Article 4.

 Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Article 116. Misprision of treason. - Every person owing allegiance to (the United States) the Government of the Philippine
Islands, without being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, conceals or does not disclose and
make known the same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which
he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason.

Article 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon public officers or employees who have failed to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power, or shall continue
to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office under them.
(Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).

Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and
suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall
maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of
offenses.

Article 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. - Any public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his
custody or charge, shall be punished:

1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary special disqualification in its maximum
period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.

2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have
been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.

Article 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon any person who, having been elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without legal
motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.

Article 275. Abandonment of person in danger and abandonment of one's own victim. - The penalty of arresto mayor shall be
imposed upon:

1. Any one who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall find in an uninhabited place wounded or in
danger of dying, when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute
a more serious offense.

2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured.

3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of age, shall fail to deliver said child to the
authorities or to his family, or shall fail to take him to a safe place.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 953

REQUIRING THE PLANTING OF TREES IN CERTAIN PLACES AND PENALIZING UNAUTHORIZED CUTTING,
DESTRUCTION, DAMAGING AND INJURING OF CERTAIN TREES, PLANTS AND VEGETATION

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1153

REQUIRING THE PLANTING OF ONE TREE EVERY MONTH FOR FIVE CONSECUTIVE YEARS BY EVERY CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES
People of the Philippines vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza

G.R. No. 35748 (56 PHIL 353) December 14, 1931

Ponente: J. Villa-Real

Facts:

Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre were charged of the crime of arson where the former was a principal by direct participation and
the latter being an accomplice.

Martin Atienza, a married man, cohabited with Romana Silvestre, a married woman. Romana Silvestre was the 2 nd wife of Domingo
Joaquin, who filed a sworn complaint of adultery against Silvestre and Atienza. They were then arrested but were able to bail by giving
a bond of P6,000 each. They begged the municipal president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe, to urge Domingo Joaquin to
withdraw the complaint and they promised not to live again in the barrio of Masocol and stop their cohabitation. They were allowed
after signing a promise. Domingo Joaquin acceded to it causing the dismissal of the adultery case and cancellation of the bonds.

Romana Silvestre went to her son, Nicolas de la Cruz, by her former marriage under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves.
Said son was living in the same barrio. Romana Silvestre lived in the home of her son and continued to cohabit with Martin Atienza.
During supper of the night of November 25, 1930, Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife Antonia de la Cruz were told by Martin Atienza, who
was armed by a pistol, to take their furniture out of the house because he would set fire on it because it was the only way he could
revenge upon the people of Masocol on the adultery charge on them. The couple left and asked the help of lieutenant Buenaventura
Aria. They latter heard cries of “Fire!” and such destroyed 48 houses. Three other residents saw Martin Atienza going away from the
house with Romana Silvestre.

An accomplice, as defined by Art 14 of the Penal Code, as one who does not take direct part in the commission of an act, nor force nor
induce another to commit such act, nor cooperates in the commission of the act but cooperates by previous or simultaneous action.
Romana Silvestre’s silence and passive presence were taken into consideration to convict her as an accomplice to the crime of arson.

Issue:

Whether or not Romana Silvestre was guilty of the crime of arson as an accomplice?

Ruling:

Romana Silvestre was acquitted. The Court held that a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice, encouragement,
or agreement, or material, through external acts, is required to consider one as an accomplice to the crime. In the case of Romana
Silvestre, her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts do not constitute cooperation and as for her failure to give
the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice. Also, there was no evidence of an agreement or
conspiracy.

Martin Atienza was convicted of the crime of arson in the most serious degree and Romana Silvestre was acquitted.

People vs. Talingdan (Crim1)

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa
Domogma, accused-appellants

En Banc

Per Curiam, July 6, 1978

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:
 Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag
 No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution
 They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra
 Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted her family home a couple of
times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her
 On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and
during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to go down the house and leave them
 Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa
 About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than
3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time
 Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa
several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police
 Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; Bernardo
ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill him
 On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house
 The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations
Corazon's version:
 Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa meeting with Talingdan and their co-
appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo
 She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"
 When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him"
 Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go down the house to go to the yard
where she again met with the other appellants.
 She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.
 Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room.
 Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid
no attention
 Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door
 He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan
 The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at
him again
 Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for helo, Bides warned her that he will kill her if
she calls for help
 Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers, the former threatened to kill the
latter if she reveals the matter to anyone
The defendants'' version:
 Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her.
 Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan; an illicit relationship never existed
between them
 Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the Mayor in Bangued from June 22 to June
26
 Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan, 250-300 meters from the place of
the killing
Issue:
 Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder
 It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspuracy to kill her husband because
there is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death
 It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof on her part, which it is
argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator
Holding:
 Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.
Ratio:
 Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony.
 It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she cannot have the same
liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped directly in the planning and
preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object.
 There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed.
 She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to have no suspects in mind
when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate
 Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding the conspiracy, after Bernardo was
killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants
 These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"

Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.

People vs. Puno (Crim1)

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry,"
accused-appellants

En Banc

Regalado, February 17, 1993

Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts:
 January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's
husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in
Araneta Ave, QC
 He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his
place
 When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with
Isabelo driving
 After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car
beside the driver
 Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her
 Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
 But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
 The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000
 Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
 Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
Pampanga
 According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and was able to
flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she
jumped out of the car
 The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at
North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car
 He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride
 He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway
Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
1. No.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
 For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty
 In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders
 This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for
robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the
Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)
 PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
 The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway does
not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
 This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10
years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)

EN BANC
G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias BONG (At Large),
ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD DELIM alias BONG, accused-appellants.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,[1] dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City,
finding accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing
them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The court also ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums
of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias Bong and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder
under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of
cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son
of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[2]
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel remain
at-large.
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts [3]
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim,
was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modestos
wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered
Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to
visit Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their supper in their home. Joining them
were Modesto and Ritas two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald
suddenly barged into the house and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto
while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.[4] Marlon, Robert
and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the
intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and
ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January
24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Nio, at Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the incident
the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto.Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy
opted to first look for his father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from Modestos house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his
relatives returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999,
Randy reported the incident to the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and
Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He
was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on
the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modestos cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen rushed to the
scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.[5] Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the
names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto.Rita and Randy
were at a loss why the five malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police
investigators.[6] Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their respective
houses. The police officers scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which reads:
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD.[7]
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police investigators were able to confirm that
Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their firearms.[8]
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had pending cases for robbery in the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with
the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[9]
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.[10]
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their house at Asan Norte,
Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modestos house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He theorized that Rita and Randy
falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte where he had been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a
hollow-block factory in that city where he was a stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leons alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his hometown in Pangasinan during his
employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She
claimed that the distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay
Certificate to prove that he was a resident of Laoag City from January 1998 up to February 1999.[11]
 Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived
with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon
denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon
Delim (for) the commission of Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner
as provided for by law; the Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of
P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus
fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation.

US v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, 19 March 1910, 15 Phil. 488

Topics: Elements of Criminal Liability; Mental Element; Deliberate Intent (Dolo); Mistake of Fact

Petitioner: The United States

Respondent: Ah Chong

Facts

Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in the same place and usually slept in
the same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by some one trying to open the door, and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He received no answer, and fearing that the intruder was a robber, leaped from the bed
and again called out: "If you enter the room I will kill you." At that moment he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the
intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon he called to his employers and rushed back into the room to secure
bandages to bind up the wound.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which
took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these
repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have been on friendly and amicable terms prior to
the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his
companion with his identity.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide,
with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed
by law.

While there can be no doubt of defendant's exemption from liability if the intruder had really been a robber, the question
presented is whether, in this jurisdiction, a person can be held criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of f acts,
he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he
had known the true state of facts at the time.

Issue

Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does
an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which
would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act?

Held
No. There is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due
to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus
furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in
those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

“4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.”

Under these provisions there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal
liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in
fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would
doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he
persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of
escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using
any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief
to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the
wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

Spanish jurist Pacheco: A voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; the word "voluntary"
implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in
the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary."

The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various
crimes and misdemeanors.

Legal maxims.:
· Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so”;
· Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;"

Moral science and moral sentiment: no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright
mind, destitute of every form of evil.

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no
man"), However Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a
sufficient excuse"). Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; The guilt of the accused must depend
on the circumstances as they appear to him.

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the
property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would
have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty
of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted
by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and
the property under his charge.

Ruling

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de
oficio.

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People V. Oanis

1943
People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.

Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances

FACTS:
 Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly
called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
 The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector.
 Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door where they were, simkultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded,
and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by
the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the
notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson,
Irene's paramour.
 According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter
asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES.
 ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
 appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
 "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
 a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence
in making an arrest
 The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
 According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
Labels: 1943, Case Digest, crim law 1, G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, mitigating circumstances, People
v. Oanis

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 | 2001-11-19

Subject: Void for Vagueness Doctrine; The Plunder Law does not suffer from the constitutional defect of
vagueness; Overbreadth doctrine; Facial challenge applies only to free speech cases, does not apply to penal
statutes; Section 4 of the Plunder Law, being a mere procedural measure, does not give rise to substantive
rights; Plunder is malum in se

Facts:

Former President Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law), as amended by RA 7659. He
challenges the law as unconstitutional for (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it violates the right of
due process of the accused as it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
(c) by defining Plunder as 'malum prohibitum', it abolishes the element of mens rea incrimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code.

Estrada also points to the failure of the law to providefor the statutory definition of the terms "combination"
and"series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt orcriminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2, and the word"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions supposedly render the Plunder Law unconstitutional
for being impermissibly vague and overbroad.

Held:

Void for Vagueness Doctrine

1. The void-for-vagueness doctrine statesthat "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
interms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at itsmeaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of dueprocess of law." It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislationthat is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

2.  A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standardsthat men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning anddiffer in its application. In such instance, the statute isrepugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects:
 

i.  it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and,

ii. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion incarrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.

3.  But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous
yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.

4.  As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide
the judge in itsapplication; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.

The Plunder Law does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness

5.  It contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation-- what the Plunder Law punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in
Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

6.  A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them.

7.    Words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinaryacceptation and signification, unless it is evident
that the legislatureintended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.

8. When the Plunder Law speaks of 'combination,' it is referring to at least 2 acts falling
under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1(d)

9.    To constitute a 'series' there must be 2 or more overt or criminal actsfalling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1(d)

Overbreadth Doctrine

10.  The overbreadth doctrine decrees that"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

 
Facial challenge applies only to free speech cases, does not apply to penal statutes

11.  A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.

12.  The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be
invoked when what is involved is a penal or criminal statute.

Section 4 of the Plunder Law, being a mere procedural measure, does not give rise to substantive
rights

13.  The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of thecrime suffers from a
dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable
doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in
the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass,accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that theaccused is charged
in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty(50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution
need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) ofthe raids
beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.

14.  Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the
accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. Even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder
may be had. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated, it may simply be
severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all,
the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough .

Plunder is malum in se

15.  Plunderis a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.

a.     The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the RPC toprosecutions under the Anti-
Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens reais an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender isdetermined by his criminal intent.

b.    The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in
se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter thatsuch acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case ofplunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se.

THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
 
ABAD, J.:
 
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering from
malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconstruction  projects affecting the homes of victims of calamities.
 
The Facts and Case
 
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public property (technical malversation) Under Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code.1
 
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, operated a
Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with
which to rebuild their homes.  The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction.
 
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio  Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70% done,
the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families. This
worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the
loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she  sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an
officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality's Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP)  that rationed food
to malnourished children.  Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its
storeroom.  And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given
to the CSAP beneficiaries.
 
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval.
After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks
of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2  Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio,
however, to consult the accounting department regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises,
the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant's Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it
was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to
its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per
auditing rules. 
 
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present
complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP
goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte's malnourished children. She also pointed out that the
Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the distribution of SFP
goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the
CSAP beneficiaries.
 
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor of the
municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims
good faith, believing that the municipality's poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food.
Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of
their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its transactions.
 
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical
malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him
P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a
pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.  On May 12, 2010 the
Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro's motion for reconsideration.  On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed the
Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.   
 
The Questions Presented
 
In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan's finding that he committed technical malversation. He
particularly raises the following questions: 
 
1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different from their
originally intended purpose; 
 
2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that could be used to
augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality; 
 
3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him; and  
 
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation. 
 
The Court's Rulings 
 
One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code4 has three
elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property
under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were
applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.5 Ysidoro
claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and
two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific
purpose.
 
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133
appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.6  This appropriation was based on the executive budget
7 which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of
Social Services8 which covers the CSAP housing projects.9  The creation of the two items shows
the Sanggunian's intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.
 
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP's
needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs.  The
target clientele of the SFP according to its manual10 are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-
school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total monthly income
is P3,675.00 and below.11  This rule provides assurance that the SFP would cater only to the malnourished
among its people who are in urgent need of the government's limited resources.
 
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing free labor
for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the
construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither
could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries. 
 
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that, therefore, the
same could already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People12 which states
that funds classified as savings are not  considered appropriated by law or ordinance and can be used for other
public purposes.  The Court cannot accept Ysidoro's argument.
 
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran throughout the
year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project, leaving funds
or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already distributed the food items needed by the
SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its
storeroom constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to predict to the
last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods were no longer needed for the remainder of
the year was quite premature.
 
In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to  validly apply funds,
already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose.  Thus: 
 
SEC. 336.  Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. - Funds shall be available exclusively for the specific
purpose for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be  passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations from one item to another. However, the local chief executive or the presiding officer of the
sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget
for their respective offices from savings in other items within the same expense class of their respective
appropriations.
 
The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law gives the
Sanggunian the power to determine whether savings have accrued and to  authorize the augmentation of
other items on the budget with those savings. 
 
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of the subject
goods, such finding should be respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to present
the municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony would have been adverse if produced.
Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule on the presumption of innocence and the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions.
 
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor testified, his
testimony would have been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditor's view regarding the transaction is
not conclusive to the case and will not necessarily negate the mayor's liability if it happened to be favorable to
him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into speculations regarding what the municipal auditor would have
said had he appeared and testified.
 
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the CSAP
beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he
argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.
 
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense
is  mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense
because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.13
It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated.  Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.14 
 
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro's act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of
technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a
mere fine.
 
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in  its entirety the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in  Criminal
Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.
 
SO ORDERED.

Dungo and Sibal Jr. vs. People (2015)

G.R. No. 209464 | 2015-07-01

Subject: Remedy of accused sentenced to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by the Court of Appeals;
Anti-Hazing Law in the Philippines; mala in se vs. mala prohibita; Hazing under RA 8049 is malum
prohibitum; Elements of hazing; Initiation rites; Liability under hazing law; Defense and mitigating
circumstance not available; Recourse of offended party; The Information properly charged the offense proved;
Conspiracy of the offenders was duly proven; Section 4 creates a disputable presumption of actual
participation; Guilt of the petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt thru circumstantial evidence; Denial
and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by witnesses

Facts:

Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal, Jr. (petitioners) were charged in an Information for violation of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law of 1995), for having caused the injury resulting to death of Marlon Villanueva
during an initiation rite. The petitioners were officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity. When
arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The Information was later amended to state “during a planned initiation rite”

As established during the trial, when Marlon Villanueva was brought to the emergency room of JP Rizal
Hospital, Dr. Masilungan, the attending physician, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and
had no heartbeat. He did not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. When Dr. Masilungan
questioned the two (2) men that brought Villanueva to the hospital, they claimed that they found Villanueva
lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City.

In his medico-legal report, Dr. Masilungan opined that due to the nature, extent and location of the injuries,
Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing injuries because he had undergone hazing
himself when he was a student and also because of his experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.

Dr. Camarillo, PNP medico-legal officer, reported that during the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks
from the cadaver with the marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fratemity.

Susan Ignacio was the owner of the sari-sari store located in front of Villa Novaliches Resort. On the evening of
January 13, 2006, she saw a jeepney with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort.

Donato Magat, a tricycle driver, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he
was told that someone inside the resort needed a ride. He saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another
man, who looked very weak, like a vegetable, towards his tricycle. When asked, the companions replied that he
had too much to drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital.

Abelardo Natividad, the security guard on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, identified Sibal and Dungo as the two
persons who brought Villanueva to the hospital.

The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated
to bodily assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final
initiation rites.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. MR was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "unlawfully and
feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla." Yet, both the RTC and the
CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049 because they "induced the victim to be present" during the
initiation rites. The crime of hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by
actual participation. Thus, the petitioners contend that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against them has been violated.

Held:

Remedy of accused sentenced to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by the Court of Appeals

1.  When the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may:

(a) file a notice of appeal under Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to avail of
an appeal as a matter of right before the Supreme Court and open the entire case for review on question of
fact and/or law; or

(b) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and
raise only questions of law.

2.  The petitioners opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently,
they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their
reply, which is a question of fact that would require an examination of the evidence presented. In the interest
of justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole
case for review.

US laws and jurisprudence

3.  It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of hazing were transported by the
Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. Thus, a study of the laws and jurisprudence of the United
States (US) on hazing can enlighten the court.

4.  Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally abusing

newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation.

5.  Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence, acts of
humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts. The physical form of hazing may include beating,
branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing have included simulated sex
acts, sodomy and forced kissing.[44] Moreover, hazing does not only result in physical injuries and
hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and traumatic stress.

6.  In the US, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of
hazing even if they have the consent of the victim.

Anti-Hazing Law in the Philippines

7.  R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other forms of
initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations.

(a) mala in se vs. mala prohibita

8.  Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which
would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. The rule on the
subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law
been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is
prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime
itself.

9.  A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while
all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. However, there may be mala in se crimes under
special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080; and there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC,
such as technical malversation.

9.  The approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the
inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then
it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its
commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita.

(b) Hazing under RA 8049 is malum prohibitum

10.  The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show that
the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be malum prohibitum. Under the law, there is no necessity
to prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of
the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility
and say, "We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites.“

11.  The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy
and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also,
the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.

(c) Elements of hazing

12.  From the definition in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:

(i) That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization;
(ii) That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and
(iii) That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as
forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him
to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

(d) Initiation rites

13.  There must be an initiation rite or practice performed by the fraternities, sororities or organization. The
law, however, did not limit the definition of these groups to those formed within academic colleges and
universities. In fact, the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include
any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Military
Academy (PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. Even
the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a
requirement for employment are covered by the law.

14.  R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular
members of the AFP and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police
Commission, duly recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director General of the PNP, shall not
be considered as hazing.

15.  And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited  by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that initiation rites
of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the following requisites are met:

(i) That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school authorities or head of
organization;
(ii) The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation;
(iii) That the written notice shall indicate:

a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;
b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and
c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites.

16.  Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the school or organization or their
representatives that they must assign at least two (2) representatives, as the case may be, to be present
during these valid initiations. The duty of such representative is to see to it that no physical harm of any kind
shall be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.

17.  Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or organizations that
fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and organization administrators do not
have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.

(e) Liability under hazing law

18.  Section 4 of the law provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices.

Liable as Principals

19.  The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to hazing
or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members
of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall
be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
actual participation, unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.

20.  The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group,
fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing. Although these planners were not present when the
acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals. The provision took in
consideration the non-resident members of the organization, such as their former officers or alumni.

21.  The third class of principals would be officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority
who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat. These
officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct participation in the infliction of harm, but due to
their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing.

22.  The fourth class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when the
acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from occurring.
The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but also his failure to prevent
the same.

23.  The fifth class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or
organization. The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members. The parents must
have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to take any action to avoid
the same from occurring.

Liable as Accomplices

24.  The school authorities, including faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual
knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as
accomplices.

25.  Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an accomplice to the
crime. The owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein
and he failed to take any steps to stop the same.

(f) Defense and mitigating circumstance not available

26.  Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged with
the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so
grave a wrong. Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense in
hazing.

(g) Recourse of offended party

27.  The offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different courses of action. It provides that the
responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training organization, may impose
the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged under this provision even before
their conviction. Necessarily, the offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal actions  against
the offenders.
The Information properly charged the offense proved

28.  Petitioners claim that the amended information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual participation,
but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement.

29.  The Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to
know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly.

30.  The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the (amended) information
included the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood to
have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the perpetrators had different roles
therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of the roles of the petitioners in the hazing
activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be present at
the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which
eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts
of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present.

31.  Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing. To require the prosecutor to
indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case, when
details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The law
does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).

32.  The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of hazing, the
offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity, which has been satisfied in
the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently informed the petitioners that they were
being criminally charged for their roles in the planned initiation rite.

Conspiracy of the offenders was duly proven

33.  A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony.
The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime
itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the
criminal plan.

34.  In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime,
usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of
some complete whole. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
intended.

35.  The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove
conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

(a) Section 4 creates a disputable presumption of actual participation

36.  R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption of actual
participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the
presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he
prevented the commission of the punishable acts.

37.  The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA 8049 before the CA, but did not
succeed. A finding of prima facie evidence does not shatter the presumptive innocence the accused enjoys
because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still to be proved;  the trial court cannot depend
alone on such evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may
adduce.
38.  Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders are not
new. For example:

(i) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug;
(ii) the dishonor of the check for insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit;
(iii) the possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence
of fencing

(b) Conspiracy was proven

39.  The presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the
testimony of Ignacio. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of their actual participation in the hazing of
Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut and overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution
by proving that they prevented the commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.

40.  Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that they
performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce the victim
to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it based on the prima facie evidence.
These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.

41.  Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven
by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of
the acts therein.

Guilt of the petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt thru circumstantial evidence

42.  Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also
established by circumstantial evidence.

43.  In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden. Bearing in mind the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and proper for
the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it.

44.  To sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence  require the existence of the
following requisites:

(i) there are more than one circumstance;

(ii) the inference must be based on proven facts; and
(iii) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.

45.  To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to
leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence requires that the
circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.

46.  The Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
was overwhelming enough to establish the guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. They took part in
the hazing and, together with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical injuries to
Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually took a toll on the
body of the victim, which led to his death. With the fact of hazing, the identity of the petitioners, and their
participation therein duly proven, the moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has
been satisfied.

Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by witnesses

47.  Dungo and Sibal presented the defense of denial and alibi. These defenses, however, must fail. Denial and
alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate. As properly held by the
RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the petitioners by
prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio.

48.  The testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked credibility and reliability. The corroboration of
defense witness Rivera was suspect because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and
emotional that she would stand by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity
brothers, likewise, do not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case.
Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and disinterested witnesses to substantiate their
defenses of denial and alibi.

Garcia vs. Court of Appeals (2006)

G.R. No. 157171 | 2006-03-14

Subject: 

Mala in se vs. Mala prohibita; Acts prohibited under Sec. 27 (b) of R.A. 6646 are crimes mala in se; Criminal
Intent is presumed when a Person Performs Unlawful Acts Extraordinary diligence required in canvassing
election results

Facts:

Arsenia B. Garcia, a chairman of the board of canvassers in Alaminos, Pangasinan, was charged and convicted
before the RTC for decreasing the number of votes cast in favor of Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. during the 1995
senatorial elections, a violation of Sec. 27 (b) of R.A. 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law. It was alleged that the
grand total of Sen. Pimentel Jr.’s votes were reduced to 1,921 instead of 6,921 or 5,000 votes less than the
actual number of votes received.

Garcia appealed the same to the CA which affirmed the lower court’s decision. It likewise denied her motion for
reconsideration, thus an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Garcia admitted during trial that she was the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently
entered by the secretary of the board of canvassers. She also admitted that she was the one who prepared the
Certificate of Canvass (COC), though it was not her duty. Despite this, she claims that there was no motive on
her part to reduce the votes of Senator Pimentel, Jr.

The respondent court on the other hand contends that acts prohibited under Sec. 27(b) of R.A. 6646 are crimes
mala in se, thus intent is taken into consideration. Given this, the act of preparing the COC even if it was not
her task manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous COC entry. It was further contended that it was
her concern as the chairman of the board of canvassers to ensure the authentic entry of votes.

Held:

Mala in se vs. Mala Prohibita

1. Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.
Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise,
no crime is committed.

2. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but
become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether
the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of
public policy.

Acts prohibited under Sec. 27 (b) of R.A. 6646 are crimes mala in se

3. Acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to
overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a
limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the
law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.

4. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently
immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

5. The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under
Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is
already punishable under the said provision

Criminal Intent is presumed when a Person Performs Unlawful Acts

6. Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden
of proving its existence.

7. Garcia’s acts showed that there was intent on her part to decrease the number of votes. Preparing the COC
even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.

Extraordinary diligence required in canvassing election results

8. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of
canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting
statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose
entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
Kummer vs. People (2013)
G.R. No. 174461 | 2013-09-11

Subject: Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not affect
their credibility; It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge who heard
the case; Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness; There is no
absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form of human behavior; Public documents are admissible in court
without further proof of their due execution and authenticity; Presumption of regularity; Paraffin test, positive
finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that subject indeed fired a gun, only corroborative
evidence; Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required

Facts:

On June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the
house of the petitioner Leticia Kummer. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by
saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."

Kummer opened the door and at this point, her minor son, Johan Kummer, using his left hand, shot Mallo twice
using a gun about six inches long. Malana immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When Malana
turned his back, he saw petitioner Leticia leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and
causing him to fall flat on the ground.

Leticia went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with her son, she saw where Mallo was
lying flat and uttered, “Johan, patay na,” in a loud voice. They held Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about three
(3) to four (4) meters away from the house.

The prosecution filed an information for homicide against Leticia and Johan. Both pleaded not guilty. Leticia
claimed that she and her children, Johan, Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the evening of June 19,
1988. She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun report,
and the banging at their door. Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s Army
prevalent in their area, Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people
causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass;
another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door
and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.
`
The RTC found both the Leticia and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Johan, still
a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the recognizance of his father. Only Leticia
appealed the RTC judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the conviction. The CA found Malana
and Cuntapay’s positive identification and the corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution more than
sufficient to convict. It likewise held that the discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct
testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and
reconcilable. Hence, the present petition.

Held:

Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not affect
their credibility

1.  The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on
one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral
matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the
commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses, as these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove
that their testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities,
unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or recall.

2.  Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan
shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the oversight of the administering
official in typing the exact details of their narration.
3.  Affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its
seeming contradiction with the declarant’s testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard
questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly
descriptive of the series of events as the affiant knows them. Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may
sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant’s mouth, thus allowing the whole statement to be taken out
of context.

4.  As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court.

5.  It has been held that the claim that “whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court facts which he
failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists between the testimony and
the affidavit” is  erroneous. If what were stated in open court are but details or additional facts that serve to
supplement the declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be ruled out as inconsistent and
may be considered by the court.

It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge who heard the
case

6.  The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because the judge who
heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of
a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can
merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision.

7.  Thus, the contention - that since Judge Abella-Aquino was not the one who heard the evidence and thereby
did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses - must fail. It is sufficient that the
judge, in deciding the case, must base her ruling completely on the records before her, in the way that
appellate courts do when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. Thus, a judgment of conviction
penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records available to her.

Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness

8.  Motive gains importance only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases,
the prosecution does not need to prove the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the
author of the crime

9.  In light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the crime by
not one but two prosecution eyewitnesses, the failure to cite the motive of the petitioner is of no moment. It is
a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent reason at all, and that friendship
or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime.

There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form of human behavior

10.  Human nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given situation.
Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity and conformity in action and
reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm, react differently and act contrary to the expectation of
mankind. There is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange,
startling or frightful experience.

11.  The CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged by the petitioner who, in her present
plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize every detail that can favor her case. Unfortunately, if at all,
her claims refer only to minor and even inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.

Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and
authenticity

12.  The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public
document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its
due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify,
describe and testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

13.  In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in
court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on
the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication does not apply to
public documents. In other words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify
and authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima
facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan
and on the right hand of the petitioner. Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is admissible as
evidence.

Presumption of regularity

14.  On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the paraffin test, suffice it
to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted the
report observed the regular procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence
in the performance of one’s duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion. The presumption of
regularity in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the petitioner’s contention that an explanation
has to be given on how the actual process was conducted. Since the petitioner presented no evidence of
fabrication or irregularity, we presume that the standard operating procedure has been observed.

Paraffin test, positive finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that subject indeed
fired a gun, only corroborative evidence

15.  While the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired
a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses’ testimony that the
petitioner shot the victim. Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may
leave traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be washed off with tap water,
unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.

Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no re-arraignment is required

16.  Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades thenature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused [would] not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.”

17.  A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more
formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed
amendment would not alter the nature of the offense. (see People vs. Joaquin Borromeo)

18.  The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is (i) when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, (ii) when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, and (iii) when any evidence the accused might have would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended.

19.  It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was
committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. The act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the
information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of
homicide.
20.  Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason
for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be
possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him.

21.  The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This
however pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do
not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the
theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect
the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.

22.  An amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call for a second
plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned
the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused
simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.

23.  The amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one
month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change
in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment  - it does not change the nature
of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the
new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available
after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true
with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature
and did not need a second plea.

Topic: ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (WARRANTLESS SEARCHES - Valid Waiver)

Title: PEOPLE vs ASIS

Reference: GR No. 142531 October 15, 2002

FACTS

Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an Information; the information stating "That on or
about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence
upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts
of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; 1 wristwatch' 1 gold
necklace; and undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY
CHING against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine
Currency, and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death." When
arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by
an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the
crime committed, strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted to link both accused to the crime.

After due trial, both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. RTC of Manila held that the "crime charged and proved
is robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the RPC," ruled that "although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery
were presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved
that the two (2) committed the crime," and appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and
treachery and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death.

Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do not question the legality of their arrest, as they
made no objection thereto before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly
recovered from the bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal
and taints them

as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that
contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a
warrant.

ISSUES
 Whether or not Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of the bloodstained pair of short, in his possession
during the warrantless search?

RULINGS

NO. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present case,
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Formento,
together with his wife and mother, was present.

Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since he was physically present, the
waiver could not have come from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was
not present when the search was made.

Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein,
Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at
that moment. There was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law," becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a
deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a
warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence
seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives
room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It
must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves
acquittal.

JESUS TRINIDAD Y BERSAMIN, PETITIONER, V. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 239957 | 2019-02-18

DECISION
 

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Jesus Trinidad y Bersamin (Trinidad)
assailing the Decision[2] dated January 25, 2018 and the Resolution[3] dated May 31, 2018 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39598, which affirmed the Decision [4] dated November 7, 2016 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 155678 and 155679 finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition under Section 28 (a) in relation
to Section 28 (e) (1), Article V of Republic Act No. (RA) 10591. [5]
 

The Facts
 

On December 12, 2014, an Information[6] was filed before the RTC charging Trinidad with violation of RA 10591,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
 

On or about November 14, 2014, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
being then a private person, without any lawful authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in [his] possession and under [his] custody and control one (1) unit [c]aliber .38 revolver
marked Smith & Wesson with serial number 833268 with markings "RJN", a small arm, loaded with six (6)
pieces live ammunitions of caliber .38 with markings "1RN, 2RN, 3RN, 4RN, 5RN and 6RN", without first
securing the necessary license or permit from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National
Police, in violation of the above-entitled law.
 
Contrary to law.[7]
 

The prosecution alleged that at around 8:30 in the evening of November 14, 2014, members from the
Philippine National Police (PNP)-Pasig Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation, with Police Officer (PO) 1
Randy S. Sanoy (PO1 Sanoy) as the poseur buyer and PO1 Rodrigo J. Nidoy, Jr. (PO1 Nidoy) as the back-up
arresting officer, to apprehend a certain "Jessie" who, purportedly, was involved in illegal drug activities at
Aurelia St., Barangay Bagong Hog, Pasig City. [8] After the alleged sale had been consummated, PO1 Nidoy
arrested Trinidad, frisked him, and recovered from the latter a 0.38 caliber revolver loaded with six (6) live
ammunitions tucked at his back, as well as a 0.22 caliber rifle loaded with seven (7) live ammunitions and two
(2) magazines (subject firearms and ammunition) which were found beside the gate of his house. [9] When asked
if he has any documentation for the same, Trinidad claimed that they were merely pawned to him. After
marking the seized items, they proceeded to the nearby barangay hall and conducted inventory and
photography thereof, and then went to the police station where the request for ballistic examination was made.
[10]
 Finally, the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory, where, after examination, it was revealed that
"the firearms are serviceable and the ammunitions are live and serviceable." [11] During trial, Trinidad's counsel
agreed to the stipulation that Trinidad has no license to possess or carry firearms of any caliber at the time of
his arrest.[12]
 

For his part, Trinidad denied the accusations against him, claiming, among others, that aside from the present
case, he was also charged with the crime of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs, which arose from
the same incident, but was, however, acquitted [13] therein for, inter alia, failure of the prosecution to prove
that Trinidad was validly arrested thru a legitimate buy-bust operation. He then formally offered in
evidence the said acquittal ruling, which was objected by the public prosecutor for being immaterial and
irrelevant to the present case.[14] The RTC admitted said evidence only as part of Trinidad's testimony. [15]
 

The RTC Ruling

 

In a Decision[16] dated November 7, 2016, the RTC found Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of violation of RA 10591, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of ten (10) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, as minimum, to eleven (11) years
and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count.[17]
 

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition, considering that: (a) PO1 Nidoy positively identified the firearms presented before
the court as the same firearms seized and recovered from Trinidad's possession; and (b) Trinidad admitted that
he is not a holder of any license or permit from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit. It gave credence to the
positive, clear, and categorical testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses rather than Trinidad's defenses of
denial and alibi.[18] It likewise held that Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs charges is immaterial to this case,
opining that the ground for his acquittal is neither unlawful arrest nor unlawful search and seizure, but the
procedural flaw in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. [19]
 

Aggrieved, Trinidad appealed[20] to the CA.

 

The CA Ruling
 

In a Decision[21] dated January 25, 2018, the CA affirmed Trinidad's conviction with modification, sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for
each count.[22] The CA ruled that the evidence for the prosecution convincingly established all the elements of
the crime charged as Trinidad: (a) was caught in possession and control of two (2) firearms, consisting of one
(1) .38 caliber[23] revolver loaded with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .22 caliber rifle loaded with seven
(7) live ammunitions, as well as two (2) magazines during the conduct of the buy-bust operation; and (b) failed
to show any permit or license to possess the same, simply claiming that the said firearms were pawned to him.
[24]
 It likewise noted that Trinidad's counsel agreed to the stipulation that Trinidad has no license to possess or
carry the subject firearms at the time of his arrest. [25] Finally, it agreed with the RTC's opinion that Trinidad's
acquittal in the drugs charges was due to the prosecution's failure to prove the chain of custody of the seized
dangerous drugs, and not due to his supposed questionable arrest. [26]
 

Dissatisfied, Trinidad moved for reconsideration, [27] but was denied in a Resolution[28] dated May 31, 2018;
hence, this petition.
 

The Issue Before the Court

 

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Trinidad's conviction for the
crime charged.
 

The Court's Ruling

 

The petition is meritorious.

 

"At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." [29]
 

"Section 2,[30] Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable
cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes 'unreasonable’ within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
[31]
 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree." [32]
 

"One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed."[33]
 

A lawful arrest may be affected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, a warrantless arrest may
be done when, inter alia, the accused is caught in flagrante delicto,[34] such as in buy-bust operations in drugs
cases.[35]However, if the existence of a valid buy-bust operation cannot be proven, and thus, the validity of
the  in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest cannot be established, the arrest becomes illegal and the consequent
search incidental thereto becomes unreasonable.[36] Resultantly, all the evidence seized by reason of the
unlawful arrest is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. [37]
 

In this case, Trinidad essentially anchors his defense on the following contentions: (a) his arrest stemmed from
a purported buy-bust operation where the illegal drugs and the subject firearms and ammunition were allegedly
recovered from him; (b) this resulted in the filing of three (3) Informations against him, two (2) of which are
for violations of RA 9165[38] (which were tried jointly), while the other pertains to the instant case; and (c) his
acquittal[39] in the drugs cases should necessarily result in his acquittal in this case as well. In finding these
contentions untenable, the courts a quo opined that the resolution in the drugs cases is immaterial in this case
as they involve different crimes[40] and that "the ground for the acquittal x x x is neither unlawful arrest nor
unlawful search or seizure, but the procedural flaw in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs." [41]
 

However, a more circumspect review of the decision absolving Trinidad of criminal liability in the drugs cases
reveals that he was acquitted therein not only due to unjustified deviations from the chain of custody rule,
[42]
 but also on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a valid buy-bust
operation, thereby rendering Trinidad's  in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest illegal and the
subsequent search on him unreasonable.[43]Thus, contrary to the courts a quo's opinions, Trinidad's
acquittal in the drugs cases, more particularly on the latter ground, is material to this case because the subject
firearms and ammunition were simultaneously recovered from him when he was searched subsequent to his
arrest on account of the buy-bust operation.
 

The Court is aware that the findings on the illegality of Trinidad's warrantless arrest were made in the drugs
cases, which are separate and distinct from the present illegal possession of firearms and ammunition case.
Nevertheless, the Court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of such findings as evidence, and apply
them altogether for the judicious resolution of the same issue which was duly raised herein. To be sure, the
general rule is that the courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases. However, this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the other case has a close connection with the
matter in controversy in the case at hand. [44] In Bongato v. Spouses Malvar,[45] the Court held:
 

[A]s a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if
these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. There are exceptions to this
rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in
the record of the case before it, yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in other proceedings, in
order to look for the law that is determinative of or applicable to the case under review. In some instances,
courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the
matter in controversy. These cases "may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as
to invoke a rule of judicial notice."[46](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 

Here, an examination of the ruling[47] in the drugs cases (which Trinidad offered as evidence and the RTC
admitted as part of his testimony[48]) confirms that the drugs cases and this case are so interwoven and
interdependent of each other since, as mentioned, the drugs, as well as the subject firearms and ammunition,
were illegally seized in a singular instance, i.e., the buy-bust operation. Hence, the Court may take judicial
notice of the circumstances attendant to the buy-bust operation as found by the court which resolved the drugs
cases. To recall, in the drugs cases, the finding of unreasonableness of search and seizure of the drugs was
mainly based on the failure of PO1 Sanoy's testimony to establish the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation
against Trinidad as said testimony was found to be highly doubtful and incredible. [49] This circumstance similarly
obtains here as in fact, the testimonies of both PO1 Nidoy [50] and PO1 Sanoy[51] in this case essentially just mirror
on all material points the latter's implausible narration in the drugs cases. In view of the foregoing, the Court
concludes that the subject firearms and ammunition are also inadmissible in evidence for being recovered from
the same unreasonable search and seizure as in the drugs cases. Since the confiscated firearms and
ammunition are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged in this case, Trinidad's acquittal is in order.
 

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 25, 2018 and the Resolution dated May
31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39598 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Jesus Trinidad  y Bersamin is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAMERTO OBOSA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The case before this Court is an automatic review of the decision 1 dated May 3, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-49679 (95), finding Mamerto Obosa guilty of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Leonarda Lora y Lalic, the
sums of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P250,000.00 as funeral expenses, P250,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On December 4, 1995, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, charging
Mamerto Obosa with murder committed as follows: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"That on or about the 7th day of July, 1995 in Kal. City, MM., Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab with a bladed
weapon one, LEONARDA LORA Y LALIC, hitting the latter on the different vital parts of her body, thereby
inflicting upon said victim serious physical injuries, which injuries ultimately caused the latter’s death. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"CONTRARY TO LAW" 2

When arraigned, Accused Obosa pleaded not guilty. 3 Trial ensued thereafter.

The facts, as established by the prosecution and summarized by the Solicitor General, 4 are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Leonarda Lora was the owner of three apartment units — Apartments A, B, and C — at Lot 18, Tawilis Street,
Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City (TSN, April 15, 1996, p. 5). On July 7, 1995, around 1:00 p.m., Leonarda was in
Apartment A with her niece, Jenny Lora, and an employee, Elisa "Ely" Gorne, trimming finished clothings for her
garment business (TSN, March 6, 1996, p. 3). After the trimming was completed, Leonarda went out to deliver
the finished clothings at 3:00 p.m., but was back at the apartment by 3:40 p.m. (Ibid., pp. 3-4). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, appellant rang the doorbell to Apartment A (Ibid., pp. 4-5, 13). Appellant
was Ely’s brother-in-law, and Leonarda’s attorney-in-fact for various transactions, including the filing of an
ejectment case against a certain Jose Marquez (Ibid., pp. 6, 14). In addition, appellant drove a taxi that was
owned and registered in the name of Leonarda (Ibid., pp. 7-8). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Appellant and Leonarda then proceeded to Apartment C, which was being used by the latter and Jenny as their
residence (Ibid., p. 5). Jenny, who was asked by her aunt to follow them, observed that Leonarda and appellant
were arguing about something (Ibid.). Jenny heard appellant tell Leonarda, "Kung hindi ka magbibigay ng pera,
papatayin kita" (Ibid., p. 7). Frightened by what she heard, Jenny returned to Apartment A, while Leonarda and
appellant went inside Apartment C (Ibid.). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Benjamin Marquez, who was resting at the terrace of the second floor of his uncle’s house two meters away
from Leonarda’s apartments, saw appellant and Leonarda go inside Apartment C at past 4:00 p.m. (TSN, April
23, 1996, pp. 2-4, 18). Sometime later, he heard a female voice coming from Apartment C shout, "Huwag!"
(Ibid., p. 11). He then saw appellant, holding both of Leonarda’s hands, drag the latter to the sofa (Ibid., pp.
12-13). Thinking that appellant and Leonarda were having a simple quarrel, Benjamin ignored the incident
(Ibid., p. 13).
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Back in Apartment A, Jenny was trimming clothes (TSN, March 6, 1996, p. 8). About 4:40 p.m., the person
renting Apartment B rang the doorbell to inform Jenny that nobody was answering the doorbell at Apartment C
(Ibid., pp. 8, 14). Ely told the person renting Apartment B just to return the following day (Ibid., p. 8). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Meanwhile, around 5:20 p.m., Jenny saw appellant going out of Apartment C (Ibid., pp. 9, 15). About the
same time, Benjamin saw appellant return to his taxi and leave (TSN, April 23, 1996, p. 19). Thereafter,
another neighbor, Jasmin Navarro, informed Jenny that nobody came to the door of Apartment C
notwithstanding that she had pressed its doorbell several times (TSN, March 6, 1996, pp. 9-10). Concerned,
Jenny went to Apartment C to check on her aunt (Ibid.). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Upon entering Apartment C and switching on the light, Jenny saw her aunt on the sofa, her head bent
backwards, and her face and whole body bloodied (Ibid., p. 11). An autopsy subsequently conducted revealed
that Leonarda sustained four fatal stab wounds which penetrated her heart, lungs, and liver, causing massive
hemorrhage and, eventually, her death (TSN, April 23, 1996, pp. 34-38). Leonarda likewise sustained
lacerations and contused-abrasions on her face and chest wall caused by either a blunt instrument or fist blows
(Ibid., pp. 38-42). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"Prior to her violent death, Leonarda disclosed to her brother, Alfredo Lora, that appellant owed her a huge sum
of money. Leonarda likewise had a past due account with the Bank of Southeast Asia which was secured by a
chattel mortgage constituted on the taxi being driven by appellant (TSN, August 14, 1996, pp. 2-7). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"In the initial investigation of this case, appellant revealed to the authorities that two associates of Leonarda
supposedly came to see her after he left Apartment C (TSN, April 1, 1996, pp. 4, 11, 13). Claiming to know the
whereabouts of these two associates, appellant promised to lead the police to them (Ibid.). Instead of doing so,
however, appellant disappeared and went into hiding (Ibid.). 5

Appellant, on the other hand, denies the charge against him and presents his version of the incident,
synthesized as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On July 7, 1995, at around 3:00 p.m., appellant went to the house of Leonarda Lora to deliver a certificate of
title of a parcel of land. Afterwards, he proceeded to his house at Block 35, Lot 14, F-1, Phase 3 Kaunlaran
Village, Caloocan City. 6 chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

At around 6:15 p.m., Jenny Lora and Elisa Gorne arrived at the house of appellant and informed him that
Leonarda Lora had been stabbed Appellant, who was at that time entertaining a visitor, hurriedly dressed, then
boarded his taxi with Jenny Lora, Elisa Gorne, and his daughter Miriam Obosa, and rushed to Leonarda’s
apartment. Along the way, he stopped at the police headquarters in Langaray Street to report the incident. Two
policemen were dispatched to accompany appellant to Leonarda’s place. Upon entering the front door, they saw
her bloodied body sprawled on the sofa. The policemen, after assessing the situation, stated that they would
not conduct an investigation because the victim was already dead. Thus, they left the scene. 7

Appellant proceeded to the Sangandaan Police Headquarters to request for an investigator. Thereafter,
appellant returned to Leonarda’s apartment with Vivencio Gamboa, the investigator assigned to the case. After
conducting an investigation, Vivencio Gamboa called up a funeraria and made arrangements for the internment
and burial of the victim. 8 During the wake, which lasted for one week at the International Funeraria in Sta.
Cruz, Manila, 9 appellant was present. He also followed the remains of the victim when it was transferred to her
house in Tawilis, Bilaran, Dagat-Dagatan, then to her province in Leyte, until the internment. 10

On cross-examination, appellant testified that the window of Leonarda’s apartment facing her neighbor’s house
was draped with thick and heavy curtains, preventing anyone to see the people inside. 11 He further declared
that his house is only six blocks away from the apartment of the deceased and that the distance may be
traversed on foot in ten minutes. 12

Appellant denied the allegation of Jenny Lora that he was at the apartment of Leonarda at 4:30 p.m. on that
fateful day of July. He insisted that he went home at past 3:00 p.m. after he turned over a certificate of title to
her. 13 He was also at home on January 19, 1996 when he was arrested for the murder of Leonarda Lora. 14

On May 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, 15 the dispositive portion of which reads: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused MAMERTO OBOSA GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of MURDER and accordingly sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00; to pay funeral expenses in the amount of
P250,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P250,000.00, attorney’s fees in the sum of P25,000.00 and the
costs of the suit. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED 16

The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review, in view of the death penalty meted to the accused.
1ibrary
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw

In his brief, Accused-appellant Mamerto Obosa contends that the court a quo erred in: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. . . . NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"II. . . . CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE BASIS OF PURE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.

"III. . . . NOT PROPERLY APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI RAISED BY THE ACCUSED AND
CORROBORATED BY OTHER WITNESSES.’’ 17 .

Thus, the core issues in this case are, essentially, the credibility of witnesses and the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction of appellant of murder. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It is a well-entrenched doctrine that appellate courts will generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses since the latter court is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 18
However, the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the
evidence. 19 We shall, therefore, determine whether these exceptions are present in the case at bar. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted appellant of the
crime charged. However, he assails the credibility of Jenny Lora, the principal witness for the prosecution,
because of her conflicting sworn statements given to the police and the inconsistencies in her testimony before
the trial court.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Upon a thorough perusal of the records, we find the testimony of Jenny Lora credible even if she executed
conflicting sworn statements before the police. Admittedly, in her first sworn statement, she failed to name the
perpetrator of the crime, but she identified appellant in her second sworn statement. She explained that he was
beside her at that time and coerced her what to state. When she executed her second sworn statement, he was
no longer present. Hence, she was able to give her statements freely and named appellant as the person who
stabbed her aunt. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In court, Jenny Lora testified in a candid and straightforward manner, repeating her statements in her second
sworn statement. Her initial reluctance to name appellant in her first affidavit is understandable for she feared
reprisal. Despite a lengthy cross-examination, she maintained her version of the incident. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Significantly, we cannot discern any ill-motive on the part of witness Jenny Lora in testifying against appellant,
pointing to him as the person who killed her aunt. On the contrary, as the niece of the deceased, Jenny had
more reason to ensure that the real perpetrator of the crime be punished if only to avenge the senseless death
of her aunt. It is unnatural for a victim’s relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse
somebody other than the real culprit. Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness has
been actuated by any improper motive, and absent any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, the testimony
given is ordinarily accorded full faith and credit. 20

What reinforces the testimony of Jenny Lora is the testimony of another witness, Benjamin Marquez, who was
resting in the veranda of his uncle’s house beside Apartment C prior to the stabbing incident. The curtain of
Leonarda’s apartment was tied to the side of the window, allowing Marquez a clear view of the premises. 21 He
saw appellant dragging Leonarda to the sofa minutes before she died. He also heard a female voice from the
same apartment shouting, "Huwag!’’.

While the prosecution did not present any eyewitness, however, there is circumstantial evidence to prove that it
was appellant who committed the crime. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence
when the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 22 All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. 23 The
circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the guilt of the accused. 24 In this way, circumstantial evidence could be of similar
weight and probative value as direct evidence. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime.25 cralaw:red

In this case, the following circumstances, when pieced together, lead to no other conclusion than that appellant
is the culprit.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

First, appellant arrived at Leonarda’s apartment at around 4:00 p.m. of July 7, 1995.

Second, he demanded money from the victim and threatened her with death if she refused to comply. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Third, appellant and the victim entered the apartment together.

Fourth, a female voice inside the apartment was heard shouting, "Huwag!’’

Fifth, appellant was seen dragging the victim to the sofa inside the apartment. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Sixth, then appellant left the apartment a few minutes past 5:00 p.m. and boarded his taxi.

Seventh, the distance from appellant’s house to the scene of the victim is negotiable in ten minutes by foot. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Eighth, Jasmin Navarro, a neighbor of the victim, rang the doorbell of the apartment at around 5:30 p.m. and
received no answer.

Ninth, Jenny Lora entered the apartment and saw the victim sprawled on the sofa, bloodied. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Tenth, the investigation conducted reveals no signs of burglary or forced entry.

Noteworthy is the fact that the appellant was the last person seen with the victim before she died. And he was
in the vicinity of the scene of the crime within minutes before and after the approximate time of her death. To
complement its theory, the prosecution introduced evidence showing there was motive on the part of appellant
in committing the crime. Jenny Lora testified that previously, appellant threatened to kill Leonarda if she would
not meet his demand for money. With proof of such motive and circumstantial evidence on hand, appellant’s
guilt is indeed beyond any doubt. In People v. De Mesa, 26 this Court held that "Motive is generally irrelevant,
unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence
or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction."  chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he was at home at the time of the incident. With him
was Virgilio Layog, who stayed there from 6:00 to 6:30 in the afternoon, and saw Jenny Lora and Elisa Gorne
arrived to inform appellant that Leonarda had been stabbed. 27 It bears stressing at this point that appellant
accounted for his presence at his residence only between 6:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., but not from 4:00 p.m. to
6:00 p.m., the approximate interval of time when the stabbing incident occurred. He likewise admitted that the
distance between his house and the victim’s apartment could be traversed on foot in ten minutes. Obviously,
since he was driving his taxi, he would have little problem negotiating the distance after the incident and still be
at home in time to receive his visitor, Virgilio Layog. Thus, the lackluster defense of appellant fails to cast doubt
on the continuous chain of circumstances established by the prosecution. To be sure, such defense cannot
prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses that he is the assailant. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We therefore find appellant guilty of the crime charged. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following are the essential elements of the crime of murder: a) that a person was killed; b) that the accused
killed him; c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and
d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In its decision, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery to qualify the offense to
murder, and considered dwelling and abuse of confidence as generic aggravating circumstances attendant to
the commission of the crime. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We agree with the trial court in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery. Treachery
may be considered an aggravating circumstance when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons
employing means, methods or forms of attack which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the
crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 28 For treachery
to exist, two essential elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the said means of execution was deliberately
or consciously adopted. 29

The nature and location of the stab wounds showed that the killing was executed in a treacherous manner,
preventing any means of defense on the part of the victim. She was stabbed, not just once, but four times on
her chest, each stab being fatal. The lacerations and other contusions indicated that she was hit on the different
parts of her face by a blunt instrument or fist blows. Her lips were sore. She was also unarmed. Indeed, she
could not have been able to retaliate or defend herself under such disadvantaged conditions. Without doubt,
treachery attended the commission of the crime. The trial court did not err in qualifying the killing to murder.

Regarding the other aggravating circumstances of dwelling and abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness,
the same cannot be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. The information does not allege the
presence of such circumstances. They were only established during the trial. A recent amendment to the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 30 mandates that "the complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances." 31 Thus, qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances must be
expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be considered by
the court even if proved during the trial. 32 This principle is applicable in all criminal cases, not only in cases
were the aggravating circumstance would increase the penalty to death. 33 Guided by the rule of applying
retroactively a penal statute, substantive and remedial or procedural, that is favorable to the accused, we hold
that the circumstances of dwelling and abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness should not be appreciated
against the appellant considering that these aggravating circumstances are not alleged in the information. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

There being no generic aggravating circumstances considered in the case at bar, a modification of penalties
imposed by the trial court is in order. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63 of the same Code, if the penalty prescribed by
law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. In this case, though the killing was
qualified with treachery, in the absence of any other aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be lowered
from death to reclusion perpetua. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

As to damages, the amount of P250,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages should be reduced to
P50,000.00, in light of the purpose for making such award, which is to compensate the heirs of the victim for
injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Moreover, we cannot sustain the award of P250,000.00 as actual damages (for the funeral and burial expenses)
in the absence of any supporting evidence on record. 34 No competent proof was presented in court in the form
of receipts and other documents as to the expenses incurred arising from the death of the victim. For the same
reason, attorney’s fees should also be deleted. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City, dated May 3, 1997 in
Criminal Case No. C-49679(95); is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellant Mamerto Obosa is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, instead of death, and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Leonarda Lora
y Lalic, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias “RONALD," defendant-appellant
161 SCRA 623, May 28, 1988

CASE NATURE: APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.

SC RULING: The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in all respects.

LEGAL DOCTRINE/TOPIC: MOTIVE. Proof of motive is not essential when the culprit was positively identified.

FACTS:
On or about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, Julius Cagampang with his wife, Victorina Cagampang, and their two children were
conversing in the store adjacent to their house at Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald”
arrived and fired at Julius Cagampang, who instantly fell, wounded and bleeding. Plaintiff shouted at Victorina (wife) to let out Julius’ firearm and
fired two shots at Julius. Victorina hurried to get the maleta with the firearm inside and gave it to the plaintiff, who took her husband’s .38 caliber
revolver, and fled. Julius Cagampang, inflicted with mortal wounds, instantly died. The plaintiff was with Anecito Ellevera who is at large.

The accused and his companion were members of NPA and were hiding in the mountains of Malapong. Accused surrendered to Mayor Dick
Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public
market on November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista Municipal Jail, where Victorina (wife) was summoned by the Station Commander
Milan, where she saw and identified the accused as the man who killed her husband.

Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald” was charged with the crime of murder and upon arraignment on June 8,1982, he entered a plea of not guilty. The
accused’s defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of
Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as “pulutan,” until
8:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980. He also capitalized the fact that Victorina (wife) did not know him but he
was positively identified by her and was corroborated by another prosecution witness Claudio Sabanal (tricycle driver) who was a long-time
acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as “Ronald”.

Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties thereof
under Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He appealed:
1. in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the deceased Julius Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of alibi.

ISSUES: Whether or not Vicente Temblor is guilty of murder.

RULING: Yes. Vicente “Ronald” Temblor is guilty of murder.

The settled rule is that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because
of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence. Wife’s
testimony is credible, probable and entirely in accord with human experience.

The rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

Appellant’s alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined that the defendant’s knowledge that
Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the New People’s Army for the sole purpose
of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the
NPA’s “agaw armas” campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been positively identified (People vs. Tan, Jr., 145
SCRA 615).

The records further show that the accused and his companion fled after killing Cagampang and taking his firearm. They hid in the mountains of
Agusan del Norte. Their flight was an implied admission of guilt (People vs. Dante Astor, 149 SCRA 325; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in all respects, except as to the civil indemnity payable to the heirs of the deceased
Julius Cagampang which is increased to P30,000.00.
018. PEOPLE v. HASSAN

L-68969/ January 22, 1988 / Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Zamboanga Vr XIII/

Defendant-apellant- Usman Hassan

Decision by: Sarmiento, J.

Digest by: Sai Bautista

Short Version: Hassan was convicted of murder on the bases of the testimony of a lone witness for the prosecution and the sloppiness of the
investigation conducted by the police investigator of the Zamboanga City Police Station. The Supreme Court found that guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. As a general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of
mind, procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable
doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the
identity of the culprit as when 'the identification is extremely tenuous

Facts: Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death one Ramon Pichel, Jr. Jose Samson, lone witness for the prosecution testified
that he was with the victiom at about 7:00 pm of July 23, 1981 when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in
Zamboanga City and that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw assailant stab the victim, who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was
parked about two or three meters from the fruit stand; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon from behind "only once" and that after the stabbing, the
assailant ran towards the PNB Building. RTC of Zamboanga convicted Hassan based on this testimony and testimony of Police Corporal Rogelio P.
Carpio regarding the investigation conducted by the police.

Issue: WON accused should be found guilty for the crime of murder- NO!

Ruling: Evidence for the Prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof- beyond reasonable doubt- required to convict an accused
person.

Ratio: (Relevant part:MOTIVE) In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and alibi of
the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. In this case, testimony of the
lone eye witness and evidence introduced by the police are weak and unconvincing

~The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, that he saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" only once contradicted
the expert testimony of the medico-legal officer of the NBI officer who identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the chest and third
rib, and another located at the left arm posterior aspect. The medical expert also concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound that it
was inflicted on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him." 

~The procedure adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman. Corporal Carpio testified that Usman
was alone when he was brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination he stated that the accused was
identified by Samson in a "police line-up”. Court considered the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between eyewitness and the
accused as violation to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial
stage — the identification of the accused.

~Also, the rest of the investigation of the crime and the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly. Statement of Hassan
was taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been taken. The fruit vendor
—from whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes was not investigated. Nor was the arresting officer, companion of Corporal Carpio
presented. The knife and its scabbard, which were confiscated by Carpio from Hassan at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any
testing at all to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and compared with the blood type of the deceased. Court also
emphasized the fact that accused was found sitting on his pushcart with a companion after the incident. If he were the assailant, he would have fled.

~ A day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, with the suspect
in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of
arrests. There was no attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with the
killing of Pichel, Jr which could have produced the link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence.

Court found that there was total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule,
motive is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, procedurally, however, for purposes of
complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of
the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit as when
'the Identification is extremely tenuous,"  as in this case.

Accused AQUITTED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias BONG (At Large),
ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD DELIM alias BONG, accused-appellants.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,[1] dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City,
finding accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing
them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The court also ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums
of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias Bong and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder
under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of
cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son
of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[2]
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel remain
at-large.
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
 At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts [3]
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim,
was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modestos
wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered
Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to
visit Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their supper in their home. Joining them
were Modesto and Ritas two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald
suddenly barged into the house and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto
while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.[4] Marlon, Robert
and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the
intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and
ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January
24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Nio, at Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the incident
the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto.Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy
opted to first look for his father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from Modestos house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his
relatives returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999,
Randy reported the incident to the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and
Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He
was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on
the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modestos cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen rushed to the
scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.[5] Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the
names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto.Rita and Randy
were at a loss why the five malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police
investigators.[6] Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their respective
houses. The police officers scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which reads:
SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- Body - both upper extremities are flexed
- both lower extremities are flexed
- (+) body decomposition
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
- 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
- 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto occipital area (POEx)
- 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
- #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
-          10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
-          penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD.[7]
 The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police investigators were able to confirm that
Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their firearms.[8]
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had pending cases for robbery in the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with
the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[9]
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.[10]
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their house at Asan Norte,
Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modestos house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He theorized that Rita and Randy
falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte where he had been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a
hollow-block factory in that city where he was a stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leons alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his hometown in Pangasinan during his
employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She
claimed that the distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay
Certificate to prove that he was a resident of Laoag City from January 1998 up to February 1999.[11]
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived
with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon
denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon
Delim (for) the commission of Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner
as provided for by law; the Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of
P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus
fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City is hereby ordered to transmit the persons of
Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime and use of
unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief, assail
the decision alleging that:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF
ALIBI.[13]
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime charged in the Information is murder or
kidnapping. During the deliberation, some distinguished members of the Court opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are
charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein
that the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed)
Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from
helping the latter. They submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of
kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the Information went further to charge accused with the killing of the victim should be of no moment,
the real nature of the criminal charge being determined not from the caption or the preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law
alleged to have been violated these being conclusions of law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. They further submit
that since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death
of the victim but only for kidnapping the victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the
crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling.Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v.
Isabelo Puno, et al.,[14] that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the
offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the malefactor. This Court further held:
x x x. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking
away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the
offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty
does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.[15]
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute the
felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. [16] The crime
committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is
determinative of what crime the accused is charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential element of specific intent
crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain
criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. [17] Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is
the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a
prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.[18] Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the
accused as established by the evidence on record.[19]
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a
particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule,
proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence
of accused for the crime charged such as murder.[20] The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively
trivial.[21] Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of
his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping.[22] In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is
ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to
kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto
was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary
intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping.
[23]
 Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article
268 thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon,
Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason;
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. [24]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second,
defendants agency in the commission of the act.[25] Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective
element of crimes.[26] In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be
dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or
suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. [27] To
prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed
(with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing
of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.[28]
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He
also sustained seven (7) stab wounds,[29] defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives,
in the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the
malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences flowing therefrom. [30] As the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:[31]
This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital
cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law
presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances
of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed
by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It relied on circumstantial evidence to discharge
its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants of murder.Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. [32] What was once a rule of account respectability
is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as
indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each
being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the
offense charged.[34] For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[35] If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
 In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove that accused-appellants, in
confabulation with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:
1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon poked his gun on
Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded him out of his house:
FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?
A We were eating, sir.
Q You said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked answered Marlon
Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked he
answered Ronald Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm were they carrying at that time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short firearms, what did they do then when they entered your
house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?
A None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, Stay in your house, and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my father, sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside?
A Inside our house, sir.
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir.[36]
Randys account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:
PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at around 6:30 in the evening while preparing for
your supper three (3) armed men entered inside your house, who were these three (3) men who entered your house?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to answer, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong entered your house, are these three (3) persons
who entered your house in Court now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?
A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir.[37]
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a lookout when he stood guard by
the door of the house of Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:
FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three persons, what did you and your mother do while
these three persons were taking out of your house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three persons Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic), where
were Leon and Manuel then?
A They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?
 A Because they were at the door, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were guarding you, these Leon and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?
A They have gun, sir.
Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who when his name was asked, answered, Leon Delim). [38]
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house with Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy
were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking help from their relatives and police authorities.
4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found under the thick bushes in a grassy
area in the housing project located about 200 meters away from the house of Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was already in the state of
decomposition:
Q So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father?
A The same place and at 3:00 oclock P.M., we were able to find my father.
COURT: Where?
A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look for your father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00 oclock
P.M.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My Aunt, sir.
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Who else?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.
COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition?
A He was dead, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then when you saw him dead?
A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic).[39]
The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of Modesto was in a state of decomposition, with
tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds and
defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:
PROS. TOMBOC:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?
WITNESS:
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper extremities are flexed and both lower extremities are
flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the victim, Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were so many worms coming out from the
injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim was an igorot (sic) and they have tradition
that they will bury immediately. Whether they like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was also 20 ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular area,
right; I cannot also determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE);
and there was also 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).
Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Five (5) sir.
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound,
lateral aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect
M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound,
medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm.
Q How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora?
A Yes sir.[40]
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it and the distention of his scrotum and penis are
evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for a period ranging from three to six days.
[41]
 Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the exact death of the victim. An equally persuasive authority states:
Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:
Time Since Death Condition of the Body
48 hours Ova of flies seen. Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters present. Moving maggots seen.
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and disfigured. Hair and nails loose. Tissues soft and discolored.[42]
The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23, 1999 to the discovery of his cadaver which
was already in the state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, about 200 meters away from his house, is consistent with and
confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution that the victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999.
5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and were nowhere to be found:
COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto Delim?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects?
A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his brothers, sir.
Q What are the names of the brothers?
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for investigation?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be found, they all left the place, sir.
Q In what place did you look for the brothers Delim?
A Within the vicinity, sir.
Q In what place?
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir.
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers?
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
Q Wherelse (sic)?
A Labayog, Sison, sir.
Q Wherelse?
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir.
Q What was the result?
A Negative result, sir.[43]
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto and Rita:
COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day, January 23, 1999?
A Yes, sir, I know them.
Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999?
A They are my neighbors, sir.
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23, 1999?
A I know them, sir.
Q Why do you know them?
A They used to go to our house, sir.
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your husbands name is Modesto Delim are they related
with each other?
A Yes, sir.[44]
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong circumstantial evidence of their
guilt for the death of Modesto. Although flight after the commission of an offense does not create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the
same is admissible in evidence against them and if not satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with their innocence, will tend to show that
they, in fact, killed Modesto.[45]
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified
that they were not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-accused
on the other before the incident, or any motivation on the part of the three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto.Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be
concluded that a person or persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of
judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all. [46] In this case, the inscrutable facts are that
Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house at the gunpoint, hogtied, put a piece of cloth
in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was
found concealed under the bushes and already in a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot
wounds and died because of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having
been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some causes or
influences moving the mind.[47] The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the prosecution should not be trashed simply because the malefactors
had no motive to kill Modesto.
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and Leon to rebut the same and explain
what happened to the victim after taking him from his house in the evening of January 23, 1999. They may have freed the victim shortly after taking
him, or the victim may have been able to escape and that thereafter a person or some other persons may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald
and Leon failed to give any explanation. Instead, they merely denied having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as their defense.
Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he conspired with accused-appellants Marlon and
Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[48] Conspiracy must be proven with the same
quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of
the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.[49] To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. [50] It is sufficient if, at the time of the commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not
who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim.[51] This is based on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of
the common plan:
x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered and treated as the acts and declarations of his
principal. What is so done by an agent, is done by the principal through him, as his mere instrument. Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D.
& M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). If the conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its
existence, the acts of one in furtherance of the common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common design, he
does as the agent of the co-conspirators. R. v. OConnell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710.[52]
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law says that the
acts, words and declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all. [53]
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged
into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and
warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the
house. The overt acts of all the malefactors were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the
malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime
were (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking assistance from police authorities
and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.[54] Patently,
Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty of the killing of Modesto.[55] Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by
Marlon and Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation.[56] If part of a crime has been committed in one place and part in another,
each person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if they
are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as
principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime. [57]
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same were marred by inconsistencies:
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father. Later however, Randy claimed that the malefactors
proceeded to the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan;
2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into their house. She later changed her testimony and
declared that it was Robert, together with Marlon and Ronald who barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she testified that after the three men brought out the
victim, the two other accused entered the house and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999, and she was accompanied by her son
Randy. However, Randy testified that he was alone when he looked for his father from January 24 to 26, 1999.[58]
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective
testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by the appellate
court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of its unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of
the witnesses as they give their testimonies before the court. In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were moved by any improper or ill
motive in testifying against the malefactors and the other accused; hence, their testimonies must be given full credit and probative weight. [59] The
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them incredible or their testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne
in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a persons sense of observation is impaired by many factors including the
shocking effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute
neither the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of his testimony.[60] Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to
minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent facts. [61] Inconsistencies on minor and
trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. [62]
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms and the true meaning of answers to isolated
questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and his answers thereto.
[63]

Randys testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent with his testimony that Ronald and Marlon
brought his father towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan.Randy may not have known the destination of accused-appellants but he saw
the direction to which they went. While it may be true that when asked to identify the three who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as one
of them, however, Rita had been consistent throughout her testimony that those who barged into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leons
counsel never cross-examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her identification of Leon as one of those who barged into their house to give
her an opportunity to explain her perceived inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.[64]
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired impeachment of her. [65] As to whether Rita
and Randy were together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely stood guard by the door of the house or entered the house are inconsequential. The
fact is that Leon stood guard throughout the night to prevent Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the earmarks of truth and
sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-examination, they responded with consistency upon material details that could only come from a
firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to disregard the findings of the
trial court regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving credence and probative weight to their
evidence to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that their collective evidence to prove their defense is strong.
 We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution because the same is easy to
concoct between relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender.[66] It is hard for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit
approbation by the trial court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that they were in a
place other than the situs criminis at the time of the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the said
crime.[67] They failed to discharge their burden.Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the
culprits. The house of Ronald, where he claimed he was when the crime was committed, was only two kilometers away from the house of Modesto
and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced
fact that he was a resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of the crime. With
respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that he resided in, left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila
on January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of Modesto. The trial
court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of superior strength and the use of unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating circumstances. The
Office of the Solicitor General contends that indeed treachery was attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty
of murder defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime
itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime. [68] As this Court
held: No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the
condition of defendant.[69] Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. [70] Although the victim may have been
defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be
appreciated against the accused.[71] In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to
present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be
presumed that although he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the
malefactors. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked.[72] What is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio Francisco[73] is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of
their combined strength in order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength.[74] In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took
advantage of their numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed
while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superioty and their handguns when Modesto was
shot and stabbed.[75]
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is no allegation in the
Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the
crime of violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.
[76]
 Neither can dwelling, although proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule
110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.[77] Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this
case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused. [78]
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should be meted an indeterminate penalty,
the minimum of which shall be taken from the entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years and one day to 12 years and the maximum period of
which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The sum of P75,000.00 awarded as moral
damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. [79] The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in
order.[80] In addition, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[81]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon
Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is
hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporalin its medium period as maximum. Accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

Kummer vs. People (2013)

G.R. No. 174461 | 2013-09-11

Subject: Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not affect
their credibility; It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge who heard
the case; Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness; There is no
absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form of human behavior; Public documents are admissible in court
without further proof of their due execution and authenticity; Presumption of regularity; Paraffin test, positive
finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that subject indeed fired a gun, only corroborative
evidence; Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required

Facts:

On June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the
house of the petitioner Leticia Kummer. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by
saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."

Petitioner opened the door and at this point, her minor son, Johan Kummer, using his left hand, shot Mallo
twice using a gun about six inches long. Malana immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When
Malana turned his back, he saw petitioner Leticia leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s
back and causing him to fall flat on the ground.

Petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with her son, she saw where Mallo
was lying flat and uttered, “Johan, patay na,” in a loud voice. They held Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about
three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house.

The prosecution filed an information for homicide against Leticia and Johan. Both pleaded not guilty. Leticia
claimed that she and her children, Johan, Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the evening of June 19,
1988. She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun report,
and the banging at their door. Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s Army
prevalent in their area, Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people
causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass;
another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door
and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.

The RTC found both the Leticia and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Johan, still
a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the recognizance of his father. Only Leticia
appealed the RTC judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the conviction. The CA found Malana
and Cuntapay’s positive identification and the corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution more than
sufficient to convict. It likewise held that the discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct
testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and
reconcilable. Hence, the present petition.

Held:

Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not affect
their credibility

1.  The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on
one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral
matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the
commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses, as these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove
that their testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities,
unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or recall.

2.  Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan
shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the oversight of the administering
official in typing the exact details of their narration.

3.  Affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its
seeming contradiction with the declarant’s testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard
questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly
descriptive of the series of events as the affiant knows them. Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may
sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant’s mouth, thus allowing the whole statement to be taken out
of context.

4.  As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court.
5.  It has been held that the claim that “whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court facts which he
failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists between the testimony and
the affidavit” is  erroneous. If what were stated in open court are but details or additional facts that serve to
supplement the declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be ruled out as inconsistent and
may be considered by the court.

It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge who heard the
case

6.  The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because the judge who
heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of
a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can
merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision.

7.  Thus, the contention - that since Judge Abella-Aquino was not the one who heard the evidence and thereby
did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses - must fail. It is sufficient that the
judge, in deciding the case, must base her ruling completely on the records before her, in the way that
appellate courts do when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. Thus, a judgment of conviction
penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records available to her.

Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness

8.  Motive gains importance only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases,
the prosecution does not need to prove the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the
author of the crime

9.  In light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the crime by
not one but two prosecution eyewitnesses, the failure to cite the motive of the petitioner is of no moment. It is
a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent reason at all, and that friendship
or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime.

There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form of human behavior

10.  Human nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given situation.
Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity and conformity in action and
reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm, react differently and act contrary to the expectation of
mankind. There is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual, strange,
startling or frightful experience.

11.  The CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged by the petitioner who, in her present
plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize every detail that can favor her case. Unfortunately, if at all,
her claims refer only to minor and even inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.

Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and
authenticity

12.  The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public
document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its
due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify,
describe and testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

13.  In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in
court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on
the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication does not apply to
public documents. In other words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to identify
and authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima
facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan
and on the right hand of the petitioner. Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is admissible as
evidence.

Presumption of regularity

14.  On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the paraffin test, suffice it
to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted the
report observed the regular procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence
in the performance of one’s duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion. The presumption of
regularity in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the petitioner’s contention that an explanation
has to be given on how the actual process was conducted. Since the petitioner presented no evidence of
fabrication or irregularity, we presume that the standard operating procedure has been observed.

Paraffin test, positive finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that subject indeed
fired a gun, only corroborative evidence

15.  While the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired
a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses’ testimony that the
petitioner shot the victim. Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may
leave traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be washed off with tap water,
unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.

Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no re-arraignment is required

16.  Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades thenature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused [would] not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.”

17.  A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more
formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed
amendment would not alter the nature of the offense. (see People vs. Joaquin Borromeo)

18.  The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is (i) when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, (ii) when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, and (iii) when any evidence the accused might have would be
inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended.

19.  It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was
committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. The act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the
information will permit. Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of
homicide.

20.  Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason
for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be
possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him.

21.  The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This
however pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do
not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the
theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect
the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.
22.  An amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call for a second
plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned
the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused
simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.

23.  The amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one
month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change
in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment  - it does not change the nature
of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the
new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available
after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true
with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment was of this nature
and did not need a second plea.

People v Carmen
G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001
TOPIC: Culpa | Elements
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-Appellants: Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga @ Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga
@ Nonoy Sibonga, And Reynario Nuñez @ Rey Nuñez
Ponente: Mendoza

FACTS: RTC Cebu convicted defendants of murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs.
around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1997, 2 girls playing heard a boy shout for help, around the vicinity of the house of Carmen
known as Mother perpetuala. She and two ther women Cledonia and Delia were immersing Randy Luntayao’s head into a drum of water, forced
him to drink water and then banged his head on the bench ehwas tied down to whenever he tried to raise his head. They pounded the chest and
dropped Celedonia’s weight on the boy’s chest. They plunged a knife on his left side and caught the blood into a plastic gallon container.
Randy was 13, the eldest child of Eddie Luntayao. They thought he had a nervous breakdown, and Carmen said she could exorcise the boy.
A few hours later, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into the prayer room and placed him on the altar.
Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randy was clearly dead, and Carmen stopped him from seeing the boy because she said he would be
resurrected that evening. But came that time, Carmen asked Nunez to to call the funeral parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead.
It was arranged that the body would be transferred to the house of accused-appellant Nuñez. the Luntayao family, accompanied by accused-
appellant Nuñez, took Randy's body to Nunez's house in Tangke, Talisay. The following day, January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Nuñez told
Eddie to go with him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report Randy's death and told him to keep quiet or they might not be able to get
the necessary papers for his son's burial. Nuñez took care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed. At around 3 o'clock in the
afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to Tangke, Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told
her that they preferred to bring their son's body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were told by accused-appellant
Carmen that this was not possible as she and the other accused-appellants might be arrested. That same afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried
in Tangke, Talisay.
After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from the Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City
which referred him to the NBI. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint for murder, and asked that his son’s remains be exhumed and
autopsied. Carmen and the others admitted that she and the other accused-appellants conducted a "pray-over healing" session on the victim on
January 27, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen refused to give any further statement. On Feb 20, 1997, the body was exhumed and autopsied:
traumatic head and chest injuries.
Defense witnesses attested to the healing of Carmen by pray over and without any form of violence.

ISSUE: whether the accused are guilty of murder

HELD: No, because the death resulted from reckless imprudence and there was no malice or intent to kill.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are
hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused-
appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

RULE:
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to
do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act.
Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or
evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

RATIO:
RTC Ratio: In murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is treachery in the attack, and this is true even if the offender has no
intent to kill the person assaulted. Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. One who commits an intentional
felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily,
when a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person
committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious acts are not intended by him. Intent is presumed from the
commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may arise from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to
rebut this presumption. In the case at bar, there is enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in inflicting physical harm
to the victim (an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong done resulted in the death of their victim. Hence, they are liable for all
the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended.

SC: The treatment was intended to drive the bad spirit away from the boy, but the strange procedure resulted in death. The accused did not
intend to kill him. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not bring about the
cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder. accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical
practitioner, belong to a religious group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing. treachery cannot be
appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is no treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution
to ensure the safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim.[33] Viewed in this light, the acts which the
trial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants to restrain Randy Luntayao so that they can effect
the cure on him.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.

Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.

Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of
homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the
widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her
right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)

The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same
court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action. ...

According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may
be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)

The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two
enactments are quoted hereinbelow: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)

There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:

1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the
expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code Commission,
thus:têñ.£îhqwâ£

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a
private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and
to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the
vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a
criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the complainant in the
criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He
should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)

And Tolentino says: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his
right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is
defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal
action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such
reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or
suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the
result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used
in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this
apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its
specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense.
In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical
injuries, bacause the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in
American Law, and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the
article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by
the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action
should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted
homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)

Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not
included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them
merely concurred in the result.

In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal
action against her.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no special
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

 
 

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article 100 of the
Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in
article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29
SCRA 437).

The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi
vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).

The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in article 33 of the
Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article 100 of the
Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in
article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29
SCRA 437).

The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi
vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).

The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in article 33 of the
Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.

PEOPLE v. FERNANDO PUGAY Y BALCITA, GR No. 74324, 1988-11-17

Facts:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY Y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON Y
MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER... poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani
Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,... burn the whole body of said Bayani
Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and superior strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately... augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
"CONTRARY TO LAW"... trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty of the crime of murder but crediting in
favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to... commit so grave a wrong,... The deceased
Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they
slept together.
Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and
Samson with several companions arrived.
They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
he accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body
of the former.
Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of... pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson
set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police
Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
spontaneously pointed... to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
Issues:
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
With respect to the accused Samson
Ruling:
We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
he accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the
contents thereof was water... and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand,
alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of
note is the fact that both statements did not impute any... participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
here is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the
two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the
accused Pugay or
Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely
wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different
acts directed against the... deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the
deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The... stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have
escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undersirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time... were making fun of
the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence
defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as... follows:
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if
not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
here is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of
treachery... to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline
and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him
the benefit of doubt, it... can be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire.
His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least
some kind of physical injuries on his... person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver
offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides,
inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by... any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of
the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.

Ivler vs. San Pedro (2010)

G.R. No. 172716 | 2010-11-17

Subject: Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only
to Determine the Penalty; Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution
for the Same Quasi-Offense; Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code
Facts:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, Jason Ivler was charged before the MeTC, with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by Evangeline L. Ponce and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle.

On 7 September 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.The RTC dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by Ivler in connection with the decision of the MeTC. Hence, this petition.

Ivler adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. He argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. He submits
that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies
(e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

Held:

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only
to Determine the Penalty

1. The two charges against Ivler, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

2. The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that “reckless imprudence” is not a crime in
itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad
to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Were criminal negligence but a modality in the
commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion
to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the
way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crime. (See Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga)

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence BarsSubsequent Prosecution for the

SameQuasi-Offense

3. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly barred
the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause .

4. imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent
or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.  The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account
to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. (See People vs. Buan)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized  Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

5. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of  two
categories:

(a) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies); and

(b) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool
to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for
the most serious crime.

6. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing  not an act defined as a felony but “the mental
attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,”  a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.

7. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a
quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an
offense which is a necessary means for committing another.

8. Hence, prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

9. If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-
offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower
rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

People v. Buan
March 29, 1968 | Reyes, J.B.L.
XIV. Quasi-Offenses

Doctrine:
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The essence of the quasi-
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense. As the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense remains one and the same. It cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

Case Summary:
Jose Buan, a bus driver, hit a jeepney, injuring the jeep passengers and damaging the jeep. He was charged with “slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence” but was acquitted by the Justice of the Peace. An Info for “serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence” was
filed with the CFI. Accused moved to quash as he was already acquitted in the Justice of the Peace. SC agrees with accused saying that once
convicted/acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, he may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. SC then directed the CFI to quash the complaint and dismiss the charge.

FACTS:
1. Jose Buan was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company in 1962, along the MacArthur Highway in Guiguinto, Bulacan.
 The bus driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and causing it to turn turtle, and
injuring its passengers.
 Six of the latter suffered slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days; three other riders came out with serious bodily
injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
2. A charge was filed against Buan, one for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for
which he was tried and acquitted on December 16, 1963.
 Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance the information in the case now before us,
for serious physical injuries, and damage to property through reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same
highway collision.
3. When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel moved to quash the charges on the ground that he had already been
acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court. The prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion to quash.
Unable to secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal - YES
2. Whether or not the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could be joined with the accusation for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence - NO

RULING:
1. YES. Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The
essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under article 365 RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
o The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
o And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
o This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that of this Court. See notes.

2. NO. The charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. In People
vs. Diaz:

". . . The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously
cleared by the inferior court."

DISPOSITION:
Order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is directed to quash and dismiss the charge.

NOTES:
 People vs. Silva (1962): Where as a result of the same vehicular accident one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another
three suffered only slight physical injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless imprudence.
 People vs. Diaz (1954): The ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a second information
of Damage to Property Through Reckless Imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused.
 People vs. Belga: Dismissal of an information for physical injuries through reckless imprudence as a result of a collision between two
automobiles was declared to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless imprudence and another for
multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision.
 Yap vs. Lutero (1959): The same doctrine was reasserted.
 In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable
in Courts of differing category, or that the complainants were not the same individuals.
[CASE DIGEST] People v. Guillen (G.R. No. L-1477)
January 18, 1950 | G.R. No. L-1477

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

Julio Guillen, defendant-appellant

FACTS:

On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, Manila, Guillen planted a hand grenade
near the stage and threw another one toward then President Manuel Roxas in an apparent assassination attempt born out of
Guillen's spite for the President over the latter's perceived failure to fulfill his promises and his call for the passage of the so-called
parity measure. General Castaneda managed to kick the grenade off the stage. However, its explosion caused the death of Simeon
Varela (Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carillo, and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and multiple frustrated murder filed against him. At one point, he
even tried to use the insanity excuse, but he was found to have been mentally stable.

Later on, by his own admission, he confessed to his crimes. He was subsequently found guilty of all the charges and was sentenced
to death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

HELD:

No, the SC ruled that Guillen's actions on March 10, 1947 and their penalties were covered by Art. 48 of the RPC, not sub-section 1
of Art. 49. The Court said that by a single act -- throwing a hand grenade at President Roxas -- he committed two grave felonies:

(a) murder and (b) multiple attempted murder.

At the same time, the murder of Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, given that the victim was not
able to put up a defense against the attack, even though he was not the principal target.

And lastly, the Court ruled that the injuries sustained by the other victims constitute attempted and not frustrated murder. The
Court reasoned that Guillen's failed attempt to kill President Roxas was due to some reason or accident (General kicking the
grenade off the stage) other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In the end the Court affirmed the death sentence handed out by the lower court.

___

Art. 48, RPC: "Penalty for complex crimes -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period."

PeopleVsSabalones
Roling” Accused Appellants
Artemio Timoteo Beronga
Teodolo Alegarbes
Eufemio Cabanero
Facts: Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga are convicted of murder and frustrated murder. The conviction arose from
a shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which were allegedly ambushed by appelants. After conducting a
preliminary investigation, second assistant provincial Juanito M. Gabriana Sr. filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 7 five amended information charging four “John Does” who were later indentified as Rolusape Sabalones,
Artemio Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes, and Eufemio Cabanero, with two counts of murder and three counts of
frustrated murder.
Criminal case 9257 Glenn tiempo, riding a jeep ahd who gave no provocation, inflicted latter several gunshot wounds,
causing instantaneous death
Criminal case 9258 Alfredo Nardo, same
Criminal case 9259 Rey Bolo riding a car and who gave no provocation, inflicted later laceration on mouth due to gunshot
Frustrated Murder case 9260 Rogelio Presores who gave no provocation, inflicted gun shout wound thru the right chest
Frustrated Murder case 9261 Nelcson Presores who gave no provocation, inflicted gunshot wound at the neck penetrating
the trachea.
Issue:
1) Are the witnesses and who testified sufficient as prosecution evidence
2) Are the alibis for the defense strong enough to be acquitted
3) What will be the punished crime and the penalty of the prosecuted.
Held:
1) No, since the apelants were convicted based primarily on positive identification of the two survivors by Edwin
Santos and Rogelio Presores and not only on the extrajudicial statements that merely corroborates the eyewitness
testimonies making it irrelevant to the case
2) No, alibi is not credible when the accused appellant is only a short distance from the crime scene and the alibi is
offset by positive identification by two survivors
3) For the two counts of murder, the trial court imposed penalty for 14 yrs,8m, and 1 day reclusion temporal medium
as minimum to 17 years,4m, and 1 day reclusion temporal max, are incorrect under art 248 of RPC the imposable
penalty for frustrated murder, therefore is prision mayor ini its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, because there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstance as the Court of Appeals itself held the penalty
prescribed by law should be imposed in it medium period with the application of the indeterminate. Sentence Law,
penalty for frustrated murder should be 8 years of prision mayor (minimum) as minimum,, to 14 yrs and 8 months
of reclusion temporal (minimum) as max.
People of the Philippine (plaintiff-appelle) v Martin Simon y Sungga ( respondent)
People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150

The judgment appealed from finds the appellant Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of
homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the
costs.
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living
children, has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and
has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work since he suffered
the stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters named Maria and another, are married, while still
another one is a nun. With the exception of the other married daughter and the nun, alt of them,
including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom they depend for support.
Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate
relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that
the appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house.
The relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The
appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such
extremes, that he had to be deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather's
house in Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The
appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with her child.
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has appeared
sad and worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because
the child meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for support. For some
time the appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and threatening and at other times
entreating the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to support
her and his child. Although the deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of
support, he never complied with his promise.
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the
deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went
downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that
occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his
death.
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the
appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that
the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude,
the deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on the
face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of the movement of his arm, the weapon
landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of
the deceased. We find that this conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony the
appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a
permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the
hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his
plan of compelling him to marry or, at least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this
intention in some of his letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his
proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased
resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore
mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the
blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the
death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into
consideration in favor of the appellant.
Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted in
legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping
out and brandishing his penknife.
The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers
to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the accused, should be
applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been
interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime committed befalls a different person
(decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 28, 1899), which is not
the case herein.
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article 249
of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of three
mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in
degree, that is, prision mayor, should be imposed.
Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, affirming the judgment appealed from in all other respects,
with the costs. So ordered.

Bataclan vs. Medina (1957)

G.R. No. L-10126 | 1957-10-22

Subject: Diligence of a good father of a family not a defense of common carriers; Proximate cause

Facts:

Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by Mariano Medina and driven by its regular chauffeur
Conrado Saylon left the town of Amadeo Cavite on its way to Pasay City. Among the 18 passengers were Juan
Bataclan, Felipe Lara, Natalia Villanueva and one called Visaya. At around 2:00 in the morning while the bus
was running in Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst. The bus began to zigzag until it fell into a canal on the
right side of the road and turned turtle. Some passengers managed to leave the bus except for the four
aforementioned passengers as they were stuck. Gasoline started to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on
the side of the chassis.

After half an hour, about ten men came to rescue, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo.
Almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning the bus including the passengers inside it.

The widow of passenger Bataclan filed a case against the operator Medina to recover compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages. The lower court awarded damages not for Bataclan’s death, but for the physical injuries
suffered by him. According to the court, the proximate cause of the death was not the overturning of the bus
but the fire that burned it. It concluded that Bataclan, though he suffered physical injuries, was still alive when
the bus turned turtle. The widow and Medina both appealed. The former on the damages awarded and the
latter questioning his liability.

Held:

Diligence of a good father of a family not a defense of common carriers

1. Art. 1759 of the New Civil Code provides that a common carrier shall be responsible for injuries suffered
by a passenger although it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
engagement of its employees.

2. Art. 1763 of the same code provides that common carriers are responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or strangers, if the employees could have
done something to prevent the same.
3. There was negligence on the part of the Medina, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as
shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zagging, there was a
distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop
the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

Proximate cause of death was the overturning of the bus, not the fire

4. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

5. The proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected.

6. The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was in the wee
hours of the morning, the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and
what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the
aid and effect the rescue requested from them.

7. The coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y
ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), defendants, FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS
y ILIGAN, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 75369 | 1990-11-26

DECISION

FERNAN, J.:

In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Branch II 1 convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for the latter's death and P256,960 representing the victim's
unrealized income.

On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was filed against Fernando Iligan, Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog:

"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality of Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan armed with a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a sudden unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., on his
face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latter's face which resulted to (sic) the death of said Esmeraldo Quiñones.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their arraignment on January 12, 1981 Fernando Iligan and Edmundo
Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the prosecution presented the following version of the commission of the crime.
At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were
walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a
certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed
("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they had no desire
to fight. 3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran
pursued by the three accused. They ran for about half an hour, passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing
that they were no longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited the two to accompany him to his house so that he
could change to his working clothes and report for work as a bus conductor. 4

While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly emerged on the roadside and without a word,
Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and
Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they heard shouts of people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone
shout "May nadale na." 6

On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his head busted. 7 They helped the
brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him to their house. 8

That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiñones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the
municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas. The postmortem examination report which is found at the back of the death certificate
reveals that Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained the following injuries:

"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple fracture of the entire half of the frontal left, temporal, parietal and occipital
bone of the head, with massive maceration of the brain tissue.

"2. Other findings Incised wound at the right eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4 cms. in length, 0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in
depth, abrasion on the left shoulder and right side of the neck." 9

The death certificate also indicates that Quiñones, Jr. died of "shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident."

The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their respective houses at the time the crime was
committed.

Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his house to fetch his visitors at the dance hall. 10 Along
the way, he met his nephew, Edmundo Asis, whom he presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew to accompany him to the dance hall.
However, they were not able to reach their destination because Edmundo was boxed by somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11
Instead, Fernando Iligan brought his nephew home. 12 On their way, they were overtaken by Juliano Mendoza whom Fernando Iligan
invited to his house to help him cook. 13 After bringing his nephew home, Fernando Iligan and Juliano Mendoza proceeded to Iligan's house
and arrived there between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day. 14

Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligan's testimony. He testified that while they were walking in front of the Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped
someone whom he did not recognize because there were several persons around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he addressed
his apology boxed him on his left face. He fell down and Iligan helped him. Later, Iligan accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15 After
Iligan and Juliano Mendoza had left his house, he slept and woke up at 7:00 o'clock the following morning. 16

The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiñones, Jr. died because of a vehicular
accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986, said:

"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death have shown that the victim's death was caused
by a vehicular accident. To this, notwithstanding, the Court cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of the alleged vehicular
accident has not been fully established. Second, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr., (the) father of the victim, testified that Dr. Abas told him that if
his son was hacked by a bolo on the face and then run over the entire head by a vehicle's tire, then that hacking on the face could not be
visibly seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third, Exhibit '2' (the photograph of the victim taken immediately after his
body had been brought home) is a hard evidence. It will attestly (sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any vehicle. On the
contrary, it shows that only half of the face and head, was damaged with the wound starting on a sharp edge horizontally. There are
contusions and abrasions on the upper left shoulder and on the neck while the body downwards has none of it, while on the right forehead
there is another wound caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is simple, that if the victim was run over by a vehicle, the other half
portion of his head and downward part of his body must have been likewise seriously damaged, which there are none." 17

The lower court also found that Iligan's group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of the victim to vindicate the boxing on
the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted
Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and imposed on them the aforementioned penalty.

Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which they were convicted. For the second time, they
attributed Quiñones, Jr.'s death to a vehicular accident.

No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The defense relies on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a
prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident 18 which opinion
was earlier put in writing by the same witness in the postmortem examination. Dr. Abas justified his conclusion by what he considered as tire
marks on the victim's left shoulder and the right side of his neck. 19 He also testified that the incised wound located at the victim's right
eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so superficial that it could not have caused the victim's death. 20

Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity of the actual occurrence of the vehicular mishap. One such evidence is the
testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis that when he helped bring home the body of Quiñones, Jr., he told the victim's father,
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr. that "before Esmeraldo Quiñones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle, he was hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21 When
asked why he mentioned an automobile, Zaldy Asis said that he did not notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it "because his
(Quiñones, Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis had actual knowledge of said accident but for
understandable reasons he declined to declare it in court. Defense witness Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo, also
testified that when he went to the scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the victim scattered across the road where he also saw tire
marks. 23

For its part, the prosecution, through the victim's father, presented evidence to the effect that Iligan authored the maceration of half of the
victim's head. Quiñones, Sr. testified that from their house, which was about five meters away from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding
a "sinampalok" as he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased someone. During the second time that he saw the three
accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan." 24 Hence, the lower court concluded that the victim's head was "chopped" resulting in the
splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It should be emphasized, however, that the testimony came from a biased witness and it was
uncorroborated.

While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it open
for a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court. 26 In this instance, the lower court
erred in finding that the maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a
different conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by
Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr.

Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional
felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony
committed by the offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are present in this case.

The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by the
physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the
location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and
delicate part of the body: the head. 29

The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30 where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle passed
seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of
people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle.

Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan's hacking of Quiñones, Jr.'s head might not have been the direct cause, it was the
proximate cause of the latter's death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." 31 In other
words, the sequence of events from Iligan's assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short
span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.

We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of
the crime and identified by the prosecution witnesses. 32

But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such
attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. 33 There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the
appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. 34 In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan
followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the
appellants. The group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. 35

The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all
of the following: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung
to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 36

Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the lower court's finding, proof beyond
reasonable doubt has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan's co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part
in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier
pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming
from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the former's criminal intent
but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a
party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 37
Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the
assault perpetrated by Iligan. 38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.

There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal
Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victim's unrealized income and
therefore, the same is disallowed.

WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide for which he is imposed the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).
Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.

SO ORDERED.

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 72964 | 1988-01-07

 Keywords

Related Knowledge Entry

Efficient Intervening Cause

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of
the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo
Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby
which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he
saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the
irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay
for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including
the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in
parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.
When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking
Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters
away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven
but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the
Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by
Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health
physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses
because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who
conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated
September 28, 1981) which reads:
 

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

"This is to certify that I have examined the would of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:

"1-Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.

"As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This would was presented to me only for
medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied
by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio
recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit "A"), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

"Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/1030H/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station
accompanied by brgy councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close
relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic)
all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be
repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other." (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was
given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very
serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a hearing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde
are as follows:

"Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. At DX: TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With
difficulty opening his mouth.
#35, 421 Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm. 02
inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no avail. Pronounced dead
by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M. PMC done and cadaver brought home by relatives." (p. 100, Original Records)
 

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the
then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of
P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered
confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his
penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an
affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

"That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present
having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

"That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other
places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

"That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued-irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of
San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were
regulated and reduced;

"That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will
bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches become shallow which was suitable for
catching mudfishes;

"That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;

"That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals with some companions;

"That few days thereafter, or on November 15, 1980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus."
(p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability
shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended . . ." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom."
(People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631)

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier
suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after
the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day,
November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence
of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:

"The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was
wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration.
True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said
wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected with
tetanus which ultimately caused his death.

"Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of
the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus
except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the
victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an
accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.; People v. Red, CA 43
O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel, 78 Phil. 418)

"Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going
back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation
canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle
out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that
the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand." (pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own
negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus
when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the
wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at
the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:
 

xxx xxx xxx

". . . A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

". . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
 

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier
was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus

"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms,
ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury, the
mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

"Nonspecific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and
difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of
difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible
for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite
variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In
the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and symptoms
encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, on interval referred to as the onset
time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms
are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and
causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful
and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer-
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous
system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6
days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The
criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus,
dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal
Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005)
 

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation
period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14,
1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15,
1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time,
it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have seen more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038)

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99
Phil. 118)

"'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances, which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.' (45
C.J. pp. 931-932)." (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the
records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this
respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities
of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed
the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16)

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal
aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability.
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the
recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
 

xxx xxx xxx

". . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only
a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559)

"The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him
from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:

"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of
the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of
justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense,
when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

"'This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender
while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: 'There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby be extinguished.' It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not
the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of
the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"'For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice ---- a cause for disillusionment on
the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.'"
 

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00.
However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the
homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for
fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

RODOLFO BELBIS JR. y COMPETENTE and ALBERTO BRUCALES, Petitioners, versus PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 181052 | 2012-11-14

 Keywords

 View Summary

THIRD DIVISION

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This  is  a  Petition  for  Review on  Certiorari1 under  Rule  45,  dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo.1 Belbis, Jr.
and Alberto Brucales that seeks to reverse and set aside  the  Decision2 of the  Court  of Appeals  (CA),
dated August  17,  2007, and  its  Resolution dated January 4,  2008,  affirming  with modification the
Decision3 dated  December 23,  2004  of the  Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tabaco City, AI bay, Branch  17,  finding
petitioners  guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime off Homicide. 
The factual antecedents follow. 

Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay.  Around  9:00 p.m.
of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house and proceeded to the area assigned to him.  Later on, around 10:00 p.m.,
Veronica Dacir (Veronica), Jose's live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose
was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner
Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him.  Jose was taken to St. Claire Medical Clinic
at Tiwi, Albay, about four kilometers from Barangay Naga where he was initially attended by Dr. Bernardo Corral (Dr.
Corral). Jose was later referred to Ziga Memorial District Hospital at Tabaco, Albay and, thereafter, was referred
to Albay Provincial Hospital on December 10, 1997 at 2:00 a.m.  He was confined therein for six (6) days.  Dr.
Sancho Reduta (Dr. Reduta), his attending physician, issued a medical certificate, which stated the following wounds
found on Jose's body: (1) stab wound, 3 cm., lumbar area, right; (2) stab wound, 3 cm., lumbar area, left; (3) stab
wound, 3 cm., left buttock, medial aspect; and (4) stab wound, 3 cm., left buttock, lateral aspect. He was also found
positive for alcoholic breath, his blood level was monitored and was given I.V. (intravenous) fluids and antibiotics. He
was finally discharged on December 15 1997. Dr. Reduta issued Jose prescriptions and instructed the latter to go
back to the hospital after the medicines prescribed are consumed. Jose remained bedridden and should have
returned to the hospital on December 22, 1997, but failed to do so due to financial constraints. During that time, the
wounds of Jose were not yet fully healed.

Veronica brought Jose back to St. Claire Medical Clinic on January 1, 1998, because the latter was complaining of
urinary retention and pains in his left and right lumbar regions. Dr. Corral suspected that Jose had septicemia; thus,
he was given I.V. fluids, antibiotics and diuretics, and a catheter was used to relieve Jose of urinary retention.  Upon
Jose's request, he was discharged on January 3, 1998. He was brought back to the same hospital on January 7, 1998
and was diagnosed by  Dr. Corral as having advanced Pyelonephritis, his kidney was inflamed and with pus
formation and scarring. Around 10:30 a.m. on January 8, 1998, SPO1 Lerma Bataller of the Philippine National
Police-Tiwi went to the hospital to secure Jose's ante-mortem statement. Later, in the afternoon of the same day,
Jose was brought to the clinic of Dr. Marilou Compuesto upon the advice of Dr. Corral where he underwent
ultrasound scanning. It was found that Jose's kidney had acute inflammation due to infection. He was returned to
St. Claire Medical Clinic and was advised to go to Manila.  However, Jose died at 10:00 p.m. of the same day. 

Dr. Corral issued a Death Certificate which shows the following:  

a) Immediate cause - Uremia, secondary to renal shutdown 

b) Antecedent cause - Septicemia, renal inflammatory disease.

Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, Medical Officer III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) of Naga City, Region V,
conducted an autopsy on the victim's cadaver on January 14, 1998 and issued Autopsy Report No. BRO No. 98-02,
which indicated multiple organ failure as the cause of the victim's death. Thus, petitioners were charged with the
crime of homicide. The Information reads: 

That on or about the 9th day of December 1997, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay
Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay, Philippines,  and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, and stab JOSE BAHILLO, thereby inflicting upon the latter
stab wounds which caused his death on January 8, 1998, to the damage and prejudice of the latter's heirs. 

CONTRARY TO LAW

On February 17, 1999, petitioners entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented documentary evidence as well as the testimonies of Dr. Marilou Compuesto, Dr. Sancho
Reduta, Dr. Bernardo Corral, Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, SPO1 Lerma Bataller and Calixto Dacullo.

Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense.  Through the testimonies of
petitioners, Dr. Olga Bausa and Dr. Edwin Lino Romano, their version of the incident is as follows: 
Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in Naga, Tiwi, Albay, engaged in a
conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their way home, they
heard Jose's whistle go  off as the latter was following them. Petitioner Rodolfo asked Jose what is the matter and the
latter replied, "What about?" Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on petitioner Rodolfo, but the latter was able to
evade it. Afterwards, Jose held the nightstick horizontally with both hands and tried to hit petitioner Rodolfo's
forehead. Petitioner Rodolfo held the nightstick which was in reality, a bolo sheathed on a scabbard.  Jose pulled the
bolo inside and the wooden scabbard was detached from it, thus, the blade thereof injured his left hand.
Petitioner Rodolfo kept holding the wooden scabbard and when Jose thrust the bolo to petitioner Rodolfo, the latter
parried it with the wooden scabbard he was holding. Petitioner Rodolfo managed to take the bolo away from Jose
and, thereafter, the latter embraced petitioner Rodolfo while trying to get the bolo back. Petitioner Rodolfo held the
bolo with his right hand and swung it away from Jose. Thereafter, Jose pushed petitioner Rodolfo causing the bolo to
slip from the latter's hand. Jose tried to pick the bolo up, but petitioner Rodolfo was able to hold it first, thus, Jose
stepped back.  During that commotion, petitioner Alberto was only watching and told Jose and petitioner Rodolfo to
stop fighting. 

Thereafter, petitioner Alberto accompanied petitioner Rodolfo to the latter's house because he suffered a hand injury.
Petitioner Rodolfo was then brought to Tabaco General Hospital  before he was referred to Albay Provincial Hospital.
Dr. Reduta sutured the top layer of his wound and the following day, he went back to Tabaco General Hospital where
he was operated on his left hand injury by Dr. Romano. 

Petitioner Rodolfo brought the bolo used in the incident with him in his house and reported the matter to the police
station of Tiwi and surrendered the same bolo to the police authorities. 

The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense.  The dispositive portion of the decision follows: 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the death of Jose Bahillo. Considering the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense in their favor, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Jose Bahillo the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. 

Costs against the accused.  

SO ORDERED.4

After the denial of their motion  for reconsideration, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA.  However, the latter
denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification that there was no mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense. The decretal portion of the decision reads: 

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 23 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed.  Accused appellants Rodolfo C. Belbis, Jr. and
Alberto Brucales  are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. 

Costs de oficio. 

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.  Hence, the present petition. 

Raised are the following issues:

I 

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE VICTIM
TO VERONICA DACIR, ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE VICTIM'S DEATH. CONSTITUTES A DYING DECLARATION WITHIN
THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 37, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT? 

II 

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE NOT
ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
INCOMPLETE SELFDEFENSE? 

III 

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STAB WOUNDS WERE THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VICTIM'S DEATH? 

IV 

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IS NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR?6

The petition lacks merit. 

In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal,
especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record.7 This rule, however, is not without
exceptions, one of which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court which necessitates a review of such factual findings.8

Petitioners claim that there is discrepancy in the findings of the RTC and the CA.  According to them, the RTC never
mentioned about a dying declaration which the CA discussed in its decision.  They then argue that the CA erred in
ruling that the statements made by the victim in the presence of witnesses Veronica Dacir right after being stabbed,
and SPO1 Lerma Bataller before he died, are dying declarations within the contemplation of the law as the victim still
lived  for one month after the said dying declaration was made.

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which concern the
cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain
to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of
recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief
that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.9

As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration  is made by
the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a
witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; and
(4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the  declarant's death is the subject of inquiry.10

The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on January 8, 1998 does not prove that the
victim made the statement or declaration under the consciousness of an impending death.  The rule is that, in order
to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the
declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the
dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of
the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending.11  As such, the CA incorrectly ruled that there were dying declarations.
The CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim to Veronica Dacir right after he was stabbed as part
of the res gestae and not a dying declaration. Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, reads as follows:

Sec. 42.  Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to  the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part
of the  res gestae. So also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. 

All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the
influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who  made the declaration before he had time to think and
make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence
in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances.  In sum, there
are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the  res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the  res gestae, be a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.12

It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical.  The following factors are then considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz.,
(1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2)  the
place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4)
the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5)
the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.13

Clearly, the statement made by the victim identifying his assailants was made immediately after a startling
occurrence which is his being stabbed, precluding any chance to concoct a lie.  As shown in the testimony of
Veronica: 

Q What time did you sleep that night? 

x x x x 

A I was not able to sleep that  night because I already heard my husband.

Q What did you hear? 

A He was shouting. 

Q What was he shouting? 

A He was calling my name, "Bonic." 

Q How did you come to know that it was the voice of your live-in partner? 

A Because upon hearing his call "Bonic," I went to the side of the road and I saw him on the road walking
towards our house. 

Q More or less what time was that? 

A 10:00 p.m. 

Q What did you do? 

A I approached him. 
Q What particular place did you approach him? 

A Near the store of Susan Galica. 

Q What happened when you approached him? 

A I asked him what happened. 

Q What was the answer? 

A He said that he was stabbed by Paul. 

Q What else? 

A: He was held by Boboy. 

x x x x 

Q What did you observe from Jose Bahillo your live-in partner before you brought him to the hospital? 

A He was bloody and he was weak. 

Q Could you tell us where did you see the blood? 

A At his back and on his shorts.14

Be that as it may, the CA need  have discussed in its decision the presence of a dying declaration or a statement as
part of the res gestae, because petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done the deed
to defend himself.  It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise,  conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.15  Self-defense cannot be
justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely
doubtful by itself.16  Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming
self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.17

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.18  Verily, to invoke self-defense
successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the  life of the accused, who
was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.19

Petitioners argue that the unlawful aggression that was started by the victim continued even if petitioner Rodolfo was
already in possession of the bladed weapon used in the victim's stabbing.  Petitioner Alberto narrated the event as
follows: 

Q: What happened? 

A: Rodolfo Belbis Jr. was able to fend off or parry the blow. 

Q: Then what happened again? 

A: The next action of Jose Bahillo was to hold the wood horizontally and push it towards Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and
Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was able to get hold of it. 
Q: Then what happened after Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was able to get hold of this stick? 

A: The piece of wood was detached. The one Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was holding was the scabbard, while the one with the
sharp instrument was held by Jose Bahillo. 

Q: Then what happened after this? 

A: Jose Bahillo embraced Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. 

Q: Then? 

A: Wanting to get hold of that sharp instrument. 

Q: Then what did Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. do when Jose Bahillo embraced him and tried to wrest the sharp instrument
from him? 
A: While this Jose Bahillo was embracing this Rodolfo Belbis, Jr., Rodolfo Belbis. Jr. was moving his hands while
holding the sharp instrument, holding it away and thrusting it towards the back of Jose Bahillo, near the waistline at
the back. 

Q: Then what happened when you saw this? 

A: When Jose Bahillo was not able to get hold of that sharp instrument, this Jose Bahillo pushed the body of Rodolfo
Belbis, Jr. away from him and Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. fell down. 

Q: Then what happened to the sharp instrument which Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was holding when Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.
fell down? 
A: That sharp instrument got loose from his hand but it was situated just near him. 

Q: Who are you referring as "him?" 

A: Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. 

Q: Then after this sharp instrument was loosened from the hand of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. after he fell down, would you
kindly inform this Court what happened next? 

A: At that point, this Jose Bahillo again tried to get the sharp instrument but Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. was faster and he got
hold of that instrument and [thrust] it towards Jose Bahillo.20

From the above testimony, it is apparent that the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased when
petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon.  Although there was still some struggle
involved between the victim and petitioner Rodolfo, there is no doubt that the latter, who was in possession of the
same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Retaliation is not the same  as self-defense. In retaliation,
the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-
defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.21  Such an aggression can also
be surmised on the four stab wounds sustained by the victim on his back.  It is hard to believe based on the location
of the stab wounds, all at the back portion of the body (right lumbar area, left lumbar area, left buttock,
medial aspect and left buttock, lateral aspect), that petitioner Rodolfo was defending himself.  It would have been
different if the wounds inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim's body. The CA is, therefore, correct in
agreeing with the observation of the RTC when it found that: 

x x x The Court is not convinced on how Bahillo sustained the four stab wounds as narrated by Belbis. If it
is true that Bahillo embraced him when he was able to wrest possession of the bolo, trying to get it back;
that he held it away from his reach and swung it at Bahillo's back; that he felt the blade touch the body,
the nature of the wounds inflicted would be different. It would be a laceration, slash or abrasion since it
was the sharp blade that hit the back and not the pointed end of the bolo. The location and nature of
the injuries which were stab wounds clearly showed that they were not caused by swinging
thrust. They were caused by direct thrust. It was the pointed end of the bolo that caused the
injuries which hit the same spot - the lumbar area and the buttock.22

The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the
attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary  to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.23  In the
present case, four stab wounds that are the product of direct thrusting of the bladed weapon are not necessary to
prevent what the petitioners claim to be the continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already
without any weapon. In connection therewith, having established that there was no unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim when he was stabbed, petitioners cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense. 

Anent the contention of petitioners that the CA failed to consider the testimony of the doctor who performed the
autopsy in its entirety, the same is without any merit. What really needs to be proven in a case when the victim dies
is the proximate cause of his death. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."24  The autopsy report indicated that the cause of the victim's death is multiple organ
failure.  According to Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, the doctor who conducted the autopsy, the kidneys suffered the most
serious damage.  Although he admitted that autopsy alone cannot show the real culprit, he stated that by having a
long standing infection caused by an open wound, it can be surmised that multiple organ failure was secondary to a
long standing infection secondary to stab wound which the victim allegedly sustained.25  What is important is that
the other doctors who attended to the wounds sustained by the victim, specially those on the left and right lumbar
area, opined that they affected the kidneys and that the wounds were deep enough to have caused trauma on both
kidneys. On that point, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment,26 is correct in stating the
following: 

9.3.1 Petitioners-appellants contend that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Lee for the
defense. Dr. Lee opines on cross-examination that the stab wounds sustained by Bahillo are not the cause of his
death because he lived for quite sometime and that there was no direct injury on his vital organs. There was,
however, a qualification to Dr. Lee's statement on cross-examination. He opines that he could only connect the stab
wounds with the infection and death of Bahillo if he has knowledge of the past medical records of the patient.
Petitionersappellants' reliance of the said statement of Dr. Lee is misplaced because the doctor only examined the
cadaver of Bahillo. This explains why he has no direct knowledge of Bahillo's medical records. The opinions of
the other doctors who testified for the prosecution and who examined Bahillo while he was still alive are more
conclusive than those of Dr. Lee. They had direct knowledge of the causal relation between the stab wounds,
the kidney failure and the death of Bahillo.27

Thus, it can be concluded that without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted with an infection
which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his  death.  The offender is criminally liable for the death of
the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.28

As to the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same
does not deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1)
the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the
latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.29   The essence of  voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the
intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his
guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture.30  Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of
arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as
"voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.31 In the present case, when the petitioners reported
the incident and allegedly surrendered the bladed weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be considered as
voluntary surrender within the contemplation of the law.  Besides, there was no spontaneity, because they only
surrendered after a warrant of their arrest had already been issued. 

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.
and Alberto Brucales, is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the  Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 17,
2007, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2008, affirming with modification the Decision dated December 23, 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17, finding petitioners beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide are hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE v. ORLITO VILLACORTA, GR No. 186412, 2011-09-07

Facts:
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr.
Belandres).
Mendeja... was tending her sari-sari store
Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendeja's store.
Cruz was ordering bread at
Mendeja's store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz's body using a
sharpened bamboo stick.
Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta.
Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.
Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz's medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to
stab... wound.
For its part, the defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz.
Upon arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy... cigarettes at a nearby store.
This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home.
Villacorta only... found out about Cruz's death upon his arrest
RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment
Villacorta comes before this Court via the instant appeal.
Issues:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED A CRIME, HE COULD ONLY BE HELD LIABLE FOR
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.
Ruling:
Villacorta assails the credibility of Mendeja, an eyewitness to the stabbing incident.
We are not persuaded.
Such determination made by the trial court... proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,
their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and... candor.
The purported inconsistencies in Mendeja's testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on matters that have no bearing on the
fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz
In the face of Mendeja's positive identification of Villacorta as Cruz's stabber, Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated
denial.  Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant
impotence.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he
should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.
The proximate cause of Cruz's death is the... tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."
There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro
Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of... severe tetanus infection.
If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days
later.
The infection of Cruz's stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to
the time of his death.
Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz.
We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the prosecution was not able to establish
Villacorta's intent to kill.
The instrument used is not as lethal as those made of metallic material.  The part of the body hit is not delicate in... the sense that
instant death can ensue by reason of a single stab wound.
When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only.
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend
directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might
make.
To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will
take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime...
without risk to the aggressor.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this case, and we sustain such finding.
Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for an attack on his person.
ART. 266.  Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. - The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party from labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

given that Villacorta has been in jail since July 31, 2002 until present time, already way beyond his imposed sentence, we order
his immediate release.
A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as
defined and punished by Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code,

eople vs Michael Tadeo (2002)

G.R. No. 127660 and G.R. Nos. 144011-12 | 2002-09-17

Subject: Evident premeditation not present; Treachery not present; Tadeo should only be convicted for
attempted murder, not frustrated murder, against Florencia Cabatu; Mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should be appreciated; Where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or
murder, the illegal possession of firearms is merely an aggravating circumstance; The use of an unlicensed
firearm cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance

Facts:

On 4 November 1993, around 11:30 in the morning, Michael Tadeo was drinking with Mayolito Cabatu and
several others in Sto. Domingo, Isabela, to celebrate the successful installation of a water pump that would
supply potable water to their barangay. Around 4pm in the afternoon, after five hours of imbibing alcohol,
Mayolito was so dead drunk that he excused himself and proceeded to the pavement where he sat wobbly on
the gutter. Ricky Cardona, one of the carousers, and Florencia Cabatu, Mayolito's mother, approached Mayolito
and assisted him in going home. But, before they could leave, Mayolito shouted "barako," apparently to tease
Tadeo and titillate him into a "fight" who, true enough, took offense against the mocking remark.

Tadeo instantaneously grabbed a beer bottle and tried to whack Mayolito with it on the head. Ricky and
Florencia intervened. Tadeo briskly went home exclaiming, "Aguray kadta a!" which means "Wait, I will come
back!" Then he hastily returned clutching a .38 cal. revolver and confronted Mayolito, Ricky and Florencia why
they were intervening. Tadeo lost no time in shooting Mayolito six times, some bullets piercing his head. He
then trained his gun on Florencia, but unfortunately, the pistol was already empty, so he approached her
instead and whipped her on the face with the butt of his revolver.

Rogelio Cabatu, brother of Mayolito, approached with a bolo on hand, and hacked Tadeo on the head. With
blood oozing from his head, Tadeo retreated towards his house to reload his gun, and upon his return,
immediately shot Florencia on her left buttock, while Rogelio sought cover.

Tadeo turned himself in. Tadeo was accordingly charged with (a) murder for the fatal shooting of Mayolito
Cabatu, (b) frustrated murder for the injury sustained by Florencia Cabatu, and (c) qualified illegal possession
of firearm, i.e., use of an unlicensed firearm in committing murder or homicide.

Tadeo pleaded not guilty to the charges and offered self-defense as his version of the incident. He claimed that
Mayolito dared him into a fist-fight. After Tadeo successfully took possession of the gun, he fired several shots
more, injuring Mayolito in different parts of his body.

After trial, the court found Tadeo guilty of the crimes charged. In the present appeal, Tadeo questions the
appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and claims that he should
instead be held guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide only. Further, he insists that the trial court
erroneously disregarded the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in imposing the proper penalties,
including the absence of any evidence indicating that the gun he used was unlicensed.

Held:

Evident premeditation not present

1.  Michael Tadeo and the deceased Mayolito Cabatu were both drunk and the fight was preceded by rising
tempers. Invariably, Tadeo was not in full possession of his faculties which would have been necessary for him
to kill Mayolito Cabatu, or try to kill Florencia Cabatu with the attendant evident premeditation, i.e., the
execution of the criminal act must come with sober thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.

2.  In turn, because of Tadeo's mental and moral stupor at the time of the perpetration of the criminal acts, the
prosecution could not have proved the requisites of this qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation:

(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
(c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and for his conscience to overcome his will.

Treachery not present

3.  In the same vein, having been inebriated and overtaken by anger immediately prior to the assault, Tadeo
cannot be accused of treachery. Under this state, he did not have the time nor the proper disposition to reflect
on the means or mode of attack for it to be said that he deliberately and consciously pulled out his gun and
fired at the deceased to insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself. Furthermore, the heated
exchanges between him and the deceased prior to the attack must have placed the latter on his guard, hence,
we cannot rule that Mayolito Cabatu was caught completely by surprise when Tadeo took up arms against him.

4.  For there to be treachery by reason of the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack, there must have
been no warning of any sort to the deceased or offended party. Verily, the statement of Tadeo to Mayolito
Cabatu, viz, "Aguray kadta a!" meaning "Wait, I will come back!" which the deceased took seriously, as he did
confront Michael Tadeo when he returned, shows convincingly that the victim was not unprepared nor stunned
to see Tadeo wielding a gun and firing at him. The element of a sudden unprovoked attack indicative of
treachery was therefore missing.

5.  Similarly, we reverse the finding of the trial court that the attack against Florencia Cabatu was sudden and
unforeseen.The crime against her happened when Tadeo was highly intoxicated and seething with anger
against his perceived tormentor, and immediately after he had gunned down Mayolito Cabatu, after the same
gun was aimed at her but did not fire for being empty, and Tadeo returned to his house to reload his gun.
Evidently, these contemporaneous and preceding events must have already placed the victim on heightened
alert and sufficient forewarning that a reprisal was in the offing. This crime which has been erroneously labeled
as "frustrated murder" lacks the twin elements of aleviosa: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself; and, (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him.

Tadeo should only be convicted for attempted murder, not frustrated murder, against Florencia
Cabatu

6.  Tadeo should only be convicted for attempted murder, not frustrated murder, committed against Florencia
Cabatu. She was hit in the left buttock which was not per se a mortal wound. As per Dr. Ricafort's testimony,
Florencia Cabatu was "walking normally" when brought to the hospital for medical treatment after a full five-
hour period from the time she was shot by Tadeo. Clearly, where the wound inflicted on the victim is not as
severe as to cause her death, the offender not having performed all the acts of execution that would have
brought it about, the crime is perpetrated only in its attempted stage.

7.  If in the realm of possibility tetanus could at all infect Florencia Cabatu's wound and make it mortal or
fatal, the disease would only constitute an efficient intervening cause, therefore, distinct and foreign to the
crime. Hence, we cannot conclude that all the acts of execution had been performed by Tadeo to kill the
hapless woman, for to classify the crime in the frustrated stage, the rule is that the probable death of the
victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused
and, since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, that there be proof thereof beyond reasonable doubt.
Moreover, Tadeo failed to complete all the acts of execution because Florencia Cabatu was able to evade him
and hobble to the vicinity of the detachment of the barangay civilian security force.

Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated

8.  The trial court erred in not crediting Tadeo with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. At 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon of the same day of the shooting of Mayolito Cabatu and her mother Florencia Cabatu,
the policemen converged at the house of the barangay kapitan where they met Tadeo's father who assured
them that his son would surrender and in good faith led them to his house where Tadeo had gone after the
shooting episodes. There the father yielded to the policemen a gun which he said was the weapon used in the
criminal acts while Tadeo on the same occasion and without hesitation turned himself in. Clearly, the act of
Tadeo in surrendering to the authorities showed his intent to submit himself unconditionally to them and save
them the trouble and expense that would have to be incurred in his capture. The spontaneity of his surrender
cannot also be denied because even the weapon used in the crimes was yielded by his father to the policemen
in his presence without objecting to its surrender nor denying his participation in the deadly clashes.

9.  For this reason he complied with the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, namely:

(a) the offender was not actually arrested;

(b) he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and
(c) his surrender was voluntary.

Where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, the illegal
possession of firearms is merely an aggravating circumstance

10.  We must reverse and set aside the conviction of the accused where he was charged with illegal possession
of a firearm used in perpetrating the homicide and attempted homicide, i.e., violation of par. 2, Sec. 1, PD
1866, as a result of the decriminalization of violations of PD 1866 by RA 8294 where the unlicensed firearm is
used in carrying out the commission of other crimes.

11.  We have declared that the formulation in RA 8294, i.e., "if homicide or murder is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance," signifies a legislative intent to treat as a single offense the illegal possession of firearms and the
commission of murder or homicide with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an
unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the
two (2) separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal Code and qualified illegal possession
of firearms used in homicide or murder under PD 1866; in other words, where murder or homicide was
committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a
special aggravating circumstance.

The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance

12.  The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be considered however as a special aggravating circumstance in
Crim. Case No. 23-498 and Crim. Case No. 23-494. For one, it was not alleged as an aggravating circumstance
in the Informations for murder and frustrated murder which is necessary under our present Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Moreover, even if alleged, the circumstance cannot be retroactively applied to prejudice
Tadeo; it must be stressed that RA 8294 took effect only on 6 July 1994 while the crimes involved herein were
committed on 4 November 1993.

13.  In any event, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is no evidence proving the illicit
character of the .38 cal. revolver used by appellant in killing Mayolito Cabatu and in trying to kill Florencia
Cabatu, as to which requisite of the crime the record is eerily silent.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ORLANDO ACURAM, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding accused-appellant Orlando Acuram guilty of murder.

On September 30, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber Apepe charged appellant with the crime of
murder, allegedly committed as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at Poblacion, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, which is
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and treachery did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with the use of his armalite rifle, shoot at one Orlando 1
Manabat who was just standing on the highway waiting for a ride towards home, thus, hitting and wounding the
latter on the right leg or thigh, which caused his death the following day.
chanrobles.com : law library

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 2

Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. 3 Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment, disposing as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts convincingly proved by the prosecution, the accused, ORLANDO
ACURAM, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and
is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO MANABAT the
jurisprudential sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED." 4

The records disclose that on June 29, 1991, at around seven o’clock in the evening, Rolando Manabat, Oscar
Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day’s work, proceeded to the market in El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Since no fish was available at that time, they decided to head for home
instead. They went to the national highway, stood at the right side facing east towards the direction of Cagayan
de Oro City and waited for a ride there. They flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney which, however,
swerved dangerously towards them. At this juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a
kamo, Manligis man kamo" (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A passenger inside the jeepney
shouted back, "Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang
out in the air, accompanied by sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney. Then Rolando shouted,
"Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City.
Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his companions to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center.
Later on, they were informed that Rolando needed blood transfusion and so they transferred him at around
11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in the same city.

Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The doctor found the victim’s
blood pressure to be just forty over zero (40/0) and the victim’s right leg was heavily bandaged. He decided to
operate on the victim when the latter’s blood pressure stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the
victim underwent surgery. Unfortunately, the victim died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa later testified that the
cause of Rolando’s death was "secondary to huddle respiratory syndrome secondary to blood loss, secondary to
gunshot wounds", or briefly, massive loss of blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal
circumstances, the wound would not necessarily cause death but in this case where the wound transected the
major part of the leg, the wound was fatal. He clarified that the victim sustained only one gunshot wound which
entered at the front portion of the right knee and exited at the back of the right knee, causing two wounds. 5

The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered that appellant Orlando
Acuram, a policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company based at San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental,
was among the passengers of the errant jeepney. He was seated at the front, right side of the jeepney and was
the only one among its passengers who was carrying a firearm. Pending investigation, he was restricted to the
camp effective July 1, 1991, upon orders of his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra. 6 Appellant
was later surrendered by his commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of the warrant of
arrest issued by MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery. 7 On motion by the prosecution and without objection from the
defense, the trial court suspended appellant from the service and ordered his detention at the provincial jail. 8

During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney and had a gun at that time
but denied firing it. He claimed that it was impossible for him to fire his rifle during that time since he was
sitting at the front seat of the jeepney, sandwiched between the driver and the latter’s father-in-law. Moreover,
he said that the rifle was locked and wrapped by his jacket and its barrel was even pointed towards the driver.
9
The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable. On the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, the court found appellant guilty as charged. Insisting on his innocence, appellant
readily filed his notice of appeal. 10 In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the
trial court:
chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED APPELLANT TOOK FLIGHT OR ESCAPED
AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED, AND
THE ALLEGED WEAPON NOT POSITIVELY TESTED.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS, THE EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH IS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM." 11

We shall take up in seriatim the challenges posed by appellant to the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence
for the prosecution. We shall also consider the weight and credibility of his defense.

To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting incident, we find that his behavior
proves otherwise. Appellant admits that he was at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting happened.
Considering that he is a law enforcement officer, the unusual incident should have at least elicited his curiosity
and he should have inquired about it. However, he chose to ignore the incident and go his way. 12 That a
policeman could display such indifference to a crime committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it was
true that he reported for duty the day after the incident, the following day, he was ordered by his commanding
officer restricted within the camp pending investigation of the case. By this time, appellant must have learned
that his commanding officer had received a radio message and that he was already a suspect. As the trial court
noted, no superior officer will hold back from any of his men involved, such a grave charge. Despite these,
appellant did not present himself before the police in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was
conveniently nowhere to be found.

Thus, appellant’s first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, in
our view, is quite untenable. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt
or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 13 In this
case, it was appellant’s commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained
by one’s superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not
tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court is correct in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in appellant’s favor.

On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit. Appellant asserts that the trial court
erred in concluding that the killing was qualified by treachery. On this point, we agree. For treachery to be
considered an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of
attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. 14 In this case, the shooting was done
at the spur of the moment. As observed by the trial court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver
and the passengers of the jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous response to the cursing, as appellant
correctly claimed. 15 Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash
and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will. 16

Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the perpetrator of the crime. He
claims he was not conclusively identified and the alleged fatal weapon was not positively tested. True,
prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as the one who fired the gun at the victim.
Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix where the trial court may
draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 17 It is settled that conviction may be based on circumstantial
evidence provided that the following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 18 Circumstantial evidence could be of similar weight
and probative value as direct evidence. From direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of
circumstances the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a conviction that from
said fact or facts some other facts may be validly inferred. 19 No greater degree of certainty is required when
the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime. 20

As noted by the trial court and the Solicitor General, the evidence for the prosecution is replete with details,
duly proven by the prosecution and to some extent by admissions of the defense, enough to sustain the guilt of
appellant. These are: (1) The appellant was a former member of the Philippine Constabulary and, during the
incident, was a member of the Philippine National Police. He was skilled in handling firearms. (2) The appellant
was issued a firearm (armalite rifle) by his command, which he was then carrying with him before, during and
after the incident. (3) At the particular date, time and place of the incident, appellant was carrying his duly
issued armalite rifle inside the jeepney from where the gunfire came from. (4) The appellant was sitting on the
extreme front-right-side of the jeepney where the sparks of the gunbursts were seen and heard by the
witnesses. (5) There were no other persons with a rifle inside the jeepney except the appellant. (6) The empty
shells of an armalite rifle were recovered at the place where the fatal shooting occurred. (7) The appellant did
not go forward to the authorities to present himself until after a warrant of arrest was issued and, in fact, until
his actual arrest. 21

The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading to a reasonable conclusion
that appellant, to the exclusion of others, was responsible for the victim’s death. They constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the offense. It is the height of desperation on
appellant’s part to insist that there should be an eyewitness to the precise moment the shot was fired
considering the sudden and completely unexpected shooting of the victim. 22 Here, circumstantial evidence
suffices.

Appellant’s insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of paraffin and ballistic tests, in our view, is far
from convincing. Suffice it to state that even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that
a person did not fire a gun. The absence of nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a firearm with
gloves on, or if he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter. 23

Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death of the victim on the lack of prompt and
proper medical attention given. He insists that the delay in giving proper medical attendance to the victim
constitutes an efficient intervening cause which exempts him from criminal responsibility. This assertion is
disingenuous, to say the least. Appellant never introduced proof to support his allegation that the attending
doctors in this case were negligent in treating the victim. On the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that
the attending doctor at the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by applying
bandage on the injured leg to prevent hemorrhage. He added that the victim was immediately given blood
transfusion at the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital when the doctor found out that the victim had a very
low blood pressure. Thereafter, the victim’s blood pressure stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the victim as
the main blood vessel of the victim’s right leg was cut, thereby causing massive loss of blood. The surgery was
finished in three hours. Unfortunately, the victim died hours later. We cannot hold the attending doctors liable
for the death of the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim does not break at all
the causal connection between the wrongful act of the appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It
does not constitute efficient intervening cause. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the
shooting by the appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of
his criminal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the injured did not
receive proper medical attendance would not affect appellant’s criminal responsibility. The rule is founded on
the practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of
his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely
establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death. 24

To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the crime committed is only
homicide, not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is only
reclusion temporal. As there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance found by the trial court or
shown after a review of the records, the penalty in this case shall be fixed in its medium period of reclusion
temporal, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4
months. Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of
prision mayor as a minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum. The range of prision
temporal is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The span of reclusion temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal
Case No. 91-1161, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Orlando Acuram is hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and
sentenced to suffer a prison term of 10 years of the medium period of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years
and 10 months and 1 day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rolando Manabat in the amount of P50,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Intod vs. CA and People (1992)

G.R. No. 103119 | 1992-10-21

Subject: Impossible Crime

Facts: Factual impossibility in the crime of attempted murder

Suplicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, Avelino Daligdig and Salvador Mandaya planned to kill
Bernardina Palampangan because of a land dispute between her and Intod. They then went to Palampangan’s
house one night, all armed with firearms. As soon as Mandaya pointed the bedroom of Palampangan, his
companions immediately fired at it. It turned out, however, that their subject was in another city and her home
was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots.

The RTC convicted them of attempted murder, which was affirmed by the CA’s decision. Thus they filed a
petition for review.

According to them, they cannot be held liable for attempted murder because Palangpangan’s absence from her
room on the night they riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, the
People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.

Held:

Factual impossibility in the crime of attempted murder

1. Art. 4 Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal responsibility shall be incurred “ By any person
performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. “

2. This provision penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. Its rationale is to
punish criminal tendencies.

3. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either legal impossibility or physical or factual impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
4. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. This applies in this case.

5. Intod and the others fired at the place where they thought their victim would be, although in reality, the
victim was not present in said place and thus, they failed to accomplish his end. Thus they were found guilty of
an impossible crime.

Case: People v. Saladino, L-3634, 30 May 1951, 89 Phil. 807

Topic: Impossible Crimes (Art 4, Par 2, RPC)

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Bartolo Saladino and Anastacia Alejo

Facts

In the night of June 23, 1948 Corporal Bartolo Saladino and Private Anastacia Alejo of  the Philippine Constabulary were
resting in the house of Celso Abucay in Paoay, Ilocos Norte,together with policemen Melchor Quevedo, Wilfredo Osman
and George Plan of that municipality. 

They had gone on patrol duty to the barrio for the purpose of apprehending those who on a previous night had fired upon
the dwelling.

About midnight they were suddenly awakened by cries for help. They went down and were approached by one Felix Pasion
who reported he had been robbed, one of the robbers being Luis Bernabe.

The next morning, Saladino and Alejo, accompanied by the policemen proceeded to the house of Luis Bernabe in Barrio
Samac of San Nicolas same province. Having found the suspect, they brought him, for questioning, to the residence of
Felix Pasion in Barrio Singao same municipality.

It was about ten in the morning. As Pasion reiterated his imputation, Saladino led Bernabe up the house for further
investigation. He was followed by Anastacio Alejo and the policemen. Bernabe denied the charge. To extract a confession,
Saladino repeatedly boxed and kicked him in different parts of the body. Bernabe continued denying his guilt. Saladino got
a piece of wood, two inched thick and one yard long, and clubbed him several times on the chest, abdomen and the back.
Then he called on Alejo to take his turn. Alejo reluctantly whipped Bernabe four times with the branch of a tree, and then
retired to the kitchen. Saladino again questioned his prisoner and as the latter would not admit his culpability, he repeated
the severe beating, and tying Bernabe’s wrists together with a rubber strap, made him stand on a chair, tied the strap to a
beam in the ceiling and then pushed the chair from under Bernabe with the result that the latter was left hanging in the air.
While in that position Bernabe was cudgeled by Saladino, with the wooden club, on the sides, armpits, stomach, hips and
back. It was at this juncture that policeman Plan interceded for the victim saying, Stop now corporal. Better bring him to
your headquarters and there you will investigate him”. But Saladino ignored plea, and resumed the maltreatment, loudly
predicting that Bernabe would confess before noon. After Bernabe had remained suspended for five minutes, Saladino
untied him, made him sit on a chair and urged him to acknowledge his offense. As Bernabe persisted in his refusal,
Saladino kicked the chair and Bernabe fell on the floor, even as Saladino pouncing on his captive booted him several times
until the latter lay motionless on the floor. “It seems he is dead,” Policeman Oaman exclaimed. Saladino replied “No, he is
only feigning death” and presently stepped on Bernabe’s throat and chest. Then Saladino let him alone for fifteen minutes,
during which time Bernabe did not stir nor breathe. An old man approaching Bernabe and taking his pulse said that the man
was dead. Suddenly realizing his predicament, Saladino ordered two civilians to carry Bernabe down and told Alejo: “shoot
him now and we will say that he ran away”. Complying with the corporal’s order Alejo shot Bernabe four times with his
carbine, after the latter had been laid down flat on his stomach about thirty meters away from the house. Three days
afterwards Bernabe was intered.

Issue

Whether or not the accused shall incur criminal liability?

Held
Yes. Bartolo Saladino and Anastacia Alejo shall incur criminal liability.
 
From the foregoing it is plain that Bernabe having died as a consequence of the violent mauling by Saladino, the latter must
be declared guilty of assassination. Anastacio Alejo does not appear to have conspired with him, and is not liable either as
principal or as accomplice of the murder. But he is guilty as accessory after the fact for having performed acts tending to
conceal Saladino’s crime by making it appear that Bernabe had run away.

U.S. v. Cuison 20 Phil. 433 is a relevant example. Facundo Balangac was shot from behind by Private Valentin Fortuna in
the cemetery of Barili, Cebu. “Some hours afterwards, the defendant Cuison with several constabulary privates, among
them Valentin Fortuna, went by order of Lieutenant Poggi to the place where the body of the deceased lay, and commanded
the soldiers to spread out in skirmish like and discharge their firearms into the air; then the defendant, with the private
Fortunam, went to the house of Epimaco Sosa to ask him for a dagger to place beside the body of a man whom they had
shot, thereby to give the appearance that the deceased had been carrying a dagger.”
 
This court declared the defendant Cuison guilty of accessory after the fact saying:

“But we do find criminal liability in the acts performed by Corporal Cuison, eventhough he obeyed orders from his
Lieutenant, Poggi; such liability consists in his having intervened subsequently to the commission of the crime, by
furnishing the means to make it appear that the deceased was armed and that it was necessary to kill him on account of  his
resistance to the constabulary man, who, to lend color to such pretended resistance, discharged their firearms into the air,
under the direction of Cuison, at the place there where the corpse was lying; and also consists in his having tried to find a
dagger to place beside the deceased. Such acts must be characterized as concealment, and since they are not only wrong but
also unlawful, the defendant is not exempt from liability, even though he acted in obedience to a command from his
superior, because such command was illegal and in conflict with law and justice. Therefore it can not be alleged that
obedience was due, or that it exempts the defendant from criminal liability.”

Ruling

Therefore, inasmuch as the penalty imposed on appellant Saladino accords with the law, the judgment against him is
affirmed, with costs.

As to appellant Alejo the appealed decision is revoked and one will be entered sentencing him to imprisonment for not less
than 3 years of prision correctional nor more than six years and two months, of prision mayor; and in case of insolvency of
Saladino to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of his own
inability to
pay. No costs against this appellant.

So ordered.

Jacinto vs. People (2009)

G.R. No. 162540 | 2009-07-13

Subject: Qualified theft; Impossible crime; Crime must be charged in the information

Facts:

Baby Aquino handed Banco De Oro (BDO) a postdated check amounting to P10,000 as payment for her
purchases from Mega Foam Int’l, Inc. to Gemma Jacinto, being the latter’s collector. Somehow, the check was
deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle. Jacqueline is the
sister of Gemma and the former inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam received a phone call from one of their customers,
Jennifer Sanalila. The latter wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam,
instead of issuing the checks payable to cash. The customer had apparently been instructed by Capitle to make
check payments payable to cash. Another phone call was received from Land Bank for the purpose of informing
Capitle that the BDO check issued by Aquino bounced.

Ricablanca phoned Anita Valencia asking the letter to inform Capitle about the bounced check. Valencia told
Ricablanca that the check came from Aquino. Ricablanca was instructed to ask for the check’s replacement.
Ricablanca was further told the plan of taking the cash and dividing it equally into four: for Valencia,
Ricablanca, Jacinto and Capitle. It was reported to Joseph Dyhengco -- Mega Foam’s owner.

Dyhengco, with the help of the National Bureau of Investigation, planned an entrapment operation. The plan is
to dust ten pieces of P1,000 bills and to give it to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going
along with Valencia’s plan. The latter went to Aquino’s factory who pretended that she would be replacing the
check for cash, when in fact she is going to use the marked money and divide it between Valencia and Jacinto.
Valencia and Aquino were immediately arrested by the NBI.

The RTC found them guilty for qualified theft. The CA modified the penalty as to Valencia. A partial motion for
reconsideration was denied, thus they filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Jacinto and the others now contend that they cannot be charged of qualified theft because the check has no
value, it being subsequently dishonored. Thus, the element of intent to gain from the thing stolen in qualified
theft is absent.

Held:

No qualified theft (lack of intent to gain)

1. The elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code are the following:

a. The taking of personal property

b. The said property belonged to another - the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for
purchases she made

c. The taking was done with intent to gain

d. It was done without the owner's consent

e. It was done with grave abuse of confidence

2. The personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain
from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be
imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
3. In this case, Jacinto unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. The element of intent to gain is absent.

Impossible crime of qualified theft

4. The elements of an impossible crime are:

a. That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property

b. That the act was done with evil intent

c. That its accomplishment was inherently impossible, OR the means employed was either inadequate or

ineffectual.

5. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either legal impossibility or physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

6. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. Factual impossibility on the other hand occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor
or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.

7. In this case, Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime
against property. Her evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for
Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced,
she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to her at the time, that prevented the
crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless,
because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of
said dishonored check. Jacinto should only be held liable for the impossible crime of theft.

Crime must be alleged in the information

8. The fact that Jacinto further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a
different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by the
allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on her; otherwise, it would violate the
due process clause of the Constitution.The fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of
criminal liability