Socio-Econ. Ph. Sci. Vol. 7, pp. 67-77 (1973). l’ergamon Press.

Printedin GreatBritain

THE “SYSTEMS VIEW” AND PLANNING THEORY

ANDREAS FALUDI

Department of Town Planning, Oxford Polytechnic, Oxford, England

(Received 19 July 1972)

This paper evaluates the British “systems view” of planning in terms of its success in
providing a basis for planning theory. It is argued that it falls short of fulfilling all the
criteria of a satisfactory base for planning theory, i.e. it does not provide a rationale for
physical planning. Instead of making full use of the potential for criticising their practise
inherent to its concept, the systems view merely rationalises what physical planners do anyway.
In an attempt to investigate what the rationale of physical planning might be, the author then
suggests one should conceive physical development plans as resource budgets which act mainly
as constraints on, rather than as guides for, action.

“Some modern urban&s use planning methods but continue to pursue the goals
of urbanism, treating cities and metropolitan areas as primarily spatial pheno-
mena and systems” (HERBERT J. GANS).

MCLOUGHLIN’S book Urban and Regional Planning-A Systems Approach [7] has been
hailed as a landmark, as the textbook on the new planning methodology. With the publica-
tion of Chadwick’s work A Systems View of Planning-Towards a Theory of the Urban
and Regional Planuing Process [3], the application of methods of systems analysis to planning
has now acquired the status of a distinct school of though with a clearly identifiable location
in the intellectual landscape of British planning and with considerable potential for in-
fluencing planning practice in the near future. The purpose of this paper is therefore to
evaluate the “systems view” as represented by these two works in terms of its success in
achieving what it professes to achieve, namely to provide a basis for planning theory.
The procedure will be:

(4 to develop a very simple conceptual framework for talking about planning theory;
(b) from this framework to derive criteria for a general theory of planning and for
specific planning theories;
Cc)to suggest, in summary form, why the systems view fails to satisfy all the criteria
of a specific planning theory;
(4 to substantiate this proposition by reference to the two books and to an argu-
ment about the nature of space conducted within the spatial disciplinepar excellence,
geography. This throws doubts on the usefulness of what is called “physical”
planning. It will be argued that a physical development plan, rather than being a
plan for action, is more of the nature of a resource budget, i.e. constraining action
but not guiding it.
68 ANDREAS FALUDI

For a conceptual framework we may turn to Fig. 1. There, a distinction is drawn,

first of all, between a guidance system (“guidance” to include self-guidance) and the environ-
ment. Theguidancesystem represents, in the first instance, all human activities which have as
their aim directly or indirectly to transform some relevant variables in the environment which
in turn are a sub-set of all environmental variables. But it is useful to differentiate further
between guidance systems which deal with the environment directly and those which guide
other guidance systems in turn, procure their means of production, sustain the commit-
ment of their members, etc. etc.
The “environment” of these more specialised guidance institutions therefore consists
of the environment of all human activities and some of these activities themselves, including
the institutional forms which they take. Some of their actions may be directed towards the
former, some towards the latter. Thus, their set of relevant variables may include human
activities and institutions as well as other aspects of the environment.
Governments may thus simply be seen as (self-) guidance systems on the all-embracing,
societal level or as societal guidance systenw. Public planning functions, of whichever kind,
including the planning of adapted spaces and communication channels, are performed by
various specialised societal guidance systems which we shall call pZanning system.
Planning systems address themselves ench to their ,s/jecjfic .set of relevant variables.

I Societal guidance
I
system

Relevant envlronmentoi variables

Environment
_ -- -l
FIG. 1. A conceptual framework for planning theory.

In FQ. I, the general interaction between a societal guidance system and its environ-
ment is indicated by a wide arrow standing for the stream of information and energy
exchanged between it and the environment. The exchange between a planning system and
its specific set of variables forms part of this stream.
It must be added that this is not a closed circuit, i.e. that societal guidance systems and
their environment, when taken together, are not of the nature of a closed system. An
arrow coming from outside the relevant variables of the environment indicates the quality
of this interaction as that of an open system, but here the matter will not be pursued any
further.
 The “Systems View” and Planning Theory 69

Planning systems, whatever else they may do, form an image of their environment and
their specific set of relevant variables in the environment, naturally enough, forms a very
prominent part of this image. That is not all that there is to planning though, because the
planning process results in modifying actions aimed at the specific set of environmental
variables. To take such actions requires decisions which in turn require a facility which I
shall call societal wiZ1thus paraphrasing Miller et al. [S] and Deutsch [4]. Both the wider
societal guidance institutions as well as planning systems partake in this facility of societal
will. This societal will, and the way it is formed deserves more of our attention, but this is
again not the place to pursue the matter any further.
Building on this conceptual framework, one may now proceed by outlining what
criteria a general theory of planning and any speczjic planning theory would have to fulfil.
This is quite simple. A general theory of planning must envelop all specific theories of
planning : it is a theory explaining what planning processes performed by societal
guidance institutions have in common; including their systematic variations. To put it
differently, a general theory of planning is an elaboration of a conceptual framework as
outlined above; the one which has been put forward or any other one which is found to be
more suitable.
A specific theory of planning, in turn, must explain the way in which the activities of a
particular planning system relate to a general theory of planning. More precisely, it must
(a) show why a planning system’s actions are directed towards a specific set of environ-
mental variables;
(b) show how the image held by that planning system adequately reflects the nature of
these variables ; and
(c) show how the specific form of planning performed by that planning system fits that
image.
This critique of the systems view relates primarily to (a) above. Tn summary, it boils
down to the one point, namely that the systems view fails to answer the question of why there
should be a form qf planning concerned with adapted spaces and communication channels as
its specific set of relevant environmental variables. To put it differently, it fails to give a
satisfactory rationale for what is more commonly described as physical planning.
Of course this is not to say that the systems view has no merits. It is a useful step in the
direction of a general theory of planning. Many of the basic propositions of such a theory
are contained in it, in particular in Chadwick’s book. But what this amounts to as yet is
merely a way of showing how what planners do anyway makes sense when interpreted in
terms of systems analysis and how planners’ actions may be improved still further by
making fuller use of methodological rigour. This, however, still falls short of a rationale.
Such a shortcoming of the systems view is all the more surprising since both authors
come close to dealing with the question of such a rationale. Their failure of completing their
own train of thought, of developing the systems view into an instrument of assessing critically
what physical planning is about, amounts to an inconsistency which, given the coherence of
argument and depth of analysis otherwise exhibited by their works, can only be understood
as reflecting their interest which is prima facie with physical planning, and not with a general
theory of planning.
To substantiate this point, I shall refer to the two works, taking McLaughlin’s book [8]
first. The fundamental point which he makes is that
“ . . . human relationships with the environment can be understood as an ecological or
eco-system. In terms of human behaviour we identify the components of the system
70 ANDREAS FALUDI

as activities located in spaces . . . connected by means of physical or non-material

communications which flow through channels” (p. 34).
What we must note about this view is that it leads to a differentiation between human
activities oriented towards the environment and other kinds of human activities. Mc-
Loughlin is quite explicit about where his interests lie:
“As planners we are interested in only a small aspect of the motivations which drive
individuals and groups . . . (i.e. with those) which people feel because of dissatisfac-
tion . . . with . . . place related aspects of their lives . . .” (p, 38-39).
The justification for selecting this, or any other, aspect he derives from his contention
that
‘L
. . . a system is not the real world, but a way of looking at it. Definitions of systems
therefore depend in part on the purposes and objectives for which they are being
used. . .” (p. 79).
He also quotes the management scientist Stafford Beer approvingly saying that
“the definition of any particular system is arbitrary. . .” (p. 77).

Thus, he appears to suggest that, since the definition of a system is arbitrary, any way
of defining it would suffice, including his own. But an alternative conclusion which one
could draw from this would be to expect the argument to turn precisely on the appro-
priateness of choosing to regard urban and regional areas as systems in the way he does.
That is, given the voluntaristic element in choosing to regard something as a system, the
author has a responsibility for it and has to defend himself on this point.
Kuhn [6] provides an illustration for what is meant:
“If we are interested in the internal relations of parts within a human muscle cell, the
cell wall is the boundary of the cell system and the blood flowing around it is part of the
cell’s environment. But if we are interested in the whole nutrition system, the muscle
cells, the blood and the digestive tract all fall inside the system, while the brain, bones
and ears fall outside it . . If any given study is to be fruitful, the boundaries of the
system must be appropriate to the problem” (p. 49).
One must therefore ask whether McLaughlin has outlined what his problem is and in
which way he assesses the appropriateness of the boundaries of his system to that problem.
In our terms he must show why he has chosen physical variables as the specific set of
environmental variables. Any such indication is, however, absent. McLaughlin only
assumes that it is useful to regard an urban and regional area as a system, but fails to give
evidence for his assumption. His angle is obviously that of a physical planner who is
delighted about the new tools which systems analysis provides. The following quotation
emphatically underlines this strong interest of his:
“We put this framework forward simply because it is our belief that it solves far more
problems than it creates and it is at the same time an elegant and beautiful means of
understanding the man-environment relationship and a potentially powerful means for
its control and guidance” (p. 91).
Given the assumption about the voluntaristic aspect of the choice of a specific systems
approach outlined above, it would be wrong to criticise McLaughlin’s view as an a priori
false one. What one can criticise him for is the lack of discussion of alternative approaches.
If it is ultimately the public good that he professes to be interested in, then it is not self-
evident that it is most useful to concentrate on the physical environment in the way in which
 The “Systems View” and Planning Theory 71

he does. One could for instance make the point that the city as a system was as much
influenced by a change in taxation, in popular preferences, political climate, etc. as it was by
changes in its physical fabric. It may therefore be equally useful and equally conducive
to the public good to regard the city as a system of a different kind, including such things as
the motivation of human beings.
At first glance, Chadwick [3] appears to meet this point. Though his concern is with
what he calls “spatial planning”, he starts with a catholic definition of space:
“What man actually perceives we may call perceptual space and by applying various
tests to his perception he is able to deduce the existence of ph,ysical space . . . Certain
other kinds of space may be said to exist: we may say that a town is “within the
sphere of influence” of a large city and we may distinguish this sort of space as being
either economic space or social space. . . there are activities in common between
areas and places differentiated in space and “in common ” implies that there is com-
munication between the two place. Thus between man and physical space which is his
environment there is a flow of information . . . Likewise there are flows of information
between men separated by physical space which we may describe as social or economic
values, i.e. economic or social spaces are envelopes of all communication channels . . .
In essence, we are in fact dealing with a spatial system which is one, whole and multi-
dimensional : spatial planning is really what we are concerned with” (pp. 14-15).
In particular, Chadwick does not single out the space-related as against the other
aspects of people’s lives in the way in which McLaughlin does:
“Holding values, of whatever sort, motivates man to activity. . . These activities are
place-related, in the sense that some occur in geographically limited areas which we
may call activity spaces: “within-interaction”, as distinct from the flows which arise
as “between-interaction” when one activity is related to another. Activities and
related flows may be seen as parts of activity systems, which may be interpreted both as
occupying physical space and as being capable of representation in abstract spatial
terms . . .” (p. 19).
Chadwick then discusses the concept of space, going into considerable depth regarding
the mathematical concepts underlying. Space, he says, is that which is continuous. This is a
definition which does not confine the concept to three-dimensional or real space. He
discusses an extension of the concept of space to n-dimensional or topological or abstract
space drawing on examples from various fields, including economics, sociology and
psychology.
This appears to offer a chance of investigating solutions to planning problems which
lie in other-than-physical spaces. One may also conceive of packages of physical and non-
physical policies which are considered jointly in all their dimensions with the exact degree of
mix between elements being determined from case to case depending on the problem at
hand. But unfortunately Chadwick does not take this line. He takes what amounts to a
retrogressive step, namely to relate all dimensions uniformly to a two-dimensional map-
space.
There is no theoretical argument put forward for this procedure, although Chadwick
himself concludes an extensive discussion of one kind of other-than-physical space, i.e.
potential space, by saying that
“ . . . the potential space has no necessary topographical basis, although many pheno-
mena may be usually related to topographical distance” (p. 108, emphasis mine).
72 ANDREAS FALUDI

Thus, he is himself throwing doubt on whether it is possible in all cases to perform

such projection on map space. But instead of pursuing this point he emphasises how use-
ful such a procedure is for “us as planners” (this being a rare occasion of Chadwick identify-
ing himself with his professional readership). Of course this still falls short of an argument
for why one should map all manner of abstract spaces on a topographical basis. Relating
everything to an economic or social or political base could be equally convincing.
Admittedly, Chadwick does give pragmatic reasons. In a later chapter he reiterates in
the first instance, that human activities are
“
. . . representable as patterns in space-mathematical space, that is of n dimensions-
which can be transformed into two-dimensional space for comparison and manipula-
tion. Thus activities can be represented as social space or economic space; perceptual
space can be depicted too. These can be transformed to two-dimensional activity
spaces represented graphically, and compared with similar representations of “adapted
spaces” and topographical features” (p. 278).
But here he adds a pragmatic reason:
“This is a process of spatial modelling, representing the main aspects of the system
involved, just as may be done also algebraically, except that graphical methods convey
instantaneous meaning to the eye, whereas algebra requires longer interpretation:
moreover the device of interpolation allows some data deficiencies to be overcome
. . .” (pp. 278-280).
The background to this is the ingenious manner in which Chadwick applies Ashby’s
law of requisite variety [2], combining it with the work of Miller et al. on “Plans and the
Behavior” [S]. This is a fascinating way of explaining how human beings manage to cope
with complexity in their environment despite their limited channel capacity. Its central
idea is that of a hierarchical organisation of information into patterns which are successively
more and more abstract the higher up one goes. But, whilst this is illuminating as an idea,
the argument fails to convince where Chadwick assumes that the most useful way of reduc-
ing variety is that of spatial mapping.
In particular, it is doubtful whether graphical methods convey instantaneous meaning
to everybody’s eye, or whether the language of maps and diagrams is not a private one,
private that is to people trained in representing complex situations on a two-dimensional
plain and translating them back again from such a two-dimensional representation into a
mental image of a complex situation. Abercrombie’s [1] research into ways in which such
faculties are required during architectural education has produced revealing results. She
emphasises the importance of what she calls “schemata” which are
“
. . . things that you’re used to seeing, and which makes it impossible for you to see
something which conflicts with it” (p. 119).
She also underlines how laborious the process of understanding and representing the
physical environment is, i.e. the process of learning the “code” of schemata relevant to its
mapping. The question is therefore whether the untrained mind, untrained that is in the
language of graphical representation, is capable of performing the same reduction of
variety, the same feats of “pattern recognition”, as Chadwick suggests, which seems to be
very much open to doubt.
If, however, pattern recognition depends on an acquired way of looking at the world,
then one must beware of the hidden biases which any particular conceptualisation carries.
This relates back again to the complaint about McLaughlin’s book: what is absent is an
 The “Systems View” and Planning Theory 73

adequate level of discussion of alternative ways of seeing this world, of selecting aspects of
its infinite variety for consideration.
Such failure of considering how to represent problems in other than topographical
ways sometimes leads to curious conclusions about methods by which even irreconcilable
conflict may be circumvented in Chadwick’s kind of spatial planning. Following Alexander,
he suggests that goals may be converted into factors
“
. . . a factor being that which indicates whether, at any given point in space, a cri-
terion is achieved or not: thus factors are representable in spatial terms” (p. 286).
He then goes on to say that some goals/factors interact, i.e. that there are subsets of
them. By plotting the various factors, a “solution space” is arrived at, i.e. “. . . an area
within which a solution lies to the regional problem . . .” (p. 295). Then Chadwick turns
to the case of irreconcilable conflict:
“It may be objected that if two goals completely conflict, then no adjustment of that
conflict is possible. However, the achievement of goals is interpreted by factors, which
are spatial and we may find it possible to achieve a spatial situation which meets both,
conflicting factors” (p. 292).
Surely, the fact that any two goals can be accommodated within the same solution
space does not remove any conflict which there may be between them. If there is conflict,
would the most important thing not be to represent it in a type of space in which what is
salient about conflict may come out more clearly, i.e. in a type of space where it cannot be
accommodated. From all that one understands about abstract space, this would be possible
using the concepts which Chadwick provides.
He comes close enough to a similar conclusion himself when he warns his reader:
“Note that spatial relationship between factors may be seen by comparing factor
diagrams: this may or may not indicate causal interaction” (p. 289).
Again if this is so, would it not be more useful to search out the causal interactions
directly, instead of producing all these projections on map-space? This is the central
point of the theory of spatial planning which he advocates and it is left rather unexplored.
If there is a case for physical planning, then it must turn on this point.
In all fairness to the sceptic Chadwick, he does not profess to be very sure of what this
case for physical planning is. He discusses various aspects of the argument, considers as
one formidable factor contributing to its continuation the inertia built into the legislative
and administrative system of physical planning, and suggests that there is at least a reason-
able case for the relationships between sets of requirements to be co-ordinated in the
process of urban development. But the purpose of physical planning must not be that of
optimising :
“A ‘good-fit’ of activities with adapted spaces is not needed and would be quite
undesirable even if it was possible. The low-variety solution is so to organise adapted
spaces as to allow maximum choice” (pp. 371-2).
Indeed, his view seems to be that physical planning is rather unsuitable as a means for
achieving positive human goals, because he says that
“. . .
ifthe purpose of town and regional planning is to “optimise activities”, it may be
more fruitful to attempt this directly rather than through the set of adapted spaces,
especially in view of the “sloppy fit” we have discussed between adapted spaces and
activity systems” (p. 331).
74 ANIHWAS
FALUDI

Well, there we are. My reading of this is that optimisation-whatever that is-is best
attempted in a manner which suits the particular problem at hand and not necessarily by
means of physical planning. It must be added, however, that Chadwick himself voices grave
doubts as to whether optimisation of activity systems is at all desirable, even in a direct
manner, though he is slightly inconclusive on this point (as well as on the question of
social planning). If one pressed Chadwick hard enough he would perhaps emerge as some-
thinglikeananti-planner(thatisifplanningmeanssomeform ofoptimisingonasocietallevel).
This is a phenomenon which is perhaps not at all uncommon amongst physical planners.
But even within Chadwick’s own very sceptical view of the purpose of planning,
physical planning as the “low-variety solution” for maximizing choice fails to convince
finally. There may, after all, be other low-variety solutions along different dimensions
aiming at maximising choice. Why, therefore, just the one type of planning which is
commonly called physical planning r? Why, indeed, that type of planning at all? There is
some hole in the argument still.
Before outlining my own views on this question it might be as well to digress for a
while and discuss concepts of space. This is because it appears that Chadwick’s views
are shaped by what is called an “absolute” concept of space. Such a view is at least implied
in his method of projecting all manner of activities on a uniform topographical or map-
space, the assumption evidently being that, whatever else may be significant about
activities and communication, they all occur in one and the same physical space. The
rationale for physical planning (i.e. the arrangement of activity spaces and communication
channels) seems to be that of avoiding conflict or achieving some sort of order within this
physical space irrespective of what happens along the non-physical dimensions of activities.
This is just because their physical dimensions are being seen as absolute properties, ex-
pressed in terms of an unambiguous location and unequivocal measurements.
But the view of space as absolute is being questioned even from within the ranks of
geographers. Harvey, in his book Explanation in Geography [5], gives a review of this
argument. According to him, the view of space as an abstract filing system, what he has
termed the “container” view of space, has originated with Kant who has himself been
influenced by Newton. Newton, in order to be able to conceive his law of motion, had to
resort to the one and only geometry available in his days, i.e. Euclidean geometry, which he
assumed to be self-evident and apriori true.
Thus, the concept of absolute space is bound up with the development of Newtonian
physics which has become very much part of our world outlook. The “container” view of
space therefore has an intuitive appeal to us. Nevertheless, as is well known in physics, the
absolute concept of space has been replaced by alternative views based on Einstein’s
relativity theory. Also, during the nineteenth century, non-Euclidean geometries have been
developed. Within the geographical discipline itself,
“ the investigation of location theory has led to the development of relativistic
nbtibns about space” (p. 209).
such that one now views activities and objects as defining their spatial fields of influence.
Harvey [5] summarises the situation as follows:
“ . . . much of the philosophy of geography still relies on the Kantian concept of
absolute space-a concept that has been generally discredited for a century or more--
while much of the practical work of geographers operates with relativistic views of
space. These views are in open conflict . . . Space may be the central concept on which
 The “Systems View” and Planning Theory IS

geography as a discipline relies for its coherence. But the nature of space itself and the
different interpretations which may be put on the concept have scarcely been apprecia-
ted” (p. 209).
This point may be made with equal force about physical or spatial planning.
Complementary to the concept of space, there is also the concept of distance. Here, too,
geographers come to the conclusion that distance
‘1
. . can only be measured in terms of process and activity. There is no independent
metric to which all activities can be referred. In the discussion of the location of
economic activities distance may be measured in terms of cost, in the discussion of
diffusion of information distance is measured in terms of social interaction, in the
study of migration distance may be measured in terms of intervening opportunities and
so on” (p. 210).

This leads Harvey finally to a conclusion which is of immediate relevance to Chadwick’s

method of spatial planning, namely that
“
. . space is no longer something which can encompass our perception of the world.
It is rather, a collection of measures determined by our perception. If space and
matter can no longer be effectively separated and if the properties of space can no
longer be regarded as given n priori, then the logical justification for the particular
view of geography adopted by Kant et al. (i.e. that of geography as a spatial discipline,
space referring to ‘absolute’ space-A.F.) can no longer be sustained” (p. 221).

This is of course not to deny that three-dimensional, physical space is a useful frame
of reference for looking at many phenomena. Geography will continue to do so and
physical planners will too. All that this says is that it is not the only frame of reference, and
that there must be, prior to the choice of any frame of reference such as physical space,
some consideration of why this frame of reference is chosen in preference over the variety of
others which are available.
My own view on this is that there can be no answer to this question beyond that of
prescribing a method by which decisions should be made between alternative forms of
planning-or let us call them alternative types of space in which the solution to problems
must be sought. Some of these spaces may theoretically be purely physical and there can be
physical planning in this sense, though I am doubtful about this. Some of the spaces
will be of a different kind and they will require solutions which may be described as “econo-
mic” and “social” planning, but I am even less convinced about the usefulness of these
concepts than about “physical planning”. Still other spaces will combine physical, and
other dimensions, and new types of planning may emerge, which is where I put by hopes.
But all these types of planning will have something in common which is the planning
method. The planning method requires specific types of planning to be themselves subject
to purposive thought and action, i.e. to planning.
It is this planning of planning towards which planning theory ought to be able to make
the most useful contribution. Planning theory would simply be the theory of the planning
process in its general form, an umbrella to all kinds of specific planning theories. These in
turn must justify their existence within that one framework by reference to identifiable
attributes of their specific set of environmental variables. In terms similar to Chadwick’s,
they must identify the particular dimensions of the total multi-dimensional action-space of
an actor that each of them is concerned with, giving reasons for this choice. Practically
76 ANVREAS FALUDI

speaking this amounts to a more or less continuous weighting of alternative forms of

planning against each other. Hopefully, this would mean pulling down many of the fences
which separate different fields of planning in favour of more integrated approaches.
In organisational terms this amounts to the requirement for any planning system
occasionally to review the type of planning which it undertakes for its appropriateness to
the problems at hand. These reviews in turn lead to the establishment of higher-level
planning bodies within guidance systems which give a permanent, institutional base to the
continuous review of specific planning activities. Only such guidance systems which have
permanent review bodies of this kind, i.e. such that engage in some planning of their own
planning, will be able to act in a rational way.
Rational planning systems are, therefore, rather complex, i.e. consisting of at least
two levels which may be called “operational” and “general”. On the operational level, one
finds a number of action programmes addressing themselves to different sets of variables in
the environment, with the sum total of these action programmes spanning the whole action
space of a guidance system. On the general level, these action programmes are reviewed
for their effectiveness, resulting in their occasional modification.
One can hardly conceive of any of the sets of environmental variables including only
physical variables. Here, we are speaking about societal guidance systems, and every one of
their actions are bound to affect variables within the social system, as well as physical
variables.
But the case for physical planning, i.e. the drawing up of plans for the future develop-
ment of the physical dimensions of socio-technical systems, such as which territorial units
can be conceived, could be made in a different way. Rather than seeing plans for physical
development as plans for action, one should probably see them as a form of budgeting.
This is best explained with the help of the diagram in Fig. 2.

Resource budgets
Lond resources

Generol level

Operot~onol level ( Progromme I ) 1 Programme 2 J (Programme 3 1 _ IPqrmnmeMI

FIG. 2. A complex planning system.

Land is one of the resources which a territorial unit has at its disposal. Develop-
ment plans may be seen as nothing but a land-use budget, indicating the location and
intensity of land-use activities including the necessary communication channels linking them
with each other. As a budget does, they constrain action or they express the firm intention
of taking action of a specific kind, rather than guiding it.
Such constraints result from the insights into the interdependencies of action pro-
grammes via one of the common resources that they make use of, land, in the same way
as a financial budget drives the interdependencies home which exist between action pro-
grammes on the financial side. It is quite reasonable to measure action programmes along
their physical (i.e. land-use) and financial dimensions: lack of any of these resources would
render the best action programmes impossible. It is, on the other hand, quite unreasonable
 The “Systems View” and Planning Theory 17

to expect that any action programme may be described exhaustively by any one of these
measurements. Hence, the “sloppy fit” between human goals and physical planning to which
Chadwick [3] refers.
The case for physical planning as such can therefore only be made if it is not seen as
directly linked to action, but as a fairly abstract (but nevertheless important) representation
of the anticipated future development of a territorial unit in its spatial dimension. Action
programmes would not arise out of a physical development plan but from the general
processes of societal guidance. Checking such action programmes against physical develop-
ment plans, as against other budgets, would merely ensure that they were feasible.
This activity of cross-checking intended action against available resources will of
course occasionally lead to a review of the budgets themselves. This is namely one of the
functions of general planning, i.e. to change patterns of resource allocation to suit changing
intentions. The various resource budgets, such as a physical development plan, may now
be seen as one of the instruments of general planning, such as has been argued by Stewart
and Eddison [9] for structure plans and corporate planning. But the concern for physical
development is secondary to the concern with improving public action.
Physical planners have traditionally taken the opposite view. Tnstead on the norma-
tive appeal of rational public action, they have always built their professional ethics on
their special responsibility for one specific set of relevant variables in the environment,
i.e. spatial variables. It is McLaughlin’s and Chadwick’s failure of having developed the
systems view into an instrument of critical evaluation of this traditional approach rather
than merely providing a rationalisation of existing practices in physical planning, that one
may criticise them for. As I have attempted to show, their own concepts would probably
have lent themselves to providing a basis of such a rational evaluation of physical planning.

REFERENCES
1. M. L. J. ABERCROMBIE, Perception and construction, Design Methods in Architecture,
edited by G. BROADBENT. Lund Humphries, London (1968).
2. W. Ross ASHBY, An Introduction to Cybernetics. Methuen, London (1956).
3. GEORGE CHADWICK, A S.vstems View of Planning-Towards c7 Theory of the Urban w7tt
Regional Planning Process. Pergamon Press, Oxford (I 971).
4. KARL W. DEUTSCH, The Nerves of Government--Models of Political Communication and
Control. Macmillan, New York (1966).
5. DAVID HARVEY, Explonatkm in Geography. Edward Arnold, London (1969).
6. ALFRED KUHN, The Strrdy of Society. Tavistock, London (1966).
7. J. BRIAN MCLOUGHLIN, Urban and Regional Planning-A Systems Approach. Praeger, New
York (1969).
8. GEORGE A. MILLER, EUC~ENEGALANTER and KAKL H. PRIBHAN, Plans and the Structure o/
Behavior. Holt, Reinhart and Winston, New York (1960).
9. J. D. STEWART and TONY EDDISON, Structure planning and corporate planning, J. R. Town
Plann. Inst. 57, 367-369 (1971).