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A Bring Your Own Device Risk Assessment Model

Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), a technology where individuals or employees use their own devices on the organization’s network to perform tasks assigned to them by the organization has been widely embraced. The reasons for adoption are diverse in every organization. In spite of the security control strategies implemented by these organizations to safeguard their information resources, there has been an upsurge in information security breaches as a result of existing vulnerabilities in these...
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
135 views

A Bring Your Own Device Risk Assessment Model

Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), a technology where individuals or employees use their own devices on the organization’s network to perform tasks assigned to them by the organization has been widely embraced. The reasons for adoption are diverse in every organization. In spite of the security control strategies implemented by these organizations to safeguard their information resources, there has been an upsurge in information security breaches as a result of existing vulnerabilities in these...
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Oonge S. Omboga, Muhambe T. Mukisa & Ratemo M.

Cyprian

A Bring Your Own Device Risk Assessment Model

Oonge S. Omboga [email protected]


School of Computing Department of Information Technology
Maseno University
Maseno, P.O. Box 333-40105, Kenya

Muhambe, T. Mukisa [email protected]


School of Computing Department of Information Technology
Maseno University
Maseno, P.O. Box 333-40105, Kenya

Ratemo, M. Cyprian [email protected]


Department of Information Technology
Kisii University
Kisii, P.O. Box 408 – 40200, Kenya

Abstract

Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), a technology where individuals or employees use their own
devices on the organization’s network to perform tasks assigned to them by the organization has
been widely embraced. The reasons for adoption are diverse in every organization. In spite of the
security control strategies implemented by these organizations to safeguard their information
resources, there has been an upsurge in information security breaches as a result of existing
vulnerabilities in these systems and the legacy systems in use. Various approaches have been
employed to deal with security challenges in BYOD, but according to literature, risk assessment
has proved to be the first key step towards improving security of the BYOD environment in an
enterprise. Risk assessment models have been proposed by various researchers, although, most
are largely influenced by the degree of technological advancement and utilization as well as the
working cultures within institutions. The existing models were largely developed in technologically
advanced countries and thus do not fit well in developing countries. This study sought to develop
flexible BYOD risk assessment model that can be adopted by varied institutions to secure their
information resources. The study was carried out in Five (5) purposively selected state
universities in Kenya. The research adopted a mixed research design approach with mixed
sampling technique utilized to select the participants. Reliability and validity of data collection
tools were evaluated and recommended by IT security and network experts. The qualitative and
quantitative data was collected by interviewing experts and administering a questionnaire to
sampled participants. The developed model was validated both statistically and by experts. The
findings revealed that threats and vulnerabilities contributed to 39.9% and 69.2% respectively to
the risk of the BYOD environment while Data Encryption (DE) and Software Updates (SU) came
out strongly as intervening variables which have a major impact on the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables.

Keywords: BYOD, Risk Assessment, Risk Assessment Models, Information Security.

1. INTRODUCTION
Information technology (IT) has progressed from being a commodity service provider to a
strategic asset in the current business operations. IT has become a means to achieve greater
efficiency and productivity [1], while the use of cloud services has emerged as a popular solution
by institutions providing cheap and easy access to externalized IT resources. These resources
are commonly accessed by user owned devices [2] with a growing phenomenon where
companies allow employees to perform the assigned tasks on their personal devices. This is

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popularly referred to as BYOD and defined by [3], as an alternative strategy that allows
employees, business partners and other users to use personally selected and purchased client
tablets/ e-Readers, smart phones and other devices to execute enterprise applications, access
data and do personal stuff while on the organizational network.

BYOD was first introduced in 2009 by Malcolm Harkins, after realizing an increased need by
employees to use their own mobile devices in the workplace [4]. Organizations, including
enterprise, higher education and healthcare embraced BYOD to tap to a wide range of benefits
that comes from the workforce or end-users being able to access corporate/managed resources
on their own devices. According to a survey by Cisco Networks [5] 85 percent of organizations
allowed some form of BYOD on their institutional network. Higher academic institutions like other
organizations have embraced BYODs’ for a wide array of purposes, which [6] classified into
seven main functional areas; administration, collaborative, interactive, referential, location aware,
data collection and microworld.

The 21st century student and end-user in general, bring along multiple devices they own to
university with high expectation that universities will avail or allow them download the resources
needed on those very devices to accomplish their work or assignments while in college.
Meanwhile, the learning institutions have had to find innovative ways of making campus-based
learning resources available not only off-campus, but on non-managed, user owned devices too.
The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly accelerated the need for BYOD in universities with off-
campus access to IT resources now becoming the norm [7].

Use of BYOD tags along many benefits that include globalization, cheaper, easier, quicker and
more efficient borderless communication, portability, productivity and time-to-work flexibility [8].
Technologies like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), Voice over Internet Protocols (VoIPs), virtual
meetings, cloud technology, and other work collaboration tools are now into heavy use to enable
remote working and communication [5]. This has led to an explosion of personal devices with the
most modern technologies accessing work networks remotely [9]. The influx of the diverse sets of
devices on the network weakens the information security defenses inviting information security
risks to the very assets that need protection [10].

The main objective of this study was to develop a cheaper, ease to use BYOD risk assessment
model for limited budget organizations. To develop the model, the researcher explored the
BYOD-related risks, assessed the existing risk assessment models and adopted some optimal
variables from the existing models. The study’s intention was to help institutional decision makers
to understand the implications of introducing BYOD in their institutions and the effective way to
address the identified risks and finally bridge the theoretical gap in the subject.

1.1 Approach of The Study


This study began with a review of the pertinent literature in order to identify risks related to the
introduction of the BYOD concept in institutions of higher learning. An analysis of the risk
assessment models from literature were evaluated to establish suitable variables that can be
borrowed specifically for BYOD in an open academic environment. The developed risk
assessment model was tested in two different learning institutions to assess its capability and
efficacy.

2. RELATED WORK
The education sector in developing countries just like their developed counterparts hold vast
amounts of valuable data that includes student and staff information, partners’ information, alumni
databases, and highly valuable research data [11] however studies posit that universities are
inadequately prepared to protect their informational resources [12]. This is majorly because
universities often work with legacy systems that are supported by teams that are not equipped to
deal with the evolving sophisticated attacks.

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BYOD adoption in such institutions bring along major information security concerns surrounding
the software, hardware, deployment and technical aspects as outlined by [13]. Most academic
institutions implement BYOD with little or poorly crafted policies [14] posing unexpected
information security threats through the devices and the applications running on them. Among
the major concerns to the institutions are privacy of information both on the user and the
institution devices, decisions on device enrolment, licensing evaluation, security policy and
compliance, education and security training [15].

Higher learning institutions who adopted BYOD have been valuable targets by cybercriminals.
The threats and cyber-attacks go beyond loss of personally identifiable information and may
include institutional information, operational, reputational, and/or financial impacts. Research
shows that in the year 2020, 54% of UK universities reported a data breach to the ICO
(Information Commissioner’s Office) with 86 universities admitting serious shortcomings in their
ability to prevent data breaches [16] [17]. Hacking, malware and unintended disclosures were the
most commonly reported security breaches within institutions [18] [19]. Attacks such as
eavesdropping, theft of sensitive information through social engineering, malicious software
infection, theft and intrusion of mobile devices have also been on the rise [20] [21]. [22], affirms
that the top risks for educational institutions include phishing, harassment, ransomware, IP theft
piracy, account hacking, and denial of service attacks. It is further noted that majority of members
of the management within these institutions do not know what these attacks are and are not
aware of the risks that each pose to their institutions.

In a study done by [23], issues related to security breaches of data due to adoption of BYOD
were identified as the major challenges facing institutions of higher learning in South Africa. The
study further reports that unauthorized access to sensitive data stored on mobile devices and on
the institution’s network, attacks from malicious software and impersonation are a common
feature. BYOD in most Ethiopian higher learning institutions was adopted without considering
transparent policies, security and privacy issues, device and application management tools, end-
user security/privacy awareness and training [24]. Further, it is noted that the excessive freedom
to access the network has posed major security and privacy risks and bandwidth constraints. In
Kenyan higher learning institutions, [20] established that user security unawareness was the
leading IT security challenge followed closely by the varied device platforms challenges. The
author further stated that loss of device control and lack of visibility of devices on the institutions’
networks make them susceptible to intrusion, data leakage, and device and data theft. Viruses
and malware are common among the student devices as they keep sharing information without
minding the status of the other device before connection [17] [18] [25]. The human aspect of
security in BYOD plays a big role. As cited by [17], humans are a major threat to information
security due to their negligence and sometimes deliberate actions. The non-compliance behavior
of humans in a BYOD environment may result to data leakages causing major institutional losses
[24]. It is further stated that one in every five institutions suffers from a security breach involving a
mobile device connecting to malicious hotspots and malware [17] [25].

While it is true that making institutional data available and accessible to students and employees
can contribute to productivity, literature clearly shows that it poses risks that can lead to major
losses. According to [26], controlling different devices and platforms which connect across
multiple networks is a potential cybercriminal minefield that universities are keen to avoid. There
are also concerns around who takes responsibility for data loss and replacing the device in the
event of it being lost, stolen or malfunctioning.

Allowing access to university systems, and services through network connections on unchecked
and unmanaged machines carries risks. If the endpoints are infected with malware, there is a
chance for this to further infect university systems. Furthermore, users with malicious intentions
present a higher risk to systems that allow BYOD devices if not managed properly.

It is evident that most institutions that adopt BYOD are exposed to emerging IT security
challenges. These security challenges are varied and dynamic in nature. For this reason, [27]

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recommends that establishing challenges due to BYOD adoption should not be a onetime activity
but a continuous process. It therefore becomes necessary that institutions should continuously
take precautions to prevent and mitigate information security breaches through the adoption of
risk assessment. Institutions that do risk assessments understand better where their strengths
and weaknesses are when it comes to ensuring the security of their sensitive data. It is further
noted that risk assessment exposes the efficiency of the organization’s controls, determines risk
factors, detects vulnerabilities and uses them in crafting detailed plans and solutions that offer
options of how to alleviate them.

There are various security assessment types [28]. Pen Testing (penetration testing) aims to
simulate an attacker to see how well security measures of the organization work [29] [30], risk
assessment [31] that detects risks and potential losses that can be caused by them and
vulnerability assessment [32] whose aims is to identify vulnerabilities of the security measures
and offers solutions to alleviate them. This paper develops a BYOD risk assessment model for
open institutions with limited budgets by borrowing concepts of the existing risk assessment
models combined with other factors from literature review.

2.1 Risk Assessment Models


Broadly [33] [34] divide risk assessment models into qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative
models use measurable objective data to determine; asset value, probability of loss, and
accompanying risk(s) while qualitative methods use a relative measure of risk or asset value
based on ranking or separation into expressive categories such as low, medium, high; not
important, important, very important; or on a Likert scale. [35] [36] compare the two model types
by highlighting the advantages of each and expresses need to integrate the advantages of each
in the risk assessment process.

To establish the existing risk assessment models, articles were identified by searching relevant
databases, such as ERIC, JSTOR, SciNet, EBSCOhost, and Google Scholar. The most recent
and relevant journal papers were selected with most of them having been published in less than
seven years. A comparison of the most recent and supported models was done. Only models that
explicitly defined and decomposed risks, as well as suggest either taxonomy of factors or a
formula for computing risks based on these factors were selected. The literature search identified
twenty-five risk assessment models in existence [37] [38] [39]. For the purpose of this study, the
models were classified in four categories as shown in table 1. This first selection iteration
excluded some models from the study based on essential model features; if the model is a
method or guideline, if the model identifies Information System (IS) risks or not, if it has current
documentation and if it has regular reviews.

Name of
risk Method or Identifies Last 2nd
Documentation?
assessment Guideline? IS Risks Review Iteration?
model
Up-to-
Octave Method Yes Free Yes
date
Up-to-
Mehari Method Yes Free Yes
date
Up-to-
MAGERIT Method Yes Free Yes
date
IT-Grund Standard Up-to-
Yes Free Yes
schutz and Method date
Up-to-
EBIOS Method Yes Free Yes
date
NISTSP800- Up-to-
Guideline Yes Free No
30 date
Up-to-
FAIR Method Yes Free Yes
date

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Name of
risk Method or Identifies Last 2nd
Documentation?
assessment Guideline? IS Risks Review Iteration?
model
Up-to-
TARA Method Yes free Yes
date
RISK Up-to-
Method Yes Free Yes
RANKER date
Up-to-
CRAMM Method Yes Expensive No
date
Up-to-
MIGRA Method Yes Expensive No
date
Up-to-
MAR Guideline No Free No
date
ISAMM Method Yes Unavailable N/A No
Guidelines
GAO/AIMD-
and Case Yes Free N/A No
00-33
Studies
IT System
Security Guideline Yes Unavailable N/A No
Assessment
MG-2 and
Guideline Yes Unavailable N/A No
MG-3
Security Risk
Management Guideline Yes Unavailable N/A No
Guide
Dutch A&K
Method Yes Unavailable No
Analysis Obsolete
MARION Method Yes Unavailable Obsolete No
Austrian IT
Up-to-
Security Guideline Yes Unavailable No
date
Handbook
Microsoft
Security risk Up to
Guideline Yes Free No
management date
guide
Risk IT Framework No Available N/A No

BYODRAM Method Yes unavailable obsolete No


Up to
CVSS Method yes Yes Yes
date

TABLE 1: First Selection of the Risk Assessment Models.

The criteria reduced the initial collection of models to 9 models. The models with a “yes” at the
first iteration column were selected for further consideration where the study subjected them to
another set of standards suggested by the author. The five (5) selection criteria applied are
described below:
i. Complexity and effort skills and preparation needed to implement the model. Using the
criteria; Little preparation needed, preparation needed, extensive preparation and effort
needed.
ii. The risk assessment approaches; e.g. self-assessment, interviews, workshops).
iii. Supporting tools; Free tool, paid tool, no supporting tool but has supporting
documentation (e.g. worksheets, questionnaires, forms)
iv. Origin/source of the tool e.g. Academic; Governmental; Commercial.

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The second iteration, considering the four characteristics cited, dropped six of the nine selected
models from the first iteration. The three remaining models; OCTAVE, IT-Grund schutz and
CVSS with their characteristics are described in table 2.

Model Description Strengths Drawbacks


For risk-based infosec.
The process requires a significant
strategic assessment and
time commitment, and the
planning
documentation is large and vague
Methodology is self-directed
(Joshi, 2014).
and easily modified.
- Provides a Used as the foundation risk There are planned updates to
standardized approach assessment component or OCTAVE that may impact its
to risk-driven and process for other risk downsides, but the exact effects are
OCTAVE
practice-based method currently unknown.
information security Thorough and well-
Fairly Complex Framework
evaluation documented.
Qualitative not quantitative risk
Freely available
model
Encourages corroboration
between various company
groups.
is based on the risk
analysis approach that
focuses on threat
To identify and Complexity and voluminous nature
identification, assigning
implement computer which necessitates the need for
IT-Grund likelihood of occurrence and
baseline security more people to implement. A
schutz selection of suitable
measures within an hindrance to most ‘developing’
information security
organization institutions. [33][34][35]
measures and their
respective implementation
costs
Does not clearly provide a method
Identifies and scoring
for aggregating individual scores
underlying vulnerabilities
across system
Unsuitable for managing IT risk
Is suited for organizations,
because it does not consider
industries and governments
mitigation strategies
Assessment and CVSS assumes that vulnerabilities
free, open, quantitative quantification of the impact are independent which is not the
CVSS of software vulnerabilities case
risk assessment
Standardized vulnerability
scores,
A numerical score that
indicates the severity of the
vulnerability on the assets;
a low , medium, high or
critical

TABLE 2: Strengths and Drawbacks of the Selected Risk Assessment Models.

This study borrowed the flow of activities from the three risk assessment models to help come up
with the BYOD risk assessment model. The study adopted the strengths of each of the three risk
assessment models; OCTAVE, IT-Grundschutz and CVSS to enable the research not only to
become simple to implement and easy to use, but also captures both qualitative and quantitative
approaches in accomplishing its functions, hence, preferred in varied environments and good
especially in a limited resource BYOD environment.

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OCTAVE’s qualitative approach on threat and infrastructure vulnerabilities identification as


highlighted by [40] was used in the threats and vulnerabilities identification process. [40] proposes
IT-Grund schutz, model based on the risk analysis approach that focuses on threat identification,
assigning likelihood of occurrence and selection of suitable information security measures and
their respective implementation costs to contribute immensely to the adoption of a risk based risk
assessment model development. The quantitative aspect of risk assessment was adopted from
CVSS model that uses the numerical score approach that indicates the severity of the
vulnerability on the assets which helps develop a low, medium, high or critical criteria for risk
ranking. The BYOD risk assessment model will help prioritize risks by their financial impacts and
at the same time involve people who are not experts in the information security field to perform
regular risk assessments [18].

2.2 Conceptual Model Development


Literature review identified threats that are common in the higher learning institutions from various
countries. It was however necessary for the study to classify the threats into suitable categories.
Students and staff using own devices may find themselves losing the Device through theft,
forgetting or misplacement of the device. Thus it is difficult to know who finds it and what will
happen to the sensitive data in the device. Theft of data, loss or destruction of BYOD asset,
fraud, unauthorized access to the network services, infection with malicious code, disclosure of
someone’s personal data and identity theft [41] [42] [43] were classified together as Malicious
Human Attacks (MA).

Downloading and installing third party applications to user (students and staff) devices while
disregarding security concerns [44], exposing the institutional data to security threats when
connecting to unsecured networks or browsing malicious WebPages [45], not installing third party
security software on devices [41] and forgetting guidelines set by policies or at times being
unaware of existing policies were classified together as Lack of User Security Knowledge
(LDSKU). Another institutions of learning biggest concerns their employees’ and students’ lack of
security awareness [45]. It sighted lack of security awareness amongst students and staff, lack of
skilled IT security staff within the institution have been classified together as lack of user security
knowledge.

Illegal access to information by Bluetooth access, free Wi-Fi access, and open hot spots access
was classified as wireless network attacks by the mobile devices (WIA).

According to [46], a security survey conducted by Google indicated that as many as 65% of
people reuse the same password for multiple or all accounts. Students and staff alike have a
tendency of sharing passwords, creating weak passwords, or reusing passwords across devices
or for a long time leaving the network they access vulnerable to intrusion and attacks. These
vulnerabilities were classified as “Poor Password Management” (PPMGT).

Poor System Configuration (PSYSCON) consisted of; unpatched security flaws in server
software, enabled or accessible administrative and debugging functions, administrative accounts
with default passwords, SSL certificates and encryption settings that are not properly configured
[47]. These vulnerabilities were realized from higher learning institutions that were inadequately
prepared to protect themselves due to the lack of competent information security experts.

Improper physical access controls into the institutions legacy system, improper maintenance
procedures or non-adherence to security identification procedures were grouped as Weak
Authentication Procedures (WA).

Learning institutions can reduce malware attacks through Keepings the devices operating system
and social network software’s up to date to ensure protection against most mobile security
threats. Choosing mobile security software from a trusted providers and keeping it up to date.
Installing firewall to provide with digital threats and to allow online privacy. Insisting on use of
passcode on phone to reduce chances of compromising information whenever loss or physical

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theft of a mobile device occurs. Downloading apps from official app stores that vet the apps they
sell employ mitigating feature(s) in BYOD devices such as on device encryption as well as
certificates and tokens. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and application containers separate user
applications and data from corporate ones, and device virtualization [48] [49] [50]. Strong
encryption could also mitigate wireless network attacks and data transmission vulnerabilities. Use
of Mobile Device Manager (MDM) and BYOD policy could minimize poor system configuration
while training all the users on BYOD policy security and password management is important for
user knowledge boosting.

To determine the effects on the mitigation solutions, a selected line of variables was scrutinized
after allocating them causal relationships and assigned as intervening variables, and their effects
hypothesized and tested. Table 3 summarizes the three categories of variables and their
respective measurable attributes as used in the study.

Item Model Measure Attributes Measurement


Construct Scale
Malware Threat Malicious Actors, Malicious Applications, Malwares,
Ordinal
Attacks (MTA)
Malicious Users / Attackers,
Break-in,
Physical access
Malicious Human Device Loss/theft
Ordinal
attacks (MA) Data loss/leakage through sharing, data breach,
media corruption Device malfunction
Improper decommissioning
Independent
variable
Device loss or
(threats) Ordinal
stolen
Lack of device
Security
IT Support, IT training Ordinal
knowledge
(LDSKU)
Bluetooth access,
Wireless Network
Free Wifi access, Ordinal
attacks (WIA)
Free Hot sports.

Independent No secure / strong passwords,


Poor Password
Variable Poor password management
Management Ordinal
(Vulnerabilities) Shared passwords,
(PPMGT)
weak or stolen passwords, reuse passwords
Data No encryption, Jailbroken or Rooted OS, Untrusted
Transmission Applications, open channels like Bluetooth, using
Ordinal
Vulnerabilities unsecured public wireless network, forget to apply
(IDT) security filters or policies
Jailbroken or rooted OS, Vulnerable Applications,
Poor System
Malicious Applications
Configuration Ordinal
Unpatched system & applications Super user or
(PSYSCON)
Admin Account Privileges
Weak
Improper Physical controls, Improper maintenance
Authentication
Procedures or Non Adherence to Procedures Ordinal
Protocol(WA)

Lack Of Device
security No proper compartmentalization, Admin Privilege
Ordinal
Knowledge of misuse. employees’ lack of security awareness,
user (LDSKU)
System flaws, programming errors , configuring
security settings, use of custom keyboard
System Flows Ordinal
extensions, Insecure inter-process communication
(IPC).

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Malware Attacks Unauthorized Modifications/ Access


Ordinal
(MA) Lack of Antivirus software or Firewalls.

TABLE 3: Measurable Attributes.

2.3 The Proposed Conceptual Model

FIGURE 1: Proposed Conceptual Model.

3. METHODOLOGY
The study was carried out in five (5) of the thirty-one (31) public chartered universities in Kenya,
selected by use of purposive sampling on the basis of year of establishment, information systems
infrastructure and the level of BYOD adoption. Mixed sampling technique (Purposive sampling to
choose participating learning institutions and simple random sampling to pick respondents in the
student, teaching, non-teaching and administration cadres, to ensure each member in the set has
equal chance of inclusion to guarantee representation of the sample; stratified sampling to select
participants based on cadres; ICT services staff, management staff, support staff, academic staff
and the students [50] [56] [57]).

A simplified formula by [58] for determination of sample size was used. The formula yielded a
sample size of 400 participants for the study. As [59] puts it, there is need to add 30% of the
sample to compensate for people who fail to fill the questionnaire or commit errors during the
filling which topped it up to 520 participants. This study involved different carders; the university
non-teaching staff, teaching staff and students. These variations prompted the researcher to add
further 30% more participants so that the outcome may be more reflective of the population as
cited by [59]. This settled for sample size of 699 (six hundred ninety-nine) distributed as indicated
in table 5.

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Carder Carder Sample size

University staff Lecturers 26


ICT staff 8
Administrative staff 46
Management 15
Students Students 604
Total 699

TABLE 5: Sample size on each Carder.

An online five point Likert scale questionnaire was distributed to participants who included
lecturers, non-teaching staff, management and students while interviews were conducted to
senior ICT officers to highlight on the readiness and impacts of BYOD adoption. Data was
analyzed using SPSS version 23 and NVIVO version 12 for quantitative and qualitative statistics
respectively while model validation was done using Path coefficient analysis (β) coefficient of
determination also called of R2 (R square), impact value f2 and the predictive relevance also
called q2 tests using SmartPLS version 3. To ensure credibility, triangulation, a method for cross-
checking data from the perspective of multiple research tools was performed on the outcome of
both qualitative and quantitative.

3.1 Measurement (Outer) Model Validation


Model validation was done at both construct and indicator level to establish the fitness of the
variables. Normality of data was tested by calculating the skewness and Kurtosis values using
SmartPLS which realized values of between greater than +1 and lesser than -1 indicating heavily
skewed data, hence, better for Partial Least Square-Structural Equation Modelling PLS-SEM)
other than the simple inferential statistics. Despite failing the normality test, the data passed the
multi-collinearity test which is an indicator of independence between the variables used in the
study.

Face validity for the research tools was done by subject experts who included; IT and information
security lecturers, supervisors and peers while a review of literature helped in ensuring content
validity. A successful discriminant validity matrix indicating the uniqueness of constructs was
done by running a PLS algorithm using SmartPLS software and values below 0.71 were
established as recommended by [60].

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3.2 Structural (inner) Model Validation

FIGURE 2: Threats and Vulnerabilities Path Diagram.

The inner model was validated using Path coefficient analysis (β) in figure 2 (shows significance
2
of the indicators), coefficient of determination also called of R (R square), impact of respective
2
exogenous variables to the endogenous variable of the model value f and the predictive
2
relevance also called q .

The path coefficients whose (values) range from 0-1 show the strength, direction and significance
of the independent variables to the dependent variable. A minimum of 0.1value is expected for
the path coefficients. Figure 2 shows the strengths of indicators in their respective constructs are
all above 0.1 a show of their strength. The higher the value of the indicator, the more it
contributed to the respective construct.
2
An R (square) model test was done using SPSS software and a value of 0.275 was realized,
meaning that the new model’s independent variables explain 27.5% of the dependent variable
which is a significant figure as supported by [60]. This means that apart from threats and

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vulnerabilities, there are other major factors that contribute to the insecurity of information
systems within an institution.
2
The effect size f , was calculated by running a PLS algorithm using SmartPLS while excluding a
single independent variable in each case. It was realized that threats have a weak effect size of
0.007 on the dependent variable compared to a high value of 0.21 of vulnerabilities. According to
2 2 2
[61], f ≥ 0.02, f ≥ 0.15, and f ≥ 0.35 represent small, medium, and large effect sizes,
respectively, meaning that compared to threats vulnerabilities of a system contributes more to
risks than threats.
2
The predictive power, q of the structural model was calculated by running a blindfolding
procedure in SmartPLS. The blindfolding procedure was conducted with a recommended
omission distance of 7. Positive values greater than zero (threats=0.036; vulnerabilities=0.160)
were realized indicating that the variables were well constructed and the predictive power was
achieved [60].

3.3. Moderating Variables Analysis


Ten moderating variables were identified in the conceptual framework (Member training (MT),
Data Encryption (DE), Software Updates (SU), Security Software (SS), Multiple Authentication
Management (MAM), Mobile Device Policy (MDP) and Mobile Device Management (MDM))
hypothesized and tested, however only two had a significant impact on the relationship between
the stated independent variable and the dependent variable. Data Encryption (DE) registered a
path coefficient (β) value of -0.099 with a p-value of 0.03 (<0.05) between Insecure Data Transfer
(IDT) and risk level while Software Updates (SU) had a path coefficient (β) value of 0.076 with a
p-value of 0.024(<0.05) having an impact between Malware Attacks (MA) and risk level. The
significant moderating variables were integrated into the model. Summarized in the table 6.

Moderator Path
Variable Causal path Coefficients T Statistics P
Hypothesis (β) (|O/STDEV|) Values
(DE) DE_IDT -> RISK PERCEPTION H1 -0.099 2.173 0.03
DE_WIA -> RISK PERCEPTION H2 0.007 0.189 0.85
(MAM) MAM_MA -> RISK PERCEPTION H3 -0.035 0.75 0.453
(MDM) MDM_MTA -> RISK PERCEPTION H4 0 0.002 0.999
MDM_PSYSCON -> RISK
H5 0.023 0.535 0.593
PERCEPTION
(MDP) MDP_PSYSCON -> RISK
H6 0.017 0.593 0.553
PERCEPTION
(MT) MT_LDSKU -> RISK PERCEPTION H7 0.017 0.48 0.632
MT_PPMGT -> RISK PERCEPTION H8 0.045 1.22 0.223
(SS) SS_MA -> RISK PERCEPTION H9 0.072 1.697 0.09
(SU) SU -> RISK PERCEPTION 0.036 0.825 0.41
SU_MA -> RISK PERCEPTION H10 0.076 2.259 0.024

TABLE 6: Moderating Variable Analysis.

4. THE FINAL BYOD RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL


The analysis of the causal relationships between the independent, moderating and the dependent
variables resulted into the formation of a new model in figure 3. It was realized that out of the ten
moderating variables, only two; Software Updates (SU) and Data Encryption (DE) had an effect
between Malicious Attacks (MA) and risk and Insecure Data Transfer (IDT) and risk respectively.

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Oonge S. Omboga, Muhambe T. Mukisa & Ratemo M. Cyprian

FIGURE 3: The BYOD Risk Assessment Model.

4.1 Model Calibration


The path coefficient weights (Figure 2) were used to get the decomposed variance for each
construct. The decomposed variance when summed together add up to 1 (one) which was then
used to award points that are used for calibration. The weights values in figure 2 are shown in
column 3 of table 6. This was done by taking the individual decomposed variance of a construct
divided by the total decomposed variance, multiplied by 100 and rounded to a whole number.
Threats as a predictor variable contributed less than system vulnerabilities to the dependent
variable, risk. From the analysis the dominant threats for BYOD environment were Insecure Data
Transfers (IDT) with 14 points, and major vulnerabilities were Malicious Human Threat attacks
(MTA) with 14 points also.

Predictor Constructs Weights Decompose Percentage Points Predictor


variable d variance contributio awarde variable
n (%) d contributio
n
Threats IDT 0.356 0.144 14.4 14 48
PPMGT 0.233 0.094 9.4 9
PSYSCON 0.311 0.126 12.6 13
WA 0.291 0.118 11.8 12
Vulnerabilities LDSKU 0.321 0.130 13.0 13 52
MA 0.289 0.117 11.7 12
MTA 0.353 0.143 14.3 14
WIA 0.315 0.128 12.8 13
Total 2.469 1.000 100 100 100

TABLE 7: Model calibration.

The calibration table assisted in assigning values to specific questions that were used in risk
assessment as shown in table 8.

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Oonge S. Omboga, Muhambe T. Mukisa & Ratemo M. Cyprian

4.3 Final BYOD Risk Assessment Model Calibration


Using the points awarded column in table 6, calibration for individual indicators was done. The
path diagram in figure 2 had weights for each indicator (question in the questionnaire). To get a
score for an individual question in the final model, total scores for the indicators in each construct
was done. Then a percentage of each indicator was sought which helped to realize the number of
points to be awarded from the assigned points column in table 8.

Factor R2 Assigne Indicators Max. Verdict options Item


d points score Score
Range
BYOD devices used to 5 Never allowed 5
carry university data and Rarely allowed 4
information around. Occasionally 3
Often allowed 2
Always allowed 1
BYOD users save 3 Never allowed 3
sensitive data on flash Occasionally allowed 2
IDT 0.144 14 drives Always allowed 1
BYOD users share 3 Never allowed 3
sensitive data on social Occasionally allowed 2
media always allowed 1
BYOD users access 3 Never allowed 3
Unsecured WIFI for data Occasionally allowed 2
transfer Allowed 1
No clear password policy 3 Policy exists 3
for access to university Draft exists 2
resources. Not available 1
Minimum character policy 2 Policy enforced 2
PPMG for Password Policy exists 1
0.094 9 enforcement
T Policy missing 0
Password complexity 4 Fully Enforced 4
enforcement Rarely enforced 3
Exists 2
Missing 1
BYOD access 1 Access config Done 1
configuration done Access config Not done 0
BYOD devices monitored 4 Always monitored 4
Often monitored 3
Rarely monitored 2
Not monitored 1
PSYSC Information access 4 Fully implemented 4
0.126 13
ON hierarchy implementation Partially implement 3
exists 2
Not implemented 1
Policy on Password 4 Fully Enforced 4
change Partial enforced 3
Exists 2
No policy 1
Policy on same profile 3 Fully enforced 3
concurrent access Partially enforced 2
Not enforced 1
Access to network 2 Not allowed 2
resources without Allowed 1
WA 0.118 12
configuration allowed
Some university 3 Not Possible 3
information resources Occasionally possible 2
accessed without a
password Always possible 1

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Oonge S. Omboga, Muhambe T. Mukisa & Ratemo M. Cyprian

Factor R2 Assigne Indicators Max. Verdict options Item


d points score Score
Range
Authentication policy 4 Fully enforced 4
Partially enforced 3
Exists 2
No policy exists 1
Users lax with security on 4 Never true 4
their BYOD devices Rarely true 3
Occasionally true 2
Always true 1
Users’ BYOD devices 4 Never true 4
left unattended Rarely true 3
LDSKU 0.130 13 Occasionally true 2
Always true 1
Technology awareness 2 Yes 2
done No 1
Threats and their 3 Very true 3
consequences made True 2
known to users Not true 1
Personal devices used to 4 Not true 4
steal organization data Rarely true 3
Occasionally true 2
Always true 1
Theft of BYOD devices 3 Never true 3
by insiders and/or Rarely happens 2
MA 0.117 12 outsiders common True 1
Virus injection to BYODs 5 Never true 5
common Rarely true 4
Occasionally true 3
Often true 2
Always true 1
Malicious software is a 5 Never true 5
challenge Rarely true 4
Occasionally true 3
Often true 2
Always true 1
BYOD Devices with 3 Not true 3
updated antivirus Occasionally true 2
software difficult to Always true 1
MTA 0.143 14 identify
BYOD Devices with 3 Not true 3
expired antivirus allowed Occasionally true 2
to connect
Always true 1
BYOD Devices connect 3 Not true 3
irrespective of their Occasionally true 2
antivirus software status
Always true 1
BYOD Users always 3 Not true 3
connecting to free WIFI Occasionally true 2
Always true 1
WIA 0.128 13 Users able to identify 2 Yes 2
rogue WIFI No 1
Bluetooth always 3 Always true 3
deactivated Occasionally true 2

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Factor R2 Assigne Indicators Max. Verdict options Item


d points score Score
Range
Never true 1
Hotspot establishment 5 Always controlled 5
Often controlled 4
Occasionally controlled 3
Rarely controlled 2
Never controlled 1

TABLE 8: Calibration Table.

4.3 Testing The Proposed BYOD Risk Assessment Model


The proposed BYOD risk management model (Figure 3) was tested in order to establish an
optimal approach to addressing the BYOD related risks. The elements of this model were used
for posing the interview questions to the institutions ICT administrators. This was implemented by
using the calibrated BYOD risk assessment model as developed in table 8. Lower final scores
indicate higher risks, middle scores indicate medium risks while higher scores represent secure
BYOD environments.

4.4 Model Capabilities and Limitations


In terms of its practical application, the BYOD risk assessment model is useful for conducting
case studies and also in-house evaluations (i.e. internal revisions). The management and security
experts of an institution are responsible for taking decisions that contribute to the institution’s
development, where the presented approach may be of great assistance. Since the model is
simple to understand, security managers can use it as a tool to obtain information and adopt
rational decisions. At the operational level, the model is useful for IT staff drafting plans and
identifying critical security areas since its application allows them to obtain answers to questions
that cannot be answered by conducting isolated technical or economic analyses. Such questions
may, for instance, include the following: How efficient is the institution security? Is it efficient
enough? How does it compare to other institutions? If there is a need for more reliable results, the
model can be used in combination with other decision-making models (e.g. for establishing
whether a certain measure recommended as a solution by the mode will, in fact, pay off). If an
institution using the model finds that it is necessary to implement a new measure or improve the
existing one, it can, for example, hereinafter use more complex performance-based earned value
technique to measure technical performance for achieving planned functionality.

The main limitation of the model emanates from the development process, majorly from using a
relatively small sample. The target group included experts, who are dealing with the management
of information security professionally and on a daily basis. Since the development of risk
assessment model relied on measuring the importance of a vast quantity of variables, the sample
should have been larger in order to meet general and formal statistical requirements. When
considering the fact that the levels of professional public participation in research studies related
to information security is very low and that it is almost impossible to compile a list of the entire
population of experts, it was decided that an interactive group assessment of criteria is sufficient
for setting the foundations of the model. However, any additional use of the model for market or
scientific research would most certainly require a larger sample.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


In conclusion, this study has established that the adoption of the BYOD phenomenon does not
come free of challenges and there is no single solution for all the security challenges or universal
remedy for solving all the risks and concerns related to BYOD. It is therefore imperative to
introduce appropriate BYOD (e.g. security) and other specifically tailored institutional policies
(e.g. employee, privacy) which can increase not only overall BYOD security but also the
satisfaction and privacy of employees, thereby minimizing the overall risk for the organization. It is
also a sound idea to assess the institutions systems from time to time in order to create a starting

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point where the institution needs to focus their attention, and can quickly set an actionable plan to
help improve security measures, and ultimately improve security posture within. In-depth
information security risk assessments can give scoring metrics for the different areas of security
providing the institution with a numeric baseline indicating the severity of the risk not only to help
in making improvements, but also provides the ability for everyone in the institution to speak the
same language about security. The assessments will provide the necessary recommendations to
make immediate improvements to the score, and the overall security posture.

This study recommends automation of this model using suitable programming languages to
enable the model to be readily available, easy to update, maintain and distribute to other
organizations. The model should also include optimal mitigation strategies to help control the
security loopholes found during assessment. The risk mitigation strategies proposed should be
easy and flexible to implement for organizations that have limited budgets. Having in mind the
limited sample size in this research, it is suggested that further studies are performed using a
larger sample from different organizations in order to increase the generalizability of the BYOD
model.

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