Central Bank Employees Association Inc. vs.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
GR 148208, 15 December 2004
FACTS:
On 3 July 1993, RA 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On 8 June 2001, almost 8 years after the effectivity of RA 7653, the Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President, to restrain the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of RA 7653 (Exercise of Authority) provides that:
"In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall ... (c) establish a human resource
management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or
dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at
all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A
compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral’s human
resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system
conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758
[Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the
rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758."
The Association alleges that the proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of
employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or
those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is “a classic case of class legislation,” allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel’s position.
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653
has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in
question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some
2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was
implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law,
respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for
prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the
legal issue involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are unduly discriminated upon by exempting BSP
officers (SG 20 and above) from the Salary Standardization Law thus violates the equal protection of law
clause.
Held:
No. It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the
classification is not unreasonable.
With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653,
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because
there were substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c),
Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-
file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs.
The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the
class. The provisio may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who
are without differences.
The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests
on the policy determination by the legislature.
The policy determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-
and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the
rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are similarly situated.
The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The
challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the
irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination,
directly or indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if not
identical are analogous.
TABLARIN vs GUTIERREZ
FACTS
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools
of the Philippines.
The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987.
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin
the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative
order.
This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than
abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. The petitioners have not made their
case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation
and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed
to by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON MECS order no. 52 s. 1985 is unconstitutional
HELD
NO. MECS order no. 52 is constitutional.
The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to
the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional
and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to
the student body of the medical schools.
the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing]
the quality of medical education in the country.
They are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area.
HIMAGAN vs PEOPLE
FACTS
Petitioner, a policeman, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the information, the trial court issued an Order
suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, that his suspension should be limited to
ninety (90) days. The respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A.
6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. Hence, the petition for
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift
petitioner's preventive suspension.
ISSUE:
WON Section 47 of RA 6975 violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection
of law?
HELD
NO. There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder
under the Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to
members of the PNP. Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other
meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense.
The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same
does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals
with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. The equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS
Petitioners, who were members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives seeking to declare
as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly
repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is
no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy, while Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained.
Respondents contends that there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial
distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of
their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by
popular will. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
ISSUE
WON the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones.
Held:
No. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
Moreover, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Hence, equal protection is not infringed.
LADLAD vs COMELEC
FACTS
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders.
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list
organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In
2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed
on moral grounds. Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution,
stating that “the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals
whose interests are also the nations. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.”
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. COMELEC reiterated that
petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector
is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELEC’s field personnel. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE
WON Petitioner should be accredited as party-list organization under RA 7941
HELD
YES, the Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also
directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation. With regard to the
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, the Court finds that
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
As for the Equal Protection clause, the Court find that from the standpoint of the political process, the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on
the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.
“We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added
to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a
much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims
that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real
human rights, and is a result of the notion that if “wants” are couched in “rights” language, then they
are no longer controversial.”
