Aggregative and Deliberative Models of

Democracy: Reciprocity as a Consolidating

Concept?1
Tereza Křepelová
Masaryk University

Abstract:
Although since the mid-1970s the number of democratic governments has grown worldwide, citizens´ satisfaction
with real democracies has dramatically declined. Democratic theory as an academic discipline naturally reacts to this
dissatisfaction, both by considering new, innovative versions of democracy or by redefining existing idealized models
of democracy. Thus, it is not surprising that the contemporary democratic theory has an overwhelming number of
theories, concepts and models outlining how an ideal form of democracy should look like. However, this inflation
seems to be counterproductive concerning the fact that democratic theory should provide a clear theoretical framework
for both empirical measurements and practical policy-making institutions as well. Hence, the paper presented aims
to focus on the two main opposing models of democracy: deliberative and aggregative and propose their conceptual
consolidation. Both mentioned models differ substantively in their answers to the question: “What is the aim of
democracy?” While the aggregative model links the goal of democratic procedure to the aggregation of the mutually
conflicting individual preferences that are formulated on the basis of self-interest, thus the aggregative democracy is a
zero-sum game, the deliberative model rather presupposes that preferences are formed through the process of
deliberation itself which - unlike aggregation - aims at reaching the mutually accepted and justified consensus (if
possible). This dichotomy is rooted in different metatheoretical presumptions underlying both models, most significantly
those related to the capabilities such as agent´s rationality and reasonableness, which are linked to the agent´s
commitment to follow his/her personal interest or sacrifice them for the sake of group or collective interest. Paper
presented aims to illustrate that both models could be consolidated through the concept of reciprocity that can serve
also as an answer for problematic parts of both models (problem of ethical-egoism and free-rider paradox in case of
aggregative model and the problem of unrealistic prerequisite of altruism and accent on common good in case of
deliberative model). Reciprocity lies at the centre of a cooperative strategy that has proved to be the most advantageous
from the perspective of collective rationality aiming at maximizing personal interests in context of collective decision-
making process (prisoner´s dilemma could serve as an illustration). Furthermore, it is also interlinked to the
deliberative demand on reasonableness that presupposes compliance with the deliberative procedure itself. It is precisely
the criterion of reciprocity that implies that an individual is not subjected to the unrealistic requirement of absolute
subordination of individual interest for the sake of collective good but rather he can maximize its personal interest
only through the cooperation that – in a long term – demands reciprocity. Through the concept of reciprocity, this
burden is being equally distributed to all members of the society. Subsequently, communicative procedures laying in
the heart of deliberative model in this respect serve as a tool for building and cultivating inter-subjectivity that is a
core element for collective rationality and strengthening the inter-agent´s trust in the procedure of cooperation as
mutually preferred (and if so, then also beneficial) strategy.

1 Paper for ECPR General Conference, 2019, Wroclaw. Work in progress, please do not cite without permission.
Content:

Aggregative and Deliberative Models of Democracy: Reciprocity as a Consolidating Concept? .... 1

Abstract: ................................................................................................................................................ 1

1. Introduction: Why We Need Consolidated Theory of Democracy? ....................................... 3

2. A Few Remarks on Models of Democracy ..................................................................................... 4

2.1. From the Theory to Praxis or Vice Versa? .............................................................................. 4

3. Aggregative and Deliberative models of Democracy in Comparative perspective: Goals,

Normative Criteria and Meta-theoretical background ....................................................................... 7

3.1. Aggregative model of democracy: Goals and Normative criteria......................................... 8

3.2 Deliberative model of democracy, its goals and criteria for democratic decision-making
.............................................................................................................................................................. 11

3. 3. Moral conceptions in the background of models of democracy ....................................... 15

4. Rationality, Reasonableness and Reciprocity................................................................................ 17

5. On the Possibility of Convergence of Both Models .................................................................... 19

6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 22

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 24
 1. Introduction: Why We Need Consolidated Theory of
Democracy?

We are currently facing a paradoxical situation: although the mere of democratic

governance has increased worldwide since the mid-1970s, citizens' satisfaction with real
democracies has been decreasing (della Porta 2013: 1). If we ask about the cause of civil
dissatisfaction with the state of liberal democracy, the answers will differ depending on how we
define ideal form of democracy. Despite the fact, that the phenomenon of democracy has enjoyed
research interest of political philosophers and political scientists for more than two thousand years,
this effort has not resulted in the establishment of some consensually accepted theory or model of
democracy. As Robert Dahl, a classic of democratic research, states, the range of answers to the
question of “What democracy is?” varies since the organic evolution of democratic systems has
taken various forms across historical and cultural contexts (Dahl 2001: 8). As Dahl subsequently
stresses, all attempts to establish systematic and consensually accepted theory of democracy are
inevitably confronted by the fact that our theorizing about ideal political system is linked to the
historically existing regime which forms our theoretical expectations embed in the ideal model. For
this reason, also ideal models of democracy change over time leaving us rather sceptical about
universal set of conditions of democratic decision making that would sufficiently fulfil our
expectations regardless on social and historical context.

For this reason, has the current discipline of theory of democracy (can be used
interchangeably with the Democratic theory) an abundance of various theories, concepts,
approaches, models (and their typologies and classifications of classifications), aiming at outlining
an ideal model of democracy. This fact can be on the one hand perceived as an expression of the
pluralistic and dynamic development of the democratic theory, however on the other hand, a
plethora of models, theories and concepts can make it difficult for all those with an ambition to
understand the cause and quintessence of differences between various theoretical approaches to
democracy. Furthermore, if the political science and political philosophy have an ambition to
evaluate current existing democracies and rank their level of development and therefore designate
certain forms of democracy as more developed, desirable and better, they must necessarily work
with a certain idealized model of democracy, according which will be existing democracies
compared. It is thus the idealized model that expresses the normative idea of what democracy
should at the best look like and what are the necessary requirements for democratic process.
Different views on this matter will appear when we ask the substantive question that lies at the
core of the plurality of democratic theory: What is the aim of democracy?

In the paper, I will present two different types of answers to this question that are mirrored
in the two different accounts of democracy: aggregative and deliberative that are being perceived
as mutually opposing (cf. Shapiro 2003b: 2; Van Mill 2006: 8; Peter 2009: 1; Chambers 2012: 52,
Dryzek 2003: 1). The comparison of these models allows to illustrate to what extend they overlap
and differ and whether they are mutually compatible from the theoretical point of view. The
purpose of this paper is, thus, to compare both models in regard with their goals, requirements for
the democratic process (normative criteria) and meta-theoretical presumptions and moral
conceptions in their background. Furthermore, I intend to outline the possibility of their
conceptual convergence under the concept of reciprocity. The reason why I aim for the conceptual
junction of both models is linked to the idea, that democratic theory as an academic discipline (and
political philosophy in general) should be able to provide consistent theoretical basis for empirical
measurements, rather than a plethora of mutually opposing and incompatible concepts and model.
Furthermore, I believe that both models have their own theoretical “blind spots” as they approach
the phenomena of democracy from different perspective, however I will try to illustrate that these
blind spots can be addressed through their mutual fusion which will hopefully provide coherent
conceptual framework for both – empirical measurements and the general understanding of the
phenomena of democracy as well.

2. A Few Remarks on Models of Democracy

2.1. From the Theory to Praxis or Vice Versa?

Examining the phenomenon of democracy can be done within two dimensions: the empirical and
the normative. However, it would be wrong to assume that both perspectives are completely
separable and independent on each other. One of the emblematic examples that illustrates the
attempt to abstract from the normative theoretical dimension is the influential theory of
Consensual democracy by Arend Lijphart, presented in his work Patterns of Democracy (2012).
Lijphart´s idea was de facto based on the previous long-term empirical analysis of existing
democracies, the subsequent comparison of their effectiveness and the consequent assumption of
a universal desirability of the consensual democracy rather than majority democracy. The
problematic aspect of such approach is the following: the criteria on which basis Lijphart
conceptualized the effectiveness are purely arbitrary2 as he didn´t provide any sort of their
justification or explanation of how they relate to the effectivity of democracy and more importantly,
what an effective democracy means. The justification of these indicators would have to be based
on certain normative assumptions about the desirability of particular outcomes of democratic
decision-making process and democratic systems over another – which would require normative
model or theory of democratic (therefore an idea of how ideal democracy should look like). For
this reason, it is impossible to evaluate empirically existing democracies solemnly on the basis of
empirical data as such. The normative model of democracy therefore serves as sort of compass and
conceptual guidance that allows us to navigate through the empirical evidence and provides us
justified reasoning why we favour some feature and attributes of democracy over another.

The empirical and normative perspectives are interlinked especially when we aim at
evaluating the quality of existing democracies. Although it is clear that without a normative
theoretical model that would provide clear idea of how to classify empirical knowledge, it is not
possible to measure the quality of actual democracies, we are currently witnessing many
comparative studies3 that are based on ad hoc definition of democracy or even explicitly aspire to
work with non-normative definition of democracy. Furthermore, these rankings and studies are
frequently cited by particular political establishments for which they (un-intentionally) provide an
affirmation of their democratic legitimacy. But how do we interpret such indexes that often contain
the definitive category of "fully developed” democracies? Does this mean that democracy in these
particular countries reached its ideal standard? Or should we use it only as a conceptual category
which helps us to distinguish democracies from completely undemocratic countries? Those are

2 A. Lijphart used three categories of indicators to measure the effectiveness of each model of democracy, the first
category is formed by Worldwide Governance Indicators, which consist of an expert evaluation of the six dimensions
of "good governance" (political rights, stability, absence of violence, effectiveness of governance, private sector
development, rule of law, combating corruption). The second category consists of macroeconomic indicators,
especially economic growth, inflation control and unemployment reduction. Lijphart considers these indicators of
policy-making effectiveness, while the third category is focused on violence control (Lijphart 2012: 256).
3 For example, the influential Freedom in the World (Freedom House) index focuses on the following areas (updated

methodology for 2018): electoral process (free elections), political pluralism and participation, effectiveness of the
government, freedom of expression and religion, freedom of gathering, rule of law, judicial independence and the
individual rights of liberties (see https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018), nevertheless
the choice of these criteria is more or less arbitrary and not backed up by any theoretical justification providing
explanation why these criteria best represents the quality of democracy. The authors of the index points only to the
fact that these criteria are derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 1948.
questions that follows when we cut of the normative dimension of democratic theorizing, which
however seems to be common practise in the contemporary democratic theory.

In regard with the previous mentioned, Ian Shapiro, who has mapped the state democratic theory
at the turn of the millennium, states that normative and empirical theories of democracy arise
mostly separately and without mutual knowledge (Shapiro 2002: 23). Furthermore, as Brigitte
Geissel also points out, it is inexplicable that participatory and deliberative theories of democracy,
which are becoming increasingly important in normative political theory, have not been in any way
involved in most empirical researches focusing on measuring the quality of democracy (Geissel
2016: 573).4

According to Geissel, in the context of empirical measurement of quality of democracy

empirical scientists mostly deal with the research dilemma “thick or thin”, in other words, whether
use broader or narrow definition of democracy in terms of amount of criteria related to democratic
process (Geissel, Kneuer and Lauth 2016: 572). In line with this Donatella della Porta (2013: 2)
pointed out that the effort to abstain from the normative theories of democracy is often justified
or motivated by the problematic operationalization of some models of democracy (such as
deliberative or participatory models). For this reason, minimalist conceptions of democracy that
are at the heart of aggregative model of democracy are preferred the most by the empirical political
scientists (Goodin 2008: 7).

The most emblematic example of the minimalist conception of democracy was proposed
by Joseph A. Schumpeter in the Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, whose ambition was to
create a counterpoint to the "classical accounts of democracy" (as Schumpeter labelled these
theories) formulated in the 18th century that were arising from the concept of common good and
general will (typically the conception of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's democracy). In contrast,
Schumpeter perceived democracy as a political process analogous to a market in which the voters
play the role of customers while politicians are suppliers. His concept of democracy was therefore
based primarily on requirement of competitive elections, which serve as a tool for the replacement
of ruling elites (Schumpeter 2004: 302–303). The problem with such approach follows:
Schumpeter himself insisted that he is trying to present a more realistic concept of democracy that
would accurately reflect democracies as they truly are (Schumpeter 2004: 287). Nonetheless, when

4 We should take in consideration, that some efforts to include these models exist, e. g. the V-dem project, which
seeks to de-aggregate the measurement of democracy quality in relation to different dimensions of democracy, thus it
reflects participatory, deliberative, liberal, majority, egalitarian approaches (see https://www.v-dem.net), or the so-
called Effective Democracy Index proposed by Christian Welzel and Roland Inglehart, which in its measurements focuses
on the value of human development, individual autonomy, political participation and, above all, the rule of law
(Inglehart, Welzel 2011).
we aim to take over such approach for measuring the quality of democracy, we basically measure
the quality of democracies upon the standards of available democracies – and if those are poor,
then also our standards for their evaluation are low. Furthermore, there is an obvious
methodological problem linked to presumption that upon the criteria derived from X, we claim
that X is democratic. In other words, we are trapped in a tautological research that assumes its own
conclusions. And much worse, such research becomes, albeit unintentionally, an affirmative
instrument of the existing establishments, which can thus declare themselves as democratic.

Although this tendency to “facilitate” research of the quality of democracy is being

currently widely criticized, it can be considered as symptom of more complex problem linked to
the growing discrepancy between areas of political philosophy and empirical political science. As
Alessandro Ferrara notes, the greatest challenge for democratic theory is the current democratizing
world, for which it should be able to provide conceptual apparatus that enables to distinguish "true
democracy from elected oligarchies" (Ferrara 2017: 107). However, this naturally requires close
cooperation between the two disciplines. In other words, if we have the ambition to evaluate the
quality of democracy in its concrete existing forms, we have no choice but to think about
democracy normatively. This, however, inevitably follows when we ask ourselves a question that
lies at the heart of any theory of democracy (and that was stated in the introduction as the source
of plurality of particular theories of democracy): What is the aim of democracy?

3. Aggregative and Deliberative models of Democracy in

Comparative perspective: Goals, Normative Criteria and
Meta-theoretical background

In order to understand differences between both accounts of democracy we need to perceive them
in the comparative perspective allowing us to examine them through the similar categories. We will
do so by answering the question what both models of democracy aiming at and what requirements
they set for the democratic process.5 As stated in the introduction, these set of requirements can

5 Here we need to take in consideration that there are no general normative criteria of models of democracy as such,
rather these criteria are author-dependent, since all authors proposed different types of perspective on democracy. For
this reason, we will focus on most emblematic authors, who formed the discussion about particular model of the
democracy most. The model of democracy thus represents an overlapping normative approach towards the
phenomenon of democracy regarding their goals, requirements for democratic procedure and assumptions about the
voter´s capabilities and powers to formulate and decide on their preferences.
be considered as an explicit expression of their normativity as they sum up the necessary and
sufficient conditions that need to be conceptually fulfilled in order to describe a process or set of
institutions as democratic. However, in order to better understand from where these requirements
arise, it is necessary to examine the different moral concepts that stand behind the individual
accounts of democracy. The following section will therefore provide a comparison of both models
in regard with their goals, normative criteria set for the democratic procedure and their meta-
theoretical backgrounded formed by the moral conceptions that underlines both models.

3.1. Aggregative model of democracy: Goals and Normative criteria

At the heart of the aggregative model of democracy lies the question of how to transform individual
preferences into collective decision. For this reason, it is closely linked to the Social choice theory
(Peter 2009: 7, Van Mill 2006: 8) represented by the authors such as Kenneth Arrow, Duncan
Black, Anthony Downs, James Buchanan or William Riker. As K. Arrow (1963: 1-2) states in his
book Social Choice and Individual Values, "in capitalist democracy there can be only two
mechanisms through which public choice can be made: elections and the market". We can therefore
identify a parallel between democratic decision-making and market, as elections are - like the market
- a mechanism that aggregates individual preferences. Arrow then wanted to find a procedural
solution that would transform these individual preferences into a collective decision. This ambition
was reflected in the formulation of four main criteria which according to Arrow (1963: 22–31, 96–
100; see also 8.4.3 in this book) materialize reasonable expectations of the preference aggregation
procedure:

1. Absence of constraints (universal domain or universality condition): requires that

any individual preference will be included in decision-making; in other words,
collective decision-making should not discriminate any individual preference. This
requirement is a specific expression of equality within the aggregative model since
within the decision-making process the preferences of the individuals should have
the same weight.

2. Independence on irrelevant alternatives requires that collective decisions are not

influenced by the individual preference on an alternative vote

3. Weak Pareto principle (responsiveness condition): if all individuals evaluate

alternative X as strictly better than alternative Y, the result of a collective decision
 should also be this sort of alternatives. In other words, if there is unanimity in
ranking these preferences, collective choice should reflect this therefore the social
ordering should be positively related with the individual orderings.

4. Exclusion of dictatorship (non-imposition condition): excludes the option of a

dictatorial decision, since collective choice should not be determined by the
preferences of one individual. We can consider this condition as another, though
very weak, expression of political equality.

In addition to these criteria, Arrow also proposed the requirement of rationality of the actors, which
is defined by the axiom of completeness and transitivity (Ibid. 13). These axioms presupposes that (i)
an individual is able to order a set of offered alternatives according to his preferences
(completeness) and (ii) if he prefers an alternative A to an alternative B and alternative B to
alternative C, he must then prefer alternative A to alternative C (transitivity) . It follows that the
choice that is made from any set of alternatives can be also made by a sequential choice between
paired alternatives in that set (ibid: 20). However, in his theorem of cyclic majority 6Arrow
illustrated that there is no aggregative procedure that meets all of these criteria (including the
rationality criterion). This paradox says that if three or more people are to choose from three or
more options, there is no fair mechanism to aggregate their preferences into a collective decision
since any alternative can be ultimately beaten by another (ibid: 3). Imagine three subjects (voters)
who are to rank three variants (A, B, C) according to their preferences and in the line with the
axiom of rationality. If we now divide voting on variants into a paired vote using the majority rule,
we will find that the results of our voting will vary depending on the order in which we vote on the
paired variants.

In this respect William Riker (1982) following Arrow´s theorem identified two types of
democracy: liberal (Madison tradition) and populist (Rousseau tradition). The latter has become
the subject of his criticism. With the reference to the theorem of cyclical majority, he doubted the
main premise of the populist concept of democracy, namely the existence of the “will of the
people” or general will to be more precise. He pointed out that if it is not possible to fairly aggregate
the preferences of all voters so that the subsequent output corresponds to their distribution in
society, we cannot reasonably talk about will of the people. In general, it also criticizes the elements

6 Also known as the Condorcet paradox which was already formulated by Nicolas de Condorcet in the 18th century.
of direct democracy that it sees as a risk to liberal values, and emphasizes the need to limit
democratic will by constitutional constraints (Weale 1984: 378–379). On the contrary, he favoured
the minimalist "liberal" conception of democracy that basically equal to the possibility of voters
to exchange unwanted government (Zagare 1983: 845), albeit his sympathy towards this
conception, Riker himself described the minimalist concept of democracy as a ”perverse veto"
(Riker 1982: 244)

However, in regard with the aggregative model of democracy, we need to mention probably
another influential account of R. Dahl. Dahl´s theory is also being classified as an aggregative (see
e.g. Vargovčíková 2014: 90), despite the fact that his theory differs in many regards from the
Arrow´s one. Unlike Arrow, Dahl does not focus primarily on aggregative mechanisms and reflects
democracy as more complex phenomenon. The link between Dahl and the aggregative model of
democracy will be evident from his definition of the substantive goal of democracy, which is
according to Dahl the most reliable mean of protecting individual interests that are to be
transformed into a collective decision (Dahl 1995: 292). We can, thus, recognize the focus on the
interests of individuals as the key aspect of Dahl´s theory in which centre is also assumption of
fundamental equality of all persons. This equality can be, however, best understood as equal chance
of all citizens to pursue their individual interests. This means that the individual interests of all
individuals should receive the same consideration when making collective decisions (Dahl 1995:
81–82). The criteria that Dahl (2001: 39) formulates in regard with the democratic decision making
process are the following:

1. Effective participation which is linked primarily to the voter turnout. This means
that all citizens should be given adequate and equal opportunities to communicate
and express their view on the public agenda;
2. Equal vote, each member of the democratic community should have an equal and
effective opportunity to vote, with all votes having equal weight in the census;
3. Enlightened understanding means that within a reasonable period of time, each
member must have an equal and effective opportunity to learn everything necessary
about all alternatives to the further course of action and their likely consequences;
4. Control over setting topics (agenda) for discussion. Members must have the right
to decide which topics will be on the agenda and how they will be discussed. As a
result, the democratic process defined by the previous three criteria will never be
definitive;
5. Inclusiveness of all adults. All, or at least most adults, permanently resident in the
locality should be granted full citizenship rights as set out in the first four criteria.
Dahl's more comprehensive concept of democracy thus significantly increases the scope of
requirement of the aggregative model of democracy in terms of normative demands for a
democratic procedure, while maintaining the emphasis on the aggregation of individual preferences
reflecting individual interest. As will be evident from the following chapter, Dahl´s requirements
mostly overlap with the demands of the deliberative model of democracy formulated by Jürgen
Habermas.

3.2 Deliberative model of democracy: Goals and Normative criteria

The emergence of deliberative theories of democracy that is also being referred to as the
"deliberative turn" in democratic theory, is associated with the early 1990´s. In general is the
deliberative account of democracy perceived as a manifestation of a counterpoint to the established
aggregative model (Dryzek 2010: 3). The deliberative perspective intended to address and
conceptually grasp the problematic aspects of actually existing developing democratic systems such
as legitimacy of the outcomes of majority decision-making in polarized societies, informed voters
issue, rationalization of political debates in context of heterogeneous and multicultural societies)
which the aggregative model of democracy neglects as it is not essential to its key goal – aggregation
of individual preferences. Thus, in the context of the Post-Cold War era and the Fukuyama´s vision
of the victory of liberal democracy, deliberative democrats made clear that the democracy probably
hasn´t reached its final stance and further rethinking of what is necessary to the decision making
process in the complex societies is needed.

The normative criteria of the deliberative model of democracy will be drawn from most
influential theoretician of deliberative democracy, Jürgen Habermas, whose theory significantly
shaped the entire discussion. Habermasian conception of deliberative democracy stresses the
pivotal role of law which is itself the outcome of a democratic process but also an element of social
integration. Habermas refers to the public autonomy and self-legislation of citizens who are both
authors and subjects of the laws they create (Habermas 1996: 120–121). This status cannot be
achieved by the unilateral attribution of fundamental rights to citizens; on the contrary, citizens
must be seen as the creators and active agents and thus also as the moral legislators of the legal
framework and laws within of a modern democratic society. The law and the framework for its
creation - the democracy - are co-originally constituted (Habermas's term is co-originality or
Gleichursprünglichkeit), because they presuppose each other (ibid.). Deliberation in the public
sphere is then the deepest source of the legitimacy of law, for it is the result of the "discursive
formation of will and opinion" in terms of civil equality. The very framework of deliberation itself
should be secured through an appropriate legal procedures and instruments including fundamental
rights - which will guarantee fair conditions of communication, negotiation and non-violent
argumentation. The criteria formulated for that purpose by Habermas (2000b: 41) can be therefore
considered as the normative conditions of deliberative model of democracy and they are
formulated as follows:

1. Full inclusion of all persons to whom the outcome of the decision may relate to (all
affected principle), no one capable of making a relevant contribution shouldn’t be
excluded.
2. Equality of parties; all participants have an equal vote,
3. Non-violence of interaction; they are internally free to speak their honest opinion
without deception or self-deception, there are no sources of coercion built into the
process and procedures of discourse.
4. Openness to topics and contributions; no content restrictions on what participants are
allowed to utter,
5. Reviewability of the decision and the emphasis on the temporality of the vote that can be
subjected to revocation in order to reaffirm decisions made.

Nonetheless, in regard with the goal of deliberative democracy, we are facing disagreements in
the community of deliberative democrats themselves. Some authors identify the substantive goal
of deliberative model of democracy with the desire to seek common good, or rather a general will
in the Rousseau sense, or consensus more generally (see, e.g., Shapiro 2002; Waldron 1999: 91),
but as we will explain below, the question of the necessity for reaching the unanimous consensus
and even its desirability within the deliberative model is being questioned by deliberative democrats
themselves and forms one of the conflict lines inside the theories of deliberative democracy.
Similarly, it is questionable to associate deliberative democracy with the Rousseau tradition. For
example, as Van Mill (2006: 17) points out, we certainly won´t find emphasis on dialogue as a
platform for revealing the general will in Rousseau's writing as he rather stresses the role of
individual´s inner rational contemplation.

In the following section I will therefore concentrate on the two main conflicting issues
within the deliberative model of democracy that are crucial for comparison and conceptual
convergence with the aggregative model of democracy. The first is the previously mentioned
question of consensus as an ultimate goal of deliberation since the aggregative model of democracy
is linked to the majority vote rather than reaching the consensus. Second is the role of individual
interests and preferences that are key element for the aggregative model because they are initial
input of the democratic procedure.

3. 2. 1. Role of Consensus within Deliberative Democracy

Is (enlighten) consensus the ultimate goal of deliberation? Or, alternatively, is it only possible
however not necessary output of deliberation? Is it even desirable to strive for it, and if so, under
which conditions? In the theory of deliberative democracy, there are basically two main camps
related to these questions: (1)Consensualists (including e. g. Joshua Cohen, David Estlund, Jürgen
Habermas or John Rawls) and (2)Pluralists (including radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau,
Chantal Mouff, Samantha Besson and moderate democrats like Jeremy Waldron, Jane Mansbridge,
or Charles Larmore). While consensualist theories of deliberative democracy are based on the
assumption that consensus is the ideal outcome of deliberation and the participants of deliberation
should strive for it (Martí 2017: 5), pluralists recognize the role of disagreement and pluralism as
an inherent feature of existing societies. Above all, they also emphasize its value and importance
for deliberation as pluralism is the essential starting point and, in many areas, also the ending output
of deliberation (ibid.: 7-8). This discussion naturally reflects deeper meta-theoretical disagreements
between these camps, which arise from the dichotomy between value pluralism and monism and
the associated possibility of ethical objectivity that is linked to the proponents from the
consensualist branch (ibid.: 7).

Martí (2017: 11-12) maps the ranking of preferences of individual camps in relation to the
consensus or disagreement with respect to the way how is one or another achieved. The
consensualist perspective then corresponds to the following order: The ideal is (1) a post-
deliberative rational consensus, then (2) a reason-based post-deliberative disagreement, followed
by (3) pre-deliberative disagreement. (4) Pre-deliberative consent and post-deliberative consent or
disapproval based on manipulation and threats are completely undesirable. Thus, we see that for
the consensualists the crucial aspect is the deliberation as such - even disagreement resulting from
it is more valuable than consensus reached without a deliberative process. As Martí further points
out, pluralists, on the other hand, agree on preferences (2) over (3) and (4), but they categorically
reject (1) over (2). It is therefore clear that deliberative democrats do not entirely agree on what is
the ideal outcome of deliberation, but in general they recognize inherent value and necessity of
deliberation as such. We can conclude, that at the heart of the deliberative model of democracy is
not the output of the deliberation process, but above all the process itself that consists of mutual
explanation of individual stances and preferences and rationalization of the arguments through
public discussions where diversity and conflict of views are not only possible but above all
necessary for the desired outcome of deliberation. Thus, the starting point of deliberation is not
unity, but diversity, which leads to mutual learning and understanding of the perspective of other´s
members of society.

3. 2. 1. Role of Individual Interests within the Deliberative democracy

The role of individual interest within the deliberative model of democracy needs to be
examined for several reasons. First of all, it is usually over-idealization of the individual agents
(especially in regard with their willingness to give up their preferences in order to achieve common
god) that are deliberative democrats being criticized for. The requirement for giving up personal
interest in order to seek common good is by many perceived as both unrealistic and illegitimate
demand imposed by deliberative model.

However, in connection with this issue, Jane Mansbridge emphasizes that even in the
deliberative model, self-interest and individual preferences enrooted in self-interest play an
important role, especially in the phase of mutual clarification of one's position and the reasons
standing behind this position. In the phase of deliberation everyone must present their point of
view based on their own interests so the profound and authentic discussion may begin. Without
this component it wouldn´t be impossible to reach mutual learning and understanding of the
reasons of others which is the core value of deliberative process (Mansbridge et al. 2010: 77). This
aspect is also related to the dimension of the epistemic capacity of democratic decision-making,
which in the most general definition refers to the ability of democracy to reveal "true", knowledge-
based, or simply correct decisions. David Estlund (2007: 177) the epistemic capacity of deliberative
democracy (or to be more precise - deliberative proceduralism proposed by D. Estlund) attributes
to the idea that "dispersal of knowledge", e.g. the existence of scattered (also distributed or local)
knowledge across society enables democracy to find epistemically correct (or epistemically better)
decision. Estlund then emphasizes, that the individual experience serves as a source of information
in democratic decision-making. Mansbridge also draws attention to the further importance of
individual interests in the deliberative model, namely to the assumption that the common good or
public interest is simply the resultant of individual interests. In other words, individual interests are
a constitutive component of public interest. For this reason, Mansbridge also considers individual
interest to be valuable on its own account and therefore also intrinsically self-justifying (Mansbridge
et al. 2010: 75). This idea can serve as a conceptual link aggregate model of democracy, for which
individual interests are the alpha omega.
3. 3. Moral conceptions in the background of models of
democracy

As was stated before, models of democracy don’t stand in the normative vacuum, they are rather
determined by particular moral conceptions or assumptions that might not be explicitly reflected
by many authors albeit they influence the normative setting of particular model by a great deal

3. 3. 1.Utilitarism, consequentialism and of Aggregative democracy

The moral doctrine in which is the aggregative model rooted is the utilitarianism that can be most
easily defined through an idea of maximizing utility, for this reason it is also classified as the
consequentialist moral theory. The main attributes of utilitarianism can be generally formulated as
follows (see Peter 2009: 16–20): (1) radical consequentialism, which derives the correctness of
action solely from its consequences, not from the nature of the act itself. (2 Welfarism linked to
the presumption that the individual well-being is the highest form of goodness and as such it is the
ultimate goal of action of all individuals. (3) The last component is the presumption of interpersonal
comparison of utilities, therefore the presumption that the "units" of pain and pleasure perceived
by the different agents are mutually comparable (they can be measured according similar scale)
and can be added and subtracted, as a result we can arrive at the so called cardinal utility for society
as a whole (Shapiro 2003b: 26). The aggregative model of democracy adopts this general framework
of maximization in a fundamental way, with one important change: following the model of modern
economics, it disposes of the controversial assumption of numerical measurability and
comparability of individual utilities and focuses on the aggregation of so-called ordinal utilities
regarding alternative outcomes. In other words, the only aggregated 'value' is whether individuals
consider one arrangement to be better (worse) than another and attribute to it greater (lesser)
benefit. This relationship between alternatives is then called preference.

Within utilitarianism, there are basically two main approaches to understanding utility,
which differ in answering the question of what is to be maximized, or how can we define the utility
as such. The subjectivist approach is linked to the Jeremy Bentham´s conception of hedonism and
the subject of maximization is a pleasure (in the sense of psychological or physiological pleasure).
The objectivist approach on the other hand stresses that personal interests cannot be equated with
the mere existence of subjectively perceived pleasure or with immediate satisfaction of human
desires. For the objectivists it is therefore necessary to rely on certain objective categories of utility,
whether idealized, rationally justified or linked to the objectivist concepts of good life (also referred
to as perfectionism). K. Arrow identified himself with the subjectivist version of utilitarianism
(1963: 22-23) for which is collective interest (or public interest) formed by the aggregation of
subjective desires of the individual agents reflected in their preferences.

However, in regard with this presumption, we need to take into consideration the problem
of unconsidered or randomly formulated preferences (we need to mind that rationality does not
concern the preferences themselves, only our capacity to order them) or even preferences that
are outcomes of manipulation or bribery. This could be considered as a blind spot of the
aggregative model of democracy since it does not pay attention to the way of how the individual
preferences are created or whether they truly match the well-being and interest of the individual
agent who hold such preference. If the aggregative model aims not be only a mere set of formal
mechanisms for summing up randomly formulated and unconsidered preferences prone to
manipulation, it must include further requirements for the democratic process that would address
this problem. This component can be however provided by a deliberative model of democracy that
in its normative requirements secures mechanisms providing rationalization of arguments as well
as the platform for profound deliberation and formulation of considered and conscious judgements
about individual preferences.

3. 3. 2. Deontology, Practical reason and Deliberative democracy

Unlike the aggregative democracy, which is based on the utilitarian or consequentialist

conception of morality, the roots of the deliberative conception are primarily deontological; more
specifically it can be associated with Kant's moral philosophy (Peter 2009: 38). Deontological
concepts of morality are not conditioned by any external purpose; the moral desirability of an act
is not derived from its consequences and it´s not subjected to the requirement of maximizing good
(happiness, welfare, etc.) Consequently, the distinguishing criterion of permissibility of some act is
assessed according to its conformity with some moral rule or principle (Potter 2009: 182). This
assessment can be done on the account of the practical reason, which can be generally understood
as a source of morality. The Kantian idea of practical reason enables us to reflect on the purpose
of our decisions, as well as to revise our judgements, acts and preferences on the basis of the
presented reasons for alternative ways of action (Peter 2009: 31 et al.) One of the principles derived
from practical reason is the categorical imperative7 from which is subsequently derived the
requirement of reciprocity, that is according to some authors a key element of deliberative
democracy (Gutmann and Thompson 2003: 18–19).

4. Rationality, Reasonableness and Reciprocity

Further presumptions that are mirrored in the both models of democracy concern elementary
capabilities and powers the individual agents. In the following section we will discuss the concept
of rationality, reasonableness and reciprocity (as an umbrella concept for previously mentioned) as
all of them serve as joint concepts between both models. The concept of rationality that formed
also one of the requirements of the Arrow´s model of aggregative democracy has several
interpretations depending on particular philosophical or social-scientific tradition. We will discuss
Hobbesian tradition, which provided the ideological basis for rational choice theories and
accordingly also aggregative model of democracy and the Kantian tradition, that formed the
deliberative model and nowadays is being represented mostly by J. Rawls and J. Habermas
(Chambers 1996: 25).

Simone Chambers identifies Habermas' idea of rationality with a requirement for

justification: our claim or action can be considered as rational if we can provide reasons for it
(Chambers 1996: 90). These reasons should support the general validity of our argument within
the deliberation. Consequently, it is clear that reasons based solely on self-interest are less likely to
gain the support of others which creates platform for challenging purely egoistic claims and
demands that logically cannot be justified from the perspective of all participants of deliberation.
In this regard Joshua Cohen (1989) stresses the need for a 'rationally motivated consensus' which
relate to the situation when all rational members of the community recognize that there are good
reasons for accepting proposed act. It follows, that rationality in the deliberative model does not
require an absolute denial of self-interest - on the contrary, it is an inherent element for assessing
the legitimacy of the claims of the other members of the community. In this regard, we arrive to
the requirement of reciprocity, which guarantees that this framework will not be misused to
maximize the individual interests of an individual or group of individuals at the expense of the
individual interests of other members of the community.

Aggregative model of democracy defines rationality according to the tradition of rational

choice theory, that is also being known as an instrumental rationality. As Anthony Downs points

7 "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law.” (Kant 1993: 30)
out rationality is strictly linked to the means chosen to achieve the goal, not the goal itself. (Downs
1957: 5). Thus, rationality in relation to voters' decision-making process does not concern the
substance or justifiability of the preference itself, rather it is linked to the effectiveness of the way
to achieve this preference. By analogy, Downs defines the criteria of rationality as follows: An
individual is able to somehow decide in a situation where he is presented with a series of alternative
options; is able to tell how each alternative is compared to the others (better / worse / indifferent);
this arrangement is transitive (see above); the individual always chooses the option that is highest
in his ranking; his choice from the same set of alternatives is, ceteris paribus, always the same
(Downs 1957: 6).

In relation to the axiom of rationality, which is one of the starting points of the aggregate
model, it is necessary to point out the problem raised by David Gauthier (1970) and elaborated by
Amartya Sen (1998: 75-78) or Gerald Gaus (2003: 84-88). The problem arises when we want to
apply it on the situation where the individual is about to decide in the interaction with other
individuals while he has an incomplete information. The situation can be illustrated through an
example from the game theory usually known as a prisoner's dilemma. The scheme is the following:
Two prisoners are questioned separately and are offered following alternatives: (a) if they both
testify, each gets 6 years; (b) if one testify against the other, who remains silent, the first one will
be released while the other gets 10 years (c) if both of them refuse to testify, they will be sentenced
for symbolic 2 years. From the perspective the rational choice theory, it is rational for the individual
to testify against the other prisoner, although from collective point of view to deny testify is the
most optimal alternative, because if they both deny to testify, they will both get only two years;
however, from the individual perspective of the prisoner it is rational to testify, in which case he
either gets 6 (since one prisoner count with the egoistic rationality of the other) or will be freed.
This paradox generally illustrates that action based solely on maximizing individual interest can
ultimately cause the harm to these interests, because both prisoners will testify and then get six
years, whereas if they would cooperate with each other, they would be sentenced only for two
years. In contrast, A. Sen applied various moral theories to the given situation - among others
Kant's categorical imperative (in this situation, the assumption that the prisoner should not act as
he would not want the other prisoner to act). It follows, that in this situation overcoming of
individual interest by individual agent leads to an overall improvement in individual situations (Sen
1998: 77).

However, maximizing individual benefits in situations similar to a prisoner's dilemma need

not rely solely on external moral theories. Christopher McMahon distinguishes between individual
and collective rationality. The latter is linked to the assumption that individuals should take into
account the actions of other individuals when seeking to maximize their own interests. Thus, within
the framework of collective rationality, the motivations remain the same as in the case of individual
rationality (e.g. maximizing individual benefits), but when it comes to decision making it considers
possible actions other individuals may take (McMahon 2001: 6-8). With regard to collective
rationality, a cooperative strategy comes into play, which is individually most advantageous but
requires an element of reciprocity. According to McMahon (ibid: 8), this means that, within the
framework of collective rationality, an individual must consider whether there are good reasons to
assume that others will cooperate as well – since only if the reciprocity of mutual cooperation is
fulfilled, it is rational to participate in cooperation and also it is advantageous for all parties.

Here we, again, meet the need of reciprocity, that was presented as the key requirement
within both – deliberative and aggregative model of decision-making process.

5. On the Possibility of Convergence of Both Models

Through the comparison of both model I tried to illustrate that they grow up on different
metatheoretical assumptions which are subsequently reflected in the way how they view the goal
of democracy as well as what sort of requirements they impose on democratic process. Hereafter,
I will outline in which regards both models differ and overlap and whether it is possible to joint
them conceptually.

The overlap between Arrow's, Dahl's and Habermas's requirement for democratic process
can be then identified in the criterion of political equality. This is represented by political equality
in terms of general suffrage but also in terms of equal chance to influence the subject of voting. In
Dahl´s and Habermas's requirements is the later explicitly mentioned, in Arrow´s account this
relates to the absence of constraints as everyone should have an equal chance to propose the agenda
which will be discussed. Likewise, the criterion of dictatorship exclusion can be understood as an
implicit expression of the value of (political) equality. If we look at the overlap between Dahl and
Habermas, we can identify an explicit correspondence of requirements for full inclusion and
revisability of topics (with Dahl, this is linked to the control of agenda-setting, allowing citizens to
reintroduce any topic). There is also an overlap in connection with Dahl's criterion for an informed
and enlightened understanding that should forego the voting which can be also considered as the
very core of deliberative democracy. Similarly, we can conclude that Dahl would agree with
Habermas' demand for nonviolence of interaction in terms of the absence of threats, violence or
coercive methods in electoral decision-making. Dahl's effective participation is also unproblematic
from a deliberative point of view, if we understand it first of all in terms of an inclusive approach
to the deliberation (for deliberative democrats is the mere participation on decision-making
desirable, however not necessary as e. g. for radical theorists of democracy).

Despite the wide overlap between Habermasian and Dahl´s requirements, Dahl himself
was rather sceptical about deliberative democracy for the impossibility of its realization. He
claimed, that more people involved in the deliberation, the less we are able to fulfil its conditions,
because the less space will be left for individual participants (see Dahl and Tufte 1973). Naturally,
this problem is one of the central themes among deliberative democrats as well. As R. Goodin
points out, one of the most urgent questions of deliberative theory is how we can actually put
deliberative procedures into practice, especially how to implement deliberative procedures from
small arenas to large-scale arenas at the national or even global level of society (Goodin 2008: 3).
In this regard, Goodin proposes a two-dimensional model of deliberation: In the case of smaller
arenas, it is possible to implement the (currently existing) New England City Hall system where a
large proportion of the relevant community meets regularly to discuss and vote on the agenda
linked to their city (ibid: 265). However, in larger arenas such as those of national level the element
of political representation cannot be avoided (see chapter 7). In that case Goodin proposes that it
should be complemented by deliberative attributes such as institutes of (randomly elected) jurors
or counsellors from citizens rows, deliberative forums with focal points groups and expert
assistance, voting simulations, etc. It is noteworthy that although deliberative democracy is often
blamed for excessive idealization and impossibility of fulfilment in the context of existing societies,
the most deliberative tools and mechanisms are inspired by existing political practise.

In regard with the comparison of both models, we have to also address the remaining
Arrow´s criteria - that is, independence from insignificant alternatives and the weak Pareto principle
– that relate to the requirements of the mechanics of aggregation itself, however they are not
articulated in the deliberative model of democracy. Both of Arrow´s criteria aim to prevent strategic
manipulation of the alternatives as well as to ensure that individual preferences are equally reflected
in the collective decisions. Nonetheless, it is paradoxical the Arrow´s theorem proves, that the
criteria proposed by Arrow cannot be fulfilled by any voting mechanism, which leave the
aggregative model contradictory on its own basis as the requirements for democratic process
cannot be simultaneously met even in the idealized theoretical level. This problem can be however
“solved” or at least addressed throughout incorporating attributes from the deliberative model of
democracy that does not treat the preferences as fixed from the very beginning of the process,
since they can be changed and revised in the light of proposed argument within the deliberative
phase. This allow us to think about the aggregated result in relative terms and therefore asses its
validity in regard to other criteria linked to the satisfaction of the participants with the decision,
rather than hollow counting mechanism of aggregation. Furthermore, the aim of deliberative model
is to reach consensus (if possible) or enlightened disagreement solved by majority vote which is
however is perceived only as temporary and reviewable. As such it can vividly reflect the adaptive
preferences of the voters. The requirement of reciprocity is therefore crucial in solving Arrow´s
paradox of cyclical majorities as it guaranties that outcomes of particular aggregative scheme
(results of an election) that may not favour particular group of voters will be recognized as
legitimate. In this regards all participants of elections must share the burden implied by Arrow´s
theorem equally and therefore also recognize the temporality and possibility of revision of such
decision (as the deliberative model requires).

Regarding the goals of both models of democracy that are rooted in their metatheoretical
presumptions and moral conceptions we can however recognize substantive differences, that can
be in general linked to the different perspective of both models on the role of individual
commitment to the society as a whole and the role of self-interest and instrumental rationality in
democratic decision-making process. In connection with this, I tried to point out that even the
deliberative model recognize the importance of individual interests - either through its own value
and their self-justificatory status, or the instrumental value linked to the fact that personal interest
form the very basis of epistemic diversity and therefore also epistemic value of the decision-making
process. Conversely, the deliberative aspect may also appear to be a key element in the aggregate
model, especially in the pre-aggregation phase, where deliberative practices help individuals identify
their individual interests and rationalize preferences to truly maximize their benefits in the context
of collective decision-making (as the paradox of the prisoner's dilemma illustrated.). However, in
this regard is the role of self-interest and individual preferences again linked to the requirement of
reciprocity which secures, that only those propositions that could be accepted by other participants
can be reasonably demanded through the collective decision-making process.

The requirement of reciprocity can, thus, be seen as a concept that overbridge instrumental
rationality of the aggregative model and the concept of practical reason linked to the deliberative
model. The conceptual convergence of these two presumptions was in the discipline of political
philosophy already proposed by John Rawls. Rawls emphasizes that each individual is endowed
with two kinds of moral powers: the first power - rationality - corresponds to the individual's ability
to define his own conception of good based on his own individual interests as well as to choose
the most effective means to follow this conception of good (Boettcher 2004: 601). The second
power is reasonableness. According to Rawls a reasonable citizen has the capacity to abide by
fair terms of cooperation, even at the expense of their own interests, provided that others are
also willing to do so (Rawls 2005: 50). Here we can identify the element of reciprocity that joints
these two powers, since the participation in the democratic society is mutually beneficial if and only
if all members of society accept the same commitment. Although Rawls emphasized that in some
respects the rationality needs to be subordinated to the reasonableness, he perceived both as
complementary (Rasmussen 2004: 56). The similar complementarity in regard to the rationality is
therefore possible to attribute to both models of democracy as well.

Reciprocity is however also present in Rawls' concept of the so-called burdens of judgement
(Rawls 2005: 54) that concerns the epistemological dimension of decision-making process.8 This
concept reflects the mere fact of the life in the heterogenous and pluralistic society divided by
disagreement of its citizens. For this reason, the reciprocity concerns also the requirement for
recognizing this reasonable disagreement and abandoning idea that some particular conception of
good should be superior (and enforced on other citizens). Reciprocity in the sense of burdens of
judgements basically implies a tolerance, that is again, reasonable only when it is respected and
abide by all members of society.

6. Conclusion
In the paper presented I aimed to illustrate that the element of reciprocity can serve as a
conceptual joint between the aggregative and deliberative model of democracy that are being
perceived as mutually opposing and divergent models. The concept of reciprocity lies in the heart
of a cooperative strategy (in regard with the collective decision-making process) that has proved to
be the most advantageous in terms of maximizing individual interests, which is the key element of
the aggregative model. At the same time, the requirement of reciprocity also is also present in the
deliberative model especially in regard with the commitments that all participants of deliberation
have to bear equally. Furthermore, the requirement of reciprocity guarantees the position of
individual interest in the decision-making process, since all participants have to recognize the right
of others for pursuing these interests as well. On the other hand, the reciprocity also guarantees
that claims raised by one or group of citizens wouldn´t be merely egoistic demands since such
claims couldn´t be reasonably expected to be accepted by others.

In regard with the collective and individual rationality, the requirement of reciprocity
implies, that the individual doesn´t have to subordination his individual interest to the collective

8 The concept of the burdens of judgements relates to the following problems regarding formulation of our
believes and conception of good: We usually have to face the conflicting evidence, we are giving differing weights
to our considerations and conceptual indeterminacy, we hold different values that are conflicting with the values
of others. All those aspects lead to the need of reciprocal recognition of these burdens since we cannot justifiably
assume what propositions are right or wrong. Consequently, we have to recognize, that our perspective is
burdened by our subjective judgement and therefore we cannot impose it on others.
good, but rather that he will maximize his own interest only through the cooperating with others.
Nonetheless, such cooperation will be mutually beneficial if and only if this burden would be
accepted by all members of society, therefore, according to the requirement of reciprocity. Using
Rawl´s terminology we can say, that in the context of collective decision making it is rational to be
reasonable. Deliberation as a pre-decision-making mechanism can serve as a tool for cultivating
intersubjectivity among citizens that would provide all participants with assurance and good
reasons to believe that cooperation is a mutually preferred strategy. Therefore, it is the idea of
reciprocity, that is inherently linked to the trust among citizens and to the trust in democracy as
such.

This outline of conceptual convergence of both models can be useful in regard with the
previously mentioned measurements of the quality of democracy and the contemporary paradox
of general distrust and dissatisfaction of the citizens with democratic regimes. Despite the fact that
the aim of this paper was not to provide a precise design for measuring quality of democracy in
regard with reciprocity nor providing a framework for its operationalization, it raises a question
whether the contemporary paradox of growing numbers of democratic states and general distrust
in democracy cannot be attributed to the incomplete measurements of quality of democracy which
are mostly focusing only on legal framework and procedures, rather than citizens themselves and
their authentic view on their own role within the democratic society. Therefore, the further research
on the question of how individual citizens perceive their own role and commitments towards others
and democracy as such can help to explanation of this paradox. For this reason, I believe, that
political philosophy should cooperate more with the empirical political science and provide more
complex and coherent conceptual framework for the empirical measurements of the quality of
democracy. The reciprocity, thus, can be considered as one part of this complex framework that
would enable us to assess the current state of democracy more accurately and profoundly.
Bibliography

• ANDERSON, Elizabeth. 2009. „Democracy: Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental

Value“. Str. 213-227. In: Christiano, T. (2012). Rational deliberation among experts and
citizens. In J. Parkinson & J. Mansbridge (Eds.), Deliberative Systems: Deliberative
Democracy at the Large Scale (Theories of Institutional Design, pp. 27-51). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

• ARROW J. Kenneth.1963. Social Choice and Indivdividual values. John Wil.y & Som,
Inc

• BELL, Duncan. (2014). What Is Liberalism? Political Theory, 42(6), 682-715.

• BENHABIB, Sheyla.1997 Review: Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a

Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. by Juergen Habermas The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Sep. 1997), pp. 725-726

• BUCHANAN, James. (1954), Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets. Journal of
Political Economy, 62, issue.

• DAHL, Robert A. 1989. DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS. By Robert A. Dahl. New
Haven: Yale University Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 397

• DAHL, Robert A. 2001. O demokracii: průvodce pro občany. Praha: Portál.

• DALTON, R. J. (2004). Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion of

political support in advanced industrial democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• DUFEK, Pavel a Jan HOLZER. “Democratisation of Democracy? On the Discontinuity

Between Empirical and Normative Theories of Democracy. “Representation, Routledge,
2013

• DUFEK, Pavel. 2013. „Teorie demokracie a politická filozofie: Úskalí demokratizace

demokracií “. Str. 50-74. In: HOLZER, Jan a Pavel MOLEK. Demokratizace a lidská
práva: středoevropské pohledy. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství (SLON) v koedici s
Masarykovou univerzitou Brno.
• DRYZEK, John S., Bonnie HONIG, Anne PHILLIPS a Robert E. GOODIN. 2006.
The Oxford handbook of political theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford
handbooks of political science.

• DRYZEK, John S a Simon NIEMEYER. Foundations and frontiers of deliberative

governance. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2010.

• DRYZEK, John, GOODIN, Robert. „Making use of mini-publis “. In GOODIN, E.

Robert. 2008. Innovating Democracy. Democratic Theory and Practice After the
Deliberative Turn. Oxford University Press

• DEWEY, John. 1946. The public and its problems. an essay in political inquiry. chicago
gateway books

• DWORKIN Ronald. "Liberalism," in Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford:

Clarendon, 1985/ in: Hampshire, Stuart. Public and private morality. Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

• DWORKIN, Ronald. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge
Harvard University Press. 2000..

• DWORKIN, Ronald. 2011. Justice for hedgehogs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.

• EVANS, Jocelyn A. (2004) Voters & voting: an introduction. London: Sage Publications.

• EMERSON, Peter. 2012. Defining Democracy: Voting Procedures in Decision-Making,

Elections and Governance. Heidelberg: Springer

• ESTLUND, M. David. (2009) Democratic AuthorityA Philosophical

Framework.Princeton University press.

• FERRARA, Alessandro. 2017. „Různorodé demokracie, jejich veřejné sféry a studia

axálního věku “IN: ŠTĚCH, Ondřej. Náboženství a sekularita: zápas o veřejný prostor.
Praha: Filosofia, 2017. Filosofie a sociální vědy.

• FREEDEN, Michael. 1996. Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach.

Oxford. Clarendon Press.

• GAUS, Gerald. 2000. Political Concepts and Political Theories. Westview Press.
• GAUS, Gerald F.2003. Contemporary theories of liberalism: public reason as a post-
Enlightenment project. London: SAGE, Sage politics texts.

• GEISSEL, Brigitte, KNEUER, Marianne, LAUTH, Hans-Joachim. (2016). „Measuring

the quality of democracy: Introduction “. International Political Science Review. Vol.
37(5): 571-579.

• GEISSEL, Brigitte, MAYNE, Quinton 2016. „Putting the demos back into the concept
of democratic quality “. International Political Science Review. Vol. 37(5) 634-644

• GOODIN, E. Robert. 1995. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University

Press.

• GOODIN, E. Robert. 2008. Innovating Democracy. Democratic Theory and Practice

After the Deliberative Turn. Oxford University Press.

• HABERMAS, Jürgen. 2002. „Tři normativní modely demokracie “. Str.79-95. In:

SHAPIRO, Ian a Jürgen HABERMAS.Teorie demokracie dnes. Praha: Filosofia.

• HABERMAS, Jürgen. 2000. Strukturální přeměna veřejnosti: zkoumání jedné kategorie

občanské společnosti. Praha: Filosofia, Morální a politická filosofie.

• HARDIN, Rusell. 1999. Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy. Oxford

University Press.

• Hayek, Friedrich A., „Principy liberálního společenského řádu. “In Tomáš Ježek (ed.).
Liberální ekonomie. Praha, Prostor, 1993

• HELD, David. 2006. Models of democracy. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity.

• CHAMBERS, Simon. 2012. „Deliberation and mass democracy “. IN: Deliberative

Systems. Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale. JOHN PARKINSON, JANE
MANSBRIDGE. Cambridge University Press.

• CHAMBERS, Simon. 1996. Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics
of Discourse. Cornell University Press.

• CHYTILEK, Roman. Volební systémy. Praha: Portál, 2009.

• LACLAU, Ernesto a Chantal MOUFFE. Hegemonie a socialistická strategie: za

radikálně demokratickou politiku. Praha: Karolinum, 2014. Politeia.
• LARMORE, Charles. Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987)

• LIJPHART, Arend. 1999. Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in

thirty-six countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.

• LIST, C. and Goodin, R. E. (2001), Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet

Jury Theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy, 9: 277-306.

• MANSBRIDGE, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., Estlund, D., Føllesdal, A., Fung, A.,
Lafont, C., Manin, B. and Martí, J. l. (2010), The Place of Self‐Interest and the Role of
Power in Deliberative Democracy. Journal of Political Philosophy, 18: 64-100.

• MARTÍ, José Luis. 2017. Pluralism and consensus in deliberative democracy. Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20
(5)10.1080/13698230.2017.1328089

• MILL, John Stuart. O svobodě II. J. Otto, Praha. 1913

• MOUFFE, Chantal. Agonistics: thinking the world politically. London: Verso, 2013.

• NUSSBAUM, Martha. Political Animais: Luck, Love, and Dignity, in: Metaphilosophy,
vol. 29,

• PETER, Fabienne. 2009. Democratic Legitimacy. Routledge.

• RASMUSSEN, M. David. 2004. „Rozumnost versus rozum. Úvahy o rozumnosti

veřejného rozumu “. In: HRUBEC, Marek. Demokracie, veřejnost an občanská
společnost. Praha: Filosofia, Filosofie a sociální vědy.

• RAWLS, John. Teorie spravedlnosti. Praha: Victoria Publishing, 1995

• RAWLS, John.1996. Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
John Dewey essays in philosophy.

• RAWLS, John.: Základní svobody a jejich priorita, in: Kis, J. (ed.): Současná politická
filosofie, Praha, OIKOYMENH 1997

• RAZ, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

• SEN, Amartya Kumar. Choice, welfare and measurement. 2nd print. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998
 • SHAPIRO, Ian a Jürgen HABERMAS. 2002. Teorie demokracie dnes. Praha: Filosofia.

• SHAPIRO, Ian. 2003. Morální základy politiky. Praha: Karolinum.

• SHAPIRO, Ian. The Flight from Reality in the Human sciences. Princeton University
Press. 2007.

• SCHUMPETER, Joseph Alois.2003. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Taylor &

Francis, 2003

• URBINATI, Nadia. 2018. Znetvořená demokracie. Praha. Nakladatelství Karolinum.

• Van Mill, David. Deliberation, Social Choice and Absolutist Democracy. Routledge. Park
Square, Milton Park, Abingdon,

• WALDRON, Jeremy. Law and disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

• VARGOVČÍKOVÁ, Jana. 2014. „Deliberativní demokracie: rozpravou za hranice

liberální demokracie? “. Str. 89-131. In: ZNOJ, Milan a BÍBA, Jan a
VARGOVČÍKOVÁ, Jana. Demokracie v postliberální konstelaci. Praha: Karolinum.

• WARREN, Mark. 2017. A Problem-Based Approach to Democratic Theory. American

Political Science Review, 111(1).

• WEALE A. (1984). Social Choice versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political

Theory. British Journal of Political Science, 14(3), 369-385.

• ZAGARE, F. (1983). Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory

of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. By William H. Riker. (San Francisco:
W.H. Freeman, 1982. American Political Science Review, 77(3), 844-845.

Internet sources:

• ZNOJ, Milan. 2005. „Deliberativní – a co dál? “.

<http://www.listy.cz/archiv.php?cislo=054&clanek=040531 />. (online) (cit. 18. 1.
2018)

• Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem): https://www.v-dem.net

• Index „Freedom in the World“ (kritéria měření kvality demokracie):
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology

• Výstupy Global Attitudes Survey 2017

• http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/16/globally-broad-support-for-representative-and-
direct-democracy/

• Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI):

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home

• Brink, David, "Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mill-moral-political/>.

• Gaus, Gerald, Courtland, Shane D. and Schmidtz, David, "Liberalism", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/liberalism/>.