationabilis mundi anima, quae gemina <natura praedita> iuxta meliorem naturam
<mundi auctorem contemplatur magna> ueneratione, <et iuxta inferiorem naturam> tutelam
praebet inferioribus, diuinis dispositionibus obsequens, prouidentiam natiuis impertiens, aeter-
norum similitudine propter cognationem beata, dissolubilium rerum auxiliatrix et patrona. Cuius
in consulendo ratiocinandoque uirtutis in moribus hominis apparent insignia, qui cultor eximius dei
diligentiam mansuetis impertit animalibus; isdem quippe uirtutibus animae quibus sensilis mundus
fouetur, quando ad ceteros uitales uigores, qui sunt communes hominibus et bestiis, stirpibus etiam,
id est crescendi mouendi semet appetendique et imaginandi, accedens ratio propriam hominis

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68 Soul and Souls (1)
In giving it such an important providential role, Calcidius belongs to that
strand of Platonism that extends the demiurgic function to the World Soul.
In general, Calcidius creates a chain of Providence, which also includes
demons (as in ch. 135, see section 8.1 in this study) and human beings, so,
in sum, all beings endowed with reason. This approach has to be contrasted
with a view that has a supra-cosmic entity take over the task of the World
Soul, as in Philo of Alexandria (Runia 1986: 204ff.; Reydams-Schils 1999:
152–154) or Maximus of Tyre (Or. 41, Reydams-Schils 2017b). The second
half of ch. 54 establishes the parallel between the World Soul and the human
soul, and anticipates the treatise on the human soul of the second part of the
commentary (discussed in ch. 6 in this study). From this initial wording, one
can tell already that Calcidius leans towards an interpretation that under-
scores the afﬁnity between the cosmic and the human soul, instead of
dwelling on their differences: a human being is said to be equipped with
the same features as the universe, of both vital powers and reason.
As a summary and transition, the sequence of chs. 51–54 not only
addresses the two main functions of the World Soul, but also sums up its
relation to mathematical features (ch. 51, 100.4–5: quem ad modum natura
eius numeris modisque conveniat; see also ch. 3 in this study). Calcidius does
not quite go to the extent of calling the soul number(s) but couches his
analysis systematically in terms of a kinship or a matching: the structure of
the soul reﬂects certain relationships among numbers (as with his use of
congruere, conuenire, or concinere; see also ch. 32). As his inspiration
Calcidius cites Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans; there is, again, no explicit
trace of Xenocrates or Speusippus to be found.15
Here too Plutarch helps us discern what is at stake. In his De animae
procreatione in Platonis Timaeo, Plutarch explicitly, and vehemently, takes
issue with Xenocrates for having claimed that the soul’s essence is self-
moving number (1012D–1013D, in which he also criticizes Crantor for
a different position). Plutarch concludes:
By means of number and ratio and concord he [Plato] did arrange its [the
soul’s] substance underlying and receiving the fairest form, which by their
agency (hupo toutōn) arises in it; but it is not the same, I think, to say that the
soul is put together on a numerical pattern (kat’ arithmon) and to say that its
essence is number, since <in fact> it is put together on the pattern of

animam perﬁcit, ut non solum uitae compos sit, sed etiam bene uiuendi non desit optio; atque ita
naturalis et rationabilis item animae contubernio uita hominum temperatur (text Bakhouche,
followed by Magee).
15
On this issue see also section 1.3 in this study.

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5.2 The Role of the World Soul 69
a concord (kath’ harmonian) but is not a concord, as he himself proved in
the work on the Soul [Phaedo].16 (1013C–D, trans. Cherniss)
It is one thing to claim that the World Soul is put together after a pattern
of harmonies, and quite another to say that it actually consists of such
harmonies, though it would be challenging to conceptualize the difference,
especially if the World Soul is meant to be incorporeal.
The extension of the World Soul in Plato’s Timaeus also poses a problem
for its alleged incorporeality: it is meant to be “woven through” (diapla-
keisa) the World body from the center to the limit of the heavens, and to
envelop the latter (36e). Behind attempts by Platonists to explain this
feature is a controversy with the Stoics, who posit three-dimensionality
as a hallmark of bodies.17 Calcidius uses the language of “similarity” to
address this issue. In ch. 33, he argues that given that the World Soul would
breathe life (inspiratur) into bodies with surfaces (superficiem) and volume
(soliditas), it would need “powers similar” (similes . . . uires) to volume and
surface, on the principle that “like goes together with like” (paria paribus
congregantur), a principle that echoes the explanation of the cognitive
function of the World Soul. When Calcidius returns to the same issue in
ch. 92, he talks again about a “similarity” with body, or between soul and
body (ut esset in animae textu corporis similitudo; inter animam corpusque
similitudo). But how is one to envisage such an affinity?
The sequence of chs. 51–54 is followed by Calcidius’ first reference to
a view of a group which he elsewhere calls “the Hebrews,”18 but here
designates as “a venerable sect and one very skilled in its understanding
of the divine” (sectae sanctioris et in comprehensione diuinae rei prudentioris).
They state that God made the body of human beings from earth, drew life
from the celestial vault, and bestowed his own breath on the soul (inspir-
ationem proprio flatu intimasse) as reason. Even though this passage strictly
speaking applies only to the human soul (as is also the case in similar
passages in Philo of Alexandria),19 a number of the locutions Calcidius has
been applying to the World Soul, all having to do with “breath” and
without equivalent in Plato’s account, now start to make sense: right at

16
ἀριθμῷ δὲ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ διακεκόσμηκε τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ὑποκειμένην καὶ δεχομένην τὸ
κάλλιστον εἶδος ὑπὸ τούτων ἐγγιγνόμενον. οἶμαι δὲ μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν συνεστάναι
τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἀριθμὸν ὑπάρχειν· ἐπεὶ <καὶ> καθ’ἁρμονίαν συνέστηκεν ἁρμονία δ’
οὔκ ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ Ψυχῆς (Phaed. 92) ἀπέδειξεν.
17
See for example the doxography in Nemesius, Nat. hom. 2.17–19 Sharples and van der Eijk; cf. also
Waszink 1964: 10-12; Reydams-Schils 1999: 59-60; see also ch. 12 in this study.
18
This issue is discussed more fully in section 15.3 in this study.
19
E.g. Philo, Opif. 69 and 72–75; Runia 1993: 283–284.

20
Baltes refers to Marius Victorinus, Adv. Ar. 4.11.37ff. and Proclus, In Remp. 2, 212.23ff., and assumes
the source is Porphyry. On the latter issue, see ch. 14 in this study.
21
On the issue of the role of Stoicism in the commentary, see ch. 12 in this study.
22
On the coherence of this part of the commentary, see also section 3.2 in this study.

On Soul and Souls (2)

The Human Soul and Its Relation to the World Soul

According to Calcidius, “man is called a ‘miniature universe’ by the

Ancients” (hominem mundum breuem a ueteribus appellatum) because the
World body and the human body are made out of the same materials, and
the World Soul and the human soul share the same nature (ch. 202). This
succinct rendering of the theme became a Leitmotiv in the tradition
(Kurdzialek 1971). Calcidius devotes an entire sub-treatise to the human
soul, and more precisely to the related questions of its substance and the
location of its principal part (chs. 213–235).1 His treatment of this topic
elaborates on the claim that a human being has both a natural and
a rational soul in the first part of the commentary (ch. 54).
This chapter takes a closer look at how Calcidius handles the doxogra-
phical tradition, that is, the views of predecessors. The benefit of such
a detailed analysis is that it allows us to acquire a better sense of Calcidius’
method as a commentator (and thus also of his relation to potential
sources, discussed in chs. 13 and 14 in this study). Which basic doxogra-
phical pattern does Calcidius adopt? Which choices does he make in his
rendering of the different positions? How does he harmonize these views to
allow for a better basis of comparison in light of the position he endorses?
Finally, what is the broader context for this specific treatise in the com-
mentary as a whole?

6.1 Doxography
So, let us start with an outline of Calcidius’ doxographical schema. First
Calcidius presents a series of positions that consider the soul to be inti-
mately related to matter, and hence to be corporeal (I). But given that there
1
This chapter is based on Reydams-Schils 2006. Cf. also Dörrie 1957; Dillon 1977: 401–408; Baltes
1976–1978 I: 172–184; Deuse 1983 (who pays no attention to Calcidius in his own right); Gersh 1986 II:
483–492; Mansfeld 1990: 3112–3117; Trabattoni 1993; Emilsson 1994; Baltes and Dörrie 1998: 164.4:
360–374; and for the broader context, Boys-Stones 2018: ch. 9.

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72 On Soul and Souls (2)
are different views on matter, different subheadings fall under this first
position. There are those who consider matter to be divisible (substantia
siluae diuidua, in the sense of divided, not in the sense of infinitely
divisible; see ch. 275, 279.11),2 who do not assign a specific place in the
human body to the principal part of the soul (IA). Among the representa-
tives of this view Calcidius lists Asclepiades, Democritus, and Epicurus,
but the information he provides here is derived mostly from Asclepiades, as
a comparison with other sources reveals (see Waszink’s edition), and this
attests to Calcidius’ interest in the medical tradition.
After the first group of people who hold matter to be divided, there are
next those who consider matter to be unified and continuous (silua
adunatione quadam sibi continuata, Calcidius does not use the term indi-
vidua in this context, which he tends to reserve for Being3), IB, and here we
find a view attributed to Empedocles (IB1), the Hebrews (IB2), which
Calcidius only partly rejects, and the Stoics (IB3), of whom he mentions
Zeno and Chrysippus by name. Empedocles, the Hebrews, and the Stoics
are said to have located the principal part of the human soul in the heart.
So far Calcidius has assessed the positions of those who consider the soul
to be corporeal and therefore establish a connection between their views on
the soul and on matter, considering matter either divided (IA) or contin-
uous (IB). Aristotle appears to occupy a middle ground (II): while not
considering the soul itself to be corporeal – and this is a significant
improvement in Calcidius’ eyes – Aristotle’s views on the relation between
soul and body, and his notion of entelechy or perfect realization (prima
perfectio, as Calcidius renders it) in particular, still intertwine the soul too
intimately with the body. As a result, Calcidius indicates, he also down-
plays its rational functions and compromises its immortal nature. Aristotle
too is said to locate the principal part of the soul in the heart. Last we turn
to Plato’s alleged view (III), of an incorporeal human soul, that in its
rational aspect (I am keeping my terminology deliberately vague here for
the time being) has a divine kinship with the intelligible realm, is self-
moving, and, of course, immortal.
Plato, we are then told, in fact allocated two ruling principles to the
human soul, the one, spirit (uigor as different from mere anger, iracundia),
located in the heart, in charge of the lower soul, which includes the
appetites as well as the vital functions, and the other constituting the

2
van Winden 1959: 52.
3
In ch. 38 he applies the term to a perfect mathematical body: corpus indiuisum atque indiuiduum, quo
nihil est perfectius.

4
Theiler 1973; Baltes and Dörrie 1998: 369–370.
5
Quia igitur principales uires animae duae sunt, una deliberatiua, altera quae ad appetendum quid
impellit, et est deliberatiua quidem uirtus propria rationabilis animantis, illa uero alia id ipsum
animantis, consequenter competentia uiribus et apta membra dimensa sunt.
6
Illud uero aliud principale, quod secundae dignitatis esse praediximus, non rationabilis animantis,
sed id ipsum animantis. Commune ergo ut animalis in corde ac medietate, ut uero rationabilis
animantis in cerebro. Unde cetera quidem animalia uno utuntur principali, quod in corde est, at uero
homo duobus, uno in corde, altero in capite.

6.2 Method
As compact as Calcidius’ doxographical outline for the ﬁrst view is, it
reveals much about his method. Jaap Mansfeld identiﬁed the

7
See ch. 5 in this study.

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6.2 Method 75
doxographical schema behind ch. 214,8 and if we take a synoptic view of the
sources Mansfeld cites,9 this schema looks as follows. Among the people
who hold that matter is divided (IA), there are four subgroups: (1) those
who claim a theory of partless basic components – expertia in Calcidius’
wording, ἀμερῆ in Greek (Diodorus Cronus); (2) those who adhere to parts
that are indistinct – partes indifferentes, sui similes, ὁμοιομερῆ (Anaxagoras,
Archelaus); (3) those who claim parts with distinctions, both (a) atoms –
atomi, ἄτομα (Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus) and (b) “masses,” moles,
ὄγκοι (Asclepiades, Heraclides). Note that this is a theoretical reconstruc-
tion: the passages in the sources do not all mention the same options, in the
same order, and with the same names, and there is no exact parallel in
the extant sources for Calcidius’ listing. Moreover, in the treatise on the
human soul, he lists by name some representatives of the atoms and the
“masses” theories only: Democritus, Epicurus, and Asclepiades. But else-
where in the commentary he shows that he actually knows representatives
of the other views too. In chs. 203 (222.11) and 279 (284), he mentions
Diodorus Cronus as adhering to a theory that posits minimal bodies
(corpuscula, ch. 203; exiguitas indiuiduorum corporum, ch. 279), and in
those same contexts he mentions Anaxagoras as representing the
homoiomerē view (similium, singulis materiis). In ch. 203, he also mentions
Leucippus and Democritus as atomists, leaving out Epicurus.
These three passages taken together (the one from the treatise on the
human soul, as well as chs. 203 and 279) attest to an independent and
conscious use of a doxographical schema on Calcidius’ part, in which his
choices are guided by the contexts and requirements of the speciﬁc section
of his argumentation.
When we turn to those who consider matter to be continuous (IB)
Calcidius’ interest in views of the “Hebrews” raises the question of possible
connections with Philo of Alexandria, whom he actually mentions by name
once (ch. 278, 282.8 Waszink).10 Among the Platonists, this interest was by
no means limited to Porphyry (and not merely to his polemics either), and
is well attested for Numenius.11 It also shows up in less expected contexts,
such as in Galen’s De usu partium (11.14; see also ps. Longinus, Subl. 9.9).12

8
Mansfeld 1990: 3113, n. 238.
9
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 213.18–214.6 Bruns (also in connection to the question of a uniﬁed
or a divided matter), Sextus Empiricus, Pyr. 1.147, 3.32; Math. 9.363–4; ps. Galen, Hist. phil. 18 =
Doxographi Graeci 610.20–611.3 Diels.
10
On this issue, see also sections 1.3 and 15.4 in this study.
11
See e.g., F1a, 9–10, 13, 30, 56; for an excellent discussion of the issue, see Zambon 2002.
12
Brisson 2002.

6.3 View Attributed to Plato

As potential antecedents of Calcidius’ claim that the human soul has two
principal parts or powers, Matthias Baltes14 cites a passage from the Placita,
in which Pythagoras, under the heading of the soul’s hêgemonikon, is said to
have distinguished between a principle of life (ζωτικόν) situated in the
heart, and a rational principle in the head (λογικόν, Diels 391a23ff.). He
also cites Ptolemy’s On the kritērion and hēgemonikon (16, 22.13ff.
Lammert), which distinguishes between two ruling principles, one of life,
located in the heart, the other of the good life (compare this to Calcidius
ch. 54, 102.18–19), located in the head, as well as a passage from Philo of
Alexandria (Det. 82). But the parallel with Philo is limited because he
discusses two powers of the human soul, a vital and a rational one, but does
not assign two ruling principles to two different locations. Moreover, by
assigning blood to the life power, and breath to the rational one, he may
actually have the view in mind that locates the hēgemonikon in the heart.

13 14
See Introduction and section 12.2 in this study. Baltes and Dörrie 1998: 367, n. 148.

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6.3 View Attributed to Plato 77
(Throughout his writings, Philo oscillates between the cardiocentric and
the cephalocentric view, and in a number of passages leaves the question
open.15) The distinction between the rational and life principle in the other
two texts, attributed to Pythagoras and from Ptolemy, also yields only
a limited parallel, because Calcidius’ second and lower soul-principle
embraces more than merely the functions usually ascribed to the vital
principle, by including spirit, which is in direct control of desire.
Willy Theiler mentions one more parallel for Calcidius’ use of uigor,16
namely a passage from Galen,17 which hinges on the use of the word tonos,
tension, in itself a central notion of Stoic physics. Of the physiological
equivalent of Plato’s second soul part, spirit, Galen writes:
The second source (archē) is seated in the heart; its work is by itself to
provide the “tone” (tonos) of the soul, to be constant and unyielding in the
things that reason commands, and in states of passion to provide the boiling,
as it were, of the innate heat, as the soul at such times desires to avenge itself
on the supposed wrongdoer, and this kind of thing is called anger (thumos);
in its relation to other things its work is to be the source of warmth for the
several parts and of pulsing motion for the arteries. (trans. De Lacy)
But by stipulating three soul archai, Galen, unlike Calcidius, sticks to
Plato’s tripartition in the context of this passage, rather than adopting the
dual scheme predominant in Calcidius and Middle Platonists.
Calcidius chooses his doxographical battles. Throughout the treatise, for
instance, he oscillates between assigning a principal “part” or a principal
“power” to the human soul. And he justiﬁes this oscillation: dismissing in
one aside an issue that is crucial to Porphyry (F251-55 Smith), he claims that
it makes no difference whether we talk about “parts” or “powers” as long as
we keep in mind that “the soul is not corporeal and has no magnitude” (ch.
223, 238.4–5).18
Despite the difference between the positions Calcidius describes, these
have also to a certain extent been harmonized, to allow for a better basis of
comparison. As we will see in greater detail below, he is not interested in
the contrast between a soul principle and a life principle, but in the
distinction between a higher and a lower soul-principle, which has ties

15
Reydams-Schils 2002b. 16 Theiler 1973: 316.
17
Galen, PHP 7, 438.24–441.3 De Lacy: ἑτέρας δὲ τῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ καθιδρυμένης, ἧς ἔργα καθ’ ἑαυτὴν
μὲν ὁ τόνος ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ μόνιμον ἐν οἷς ἂν ὁ λογισμὸς κελεύσῃ καὶ τὸ ἀήττητον, κατὰ
πάθος δ’ <ἡ> οἷον ζέσις τῆς ἐμφύτου θερμασίας ποθούσης τιμωρήσασθαι τῆς ψυχῆς τηνικαῦτα τὸν
ἀδικεῖν δόξαντα, καὶ καλεῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον θυμός, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρός τι θερμασίας ἀρχὴ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος
εἶναι μορίοις ἀρτηρίαις τε κινήσεως σφυγμικῆς.
18
See also Galen, PHP 6, 368.20–26 De Lacy.

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78 On Soul and Souls (2)
with, but is not limited to, the principle of life. The polemics of authors
such as Galen and Plutarch have accustomed us to seeing an almost
insurmountable stand-off between Stoics and Platonists on the issue of
whether the soul is unified or actually has an irrational component that
can, to some extent, operate independently from reason. But there is not
a trace to be found of that polemic in Calcidius either. Instead he uses
a different doxographical schema that was also quite common in Antiquity:
a kind of master-list of rational and irrational soul functions that tried to
accommodate as many Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic elements as possi-
ble. The irrational soul functions can include: from Stoicism, representa-
tion and impulse (also present in animals) and lower-soul functions such as
the five senses and reproduction; from Platonism, spirit and appetite; and
from the Peripatetic tradition, vital functions such as growth and nutrition.
There are variations in the manner in which different authors compile such
a list, but the basic underlying approach is the same: to use the dual
distinction of rational/irrational soul components in order to establish
a common ground between different schools of thought. By the time
Porphyry became interested in this model (see for instance F253 Smith),
it already had a well-established tradition of its own. We can also see it at
work in Philo of Alexandria, for instance, as I have argued elsewhere.19
How can we detect the presence of such a master-list in Calcidius’ work?
The lists of soul functions attributed to the different thinkers throughout
the commentary (and not just in the treatise I am considering here)
regularly combine elements of different origins. Thus Calcidius uses the
Stoic connection between soul and “natural” pneuma (by which
Chrysippus may have actually meant pneuma sumphuton, not the so-
called “nature” level in the Stoic scale of being20) to highlight that the
human soul, with the ruling part and the seven instrumental parts (the five
senses, speech, and reproduction), also directs the vital pneuma, as well as
nutrition, growth (adolendo), and motion – with these latter functions
sounding like a gesture towards Peripatetic accounts (ch. 220; see also ch. 11
in this study). The Peripatetic list of soul functions includes under the
appetitive soul “anger” and “desire,” key notions in Platonic psychology, of
course. And to close the circle, in Calcidius’ account of the Platonic soul
functions, the senses have been promoted considerably: their headquarters,
so to speak, are right with the rational principle, because they are its

19
Runia 1986; Reydams-Schils 2002b. See also Seneca, Ep. 92 and Alexander of Aphrodisias, DA
94.7–100.17.
20
SVF 2.778, 773–789; Ju 2007: 102–103; see also section 12.2 in this study.

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6.3 View Attributed to Plato 79
“companions and messengers” (comites rationis et signi<feri>, ch. 231,
245.7–8; see also ch. 234), in a clear echo of the Stoic passages Calcidius
has chosen. According to this reading (which we also find attested in Philo
of Alexandria, and which could have derived some support from Plato’s
Laws 964e–965a), the senses largely take over the auxiliary role of spirit as
the natural ally of reason. Despite his reservations about the reliability of
sense-perception and opinion elsewhere (see below), Calcidius in this
context transforms Plato’s epistemology to allow more room for doxastic
reason, yielding a fruitful and harmonious cooperation between sense-
perception and reasoning that is more in line with a Peripatetic and
a Stoic perspective.
Another harmonizing feature in the treatise is Calcidius’ attempt to
prepare the ground for the two-principle view which he endorses. Even in
the first view, which according to him assigns no specific location to the
soul’s principal part, Calcidius already draws his reader’s attention to
a distinction between the contributions of the heart and the head (ch.
214). The Hebrews’ position, he goes on to argue, can be salvaged if they
would pay attention to a distinction embedded within their own views,
between the rational and the irrational soul, with the latter containing the
appetites. The Stoics, according to Calcidius, also distinguish between
a “natural” principal soul power in animals, and a “rational” ruling prin-
ciple in humans – a distinction, if it were genuinely Stoic, that would create
problems for the difference between “nature” and “soul” in the Stoic
system (compare this to ch. 54, 102.19–20): pneuma allegedly manifests
itself as “cohesion” in lifeless things, as “nature” in plants, as “soul” in
animals, and as “rational soul” in human beings (see also section 12.2 in this
study).
Calcidius’ version of the master-list runs through his entire commen-
tary. In the treatise on fate, for instance, he renders the scale of being as
follows:
And so by virtue of their association with body (consortium corporis) there is
between humans, beasts, and other, lifeless things the fellowship and com-
munion of corporeal experiences. Moreover humans have birth, nourish-
ment, and growth (nasci nutriri crescere) in common with the other [living
beings], whereas they have sense perception (sentire) and impulse (appetere)
in common only with animals that are dumb and lack reason. Next,
cupidity (cupiditas) in animals, either wild or tame, is an irrational impulse,
as is spirit (iracundia); in the case of a human being, however, whose proper
characteristic is the application of mind to reason, it is [a] rational [impulse].
Lastly, proper to a human being, who stands at the greatest remove from

6.4 Human Soul and World Soul

The main reason why Calcidius wants to set up his schema in terms of two
basic types of soul, the noetic and the life-principle (ch. 29), is that this in
turn allows him to highlight, in his treatise on the human soul (chs.
232–233), a threefold analogy between the human soul, the city (as in
Plato’s Republic), and the universe. Already in his introduction (ch. 6) he
had made it explicit that he reads the Timaeus as the sequel to the Republic:
whereas the Republic dealt with “positive” justice among humans, the
Timaeus is meant to treat natural justice, of the type the gods use with
each other.22 With this approach, he echoes the notion of the cosmic city
that had found such eloquent proponents in the Stoics.
As with many Middle Platonists, as well as with their later succes-
sors, quite a number of the features of Calcidius’ sub-treatise on the
human soul become intelligible only if read against the backdrop of
his detailed discussion of the World Soul’s composition in the ﬁrst
part of the commentary (ch. 5 in this study; Reydams-Schils 1999:
215–225).

21
Ideoque ob consortium corporis est inter homines bestiasque et cetera uita carentia societas
communioque corporeorum prouentuum, siquidem nasci nutriri crescere commune est hominibus
cum ceteris, sentire uero et appetere commune demum hominibus et mutis tantum ac ratione
carentibus animalibus. Cupiditas porro atque iracundia uel agrestium uel mansuetorum appetitus
inrationabilis est, hominis uero, cuius est proprium rationi mentem applicare, rationabilis.
Ratiocinandi tamen atque intellegendi sciendique uerum appetitus proprius est hominis, qui
a cupiditate atque iracundia plurimum distat; illa quippe etiam in mutis animalibus et multo
quidem acriora, cernuntur, rationis autem perfectio et intellectus propria dei et hominis tantum.
22
See section 2.3 in this study.

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6.4 Human Soul and World Soul 81
In Calcidius’ treatise on the human soul theories that would establish
a connection between the soul and numbers or musical harmony are
strikingly missing. He limits his reflection on this theme to the claims
that the soul is modulated (modulata) and that it has a kinship with
numbers (habet cum numeris cognationem, ch. 226, 242.6–7; see also ch.
267 on music). But, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the topic of
this merely short-hand reference has received considerable attention in the
first part of the commentary: among the basic aspects of reality Calcidius
lists not only indivisible and divisible essence, the Same and the Other, but
also the monad and the dyad, the principles of number (with number, in
turn, governing geometrical figures), as well as musical harmony. Yet in
that context, too, Calcidius stops short of actually attributing
a mathematical structure to the World Soul itself.
Calcidius tends to emphasize the affinity between the World Soul and
the human soul, and to downplay the ontological gap between them.
Admittedly the narrative structure of the Timaeus had left its readers
with some latitude concerning the rapport between World Soul and
human soul. If one asks what would make the human soul deficient in
comparison to the World Soul, the Timaeus appears to give at least three
different answers: in the first instance, the human soul is said to have been
made by the Demiurge of the same ingredients as the World Soul, but in
a less-pure mixture (41d), in the second we are told that it is the human
body that wreaks havoc on the soul upon its first incarnation (42a-b, 43a–
44d). The third and final account about the two mortal soul parts spirit and
appetite and their specific locations in the human body, though assigned
previously to the younger gods (42d–e), has to wait until much later (69c–
70d). Less-pure mixture, pernicious influence of a body that is only a part
of the whole, and lower, mortal soul parts – these are the answers the reader
receives as he or she moves through the Timaeus. (Those answers can be
reconciled, but the Timaeus itself is not our central concern here.)
Now Calcidius, as it turns out, privileges the first answer at the expense
of the others. Both the World Soul and the human soul are composed of
the two types of primordial soul listed early on in the commentary: the
purely noetic kind and the life-principle that exists in bodies (ch. 29). (As
mentioned above, it is the human soul’s relation to the “root soul,” the
uitalis uigor, that allows Calcidius to draw on the word play in Latin of
uigor as referring both to vital strength and to the Greek thumos, in the
sense of uigor irae.) Because the World Soul has also been made out of the
“root” soul, it has reliable opinions about the sensible realm (ch. 51,
100.8–10; ch. 52, 21–22), in addition to knowledge about intelligible reality.

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82 On Soul and Souls (2)
Moreover, the planets can be said to be like, that is, have a function
analogous (ut) to, that of spirit and appetite in humans (ch. 95, 148.9–11).
This is not to say, of course, that the World Soul has, in fact, irrational
functions: it merely has a corollary to what in humans would be components
that could undermine reason. But because human souls are “less pure,” they
have been contaminated more by the “root” soul. Hence human souls, like
animals but to a lesser extent, have to deal with the problem of irrationality,
and contain spirit and appetite (ch. 140, 180.13–15). Plants have yet other
functions as a result of their relation to the “root” soul, such as the vital ones
of growth, nutrition, and reproduction (in Peripatetic terms). This schema
allows Calcidius to construct his own scale of nature, as we have seen above,
with human beings also having the functions of animals and plants, in
addition to reason. Yet he also claims that spirit and appetite are of
a higher order in humans than in animals precisely because in human beings
these functions are meant to serve reason, and hence are rationalized, as
“rational impulses,” to some extent (chs. 182, 187).
Whereas the World Soul does not need sense-perception (the World
body has no sense organs), for human beings sense-perception, if used
properly, comes to the aid of reason in forming correct opinions. Calcidius
cannot ignore Plato’s claim (42e–44c) that after a human soul’s ﬁrst
placement in a human body sense-perception is one of the factors that
disrupts the soul’s proper functioning (chs. 207–211, preceding the sub-
treatise on the human soul).23 Yet, he also proceeds to attribute a much
more positive role to sense-perception and doxastic reason: “the starting
point and seeds, so to speak, of understanding and wisdom are in sense-
perception” (initium et quasi quaedam intellegendi sapiendique semina sunt
in sentiendo, ch. 234; see also ch. 231). In sum, by downgrading the
epistemological status of “correct opinion” in the World Soul, from
“true and ﬁrm” in Plato’s original to merely worthy of belief (ch. 104,
154.4),24 and upgrading the value of sense-perception and opinion for the
human soul, Calcidius can once again narrow the gap between the two
(and prepare the ground for his discussion of Plato’s praise of sight, 46e–
47b, chs. 264–266, and hearing, 47c–d, ch. 267).
Thus, it is no surprise that Calcidius embellishes his account with details
that would help to underscore the similarities between the World Soul and
the human soul. The circle of the Other in the human soul, for instance,

23
See also ch. 342, with a reference to the Divided Line in the Republic, which distinguishes between
opinion and sense-perception.
24
See section 5.2 in this study.

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6.4 Human Soul and World Soul 83
like its counterpart in the World Soul, gets cut into seven bands, although
one cannot help but wonder what the counterpart to planets in a human
soul is supposed to be (ch. 140, 180.18–19). More interesting even, as
I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, is Calcidius’ reference to
the interpretation “by some” of the World Soul’s extension throughout the
universe’s body from the middle to the periphery, and enveloping it from
the outside (ch. 100). The “middle” here, as those quoted by Calcidius
suggest, is not to be interpreted as the earth, but as the center of the vital
principle in the universe, the universe’s counterpart to the heart in a human
body, and this center in the universe would have to be the sun. Such
a viewpoint has been attributed to the Pythagoreans,25 and is also attested
for the Stoics.26 Although Calcidius does not push the point, positing two
governing principles instead of one only strengthens his structural analogy
between the World Soul and the human soul. There is more than
a superficial assimilation and taming of Stoic material going on here (as
we will examine more closely in ch. 12).
That Calcidius minimizes the differences between World and human
soul is also evident in his response, in the treatise on the human soul (chs.
228–229), to a challenge by critics of Plato, who would claim that Plato
contradicted himself in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus: in the first account,
he says the soul is non-composite, and in the Timaeus he goes on to discuss
at great length how the soul has been composed. Calcidius responds to this
challenge only in terms of the composition of the World Soul, out of an
intermediary between divisible and indivisible Being, the Same and the
Other. But he leaves the crucial issue unaddressed, that of the Timaeus’
view of spirit and appetite as added, mortal soul parts. Calcidius does not
resort here to a solution Alcinous proposes in the Didaskalikos, namely that
divine souls in fact do have a counterpart to spirit and appetite, and that
these functions suffer a deterioration upon a human soul’s incarnation
(25, 178.39–45).
As Baltes has argued, the response to Plato’s critics deals with two issues
which Calcidius has conflated, first, whether or not the soul is a composite
entity, and second, whether or not the soul has been generated.27
Calcidius, Baltes also claims, has made a mistake with respect to the first
issue, in referring to a potential contradiction between the Timaeus and the
Phaedrus (245c5–246a2, the very same passage which he cited in Latin in his
25
Cf. Theon of Smyrna 138.16–18, 187.14–188.7 Hiller.
26
Cleanthes in particular, Diogenes Laertius 7.139, cf. also SVF 1.499 (= Eusebius, PE 15.15.7); Cicero,
Nat. d. 2.24, 40–41, 83; Plutarch, De fac. 928A–C; Macrobius, In Somn. 1.20.6.
27
Baltes 1976–1978 I: 181–184.

God and Gods

In the ﬁrst part of his commentary (ch. 39) Calcidius has anticipated
a notion of the divine that aligns Providence with Plato’s Demiurge,
claiming that this god bestows substance on other things out of itself and
is a lawgiver.1 In the sub-treatise on fate he returns to this notion, and
develops it further into a hierarchical system of different aspects of the
divine.
Exhibit A consists of two passages that have drawn scholarly attention:2
First, all things that are, including the world itself, are embraced and ruled
principally by the Supreme God who is the Supreme Good “beyond all
being” and all nature, who is superior to thought and Intellect, whom all
things seek because of His being of complete perfection and requiring no
fellowship, and about whom to say anything further in the present context
would be to digress.
Then they are embraced and ruled by the Providence which is second in
preeminence to that Supreme God and which the Greeks call Nous;3 it is,
moreover, intelligible being that emulates Goodness in virtue of its tireless
conversion toward the Supreme God, and from the latter it possesses a draft
of the Goodness by which it is itself adorned and other things, thanks to His
authority, are no less ennobled. And so men refer to this will of God, this
wise guardianship, as it were, of all things, as “Providence” [foresight], so
called not, as many suppose, because it is a precursor in seeing and under-
standing events to come but because understanding, which is the act proper
to mind, is a property of the divine Mind; and the Mind of God is eternal,
hence the Mind of God is the eternal act of understanding.

1
See section 3.3 in this study.
2
This chapter is based on Reydams-Schils 2007a; see now also Hoenig 2018b: 194–201, 206–213,
summarized in 2018a: 438–441.
3
Unlike Magee 2016 and Moreschini 2003, and in agreement with den Boeft 1970 and Bakhouche
2011, I take the quem that introduces the notion of “mind” as referring to the second god, and hence
insert an “and” in the translation and accept Waszink’s punctuation, whereas Magee’s translation
suggests that the notion of “mind” applies to the ﬁrst god (“second . . . to that Supreme God which
the Greeks call Nous”).

ﬁrst god second god third god

(ﬁrst) mind second mind
^ World Soul
(Demiurge)

4
Principio cuncta quae sunt et ipsum mundum contineri regique principaliter quidem a summo deo,
qui est summum bonum ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam, aestimatione intellectuque
melior, quem cuncta expetunt, cum ipse sit plenae perfectionis et nullius societatis indiguus; de quo
plura dici nunc exorbitare est. Deinde a prouidentia, quae est post illum summum secundae
eminentiae, quem noyn Graeci uocant; est autem intellegibilis essentia aemula[e] bonitatis propter
indefessam ad summum deum conuersionem, estque ei ex illo bonitatis haustus, quo tam ipsa
ornatur quam cetera quae ipso auctore honestantur. Hanc igitur dei uoluntatem, tamquam sapientem
tutelam rerum omnium, prouidentiam homines uocant, non, ut plerique aestimant, ideo dictam,
quia praecurrit in uidendo atque intellegendo prouentus futuros, sed quia proprium diuinae mentis
intellegere, qui est proprius mentis actus. Et est mens dei aeterna: est igitur mens dei intellegendi
aeternus actus. Sequitur hanc prouidentiam fatum, lex diuina promulgata intellegentiae sapienti
modulamine ad rerum omnium gubernationem. Huic obsequitur ea quae secunda mens dicitur, id
est anima mundi tripertita, ut supra comprehensum est, ut si quis periti legum latoris animam legem
uocet.
5
Ut igitur breui multa complectar, istius rei dispositio talis mente concipienda est: originem quidem
rerum, ex qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia ministratur, esse summum et ineffabilem deum;
post quem prouidentiam eius secundum deum, latorem legis utriusque vitae, tam aeternae quam
temporariae; tertiam porro esse substantiam quae secunda mens intellectusque dicitur, quasi quae-
dam custos legis aeternae . . . Ergo summus deus iubet, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat . . . Here
I translate tertiam porro esse substantiam as “there is a third substance,” rather than as “third is the
substance” in Magee’s and Bakhouche’s translation.

7.1 A Dynamic Model of the Divine

The question that is central here, however, is not just what the divinities are
and how they are described, but the dynamic that governs the structure.
How, in other words, do these divinities relate to each other?
(i) The first problem is the exact meaning of the highest god as “above
substance” (substantia, an echo of the famous phrase ἐπέκεινα τῆς
οὐσίας, Plato Rep. 509b9). Does this mean that the highest god merely
surpasses “being” in the sense of (a) being(s) (étant – τὸ ὄν)? Or does this
also imply that the god surpasses the ontological mode of being (être – τὸ
εἶναι) altogether? (This distinction, of course, is notoriously difficult to
express in English, hence my addition of the French counterparts.7) Is
Calcidius even aware of the distinction?
(ii) The second issue brings us back to the two types of soul out of which
the World Soul supposedly has been put together (chs. 29–31; see
section 5.1 in this study): one type of soul is the equivalent of
indivisible Being, and is a radically transcendent, purely noetic
soul, which Calcidius also simply calls nous or intellectus; the other,
as the equivalent of divisible Being, is a lower soul type, a principle of
life that is the inseparable companion of bodies. But how would the
higher, purely noetic soul relate to the first mind? Are they one and
the same entity (as I think they are)? Is the nous-soul merely an aspect
of the first mind, or does it constitute a separate level in its own right,
between first mind and World Soul? The fact that the latter is called
“second” mind rather than “third” would argue against that last
possibility. But these questions indicate an absence of strict demar-
cations and thus point to a fluidity in Calcidius’ ontological

6
Dillon 1977: 401–408; Gersh 1989 and 1986 II: 421–492. This position goes back to the famous article
by Dodds 1928. For the notion of the divine in Calcidius’ translation, see Militello 2008.
7
Cf. Anon. in Parm. 12.22–27.

7.2 Three Gods

Calcidius consistently refers to the second god, Providence, or the mens
prouida, with a possessive genitive construction (in the sense of “belonging
to god”), as he does also in the opening passage of this chapter. In ch. 139,
on the Demiurge, he mentions the uoluntas (will) of the highest god
(summi dei, as in ch. 176); in ch. 189, one who follows the law expressed
in fate is said “to follow the venerable traces of the first god” (sequatur
principis dei veneranda uestigia); ch. 201 discusses the order made by the
highest god, clearly referring to the Demiurge (ordinatio summi opificis dei),
and conflating the highest god and the Demiurge (as also in ch. 287 and ch.
354, in the sub-treatise on matter).
Note also that the highest and the second god (ch. 176) are said to be
holding together and governing (contineri regique) the universe. The high-
est god is said to be doing this principaliter – that is, in the pregnant sense of
principle. These are tasks which Plato ascribes to the Demiurge. Moreover,
in Calcidius’ usage (see Waszink’s index) continere is the Latin equivalent
of both συνέχειν and περιέχειν. In the first sense, the highest god would be
holding the universe together; in other words, maintaining it and keeping it
from dissolving again;8 in the second sense, god would be containing the

8
Cf. Plato Tim. 41b4–6: συνδεῖν; Phaedo 99c6: συνδεῖν and συνέχειν used together.

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7.2 Three Gods 89
entire universe. And perhaps one could even make the case that, because
god actually contains the universe, he can also preserve it in its existence.
Three sentences that belong together can clarify the status of the
Demiurge:
a. ch. 139, 179.10–11: (on the Demiurge) pater est et opifex non substantiae
sed generationis (he is the father and maker, not of substance, but of
generation).
b. ch. 188, 212.22–23: (on the highest or first god) originem quidem rerum,
ex qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia ministratur (the origin of
things, from which substance is provided to all other things that exist).
c. ch. 191, 214.24–26: (on the Demiurge): praestantissimum quidem ani-
mal id esse quod ceteris caelestibus animalibus substantiam ex se largiatur,
colat autem aliud multo praestantius, in quo sit origo rerum (the most
prominent living being is the one that bestows substance from itself
upon the other heavenly living beings, but that in turn worships
something else much more prominent, in which the origin of things
is located).
These three statements cannot easily be reconciled. Taking (a) and (b)
together does not pose a major problem: the Demiurge is the father and
maker, not of substance, but of generation; it is the highest god who is the
origin of things, and who bestows substance upon everything else that exists.
Without mentioning the distinction between être and étant, and without
calling the highest god “One,” (b) does give us a clue about what Calcidius
could mean by considering the highest god as above “all substance and all
nature” (ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam, ch. 176).
Let us compare Calcidius’ wording in (b) with a line from Macrobius,
who, in his commentary on Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis., reveals a much
more distinctly Neoplatonist influence, mentioning even sources by name
(Plotinus and Porphyry):9
b.1 (Calcidius): (on the highest or first god) originem quidem rerum, ex qua
ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia ministratur (translation see above).
b.2 (Macrobius): Deus, qui prima causa et est et uocatur, unus omnium
quaeque sunt quaeque uidentur esse princeps et origo est. (Passage continues:
Hic superabundanti maiestatis fecunditate de se mentem creauit. Haec mens,
quae nous uocatur, qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem seruat auctoris,
animam uero de se creat posteriora respiciens, 1.14.6).

9
Deuse 1997: 260, with bibliography.

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90 God and Gods
The god who is and is called the first cause, is the one and only principle
and origin of all things that exist and appear to exist. This god, because of
the superabundant fecundity of his majesty, has created mind from himself.
To the extent that this mind, called nous, looks at the father, it conserves
a full resemblance with its maker, but it creates soul from itself by turning
towards subsequent levels of reality.
Both the similarities and the differences between the two passages are
striking; they use similar terminology, but the outcome is quite different.
First, the three levels of reality are more clearly demarcated in
Macrobius; second, Macrobius posits the first principle as the origin of all
that has being (omnium quae sunt), whereas for Calcidius it is the origin of
everything else that has being (ceteris omnibus quae sunt). Calcidius’ version
allows for the possibility that his first god is not above being altogether and
that we should read the phrase ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam
(ch. 176) as a hendiadys. This figure of speech would imply that Calcidius
means “substance” in the sense of a specific nature, or substance in the
Aristotelian sense of specific being(s; étant), with the second component,
“nature,” narrowing down the first, “substance.” One must keep in mind
here, as Waszink’s index reveals, that substantia in Calcidius can mean both
essentia (cf. ch. 27, 78.2–3, mentioning Cicero; ch. 53, 101.14–15; ch. 325,
320.5) and res substantiua, including an alignment, in our context, with
natura.10 That the first god is not above being as such is also underscored
by the fact that in the summary statement of ch. 188, soul, or, the third god, is
called the third substance (tertia substantia), not the second.
If we can easily reconcile the statement that the Demiurge is not the
maker of substance (a) with the claim that the highest god is the origin of
substance (b), how would we fit in the notion that the Demiurge gives
“substance out of himself” (substantiam ex se largiatur) to other things (c)?
The Demiurge has substance and can bestow it on other things, but he is
not the ground of his own substance; that he derives from a higher
principle, namely the first god. Yet the reflexive use of ex se, pointing
back to the Demiurge, seems to have a deeper meaning: if the second god is
the mind or the will of the first, then the boundaries between the two are
not strict. We really seem to be talking of one and the same god, but from
different perspectives – that is, god in himself and god involved with the
task of ordering the universe.

10
Cf. den Boeft 1970: 88–89, referring to van Winden 1959: 221 (based also on Waszink’s index), who
gives three meanings of substantia: (1) substantia = essentia = natura (οὐσία), (2) substantia = existence
(ὑπόστασις), (3) substantia = substratum (ὑποκείμενον). It is the ﬁrst meaning we need here.

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7.2 Three Gods 91
The realization that the second god is both identical and subordinated to
the first god is confirmed by the remainder of the commentary, in which
Calcidius returns to a familiar Middle Platonist tripartite structure of god,
the Ideas (as model), and matter (ch. 307, 308.14–309.2). Moreover,
Calcidius oscillates between describing the Ideas as the thoughts of god,
and seeing them as the work of god.11
One particular example of this structure is worth examining more
closely (ch. 304). In the treatise on matter Calcidius discusses the way in
which human beings can have access to the divine, through compositio.12
Now, order is incapable of existing without harmony, and harmony is
ultimately a concomitant of proportion, and proportion is similarly coupled
with reason, and reason is ultimately found to be the indivisible concomi-
tant (comes indiuidua) of Providence; but Providence is not without intel-
lect, nor intellect without mind. Thus the mind of god tempered, ordered,
and adorned the whole of the corporeal structure; thus the divine origin of
the craftsman (diuina origo opificis) has at last been found. And the crafts-
man puts into effect and adorns everything according to his rational power
and the majesty of his works; but his works are his thoughts, which by the
Greeks are called ideas; and the ideas are the exemplars of natural realities.
And in this way the third, exemplary origin of things is found. Thus . . . by
following the principles of synthesis we have found the craftsman god
himself; and from the works of the craftsman god we have found the
Exemplar. (ch. 304; trans. Magee, slightly modified)13
In my translation above, I left a literal rendering of opificis origo diuina. The
parallel with tertia exemplaris origo rerum, and with origo siluestris in the
previous paragraph (ch. 303, 305.15) could justify van Winden’s translation
of the craftsman as a divine principle (Magee has “the divine origin arising
from the craftsman”); but the phrase could also refer to the relation
between the second god and the first, as the origin of the second, and
hence of all beings. We run into the by now familiar phrase mens dei, which

11
Ideas as thought(s) of god: ch. 273, 278.5–6; ch. 330, 324.24–325.1; ch. 339, 332.7; ch. 340, 333.16; ch.
342, 334.23–24; ch. 349, 340.9–10; Ideas as god’s work: ch. 24, 74.11–12; ch. 304, 306.5–7, cf. Gersh
1989: 89 and 1986 II: 465–467; see also section 10.3 in this study.
12
See section 10.4 in this study.
13
Ordo autem sine harmonia esse non potest, harmonia demum analogiae comes est, analogia item
cum ratione et demum ratio comes indiuidua prouidentiae reperitur, nec uero prouidentia sine
intellectu est intellectusque sine mente non est. Mens ergo dei modulauit ordinauit excoluit omnem
continentiam corporis; inuenta ergo est demum opificis diuina origo. Operatur porro opifex et
exornat omnia iuxta uim rationabilem maiestatemque operum suorum; opera vero eius intellectus
eius sunt, qui a Graecis ideae vocantur; porro ideae sunt exempla naturalium rerum. Quo pacto
inuenitur tertia exemplaris origo rerum. Igitur . . . iuxta [legem rationemque] compositionis uero
praecepta ipsum opificem deum [invenimus], ex operibus porro dei opificis exemplum.

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92 God and Gods
is Calcidius’ short-hand for this relationship, or the two highest gods
considered together. Similarly, I render individua, which van Winden
translated as “inseparable” (same in Magee) more literally as “indivisible,”
because it could be a reference to the connection between the nous-soul and
indivisible Being (Calcidius uses the expression inseparabilis comes else-
where, for an “inseparable companion,” as in ch. 31, 80.12).
Another indication that Calcidius’ first god is not above being altogether
is to be found in his interpretation of the Parmenides.14 He reads this work
of Plato as dealing with the issue of the participation of sensible in
intelligible reality (ch. 272, 276.15–277.8). This implies that he remains
within the tradition of ontological interpretations of the Parmenides, and
does not belong with those Neoplatonist readers who used this work of
Plato to back up their notion of a One so transcendent that it would be
above being (être) altogether.15
So much for the implications of the broader context for the relation
between the first and the second god. Before examining next the relation
between the second and the third god, let us explore further how the
overlapping of first god and Demiurge affects the commentary as a whole.
This conflation is crucial for a correct understanding of passages such as the
following (from the treatise on the human soul; see ch. 6 in this study):
But if they [the Hebrews] confess to the human soul’s being rational, then
they should believe their own claim, that after having made human beings
God “breathed” into them his divine “breath,” by which we employ reason
and intellect, and by which we piously venerate God and possess a natural
affinity with his divinity and are said to be “gods and sons of” the highest
“god.” (ch. 219)16
Waszink relies on this passage as prime evidence for Calcidius’ alleged
Christian identity,17 but this claim needs to be nuanced considerably. The
passage occurs in a dialectical disagreement with the Hebrews. The com-
plete argument runs as follows: if the Hebrews want to posit blood as the
substance of the human soul, then they contradict their own belief that the
soul originates from divine breath. Calcidius hence does not always
endorse the positions he ascribes to the Hebrews.18

14
See section 2.3 in this study.
15
According to Proclus’ doxography, In Parm. 630.15–645.8 Cousin; PT 1, 8–11, 32–55 Saffrey and
Westerink.
16
Si autem conﬁtentur [Hebraei] animam hominis rationabilem fore, credant sibi, quod deus a se
hominibus factis inspirauerit diuinum spiritum, quo ratiocinamur quoque intellegimus et quo
ueneramur pie deum estque nobis cum diuinitate cognatio diique esse dicimur et ﬁlii summi dei.
17
Waszink 1962: xi–xii and 1972: 236. 18 See also chs. 276–278; section 15.3 in this study.

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7.3 Possible Parallels? 93
I will argue that the language of “a kinship with the divine” and “gods
and the sons of the highest god” does not so much Christianize the Timaeus
as posit a possible common ground between a Platonist and a Christian
perspective (see section 15.2). The distinction is crucial for a correct under-
standing of the commentary, because it would prevent us from interpreting
it systematically through a Christianizing lens. The “highest god” is
Calcidius’ first-and-second god or Demiurge, and Plato called this
Demiurge a “maker and father.”
Let us turn our attention now to the relation between the second and the
third god, between Providence as the first mind and the World Soul as second
mind. The key to this issue is Calcidius’ positing fate as the link between the
two, and his distinction between fate in substance and fate in act.19 Fate qua
substance is the World Soul, but “we recognize its being and the kind of power
it has from its acts, which belong . . . with the second god, or Providence.”20
Fate qua act is an edict or law pronounced by Providence; it governs everything
except divine and intelligible reality (ch. 145, 183.19–20);21 fate qua substance is
the World Soul, because it has been given this law as an informatio. Calcidius
may use this word in a more pregnant sense than a mere “instruction” (as den
Boeft rendered it): the law makes the World Soul what it is.22
So, at first glance, the connection between the second and the third god
is not as tight: the second god commands, the third passes on the law and
obeys; and we need an intermediary, called “fate.” As we have seen,
however, law can also be considered as the soul of the expert lawgiver, as
the soul of Providence, or the second god, with the same kind of genitive
construction which Calcidius uses also to connect the first and the second
god. Yet, in all likelihood, the phrase “the soul of the lawgiver” is a slight
trace of and allusion to the purely noetic and transcendent soul, which, as
we have seen, Calcidius posits as the equivalent of indivisible Being. The
World Soul has a relation with this noetic soul, in the sense that the latter
goes into the mixture of the former, but together with a lower soul-type,
which is the equivalent of divisible Being.

7.3 Possible Parallels?

The parallel passages to Calcidius’ tripartite schema of the divine have been
discussed by other scholars, but I would like to revisit some of these in light
19
See also ch. 143; ch. 8 in this study.
20
See also ps.-Plutarch, Fat. 568C–D; Nemesius, Nat. hom. 38; Plotinus, Enn. 3.3.5.
21
See also chs. 148, 150–158, 181, 189.
22
See also ch. 147, 185.1: diuina lex est mundi animae insinuata.

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94 God and Gods
of the relationship between the different components of this schema.23 Let
us return to a much-debated fragment of Numenius from this vantage
point.24 Numenius’ schema consists of three minds: the first, called
“father,” is the Good itself, and the Demiurge of Being (but not
a Demiurge in the strict sense of “maker”); the second contains the
Forms, is the maker or the Demiurge of becoming,25 is a “lawgiver,” and,
I would suggest, the equivalent either of the second god or of the purely
noetic soul in Calcidius;26 the third is the World Soul,27 or universe.
One fragment in particular comes to mind:
Numenius places the first [god] at the level of “the Living” and claims that it
thinks by using the second, the second god he places at the level of “mind,”
and this one, in turn, is a demiurge by using the third, the third god he
places at the level “discursive reason” (F22 des Places, cf. also F13).28
The first god, “the Living,” thinks (νοεῖν) with the aid of the second,
the second god, mind, makes (δημιουργεῖν) with the aid of the third. This
dynamic reveals a clearly reciprocal relationship between the different
entities, whereby the higher entity also turns towards the lower, and not
only the lower to the higher. We seem to be dealing with a dynamic
continuum, as distinct from the Neoplatonist dynamic of emanation and
return, and thus the label “hypostases” for the different levels in Numenius’
thought should be used only with due caution. (This is also the main
reason why we have such a hard time pinning down these entities.29) It is
Proclus who has preserved the passage above for us, and his critique –
regardless of whether his rendering of Numenius is entirely accurate or
not – is loud and clear: one has to deny of the first principle all relations
with lower levels of reality (δεῖ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναπέμπειν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον,
ἐκείνου δὲ πᾶσαν ἀφαιρεῖν σχέσιν, In Tim. 2, I 304.10–11 Diehl).30

23
For the broader context in Middle Platonism, see also Boys-Stones 2018: ch. 6.
24
For a fuller discussion of Numenius as a source for Calcidius’ commentary, see ch. 13 in this study.
25
Cf. Calcidius, ch. 139, 179.10–11.
26
Cf. Calcidius, ch. 29, in comparison with chs. 297–99, in which Calcidius mentions Numenius by
name, for the debate on this issue, see Deuse 1983: 73–76 and Phillips 2003. See also Numenius F13,
F18.6ff., F44.
27
Dillon 1977: 374; Frede 1987: 1068.
28
Νουμήνιος δὲ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ “ὅ ἐστι ζῷον” τάττει καί φησιν ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ δευτέρου
νοεῖν, τὸν δὲ δεύτερον κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τοῦτον αὖ ἐν προσχρήσει τοῦ τρίτου δημιουργεῖν, τὸν δὲ
τρίτον κατὰ τὸν διανοούμενον.
29
Dodds 1960; des Places 1973: 13–14; Dillon 1977: 371–372; Frede 1987: 1070; Gersh 1989: 89;
Opsomer 2005: 51–99. See also Anon. In Parm. 9.1–8; and the debate over Alcinous, Didask. 10:
Donini 1988: 118–131; Mansfeld 1988: 92–117; Reydams-Schils 1999: 198, n. 90; Abbate 2002: 55–75.
30
See also Proclus, In Tim. 2, I 304.6–7, 305.2–4 Diehl; In Parm. 912.19–27 Cousin, Opsomer 2005:
64, n. 65.

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7.3 Possible Parallels? 95
Though we have three minds in Numenius’ view, the second god is
properly called mind, and the first thinks through the second; though both
the first and the second god are also called Demiurges, strictly speaking
demiurgy belongs to the third, but only in function of its relation to
the second. Numenius says explicitly that the god who is second and
third is one, or, this god is the second insofar as it turns its attention to
itself and the Good, and the third insofar as it turns to matter and sensible
reality (F11).
Thus, in Numenius’ schema the relation between the second and the
third god would be closer than in Calcidius’ account. On the relation
between the first and the second god, Proclus reports that Numenius has
a twofold notion of the Demiurge, one that applies to the first god (as
father) and one that applies to the second god (as maker).31 Calcidius could
have interpreted the latter claim as supporting his view of the close ties
between his first and second god (even though he does not adopt the
distinction between father and maker).
Important too is Numenius’ way of keeping the first god in contact with
intelligible being: the first god is said to be being itself (αὐτοόν F17), to be
fused with being (σύμφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ F16), or to be riding on being
(ἐποχούμενον ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ F2, 16).32 So, like Calcidius, Numenius is
struggling to make a distinction between being as such and the being of
the Forms, without having recourse to a difference between être and étant.
There is a distinction between Calcidius’ first and second god, yet by
describing the relation between the two as one being the mind of the other,
he also reminds us of the language of a Philo of Alexandria, and his notion
of god’s logos.33 The possible parallels with Philo would reward further
inquiry. We know that Philo’s God is Being, and that this God is said to
affect all of reality, or “to contain everything, without being contained”
(περιέχων οὐ περιέχεται). God is also above any specific form (Deus 55,
God as ἄποιος).34 Yet the differences between Philo and Calcidius should
not be argued away either. First, Philo’s structure of the divine and of
God’s powers is much more complex (cf. Fug. 94–100); second, he does call

31
F21 = Proclus In Tim 3, II 103.28–32 Diehl: ὥστε ὁ κατ’ αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττός, ὅ τε πρῶτος θεὸς
καὶ ὁ δεύτερος.
32
See also Alcinous’ term οὐσιότης, Didask. 10, 164.34.
33
For Philo, see Winston 1985; Runia 1986: 3, 2.7, 450–451; Reydams-Schils 1999: 145–156; . A key
passage is Opif. 24; cf. also e.g. Abr. 119–123 (God as one and three simultaneously), Sacr. 60, Post.
12–20, Mut. 27–28, the Greek fragment of QG at Eusebius, PE 7.13.1–2. See also section 15.4 in this
study.
34
See also Calcidius ch. 305, on principles in general, including god, and Alcinous 10.165.10–13: God as
neither ποιός nor ἄποιος.

7.4 A Stoic Inﬂuence

Despite extensive parallels in the three authors’ treatment of fate, there is no
counterpart to Calcidius’ tripartite schema of the divine in either ps.-Plutarch’s
or Nemesius’ account, which would, again, point to an independent use of the
doxographical material on Calcidius’ part.39 As counterintuitive as this may
sound at first, one could make the case that the dynamic of the relationship
between the different components of the tripartite divine schema in Calcidius
(and other texts discussed here) has a stronger affinity with a Stoic view of the
divine than with later Neoplatonist developments.40
If we examine more closely the dynamic of the divine in Calcidius from
a theoretical perspective, we notice that it is in important respects the
reverse of the Neoplatonist one, with its hypostases and processes of
emanation and return. The first, second, and third divinities in
Calcidius’ account, as in the Numenius passage we examined, are distinct
entities, but as such – in contrast, for example, to Macrobius’ schema
discussed above – they are nevertheless co-related: we can look at the divine
as god in himself, as turned towards the ordered universe, or as actually
present in and maintaining this order. For the Stoics, as is well known, the
different ways of looking at the divine all ultimately go back to one active
principle: the names “god,” “reason,” “providence,” and “world soul”

35
Cf. Runia 1986: 2, 5.1.2, 204ff. 36 See section 2.4 in this study.
37
See Porphyry, Sent. 13 and 30; Zambon 2002: 230–239, 281–293.
38
See e.g. Plotinus, Enn. 6.7.39.26–27, on ascribing Providence indirectly to the One, 6.8.17.18–21.
39
The ps.-Plutarch, Fat. has a threefold structure of Providence in ch. 9 (572F–573A), but that schema
provides a different framework; see also Nemesius, Nat. hom. 43. On this topic, see Sharples 2003.
40
On the role of Stoicism in Calcidius’ commentary, see ch. 12 in this study.

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7.4 A Stoic Influence 97
capture the same reality.41 Yet the Stoics do also allow for different levels of
the divine when they posit lower gods with partial responsibilities in the
universe, which represent a specific aspect of the one active divine
principle.42 So, the Stoic influence on Calcidius would be twofold. First,
the reciprocal relations in a network of co-related entities show that even
some of the Platonist triadic schemas for the divine may be indebted to
Stoicism. Second, as I have argued elsewhere, the basic pair of first
principles of reality, god and matter, which subsumes the Ideas under
god as the latter’s thoughts,43 itself owes a debt to the Stoics.44
Yet a Platonist cannot simply adopt the Stoic model without making
some crucial modifications45 in order to take into account the all-
important ontological distinction between the sensible and the intelligible
realms, as well as the notion of transcendence. The first key difference is
signaled by Calcidius’ claim that the first god is above “all nature” (ch. 176,
ultra . . . omnem naturam), a claim that would make no sense in the context
of Stoic physics.
The second crucial Platonic modification is that in Calcidius’ account
the sense in which the second god is not entirely coextensive with the first is
different from the sense in which the third god is not entirely coextensive
with the second. The second god is an aspect of the first, but the first
encompasses more than the second, as the very ground of being. The third
god, the World Soul, is related to the second god or purely noetic soul, but
it is also related to a lower soul type and matter, which stand outside of the
intelligible realm altogether. In the network of reciprocal relationships, the
three gods are then truly distinct in the sense that they are not coextensive;
yet the second god is an aspect of the first as well as the third, but not in the
same manner.
Here another comparison may prove revealing, this time with Boethius’
account of the divine in his De consolatione philosophiae (4.6).46 Whereas
Boethius cites the same factors of divine agency as Calcidius does, the
former’s structure of the divine could not be more different. In this passage
Boethius makes it clear that there is only one god, who is the highest mind

41
SVF 1.160, Diogenes Laertius 7.135, see also Cicero, Acad. 1.29.
42 43
See also Xenocrates F15 Heinze. See also section 10.3 in this study.
44
Reydams-Schils 1999: 43–44, 145–147.
45
To assess the shift in methodology in recent scholarship, one can compare the work cited in this
volume with the approach taken by Dörrie 1975. Dörrie overlooks the fact that the Timaeus available
to the Middle Platonists had already been Stoicized, and he relies too much on the problematic
hypothesis of Posidonius and so-called “Middle Stoicism” as catalysts in philosophical
developments.
46
Reydams-Schils 2002a: 198–201. See also section 16.1 in this study.

47
See ch. 9 in this study.

Providence and Fate

If we were to identify one central theme in Calcidius’ commentary on

Plato’s Timaeus, it would have to be Providence. Plato’s Demiurge is good
and cares for the universe by making it as perfect as possible, but the notion
of Providence as such does not play a major role in the Timaeus. Plato
mentions it once when he says that the world was endowed with soul and
nous as a result of divine providence (30c1), a benevolent attitude which the
younger gods will imitate in their actions (44c7, 45b1). But there are aspects
of the physical universe which Plato’s Demiurge cannot control and
transform.1 For Calcidius, by contrast, divine Providence is central, and
in this respect he betrays a very strong Stoic inﬂuence.2 The notion is so
important for Calcidius that he in effect rewrites Plato’s account in crucial
passages to make room for it. But an all-encompassing Providence does
raise the issues of its relation with fate and the role of human free will.

8.1 Providence
Calcidius does not make the case for Providence, but assumes its role and
importance. Already early in the commentary, in his discussion of the
lambda ﬁgure for the proportions that make up the structure of the World
Soul, Calcidius associates intelligence, Demiurge, and Providence (ch. 39).3
As we have seen,4 this Demiurge would constitute the second level in
Calcidius’ divine hierarchy. Throughout the commentary he emphasizes
the connection between the divine mind and Providence, as when he states
in the sub-treatise on demons, for instance, that “divine counsel and

1
Reydams-Schils 2009 (review of Sedley 2007); Reydams-Schils 2017b (response to Bryan 2013):
133–137. On this topic in Calcidius, see also Bergjan 2002: 307–316, esp. 313–315. For the broader
context in Middle Platonism, see Boys-Stones 2018: chs. 11 and 12.
2
See van Winden 1959: 29–30; Reydams-Schils 2002a and 1999; for a fuller discussion of the Stoic
inﬂuence see also ch. 12 in this study.
3 4
See section 3.3 in this study. Ch. 7 in this study.

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100 Providence and Fate
Providence” (diuino consilio prouidentiaque) has provided specifically also
for the needs of human beings (ch. 128).5
The providential role of the Demiurge manifests itself not only in his
ordering of the world, however, but also in his preserving it for all time
from destruction (as in ch. 132, for instance: creator omnium et conseruator
deus). Plato makes this point at the beginning of the speech which the
Demiurge delivers to the younger gods, after the god has completed his
part in the ordering of the world:
O gods of gods, works divine whose maker and father I am, which, having
come to be by my hands, cannot be undone but by my consent.
Now while it is true that anything that is bound is liable to being undone,
still, only one who is evil would consent to the undoing of what has been
well fitted together and is in fine condition. This is the reason why you, as
creatures that have come to be, are neither completely immortal nor exempt
from being undone. Still, you will not be undone nor will death be your
portion, since you have received the guarantee of my will – a greater, more
sovereign bond than those with which you were bound when you came to be
(41a–b; trans. Zeyl, modified).
Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, δι’ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα ἄλυτα
ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς
ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ· δι’ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε,
ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ’ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε
οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ
κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων οἷς ὅτ’ἐγίγνεσθε συνεδεῖσθε.
The opening line of this passage poses considerable problems in the
Greek original itself, and has been the subject of many discussions in the
tradition and the scholarly literature.6 Here I will focus on the statement of
the Demiurge that his works “cannot be undone but by his consent”
(ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ ἐθέλοντος). As the remainder of the passage makes
clear, the point is that things that derive their origin directly from the
ordering activity of the Demiurge, or depend on him as their cause, cannot,
by themselves, be expected to last forever. The Demiurge, however, puts
himself forward as the guarantee that the dissolution of the heavenly bodies
and all the younger gods (as well as, presumably, the universe in its
entirety) will never happen: his will (βούλησις) proves to be an even
stronger bond than the ties that currently make up their constitution.

5
See also ch. 139; and ch. 254, on dreams; and ch. 265: god gave sight to humans so that they could
observe circuitus mentis prouidentiaeque.
6
Taylor 1928: 248–251; Cornford 1937: 367–370.

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8.1 Providence 101
Thus, the Demiurge is not only responsible for the overall ordering of the
universe, but also maintains this large-scale order.
Calcidius does not so much translate the Greek here as explain it, as he
does in other contexts, and this is why we should be wary of using his
rendering as a witness to the original.7 Where the difficult Greek8 has only
the aluta (the things that cannot be undone), Calcidius’ Latin translation
hinges on the pair dissolubilis/indissolubilis: dissolubilia natura, me tamen ita
uolente indissolubilia. By nature the heavenly bodies and younger gods can be
undone, but because the Demiurge wills it (with the addition of ita) they will
be preserved. Moreover, in the commentary (ch. 139), Calcidius reinterprets
this notion of the divine will by taking it out of time altogether:9 the younger
gods will not be liable to destruction because they “do not originate in time
but from the will of the highest god which is beyond the entire span of time.”
The implication here is that in itself the direct causal dependence on this
divine agent is sufficient to guarantee preservation.
One of Calcidius’ most striking and important insertions of the notion
of Providence into Plato’s account is found in the opening of the sub-
treatise devoted to the discussion of matter. At a crucial juncture in his
work (47e), right before his introduction of what he calls the third genos or
the receptacle, Plato distinguishes between “the works of reason” (τὰ διὰ
νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα), which he has been discussing up to that point, and
those “of necessity,” to which he will turn his attention next (δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ
δι’ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενα τῷ λόγῳ παραθέσθαι).
This is how Calcidius renders Plato’s wording:
Since with very few exceptions we have considered all that the intellect of the
provident mind established, it is necessary now to speak also about the
things which necessity brings about (ch. 268; trans. Magee, slightly
modified).
Nunc quoniam cuncta exceptis admodum paucis executi sumus, quae
prouidae mentis intellectus instituit, oportet de illis etiam quae necessitas
inuexit dicere.
In his commentary on this passage, Calcidius attributes the mens provida
to god (dei), and he uses providus a third time in the space of a couple lines

7
See also Alcinous, Didask. 15, 171.22–23: ὃ δὴ πᾶν λύσιν οὐκ ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν, “the all
cannot be undone in keeping with his [the Demiurge’s] will”; note that Alcinous applies the principle
to the universe in its entirety.
8
The Greek μὴ ἐθέλοντος, as opposed to the version ἐθέλοντος, is conﬁrmed also by Cicero in his
translation (me inuito); see the discussion in Taylor 1928: 250–251.
9
On this issue see ch. 4 in this study.

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102 Providence and Fate
(providis rationibus). Divine Providence hence looms large in Calcidius’
rendering, whereas there is no trace of this notion in the Greek counter-
part. In Plato’s phrase, “the works of reason” (or, as in Zeyl’s translation,
“what has been crafted by Intellect”), nous is rather underdetermined:
whose nous? Presumably, the Demiurge’s. But how is this nous related to
divine agency and Providence?
The importance of Providence for Calcidius is underscored by his
deliberate and insistent creation of a chain of providential agents, from
higher to lower (see also the ending of ch. 188).10 Unlike its role in Plato’s
Timaeus, the World Soul in Calcidius’ account does not merely have
a cognitive function, but would also “govern” the things below “according
to the dispensations of the Demiurge and impart Providence to earthly
matters” (ch. 31, ch. 54; see section 5.2 in this study). In the sub-treatise on
demons, Calcidius presents their traditional function of mediating
between gods and humans in terms of their taking care of human beings
(chs. 131, 132, 134, 254). The providential function of the younger gods, to
which Calcidius returns in ch. 201, is more easily derived from the Timaeus
account itself, given that Plato’s Demiurge explicitly delegates some tasks
to them (41b–d).
Human beings too are inserted into this chain of providential agency. In
the ﬁrst part of the commentary, Calcidius already mentions that human
beings inherit a providential function from the World Soul in overseeing
tame animals (ch. 54). We are also told that the human soul provides life
and well-being to the body which it inhabits (ch. 204). In the sub-treatise
on fate (chs. 142–189), he starts by pointing out the two cognitive functions
in the human soul,11 parallel to his analysis of the World Soul, although he
parses these two functions differently. The World Soul has opinions and
knowledge or understanding (scientia or intellectus); the human soul that
directs its attention to the nature that always remains the same (like the
circle of the Same in the World Soul) strengthens its wisdom (sapientia, as
a return to higher reality), but its attention to the things that change and
are subject to generation (as with the World Soul’s circle of the Other)
yields opinion, or “prudence.” Prudence, prudentia, with its overtones of
Aristotelian phronēsis, immediately conjures up the notion of the active life
and the human being’s governing of mortal matters (ch. 180: in dispositione
rerum mortalium, contrasted with sapientia; see also the reference to

10
Waszink 1969: 275–278; on this issue in Atticus and Middle Platonism in general see Boys-Stones
2016.
11
See ch. 6 in this study.

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8.1 Providence 103
deliberation in ch. 199: deliberat). From this point of view, even anger and
desire acquire a positive function. The right kind of moral indignation can
make anger an ally of reason, as Plato had already pointed out in the
Republic (440e), but Calcidius stipulates that there is also an honorable
kind of desire. Anger and desire rightly ordered help the human being to
take care of earthly matters, so that his looking down from the higher
reality would also prove to be effective (despectus aeque ne esset otiosus, ch.
187; ch. 200; see also ch. 6 in this study). Thus, it comes as no surprise that
Calcidius stipulates as the primary purpose of the incarnation of human
souls the speciﬁc providential role that has been assigned to them (ch. 191:
ad tuenda terrena; ch. 192). More surprising is the fact that he ends up
connecting a form of Providence even with matter, through the notion of
necessity as a “providential form of obedience . . . founded upon reason”
(prouida parentia ratione nixa necessitas, ch. 270; see also ch. 9 in this study).
Once the Demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus has fashioned the immortal part of
the human souls from the less pure remains of the World Soul, he mounts
them on the heavenly bodies. Calcidius interprets this action as indicating
that without assistance from the god himself, no human soul would be able
to comprehend anything divine (ch. 141). Moreover, whereas Plato merely
claims that the Demiurge “showed” these souls “the nature of the universe”
(τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξεν, 41 e), Calcidius (ch. 143), once again, states
that this order of the universe represents Providence. Calcidius’ concern with
the providential ordering of the universe leads him both to mistranslate and
paraphrase wrongly the phrase συστήσας τὸ πᾶν in Plato’s account (41d8):
Plato refers to the whole of the mixture that is then divided among the
individual human souls, whereas Calcidius interprets it as referring to the
ordering of the universe (coagmentata mox uniuersae rei machina in the
translation, post mundi constitutionem in the commentary).12
How does Calcidius introduce the concept of fate? Where Plato says that
the Demiurge “described to them the laws that have been foreordained”
(νόμους τε τοὺς εἱμαρμένους εἶπεν αὐταῖς, 41e), Calcidius now paraphrases
this point by claiming that the Demiurge “revealed the complete series of
fates” (uniuersam fatorum seriem reuelasse). Plato’s “laws that have been
foreordained” are restricted speciﬁcally to the cycle of reincarnations of
human souls, but Calcidius could be drawing from the (false) etymological
connection the Stoics establish between εἱμαρμένη, fate, and εἱρμός,13

12
den Boeft 1970: 8–9; see also ch. 147.
13
Nemesius, Nat. hom. 37.108; SVF 2.284 (Diogenianus ap. Eusebium); on fate as the sequence of
causes, see also SVF 2.917, Gellius 7.2.3 = SVF 2.1000; and Cicero, Div. 1.125–126 = SVF 2.921.

8.2 Fate: The Target of Calcidius’ Polemic

The sub-treatise on fate can be divided in three sections (den Boeft 1970,
4–6). After an introduction (ch. 142), he presents the following:
I. Plato’s doctrine of fate (chs. 143–159)
II. Refutation of views of opponents, most likely Stoics (chs. 160–175)
III. Return to a more systematic overview of the relation between
Providence and fate (chs. 176–189)
There are signiﬁcant parallels between this section of the commentary and
material that shows up in a text wrongly attributed to Plutarch, Περὶ
εἱμαρμένης, and in Nemesius’ De natura hominis (from ch. 104, section 35
onwards). But these parallels should not be exaggerated: the structure of
Calcidius’ sub-treatise on fate is not reﬂected in either parallel text;
Calcidius’ account of three levels of the divine does not match the three
levels of Providence in either ps.-Plutarch (572F–573A) or Nemesius’
account of Plato’s position (42.125–43.126);14 and both ps.-Plutarch and
Nemesius have a more sophisticated awareness of the Stoic position (even
though the ps.-Plutarch text appears to be very sketchy near the end).15 As
in the parallel accounts, Calcidius combines elements from the Timaeus,
the Phaedrus (its mention of the “law of Adrasteia”16), and the myth of Er
from the Republic (especially 617d–620d, chs. 143–144).
A number of features of this sub-treatise stand out. In this context,
Calcidius declines to give a doxographical overview; it would take too long,
he says, to survey the opinions of others about this widely debated topic
(ch. 142), and he contents himself with a rapid overview of the different
possibilities for the role of fate and free will. The treatment appears to be
rougher than other sections of the commentary, which could be an

14
Cf. Waszink 1969: 278 and Bergjan 2002: 314–315; see also Sharples 2003; see ch. 7 in this study.
15
See also Apuleius, Pl. 1.12.
16
Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 248c2; see also Calcidius, chs. 143–144; 152; a digression in ch. 178.

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8.2 Fate: The Target of Calcidius’ Polemic 105
indication that Calcidius is borrowing more from his source(s) or working
on the basis of notes without ironing out all the wrinkles or spelling out all
the connections. Ideas from Aristotle have been subsumed under Plato’s
view without their origin being signaled (see below, and ch. 11 in this
study).
In effect, the sub-treatise appears to be driven largely by a polemic
against one specific group of thinkers, the Stoics. Criticism of their
doctrine of fate was indeed a staple of anti-Stoic polemic, as attested
also by Cicero’s De fato and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ work devoted to
the same topic. Calcidius’ attack is not limited to the middle section of
the sub-treatise: earlier on he already anticipates the challenge posed by
divination (ch. 157) and the polemic surrounding that specific issue, in
claiming that the authority of its predictions can be preserved on
Plato’s view as he presents it. And in the second systematic exposition,
he returns to the theme that divination is compatible with Plato’s
position (chs. 185–186).
Remarkably absent from Calcidius’ account is any overt polemic against
the Epicureans (or the atomist tradition more broadly construed), who are
typically attacked for their denial of divine Providence. He borrows one
line of reasoning that elsewhere is attributed to Epicurus as applying to
god:17 in ch. 173 he lists a number of possibilities concerning the relation
between fate and evil: (i) that fate wants all things to be good, but lacks the
power; (ii) that fate has the power, but does not want all things to be good;
and (iii) that it lacks both power and will. In an Epicurean context (and in
the skeptical tradition, as attested in Sextus Empiricus18), given the exis-
tence of evil, this listing of options leads to an impasse, because all three
possibilities are unacceptable for divine agency. And if we posit (iv) that
fate has both the power and the will to do good, where does that leave the
existence of evil? For the Epicureans this line of reasoning would under-
score the view that the divine has no care for such matters at all. But
Calcidius presents this fourth possibility not in order to undermine the
existence of fate but to connect the notion that fate has both the power and
the will to bring about good with the stipulations that it is the cause of all
good things and evil has no bearing on it. We will examine more closely
below first, how he thinks that such a position (a) does not lead us back to
the first option, that fate lacks power, and yet (b) allows for the existence of
evil; and second, how exactly he sees the relation between Providence and
fate.

17 18
den Boeft 1970: 73–74; Lactantius, ID 13.20–21. Sextus Empiricus, Pyr. 3.10–11.

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106 Providence and Fate
The presentation of the Stoic view has some odd features. In the first
systematic exposition, Calcidius mentions Chrysippus and Cleanthes as
holding different views about the relation between Providence and fate,
but without a strong polemical undertone – though he ends up disagreeing
with both positions. In the polemical section proper, however, Calcidius
talks about the Stoics (presumably) merely in the undefined third person
(“they say,” aiunt, ch. 160; Bakhouche 2011 II, n. 255). He mentions them
explicitly only when he discusses the Stoic theory of perversion (perversio/
διαστροφή; SVF 3.229a), which stipulates that humans are led astray either
by the attraction inherent in things themselves or under the negative
influence of others (ch. 165).19 Elsewhere in the commentary, Calcidius is
usually clearer and more precise in his attribution of certain views to the
Stoics.
A brief comparison with Cicero’s De fato may be helpful to understand
what is at stake here. In ch. 142, Calcidius rapidly enunciates three logical
possibilities: (i) the view that nothing happens according to fate, (ii) the
view that everything does, which leaves no room for human freedom, or
(iii) a mixed view, according to which some things result from fate and
others depend on an act of will (see also the transition at the end of the sub-
treatise, ch. 190). Cicero presents his readers with a similar schema, listing
two of the three possibilities (Fat. 39): there are those who “thought that all
things come about by fate” (trans. LS 62C), matching the second possibi-
lity mentioned by Calcidius, versus “the holders of the other view,” who
“believed that there are voluntary motions of our minds, free from all fate”
(matching Calcidius’ third position). But under the view of what we may
call radical determinism, Cicero lists Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles,
and Aristotle, whereas he says that Chrysippus presented himself as want-
ing “to strike a happy medium.” The reason, in other words, why Calcidius
presents the determinists’ position with an anonymous “they” may well be
that in the tradition this position was seen not to be unique to the Stoics,
even if they did become the primary target in debates about the role and
extent of fate. In Calcidius’ account, views that ultimately are derived from
Aristotle do not end up on the side of determinism, but he could well be
arguing against a broader range of thinkers, and not just the Stoics. As we
will see, Calcidius himself ends up endorsing a form of compatibilism that
allows for human freedom while placing human agency not outside of the
reach of fate altogether.20

19
See Graver 2012.
20
Reydams-Schils 1999: 225–243; Boys-Stones 2007; Sharples 2007; and Bonazzi 2014.

8.3 Fate: Calcidius’ Solution

If Chrysippus, according to Calcidius (ch. 144), holds that Providence and
fate are coextensive, and Cleanthes allegedly holds that everything that falls
under Providence also falls under fate, but not the other way around (i.e.
not everything that falls under fate falls under Providence), Calcidius’ Plato
endorses the position that is the converse of the latter: everything that falls
under fate also falls under Providence, but not the other way around
(ch.143, see also Nemesius 38.109.15–20). So, for Calcidius, Providence is
the notion that encompasses everything that happens in the world (chs.
145, 147 and 189), and this, again, brings out its importance. Divine beings
that are purely intelligible and are closest to Providence do not fall under
fate, but all natural and corporeal things do, including the heavenly bodies,
which are corporeal (ch. 177). The other exception to the rule of fate is
human freedom, which the exposition is meant to secure against the
determinist position. But that second exception, as we will see, needs to
be qualiﬁed: Calcidius does not want to oppose human freedom to fate,
but to make them compatible, in a manner that is different from the Stoic
approach. The determinists as Calcidius presents them are, again, radical,
in the sense of not even trying to leave room for human freedom in
a manner in which Chrysippus is reported to have done (section 12.1 in
this study); Calcidius is not claiming that this Stoic attempt at compatibi-
lism does not work,23 he is not recognizing it as a “middle ground” at all.
Calcidius systematically couches human freedom and responsibility in
Latin terms that have a voluntarist connotation or indicate that human
beings have a choice between alternatives, and not just between giving or
withholding assent, as in Stoic psychology. In this respect his view is closer

21 22
See also section 6.3 in this study. See section 12.1 in this study.
23
As Plutarch does, for instance, in his Stoic. rep. 1055D–F; Nemesius, Nat. hom. 35.105–106, too
includes Stoic compatibilism, as does Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 181.13–182.20.

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108 Providence and Fate
to the Aristotelian notion of deliberation (see ch. 184). The terms he uses
are: uoluntas, arbitrium, optio, and electio.
In order to allow for the solution to the conundrum of human freedom
which he ends up endorsing, Calcidius borrows other elements from the
Peripatetic tradition as well. He uses the list of Providence, fate, human
free choice, fortune, and chance (ch. 145). His treatment of fortune and
chance clearly echoes Aristotle’s account from his Physics (2.4–6, with the
distinction between τύχη and ταὐτόματον, the spontaneous), and chs.
158–159 contain examples which can also be found in Aristotle’s account.
Fortune is at work in the sphere of human action and rational decision-
making, when causal lines accidentally intersect, for instance, when some-
one who digs a hole to plant something discovers a treasure (ch. 159);
chance is the equivalent of such crossing of causal lines in things devoid of
reason. Both fortune and chance, however, are “embraced by the edicts of
fate” (ch. 179; see also chs. 188–189).
The second Peripatetic distinction that is essential for Calcidius’ argu-
ment is the one among occurrences that (i) happen invariably, (ii) happen
for the most part, (iii) occur with a more balanced possibility of going
either way, and thus are as likely to happen as not (ch. 156), and (iv) happen
rarely.24 Thus the heavenly bodies, while falling under fate, are governed
by what Calcidius calls a “happy necessity” (ch. 177: beata necessitate) in
their eternal and invariable condition that reflects their close proximity in
the ontological hierarchy to Providence, whereas fortune and chance
belong with the rare occurrences, which are exceptional deviations from
the norm (ch. 172). Things in the natural and earthly realm happen “for the
most part,” that is, they display regularity, but of a kind that allows for
exceptions and for things to go wrong (as with the birth of monsters, for
instance, chs. 172 and 177). Many aspects of a human being’s existence
would fall under this heading too, but rationality in human beings and the
right kind of decision-making can improve the odds for right outcomes.
Thus, human behavior insofar as it depends on deliberation, in effect,
would fall under the things for which the probability of happening or not
happening is more balanced (ch. 156; defined as “that which is up to us”).25
In order to grasp his solution for making human freedom compatible
with fate, and through fate, with Providence, we also need to take into
account how Calcidius defines the relation between the necessary and the
contingent (ambiguum, ch. 155). Calcidius endorses the position (i) that

24
See also Nemesius, Nat. hom. 34.103.17–104.11; and ps.-Plutarch, Fat. 571C.
25
See also Nemesius, Nat. hom. 40.114.21–22; ps.-Plutarch, Fat. 571D.

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8.3 Fate: Calcidius’ Solution 109
both the necessary and the contingent are sub-species of the possible; (ii)
that the necessary is something possible the contrary of which is impos-
sible; and (iii) that the contingent is something possible the contrary of
which is also possible.26
Given this view of the relation between the possible, the necessary, and
the contingent, the way out of the tension between human freedom and
fate/Providence is to rely on hypothetical necessity (a view that is present in
a range of Middle Platonist accounts),27 which, Calcidius claims, is analo-
gous to the relation between axioms (initiis) and theorems in geometry (ch.
150). If a human being undertakes a certain action, then certain conse-
quences will follow, or, as in the famous example (ch. 153), Apollo pro-
phesies that if Laius fathers a child, that child will end up killing him.
According to this view, it is still up to Laius and fully within the freedom of
his decision-making not to father a child. Fate (and through it Providence)
does encompass this occurrence, by stipulating the connection between
antecedent and consequent, but without determining the antecedent.28
Just as human laws that stipulate the penalty for treason do not turn
someone into a traitor, the divine law expressed in fate (as its act, whereas
the World Soul is its substance29) punishes those who deviate from the
right life, and awards those who do not (chs. 179–180). This analogy
between human and divine law echoes the distinction Calcidius made in
his introduction to the commentary, between justice in human affairs,
treated in Plato’s Republic, and natural or divine justice (ch. 6), to which,
he claims, the Timaeus is devoted.30 It is in the sub-treatise on fate that this
initial distinction comes to its full fruition.
Calcidius, in other words, uses the notion of hypothetical necessity to
preserve both the range of fate and human freedom, in his compatibilist
proposal. When he asks how fate can be all inclusive (ch. 148), that is,
regulate our universe in its entirety, and yet have determinate limits, the

26
ps.-Plutarch, Fat. 571B–C; Nemesius, Nat. hom. 34.103.20–21; also of Aristotelian inspiration, see
Int. 13, 23a15–16, and the discussion in ch. 9; An. pr. 1.13, 32a18–29. As Mansfeld 1999: 144–148 points
out, this view does not reﬂect Stoic modal logic, see section 12.1 in this study.
27
See also Tacitus, Ann. 6.22; Plutarch, Quaest. conv. 740C–D; Alcinous, Didask. 26; Porphyry, ap.
Stob. 2.5.39–42 = Wachsmuth 2, 169.8–20 = Smith F271.
28
The Stoics, by contrast, appear to have interpreted the same conditional prediction as being itself
interwoven in the fated causal nexus. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 202.8–15, 21–25: Apollo
knew that Laius would disobey, but the prophesy was needed, was a necessary condition, to set the
chain of events in motion; Apollo merely gave Laius the impression (φαντασία) that he could avoid
the outcome. And as we know, it is precisely by trying to prevent the outcome after he had fathered
a child that Laius brought on the tragic consequences. In that sense fate acted through Laius; see also
Epictetus, Diss. 3.1.16–18; Diogenianus, in Eusebius, PE 4.3.12.
29
See ch. 7 in this study. 30 See also ps.-Plutarch, Fat. 573D.

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110 Providence and Fate
answer is that fate and the events it regulates are embedded in the cyclical
time structure of the Great World Year (Timaeus 39d4–5). Thus, fate can
govern all aspects of corporeal reality, so long as it is both confined within
cyclical time and also allows for human freedom and an independent factor
of moral evil.
There are important elements from other Middle Platonist accounts
which Calcidius leaves out – and thus, as in other instances, his omissions
are revealing too. Alcinous, for instance, relies on the distinction between
the intelligible and sensible realms to make the claim that human beings
are free precisely insofar as through the rational function of their souls they
turn to the intelligible realm and aim at becoming godlike.31 Although in
the sub-treatise on the human soul he alludes to its affinity with intelligible
forms (ch. 225), Calcidius does not build his argument for human freedom
on this affinity.
Preserving human freedom is important for human beings because it
would allow them to recover from their mistakes and return to their
original divine condition (ch. 189). But Calcidius is concerned first and
foremost with preserving divine agency. Positing a rigid chain of causes
would, the strongest objection goes, amount to eliminating the very
existence of Providence or gods, because what would there be left for god
to do if all is ruled by necessity (ch. 175)?32 Moreover, divine agency also
needs to be protected from any contamination by evil. It would be
monstrous, he avers, to state that evil follows from reason (ch. 175).
“God is not responsible.”33 As a result the entire series of divinities are
cleared from the potential charge of causing evil. Fate too cannot be the
cause of both good and evil, because one and the same thing cannot
encompass opposites (ch. 172), and, as we have seen, to say that fate only
wants the good, but cannot make everything so, is to weaken divine power;
to say that it can prevent evil, but does not want to, is to make the divine
cruel; to say that it neither wants all things to be good nor can bring this
about amounts to impiety (ch. 173). So, the only option remaining is that
an all-encompassing fate is the cause of good, and the responsibility for evil
has to lie elsewhere, namely in human freedom, which, however, is still
governed by fate through hypothetical necessity. An analogous line of
reasoning can be extended to the heavenly bodies (and by implication

31
As in Alcinous, Didask. 2; for a detailed discussion of this passage and others, see Vimercati
2020.
32
See also Nemesius, Nat. hom. 35.104.15–20.
33
θεὸς ἀναίτιος, as in the myth of Er from the Republic, 617e4–5, with a similar notion in the Timaeus,
42e3–4; Calcidius chs. 154 and ch. 199.

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8.3 Fate: Calcidius’ Solution 111
the World Soul), which do affect other things – a point to which we need
to return below – but cannot be the cause of both good and evil. Actually,
given their divine and perfect nature, they cannot be the cause of evil at all
(ch. 174). Human beings’ freedom and responsibility is also meant to let
the younger gods, which Calcidius equates with the heavenly bodies, off
the hook for their making of the body and the two lower parts of the mortal
soul, spirit and appetite (ch. 201).
But despite Calcidius’ claim that human action would fall under the
heading of things that could happen just as well as not, and his invocation
of hypothetical necessity, the odds for virtue and vice are not actually
balanced in human beings because they consist of both soul, which also
includes lower irrational functions, and body. Laius may have had a choice,
but his propensity towards intemperance pushed him towards fathering
a child (ch. 153), and similarly, Achilles’ violent temperament and thirst for
honor made him choose the option of a short but glorious life (ch. 154; see
also ch. 169, for Cyrus and Croesus). In the Stoic-sounding passage about
assent moving of its own accord (ch. 156), Calcidius points out that many
factors can lead to a wrong decision, including bad habits or the tyrannical
inﬂuence of vice. Thus, when Calcidius, in the polemical section of the
sub-treatise, discusses the double perversion theory of the Stoics (chs.
165–167), the attraction inherent in things themselves and the corrupting
inﬂuence of others, he is not rejecting that point of view as such, which is,
after all, reminiscent of the Socratic claim that “nobody errs willingly.” It is
true that the attraction pleasure and honor exert can lead us astray, or that
mothers, nurses, and poets (as Plato says in the Republic 377b) can push us
in the wrong direction.34 Even a certain mixture of humors in our body can
make us more prone to certain vices, such as lust and anger, and the
vicissitudes of life too can turn us away from the pursuit of the true
good. Thus, would-be sages need all the help they can get (ch. 168):
a good rearing that also disciplines the body to serve the soul, good
teachers, and divine assistance, like the daimōn that watched over
Socrates from his childhood. But the view that many factors push against
a human being’s ability to practice virtue cannot be used as a pretext to
abdicate responsibility and accountability.
It turns out that against these quite overwhelming odds, only reason can
take a stand (chs. 181–182). It is true that, by nature, some people have
a better disposition, as a result of a better mix of the humors that make up
their constitution, than others. But it is precisely because of this fact that

34
See also Cicero, Tusc. 3.2.

8.4 Refuting the Arguments in Favor of Determinism

So, what exactly is it that the determinists, among whom Calcidius ranks
the Stoics, would hold against a view of hypothetical necessity such as the
one he outlines? It is striking that in the second section of the sub-treatise
on fate the discussion is not presented merely as a critique of the determi-
nists but as a debate between the two camps. Moreover, as I have indicated
already, the section is not governed entirely by a polemic, but represents
some common ground as well. Following den Boeft in this respect (1970:
49), we can detect four lines of reasoning in defense of the determinists’
notion of fate (chs. 160–161). The first has to do with divine foreknowledge
and power: if god has foreknowledge of everything that happens, not only
pertaining to the necessary and eternal heavenly phenomena but also to
those parts of the universe that are liable to contingency (dubiam illam
naturam), including human decisions, and if he controls past, present, and
future, this implies that everything has been arranged from the start.
The second point is a corollary to the first: the notion of co-fatality
ensures that matters pertaining to the laws and other forms of exhortation,
and to sciences such as medicine, also fall under fate: if something is
destined to happen, the means by which this is to take place are determined
as well. For example, a person destined to be just will have such and such
parents to give him the right education, or a person destined to be cured
from an illness will be healed by this specific doctor, or even by a non-
expert, if fate has so arranged it. It is striking that Calcidius does not
present this argument as itself a response to a criticism leveled against the
Stoics for their determinism, the so-called Lazy or Idle Argument, as, for
instance, in the claim that if it is fated that either you will or will not
recover from an illness, it makes no difference whether you call in a doctor
or not, and hence human actions of this type become futile.35

35
Cicero, Fat. 28–29; Origen, C. Cels. 2.20.

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8.4 Refuting the Arguments in Favor of Determinism 113
Third, praise and blame are often allocated in an unexpected manner, so
that good people and deeds are punished instead of rewarded, and this, the
truncated claim implies, can only be explained on the basis of fate. Fourth,
and last but not least, the art of divination shows that everything has
already been arranged; otherwise no predictions could be made.
Calcidius addresses these objections in a different order, leaving the issue
of unexpected outcomes last, presumably because nothing registers the
problem of moral evil as strongly as the unjust treatment of good people,
illustrated poignantly by cases such as the condemnation of Socrates or the
killing of prophets (ch. 172). We will take a closer look below at how he
handles divine Providence and divination. The second challenge, of co-
fatality, leads to a different approach, already discussed above, from the end
of ch. 163 onwards (up to ch. 168), by taking into account the Stoic theory
of perversion. That is, in a sense, yes, many factors affect human beings’
ability to make the right choices and decisions, but these, in the end, do not
alter the fact that the choices and decisions are theirs to make, and that
there remains an irreducible freedom that would also allow one to over-
come significant odds.36
The first issue, of divine foreknowledge, is not limited to this section of
the commentary, or to Calcidius’ second divinity, that is, Providence
proper. Already in the first part of the commentary, when he discusses
the cognitive function of the World Soul, Calcidius adds a feature to his
translation that is not present in the original (37b; Bakhouche 2011 II,
n. 391; ch. 52), namely its ability to foresee the future (quae sint futura
metitur). But in the sub-treatise on fate, he focuses his attention on
Providence and fate. In a first move, which we have already observed
several times,37 Calcidius lifts Providence and its edicts, which constitute
the act of fate, outside of time altogether:
Providence [foresight], so called not, as many suppose, because it is
a precursor in seeing and understanding events to come but because under-
standing, which is the act proper to mind, is a property of the divine Mind;
and the Mind of God is eternal; hence the Mind of God is the eternal act of
understanding. (ch. 176; trans. Magee, emphasis in his translation)38

36
See also Cicero, Fat. 10–11, with the story of the painter Zopyrus who claimed that Socrates’
physiognomy was not very promising, and the point that he, Socrates, had managed to overcome
his natural weaknesses. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 171.11–16.
37
See also ch. 4 in this study.
38
prouidentiam homines uocant, non, ut plerique aestimant, ideo dictam, quia praecurrit in uidendo
atque intellegendo prouentus futuros, sed quia proprium diuinae mentis intellegere, qui est proprius
mentis actus. Et est mens dei aeterna: est igitur mens dei intellegendi aeternus actus.

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114 Providence and Fate
Second, it is not the case that things are known according to the nature
of the knower, but rather that god knows each thing according to its
nature (see also ch. 177: omnia reguntur, secundum propriam quaeque
naturam).39
Let us take a closer look at this passage:
(1) What will we respond? That god does indeed know all things, but that
he knows each and every thing in virtue of its proper nature:
a. as subject to necessity insofar as it is liable to necessity,
b. and as contingent insofar as it is endowed with a nature for which
deliberation opens up a path.
(2) For god does not know the contingent as something certain and
constrained by necessity (for in that case he will be deceived and not
know) but in such a way as to know it in virtue of its proper nature, as
truly contingent.
(3) What, then, do we say? That god knows all things and that his knowl-
edge is confirmed from eternity;
a. but that some of the objects of his knowledge are divine and
immortal
b. and others mortal and temporal;
a. that the substance of immortal things is stable and fixed,
b. and that of mortal ones mutable and contingent, being dif-
ferently disposed through time owing to the inconstancy of its
nature.
(4) Hence too god’s knowledge
a. of divine things, whose happiness is certain and secured by perpe-
tual necessity, is certain and necessary knowledge, both because of
the certain comprehension in the knowledge itself and by virtue of
the substance of the objects known.
b. But, although his knowledge that uncertain things are uncertain and
by disposition contingent as to their outcome is necessary (for they
cannot be other than their nature is), they themselves are nevertheless
capable of opposite outcomes rather than subjugated to necessity.
(5) Contingent events, then, are not also rigidly disposed and decreed
from the start, except perhaps for the very fact of their having to be
uncertain and dependent upon an outcome one way or the other. And
so, the fact that the nature of the human soul is such as in one instance
to apply itself to virtue but in another to lean toward malice, as with the
body’s health wavering between health and sickness, is obviously fixed
and decreed from the beginning as well. But it is neither decreed nor
ordained who is destined to be evil or good; hence our laws, instruc-
tions, deliberations, exhortations, warnings, education, steady

39
See also ps.-Plutarch, Fat. 570E–F; Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 201.16–18; Reydams-Schils 2002a:
199–200; 2010: 504–505; sections 2.4 and 16.1 in this study.

40
. . . quid respondebimus? Quod deus sciat quidem omnia, sed unumquidque pro natura sua
ipsorum sciat: necessitati quidem subiugatum, ut necessitati obnoxium, anceps uero, ut
quod ea sit natura praeditum, cui consilium uiam pandat; neque enim ita scit ambigui
naturam deus, ut quod certum et necessitate constrictum (sic enim falletur et nesciet), sed
ita, ut pro natura sua uere dubium sciat. Quid ergo dicimus? Deum scire omnia scien-
tiamque eius ex aeternitate solidari, porro quae sciuntur partim diuina esse et immortalia,
partim occidua et ad tempus; immortalium rerum substantiam stabilem et ﬁxam fore,
mortalium mutabilem et dubiam aliasque aliter se habentem ob naturae inconstantiam.
Ergo etiam dei scientia de diuinis quidem, quorum est certa et necessitate perpetua munita
felicitas, certa et necessaria scientia est, tam propter ipsius scientiae certam comprehensio-
nem quam pro eorum quae sciuntur substantia; at uero incertorum necessaria quidem
scientia, quod incerta sint et in euentu ambiguo posita – nec enim possunt aliter esse
quam est natura eorum –, ipsa tamen in utramque partem possibilia sunt potius quam
necessitatibus subiugata. Non ergo etiam dubia ex initio rigide disposita atque decreta sunt,
nisi forte id ipsum, quod incerta esse et ex ancipiti euentu pendere debeant. Quare, quod
animae quoque hominis natura talis sit, ut interdum ad uirtutem se applicet, interdum ad
malitiam praeponderet (perinde ut corpus modo sospitati modo aegritudini proximum),
ﬁxum plane est et decretum ex origine. Quis porro malus sit futurus aut bonus, neque
decretum neque imperatum, proptereaque leges magisteria deliberationes exhortationes
reuocationes institutiones nutrimentorum certa obseruatio laus uituperatio quaeque his
simulantur, quia recte uiuendi optio penes nos est.

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116 Providence and Fate
for the most part in nature – as with the body’s health, which is, after all, its
normal condition – and human deliberation, which has more balanced odds,
in principle.)
Calcidius does not want merely to preserve divine Providence, but also
to maintain the importance of divination, or, more specifically, the fact
that the heavenly bodies do affect other occurrences in the universe, and
thus that there is a greater order with implications for everything that
happens in the sublunary realm. This theme comes to the fore in ch. 76 of
the first part of the commentary, where Calcidius discusses occurrences
such as birth and death, growth and decline, and all kinds of changes,
including the change of place, which “all derive their origin from the
movements of the planets.” It is not the case that the heavenly beings have
been arranged thus for the mere sake of mortal beings, but rather that
they would provide a model to be imitated, to a limited extent, by the
sublunary realm. Among the opening passages of the second part of the
commentary, we find a statement that heavenly bodies that reappear after
long intervals can be indicative of future events for those who can read
them correctly. In this context, these heavenly bodies are not the cause of
future events but rather a sign of things to come (ch. 125). This same
point is repeated in the sub-treatise on demons, when Calcidius brings to
bear the principle of plenitude, that there have to be intermediaries
between the divine heavenly beings and humans. So, by the time he
turns his attention to the sub-treatise on fate he already has a strong
vested interest in preserving divination and prophesy (through oracles or
otherwise).
The goal of the sub-treatise on fate, again, is to mount a defense against
the radical determinists without jeopardizing the divine order of the
universe. Thus, the first discussion of divination already preempts the
criticism of the polemical section. Divination is best interpreted as reflect-
ing hypothetical necessity as well: an astrologer can consult the heavenly
bodies to discover certain conjunctions, of the type “if this happens, that
will follow,” or the most opportune moment for a certain action, once it
has been decided upon (ch. 157). In the polemical section Calcidius
stipulates that prophesies concerning contingent matters that have not
been settled yet are deliberately ambiguous to leave room for a range of
possibilities. For instance, the famous oracle that Croesus would ruin the
greatest empire if he crossed the Halys hinges, on the one hand, on the fact
that the war itself may have been inevitable, given the propensities of the
antagonists, but, on the other, that the outcome of the conflict was still
open (ch. 169). Sometimes god actually gives advice about the right course

41
For the debate on this topic, see Bobzien 1998: 165, n. 55.

Matter and Evil

Calcidius devotes about a third of the commentary to matter as a principle

of reality.1 Given the importance of Providence as a Leitmotiv of the
commentary, he has to come to terms with the problem of evil, and that
problem, in turn, requires that he address the function of matter in the
lower, sensible level of reality. In light of the educational program he has set
for himself, the topic of this sub-treatise represents the most advanced level
in theoretical philosophy within the commentary (and as we have seen,
Calcidius would have expected Plato’s Parmenides to pick up where the
Timaeus as a discourse on nature would have left off).2 The treatise also
deals with the broader question of origins or the principles of the universe
as the primary and foundational building blocks of reality, and thus
includes a more systematic exposition of the role of Forms in Plato’s
account (chs. 337–344), which we will examine more closely in the next
chapter.
Calcidius draws attention to the fact that Plato himself does not use the
term hulê (matter) to designate the receptacle (chs. 273, 308). Yet he uses
this designation in his commentary because it became the technical term in
the tradition, and thus allows him to provide an overview and comparison
of different philosophical positions. A correct understanding of Calcidius’
use of the doxographical tradition and his own ﬁnal view must take into
account the intricate structure of this longest sub-treatise of the work:
Chs. 268–354:
I. Introducing Plato’s view, chs. 268–274
II. Doxography
A. Generated matter: Hebrews, chs. 276–278

1
This chapter is an expanded version of a seminar presentation, a summary of which was published as
Reydams-Schils 2015, with a response by Bakhouche.
2
See sections 2.2 and 2.3 in this study. For the broader context in Middle Platonism, see Boys-Stones
2018: chs. 3 and 4.

118

9.1 The Initial Account of Matter

As he has done consistently throughout the commentary up to this point,
Calcidius starts the sub-treatise on matter with a more succinct rendering
of what he presents as Plato’s position. He provides an overview of all the
components that would go into a deﬁnition of matter and its function as
a principle that coexists with God and intelligible reality (ch. 268):
i. Matter is that out of which (ex qua) “the universal array of things”
(rerum uniuersitas) arises.
ii. As such it is entirely passive (patibilis natura)
in the sense of
(a) “being for body the primary substrate (subiecta corpori principa-
liter) in which (in qua) qualities, quantities, and all accidental
phenomena occur”
and
(b) as that which, while not receding from its proper nature, changes
according to the different features and forms of the things which
it receives.
For Calcidius matter’s passive nature also implies that it willingly
submits itself to divine reason (ch. 269), and that there exists even
a “providential form of obedience” in “necessity founded upon

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120 Matter and Evil
reason.” In other words, even matter makes a contribution to the
chain of Providence.3 But he is aware that such a view of the role of
matter might clash with Plato calling it an “errant cause” (τὸ τῆς
πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας, 48b6–7), an expression which Calcidius
connects to matter’s disorderly motion (inordinata iactatio, ch. 271)
before the intervention of the Demiurge. And although Plato’s
account also claims that the Demiurge had to use force to some
extent, Calcidius emphasizes the Demiurge’s reliance on persuasion
more strongly (ch. 270), in an interesting political contrast between
the rule of a tyrant and power exercised through “imperial sanctity”
(sanctitatis imperatoriae). A universe governed by force, he argues,
would not be able to last forever. At this stage in the argument one
can already anticipate that, given this view, Calcidius will have to
come up with an explanation for the original disorderly state of
matter.
For Calcidius (contrary to the Stoics, ch. 289) the claim that matter is the
primary substrate for body in itself implies, first, that matter itself cannot
be corporeal (or, as Calcidius will go on to stipulate: it is neither corporeal
nor incorporeal, ch. 319–320).4 Matter, Calcidius claims, is called necessity
because it is a sine qua non for corporeality (ch. 271). Second, the elements,
precisely because these are bodies, cannot rank among the first principles of
the universe, and one could consider matter to be the primary element
(primum elementum, ch. 272).
Calcidius’ first definition of matter and its role is embedded in
a reflection about what it means to talk about origins, or principles
(initia). As such it presents us with a first view of the role of intelligible
reality and with a reference to Plato’s Parmenides.5 Already in this context
Calcidius reflects on the kind of reasoning needed to understand matter
(ch. 274): one cannot rely on examples, because nothing else exists that
would be comparable; one cannot use syllogistic reasoning, which
deduces a conclusion from previous premises, because nothing precedes
an origin. One can merely have a sense of what matter stands for through
a process of abstraction in thought whereby one removes, one by one, all
the features inhering in it,6 through, as Calcidius puts it in an oxymoron,
“an obscure preconception, as it were, of light” (obscura quadam luminis
praesumptio).

3 4
See section 8.1 in this study. See also Alcinous, Didask. 8, 163.7–8 and Apuleius, Pl. 1.5.92.
5 6
On this issue see also section 2.3 in this study. See section 10.4 in this study.

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9.2 Calcidius’ Stance 121
9.2 Calcidius’ Stance
Given the length and intricate structure of the sub-treatise on matter, it
helps to start with the end, that is, to know where Calcidius is headed with
his exposition. In the final chapter of this sub-treatise (before turning his
attention to the ordering of the traces of the elements in the last chapter of
the commentary as we currently have it) Calcidius not only gives us his
ultimate view of matter but also brings together a number of threads that
run throughout the entire commentary. The passage is thus very illumi-
nating for Calcidius’ working methods. Here is the chapter in question:
a. “But,” he says, “after taking the decision to bring everything back within
measure.”
He means the provident will of God, and says that God
b. “decided first to give binding unity to fire, earth, air, and water; not in
their present states but” as faint “traces” thereof.
For a trace of fire is not yet fire, nor are traces of other bodies the actual
bodies; for “trace” signifies the potency in a thing, not the thing, and
a body is even further removed from being signified by the word “trace”;
thus “before the adornment of the world” matter too was a “trace” of body.
c. “Despite the squalor,” he says, “and deformity manifested by things
that lack divine foresight.”
i. Rightly so indeed, for in the absence of the divine activity what
will be beautiful or endowed with gracefulness? Thus the appa-
ratus existed even at the point when the elements were in a crude
state of confusion, but it did not yet exist as the world, nor was
there the clarity that came to it on the occasion of the providen-
tial ordering.
ii. Thus there was matter, along with its natural capacity for receiving
beauty and gracefulness, to act as substrate; and there were the
potencies of the four bodies, their confused and still disordered traces.
iii. And so in disposing and ordering them at his will, God graced this
immortal living being that is the sensible world with determinate
shapes and qualities and with formative patterns destined to endure
unto eternity.
iv. Moreover, Plato bids us to hold that all that comes to be comes to
be in the “best possible way” because of the divine mind and will,
and asserts that there is nothing truer than such a conviction. (ch.
354; trans. Magee, slightly modified)7

7
a. Sed ubi cuncta, inquit, redigi ad modum placuit.
Dei uoluntatem signiﬁcat prouidam, <cui> complacuisse dicit

b. ignem primo terramque et aera atque aquam continuasse, non talia ut nunc sunt, sed eorum exigua
uestigia.
Quippe uestigium ignis nondum ignis est nec uero ceterorum corporum uestigia ipsa
corpora sunt; uestigium quippe potentiam rei, non rem significat multoque etiam minus
corpus significatur uestigii nomine; ergo silua etiam uestigium corporis fuit ante mundi
exornationem.
c. In eo, inquit, squalore ac deformitate qui apparet in his quibus diuina deest prospicientia.
i. Iure meritoque; quid enim diuina opera carens pulchrum aut uenustate erit praeditum?
Apparatus ille igitur erat etiam tunc, elementis confusis incondite, nondum mundus nec
claritudo quae ex opportunitate prouidae ordinationis accessit.
ii. Erat igitur subiecta silua cum naturali opportunitate suscipiendae pulchritudinis ac
uenustatis, erant etiam quattuor corporum potentiae seu uestigia confusa adhuc mini-
meque ordinata.
iii. Haec ergo cum uoluit deus disponens et ordinans immortale hoc sensilis mundi animal
figuris et qualitatibus conuenustauit certis et in aeternum duraturis rationibus.
iv. Omnia porro quae fiunt optima diuina mente ac uoluntate fieri praesumere nos iubet; qua
praesumptione nihil esse uerius asseuerat.
8 9
See section 3.3 in this study. See section 8.1 in this study.

9.3 Harmonizing Different Traditions

As in previous sections of the commentary,10 Calcidius tries to create
common ground. In other cases (for example, the doxography on the
human soul, discussed in ch. 6 in this study), he is the one who ends up
inserting aspects of other views in any given view in order to retroject
onto Plato a harmonized perspective that contains as many different
aspects of these views as possible. In this case, however, he also explicitly
relies on an agreement between a number of different schools of thought
to achieve this goal. Although each philosopher applies these tenets in
a different way, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics do agree, he
states (ch. 280), that (a) the ordering of matter (constitutio siluae) is the
work of Providence (prouidentiae opus); (b) matter is continuous
throughout; and (c) is without form or quality (informis et sine ulla
qualitate; see also ch. 310: sine qualitate esse ac sine ﬁgura et sine specie).
Similarly, in his systematic exposition of the principles, Calcidius claims
that the Pythagoreans, Platonists, and Stoics agree that matter is the
origin of things (ch. 308) and that it is eternal (ch. 312).11

10
See also section 1.3 in this study.
11
As Karamanolis (forthcoming) points out, Aristotle is not included in the list of ch. 308 because
Calcidius here includes him among the auditores Platonis, which makes him all the more reliable as
an interpreter of Plato (see ch. 11 in this study).

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124 Matter and Evil
Because for him Plato always represents the pinnacle of philosophical
truth, Calcidius appropriates one of Aristotle’s charges against Plato, that
the latter in effect had developed an incomplete model by positing only
two principles, form and matter or form and privation (ch. 288; based on
Physics 1.9.192a3–34), not three.12 Calcidius transposes the structure of that
polemical strategy to state that, before Plato, none of the Ancients had
recognized all three factors necessary to explain reality (ch. 350). Most of
them, such as Empedocles, he avers, posited merely the existence of
sensible bodies; others, such as Parmenides, recognized only intelligible
reality. Only Plato came up with the notion of matter, in combination with
the other two factors. The double approach of both creating a common
ground and attributing it to Plato is evident in Calcidius’ summary state-
ment about matter, the chapter under discussion, in which he clearly
integrates Stoic and Aristotelian features.
Apart from the prominence of the notion of Providence, mentioned
already, Calcidius renders the relation between God and matter in other,
clearly Stoic terms as well. In the opening section of the treatise on matter,
he describes this relation as follows:
Providence is the operative agent, while matter is passive and offers itself
without resistance for adornment, since the divine mind penetrates and
forms it completely and in every quarter – not like the arts, which provide
form only superﬁcially, but in the way that nature and soul vivify all solid
bodies by permeating them. (ch. 269)13
As long as one rejects too biological a notion of seminal logoi (ch. 294; see
also 311), does not make god the cause of evil,14 and posits that matter
cannot be corporeal nor incorporeal (as opposed to ch. 289), the basic Stoic
schema can be put to work in this Platonic context. Calcidius accepts from
the Stoics that matter is neutral and completely amenable to a divine
ordering principle that permeates it (see also chs. 307 and 319). This picture
presents matter as not resisting order (see also ch. 270). Last but not least,
Calcidius also calls matter ousia (essentia, ch. 273; substantia, ch. 330),
a point to which we will need to return (see ch. 10 in this study).
From the extensive section on Aristotle, which also includes a rendering
of Physics 1.9.192a3–34, Calcidius is happy to borrow the notions of

12
See also the criticism in Met. 1.6.988a7–17.
13
operante quidem prouidentia et agente, silua uero perpetiente exornationique se facilem praebente,
penetratam siquidem eam usque quaque diuina mens format plene, non ut artes formam tribuentes
in sola superﬁcie, sed perinde ut natura atque anima solida corpora permeantes uniuersa uiuiﬁcant.
14
On this issue, see also sections 8.3 and 8.4 in this study.

9.4 Rejected Views

As important as the philosophical views which he borrows are the positions
Calcidius rejects. First of all, he rejects the view which he attributes to the
Hebrews (chs. 276–278) of matter being generated, even if that generation
can be understood ﬁguratively as matter’s eternal dependence on god. This
rejection poses a considerable challenge for attributing a Christian identity
to the commentator,17 especially in light of the fact that it is only here, in
this context, that Calcidius mentions the possibility of god himself having

15
Pace van Winden 1965 (reprint of 1959 with supplementary notes): 252, the use of this word in the
Aristotle section indicates that it is meant to render στέρησις, “privation,” not the Plotinian ἔλλειψις,
as in Enn. 3.2.5.
16
Charlton 1970, Appendix on Prime Matter, see esp. 144, holds Calcidius’ commentary responsible for
the view that Aristotle had such a notion of prime matter. (I owe this reference to Mary-Louise Gill.)
17
See section 16.2 in this study.

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126 Matter and Evil
created the matter he needed for making the world (ch. 278). For Calcidius,
matter is ungenerated in the sense of being an independent principle that
coexists with the divine principle. Similarly, he cites Numenius as oppos-
ing those Pythagoreans who hold that matter as dyad is derived from god as
the monad (ch. 295; section 13.1 in this study).
Equally important is the fact that he eventually parts ways (ch. 352) even
with the position he ascribes to the “Pythagorean” Numenius, that the
disorderly motion, caused by an evil lower soul, is intrinsic to matter. Such
a view, which sees matter as evil in its own right, is much more dualist than
Calcidius’ stance. If we pay close attention to the structure of the doxo-
graphical section of the treatise on matter, the claim in ch. 298 that Plato
considers evil to be inhering in the world because of the badness of the
“mother” principle, matter, reﬂects the interpretation of Plato by the
Pythagoreans and Numenius, not Calcidius’ own view of what Plato says.18
For Calcidius, in contrast to the majority opinion, as he himself indi-
cates, motion is not intrinsic to matter, and thus the motion in the
receptacle does not require us to postulate the existence of an evil soul:
And so it happened that most came to think of this disorderly movement,
this foreign “jolting,” as an “agitation” deep within matter and proper to it
in virtue of its nature, and consequently judged it to be animate and in
possession of life. (ch. 352)19
Contrary to this majority opinion, Calcidius considers the movement
within matter as coming from outside (alienus pulsus). He posits
a feedback mechanism, whereby motion gets introduced into matter by
bodies; not by full-ﬂedged bodies, however, but rather by traces of the
elements (ch. 354), and matter in turn reinforces this motion. As a corollary
to this view, Calcidius considers the lower soul, which is the inseparable
companion of living bodies (see chs. 29–32),20 not necessarily to be evil. Its
primary function, for him, is not to cause the disorderly motion in the
receptacle but to bestow life (ch. 29).21
Last but not least, he counters the view of certain Platonists (chs.
300–301, with an echo of a position attributed to Porphyry, that the
elements as bodies (a) cause disorderly motion in matter and (b) are

18
Pace Bakhouche 2015: 249 and 255 and in agreement with van Winden 1959: 236 and Waszink 1962:
lxxviii, ch. 298.
19
Ex quo factum ut hunc inordinatum motum intimam siluae propriamque et ex natura eius
agitationem plerique esse censerent, qui alienus pulsus est, proptereaque animatam eam uitaeque
compotem arbitrarentur.
20
On this issue, see also section 5.1 in this study.
21
On this issue, see also section 13.2 in this study.

22
On this issue, see section 14.2 (3) in this study.

Matter, Being, and Form

The sub-treatise on matter is ﬁrst and foremost an exposition on the

principles of the universe. One cannot understand the notion of matter,
Calcidius implies, if one does not understand its relation to Form and
Being, and thus the sub-treatise also contains a systematic exposition of the
intelligible side of reality, or the Platonic Forms (chs. 337–344). As we have
seen, because of his linear reading and presentation,1 Calcidius does not
provide a commentary on Timaeus’ introduction, with its distinction
between Being and Becoming. Given that in Calcidius’ view of theoretical
philosophy the treatment of the principles of reality falls under the heading
of theology, and theology follows upon mathematics and physics, any
discussion of the implications of the distinction between Being and
Becoming has to wait until the ﬁnal part of the commentary. In the context
of the section on matter, however, it is Plato’s subsequent distinction
between intelligible Forms and sensible things in his account of the
receptacle (51b7–52c7) that allows Calcidius ﬁnally to pick up the thread
of Timaeus’ introduction and to tackle the subject of the intelligible realm
and the Forms.

10.1 Matter and Being

Matter’s relation to Being constitutes a very thorny problem in the
Platonist tradition. Strictly speaking, and according to Timaeus’ introduc-
tion to his account, Being applies to the intelligible realm and Becoming to
the sensible. But where would this framework leave matter? It cannot be
said “not to be,” in the absolute sense, because then it would be nothing at
all, and as Plato states, the receptacle can indeed be grasped even if only by
some form of “bastard reasoning” (λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ, 52b2). Here we
need to remember that Plato himself did not use “matter” as a designation

1
See sections 2.2 and 2.4 in this study.

128

2
For parallels in the Platonist and Neo-Pythagorean tradition, see Lilla 1971: 193–196; see also section
16.2 in this study.
3
ἀλλὰ ὕλην ὑποτίθενται οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, οἵ τε Στωϊκοὶ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας,
ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ Περιπατητικός, οὐχὶ δὲ μίαν ἀρχήν. ἴστωσαν οὖν τὴν καλουμένην ὕλην
ἄποιον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον λεγομένην πρὸς αὐτῶν, καὶ τολμηρότερον ἤδη μὴ ὂν πρὸς τοῦ Πλάτωνος
εἰρῆσθαι. καὶ μή τι μυστικώτατα μίαν τὴν ὄντως οὖσαν ἀρχὴν εἰδὼς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ αὐταῖς φησι
λέξεσιν . . . See also Porphyry, Sent. 20, in comparison with Plotinus, Enn. 3.6.7.3–27; Numenius,
3.8–12; 4a7 des Places.
4
essentia, ch. 273, cf. also the chs. 289–292, the section on the Stoics, more fully discussed in ch. 12 in
this study; substantia, ch. 330, 324.11.
5
Quae quidem corpora cum sola et per se ac sine suscipiente ex eadem essentia essentia esse non possunt, in
the version of Bakhouche and Magee. Van Winden 1959: 47, Waszink, and Moreschini have: sine
suscipiente [ex] eadem essentia esse non possunt, see the apparatus criticus in Waszink’s edition.
6
See section 3.3 in this study.

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130 Matter, Being, and Form
Plato’s Sophist provides the background, 237aff.). The claims he makes here
(in passing, because he defers the more detailed discussion) would apply to
any kind of matter considered as matter:
or when Plato says, in consideration of the fact that material objects possess
no degree of perfection, that matter is in no substance; for while still in their
raw material state the objects are shapeless, lacking order and form. For
example, stones: even if they possess a natural potentiality such that through
the application of artistry a statue or some other such thing were to result,
that which evidently is in mere potentiality and lacks actuality is not insofar
as it is deprived of perfection. (ch. 107)7
But if matter is “in no substance,” how, then, can matter be called
essentia/substantia? It looks most likely that Calcidius borrowed an idea he
attributes to the Stoics (whether rightly or wrongly),8 namely that they call
matter ousia because it is the cause for other things to be (ch. 290: ut sint
causa est). Calcidius adopts a view along the lines of the one which he
attributes to the Stoics, but with the crucial restriction that matter is merely
a necessary condition for corporeal substances (ch. 271). For this role he
coins a distinctive phrase, calling matter the fomes, “kindling,” of body (ch.
317), in keeping with his translation of hulē as silua, “wood.” Strictly
speaking, however, and from the point of view of Platonic ontology, it is
the intelligible Form that is the cause for other things to be endowed with
qualities (ch. 338) or the cause of the existence of sensible things that
resemble it (see below; ch. 350: causa existendi).
Thus, the images of intelligible reality “receive substance” in matter (ch.
321: accipiunt substantiam in silua; ch. 330; ch. 349), or, “matter acquires
being” (ch. 344: silua . . . sumit substantiam) from the form that inheres in it
(see below). When Calcidius distinguishes (ch. 330) between “that which
forever is” (quod semper est, i.e. the Forms), “that which forever is not”
(quod semper non est, i.e. matter), “and that which is not forever” (quod non
semper est, i.e. sensible things), it makes most sense to interpret the non-
being here attributed to matter, which Calcidius also claims is always the
same and immutable (ch. 329), as pure potentiality.9 (According to the
section on Aristotle, non-being in the strict sense would in this context
apply to privation, ch. 288.)

7
uel cum idem Plato siluam esse dicit in nulla substantia propterea quod nulla siluestria habeant ullam
perfectionem. Dum enim sunt adhuc siluestria, informia sunt ac sine ordine ac specie, ut saxa,
quorum tamen est naturalis possibilitas, ut accedente artiﬁcio simulacrum ﬁat uel quid aliud huius
modi; quod uero sola possibilitate et sine effectu uidetur esse minime est, utpote carens perfectione.
8
On this issue, see section 12.3 in this study.
9
Cf. Aristotle, DC 282a. On this issue, see also section 14.2 (4).

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10.2 Intelligible Matter? 131
10.2 Intelligible Matter?
There are indications in the commentary that Calcidius knows of the
notion of intelligible matter, that is, a principle of potentiality that is at
work at the intelligible level too, though it would have to function quite
differently at that level than it does in the sensible realm. In the introduc-
tory section of the sub-treatise on matter, Calcidius mentions a two-level
theory of the Forms. Intelligible Form combines with matter to bring
about the intelligible and “pure” Forms of the four elements, and those in
turn bring about, presumably again in combination with matter, the
sensible elements one can see at work in the universe:
To be sure, the primary element of the universe is matter, deprived of form
and quality, which intelligible Form informs in order that there may be
a world; and from them, namely, matter and Form, pure and intelligible fire
and the other unadulterated and intelligible substances arise, and from them
finally these sensible material elements (materiae) with dominant shares of
fire, water, earth, and air. And pure fire and the other unadulterated and
intelligible Forms of substance are for corporeal beings the paradigms, called
ideai. (ch. 272)10
This section is followed by the claim that in this context Plato postpones
this high-level discussion, which he treats, Calcidius indicates, in greater
detail in the Parmenides.11 Strictly speaking, however, the notion of intel-
ligible matter does not appear in this paragraph (nor does it appear in
Aristotle’s rendering of the two-level account in terms of the One and the
dyad of the Great and the Small; Met. 1.6.988a). Calcidius does not apply
the notion of “intelligible” to matter.
The situation is different in the section of the doxography that is
devoted to the position of the Hebrews (who, as we should recall, consider
matter to be generated, though not in a temporal sense, see ch. 9 in this
study). There, Calcidius does explicitly mention the option of an intelli-
gible matter:
But if a previously formless corporeal matter which Scripture calls “earth”
was made by God, then, I suppose, there is no need for despair concerning

10
Quippe primum elementum uniuersae rei silua est informis ac sine qualitate quam, ut sit mundus,
format intellegibilis species; ex quibus, silua uidelicet et specie, ignis purus et intellegibilis ceteraeque
sincerae substantiae, [quattuor] (Magee) e quibus demum hae materiae sensiles, igneae aquatiles
terrenae et aereae. Ignis porro purus et ceterae sincerae intellegibilesque substantiae species sunt
exemplaria corporum, ideae cognominatae.
11
See also section 2.3 in this study.

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132 Matter, Being, and Form
there having been an intelligible matter of the incorporeal kind as well,
which is given the name “heaven.” (ch. 278)12
The translation here of non est desperandum as “there is no need for despair”
may be too strong, and could be better rendered as “there is no need to give
up on” – that is, it may indicate a mere willingness to leave open the
possibility rather than express a strong commitment (with a first-person
opinor).
Apart from the fact that this claim occurs in a section that presents a view
which Calcidius rejects, it is more likely that the doxographical pattern that
provides the structure of the chapter accounts for the occurrence of
intelligible matter in this context. The structure appears quite lapidary,
but becomes much clearer if we assume that Calcidius goes through
a schema of options, in a logical progression. At issue is the interpretation
of the “heaven” and “earth” in the opening line of Genesis.13 The first
option, that these would refer to the sensible heaven and earth as we can
observe them in the universe, Calcidius rejects out of hand (ch. 277)
because the sensible heaven and earth came about at a later stage in the
process. The first heaven and earth, he claims, have to be grasped by the
intellect rather than the senses. So, the first option would have both heaven
and earth refer to the level of sensible reality. The second option, which
Calcidius attributes to Philo of Alexandria (ch. 278), would interpret both
heaven and earth as intelligible paradigms. The third option in the logical
progression would have heaven refer to the intelligible realm and earth to
the sensible realm – not to the sensible things as such, but to “that which is
the substance of bodies and which the Greeks call hylē” (quae substantia est
corporum quam Graeci hylen uocant; I take the discussion of this option to
span 282.10–283.9 Waszink). This third position assumes “earth” to refer to
corporeal matter (silua corporea). As a fourth possibility, if we assume the
existence of corporeal matter (which, as we know, Calcidius does not
accept), we can also allow for the existence of intelligible matter. In sum,
the schema proceeds as follows:
(1) heaven = sensible and earth = sensible;
(2) heaven = intelligible (Form) and earth = intelligible (Form);
(3) heaven = intelligible (Form) and earth = sensible (matter); and
(4) heaven = intelligible (matter) and earth = sensible (matter).

12
Quod si facta est a deo silua corporea quondam informis, quam Scriptura terram uocat, non est,
opinor, desperandum incorporei quoque generis fore intellegibilem siluam, quae caeli nomine sit
nuncupata.
13
See also the discussion in section 15.4 in this study.

10.3 Form
When Calcidius initially discusses the “features” that inhere in matter (ch.
268), he combines many terms: qualitates, quantitates, quae . . . accidunt,
species, formae. His preferred term for the Platonic Forms is species,14
though he also transliterates the Greek idea.15 The relation between
Forms and sensible things is described mainly in language borrowed
from the Timaeus. He uses the relation between “model” (exemplum)16 or
“archetype” (archetypus)17 and “image” (imago)18 or “impression” (signacu-
lum, ch. 329, 324.4), speaks in terms of likeness (similitudo),19 and occa-
sionally of participation (ch. 338, particeps).
For Calcidius, the Platonic Forms are clearly subordinated to the
providential and demiurgic function of the second god in his triadic
structure of the divine, as the thoughts of that god.20 As Alexandra
Michalewski (2014) has shown recently, this was the dominant model for
conceiving of the Forms in Middle Platonism. An early passage in the
commentary, however, might suggest that the intelligible realm exists
independently of the divine mind:
[According to one group of interpreters] Is it that by “indivisible” Being he
indicated the Form of the intelligible world after whose likeness [the craftsman
god] transferred to bodies the Forms conceived in his mind? (ch. 29)21
This fragment on the composition of the World Soul is essential to the
commentary as a whole (see sections 3.3 and 5.1 in this study) and it

14
In ch. 329, he talks about species as “having form” (323.10: speciebus formam habentibus).
15
As in ch. 272, 276.15; ch. 273, 278.6; ch. 304, attributed to the Greeks in general 306.6; ch. 329, 323.25;
ch. 330; ch. 339; ch. 342ff. For the broader context in Middle Platonism, see also Boys-Stones 2018:
chs. 3 and 5.
16
As in ch. 272; ch. 304, 307.7; ch. 307, 309.1; ch. 329, 323.12; ch. 330; ch. 337ff.; ch. 349.
17
As in ch. 272; ch. 329, 323.12; ch. 349.
18
As in ch. 273; ch.302, 304.16; ch. 321, 317.4 (with simulacra); ch. 329 (with simulacra); ch. 330; ch. 337.
19
As in ch. 329, 324.3; ch. 330; ch. 337ff.; ch. 349. 20 As in chs. 273, 304, 330.
21
Num speciem intellegibilis mundi ad cuius similitudinem formas mente conceptas ad corpora
transferebat indiuiduam substantiam nuncupauerit.

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134 Matter, Being, and Form
represents a view that Calcidius does not adopt – he interprets “indivisible”
Being as referring to a higher, purely noetic soul. Moreover, the meaning of
this passage is ambiguous; it could refer to a view that states, (a) that the
Demiurge conceived the thoughts in his mind after the likeness of the
intelligible world, or (b) that he transferred to bodies the Forms conceived
in his mind so that the bodies would end up resembling the intelligible
world. The latter is assumed in Magee’s translation, and it is the correct
one, given the view of the Forms expressed elsewhere in the commentary.22
The thoughts of the Demiurge or his intellect constitute the intelligible
world.
To assist his readers, Calcidius provides a good summary statement of
the role of the Forms:
To state the point, then, in a kind of broad outline:
in relation to us, who possess intellect, the primary Form is the first
intelligible;
in relation to God, it is his perfect intellect;
in relation to matter, it is the limit and measure of corporeal
and material realities;
in relation to Form itself, it is an incorporeal substance and the cause
of all the things that obtain their element of likeness [50d] from it;
and in relation to the world, it is the eternal exemplar of all the things
which nature has brought forth.
And to state the point concisely: the primary Form or Idea is definable as
a substance which lacks corporeality, color, shape, and tangibility, but is never-
theless comprehensible by the intellect in combination with reason, and is the
cause of all the things that obtain their element of likeness from it. (ch. 339)23
In the sub-treatise on the human soul,24 Calcidius has argued that soul,
presumably because of its affinity with the intelligible Forms, should not be
confused with the Aristotelian notion of a form-in-a-body (240.3–6).25
This point becomes clearer in this context, in which it turns out that
Calcidius distinguishes between two levels of forms: the primary kind is the
22
Unlike the translation by Bakhouche, which renders the first option: “à l’image duquel il a conçu les
formes.” Moreschini translates in Magee’s vein.
23
Est igitur principalis species, ut cum aliqua dicatur effigie, iuxta nos quidem, qui intellectus
compotes sumus, primum intellegibile, iuxta deum uero perfectus intellectus dei, iuxta siluam
modus mensuraque rerum corporearum atque siluestrium, iuxta ipsam uero speciem incorporea
substantia causaque eorum omnium quae ex ea similitudinem mutuantur, iuxta mundum uero
exemplum sempiternum omnium quae natura progenuit; atque ut conceptim dicatur, primaria
species, quae idea est, substantia definitur carens corpore colore figura, sine tactu, intellectu tamen
cum ratione comprehendenda causaque omnium quae ex se similitudinem mutuantur. Cf. also the
parallel in Alcinous, Didask. 9, 163.14–17; discussed by van Winden 1959: 210–211.
24 25
See ch. 6 in this study. An argument for which we can find a parallel in Plotinus, Enn. 4.2.

10.4 How to Discover the Principles?

One section of the commentary that has received considerable attention in
the secondary literature is Calcidius’ presentation of the different episte-
mological processes for uncovering ﬁrst principles. Most of the attention
has been devoted to parallels and potential sources,28 but, as in other
instances, one would do better to start from an understanding of the
structure of Calcidius’ exposition in its own right and its context in the
commentary.
At the start of the systematic section of the treatise on matter (chs. 302–304),
Calcidius distinguishes between different methods of proof. He ﬁrst
26
As in chs. 337; 343–44. The distinction between two types of forms is also attested in Alcinous,
Didask. 10, 166.4, 4, 155.39–41; Seneca, Ep. 58.20; Philo of Alexandria, Leg. 2.12; Apuleius, Pl. 1.192;
and possibly Galen, in his compendium of the Timaeus (see the introduction by Kraus and Walzer
to their edition, 9).
27
Diuisa ergo a se sunt tria illa separatimque examinata, et est idea quidem intellegibilis species, utpote
quae puro intellectu comprehendatur, species uero natiua opinione percipibilis proptereaque
opinabilis, silua porro neque intellegibile quid neque opinabile, quia neque intellectu neque sensu
comprehendatur, uerum est suspicabilis, suspicio autem spuria quaedam ratio est atque adulterina.
28
Cf. van Winden 1959: 128–136; Gersh 1986 II: 436–439 (see especially n. 68); Bakhouche 2011 II:
858–860; 2013; Hoenig 2018b: 208–213 and forthcoming b. The latter, however, while mentioning
the parallels with Alcinous, emphasizes, correctly in my opinion, that “with regard to the divergent
mental processes described by Alcinous and Calcidius, we perhaps fare best by conjecturing that
both writers were drawing upon a pool of various logical and dialectical methods, and that Calcidius
may have combined for his own purposes several methods of reasoning he drew from different
contexts of philosophical exegesis” (2018b: 211).

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136 Matter, Being, and Form
distinguishes between the method of syllogism and of analysis. In the method
of syllogism, one argues from premises, or things known already and prior, to
a conclusion that follows from, i.e. is posterior to, the premises. In the second
method, which he calls “analysis” (resolutio), “on the basis of posterior things
[one] reaches the investigation of prior ones by steps.” We know already from
an earlier claim in this treatise that the syllogistic method would not work for
arriving at first principles (ch. 274): they are “not deducible from some ante-
cedent ground, for nothing is prior to an origin,” a point that Calcidius echoes
in this context to argue for the use of the second method. In order to make this
argument, however, he also needs to clarify what he means by “prior,” which he
does on the basis of the Aristotelian distinction between “what is prior to us,”
i.e. sensible reality, versus “what is prior in the order of nature, the principles of
existence” (ch. 302).29 So, one could rewrite the non-syllogistic method for
arriving at first principles as reasoning from “what is prior to human beings” to
“what is prior in nature,” i.e. truly prior in reality, not just from a human
perspective. In order to establish what is prior from an ontological perspective,
in turn, he relies on the distinction taken from Plato’s account of the receptacle
(51b7–52c7) between sensible things and the intelligibles as that between the
different objects of sensation and intelligence. Having established these points,
he first sets out to describe how one can arrive at the notion of matter (ch.
303).30 After a rather elaborate description of the elements and the sensible
qualities in the human as well as the World body, he states, as before, that we
arrive at the notion of matter in our reasoning process if we strip it of all its
features (see also ch. 274, with the use of resolutio, chs. 319 and 327).
Calcidius concludes his discussion of “analysis” by stating that it is one
of the two kinds of proof, presumably the two with which he started out,
the other being syllogism. The opening of the next chapter, however, has
baffled interpreters: “Let us now consider the other kind, which is called
synthesis” (ch. 304: Nunc illud aliud consideremus quod compositio cognomi-
natur). Does the illud aliud here refer to the first type of proof, the
syllogism? That does not seem very likely, given that Calcidius is still
using a mode of reasoning that starts with what is close to human beings,
what they can observe, namely the order in the natural world. Another
option would be to translate illud aliud as that other (well-known, impor-
tant) kind of proof, that is, as not referring back, but announcing a third
type of proof. This method of proof would be tagged on, but the flow of
the exposition would be made easier by the fact that we are still dealing

29
As in Aristotle, Phys. 1.1.184a16–26.
30
Calcidius attributes the same procedure to Numenius, see section 13.2 in this study.

31
Cf. Philo, QG 2.34. For this and other parallels cf. Hoenig forthcoming b.
32
Igitur siluam quidem iuxta legem rationemque dissolutionis inuenimus; iuxta compositionis uero
praecepta ipsum opiﬁcem deum; ex operibus porro dei opiﬁcis exemplum.

Calcidius and Aristotle

Because he considers Plato to be the pinnacle of philosophical truth and

because he attributes to him the most complete view and system,1 Calcidius
consistently retrojects arguments from later philosophers into Plato’s
thought. The earliest example of a systematic attempt to harmonize
Aristotle with Plato is attested for the ﬁrst-century BCE philosopher
Antiochus of Ascalon. If Cicero, our most important source for
Antiochus, is to be trusted, Antiochus created an alignment between
Plato, Aristotle, the Old Academy (as opposed to its skeptical phase
under the so-called New Academy), and the Peripatetics, co-opting the
Stoics where possible, or dismissing their innovations as mere changes in
terminology.2 A recent reevaluation of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha
indicates that Aristotelian elements may have been integrated into the
Pythagorean tradition earlier than is commonly assumed.3 Varro’s interest
in many philosophical schools might also need to be taken into account for
an early assimilation of Aristotelian ideas. Finally, for the Stoics Posidonius
and Panaetius too an interest in Plato and Aristotle is attested.4
Calcidius manifestly belongs with that strand of Middle Platonism that
sees Aristotle’s views overall as compatible with Plato’s.5 His use of
Aristotle is thus much more straightforward than his treatment of Stoic
material, towards which he has a very complex attitude. We will turn to
Calcidius’ use of Stoicism in the next chapter. In some cases material from
Aristotle has simply been subsumed under Plato’s view, without

1
See section 1.3 in this study. 2 As in Cicero, Acad. 1.3, 15–19, 33, 35, 37, 43.
3
See Ulacco and Opsomer 2014.
4
For Panaetius, cf. for instance Cicero, Fin. 4.78; for Posidonius’ interest in Plato, cf. F85 Edelstein
and Kidd.
5
For an overview of the reception of Aristotle in Middle Platonism, with excellent bibliography, see
Michalewski 2016. Moraux 1971–2001 remains a foundational work, and see also Karamanolis 2006.
On the role of Aristotle in Calcidius’ commentary, see Karamanolis forthcoming, and Bakhouche
2013. Unfortunately, Erismann 2016 does not include any material from Calcidius, and no passages
from Calcidius are included in the index of Falcon 2016.

141

11.1 Aristotle on Fate

As we have seen, Calcidius’ exposition in the treatise on fate has strong
Aristotelian and Peripatetic affinities that go unacknowledged. Similarly,
through Adrastus, allegedly, a number of Peripatetic features have found
their way into the first part of the commentary, without being signaled as
such.6 On the topic of fate, the parallel accounts of Nemesius and ps.-Plutarch
have this same feature, and the ps.-Plutarch goes even so far as to attribute
Aristotle’s definition of chance (Phys. 2.5.197a5ff.) to the “Platonists.”7 We can
see a tradition of systematic appropriations of material from Aristotle behind
this practice. Just as Calcidius’ treatise on fate combines several proof texts
from Plato’s works (the Timaeus, the Phaedrus, and the Republic), it also builds
on passages from Aristotle’s Physics (2.4–6), Metaphysics (5.30.1025a15–16), and
Nicomachean Ethics (3.3.1112a17), as do the parallel accounts of ps.-Plutarch
and Nemesius.
Yet the passages from Aristotle as well as the three parallel accounts all
list different examples of “fortune” and “chance” (or “chance” and “spon-
taneity” in Aristotle’s terms). The example of someone digging and acci-
dentally finding a treasure is briefly mentioned in chapter 3 of Book 3 of the
Nicomachean Ethics. That connection is relevant because in this same
context of discussing his notion of deliberation, Aristotle uses the phrase
“that which is up to us” (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) which in the discussions of fate by
Calcidius, ps.-Plutarch, and Nemesius is meant to indicate that which is in
a human being’s power as opposed to being determined. Calcidius renders
it as iuris nostri (as opposed to extra nostra potestatem, ch. 164). But
Calcidius connects “that which is up to us” to what is as likely to happen
6
See Calcidius on time (discussed in ch. 4 in this study), for instance, or on the meaning of caelum (ch.
98). See also Waszink 1964 and 1984. In ch. 84 Calcidius explicitly mentions Aristotle on the fifth
element and the heavenly bodies, see also Karamanolis forthcoming.
7
See ps.-Plutarch, Fat. 572Β, κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος; Karamanolis 2006: 179.

11.2 Aristotle on the Human Soul

In the treatise on the human soul we can detect two more ways of using
material from Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. One consists of
interpreting Aristotle as occupying some kind of middle ground between
completely erroneous views and Plato’s position; the other approach
includes him, but with an explicit acknowledgment this time, in “common
ground” positions, that is, views on which Plato and other thinkers happen
to agree. To remind ourselves,12 in his doxographical schema, Calcidius
lists Aristotle’s position after he has discussed the erroneous views that
consider the soul to be corporeal, yet before he turns to the correct view of
Plato. Thus, in the very structure of the schema Aristotle represents
a middle ground, and we get a clear ascending hierarchy, beginning with
8
NE 3.3.1112b, τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
9
NE 3.5: ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί.
10
Phys. 2.6.198a, ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ νοῦ καὶ φύσεως.
11 12
See ch. 12 in this study. See ch. 6 in this study.

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144 Calcidius and Aristotle
the Stoic position (listed in the first group), followed by Aristotle, and then
Plato.
The three chapters devoted to Aristotle (222–224) read like a very
compact digest or a collage of claims mostly from his De anima, and
Calcidius’ response (ch. 225) is equally compact.13 The exposition starts
with Aristotle’s definition of the soul from his De anima (2.1.412a27–28):
“The soul is the first perfection [= actuality]14 of an organic natural body
potentially having life” (anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis organici
possibilitate uitam habentis). The first chapter devoted to Aristotle (222)
elucidates the different components of Aristotle’s definition. In this con-
text the relation between soul and body is explained in the more general
terms of the relation between form and matter, or between actuality and
potentiality. Thus, this section anticipates the sub-treatise on matter.15
Chs. 223 and 224 draw implications from Aristotle’s (and the
Peripatetics’ – see below) view of the relation between the soul and the
body. Ch. 223 brings in material from other passages of the De anima to
state that the soul
(1) while not itself being corporeal, nevertheless has to be in a body, of
which it constitutes the perfection;
(2) is in itself without movement;
(3) is without any quantity, and indivisible;
(4) and thus, even though it has several faculties and powers, does not
consist of different kinds.
Ch. 224 draws on material from other works of Aristotle’s (such as De
generatione animalium and De partibus animalium) to elaborate on the
physiology of the relation between soul and body, and to elucidate the
claims that the soul
(5a) stretches through the entire body;
(5b) and has its principal part in the heart.
In his compact response (ch. 225) Calcidius starts out with explicit praise
for Aristotle, that he got most things about the soul right, in agreement
with Plato’s position, but that he was wrong about the substance of the
soul. Contrary to what Aristotle claims, Calcidius implies, the soul has an
affinity with the intelligible Forms (i.e., Forms not embedded in matter)
13
See also some parallels in Nemesius, Nat. hom. 2.26.10–29.20; Bakhouche 2011 II: 799–803.
14
In his edition Waszink has corrected the manuscripts to attribute to Calcidius the notion of
entelechia (236.6ff.); see Bakhouche 2011 II: 800, n. 598 and Bakhouche 2006.
15
See ch. 9 in this study.

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11.2 Aristotle on the Human Soul 145
that guarantees its eternal existence, both before and after its life in bodies.
Contra (2) above, moreover, the soul is in perpetual motion (a point
Calcidius repeats twice). As corollaries to his first point, Calcidius adds
two more criticisms of Aristotle’s notion of “perfection” (entelechy): first,
that it cannot account for the fact that only animals have souls and plants
do not (the view which Calcidius himself endorses) – plants are living
things that can reach a stage of perfection too – and second, that Aristotle’s
notion would imply that soul develops together with the body (a reply
possibly directed in part at points 5a and 5b above), whereas in reality the
soul is eternal and is not subject to birth (and death). Finally, contra point
(4) above, which he presents as Aristotle’s view, Calcidius posits different
kinds of soul, with a first division between “reason” and “appetite” (appe-
titus), and then a further subdivision of each kind: for reason, into intellect
and opinion, and for appetite, into spirit and desire. Each of these kinds
uses a certain part of the body merely as its instrument (a claim that weakens
the connection between soul and body). So, in sum, Calcidius objects to
Aristotle primarily because his view ties the soul too closely to the body,
and thereby also compromises its eternal and immortal nature.
Calcidius mentions “Peripatetics” in addition to Aristotle, but unlike
other sources does not note dissension in the Peripatetic ranks. We do not
hear, for instance, about the view that the fifth element could be the
substance of the human soul,16 nor about other views that interpret the
soul rather as corporeal,17 or even as a mere epiphenomenon of the body.18
While it is possible that Calcidius may not have had access to this informa-
tion, it would also not have fit the structure of a gradual progression,
wherein Aristotle represents a major improvement on the more crude,
“corporealist” doctrines, but still falls short of Plato’s perfection.19 Perhaps
for the same reason, the Aristotelian distinction between active and passive
mind has fallen by the wayside. That distinction might leave room for
some type of immortality, even though it is far from clear how exactly.20

16
Attributed to Aristotle himself by Cicero, Tusc. 1.18–22, F27 Ross, to Critolaus in Macrobius, F18
Wehrli, and to Theophrastus in Iamblichus, De an. 9 Finamore and Dillon.
17
Dicaearchus, 387.5 Diels, Wehrli F11; see also Strato of Lampsacus, F108, F123 Wehrli.
18
Also attested for Dicaearchus: Cicero, Tusc. 1.18–22, F7 Wehrli; Iamblichus, De an. 9 Finamore and
Dillon (see also their commentary, 95–100).
19
The Middle Platonist Atticus (F7 des Places = Eusebius, PE 15, 9.1–14 = 152.1 Baltes) also wrote
against what he perceived to be Aristotle’s view of the connection between soul and body, but his
tone towards Aristotle is much less conciliatory than what we ﬁnd in Calcidius.
20
Pace Bakhouche 2011 II: n. 622, I do not think that the phrase intellectus agitatus et rationabiliter
ignitus in ch. 224 refers to the active mind as discussed in Aristotle, De an. 3.5.430a15. The context
here is a different one, namely a discussion of the physiology behind the admittedly mysterious
relation between intellect and heart. Agitatus here, I take it, refers to some kind of process of

11.3 Aristotle in the Treatise on Matter

From Calcidius’ extensive use of Aristotle in the treatise on matter (see ch.
9 in this study) I want to examine more closely two issues: (1) Calcidius’
attribution to Aristotle of his own notion of Providence; and (2) Calcidius’
application of the Aristotelian categories.
Let us start with the latter. In keeping with his interpretation of Plato’s
Parmenides,22 Calcidius presents the Aristotelian categories primarily as
ontological predicates (appellationem, ch. 319),23 that is, as referring to
reality (ch. 336: omnia decem quae sunt genera; ch. 226), in this case sensible
reality. His analysis ﬁrst shows how the categories apply to bodies (ch. 319)
and then how they apply to the universe as an ordered reality (ch. 336). He
uses the categories to describe bodies in order to make the case that matter
taken by itself cannot possibly be considered a body, because the predicates
that apply to body do not apply to matter. So, from this point of view, one
could not even ascribe passivity as such to matter, because in itself matter
never changes its condition. When that same matter, however, is viewed
from the perspective of the order imposed on it through forms, then one
can use all categories to describe its condition. In this second move both
activity and passivity can be attributed to matter because it causes the forms
that inhere in it to move and in turn is put in motion by these forms.24 So,
in the ﬁrst step, Calcidius removes all features from matter, and in
the second, when considering matter in relation to form, he reintroduces
those same features.

quickening. Ignitus must mean more than merely “illuminated,” but rather something along the
lines of “ﬁred up,” or “imbued with heat.” Magee translates the phrase as: “being stirred and
ignited.”
21 22
See section 6.3 in this study. See section 2.3 in this study.
23
Of particular relevance here are Alcinous, Didask. 6, 159.43–160.30, which relates the categories to
Plato’s Parmenides, and Plutarch, De an. procr. 1023D–F, which connects the categories to the
knowledge of the World Soul. It is not necessary to assume that Calcidius derived his position from
a commentary on the Categories; for the early tradition of these commentaries, see Grifﬁn 2015.
24
See ch. 9 in this study.

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11.3 Aristotle in the Treatise on Matter 147
An earlier section in the commentary from the treatise on the human
soul (chs. 226–227), however, makes clear that Calcidius not only credits
Plato himself with this theory of categories, but also believes that this
schema can be applied to incorporeal beings (ch. 227: quia duplex essentia
est, altera corporea, altera carens corpore). Plato, Calcidius avers, defines the
soul as “an incorporeal self-moving rational substance” (ch. 226: substantia
carens corpore semet ipsam mouens rationabilis). One can apply the category
of substance also to soul because, just as the body, it is liable to contraries,
such as justice (which is analogous to health in the body) and iniquity
(analogous to bodily disease). Yet while the soul does have an affinity with
the intelligible Forms, and cannot be equated with the enmattered form
(specialis essentia; see ch. 6 in this study), we are still one step short of a view
that would have the categories also apply to the intelligible Forms (which
are not subject to contraries).
When he revisits the theme of Providence in the treatise on matter
Calcidius manages to co-opt Aristotle even for this purpose. In Book 12 of
his Metaphysics Aristotle famously claims that “the beings [or the world]
refuse[s] to be governed badly” (1076a4–5).25 Yet who or what does the
“governing,” and how, became focal questions in the tradition. What
exactly is the relation between the ordered universe, the kosmos, and an
Unmoved Mover, pure actuality and pure self-thinking thought, which as
final cause exerts its attraction because it is the “object of desire” (1072a26:
τὸ ὀρεκτὸν) and “object of thought” (τὸ νοητόν)? A cluster of related
inquiries emerged among interpreters of Aristotle: what exactly is the
relation between the Unmoved Mover and the (first) heaven(s)? Is there
one Unmoved Mover or a series of them, ordered in a hierarchy? What
exactly is the content of its thought as thinking itself? And, finally, how
does it relate to the world? It is this last question I want to focus on, from
the vantage point of Providence.26
Calcidius provides a radical interpretation of Aristotle’s highest god by
attributing to this divinity a full-fledged Providence – and that move is
highly unusual in the tradition. Most often, if Aristotle is considered to
endorse Providence at all, it is said to be limited to universals, and does not
cover particulars, or to extend only to the realm above the moon, and does
not govern sublunary phenomena.27

25
τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς.
26
Focal texts for the debate are, in addition to the Metaphysics passage, Phys. 8; DC; Pol. 7.3.1325b.
27
For a good overview, see Sharples 1983 and 2002 (the latter discussing the complex view of Alexander
of Aphrodisias). For the ﬁrst view, see, for instance, Nemesius 43.127.15–20; for the second (which
possibly occurs as early as Critolaus), see, for instance, Atticus F3, 8.2 des Places; Diogenes Laertius

5.32; see also Epictetus 1.12.1–3. The ps.-Aristotle, Mund. 6.397b30 might be an exception, but it
describes divine agency in terms of power (δύναμις), not Providence. But note that Apuleius in his
Latin translation of the ps.-Aristotle text replaces δύναμις with prouidentia, Mund. 24.343 (Hoenig
2018b: 133, 148–158; Petrucci 2018: 94–96). See also Cicero, Nat. d. 2.37.95, which attributes an
argument from design to Aristotle. For a recent assessment of the crucial issues (focusing on
Atticus), see Michalewski 2017.
28 29
See ch. 9 in this study. . . . ὄντος γάρ τινος θείου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ . . .
30
See section 10.3 in this study.
31
ἡ δ’ ἑτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεως πολλάκις ἂν φαντασθείη τῷ πρὸς τὸ κακοποιὸν αὐτῆς ἀτενίζοντι
τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδ’ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν.
32
See ch. 9 in this study.

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11.3 Aristotle in the Treatise on Matter 149
Providence. In an earlier section of the commentary, devoted to the topic
of dreams, Calcidius echoes the critique that Aristotle limits the reach of
Providence to the supralunary realm (ch. 250). Aristotle, so Calcidius avers,
recognizes for the realm below the moon “no governance by the decrees of
Providence, no support through the aid and counsel of angels and no
intervention on the part of demonic foresight.”33 Consequently, Calcidius
goes on, Aristotle eliminates divination and recognizes only the type of
dreams that is based on waking experiences. He is not wrong in Calcidius’
eyes for acknowledging this category of dreams, but because of his “dis-
dainful neglect” (fastidiosa incuria) of the other kinds. Calcidius consis-
tently relies on the polemical strategy that, compared to Plato, all other
philosophers at best present merely partial truths.34
In the context of the treatise on matter, however, Calcidius appears to
interpret Aristotle as aligning himself with Plato’s concept of Providence.
Calcidius makes this move right at the opening of his discussion of
Aristotle:
He [Aristotle] says that the world has by divine Providence been made to
continue through perpetuity, without coming to be or passing away; and
since his view is distinguished, noble, and well suited to the consideration of
Platonic doctrine, it should not be casually overlooked. (ch. 283)35
Aristotle receives considerable praise here precisely because Calcidius per-
ceives his position to be in harmony with Plato’s, on two counts: namely,
that of the eternity of the world (see ch. 4 in this study) and that of the role
of Providence. As was the case with his rendering of Plato’s key distinction
between “the works of reason” and “necessity” (Timaeus 47e, ch. 268),36 it
is probably Calcidius himself who has added the notion of Providence to
the view that the world should be considered eternal. In this passage,
however, the role of Providence is still restricted to the universe considered
in its entirety.37
Such a restriction does not apply to a subtle but essential modiﬁcation
Calcidius adds to his summary of Aristotle’s account in Physics 1.9.
Here is the original Greek, a passage already mentioned above. Aristotle
says of form/actuality:

33
infra uero neque prouidentiae scitis regi nec angelorum ope consultisque sustentari nec uero
daemonum prospicientiam putet interuenire.
34
See section 1.3 in this study.
35
Idem sine genitura et sine interitu dicit mundum esse diuina prouidentia perpetuitati propagatum;
cuius sententia cum sit praeclara et nobilis et ad Platonici dogmatis considerationem satis accom-
modata non otiose praetereunda est.
36 37
See section 8.1 in this study. See also Cicero, Tusc. 1.70.

38
See section 1.1 in this study. 39 See section 10.3.
40
Calcidius, chs. 176–177 and 188; see ch. 7 in this study.

Calcidius and the Stoics

Calcidius’ criticism of the Stoics is much sharper than his occasional

disagreements with Aristotle. Yet paradoxically the influence of Stoicism
on Calcidius’ commentary is, I would argue, also much more far-reaching
than that of Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition, and it has generally
been underestimated in the secondary literature.1 Calcidius’ hermeneutical
stance toward Stoicism is very complex, and for that reason all the more
interesting.2 Aristotle appears relatively easy to co-opt for specific philoso-
phical positions, but the views of the Stoics are both deeply attractive for
Calcidius in some respects and fundamentally at odds with Plato’s thought
in others.
Calcidius was not only familiar with Stoic doctrine, as cited in his
doxographical overviews, but he was also significantly influenced by it,
despite his overt polemic against the Stoics in the treatises on fate, the soul,
and matter.3 He cites Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus by name (see
Waszink’s index) and there are possible echoes of Posidonius as well. In
some cases, his reports (as, for example, the one on psychology, attributed
to Zeno and Chrysippus) are among the best sources we have.4 In the
treatise on fate, in which the tripartite schema of the divine is to be found,
he cites Chrysippus and Cleanthes (ch. 144). These citations occur neither
in ps.-Plutarch’s De fato nor in Nemesius’ De natura hominis (chs. 35–43,
though the latter does cite Chrysippus and “the Stoics” in different con-
texts), the two most important parallel texts for this section of Calcidius’
treatise. Similarly, in his doxographical overview of the different positions

1
Waszink in his edition of 1962, den Boeft 1970 and 1977, and van Winden 1959, in their commen-
taries, all played down the importance of Stoicism for Calcidius.
2
Switalski 1902 argued for a strong Stoic inﬂuence, but relied on a view of Posidonius’ role in the
tradition that is no longer tenable. As is the case with Falcon 2016 (see previous chapter in this study),
Calcidius is also absent from the important overview of the Latin Stoic tradition by Colish 1990.
3
See also the Stoic position on dreams, ch. 251.
4
In this chapter, I expand on and revisit issues addressed in Reydams-Schils 1999, ch. 5. See also ch. 6
in this study.

151

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152 Calcidius and the Stoics
on matter, Calcidius devotes an entire section to the Stoics and again
mentions Chrysippus and Zeno by name.
Stoicism does not merely manifest itself in certain sections of the
commentary and in some of the views which Calcidius attributes to
Plato. It has also shaped the commentary as a whole. The notion of an all-
powerful, entirely good Providence that is central to Calcidius’ interpreta-
tion of the Timaeus throughout,5 for instance, is in itself a sign of
a tremendous debt to Stoicism, which had manifested itself already in
Middle Platonist authors such as Plutarch and Atticus.
In the introduction to his commentary Calcidius highlights two aspects
of Plato’s Timaeus: first, its preoccupation with scientific and technical
matters (the artificiales rationes), which makes it a difficult exposition,6
thereby creating the need for a commentator, and second, its focus on
ethical questions (chs. 5–6). Regarding the latter Calcidius claims that the
Timaeus explores the theme of natural law and justice (naturalis aequitas),
as opposed to Plato’s Republic, which deals with justice on a human level
(iustitia in rebus humanis). He then goes on to describe natural law and
justice as “the kind of justice which the gods use towards each other in what
could be called the common city and republic of this sensible universe.”7
Plato’s Timaeus was traditionally seen as an inquiry into nature.8 What is
surprising in Calcidius’ account here is his emphasis on ethics. The
Timaeus admittedly deals with the normative status of the divine, the
ontological standard of excellence, and rules of conduct for human beings
who want to emulate this standard. But it is Calcidius who has supplied the
idea of a cosmic state. It is true that the beginning of the Timaeus presents
this dialogue as some kind of sequel to the Republic, but this in itself, again,
hardly suffices to account for Calcidius’ choice of emphasis. The Early
Stoics developed the notion of the cosmic state in all its philosophical
consequences, and it is even possible that they started to read the Timaeus
as a cosmic Republic.9 But whenever this explicit merging of the Timaeus
and the Stoic notion of a cosmopolis occurred, it is clearly present in
Calcidius’ interpretation of the Timaeus. Providence and the cosmopolis
go hand in hand.

5 6
See section 8.1 in this study. See section 1.1 in this study.
7
Calcidius, ch. 6, 60.2–3: eam iustitiam qua divinum genus adversum se utitur in mundi huius sensilis
veluti quadam communi urbe ac re publica.
8
See section 2.3 in this study.
9
Cf. Reydams-Schils 1999, ch. 1. On the relation between the cosmos and the political order in
Plutarch, see also van Nuffelen 2011: 157–175.

10
See also section 8.3 in this study. For an assessment of this evidence, see Dargona-Monachou 1973;
Mansfeld 1979: 158–159; and Alessandrelli 2013.
11
Itaque non nulli putant praesumi differentiam prouidentiae fatique, cum reapse una sit, quippe
prouidentiam dei fore uoluntatem, uoluntatem porro eius seriem esse causarum, et ex eo quidem
quia uoluntas prouidentia est, <prouidentiam,> porro quia eadem series causarum est, fatum
cognominatum, ex quo ﬁeri ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex prouidentia sint, eodemque
modo quae secundum prouidentiam ex fato, ut putat Chrysippus.
12 13
See section 7.4 in this study. See ch. 8 in this study.
14
On this point see also Boys-Stones 2007. Bobzien 1998: 402 makes an analogous claim for Alexander
of Aphrodisias.

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154 Calcidius and the Stoics
features, let us assess ﬁrst the quality of Calcidius’ report on the Stoic
position (or one like it).
There are some odd contaminations in the “Stoic” material of the treatise
on fate. For instance, when discussing the Stoic notion of perversion,
Calcidius claims that newborns are driven primarily by their attraction to
pleasure and aversion to pain. But the standard Stoic view, in the theory of
“appropriation” (oikeiōsis), posits self-preservation, not the attraction to
pleasure, as a young animal’s primary impulse, and for the sake of self-
preservation humans and animals would be willing to endure even pain.15
When he discusses a potentially Stoic view that fate accomplishes its
purposes through the actions of humans (as in the theory of co-fatality),16
Calcidius states that this process would turn human beings into merely
a necessary condition for fate’s agency (ch. 161: sine quibus agi non potest).
This claim, however, does not accurately reﬂect the very complex Stoic
picture of the different forms of causality interacting in human decision-
making.17 Human freedom and responsibility according to the Stoics do
not consist in the freedom to do otherwise but in the human beings’ own
contribution to the causal nexus, through the disposition of their minds
and the faculty of assent, the principal causes of the outcome, as opposed to
external forces and representations (phantasia) that deliver information
about the outside world.18 Calcidius’ rendering of this position already
reads as a polemical misrepresentation. This is not what the Stoics them-
selves would say, but what an opponent of the Stoics could retort: “Look,
your Stoic theory of fate reduces human decision-making to a mere neces-
sary condition.” Such a misrepresentation elides what the Stoics would
consider distinctive about human decision-making, namely, the reasoning
process involved. If one leaves aside rational decision-making, in this
minimalist sense fate could also be said to be at work through a falling
stone or a charging animal. In such cases one could make a similar
distinction between outside forces and the nature of the things in question.
A stone, for instance, would fall both because of a push, the outside factor,
and because it is in its (internal) nature to fall.19 But one would not ascribe

15
For good analyses of this issue, see Bénatouïl 2006: 115–116 and Graver 2012.
16
See LS 55S and 62F–G.
17
See Cicero, Fat. 39–46; Aulus Gellius 7.2; Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 181.13–182.20; and
Nemesius, Nat. hom. 35.105.6–106.13. The best analysis to date of the issues with the different
types of causes involved is Bobzien 1999.
18
On this issue see also Salles 2005.
19
This is in fact the problem with the cylinder example mentioned by Cicero, Fat. 42ff. On this issue,
see also Nemesius, Nat. hom. 106.7–9, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 181.13–182.20; Bonazzi 2014.
Marcus Aurelius (10.33) makes sure to avoid this potential misunderstanding, in claiming that an

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12.1 Stoics on Providence and Fate 155
any freedom to a stone or a charging animal. Thus, the objection seems to
go, merely granting some role to an entity in the execution of fate still falls
short of accounting for human freedom.
In addition to these misrepresentations, Calcidius’ view of the relation
between the possible, the necessary, and the contingent (ch. 155) overlooks
the sophisticated and controversial Stoic moves (developed probably by
Chrysippus) of introducing modalities that would allow for counterfactual
possibilities20 and factual non-necessities.21 Another essential Stoic move
not included in Calcidius’ account is that, for fated future truths covered
by divination, the Stoics do not use hypotheticals, if p then q, but state-
ments of the type, “not: both p and not-q.” For example, the conditional:
“if someone is born at the rising of the Dogstar, (s)he will not die at sea”
gets rewritten as: “not both ‘someone is born at the rising of the Dogstar’
and ‘(s)he will die at sea.’” This move is intended to prevent the necessity of
past events, such as “you were born at the rising of the Dogstar” (which
Calcidius accepts as well, ch. 169) from carrying over automatically to
future ones.22 Given these two crucial omissions and the misrepresenta-
tions of the Stoic position, we can again see that the determinists as
Calcidius presents them are meant to be radical. They are not even trying
to leave room for human freedom in a manner in which Chrysippus
allegedly did. As far as Calcidius goes, the Stoics did not present some
middle ground or allow for a form of what we would now call
compatibilism.
Yet, while he presents the determinist position in its most extreme, and
hence, arguably, weakest form, and turns it into a strawman, Calcidius also
integrates key features of Stoicism into his own view. First, the kind of free,
rational decision-making Calcidius attributes to human beings can be
described in terms of both Aristotelian deliberation and the Stoic assent
to impressions (ch. 156). Second, Calcidius does not reject the Stoic theory
of perversion as such, but he rejects the Stoic psychology that underpins

external force could hinder an object such as a cylinder in its motion, but that nothing can hinder the
exercise of rationality in a human being (except for one, presumably, whose reasoning ability itself
has been affected by disease, disability, or injuries).
20
Something that is never true yet remains possible; for example, even if it is certain that a jewel will
never be broken, it is still possible for it to be. See Cicero, Fat. 12–15 = LS 38E; Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Fat. 176.14–23.
21
Something that is always true, i.e. future truths and something that is fated to happen, yet remains
contingent: for example, even if the oracle had foretold it, and it was true then that this was going to
happen, it had not been necessary that Cypselus should rule in Corinth. See references in the
previous note and Bobzien 1998: 116–119; this view presupposes a distinction between Fate as
Necessity and the modality “is necessary”; see also Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1055 D–F.
22
See Cicero, Fat. 14.

12.2 Stoics on Soul

In the treatise on the human soul (see ch. 6 in this study) Calcidius devotes
a continuous exposition to the views of the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus,
which is generally considered to be among our most reliable sources, with
one important exception that has led to misunderstandings in some of the
secondary literature (ch. 220).24
According to Calcidius the Stoics share with Empedocles and the
Hebrews the view that matter is continuous and that the main principle
of the soul is located in the heart. Unlike them, however, the Stoics posit
that the soul is “breath” (spiritus; the Latin equivalent of pneuma), not
blood. Calcidius quotes a syllogism he attributes to Zeno:
That upon the departure of which an animal dies would be the soul;
an animal dies when the natural breath (naturalis spiritus) departs
from the body;
therefore the soul is natural breath.25
Chrysippus, Calcidius avers, agrees with this reasoning and has his own
variant of the syllogism, which hinges on the proposition that animals
breathe and live by virtue of one and the same thing.
The main challenge posed by this account is the notion of “natural
breath,” by which Chrysippus probably meant the pneuma sumphuton; the
pneuma that coexists with a body.26 The phrase, “natural breath” which
Calcidius uses is too ambiguous from the point of view of Stoic doctrine as
attested elsewhere. The Stoics posit a scale of existent things that assumes

23
See ch. 6 in this study.
24
Tieleman 1996: 96–101 (reviewed by Reydams-Schils 2004); Powers 2012: 258–260; on this issue see
also Reydams-Schils 2006 and Ju 2007. See Introduction and section 6.3 in this study.
25
Quo recedente a corpore moritur animal, hoc certe anima est; naturali porro spiritu recedente
moritur animal, naturalis igitur spiritus anima est.
26
SVF 2.778, 773–789; see also section 6.3 in this study.

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12.2 Stoics on Soul 157
that pneuma is present as “cohesion” in lifeless things, as “nature” in plants,
as “soul” in animals, and as “rational soul” in human beings.
The first problem with Calcidius’ account is that he ends up attributing
functions to the soul that the Stoics in other sources attribute to the lower
level of “nature” in their scale of beings. Second, he distinguishes between
a “natural” soul power in animals and a rational one in human beings, and
thus, in a reverse move, pushes the soul in animals down to the level of
“nature.” In both cases the Stoic distinction between the beings with “soul”
and those that fall under the heading of “nature” gets erased. From one
perspective, cohesion, nature, soul, and rational soul are all manifestations
of nature in its most general Stoic sense, as a designation for the activity of
the divine principle in the ordering of the universe, but in that usage the
distinction between “nature” and “soul” would not apply. Moreover, it
would not make sense to contrast “rational” with “natural,” as Calcidius
does, because the “rational” would be “natural” too. From another per-
spective, “nature” in Stoicism specifically designates plants, but in that case
the Stoics, unlike Calcidius here, distinguish between “nature” and “soul,”
and thus both the attribution of “nature” functions to the soul and the
notion of a non-rational, natural soul would be problematic. Stoic usages
of the label “nature” would thus be either too general or too specific to fit
Calcidius’ purpose, and the conclusion imposes itself that he is blurring
Stoic distinctions in this passage.
So, the first problem with Calcidius’ account is that functions such as
growth and nutrition, which animals share with plants, now appear to
fall under the soul pneuma, and not merely to belong with the “nature”
aspect of animals. This is a direct consequence of his assumptions (a)
that there are two soul-principles, and (b) that the lower one also
includes vital functions. But Calcidius’ actual wording in this instance
is quite cautious: he merely indicates that the soul, with its ruling part
and seven instrumental parts, “fills” all the parts of the body with vital
spirit (usque quaque vitali spiritu complent) and “regulates and controls”
(reguntque et moderantur) these parts “with innumerable and diverse
powers” (innumerabilibus diversisque virtutibus), including nourishment
and growth. This wording does not need to imply that all these powers
are the soul’s own, but leaves open the possibility that the soul uses
some of them merely as instruments. It makes sense to argue that in
animals the soul ends up directing all functions of the body. And such
a position does not entail a departure from standard Stoic doctrine. As
we have seen (section 6.3), it is Calcidius who is harmonizing different
views of the soul in order to attribute to Plato the most complete view,

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158 Calcidius and the Stoics
and who is integrating into each view elements borrowed from the other
models.
One such attempt hinges on a distinction between rational and irra-
tional (also in the sense of non-rational) or natural aspects of the soul,
which the Stoics would not accept and which Calcidius projects onto Stoic
psychology, thereby creating the second problem I have identified, of
positing a natural soul power:
And he [Chrysippus] defines the mind’s inner deliberation as follows: the
inner movement of the soul is its rational power. (To be sure, dumb
creatures too have a principal power of soul by means of which they discern
their sources of nourishment, form mental images, avoid hidden dangers,
leap over precipitous drops, and acknowledge that which they have need of;
they have no rational power, however, but rather a natural one): among
mortal beings man alone enjoys the use of the principal good of mind, i.e.
reason, as Chrysippus says. (ch. 220, 233.13–19)27
The lines of the passage in between the two quotes of Chrysippus, set off by
round brackets, are, I submit, Calcidius’ interpretation. The wording of
the chapter as a whole indicates also that it is Calcidius who establishes
a connection between what he calls the natural soul power in animals and
the lower vital functions, such as growth and nutrition, which for a Stoic
would fall under the “nature” heading in the scale of being. In his descrip-
tion of actions that would be guided by the non-rational or natural soul-
principle Calcidius alludes to the Stoic psychological functions of “repre-
sentation” (phantasia) and “impulse” (hormē). Representation and impulse
represent what an adult human being, according to the Stoics, has in
common with pre-rational children and non-rational animals; in adult
human beings another function is added, assent, because of the advent of
reason.28
This projection on Calcidius’ part of the rational/irrational distinction
(with its equivocations) onto Stoic psychology need not have come at the
27
Definit idem intimam mentis deliberationem sic: “Intimus est motus animae uis rationabilis.”
Habent quippe etiam muta uim animae principalem, qua discernunt cibos, imaginantur, declinant
insidias, praerupta et praecipitia supersiliunt, necessitudinem recognoscunt, non tamen ration-
abilem quin potius naturalem; solus uero homo ex mortalibus principali mentis bono, hoc est
ratione, utitur, ut ait idem Chrysippus.
28
The alignment between human and animal perception and impulse, leaving out reason and assent,
appears to have played a role in polemics against the Stoics (as in Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1122C–D, with
the Academic claim that we do not need assent to explain human action). Both Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Fat. 181.13–182.20 = LS 62G and Nemesius, Nat. hom. 35.105.6–10 = LS 53O also try to
erase the differences between human and animal psychology in Stoicism, this time by attributing
assent to both (see Inwood 1985: 87ff.). But such an alignment by no means remains confined to
polemics; it also became a doxographical tool for harmonizing different psychologies.

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12.2 Stoics on Soul 159
expense of the important realization that, according to the Stoics, human
representation and impulse do not merely coexist with reason, but are
transformed by it: whatever adult human beings do falls under the reign of
reason, whether used correctly or not. Calcidius’ entire claim about the
value of doxastic reason rests on such a realization.
Calcidius ends his overview of the Stoic position with a critique of their
view that soul as pneuma would be corporeal (ch. 221). In order to
accomplish his purpose, he turns the Stoics’ own list of different types of
mixtures against them: if the soul is a body, then a corporeal entity would
have to be mixed with the body in the strict sense, but none of the possible
mixtures would actually work. If we assume mere “juxtaposition” (appli-
catio), the soul as pneuma could not permeate and give life to the body; if
we assume, on the other end of the scale, “intermixture” (permixtio), the
soul would lose its unity, and, ﬁnally, “aggregation” (concretio) would
presuppose that two bodies could occupy the exact same place.29
Calcidius repeats this argument in the systematic exposition of Plato’s
psychology (ch. 227). What is most striking in this context is that he rejects
the idea that the soul would be corporeal precisely because he agrees with
the Stoics that a human soul, like the World Soul in the universe, “pene-
trates the entire body and gives it life” (quod omne corpus penetret idque
uiuiﬁcet). So, we have here an instance of the polemical strategy of
attempting to improve the Stoics’ theory for them.
As we have seen (section 6.3), Calcidius has also integrated aspects of
Stoic psychology into what I call his master-list of soul functions.
Moreover, as in the case of the treatise on fate, Calcidius has co-opted
other features of Stoic thought, expressed most clearly in the strong
analogy between World Soul and human soul (ch. 140; section 6.4 in
this study). For the World Soul, Calcidius posits a principal part situated in
the sun as the equivalent of the human heart (chs. 99–100), and functions
that are analogous to spirit and appetite in human beings (ch. 45). Even for
opinion pertaining to sensible reality, or doxastic reason, Calcidius has
narrowed any potential gap between the World and the human soul. (He
shows his awareness of the Stoic inextricable connection between divine
and human reason in the short treatise on dreams, ch. 251.) The view that
the human being is a microcosm, containing the same elements in body
and soul as the universe (ch. 202), is, after all, easier to maintain in a Stoic
than in a Platonic framework, because the former posits the strongest
possible continuity between a corporeal active divine principle at work in

29
On the background of this polemic, see also Groisard 2016: 207–211.

12.3 Stoics on Matter

At ﬁrst glance the treatise on matter may appear to be less critical of the
Stoics than the other sections of the commentary. The Stoics are included
in a position that Calcidius establishes as common ground between
a number of philosophical schools, and which he also endorses (see ch.
9 in this study). Like Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, the Stoics,
Calcidius avers, consider matter to be continuous and to be deprived of
form, which also entails that the order imposed on matter is the work of
Providence (ch. 280). The Stoics consider matter to be the “origin of
things” (ch. 308: origo rerum), as one of the fundamental principles of
reality; as such it exists eternally (ch. 312). As we have seen, Calcidius
adopts a Stoic account of the interaction between the divine principle and
matter in his initial presentation of the latter’s function (ch. 269), and
like the Stoics he considers matter to be entirely amenable to the order
imposed by the divine principle (chs. 270, 307, and 319), calling it even an
ousia (chs. 273 and 330).
The doxographical section on the Stoics’ view of matter (chs. 289–294)
starts out with the general view that god is the craftsman and matter the
substrate for his action, and that both are considered bodies, one as acting,
the other as being acted upon. In this account, however, Calcidius imme-
diately introduces the example of a statue which is made out of a certain
material, and for which one can then raise the question what the substrate
of that material would be, and so on, until one arrives at the most
fundamental matter that is one of the principles of all reality. As the
remainder of this doxographical section goes on to show, there may be
a contamination from a Peripatetic distinction between primary and
secondary matter in this account.30
Zeno and Chrysippus are said (ch. 290) to reserve the label substance
only for matter qua principle, and not to use it for other types of matter
inherent in things (such as bronze in a statue). So, “substance” would be
reserved for “that which is the cause of existence” (ut sint causa est) for all
things. As in other instances, this report too needs to be handled with
caution, because other sources indicate that the Stoics did not consider

30
Charlton 1970: 144 claims that Calcidius’ account is partly responsible for the attribution of the
notion of “prime matter,” erroneous in his opinion, to Aristotle.

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12.3 Stoics on Matter 161
matter to be a cause,31 and the wording could diminish the importance of
the active, divine principle. (In a polemical move Calcidius himself will
actually downplay the role of the active principle in his rendering of the
Stoic position – see below.) Another way to distinguish between “sub-
stance” and “matter” (ch. 291) is to consider the first in terms of the
foundation of a work (operis fundamentum) and the second in relation to
a maker (opificis).
In his final account of the Stoic notion of matter, which he attributes to
Zeno, Calcidius provides more details about how the active divine princi-
ple is intended to interact with matter (ch. 292): it is a breath (spiritus) that
moves matter rationally, now in its entirety, now only in part. It is said to
be not (merely) nature but to be a rational soul of the universe. This reason,
according to the Stoics in Calcidius’ report (ch. 293), runs through matter
“like semen on its way through the genital organs” (ut semen per membra
genitalia). It is the true craftsman, acting on an entirely passive matter. The
divine principle is the “by which” (a quo) and the matter that “from which”
(ex quo) something comes to be. Calcidius ends this overview with a Stoic
criticism of Plato: the existence of an intelligible paradigm for the world is
redundant given that seminal reason (ratio seminum) is sufficient to
account for its structure.
This Stoic critique of Plato leads to the breakdown of the peace in
Calcidius’ textual universe, and he now engages, again, in an explicit
polemic against the Stoics (ch. 294), which, upon closer examination, he
has already anticipated, and which he will continue in the report of
Numenius’ position (see ch. 13 in this study). Where the Stoics’ view of
the principles of reality is similar to Plato’s, they committed plagiarism (a
view already put forth in Cicero’s report on Antiochus32); where their view
deviates from Plato’s account, they are wrong. They err in particular in
considering the divine principle to be a body, and if not the same as matter,
then at least to be an inseparable quality of the passive principle. In this
context Calcidius expresses his disgust at the notion of “seminal reason,”
although earlier on (ch. 137) he had co-opted a cleaned-up version of this
theory, one might say, for the intelligible realm, with the claim that “the
seeds of a lower nature exist within the exemplar, i.e. within the intelligible
world” (cum in exemplari, hoc est intellegibili mundo, inferioris naturae
semina intellegibiliter extent).

31
Duhot 1989: 139–152; Seneca, Ep. 65.2ff.; 89.16. For Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius, cf. also
Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.13.1c = SVF 1.89, 2.336; Posidonius F95 Edelstein and Kidd.
32
See Reydams-Schils 2013.

Source and Sources (1)

Numenius

To date most of the scholarship on Calcidius has focused on his sources.

Waszink, as editor of the text, simply assumes that Calcidius was too
mediocre an author to have come up with the main lines of this commen-
tary himself,1 and hence must have relied on other sources – and according
to this approach, the closer we can get to one master source, or as few
sources as possible, the better (though Waszink rejects the hypothesis of
one master source for the entire commentary, 1962: cvi). But to the extent
that we have reason to believe, as I have argued, that Calcidius shows his
own hand in the structuring of his material, this starting assumption is
questionable (as van Winden 1959: 9–10 points out). A second major
complication arises from the fact that Calcidius, like many other authors
of the period, has a tendency not to mention his direct sources by name; he
may be using such sources also as depositories of older material which
shows up in his doxographical overviews, but he does not reveal who they
are. This chapter examines one of two potential inﬂuences on Calcidius,
Numenius, and the next reassesses the role of Porphyry.2

13.1 Calcidius on Numenius

In the sub-treatise on matter an entire section is devoted to the views of
Numenius (chs. 295–299, with a summary passage in ch. 300 that
includes Numenius). This is the last position on the role of matter
which Calcidius mentions in his doxographical overview, right before
he turns his attention to a systematic exposition of what he considers to
be Plato’s theory. This ordering itself already indicates that Numenius
holds pride of place. But the conﬁguration in which Calcidius embeds
Numenius’ account is very complex. Calcidius has just mentioned a Stoic

1
Waszink 1962: xiv, on his terminology; cvi; see also Switalski 1902: 113.
2
See also the assessment in Bakhouche 2011 I: 34–41.

163

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164 Source and Sources (1): Numenius
criticism of Plato’s view, specifically of his reliance on an intelligible
model for the things existing in the world. He brings in Numenius to
counter this criticism. Numenius is said to refute the Stoics on the basis
of Pythagorean views that, according to Calcidius, are in agreement with
Plato. So right away we have many different layers of discourse: (1) an
alleged polemic between Plato and the Stoics, (2) “Pythagorean” views,
but (3) as filtered through Numenius, who comes to Plato’s aid in this
perceived polemic.
The divine principle which this account attributes to the Pythagoreans
and Numenius is the monad, whereas matter is the dyad, or unlimited. The
order of the universe requires such a higher divine principle, the argument
against the Stoics goes. Even nature itself derives its powers from this
transcendent principle. In a move with which we are familiar by now,3
the Demiurge is represented not merely as reason facing necessity and
chance, but as Providence.
One discovers the second principle, matter, the report continues,
through a process of abstraction, by removing its corporeal features one
by one (ch. 299). Numenius, as quoted by Calcidius, mentions two
Pythagorean views of matter: one he attributes to Pythagoras and appears
to endorse, and another he attributes to some “Pythagoreans” and rejects.
According to the first view, matter in its disorderly state is ungenerated and
coeval with god; “generated” matter represents a “later” stage that reflects
the ordering interventions of the Demiurge:
(a) . . . that insofar as it is indeterminate this dyad is ungenerated,
whereas insofar as it is determinate it is generated. That is, that
prior to being adorned by the reception of form and order it was
without birth or generation, but once adorned and illuminated by
the god who gave it order it was generated; and that since the
circumstance of generation is a later one, the unadorned and ungen-
erated should thus be considered coeval with the god by whom it
was brought into order. (ch. 295)4

3
See also section 8.1 in this study.
4
Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens Pythagorae dogmate,
cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram deum quidem singularitatis nomine nomi-
nasse, siluam uero duitatis; quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem minime genitam, limitatam
uero generatam esse dicere, hoc est, antequam exornaretur quidem formamque et ordinem nancis-
ceretur, sine ortu et generatione, exornatam uero atque illustratam a digestore deo esse generatam,
atque ita, quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum aequaeuum
deo, a quo est ordinatum, intellegi debeat.

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13.1 Calcidius on Numenius 165
This position shows an afﬁnity with a view attributed to Atticus and Plutarch,5
who endorse a literal beginning of the world. The temporal connotations of
“before” and “after” in Calcidius’ account (ch. 295, antequam and posterior)
look like traces of a literal reading of the Timaeus.6 Perhaps some
Pythagoreans and Numenius interpret the temporal language allegorically,
that is, as indicating the dependence of ordered matter on a divine cause. But
if that is the case, Calcidius does not tell us. Moreover, the claim that only
indeterminate matter is coeval with god also suggests a literal interpretation of
the beginning of the world.
The second view of the relation between god/the monad and matter/the
dyad runs as follows:
(b) . . . but that some Pythagoreans, in misinterpreting what was meant
by this view, thought that the indeterminate and immeasurable
dyad was intended as well, that it was produced by the solitary
monad as the latter receded from its own natural unity and migrated
to the state of the dyad. “Misinterpreting” in the sense that the
monad that was would have ceased to be while the dyad that was not
would have come to be, and there would have been a conversion,
matter from god and the immeasurable and indeterminate dyad
from the monad – an opinion unsuitable even for men of modest
learning. (ch. 295)7
This view echoes a position attributed to Eudorus of Alexandria, who
maintains that matter, whether in its ordered or disordered state, is also
derived from the divine monad/One.8 According to this perspective, then,
matter is not coeval with god at all, neither in its disordered nor in its
ordered state. The critique addressed to this stance, however, is a polemical
misrepresentation: it is not the case, according to our sources, that the
monad would depart from its own natural state of unity and turn into the

5
See also Proclus In Tim. 2, I 283.27–30 Diehl = Atticus F20 des Places; Plutarch, De an. procr. 1014A–
B. Proclus (In Tim. 2, I 276.30–277.7 Diehl = Atticus F19 des Places) also claims that Plutarch and
Atticus make a distinction between unmeasured time before the ordering of the universe and ordered
time coming about with the universe.
6
See ch. 4 in this study.
7
Sed non nullos Pythagoreos uim sententiae non recte assecutos putasse dici etiam illam indetermi-
natam et immensam duitatem ab unica singularitate institutam recedente a natura sua singularitate et
in duitatis habitum migrante – non recte, ut quae erat singularitas esse desineret, quae non erat duitas
subsisteret, atque ex deo silua et ex singularitate immensa et indeterminata duitas conuerteretur; quae
opinio ne mediocriter quidem institutis hominibus competit.
8
Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 181 Diels.

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166 Source and Sources (1): Numenius
dyad; as far as we can tell, Eudorus assumed the existence of a highest
monad from which the pair of a lower monad and dyad is derived.9
This detailed exposition of Pythagorean notions of matter is a long
prelude to Numenius’ criticism of the Stoics, who, Numenius thinks,
wrongly assume matter to be defined and limited (ch. 295, definitam et
limitatam), whereas Pythagoras correctly stated that matter/the dyad is
infinite and limitless (infinitam et sine limite). But, of course, according to
the Stoics, matter derives its structure from the divine principle with which
it always coexists. So, this criticism is another version of the claim that the
Stoics confused, or intertwined too strongly, the divine active principle
with matter.
Numenius’ Pythagoras agrees with the Stoics that “matter is fluid and
without quality” (ch. 296, fluidam et sine qualitate). Unlike the Stoics,
however, Pythagoras is said to hold the view that matter by itself is not
considered neutral, but evil. Based on a reading of Book Ten of Plato’s
Laws, this position claims that Plato allegedly explains the evil nature of
matter by positing the existence of two World Souls (ch. 297, duas mundi
animas), one of which is evil and is inextricably connected to matter. Even
in the ordered universe this evil soul makes its influence felt.
This section of the commentary attributed to Numenius does not rest
content with refuting the Stoic critique of Plato; it carries out its own
counterattack (chs. 297–298) with the claim that the Stoics cannot
provide an explanation for the existence of evil. If the Stoics allow only
for a divine principle and a neutral matter, they need to rely on an
unexplained theory of “perversion” to account for moral evil. The idea
here appears to be that the Stoics merely drag in their theory of “perver-
sion” to fill a gap in their theory. A subsidiary line of reasoning uses
against the Stoics their own notion that events are caused by the move-
ments of the stars (cum quae proueniunt ex motu stellarum prouenire
dicantur): given that the stars are corporeal entities, they too, would be
affected by the negative influence of disorderly matter, Numenius’
alleged argument goes, and this feature explains why the stars, in turn,
can negatively affect human beings. An intrinsic flaw in the ontological
structure of the world, as the true cause of evil, would make the Stoic
notion of “perversion” redundant.

9
Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 181 Diels; see also Porphyry F236 Smith, from Simplicius’ commentary on
Aristotle’s Physics in connection with a report on the Neo-Pythagorean Moderatus – the view which
Porphyry himself endorses, see also ch. 14 in this study.

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13.2 Numenius and the Commentary 167
13.2 Numenius and the Commentary
As both Waszink and van Winden noted,10 this section of the treatise on
matter gathers up a number of threads from the fabric of the commentary
as a whole. In some cases there are verbal echoes of the language Calcidius
uses in the Numenius section. For instance, in the exposition of
Numenius’ view, the provisions (consultis) of Providence are called “salu-
tary” (salubribus),11 and this word makes it into Calcidius’ translation of
a passage from the Timaeus (48a2–5, see also ch. 270): whereas the Greek
merely has τῷ πείθειν, Calcidius renders it as salubri persuasione.
The thematic and methodological connections are even more important
and striking.
(i) As we have seen in an early passage of the commentary (chs. 29–31;
53–54), Calcidius himself endorses a reading of the Timaeus that
posits the existence of two souls, one the inseparable companion of
bodies, indicated by Plato’s notion of divided substance (diuidua
substantia), and the other a transcendent, purely noetic soul, which
allegedly stands for Plato’s “undivided substance” (indiuidua
substantia).12
(ii) For Calcidius too, the notion of Providence is essential to the order
of the universe, and to such an extent that he ends up inserting it in
his translation of passages in which the Greek does not include it.13
(But this feature also implies that it may have been Calcidius rather
than Numenius who highlighted Providence in this section of the
commentary.14)
(iii) Moreover, attributing the idea of Providence – properly understood,
that is – to Plato is central to Calcidius’ polemic against the Stoics in
the sub-treatise on Fate,15 and the speciﬁc points of the polemic
against the Stoics in the Numenius section are also present in the
exposition on fate. In ch. 165 Calcidius discusses the Stoic theory of
“perversion,” and in ch. 174, he rejects the view that stellar move-
ment causes evil (in which case evil human actions would be fated;
both themes occur together in the Numenius account – ch. 298;
Waszink 1962: lix).

10
See also van Winden’s 1965 reprint, pp. 248–259.
11
As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, the notion of consultis is an echo of the idea that the second
god is a lawgiver (Numenius F13.6 des Places); see also ch. 7 in this study.
12 13
See sections 3.3 and 5.1 in this study. See section 8.1 in this study.
14 15
Pace Waszink 1962: xl–xlii. See ch. 8 in this study.

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168 Source and Sources (1): Numenius
(iv) In ch. 303 Calcidius also proposes that the method for discovering
matter consists in a process of abstraction, or what he calls resolutio
(analysis) in this context (parallel to ch. 299 in the Numenius
account).16
(v) Through material preserved in other sources, we can detect an
influence of Numenius even in Calcidius’ hermeneutical principle
that Plato’s views represent the complete picture of the truth,
whereas his successors tended to focus instead on only partial
answers.17
(vi) We also know from other sources that Numenius included the
Hebrews in his version of the wisdom tradition.18
In spite of these connections, however, Waszink and van Winden went
too far in attributing all these other sections of the commentary in their
entirety to Numenius, extending his alleged influence even further, for
instance, to include Calcidius’ view of the threefold structure of the divine
(chs. 176–177 and 188). While there are some affinities between Calcidius’
position and the views attested for Numenius in other fragments of his
work, there are also crucial differences. As in Numenius’ view of the divine,
the boundaries between the different levels of Calcidius’ hierarchy are fluid
and both present a dynamic model of the relations between these different
levels, but the latter’s hierarchy does not match what we find in the
remaining fragments of Numenius.19
The same can also be said of other affinities between the two. Whereas
Providence is central to Calcidius’ own line of interpretation of Plato’s
Timaeus, the key Pythagorean notions of monad and dyad for god and matter
are not, even though he does mention them briefly in the first part of the
commentary (ch. 39; see also chs. 53–55). Even more importantly, contrary to
Numenius, Calcidius does not consider matter intrinsically evil, and he adopts
a much more minimal dualism than the one he attributes to Numenius and
the Pythagoreans.20 Moreover, if indeed Numenius attributes the view to
Pythagoras that the world had a real beginning in time and aligns himself with
this position, this too would constitute a major divergence from Calcidius,
who interprets the temporal language allegorically as matter’s eternal depen-
dence on a higher divine cause.21
As a corollary to his view of matter, Calcidius does not consider the
lower soul that is intertwined with bodies evil per se; his emphasis is on this

16 17
See also Hoenig forthcoming b and section 10.4 in this study. See section 1.3 in this study.
18
As in F1a-c, F9–10, F30, F56 des Places. 19 See also section 7.3 in this study.
20 21
See ch. 9 in this study. See ch. 4 in this study; Deuse 1983: 63–64.

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13.2 Numenius and the Commentary 169
soul’s role as life-force.22 It is true, as van Winden points out (1965 reprint:
256–257), that in ch. 31, in the context of his discussion of the lower and the
higher soul, Calcidius talks about the Demiurge bringing order by means
of the intellect to the disorderly movements of the lower soul, as to waves
(agitationem fluctibus similem),23 but he stops short of calling it evil (see also
Waszink 1962: xlix).
There are other indications in the commentary that Calcidius wants to
distance himself from the concept of an evil, lower World Soul. In the
treatise on demons (ch. 135) he mentions this view as a position held by the
ueteres, and in the treatise on fate (ch. 172 and ch. 174) he merely leaves
room for the hypothesis of the existence of an evil soul, but clearly with the
intention of rejecting it (Bakhouche 2011 II: 770, n. 336).
A close comparison between the relevant chapters from the treatise on
fate (chs. 165 and 174) and the passage from the Numenius section that
deals with the negative influence of the stars (ch. 298) reveals the funda-
mental difference between Calcidius’ and Numenius’ approaches to the
problem of evil (den Boeft 1970: 75–77). Numenius allegedly argues that
the Stoic notion of “perversion” is redundant because one can attribute
a negative influence to the heavenly bodies themselves. Qua bodies they
have an affinity with matter and thus cannot entirely escape being affected
by the latter’s deficiency:
Moreover, the stars are bodies or celestial fires; and matter is the nurse of all
bodies, so that those things too which to no apparent purpose or to ill effect
are driven by the stars are seen to originate in matter, which is possessed of
much intemperance, an improvident drive, the element of chance, and
a randomly motivated determination . . . [T]he natural defect could not
be eliminated altogether. (ch. 298)24
Calcidius, by contrast, pursues the line of thinking that would deny the
stars any such negative influence, on the basis of the claim that they are
divine and perfect:
What, then, is the origin of evil? They [the proponents of fate, including the
Stoics] indict stellar movement. But what is the origin of that movement?
Does the movement proper occur such that, while it remains the same, both

22
On this issue I follow Deuse 1983: 73–76, esp. 76 pace Phillips 2003.
23
As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, the sea metaphor could be an echo of Numenius F18 des
Places.
24
Stellae porro corpora sunt ignesque caelites; omnium quippe corporum silua nutrix, ut etiam quae
sidereus motus minus utiliter et improspere turbat originem trahere uideantur ex silua, in qua est
multa intemperies et improuidus impetus et casus atque ut libet exagitata praesumptio . . . naturale
uitium limari omnino nequiret.

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170 Source and Sources (1): Numenius
goods and evils issue from it, and if so, then with the stars willing it or not
willing it? If with them willing it, then the stars are living beings and move
according to purpose; if with them not willing it, then they have no capacity
for action. To be sure, either all stars are divine, good, and productive of no
evil or certain ones are maleficent. But given that all heavenly bodies are full
of celestial wisdom, and we know that evil arises from mindlessness, to what
extent is it appropriate to speak of the stars – in that place, so holy and full of
goodness – as being maleficent? Unless perhaps we are to imagine the
unspeakable, that the same stars alternate between being good and malign
and therefore bestow benefits and harm indiscriminately. But this is absurd,
to suppose, not that the celestial substance endowed with one and the same
nature is the same in all stars, but that many of them degenerate, as it were,
from their proper nature. – But surely the stars endure this against their
will? – And what will be that necessity so great as to compel them to do
wrong against their will? And this soul itself, will it be divine or malign? (ch.
174)25
The range of possibilities Calcidius covers here is meant as a rhetorical
amplification to underscore the absurdity of attributing any responsibility
for evil to the stars. Given the thrust of the passage, it is also clear that when
he raises the final issue, whether it is a divine or malign soul that would
compel the stars to exert a negative impulse, he intends to reject the
possibility of an evil cosmic soul. Thus, this paragraph, like his position
on matter, reads like a refutation of the view which Calcidius attributes to
Numenius.
What all of this evidence tells us, I believe, is that the question of
Calcidius’ sources can send us down the wrong path. Instead of attributing
to Numenius as one of Calcidius’ main sources all the passages of the
commentary that have affinities with the section from the treatise on
matter, either directly or indirectly, it makes much more sense to posit
that Calcidius made independent use of the ideas he found in his material
on Numenius. It is Calcidius who sets up the distinction between the two
types of primordial souls early on in the commentary, and he does so in

25
Unde ergo mala? Motum stellarum causantur. Sed ipse motus unde? Et utrum uolentibus stellis
motus ipse talis fit, ut ex eodem motu et mala proueniant et bona, an inuitis? Si uolentibus, animalia
sunt stellae et iuxta propositum mouentur; si inuitis, nullus est earum actus. Certe aut omnes stellae
diuinae sunt et bonae nec quicquam faciunt mali aut quaedam maleficae. Sed maleficas esse in illo
sancto et pleno bonitatis loco quatenus conuenit, cumque omnia sidera plena sint caelestis sapien-
tiae, malitiam porro sciamus ex dementia nasci, quatenus conuenit maleficas stellas esse dicere? Nisi
forte – id quod fas non est – interdum easdem bonas, interdum malignas esse existimandum
proptereaque promisce beneficia et maleficia praebere; sed hoc absurdum est, putare caelestem
substantiam una eademque natura praeditam non in omnibus stellis eandem esse sed plerasque
tamquam a propria degenerare natura. Sed nimirum hoc inuitae stellae patiuntur. Et quaenam erit
illa tanta necessitas quae inuitas cogat delinquere? Et haec ipsa utrum diuina erit anima an maligna?

26
See section 5.1 in this study.

Source and Sources (2)

Porphyry

For those scholars who posit his commentary on the Timaeus and other
works of his as (one of) Calcidius’ principal source(s),1 Porphyry serves
a function similar to that of the Stoic Posidonius in earlier scholarship: any
feature of later accounts that looks like a combination of Stoic and Platonic
elements tended to be attributed to Posidonius, even if the source of
a passage in question did not explicitly mention him. As a result,
Posidonius’ role in the chain of transmission of Stoic views was greatly
exaggerated.2 Since then this “pan-Posidonianism” has been seriously
challenged, and what is considered Posidonian in origin has been reduced
to much more realistic proportions. The time may have come to do the
same for Porphyry, and Calcidius’ commentary is an excellent case in point
for such a reassessment.3
The earlier approach relies on a number of questionable methodological
assumptions: parallels between Calcidius and fragments of Porphyry

1
The strongest proponent of this influence is Waszink 1962 (confirmed in the reprint of 1975): lxii–
lxxxii (arguing that Numenius’ influence reached Calcidius through Porphyry); xc–xcv (on p. xcv he
mentions Porphyry’s commentary on the Timaeus as Calcidius’ principal source); 1964; 1966: 53,
58–62, 65, 71; 1972: 240–241 (bringing in Sodano’s collection of fragments from Porphyry’s com-
mentary on the Timaeus as corroborating this view – but Sodano himself relies on Waszink’s thesis;
see below). Gersh (1989) endorses the view of a strong Porphyrian influence. See also den Boeft 1970:
55, where he argues for the parallel between Porphyry as mentioned by Proclus In Tim. 2, I 352.11–16
Diehl and Calcidius’ claim (ch. 162) that God knows things according to their natures (see also
sections 2.4, 8.4 and 16.1 in this study) but overlooks the fact that Proclus’ criticism of Porphyry is
contradicted by Sent. 10, 22, and 33; and den Boeft 1970: 98, with the claim that Calcidius’ hierarchy
of the divine (chs 176–177, 188) was mediated by Porphyry; van Winden 1965 (reprint of van Winden
1959): 248–259; see also den Boeft 1977: 52–65.
2
For Switalski (1902: 86–91, 109–112) Posidonius’ alleged commentary on the Timaeus is the primary
source of the commentary; see also 113 where he relies on the assumption that Calcidius is too
mediocre a figure to have had much of a hand himself in the arrangement of the material.
3
For a good overview of the debate before Waszink’s 1962 edition, see van Winden 1959: 4–10. On the
issue of the role of Porphyry see especially Steinheimer 1912 and the response by Jones 1918. In what
follows I align myself with Jones’ concerns about the method used by scholars who see an ample role
for Porphyry, and with the much more cautious approach exemplified in recent work on Porphyry’s
Contra Christianos such as Männlein-Robert 2017.

172

14.1 Porphyry’s Commentary on the Timaeus

Central to this investigation is Porphyry’s own commentary on the
Timaeus.6 If one brackets for a moment the passages from Macrobius
which Sodano includes in the collection of fragments of this work (65–68,
and 82–83 in the Appendix) and limits oneself to the evidence provided by
Proclus and Philoponus, one is struck immediately by how different
Porphyry’s approach is from Calcidius’ undertaking. The opening parts
4
See for instance Waszink 1964: 69–82 on Calcidius, chs. 20–25.
5
As an anonymous reviewer pointed out.
6
For a good overview of Porphyry’s interpretation of the Timaeus, see Köckert 2009: 175–222, with
bibliography.

7
Cf. F13 Sodano, on the periodic conﬂagrations (Tim. 22d3–5): ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος καὶ ἐπὶ
τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων μετάγει τοὺς λόγους καὶ . . . See also the claim (F26 Sodano) that
one ﬁrst has to have one’s soul in proper order before embarking on the theoretical aspect of
philosophy.
8
Jones 1918: 200–203 and Hoenig 2018b: 201–206. By contrast, den Boeft 1977: 52–65, while noticing
the importance of the Epinomis for Calcidius’ account, and the many features shared with Middle
Platonist demonology, ends up (65) suggesting, on the basis of alleged parallels between Calcidius
and Hierocles as well as the latter’s alleged dependence on Ammonius Saccas, that a now lost Middle
Platonist treatise on demonology was adapted by Ammonius and that elements of this adaptation
reached Calcidius through Porphyry. This is a case in point for the “Porphyry hypothesis” having
gotten out of hand.
9
See section 2.2 in this study.
10
On this issue see especially Baltes 1976–1978 I: 136–169; Köckert 2009: 183–194.

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14.1 Porphyry’s Commentary on the Timaeus 175
Calcidius, however, appears to lose sight of his notion of the hypercos-
mic noetic soul in his account of the three levels of god, positing a highest
god, a second god as first mind, and the World Soul as a third god
and second mind (chs. 176–177 and 188). By contrast Porphyry distin-
guishes between the hypercosmic (ὑπερκόσμιος) soul and mind (F41, 42,
53) in his claim that the hypercosmic soul is the equivalent of the maker-
Demiurge in Plato’s account (Deuse 1997: 238–249). The mind of this
hypercosmic soul, according to Porphyry, is the Living Being itself, or the
intelligible paradigm. So, whereas Porphyry establishes a close relationship
between the hypercosmic soul and its mind and emphasizes the demiurgic
role of the former, Calcidius, as we have seen, combines his first and second
gods together as the Demiurge (see ch. 7 in this study). At the other end of
the ontological scale, there appears to be no equivalent in the extant
evidence for Porphyry’s views of Calcidius’ lower soul-principle.
A second and no less crucial difference emerges: whereas Calcidius is
quite content to posit a plurality of principles, letting matter stand by itself
along with god and the forms, Porphyry argues that all these principles are
ultimately dependent on one highest principle.11 Moreover, Calcidius
provides an explanation of the role of matter and its relation to the
elements that runs explicitly counter to a view attested for Porphyry
(more on this below).
Finally, we have a section of the Timaeus which is treated by both
Porphyry (F57–81 Sodano) and Calcidius (Tim. 31c–41e). This section
contains the discussion of the World body, the World Soul, time, and
the heavenly bodies, as well as the speech of the Demiurge to the younger
gods. The difference in approach of each commentator stands out here too.
In the first part of Calcidius’ commentary the treatment of these passages
(or to be more precise, the section up to 39e) is mostly devoted to technical
and mathematical issues, broadly conceived. And while we need to be
sensitive to a selective bias in Proclus, who may be leaving out more
technical sections, Porphyry appears to interpret this section primarily
from an ontological rather than a mathematical perspective (which does
not exclude the possibility that he may have devoted some attention to the
mathematics). Thus, when he comments on the constitution of the ele-
ments, Porphyry’s primary focus is on the relation between fire and earth
and different types of demons (F57 Sodano; also treated by Calcidius in
11
F51 and 56 Sodano; Köckert 2009: 195–201. See also Porphyry, Mat. F236 Smith, in which he
connects this view to the Neo-Pythagorean Moderatus; it bears strong resemblances to the first of
two Pythagorean views discussed by Numenius as presented by Calcidius (ch. 295), which Numenius
is said to reject (see section 13.1 in this study).

12
For a similar cautionary note see also Köckert 2009: 176–177.
13
Proclus, In Tim. 3, II 171.4–9 Diehl, not included in Sodano, but mentioned in the notes, 58; not in
Smith.
14
See Waszink 1964: 26, 35–36; Macrobius, In Somn. 2.3.14–15 = F72 Sodano.
15
Waszink 1962: ci; 1964: 82 does not posit Porphyry’s commentary on the Timaeus as the sole primary
source for the ﬁrst part of Calcidius’ commentary.
16
Porphyry, F80 Sodano; see also Sent. 29.
17
See also Moreschini 2003: xxiv–xxx who assesses critically Waszink’s hypothesis that Porphyry’s
commentary on Plato’s Timaeus would have been Calcidius’ main source and Bakhouche 2011:
I 38–39, who includes a discussion of the section on dreams from Calcidius’ commentary (ch. 256).
18
See also Köckert 2009: 177–178.

(1) The human soul

For the sub-treatise on the human soul we can find in the extant material of
Porphyry parallels to some of Calcidius’ arguments, including the possi-
bility reported by Suidas that Porphyry too wrote against Aristotle’s notion
of entelechy.19 Let us take a closer look at one possible parallel: both
authors’ use of a Stoic division of different types of mixtures.
Calcidius argues against the Stoic view of the soul as corporeal, and in
doing so he discusses the three types of mixture of bodies the Stoics
allegedly posit (ch. 221).20 None of these mixtures would work for the
relation between soul and body, and thus, assuming that this list of
possibilities is exhaustive, Calcidius concludes that the soul cannot be
corporeal. For his part, Porphyry – that is, if the relevant passage from
Nemesius can be attributed to him in its entirety21 – also uses three different
types of mixtures, but without in this instance explicitly mentioning the
Stoics.22 The purpose of this investigation, however, is not to address the
simpler question whether the soul can be corporeal but to find a way to
account for the relation between soul and body that maintains the sub-
stance of both in their unity—or, in the case of the soul, both its own
substance as unfused and free from destruction (ἀσύγχυτον καὶ
ἀδιάφθορον) and its unity with the body (Dörrie 1959: 34). (By contrast,
Nemesius’ critique in his preceding chapter of the notion of a corporeal
soul relies on different Stoic material than we find in Calcidius – the only
point of contact between Calcidius and that chapter in Nemesius is a brief
reference to the idea that the notion of juxtaposition cannot account for
the manner in which the soul animates the entire body. But even that claim
is not represented in the same manner in both accounts.23) The argument
in the context of which Porphyry’s Symmikta Zetemata is mentioned
proceeds according to the following doxographical schema:

19
Gersh 1986 II: 485; see P31 = T240 Smith and P32 (Adversus Boethum de anima) = T241, F247 and
F249. See also Mansfeld 1992: 141–147.
20
Cf. SVF 2.473 = LS 48C; section 12.2 in this study.
21
On this issue see Sharples and van der Eijk 2008: 18–19; see also Sent. 33.
22
F259–261 Smith, preserved in Nemesius, Nat. hom. 3; see also Porphyry, Sent. 33.
23
Cf. Nemesius, Nat. hom. 2.22.10–17 (echoed in 3.39) and Calcidius, ch. 221, 234.9–10. The argument
in Nemesius relies on the speciﬁc claim that “it is impossible for the whole of one body to lie
alongside the whole of another” (trans. van der Eijk and Sharples), whereas Calcidius states more
simply that in juxtaposition the soul-breath would not be able to penetrate through to the innermost
body (non permanat ad corpus intimum).

liability to change and

unity of soul/body destruction together

fusion yes yes

juxtaposition no no
blending
in Nemesius
no yes
in Alexander of Aphrodisias, as attributed to Chrysippus
yes no
unfused unity
attributed to Ammonius
yes no

24
The account of this case is complicated by the fact that it also reduces “mixture” to a type of
juxtaposition, but one that is not perceptible. The notion that in krasis the components could be
destroyed is not in keeping with the evidence on the Stoics preserved in Alexander of Aphrodisias,
Mixt. 216.14–218.6 = SVF 2.473 = LS 48C.

(2) Transmigration of the human soul into animals

Another pièce de resistance for Porphyry’s alleged inﬂuence on
Calcidius consists of their respective positions on the transmigration
of human souls into animals (Waszink 1962: xci; 1972: 241). Like
Calcidius in the sub-treatise on fate (ch. 198), Porphyry is supposed
to have denied that degenerated human souls can literally transmigrate
into animals, and to have endorsed an allegorical reading of this
claim: that such humans become like animals, savage like a lion, or
cruel like a wolf, for instance.
Here is how Calcidius presents this view:
Plato, however, does not think that the rational soul assumes [42c] the
countenance or appearance of an irrational animal, but that as the body
succumbs to its lingering defects, the embodiment becomes beastly, with
vices increasing in the soul according to the conduct of its prior life; and
that the irascible but also brave human being shifts fully to the savageness
of a lion, while the savage but also rapacious one attains the nearest
likeness to the nature of wolves, and so on in other cases. Given, however,
that the return to a prior lot is available to souls (and can occur only if
a pure return to the civilized conduct worthy of a human being has been
effected), but that the correction or repentance of rational deliberation
does not arise in beings that live without reason, the soul of what was
once a human being is, according to Plato, in no way transferable, to
beasts. (ch. 198)26

25
Thus, in my opinion Dörrie 1959: 31; 33–35 is right in assuming a Middle Platonist background for
Calcidius’ account; Mansfeld 1990: 3112–3117 considers the Porphyry thesis “not implausible” (3113)
but prefers the assumption of doxographical collections of material, in the Placita tradition. See also
Chiaradonna 2005: 132–137.
26
Sed Plato non putat rationabilem animam uultum atque os ratione carentis animalis induere, sed ad
uitiorum reliquias accedente corpore incorporationem auctis animae uitiis efferari ex instituto uitae
prioris, et iracundum quidem hominem eundemque fortem prouehi usque ad feritatem leonis,
ferum uero et eundem rapacem ad proximam luporum naturae similitudinem peruenire, ceterorum
item. Sed cum sit reditus animis ad fortunam priorem – hoc uero ﬁeri non potest, nisi prius reditus
factus erit purus ad clemens et homine dignum institutum – rationabilis porro consilii correctio,
quae paenitudo est, non proueniat in his quae sine ratione uiuunt, anima quondam hominis
nequaquam transit ad bestias iuxta Platonem.

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180 Source and Sources (2): Porphyry
In reality, however, the evidence for Porphyry’s view is conﬂicting.
Augustine (CD 10.30) claims that Porphyry rejected transmigration into
animals.27 Other sources may be interpreted as stipulating both
a metaphorical and literal interpretation (though that claim is
contested),28 which has led scholars to argue that Porphyry came up with
a compromise position along the lines of one attested for later Neo-
Platonists. According to this position a human soul can ﬁnd itself housed
in an animal without turning into an irrational soul (Deuse 1983: 129–167,
Smith 1984). But regardless of whether this was actually Porphyry’s posi-
tion, such a compromise is excluded by Calcidius’ wording, that “Plato
does not think that a rational soul can take on the countenance of an
animal that lacks reason” (Plato non putat rationabilem animam vultum
atque os ratione carentis animalis induere) and that “the soul of what once
was a human being can absolutely not cross over to a beast according to
Plato” (anima quondam hominis nequaquam transit ad bestias iuxta
Platonem).
Moreover, at least one source appears to put Porphyry squarely in the
camp of the literal interpretation as opposed to the allegorical one, namely
Nemesius, whose excursion on fate does show extensive parallels with
Calcidius’ exposition.29 We need to take a close look at this complex
passage in its entirety:
A. Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν πάντες Ἕλληνες οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποφηνάμενοι
τὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν δογματίζουσιν, διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τὰ εἴδη τῶν
ψυχῶν·
(1) οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν εἶδος τὸ λογικὸν λέγουσιν, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ εἰς φυτὰ καὶ εἰς
τὰ τῶν ἀλόγων σώματα μεταβαίνειν,
i. οἱ μὲν κατά τινας ῥητὰς χρόνων περιόδους
ii. οἱ δὲ ὡς ἔτυχεν.
(2) ἄλλοι δὲ οὐχ ἓν εἶδος ψυχῶν, ἀλλὰ δύο, λογικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον·
(3) τινὲς δὲ πολλά, τοσαῦτα ὅσα τῶν ζῴων τὰ εἴδη.
B. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος περὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο διηνέχθησαν.

27
See also Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus 893A–B, a passage in which Porphyry is grouped together with
Iamblichus.
28
Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.49.59–61 and Macrobius, In Somn. 1.9.5.
29
My reading of this passage differs from Dörrie 1957: 426–431. Waszink 1966: 44 argues away the
tension by claiming that the position attested in Nemesius represents an earlier stage in Porphyry’s
thought. The reading presented here is endorsed by Finamore and Dillon 2002, on Iambl., De an.
4.24: 141–142; see also the detailed analysis in Dörrie and Baltes 2002: 179.2, 367–372. On the
parallels between Calcidius and Nemesius, see also ch. 8 in this study.

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14.2 Other Parallels? 181
εἰπόντος γὰρ Πλάτωνος τὰς μὲν θυμικὰς καὶ ὀργίλους καὶ ἁρπακτικὰς
ψυχὰς (25) λύκων καὶ λεόντων σώματα μεταμφιέννυσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὴν
ἀκολασίαν ἠσχολημένας ὄνων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀναλαμβάνειν σώματα,
(10 ) οἱ μὲν κυρίως ἤκουσαν τοὺς λύκους καὶ τοὺς λέοντας καὶ τοὺς ὄνους
(20 ) οἱ δὲ τροπικῶς αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι διέγνωσαν τὰ ἤθη διὰ τῶν ζῴων
παρεμφαίνοντα.
(A1 + B10 > B100 ) Κρόνιος μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ περὶ παλιγγενεσίας οὕτω δὲ καλεῖ
τὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν λογικὰς πάσας εἶναι βούλεται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
Θεόδωρος ὁ Πλατωνικὸς ἐν τῷ Ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ εἴδη ἐστί, καὶ
Πορφύριος ὁμοίως.
(A2 and A3 + B20 > B200 ) Ἰάμβλιχος δέ, τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτοις δραμών, κατ’
εἶδος ζῴων ψυχῆς εἶδος εἶναι λέγει ἤγουν εἴδη διάφορα· γέγραπται γοῦν
αὐτῷ μονόβιβλον ἐπίγραφον Ὅτι οὐκ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ζῷα ἄλογα οὐδὲ
ἀπὸ ζῴων ἀλόγων εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἱ μετενσωματώσεις γίνονται, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ
ζῴων εἰς ζῷα καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀνθρώπους.
A. All the Greeks in common who declare the soul to be immortal hold the
dogma of transmigration. But they differ about the species of souls.
(1) For some say there is one species, the rational, and that this passes over
into the bodies of plants and non-rational animals.
i. Some say that it is at certain stated periods of time.
ii. Some that it happens randomly.
(2) But some say that there is not only one species of soul, but two, the
rational and the non-rational.
(3) Some say that there are many species, as many as there are species of
living creatures [missing premise from 200 : and these deny cross-species
transmigration].
B. The followers of Plato particularly differed [among themselves] about
this dogma.
➢ For Plato said that ﬁerce and proud and greedy souls take in exchange
the bodies of wolves and lions; those that were given to self-indulgence
assume the bodies of asses and the like
0
(1 ) and some understood this literally to mean wolves, lions, and
asses,
(20 ) while others discerned that he had spoken metaphorically, as
obliquely referring to habits via beasts.
(A1 + B10 > B100 )
For Cronius in his work on palingenesis, which is what he calls transmi-
gration, claims that all souls are rational. Similarly the Platonist
Theodorus in his That the Soul is the Totality of Forms, and Porphyry
likewise.

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182 Source and Sources (2): Porphyry
(A2 and A3+ B20 > B200 )
Iamblichus takes the opposite course to them; he says that here is a species of soul
for each species of animal, i.e. a different species [of soul]; at any rate he wrote a
monograph That transmigrations do not occur from men into irrational animals
nor from irrational animals into men but from animals to animals and from men to
men. (Nemesius, Nat. hom. 2.34–35, trans. Sharples and van der Eijk)
The structure of this passage is essential to understanding how Nemesius sets
up the different groups. He treats two issues together: the differences between
a range of views on whether, first, there are different species of souls and, second,
human souls can engage in cross-species transmigration. The opening line of
the passage indicates that Nemesius intends to map the divisions concerning
the second issue, of the transmigration of the human soul, onto the divisions
concerning the first, the question of the different kinds of souls. The first
section (A) presents views held by “all the Greeks” and includes also the option
of transmigration into plants; the second (B) focuses on a Platonist debate
about transmigration into animals. The sections clearly complement one
another. If we pair A1 with B10 and B100 , we can complete the information of
B100 by inferring from A1 that the people who endorse a literal interpretation of
Plato (B10 ) are the ones who hold that there is only one species of soul (which
would still allow for differences of degree), the rational kind (B100 ), which
therefore can pass “over into the bodies of . . . non-rational animals” (A1).
So:
A1: For some say there is one species, the rational, and that this passes over
into the bodies of . . . non-rational animals.
➢ [B. For Plato said that fierce and proud and greedy souls take in
exchange the bodies of wolves and lions; those that were given to
self-indulgence assume the bodies of asses and the like]
0
B1 : and some understood this literally to mean lions and asses,
A1 + B10 > B100 :
For Cronius in his work on palingenesis, which is what he calls transmigra-
tion, claims that all souls are rational. Similarly the Platonist Theodorus in
his That the Soul is the Totality of Forms, and Porphyry likewise.
Conversely, if we pair up A2 and 3 with B20 and 200 , we can complete
information from A2 and 3 by inferring from B200 that people who endorse
an allegorical reading of Plato’s claim (B20 ) are the ones who allow for more
than one species of soul (either two, rational and irrational, A2, or as many
species as there are species of living beings, A3) and therefore do not permit
transmigration between rational and irrationals animals (B200 ). Thus:

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14.2 Other Parallels? 183
(A2: But some say that there is not only one species of soul, but two, the
rational and the non-rational)
A3: Some say that there are many species, as many as there are species of
living creatures
➢ [B. For Plato said that fierce and proud and greedy souls take in
exchange the bodies of wolves and lions; those that were given to
self-indulgence assume the bodies of asses and the like]
… B2′: while others discerned that he had spoken metaphorically, as
obliquely referring to habits via beasts
A3 (and A2) + B20 > B200
Iamblichus takes the opposite course to them; he says that here is a species of
soul for each species of animal, i.e. a different species [of soul]; at any rate he
wrote a monograph That transmigrations do not occur from men into irra-
tional animals nor from irrational animals into men but from animals to
animals and from men to men.
That the three groups under A are replaced by only two under B can be
explained by the fact that the crucial distinction between positing only one
kind of soul, the rational one, and positing two or more souls is sufficient to
account for the difference between the literal and the allegorical readings:
as soon as one admits more than one kind of soul, an unbridgeable gap
between the rational and irrational soul(s) opens up. In sum it turns out
that in this source Porphyry finds himself grouped together with the neo-
Pythagorean Cronius and with Theodorus (B100 ) as endorsing a literal
interpretation of Plato’s claim (B10 ), by assuming that there is only one
type of soul, the rational kind, that can cross over into animals (A1).30
So, if we were to follow the lead of Nemesius and take into account the
ambiguities of Porphyry’s position as reported in a range of sources, it
would be more plausible to posit Iamblichus as Calcidius’ source here
rather than Porphyry, because the former is presented as rejecting the literal
reading of transmigration into animals, as Calcidius does. Moreover, just as
Iamblichus is said to do so in this testimony, Calcidius assumes the
existence of more than one species of soul (ch. 223, 238.6–13 Waszink).
But, of course, even this conclusion cannot stand: Calcidius may well have
run into a more generic version of the idea in his source material. It is
complications such as these that make it much harder to pin entire sections
of Calcidius’ commentary onto Porphyry as his main source.

30
See also the discussion of Porphyry’s view that animal souls too have logos in Zambon 2002: 218–219.

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184 Source and Sources (2): Porphyry
(3) Matter
In one instance of an allusion to the Platonic tradition (auditores Platonis,
ch. 300),31 we actually find one of the few explicit echoes of Porphyry that
are both confirmed elsewhere and quite specific. The first point matters in
order to avoid a kind of circular reasoning, whereby one first assumes that
there is a direct connection between Porphyry and Calcidius, only then to
use Calcidius as a source for Porphyry, and notably for his commentary on
the Timaeus. The second stipulation, of specificity, helps us to discern that
if we are dealing with themes and arguments that are relatively widespread
and not unique to Porphyry, we may have a connection with doxographi-
cal accounts rather than directly with Porphyry.32
Here is the text of the parallel passages. This is Calcidius’ rendering into
Latin of a certain position on matter and the question of its connection to
evil. Among the auditores Platonis who endorse the view that matter is
eternal and not generated we find those:
who hold that Plato remarked earlier upon the disorderly and tumultuous
motion [30a] as being, not in matter, but in the material elements and bodies
which are considered the first principles and elements of the world. (ch. 301)
Calcidius’ wording here invites a comparison with a passage in
Philoponus,33 explicitly attributed to Porphyry (as noted in Waszink’s
edition):
Calcidius’ Latin: Nec desunt qui putent inordinatum illum et tumultuarium
motum Platonem non in silva, sed in materiis et corporibus iam notasse,
quae initia mundi atque elementa censentur.
Philoponus’ Greek:
ὁ γοῦν Πορφύριος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον ὑπομνήμασιν αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ
Τιμαίου τὸ μέρος ἐξηγούμενος οὐ τὴν ὕλην φησὶν μετὰ τῶν ἰχνῶν τὸ
πλημμελῶς εἶναι καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον, ὡς ἐν τούτοις ὁ Πρόκλος φησίν,
ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤδη ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους γενόμενα σώματα, ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος
συνέστηκεν· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι κόσμου ἀρχὰς ὕλην καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν
σώματος εἶναι ἀρχὰς (ἐξ ὕλης γὰρ καὶ εἴδους τὰ σώματα), κόσμου δὲ ἀρχὰς
τὰ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους συστάντα σώματα·
In comparing the two passages, one can tell that Calcidius’ wording is
a condensed version of a longer argument that comes in two steps: the first
is that the source of evil and of disorderly motion is not in matter, but in
31 32
See also section 1.3 in this study. See also Reydams-Schils 2007b: I.iii, 311–314.
33
Philoponus, Aet. 14.3, 546.3–15 Rabe, discussed by Sodano in his note to his F47; cf. also 6.14,
164.18–165.6 = F47 Sodano.

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14.2 Other Parallels? 185
the elements; the second – which gives us the reason for the first – is that
matter and form are the principles merely of bodies, and that the elements
qua bodies in turn are the principles of the universe. So, this position
involves two levels of ontological principles.
Waszink claims that the stance Philoponus attributes to Porphyry coin-
cides with Calcidius’ own line,34 that evil does not result from matter itself,
but from corporeality, which has a derivative and secondary ontological
status.35 If Waszink is right, this surely would attest to Porphyry’s influence
on Calcidius.
Yet there are at least two major problems with Waszink’s hypothesis.
First of all, there is a crucial difference between Calcidius’ own stance and
the one he has reported in his doxographical overview: for him the
elements, precisely because of their derivative status, cannot be considered
principles (initia/ἀρχάς). He argues explicitly against calling the elements
“principles” in ch. 307. So even if he did use Porphyry in citing this
argument, he also asserts his independence. Moreover, another major
difference emerges if we take a closer look at the Philoponus passage quoted
above, as Köckert (2009: 191–192) points out: whereas Calcidius talks about
Platonists who reject the view that the disorderly motion inheres in matter,
according to Philoponus Porphyry rejects the view that the disorderly
motion would inhere in matter and the traces of the elements. The continua-
tion of the Philoponus passage, as well as another fragment from Proclus,
confirms that Porphyry associates the disorderly motion with the full-
fledged elements, but before they have been ordered properly.36 For
Calcidius, by contrast, as we have seen (ch. 9 in this study), disorderly
motion does result from the traces of the elements, which are potentially
bodies and which put matter in motion, with matter then, in turn,
reinforcing that motion (chs. 351–354). Calcidius thus endorses the view
that the disorderly motion does not arise from matter as such, but precisely
from the combination of matter and the traces of the elements – the view
which, according to Philoponus, Porphyry rejected.
The second point is equally problematic. Calcidius has included in his
doxography, and not in the main body of his argument, a position that is
similar to one elsewhere attested for Porphyry. It is not plausible to assume
that Porphyry included himself in a doxographical schema, from a third-
person standpoint, rather than presenting himself as giving his own view. It
34
Waszink 1962: lxxix, xci, and notes to the relevant passage.
35
Endorsed also by van Winden 1965: 251–252 and Moreschini 2003: n. 827.
36
Philoponus, Aet. 14.3, 546.15–25 Rabe = F48 Sodano; Proclus, In Tim. 2, I 391.4–396.26 Diehl, see
especially 394.26–30 = F51 Sodano 37.21–25.

(4) Form, sensible things, and matter

The most convincing parallel between Calcidius and Porphyry may be
the view that there are three modes of being, one for the intelligible
paradigm, the second for sensible reality (or, alternatively, the gener-
ated forms, that is, the forms inhering in matter), and the third for
matter.37 Of the two relevant parallel passages, the one preserved in
Proclus (In Tim. 2, I 257.3 Diehl = F31 Sodano) is more complex than
what we ﬁnd in Calcidius (see below), but the second, preserved by
Simplicius (In Arist. Phys. 135.1–14 Diels, F134 Smith, not in Sodano)
is more promising (and thus Smith lists the passage from Calcidius in
his notes to this fragment).
The passage in question runs as follows:
[comparing the generated form to offspring] for it is situated between
(a) the nature which is truly existent, constant, and forever the same,
namely the idea or eternal intellect of the eternal god; and
(b) the nature which indeed is but is not forever the same, i.e., matter,
for by its nature matter is none of the things that are, since it is eternal.
(c) Thus that which is situated between these two natures is not truly
existent. For
i. being the image of a truly existent reality, it has to some degree
the appearance of being, but
ii. in its not enduring and its undergoing change within itself it is
not truly existent as the exemplars are;
for the examples thrive on ﬁxed and immutable constancy. (ch.
330, 324.23–325.6)

37
Cf. Gersh 1989: 89; see also Dörrie and Baltes 1996: 104.4, 281–283, with endorsement of the claim by
Waszink and P. Hadot that this section goes back to Porphyry (see below). See also chs. 9 and 10 in
this study.

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14.2 Other Parallels? 187
In Latin:
. . . est enim haec posita inter
(a) naturam uere existentem constantem eandemque semper,
nimirum idean quae intellectus dei aeterni est aeternus, et
(b) eam naturam quae est quidem sed non eadem semper,
id est siluam, quippe haec natura sua nihil est eorum quae sunt, cum sit aeterna.
(c) Ergo quod inter has duas naturas positum est uere existens non est.
i. Cum enim sit imago uere existentis rei, uidetur esse aliquatenus,
ii. quia uero non perseuerat patiturque immutationem sui, non est
existens uere, ut sunt exempla
illa quippe exempla rata et immutabili constantia uigent
In the Greek passage preserved in Simplicius that reports Porphyry’s view
the parallels have been underlined:
Φησὶ δὲ ὁ Πορφύριος τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγειν εἶναι, οὕτως μέντοι
εἶναι ὡς μὴ ὄν.
(a) τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ὂν ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ ταύτην ὄντως
εἶναι οὐσίαν,
(b) τὴν δὲ ἀνωτάτω πρώτην ἄμορφον καὶ ἀνείδεον ὕλην ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα
ἐστὶν
εἶναι μέν, μηδὲν δὲ εἶναι τῶν ὄντων.
αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἐπινοουμένη δυνάμει μὲν πάντα ἐστίν, ἐνεργείᾳ
δὲ οὐδέν.
(c) τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης ἀποτέλεσμα
i. καθ’ ὅσον μὲν εἴδους μετέχει, κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναί τι καὶ
προσαγορεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸ εἶδος,
ii. καθ’ ὅσον δὲ τῆς ὕλης καὶ διὰ ταύτην ἐν συνεχεῖ ῥύσει καὶ
μεταβολῇ τυγχάνει, πάλιν μὴ ἁπλῶς μηδὲ βεβαίως εἶναι.
Even though the information provided under each heading is not
quite the same, the structure of the passage attributed to Porphyry
maps exactly onto the one we ﬁnd in Calcidius, and the meaning of
Calcidius’ Latin phrases becomes clearer when we read them against
the Greek. Calcidius’ uere existens captures the meaning of the ὄντως
ὄν; he echoes the claim that matter, while being in some sense, “is
none of the things that are,” and like Porphyry, Calcidius asserts that
sensible things (or generated forms) can lay claim to being only to the
extent that they imitate or participate in the intelligible form. In
Simplicius, the context for this passage is different from that in
Calcidius: it is a discussion of the senses of non-being in Plato’s

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188 Source and Sources (2): Porphyry
Sophist.38 But this difference can be accounted for by excerpting
practices.
The conclusion Calcidius draws from these distinctions, which we do
not find in the Simplicius passage, has been interpreted as an echo of the
passage about Porphyry preserved by Proclus (In Tim. 2, I 257.3 Diehl = F31
Sodano):39
Hence there will be the following three things: that which forever is [Form];
that which forever is not [matter]; and that which is not forever [sensible
things/generated form]. (ch. 330, 325.7–8)40
If we compare Calcidius’ formula with the distinctions which Proclus
attributes to Porphyry, once again Calcidius’ version turns out to be
a simpler alternative. In line with the point he has just made about the
intermediate status of the engendered form (in sensibles), Calcidius pre-
sents a threefold distinction. According to Proclus, Porphyry presents
a schema with four components: two extreme terms, Being (τό τε
πρώτως ἀεὶ ὄν; or Form), Becoming (τὸ μόνως γενητόν; or matter), and
two intermediaries, that which while being is also becoming (τὸ ὂν καὶ
γινόμενον; the level of the souls), and that which while becoming is also
being (τὸ γινόμενον καὶ ὄν; the highest part of engendered things). It is
misleading to claim that Calcidius has three of the four components listed
by Porphyry (or that his intermediary term conflates Porphyry’s two
intermediaries, as P. Hadot proposes, 1968 I: 163–165); these are different
schemata altogether, even if they rely to some extent on similar terminol-
ogy, which, in any case, can be traced back to Aristotle.41 Calcidius talks
about engendered form as having the intermediary status, Porphyry posits
souls and “the highest part of engendered things” (the exact meaning of
which does not need to concern us here) as intermediaries.
Despite the significant similarities between the Simplicius passage and
Calcidius, and, the partial reliance on similar terminology in the Proclus
passage and Calcidius, Bakhouche (2011 II: 871–872) is right to caution
against inferring a direct connection between Porphyry and Calcidius.
Given that Porphyry’s own position on the issue of being and non-being
is more complex, as attested in Proclus (and Sententiae 26), it could be that
Porphyry merely recorded, in a doxographical sense, a reading of three

38 39
See also section 10.1 in this study. As discussed in P. Hadot 1968 I: 163–165.
40
Erunt igitur tria haec: quod semper est; item quod semper non est; deinde quod non semper est.
(The latter designation would pose problems for the cases of the heavenly bodies and the universe
considered as a whole.)
41
Aristotle, DC 1.12, 282a4ff.; Int. 12, 21a37ff.

14.3 Porphyry as a Doxographer?

Regarding Calcidius’ dependence on Porphyry, another claim that some-
times surfaces is that Calcidius mined Porphyry’s works primarily for the
latter’s doxographies or overviews of other positions.42 If there were such
sections, for instance, in Porphyry’s commentary on the Timaeus, just as
there are in Proclus’ commentary, these were not marked as such in later
sources that provide fragments of this commentary. Proclus, however, does
mention that Porphyry recorded Numenius’ views (In Tim. 1, 77.22–24
Diehl). In this case too we may be dealing with selective bias in the later
sources, which could have left out or truncated the doxographical sections
in Porphyry’s works. But then Calcidius’ practice would have been the
reverse: he would have drawn only from the doxographical sections and
ignored Porphyry’s own interpretations altogether.
In Porphyry’s extant texts there are indeed overviews of other positions on
certain subjects, such as the soul, but they are not as extensive as what we find
in Calcidius. And if, for instance, we want to posit Porphyry’s Historia
philosophiae as a source, then we face the fact that according to one testimony
at least the work ended with Plato and his times (T198 Smith = Eunapius,
Vitae sophistarum 2.1, 2.14–18). Moreover, Porphyry’s view that Plato posited
three hypostases, a highest god (or the good), the demiurge, and the World
Soul (F221 Smith) represents too widespread an interpretation of Plato in
Middle Platonism for us to assume that Calcidius derived his schema
specifically from him.
In sum, where we can detect similarities between Porphyry and
Calcidius, these similarities are part of a broader Middle Platonist dis-
course. For views that are distinctive of Porphyry, on the other hand, we
find no parallels in Calcidius. Thus, John Dillon (1977: 403–404) was right
to question Porphyry’s alleged influence on Calcidius. The most plausible

42
Waszink 1962: xc–xci, lxii mentions Porphyry’s Phil. orac., but the connection is tenuous. On this
work see now also Tanaseanu-Döbler 2017: 137–176. See also Karamanolis 2006: 265–266 on
Porphyry’s quoting practices.

Calcidius Christianus? (1)

An Authorial Voice Revisited

Ever since Waszink’s monumental edition, Calcidius has commonly been

grouped together with Latin Christian Neoplatonists, a designation that
would include Marius Victorinus and Augustine. But how tenable is this
working assumption after all, given the main aspects of Calcidius’ thought
as examined in this study? In light of the range of options for expressing
a Christian identity in the late third to the beginning of the ﬁfth century
CE, it is probably impossible to prove that Calcidius was not a Christian.
But a more fruitful approach to this issue may be to ask what difference the
assumption of a Christian identity would make for our understanding of
the commentary. The answer is, as I will argue in this chapter and the
following, next to no difference at all.1 We can also rephrase this issue as the
question how one would go about ascertaining the Christian character of
a text in the fourth century CE.

15.1 Silences
Arguments from silence, in and of themselves, have limited value, but
combined with other evidence they can become quite revealing. If we look
at a number of Christian voices of the fourth century CE, Calcidius turns
out to be markedly different from all of them. Unlike the elder Arnobius,
Lactantius, or Firmicius Maternus, who after converting to Christianity

1
See Dillon 1977: 402: “Various small indications suggest the author is Christian, but it must be said
that he wears his faith lightly.” Calcidius’ alleged Christian identity has been challenged by Somfai
2002: 12; 2003: 141; Hoenig 2014: 92–96; and Magee 2016: x–xiv; pace Waszink 1962: xi–xii;
Moreschini 2002; 2003: xvi–xvii, xx–xxx (esp. xxix–xxx), xxxi–xxxix, 2017; and Bakhouche 2011 I:
42–44. In a 1969 article, so, seven years after his edition, even Waszink includes Calcidius among
those who “although Christian, nevertheless rarely or almost never let their belief system affect their
interpretation” (“obwohl Christen, dennoch ihre Glaubenslehre ganz selten oder fast nie auf ihre
interpretatorische Arbeit einwirken lassen,” 271). But in his entry for the Nachträge zum Reallexikon
für Antike und Christentum (1972), he again vigorously defended the thesis of Christian traces in the
commentary.

191

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192 Calcidius Christianus? (1)
became critical of pagan culture, Calcidius displays no hostility towards the
non-Christian philosophical tradition. In fact, the absence of polemics –
apart from his negative attitude towards Plato’s successors and other
Platonists2 – is striking. It is as if some elements of Christianity and the
non-Christian tradition coexist peacefully in his mental universe, though
not on an equal footing: Plato has pride of place.
Unlike the earlier Clement of Alexandria, and unlike Eusebius of
Caesarea (as in PE 10 Preface, 3–4) and Nemesius, who make it very clear
that Christianity outstrips all other claims to truth, we find no such
authority claims in Calcidius’ commentary. Clement of Alexandria uses
the same image as Calcidius does of individual thinkers snatching snippets
of truth, but for Clement only Christian teaching can lay claim to this
unity of truth.3 Nemesius, in his work On the Nature of Man (late fourth
century CE, though the date is debated), can happily go on for long
stretches with minimal allusions to Christian teachings, but he also
makes unequivocally clear how he sees the non-Christian tradition in
relation to Christian doctrine:
There are many proofs in Plato and the rest, but those are very difficult, hard
to comprehend, and scarcely well-understood by those brought up in these
sciences. For us let the teaching of the sacred books suffice as a proof of the
soul’s immortality, for it is reliable in itself, since it is divinely inspired. But
for those who do not accept the Christian writings, it suffices to prove that
the soul is none of those things that perish. For if it is none of the things that
perish, and is imperishable, it is also immortal. So, this matter should be set
aside as being in a satisfactory state. (2.38, trans. Sharples and van der Eijk)4
Like Calcidius (Preface, ch. 3),5 Nemesius draws a distinction between
those who are insiders to a philosophical or other technical discourse (such
as medical treatises), and those who are not. The more technical proofs for
the immortality of the soul are difficult even for insiders who are well-
versed in this type of knowledge. But those proofs, Nemesius goes on to
say, are superfluous for non-specialists, both Christians and non-Christians
alike. Christians can fall back on the authority of revelation in Scripture,

2
See section 1.3 in this study.
3
Calcidius, ch. 243; Clement, Strom. 1.57.1; cf. also Strom. 6.55.3.
4
πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσι τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἀποδείξεις παρά τε Πλάτωνι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖναι
μὲν περισκελεῖς καὶ δυσκατανόητοι καὶ μόλις τοῖς ἐντεθραμμένοις ἐκείναις ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις γνώριμοι.
ἡμῖν δὲ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἡ τῶν θείων λογίων διδασκαλία τὸ πιστὸν ἀφ’
ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα διὰ τὸ θεόπνευστος εἶναι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μὴ καταδεχομένους τὰ τῶν Χριστιανῶν
γράμματα ἀρκεῖ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν φθειρομένων ἀποδεῖξαι· εἰ γὰρ μηδέν ἐστι τῶν
φθειρομένων, ἔστι δὲ ἄφθαρτος, ἔστι καὶ ἀθάνατος, ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ἀρκούντως ἔχον παραλειπτέον.
5
See sections 1.2 and 1.3 in this study.

15.2 Allusions to Christian Views

It is indeed the case that there are some traces of Christian views in
Calcidius’ commentary, but these traces need to be carefully assessed
to see how exactly they function. First, there are a number of allusions
phrased in the second person. It seems most natural to interpret these
allusions as concessions to the person addressed. Thus, it would be
(H)Osius, whoever he happens to be, who would presumably be
a Christian. By these allusions, Calcidius would merely be indicating

6
For other instances, see sections 37–38, 42.120 Sharples and van der Eijk.
7
Pace Moreschini 2017: 276 (see also 2002: 435) I highlight here the differences between Calcidius, on
the one hand, and Synesius and Boethius, on the other. On Synesius, see especially Tanaseanu-
Döbler 2008.

8
Est quoque alia sanctior et uenerabilior historia, quae perhibet ortu stellae cuiusdam non morbos
mortesque denuntiatas sed descensum dei uenerabilis, ad humanae conseruationis rerumque
mortalium gratiam. Quam stellam cum nocturno itinere suspexissent Chaldaeorum profecto
sapientes uiri et in consideratione rerum caelestium satis exercitati, quaesisse dicuntur recentem
ortum dei repertaque illa maiestate puerili ueneratos esse et uota tanto deo convenientia nuncupasse.
Quae tibi multo melius sunt comperta quam ceteris.
9
By contrast, it is unlikely that Celsus, who also mentioned this episode in his polemic against the
Christians, would have expressed such respect, cf. Origen, C. Cels. 1.34, 58–60. Note that from
Origen’s point of view, Calcidius would be making the same mistake as Celsus by confusing the
Magi with the Chaldeans (1.58). In this passage (1.59) Origen also refers to the Stoic Chaeremon (On
the Comets) as having allegedly claimed that such heavenly portents do not always have to announce
or accompany disasters, but could also be harbingers of good news. For the broader context, see
especially DelCogliano 2012: 48–54.
10
Plato, Timaeus 41b. Cf. also ch. 132: creator omnium et conseruator deus. I disagree with Moreschini
2003: 721, n. 261, who interprets this wording as a Christianizing trait. (His interpretation is also
rejected by Bakhouche 2011 II: 735, n. 89.)

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15.2 Allusions to Christian Views 195
immortality of the soul and does not challenge the notion of Platonic reincar-
nation when he mentions it (as in ch. 198).
Magee overdetermines the phrase in a different manner, by translating
gratia as “grace” and conseruatio as “salvation:” “the descent of a venerable
God to bestow the grace of salvation upon mankind and mortal beings”
(emphasis mine). The ad gratiam here, I would suggest, is better translated
as “for the sake of” (and neither Moreschini nor Bakhouche introduce the
notion of “grace” into their renderings). The grammatically awkward ad plus
the accusative gratiam and a genitive construction (perhaps as the equivalent of
in gratiam) – rather than gratia by itself plus a genitive, or propter plus
accusative – is governed, I submit, by the movement implied by “descent.”11
It is striking, moreover, that conseruatio (preservation) is a philosophical term,
and as such is more neutral than the Christian “salvation” (for which Latin
Christian authors prefer words related to salus). It seems that Calcidius has
either muddled a Christian expression related to the Nicene Creed,12 or
rendered it in more neutral terms. Thus, it would be more helpful in this
instance to stay as close as possible to the text itself, and to avoid loaded terms
such as “the resurrection,” “grace,” or “salvation” in the translation.
The ﬁnal line of this passage makes it clear that Calcidius is making
a concession to his interlocutor: “all of which you are much more acquainted
with than anybody else.” Would the use of ceteris here instead of aliis constitute
a problem for this interpretation? Aliis would refer to others in general, whereas
ceteris could refer to a circle to which Osius, and possibly Calcidius himself,
belong. But the word choice does not allow us to infer that all members of this
circle would have had to be Christians, nor does it allow us to deﬁne the
identity of that circle more fully.
Here is the second passage in question, in the context of a treatise on
demons (ch. 133):
Nor should the name [“demons”] by virtue of its being imposed indiffer-
ently upon good and evil beings be for us a cause of concern, for the name
“angels” occasions no concern even though some angels are God’s servants
(and those who are, are called holy) but others minions of the adverse power,
as you know perfectly well.13

11
A possible parallel is provided by Ambrose (without a verb implying motion), Hel. 4.7, 416.3
Schenkl: plantauit dominus paradisum ad gratiam beatorum.
12
τὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν, κατελθόντα; there appears to be no
version similar to his Latin formulation in the preserved Latin Christian texts.
13
Nec nos terreat nomen promiscue bonis et improbis positum, quoniam nec angelorum quidem
terret, cum angeli partim dei sint ministri – qui ita sunt, sancti uocantur – partim aduersae potestatis
satellites, ut optime nosti.

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196 Calcidius Christianus? (1)
Through his use of a “sociative” “we/us” (van Hoof 2010: 53–54), Calcidius
establishes a rapport with his addressee, and acknowledges that a Christian
may be put off by non-Christian philosophical views, in this case, on
demonology. Yet the turn from the first- to the second-person voice locates
the concerns of a specifically Christian version of intermediary powers with
the addressee.14
In contexts in which he does not use the second-person voice to draw
attention to Osius’ conviction, he uses a different strategy of establishing
common ground between himself and his addressee. Such is the case in this
passage, which Waszink considers essential for establishing Calcidius’
Christian identity (ch. 219):
But if they confess to the human soul’s being rational, then they should
believe their own claim, that after having made human beings God
“breathed” into them his divine “breath,” by which we employ reason and
intellect, and by which we piously venerate God and possess a natural
affinity with his divinity and are said to be “gods and sons of” the highest
“god.”15
Here again Calcidius uses a “sociative” “we/us.” But who is the “we” said
here to venerate god, to have a kinship with the divine, and to be called
gods as well as sons of god (Reydams-Schils 2007a: 252)? This wording
arguably does not so much Christianize the Timaeus as establish a potential
point of agreement between a Platonist and a Christian. While the phrase
could echo a New Testament passage,16 it also aligns itself beautifully with
the Timaeus. The “highest god” is Calcidius’ first god-cum-Demiurge,17
and Plato called this Demiurge famously, even if enigmatically, a “maker
and father” (Tim. 28c). The Demiurge in Plato’s account also indicates that
human beings are meant to venerate their divine origin (Tim. 42a: τὸ
θεοσεβέστατον).
Perhaps Calcidius is relying here on a technique of intentional ambi-
guity in order to establish a basis of common understanding between
Platonists of his stripe and Christians,18 a strategy that would also explain
cases in which scholars have noticed his use of terminology found in other,
Christian authors (Ratkowitsch 1996). The main methodological problem

14
In the section on dreams (ch. 250), when discussing Aristotle’s view, Calcidius himself uses “angels”
and “demons.”
15
Si autem conﬁtentur [Hebraei] animam hominis rationabilem fore, credant sibi, quod deus a se
hominibus factis inspirauerit diuinum spiritum, quo ratiocinamur quoque intellegimus et quo
ueneramur pie deum estque nobis cum diuinitate cognatio diique esse dicimur et ﬁlii summi dei.
16
As in John 10.34; Matthew 5.9; Luke 20.36; but see also Psalms 82.6. 17 See ch. 7 in this study.
18
Kahlos 2007: 33. I owe this reference to Alfons Fürst.

15.3 The Hebrews

In addition to the traces of Christianity discussed so far Calcidius includes
passages from Genesis and the Hebrew Scriptures in his commentary. To
conclude, as Moreschini does, from the presence of these passages that
Calcidius must have been a Christian, however, begs the question.22 We
know of a well-established interest in the Hebrew Scriptures on the part of

19
See also the discussion of the phrase quae ﬁunt quaeque nascuntur (ch. 23) in section 4.2 in this
study, n. 7.
20
See Calcidius’ translation of Timaeus 42e and chs. 132 (creator omnium et conseruator deus) and 146.
In his translation of 49c, he uses creare in a broader sense (aer porro exustus ignem creat; see also his
translation of 51a, with the passive creatum; chs. 79, 215). As John Magee has pointed out to me, the
usage in ch. 215 applies to Epicurean atoms “creating” soul (anima), and thus Calcidius uses creare
for processes in natural philosophy.
21
A word search reveals that it is attested for Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, and in texts attributed
to Firmicus Maternus and Marius Victorinus, among others.
22
Moreschini 2002: 435–437; 2003: xxxi; 2017; 270–275.

23
See e.g. Numenius F1a, 9–10, 13, 30, 56; for an excellent discussion of the issue, see Zambon 2002 and
Boys-Stones 2001; ps.-Longinus, Subl. 9.9; Galen, UP 11.14, on the latter see Brisson 2002.
According to Origen, C. Cels. 4.51 (F10a des Places), Numenius even includes “a story about
Jesus” in his On the Good, though without mentioning his name. For a critical assessment of
Numenius’ appreciation for and knowledge of the Hebrews, see Edwards 1990. See also Eusebius on
Amelius’ allusion to the beginning of the Gospel of John, PE 11.19; I owe this last reference to an
anonymous reviewer.
24
Origen, C. Cels. 1.15 = F1b des Places.
25
As Beatrice 1999 does, but rightly challenged by Moreschini 2003: xxxii–xxxv and 2002.
26
See also Bakhouche 2018: 224–225, 230–232. 27 See section 10.2 in this study.
28
“Stupidae” uero ex “admiratione” signiﬁcatio animae uim quandam similitudinem declarat, siqui-
dem opiﬁcis et auctoritas sui maiestate capta stuperet.

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15.3 The Hebrews 199
The “soul” which is “struck dumb,” associated with earth, here stands for
the lower, irrational soul.
So, this evidence suggests that Calcidius interprets Origen’s rendering
“but the earth was in a certain state of dumb admiration” (Gen. 1.2a, ch.
276) with reference to some lower, irrational soul intimately connected to
matter (ch. 278), that is, Numenius’ view.29 Moreover, Numenius’ view as
summarized in ch. 300 is in turn supported by a position endorsed by the
Hebrews that also includes the notion of a lower, irrational soul derived
from matter. In other words, it appears that Calcidius reads material he
found in Origen from the perspective of Numenius’ position, and not the
other way around.
Can we glean more information from the manner in which Calcidius
refers to the Hebrews? First, the views “of the Hebrews” do not always
meet with his unmitigated approval; second, some passages are cited
merely as being in agreement with the philosophical views he sum-
marizes; and, last but not least, often these passages are merely integrated
into doxographical overviews without having much of an effect on the
commentary as a whole.
We ﬁnd notable disagreements in the doxographies on the human soul
(ch. 219) and matter (chs. 276–278). In his treatment of the human soul,
Calcidius takes issue with the Hebrews’ association between blood, as the
vital principle, and the soul. As long as this association is restricted to the
lower, irrational soul, Calcidius avers, it is acceptable, but the rational soul
has been breathed by God directly into the human beings he made
(Reydams-Schils 2002a). To provide an even more telling example:
a section on the Hebrews’ view of matter, to which we will return in the
next chapter, belongs with the position that matter is generated, which
Calcidius entirely sets aside because he opts for considering matter
ungenerated.
In a number of instances, Calcidius points out that the Hebrews “agree”
with a view already laid out; his preferred verb for this agreement is
concinere. Thus, the Hebrews are said to agree with the view that the
heavenly bodies too must be ensouled and rational (ch. 130: Hebraeorum
quoque sententia concinit), and to have their version of a lower, irrational

29
Hence I disagree with van Winden 1981: 461, who claims that this is Origen’s own interpretation of
the translation; on the contrary, this is how Calcidius interprets it in the context of his treatise on
matter, having in mind Numenius’ view of the connection between a lower, evil soul and matter.
With this alternative, and much simpler, hypothesis we do not need to have recourse to Valentinian
Gnosis as recorded by Irenaeus and echoed by Tertullian (van Winden 1981: 462–466). For the
question of the connection between Wisdom and matter, see below, section 15.4.

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200 Calcidius Christianus? (1)
soul issuing from matter (ch. 300). The latter claim, as mentioned already,
aligns with Calcidius’ representation of Numenius’ view,30 from which he
also ultimately distances himself. So, the Hebrews would in this important
respect agree with a view attributed to Numenius (here not named expli-
citly, but grouped with alii), and Calcidius, in the end, would disagree with
both.
When Calcidius merely inserts a view of the Hebrews in doxographical
overviews, he uses a minimal connective such as (quo)que, which makes the
quote seem like an item in a list (as in chs. 171, 219). In his exposition devoted
to fate, for instance, divine warnings from Hebrew Scriptures are listed among
other stock examples (ch. 171; see also ch. 154), and prophets are listed side by
side with Socrates and Aristides as examples of the just having suffered
wrongly (ch. 172). Curiously his mode of operating here seems to be the
reverse of Origen’s in his Contra Celsum: whereas the latter occasionally brings
in a non-Christian example in a discourse dominated by Christian views,
Calcidius merely integrates some instances from Hebrew Scriptures in his
overviews. Despite his manifest respect for this wisdom tradition (ch. 55:
eminens quaedam doctrina sectae sanctioris et in comprehensione diuinae rei
prudentioris), these passages have little or no impact on the general gist of
his commentary. Moreover, nowhere does Calcidius claim that Plato’s views
and the Greek philosophical tradition are merely derivative and dependent on
an older Hebrew tradition, a standard trope in Christian texts.
One potential exception to this general pattern in his use of the
“Hebrews” could be Calcidius’ adoption of the notion that god “breathed”
the rational soul into humans,31 in his rendering of Plato’s account of the
origin of the soul (ch. 26: de inspiratione animae; ch. 55). But this theme is
central also to Philo of Alexandria’s view of the human soul (as in Opif.
135). And given that the role of Philo in Calcidius’ commentary is inti-
mately linked to that of Origen, we can now turn our attention to an entire
section in the commentary which scholars claim Calcidius culled directly
from Origen’s lost Commentary on Genesis.

15.4 Calcidius and Origen

In these three chapters (276–278) Calcidius discusses a view of matter as
being generated which he attributes to the Hebrews, based on Genesis.32

30
See ch. 13 in this study.
31
Moreschini 2003: 698, n. 37, picking up on Waszink’s suggestion in his edition.
32
See also section 10.3 in this study.

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15.4 Calcidius and Origen 201
He quotes translations by Aquila and Symmachus, as well as a version of
Genesis 1:2a that he attributes to Origen, though it is not attested in
Origen’s extant work (van Winden 1981). He explains that, although
matter is generated, this generation does not have to be understood in
a temporal sense, but rather in terms of matter’s dependence on God. Ch.
277 goes on to clarify that the heaven and earth first mentioned in Genesis
are not the same as the heaven and earth of the physical universe. Ch. 278
then lists three different interpretations of this primordial heaven–earth
pair, including one from Philo of Alexandria (282.7–11): (1) heaven and
earth stand for the intelligible models of our heaven and earth (Philo); (2)
heaven stands for intelligible reality and earth for the foundation of
sensible and corporeal reality, i.e. matter (attributed to alii); (3) a view
which Calcidius introduces in a first-person voice, opinor, which posits
a distinction between earth/corporeal matter (silua corporea) and heaven/
intelligible matter (silua intellegibilis). It is not entirely clear how the third
view relates to the second. We do not need to assume that Calcidius merely
adopts the opinor from his source;33 it may indicate his handling of his
source(s). The exposition is quite lapidary, and Calcidius appears to have
abbreviated his material (for a full discussion, see van Winden 1959: 52–66).
How much of this section should be attributed to Origen? Charlotte
Köckert has made the strongest case to date for the view that the entire
section goes back to Origen.34 But given the speculative nature of her
reconstruction, there is room for doubt. The main point of interest here is
that the section betrays more traces of Philo of Alexandria than the one
view Calcidius explicitly attributes to him, or than scholars have realized
(including Runia 1993: 281–290).
In the opening chapter of this section of the commentary (ch. 276, after
his discussion of the different translations) Calcidius discusses a view which
he attributes to the Hebrews, namely, that they consider matter to be
generated. This generation, however, is not to be interpreted in a temporal
sense, but as the eternal dependence of matter on God.35 To illustrate this
point, Calcidius goes on to discuss the eternal relationship between God
and Wisdom. The phrase “that there cannot have been any time in which
33
As he does in ch. 280, 311.8 in a passage derived from Aristotle; there are other instances of his use of
the first-person voice: see ch. 1 in this study.
34
Köckert 2009: 224–311, esp. 229–237. See also my review in Reydams-Schils 2012. On the basis of
Köckert’s analysis, chs. 276–278 from Calcidius’ commentary have been included in the collection
of fragments from Origen’s lost commentary on Genesis by Metzler 2010: 47–53 (under category C,
that is among the testimonia about the content of Origen’s commentary; see also Metzler 2005).
Heine 2005 does not include these chapters in his overview.
35
A crucial point overlooked by Alexandre 1976: 178–179.

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202 Calcidius Christianus? (1)
God was without Wisdom” (trans. van Winden), used to underscore
a non-temporal sense of principle (initium), posits a major theological
and ontological problem. The parallels in Origen, which both the editor of
the text, Waszink, and Köckert adduce, describe the relationship between
God the Father and Christ. But in and of itself this relationship can do
nothing to illuminate the status of matter.36 Hence van Winden (1959: 57)
was probably right in positing as a missing link in Calcidius’ argument
something along the lines of Tertullian’s claim that Wisdom is the “matter
of matters” (Adv. Herm. 34.22–25 Waszink). But there is another candidate
for this role. Philo applies designations for matter derived from the
Timaeus, such as “(foster)mother” and “receptacle,” to knowledge,
ἐπιστήμη (Ebr. 30–31), suggesting that as a feminine principle in relation
to God as father and maker of the universe, knowledge takes on a role
analogous to that of matter.37 Like Calcidius, Philo uses Proverbs 8.22 to
underscore this claim, albeit in a different version of the text. Calcidius or
his source(s), in other words, could be drawing from an older Jewish
wisdom tradition, which also underlies a view such as Tertullian’s, but
which predates Christian views about the rapport between the second and
the first persons of the Trinity. As such the passage would not have to be
interpreted as referring to this specific Christian concern.
Philo too dwells on the distinction between heaven and earth of the
first day of generation, and between the firmament and dry earth men-
tioned later in the Genesis account (Opif. 36; cf. also 29). But there are even
more traces of Philo to be found. The claim at the end of ch. 278 of
Calcidius’ commentary, that God, unlike human artisans, is the kind of
Maker who creates his own material, and in the exactly sufficient amount,
is attested, rightly or wrongly, for Philo, in the fragment of his De
prouidentia preserved by Eusebius (PE 7.21) right after an excerpt from
Origen on the same topic (PE 7.20). Thus, views that can be connected to
Philo run through this entire section of the commentary.
But if we have succeeded in pushing back the influence for some of these
passages from Origen to Philo of Alexandria, perhaps this latter connection
would still point to a Christian identity for Calcidius. Apart from the fact
that Calcidius may have found this Philonic material in Origen, is it not
the case that in Antiquity Philo is quoted and used primarily, if not
exclusively, by Christian authors? Though we do not have definitive
36
A problem overlooked by Moreschini 2003: 761, n. 743, but registered by Bakhouche 2014 and 2018:
226, 229.
37
Here I endorse Dillon’s interpretation (1977: 164) pace Runia 1986: 285–286 (with further biblio-
graphy there).

38
According to Runia 1993: 8–12, another plausible candidate would be Plotinus.
39
See section 7.3 and ch. 13 in this study.
40
Bakhouche, 2014: 354, agrees with this conclusion: “At this time point of our study, it is hard to
corroborate the hypothesis of the filiation of the Calcidian [sic] text with Origen’s Commentary on
Genesis. A Judeo-Greek source is more probable, itself influenced by philosophical interpretation.”
Bakhouche 2018 makes the case for an influence of the Sethians, but I think that the Philo affiliation
presents a simpler hypothesis.

Calcidius Christianus? (2)

God, Matter, and Creation

If we turn our attention now from more formal features of the commen-
tary, that is, the manner in which Calcidius presents his material, to
content, what light can his views of the divine and matter shed on the
question of his Christian identity? Put succinctly, there is nothing speci-
ﬁcally Christian about Calcidius’ views of the divine, and his view of the
role of matter runs directly contrary to any Christian notion of creation, let
alone creatio ex nihilo.

16.1 God
To remind ourselves, this is the structure of the divine which Calcidius
adopts,1 based on chs. 176–177 and 188:

ﬁrst god second god third god

ﬁrst mind second mind
World Soul
\ /
Demiurge

For most of the commentary “god” stands for a demiurge who seems to
unite the ﬁrst and the second god from Calcidius’ hierarchy, and the World
Soul is the third god.
Even if we allow for the facts that, for an extended period in Christian
thinking, and long after the Council of Nicaea, the exact relation between
God the Father and Christ as the second person of the Trinity continued to
hover between identity and subordination, and that Calcidius’ view of the
close connection yet difference between his ﬁrst and second god could, to
some extent, be compatible with the range of Christian views, we would be

1
See also ch. 7 in this study.

204

2
See also Origen, C. Cels. 6.8: Plato has the notion of the Son of God, based on Ep. 6 323d; and
Clement, Strom. 5.102 (see also the previous ch. in this study).
3
1) Consequens igitur est nunc, ut de spiritu sancto quam possumus breuiter requiramus.
2) Et omnes quidem qui quoquomodo prouidentiam esse sentiunt, deum esse ingenitum, qui
uniuersa creauit atque disposuit, confitentur eumque parentem uniuersitatis agnoscunt.
3) Huic tamen esse filium non nos soli pronuntiamus, quamuis satis hoc et mirum et incredulum
uideatur his, qui apud Graecos uel barbaros philosophari uidentur; tamen a nonnullis etiam
ipsorum habita eius uidetur opinio, cum uerbo dei uel ratione creata esse omnia confitentur.
...
4) De subsistentia uero spiritus sancti ne suspicionem quidam ullam habere quis potuit praeter
eos, qui in lege et prophetis uersati sunt, uel eos, qui se Christo credere profitentur.
4
See section 8.1 in this study.

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206 Calcidius Christianus? (2)
the first person of the Trinity. Moreover, in his Contra Celsum (6.60)
Origen calls God the Father the primary Demiurge (πρώτως δημιουργός)
and the Son the immediate Demiurge (προσεχῶς δημιουργός).
In his treatment of the second person, Origen, unlike Calcidius,5 does
not focus on the notion of children of God, but instead on the role of the
Logos in the creation of the universe, which in the Latin translation of his
work is rendered by the hendiadys uerbo . . . uel ratione. Calcidius for his
part, in his translation of the Timaeus (29a4–b2) uses ratio prudentiaque.
He transfers Plato’s phrase πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν, “after
that which is grasped by a rational account” (trans. Zeyl), from the
cognitive functions with which intelligible reality can be grasped (by any
rational being) to functions of the Demiurge himself, described as ille
auctor maximus, which the latter uses to adapt the world as image to the
intelligible realm as model.6 Ratkowitsch (1996: 143–144) sees in Calcidius’
phrase a reference to Logos and Providence, but translating phronēsis with
prudentia in this context may imply rather that Calcidius has a form of
“practical reasoning” in mind.
Be that as it may, by Ratkowitsch’s own admission, the phrase ratio
prudentiaque is not unique to Christian writers. It is actually more telling
than Ratkowitsch seems to realize (144 n. 17) that this wording shows up in
Cicero’s account of the Stoic view of the gods in his De natura deorum
(2.79), with its systematic emphasis on divine Providence. As we have seen,
a significant Stoic strand of thinking about the divine has been coopted in
Calcidius’ Platonist triad and his notion of Providence.7
It is true that subtle shifts in Calcidius’ translation of the Timaeus bring
out a more unified sense of the divine than the original displays. But Plato’s
account in its own right lends itself to this kind of shift: in the second half
he often switches to the singular “god,” despite the fact that the Demiurge
has delegated the fashioning of the irrational human soul functions, the
human body, and the lower life forms to a group of younger gods (as in
71a7, e3, 73b8, etc.). Moreover, in the tradition of interpreting the Timaeus,

5
Ch. 219, see section 15.2 in this study.
6
Plato’s version: παντὶ δὴ σαφὲς ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ’
ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. οὕτω δὴ γεγενημένος πρὸς τὸ λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτὸν καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ
ἔχον δεδημιούργηται· τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων αὖ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς
εἶναι.
Calcidius’ version: Quod cum sit rationis alienum, liquet opiﬁcem deum uenerabilis exempli
normam in constituendo mundo secutum: quippe hic generatorum omnium speciosissimus, ille
auctor maximus, operisque sui ratione prudentiaque his quae semper eadem existent accommodatus
imago est, opinor, alterius.
7
See section 8.1 and ch. 12 in this study.

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16.1 God 207
among both Platonists and Stoics, a more unified sense of the divine
increasingly came to the fore – as with Cicero’s translation (Lévy 2003),
which shows traces of Hellenistic debates. Aspects of that interpretive
tradition have grafted themselves onto Calcidius’ rendering of the Timaeus.
So, if Calcidius can be ranked among those whom Origen would see as
sharing some key features of a Christian theology of the first two persons of
the Trinity, Origen’s claim about the third person, the Holy Spirit, is also
highly relevant, but for an opposite reason: only a Christian, he avers,
could have the notion of the Holy Spirit.8 In Calcidius’ commentary we
can find no trace of the Holy Spirit, in spite of his triadic structure of the
divine. Even if one takes into account the fact that the exact role of the
Holy Spirit in the Trinity took even longer to settle than that of the second
person, and that there were Christian sects that denied the importance of
the Holy Spirit, this absence in Calcidius’ account is striking.
But in this case, we are not merely dealing with silence: key features of
Calcidius’ view of the divine leave no room for an inclusion of the Holy
Spirit. Although earlier in his account Calcidius posits a transcendent,
purely noetic primary soul – which is prior to the World Soul in
a causative, not a temporal sense, i.e. the World Soul depends on it –
when he presents his triadic structure of the divine, that soul appears to
have been subsumed under his second god. The World Soul, which he
calls second mind and third god, is not a good candidate to represent the
Holy Spirit because, unlike the two higher entities, the World Soul
straddles the dualist divide in Calcidius’ universe: it is not purely noetic,
but is also related to a lower soul that is the “inseparable companion of
bodies,” which is prior to it. In the World Soul, in other words, the two
coexisting structures of the divine, on the one hand, and of factors
clustering around matter, on the other, meet – a view that is widespread
in pre-Plotinian Platonism.9
Even a limited number of examples from the Christian tradition can
show what is at stake here. The tribute of Gregory Thaumatourgos to
Origen provides useful counterevidence for discerning what is distinctive
about Calcidius’ approach. This account is saturated with the Greek
philosophical tradition, and, moreover, it explicitly raises the question of
the value of this type of learning, as made clear also by a letter from Origen
to Gregory. Gregory tells us (13.151) that Origen exposed his students to the
widest range of poets and philosophers (leaving aside only “atheist”

8 9
On this topic see especially Ziebritzki 1994. See section 5.1 in this study.

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208 Calcidius Christianus? (2)
thinkers) both to familiarize his students with this thought, but also to
prevent any attachment to a specific school.
One could easily read large portions of Gregory’s tribute as reflecting
primarily a non-Christian philosophical strand of thinking, yet when it
comes to the divine (4.35–39), a Christian point of view unmistakably
asserts itself. Terminology derived from the interpretive tradition of the
Timaeus is interspersed in the account: we have the one God and father, the
language of kingship, of Providence, and of Demiurge. But the entire
passage, which does not include a reference to the Holy Spirit, is centered
on the relationship of the second person of the Trinity with the first.
Logos – here called animated, or “empsuchos” – and Wisdom are the key
names of the Son. The passage also reflects Christian worship (eucharistia)
and soteriology.
In the example from Gregory Thaumatourgos, one could argue, we can
find what a Christian co-optation of the Greek philosophical tradition
might look like. In Calcidius, by contrast, we merely have a Platonist
framework with some features also found in Christian authors. The fact
that some features of this framework appear in Christian authors does not
make the framework itself Christian, in the context of Calcidius’
commentary.10
My second example comes from an author and text that provide
a relatively secure ground for the assumption of a crypto-Christian iden-
tity, based on other preserved writings of his: Boethius in his De consola-
tione philosophiae (Reydams-Schils 2002a). Despite the time gap between
Calcidius and Boethius, and the considerable differences in their cultural
contexts, and apart from the question of sources, the comparison is useful
and revealing because of the absence in both texts of controversies over
Christian Trinitarian doctrine, because of the importance of the Timaeus
for Boethius’ worldview as well, and because of parallels in thought-
patterns and structures of argument. Both Boethius and Calcidius posit
that the mind of god is eternal, and hence does not “run ahead in seeing
and grasping future outcomes” (praecurrit in uidendo atque intellegendo
prouentus futuros in Calcidius’ wording, ch. 176); they also agree that
Providence encompasses Fate, so that whatever comes under Fate also
falls under Providence, but not the other way around.
Boethius’ account (4.6.7ff.) includes all the agents of Calcidius’ worldview:
mind, Providence, Fate, the World Soul, nature, the heavenly bodies, angels,
and demons. Yet the onto-theological structure Boethius adopts is radically

10
On this issue, see also Köckert 2010.

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16.1 God 209
different. Boethius makes it clear that there is only one god, who is the highest
mind and whose agency we can perceive diversely according to the realm to
which it is applied. Boethius covers a series of possible intermediaries through
which the divine order may operate, but his lack of commitment to any one of
these is striking. Both accounts are monist, in the sense that the highest divine
principle does anchor all of reality – with some important qualifications
concerning Calcidius’ highest god, though, more on this below – but
Boethius’ view is also monotheistic, whereas Calcidius’, I have argued, is
not.11 If the second and the third persons of the Christian Trinity are absent
from Boethius’ exposition, it is because, one could argue, he focuses here on
what would be the equivalent of the first person, or perhaps on the central
meaning of “god” common to all three persons. Calcidius, by contrast, does opt
for a triadic structure for the divine, but a Platonist one, which in key respects
differs radically from a Christian counterpart. Thus, it is much easier to see how
Boethius’ account might be compatible with a Christian perspective.
This conclusion is underscored by other differences between the two
accounts. Let us return to two crucial claims in Calcidius’ view of the
relation between Providence, that is, the “second god” and also “first
mind,” in his terms, and the ordered universe, which we have analyzed
before in the chapter on Providence and Fate:12
i. iuxta hanc legem, id est fatum, omnia reguntur, secundum propriam
quaeque naturam (ch. 177: according to this law, that is, Fate, every-
thing is ruled, each according to its own nature).
ii. quod deus sciat quidem omnia, sed unumquidque pro natura sua ipsorum
sciat (that god knows everything, but each according to its own nature;
ch. 162: everything is known, each according to its own nature).
Boethius would agree with the first claim, “that each thing is ruled
according to its own nature,” but, like other Platonists,13 takes a very
different route for the second claim, not building on the nature of the
object of knowledge, but instead on the nature of the knower: “all men
believe that the totality of their knowledge is obtained solely from the
impact and nature of things known. But the reality is wholly different: all
that becomes known is apprehended not by this impact, but rather by the
capability of those who grasp it” (5.4.24–25),14 or, “Given that . . . all that is

11 12
See section 7.4 in this study. See sections 2.4 and 8.4 in this study.
13
See section 2.4 in this study.
14
Cuius erroris causa est quod omnia quae quisque nouit ex ipsorum tantum ui atque natura cognosci
aestimat quae sciuntur. Quod totum contra est; omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui
uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem.

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210 Calcidius Christianus? (2)
known is known not through its own nature but through the nature of
those who apprehend it, let us now, in so far as divine law allows, examine
what is the nature of the divine being, so that we may likewise come to
know what his knowledge is” (5.6.1, trans. Walsh).15
From this follows the famous development that:
since god’s status is abidingly eternal and in the present, his knowledge too
transcends all movement in time. It [god’s knowledge] abides in the sim-
plicity of its present, embraces the boundless extent of past and future, and
by virtue of its simple comprehension, it ponders all things as if they were
enacted in the present. Hence your judgment will be more correct should
you seek to envisage the foresight by which God discerns all things not as
a sort of foreknowledge of the future, but as knowledge of the unceasingly
present moment. (5.6.15–17, trans. Walsh)16
What matters for my purposes here is the combination of Boethius’
monotheism, that is, the absence of different levels of hypostases in his
onto-theology, with his stance on God’s mode of knowing, which pre-
serves divine omnipotence.
What can we learn from this comparison between Boethius and
Calcidius? Calcidius worries about how to make fate limited and defined,
even though it encompasses an infinite number of events (ch. 148),
a concern not shared by Boethius; Calcidius too rejects the interpretation
of Providence as priority in time, but does not follow up on the potential of
the specific mode of god’s knowledge, because he embraces the position
that things are known according to their own nature, rather than according
to the nature of the knower. Consequently, the knower-god’s, that is
Providence’s, knowledge of contingent matters turns out to be restricted
somehow, because he knows them as contingent. Calcidius’ Providence, in
any case, is in turn dependent on a higher divine principle in an explicit
delineation of different even if related levels of god.
In addition to Ratkowitsch’s analysis of Calcidius’ Latin terms for the
divine, Benz (1932: 343–350) tried to build the case for a Christian connec-
tion on the notion of the “will of god” in Calcidius’ schema. Let us recall

15
Quoniam igitur, uti paulo ante monstratum est, omne quod scitur non ex sua sed ex comprehen-
dentium natura cognoscitur, intueamur nunc quantum fas est quis sit diuinae substantiae status, ut
quaenam etiam scientia eius sit possimus agnoscere.
16
Quoniam igitur omne iudicium secundum sui naturam quae sibi subiecta sunt comprehendit, est
autem deo semper aeternus ac praesentarius status, scientia quoque eius omnem temporis super-
gressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae inﬁnitaque praeteriti ac futuri spatia
complectens omnia quasi iam gerantur in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praeuiden-
tiam pensare uelis qua cuncta dinoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri sed scientiam numquam
deﬁcientis instantiae rectius aestimabis.

17
As in Clement, Strom. 5.103.1–2: τὸν υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον, δι’ οὗ “πάντα ἐγένετο” κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ
πατρός.
18
As in Athanasius, C. Ar. 3.63, 65.
19
Alcinous, Didask. 10, 164.42–165.1: κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ἐμπέπληκε πάντα ἑαυτοῦ; cf.
Reydams-Schils 1999: 201; see also Atticus, F4 des Places, and section 8.1 in this study.
20
See, for instance, Cicero, Nat. d. 1.19, 3.70; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1056C; Comm. not. 1076E; Marcus
Aurelius 6.40, 9.1; ps.-Plutarch, Fat. 572F; Diogenianus in Eusebius, PE 6.8.8; Bobzien 1998: 45. For
a recent reassessment of the importance of divine will for Atticus, see Petrucci 2018: 120. Marius
Victorinus (Rhet. 1.24) attests to a debate between Christians and the non-Christian tradition on the
notion of the divine will and its relation to nature.
21
As Bakhouche (2011 II: 737, nn. 102–103) rightly points out.

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212 Calcidius Christianus? (2)
16.2 Creation and Matter
If in Calcidius’ views of the divine we already find features that cannot
easily be reconciled with a Christian framework, we definitely reach
a breaking point with his account of the ordering of the world and matter.
Calcidius belongs with those Platonists who interpret the making of the
world in Plato’s Timaeus allegorically, as rendering in temporal terms what
are in reality structures of causal dependence in an eternally existing
universe.22 Thus, the World Soul is eternal, but it is causally dependent
on a supra-sensible, purely noetic soul or a second god that is nous (and
through him on the highest deity Calcidius posits) and is also related to
a lower cosmic soul.23
There is no room for a creation account in Calcidius’ commentary,24
and this feature also explains why he prefers exornatio and eschews the use
of creatio.25 If we are looking for what Christians from the milieu of Milan
(allegedly contemporary with Calcidius, according to Waszink 1962 and
Courcelle 1973) think of a worldview such as the one Calcidius endorses,
Ambrose obliges with a succinct but potent rejection: “What . . . would be
more inconvenient than . . . to associate the eternity of the work [= the
world] with the eternity of the omnipotent God?”26
Finally, as we have seen,27 in his minimal dualism Calcidius posits
matter as a second principle (archē/initium), side by side with the ordering
system of the divine in his universe. If we follow the doxographical division
of the treatise on matter (which Calcidius also weaves into his excursus on
the human soul) Calcidius moves on from the view that matter is generated
(chs. 276–278), to the view that it is not (ch. 279). When he turns to Plato’s
position (ch. 300), he again explicitly criticizes those Platonists who assume
matter to be generated.
Why would even an allegorical reading of “generated,” in which matter
is causally dependent on god, a view he attributes to the Hebrews (chs.
276–278), not do for Calcidius? If matter is merely eternal, while depen-
dent on God, it cannot be a principle in its own right, and Calcidius
unequivocally endorses the latter view. It is worth noting that with such
a move he sets aside not only the position which he attributes to the
Hebrews – including the claim that God himself made sufficient matter

22 23
See ch. 4 in this study. See section 5.1 in this study.
24
Pace Ratkowitsch 1996: 149 and 153, Bakhouche 2011 I: 43. 25 See section 15.2 in this study.
26
Hex. 1.1.2: Quid . . . tam inconueniens quam . . . aeternitatem operis cum dei omnipotentis [coniungere]
aeternitate? I owe this reference to Galonnier 2009: 204. See also Courcelle 1973.
27
See ch. 9 in this study.

28
See section 14.2 (3) in this study.
29
See also F368 Smith, quoted by Aeneas of Gaza precisely in support of the Christian position on
matter; cf. also Proclus, In Tim. 2, I 391.12–393.2; 3, II 102.7–11 Diehl. I owe these references to
Köckert 2009: 195–200. On Eudorus, see Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 181 Diels. Edwards (2015: 54)
misinterprets the phrase that “God is the opifex or articifer of matter” (ch. 311, silvae opifex; in
a response to the Stoics): this phrase does not mean that the Demiurge made matter too, but rather,
as the remainder of the paragraph makes explicit, that through the forms he imposed order on
matter (opifex siluae formas insigniet).
30
As Moreschini (2017: 259) points out, in Justin Martyr (Apol. 1.10.2; see also 59.3) and Athenagoras of
Athens (10.3; 15.2–3; 22.2) one can still detect the view that matter coexists with God; for a good
overview see also Pépin 1964: 57.
31
Cf. Köckert 2009: 240–247. 32 See section 15.4 in this study.
33
See also F1 Preuschen from the Com. Jn.

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214 Calcidius Christianus? (2)
(20.123). Of these, Wisdom, which contains the intelligible models of
reality (19.114), here appears to be the primary designation of Christ in
himself as principle (19.118), whereas Logos describes him in his rapport
with God the Father.
Last but not least, Origen, though he may not yet have a fully developed
account of creatio ex nihilo in all its implications, explicitly rejects the
notion of a coeternal matter. He distinguishes his in-group of “believers,”
“us” (πὰρ’ ἡμῖν τοῖς πειθομένοις), from a group of “them” (παρὰ τοῖς . . .
ἐπισταμένοις), for whom matter is a principle because it is ungenerated
(ἀρχὴ παρὰ τοῖς ἀγένητον αὐτὴν ἐπισταμένοις). Believers, Origen avers,
hold that God created beings from non-being.34 He is even willing to
entertain the notion that the second person of the Trinity, here called
“ensouled wisdom” (ἔμψυχον σοφίαν), bestowed existence (ousia) on
beings and matter (19.115).35 According to this schema, Calcidius would
clearly belong with the group of “them,” whose view on matter Origen, as
spokesperson for his community of “believers,” ﬁrmly rejects. All of the
evidence examined in this and the previous chapter would suggest that
Calcidius made only minimal use of a Christian Origen as his source.
Even scholars such as Ratkowitsch (1996) who make a case for
a Christian identity grant that Calcidius does not present us with
a Christianized version of the Timaeus, and Moreschini too admits
(2003: lxxx) that “in the end there is very little in Calcidius that identiﬁes
him as a Christian.” While Ratkowitsch’s hypothesis that Calcidius wants
to lure reluctant pagans with tidbits of Christianity is attractive, the
evidence we have lends itself better to the hypothesis that he wants to
make the non-Christian philosophical tradition available to Christians.
In sum, the commentary was probably written with an audience in mind
that also included Christians; it made some concessions to his addressee
and that audience, but shows no strong effort to accommodate such
sensitivities. Or, to put this point differently, the assumption that
Calcidius is a Christian does not do much, if anything at all, to unlock
the governing principles of the commentary and clarify the positions
Calcidius endorses. To say that the commentary occupies a middle ground
between Platonism and Christianity (Moreschini 2002: 440; 2003; xxxix;
and 2017) is true up to a certain point, but only if we keep in mind that

34
For a similar position, see also Clement of Alexandria, for whom matter is coexistent as mē on, but
explicitly not as a principle (Strom. 5.89.6; Lilla 1971: 193–196 and May 1994: 17–18 for this view in
Philo of Alexandria); see also section 10.1 in this study .
35
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τύπων τοῖς οὖσι καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ <παρασχεῖν καὶ> τὴν πλάσιν καὶ τὰ εἴδη, ἐγὼ δὲ
ἐφίστημι εἰ καὶ τὰς οὐσίας.

36
Hence I do not endorse the view that Calcidius presents some kind of synthesis between Platonism
and Christianity, as expressed in Moreschini 2017: 262, 269–270. Nor do I agree with Dronke (2008:
xiv–xviii) who sees in Calcidius a “free-seeker.” Such a label would presuppose that Calcidius
resisted any potential restrictions imposed on him by Christian teachings, whereas his work presents
itself as unaware of such restrictions. Edwards 2015: 54–58 describes Calcidius as a “hybrid” and also
calls him a “Christian Platonist” (58).

So, in the ﬁnal analysis, in which cultural context should we locate

Calcidius given the features of his commentary to which this study has
drawn attention? This otherwise unknown author presents himself with
a strong and confident awareness, often expressed in the first person, of his
role as transmitter of a Greek philosophical legacy through his translation
of and commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. He systematically presents Plato as
holding the most complete and true view, and appears either critical of or
indifferent towards the Platonist tradition, that is, other followers and
interpreters of Plato. He uses the Timaeus to give his addressee (and his
readers) a thematically arranged overview of “theoretical philosophy,”
divided into mathematics (science), physics, and those aspects of theology
that fit with the perceived focus of the Timaeus as a discourse on nature. It
is also part of Calcidius’ teaching strategy to present complex problems and
intricate debates in the philosophical tradition in simplified versions, with
an approach we can see at work in the translation as well.1
The view that runs through the entire commentary presents a minimal
dualism in an eternally existing world: on the divine side of reality, we find
(1) a highest god, (2) a second god and first mind, who represents the will of
the first god, and (3) a supra-cosmic noetic soul (which however is not
included in Calcidius’ explicit hierarchy of divine levels in chs. 176–177 and
188). In most instances Plato’s Demiurge appears to stand for the first
and second god taken together, but with an emphasis on the latter. At the
other end of the spectrum, we find (1) a completely neutral matter, which
coexists eternally with the divine agents, (2) traces of the elements that
introduce motion into matter but that are not full-fledged bodies, and (3)
a lower soul, a life-force that is the inseparable companion of bodies. The
World Soul, which Calcidius mentions as his third god, is some kind of

1
The absence of Calcidius from socio-cultural collections of essays such as van Hoof and van Nuffelen
(2014) on paideia and self-presentation is thus quite striking.

216

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Conclusion 217
combination of the purely noetic and the lower soul. The notion of
Providence is central to Calcidius’ concept of the ordered universe, but
without it undermining, through the edicts of fate, human moral freedom.
Given the high status Calcidius grants Plato, he approves of Aristotle
when the latter’s views can be interpreted as agreeing with Plato’s and is
critical when they cannot. Aristotle thus ends up occupying a middle
ground not uncommon in the Platonist tradition. Calcidius’ use of Stoic
material, which he appears to know rather well, is much more complex:
despite his readily apparent criticism Calcidius (or the source on which he
relies for any given section) co-opts important Stoic tenets for his own
views. The last third of the commentary, the sub-treatise on matter,
presents a strong agreement on the status and role of matter between
Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.
Calcidius represents a fourth-century strand of philosophical commen-
tary in Latin that is not dominated by the reception of Porphyry. The
hypothesis that Porphyry is one of the main source-authors behind
Calcidius’ work is not tenable. Numenius, on the other hand, does con-
stitute a major influence on Calcidius, but this influence in itself does not
tell us whether Calcidius had direct access to his work. Moreover, while
Calcidius appears to have relied on him for some features of the general
framework of his commentary, he also asserts his independence from
Numenius’ interpretation of Plato. Rather than attempting to find the
smallest number of master sources possible, this study has highlighted
Calcidius’ own hand in the commentary, not only in the consistent line
of interpretation which he advances, but also in his structuring of his
material. In light of this analysis it is most likely that he had direct access
to some texts himself and that he also used a range of compendia and
doxographical overviews (with excerpts; Macías Villalobos 2015: 41).
The assumption that Calcidius was a Christian himself is highly
questionable, even if it is impossible to prove that he was not. His
authorial voice is markedly different from that of contemporary
Christians who had an interest in philosophy (as well as later ones, such
as Synesius and Boethius), and for him Plato’s views present the highest
truth. His use of views he attributes to the Hebrews do not point to
a Christian identity either, and this realization implies that we should be
very cautious with attributing the entire section of the alleged Hebrew
view of matter (chs. 276–278) to Origen. In content Calcidius presents
his reader with what in essence is the equivalent of a Middle Platonist
divine triad and he posits matter as a principle, that is, as a foundational
building block of reality that exists co-eternally with divine agency. The

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218 Conclusion
few explicit references to Christian views make most sense as concessions
to his interlocutor, who appears to be a Christian.
As John Magee (2016: xiv–xv) has argued, it is clear from the Latin
calques of Greek expressions and grammatical structures that Greek was
the dominant language for Calcidius. Yet his Latin was good enough to
write on the often highly technical subjects of the commentary. He men-
tions Cicero (chs. 27, 266), Terence (ch. 184), and quotes Vergil (ch. 66; see
also ch. 353, Bertolini 1990), but otherwise draws from Greek material. The
dominance of an originally Greek linguistic framework complicates
attempts at dating the work that are based on style. It also means that we
should be wary of locating Calcidius in the Latin West and applying certain
expectations for Latin writers to Calcidius (pace Moreschini 2017:
261–262).
The arguments which Waszink (1962: xiv–xvii) advanced to situate
Calcidius in Milan and Italy in the second half of the fourth century, or
even later, in the milieu from which Marius Victorinus, Ambrose, and
Augustine emerged, are too tenuous, even though we have an Osius
attested for that period and place who could be a match for Calcidius’
addressee (Bakhouche 2011: I 8–13; Magee 2016: viii–xi) – more on this
below. An earlier date fits the commentary much better, in the first half of
the fourth century, as had traditionally been assumed before Waszink, and
has now been reasserted by Dronke (2008: 3–7) and Moreschini (2017). We
can use Origen for a terminus post quem, and we can also factor in some
delay, that is, assume that Calcidius may not have been fully aware of the
latest developments in Platonism and Christianity.
But another angle also presents itself here: it is not uncommon in
accounts of later Antiquity to find such time lags. In his critiques of
Stoicism Plutarch, for instance, appears to limit himself to the founders
of that school in the Hellenistic era and does not engage directly with
contemporary Stoics, or, in another example, Diogenes Laertius’ third-
century Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers does not bring the list
up to date with contemporary philosophers either. Moreover, it is worth
reminding ourselves in this context that not all later Platonists followed the
line of the main thinkers most often studied now. Thus, as Moreschini has
convincingly claimed (2003: xix; 2017: 262) not all Platonist works of the
fourth century CE necessarily relied on Plotinus and Porphyry (or even
Iamblichus) as their primary reference points.
In the first print of his edition Waszink had used the terminological
similarities between Calcidius and other Latin writers as an argument in
favor of a late date, on the basis of the assumption that Calcidius is too

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Conclusion 219
mediocre a writer and thinker to have been developing new Latin technical
terms. Apart from the dubiousness of such a petitio principii, Waszink
himself conceded in the less well-known revision of his edition that in the
case of Ambrose, as Courcelle (1973) had argued, the influence probably
went in the direction from Calcidius to Ambrose, and he also conceded
that the same observation may hold for Favonius Eulogius.2 Courcelle
wanted to date Calcidius two decennia earlier than Waszink, around 480,
but the door had now, in effect, been reopened for an earlier date.
Moreover, based on the evidence marshalled by Courcelle, the connections
between Calcidius and Ambrose are also tenuous, at best.
The only argument remaining for a late date would be based on features
of style, namely, the nature of Calcidius’ prose (see above) and the kind of
metrical clausulae he used. But these features are notoriously difficult to
date, and there are many gaps in the Latin tradition. In an oft-quoted
analysis of the metrical clausulae in the letter of dedication, Mensching
(1965) claims that on the basis of these data, one would have to situate
Calcidius between Arnobius and Favonius Eulogius. Assuming that he
meant the elder Arnobius, it is a mystery to this reader at least why he
thinks even that observation would date Calcidius c. 400 CE. In sum,
I would like to return to the hypothesis of an earlier date, around mid-
fourth century CE.
Waszink (1962: x–xvii) rightly cautioned against the automatic assump-
tion that Calcidius’ addressee was Osius, the bishop of Cordoba who
played a pivotal role in the Council of Nicea in 325. Two lines of reasoning
tell against Spain (see also Waszink 1972: 237): the first, that Isidore of
Seville does not mention Calcidius (though other scholars have detected
traces of Calcidius’ work in the latter, Bakhouche 2011: I 54–55),
the second, and more important one, that to date we have no manuscripts
from that area.
It is possible, however, that Osius, if Calcidius’ addressee was indeed the
bishop of Cordoba, commissioned this work during one of his travels. In
1959, a couple of years before the publication of Waszink’s monumental
edition, van Winden considered the possibility that Calcidius “accompa-
nied his bishop, Ossius [sic], to the Near East and there gathered his
material.” I would argue that we cannot exclude the possibility that
Osius met Calcidius while traveling and commissioned the work in that

2
For the most detailed analysis to date on the parallels between Calcidius and Favonius Eulogius, see
Dorfbauer 2011. He makes a very convincing case for the sequence Calcidius, Favonius Eulogius, and
Macrobius.

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220 Conclusion
context. In his 1972 contribution Waszink too admitted (237) that this
possibility should be considered. And as I have shown, Calcidius does
appear to present a garbled allusion to the Nicene Creed (in his ch. 126).
It seems to make most sense to place Calcidius in an era in which
Christianity was gaining decisive ground, but had not yet become so
dominant and so caught up in theological polemics as to make a Latin
commentary on Plato’s Timaeus itself a charged undertaking (Dillon 1977:
402; Moreschini 2017). Given that there is no trace in the commentary of
any of the debates on the doctrines of the Trinity and creation, or of the
controversy about Origen, and that the work appears to reflect an older
layer of Platonism predating Plotinus and Porphyry (but with the caution
on this point expressed above), the earlier date also fits better. If Calcidius
had been connected to the Milan milieu at the end of the fourth century
CE, he must have appeared strangely out of place, if not entirely clueless.
That milieu had a more advanced understanding of post-Plotinian
Platonism and of Porphyry, and was fully immersed in the theological
controversies of the day. It is thus fundamentally misleading to group
Calcidius with Latin Christian Neoplatonism.
As we move away from the Milan/Italy hypothesis, the most important
reason for greater caution in using the category of Latin Christian
Neoplatonism is that the range of voices then becomes much wider and
much more interesting.3 In a cultural context that was often dominated by
a fierce polemic between Christian and non-Christian thinkers, Calcidius’
voice shows a distinctive attempt at a non-polemical encounter between
these two formidable cultural forces from the point of view of a Platonism
that firmly adheres to what is presented as Plato’s truth, against some rival
positions and interpretations of Plato’s work, and with a confidence that
appears to require no justification. For Calcidius the Timaeus and Plato
constitute the ultimate frame of reference, but in Osius and through him
Calcidius also addresses a Christian audience.
Calcidius himself as author provided the interpretive framework and the
continuity throughout the commentary. Not that this helped him much.
In the later tradition, ironically, his work often came to stand simply for
the views of Plato himself, and his name disappears behind that of the
grand master.4 He was such an effective cultural mediator, then, that he
ultimately managed to erase himself.

3
I share the concerns about the category of Christian (Neo)Platonism voiced by Charlotte Köckert
(2009: 542 and 2010).
4
Dutton 2003: 193–194.

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Aeneas of Gaza Anonymi Commentarius in Parmenidem

Theophrastus 9.1-8: 94
893A–B: 180 12.22-27: 87
Albinus Anonymi Commentarius in Theaetetum (ed.
Isagoge Diels–Schubart)
5: 33 1.1–4.27: 11
Alcinous Anonymi Prolegomena philosophiae
Didaskalikos Platonicae (ed. Westerink)
2: 110 4: 34
3: 25–26 Apuleius
4, 155.39-41: 135 De mundo
6, 159.43-160.30: 146 24.343: 51, 147
7: 25–26 De Platone et eius dogmate
8, 163.7-8: 120 1.5.92: 120
9, 163.14-17: 134 1.12: 104
10: 62, 94 1.192: 135
10, 164.34: 95 Aristotle
10, 164.42–165.1: 211 Analytica priora
10, 166.4: 135 1.13.32a18-29: 109
14: 62 De anima
15, 171.22-23: 101 2.1.412a27-28: 144
25, 178.39-45: 83 3.5.430a15: 145
26: 109 De caelo
Alexander of Aphrodisias 1.10-12: 49
De anima liber 1.10.279b32-280a2: 49
94.7-100.17: 78 1.12.282a4ff.: 130, 188
De fato 105 3.7–8.306a1–307b24: 38
171.11-16: 113 De generatione animalium: 144
176.14-23: 155 De generatione et corruptione
181.13-182.20: 107, 154, 158 1.2.316a2–4: 38
201.16-18: 114 2.4: 44
202.8-15, 21-25: 109 De interpretatione
De mixtione 9: 109
213.18-214.6: 75 12.21a37ff.: 188
216.14–218.6: 178 13.23a15-16: 109
Ambrose De partibus animalium
De Helia et ieiunio 144
4.7.416.3: 195 Ethica Nicomachea
Hexaemeron 3.3: 142, 143
1.1.2: 212 3.5: 143

233

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236 Index Locorum
Calcidius (cont.) Ch. 256: 176
Ch. 182: 79–80, 82 Ch. 257: 14
Chs. 183-184: 112 Ch. 261: 80
Ch. 184: 108, 218 Chs. 264–266: 82
Chs. 185-186: 105 Ch. 264: 21, 25, 37
Ch. 185: 117 Ch. 265: 100
Ch. 186: 84, 117 Ch. 266: 218
Ch. 187: 82, 103, 112 Ch. 267: 81, 82
Ch. 188-189: 108 Chs. 268–355: 25, 27, 118–137
Ch. 188: 86–98, 102, 150, 153, 168, 172, 175, Chs. 268-274: 118, 125
204–211, 216 Ch. 268: 25, 30, 101–102, 119, 123, 125, 133, 149
Ch. 189: 88, 93, 107, 110, 117 Ch. 269: 119, 124–125, 160
Ch. 190: 106 Ch. 270: 103, 120, 124, 127, 160, 167
Ch. 191: 89, 103 Ch. 271: 120, 125, 130
Ch. 192: 103 Ch. 272: 13, 31, 44, 92, 120, 127, 131, 133,
Ch. 198: 179–180, 195 Ch. 273: 18, 28, 91, 118, 124, 129, 133, 160
Ch. 199: 103, 110 Ch. 274: 30, 120, 136
Ch. 200: 103 Ch. 275: 72, 74, 122, 162, 175
Ch. 201: 18, 56, 88, 104, 111, 120 Chs. 276-278: 2, 92, 118, 125–126, 197–202,
Chs. 202–207: 23 212, 217
Ch. 202: 71, 159 Ch. 276: 19
Ch. 203: 75 Ch. 277: 132
Ch. 204: 102 Ch. 278: 75, 126, 131–133
Chs. 207-211: 82 Chs. 279-282: 119
Ch. 211: 23 Chs. 279-280: 122
Ch. 212: 17 Ch. 279: 75, 212
Chs. 213-235: 3, 59, 71–84 Ch. 280: 20, 123, 160, 201
Chs. 214-221: 73, 122 Chs. 283-288: 119, 125
Chs. 214-217: 73, 122 Ch. 283: 56, 149
Ch. 214: 75, 79, 122 Chs. 286-287: 125
Ch. 215: 197 Ch. 286: 148, 150
Chs. 218-221: 73, 122 Ch. 287: 10, 88, 150
Ch. 219: 92, 196, 199, 200, 206 Ch. 288: 124–125, 130, 148
Ch. 220: 3, 78, 156 Chs. 289–294: 119, 160–162
Ch. 221: 159, 177 Ch. 289: 120, 124–125
Chs. 222-224: 74, 144–145 Ch. 290: 130, 160–161
Ch. 223: 77, 144, 183 Ch. 291: 161
Ch. 224: 145 Ch. 292: 161
Ch. 225: 61, 110, 134, 144–145 Ch. 294: 124, 161
Chs. 226-235: 74 Chs. 295–299: 45, 62, 119, 163
Chs. 226-227: 147 Ch. 295: 49, 126, 164, 175
Ch. 226: 81, 146, 147 Ch. 296: 166
Ch. 227: 147, 159 Chs. 297-299: 94, 166
Chs. 228-229: 83–84 Ch. 297: 166
Ch. 228: 55 Ch. 298: 126, 167, 169
Ch. 230: 73 Ch. 299: 164, 168
Chs. 232-233: 73, 80 Chs. 300-301: 119, 126
Ch. 231: 79, 82 Ch. 300: 17, 163, 198–199, 200, 212
Ch. 232: 73, 74 Ch. 301: 125, 184–186
Ch. 234: 79, 82 Chs. 302-320: 119
Ch. 243: 17, 192 Ch. 302-304: 135–137
Ch. 246: 17 Ch. 302: 14, 52, 133, 136–137
Ch. 250: 149, 196 Ch. 303: 91, 136, 168
Ch. 251: 151, 159 Ch. 304: 91–92, 133, 136–137
Ch. 254: 100, 102 Ch. 307: 91, 124, 127, 133, 160, 185

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