CHAPTER IV DEONTOLOGY Chapter Objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to: 1. _ discuss the basic principles of deontology; 2. apply the concepts of agency and autonomy to one’s moral experience; and 3. _ evaluate actions using the universalizability test. INTRODUCTION During the flag ceremony of that Monday morning, January 24, 2017, the mayor of Baguio City awarded a certificate from the City Government that commended Reggie Cabututan for his “extraordinary show of honesty in the performance of their duties or practice of profession” Reggie is a taxi driver who, just three days before the awarding, drove his passenger, an Australian named Trent Shields, to his workplace. The foreigner, tle sleep and was ill the previous day, left his suitcase inside the taxi cab after he having litt port, and an expensive pair of reached his destination. The suitcase contained a laptop, pass headphones, which Trent claimed amounted to around P 260,000.” Consider closely the moment when Reggie found that Trent had left a suitcase in his taxi cab: If he were to return the suitcase, there was no promise of an award from the City Government of Baguio and no promise of 2 reward from the owner. What if he took the suitcase and sold its contents? That could surely help him supplement his daily wages. Life asa taxi driver in the Philippines is not easy. A little extra cash would go a long way to put food on the table and to pay tuition fees for his children. 1d the suitcase without the promise of a reward. Why? Perhaps, lost luggage to passengers. Maybe, it was his first time to do ard before, or maybe he knows some fellow taxi drivers who from passengers after they returned lost luggage. However, the point is that there was nO promise of a reward. A reward, in the first place, is not an entitlement. It is freely given as an unrequired gift for one’s service or effort. Otherwise, it would be a payment, not a reward, if someone demanded it. chapter NV: Deontology _ 65 Yet, Reggie returne’ he had previously returned I so, Maybe, he received a rew. did or did not receive rewards eee A ANTE INE TEI EE EI ETL IIShis main reason, Was Is SUPPOse the suitcase? For now, a etl ear ns ae ie turn " ‘ tenia twa eer Possible that Reg: rysical “Its simply the rg tempting it is to keep it on Se ee ad luggage was Not because of y thing todo," Reggie might have told himself. then took and solg d the lock, Fan ce ciel Fane Valuables if Reggie did not return the suit ‘ enefitting cee ane is wrong about keeping and rs careless, Reggie could have its valuable ements cd? “It is his fault; he was mindless an‘ (on one hand, Reggie cone vf hn abe a ne thought. As the say i Yet, Reggie is things from now on: He will learn to be more mindful of his things have mused: “He wi a returned the suitcase without the promise of a rew. ich is the cap; Principles that we determine for ourselves To consider the rational will is 10 point persons.On one hand, animals are sentient ar the ability to perceive and navigate its exter are sentient organisms, we do not se Out the dliference between animals and anisms. Sentience, Meaning an organismhas mal environment Insofar as dogs and carabaos ‘e them bumpin, into trees an Walls unless their sense’ are weak. Animals constantly interact with ‘ings. Thisis also true to us humans We are also sentient. Thus, both animals — to external stimuli and intern, Nand with the world, reacting VE and thrive, ational, R ate beyond h their surtoun, and persons int al impulses to sury; On the other hand, people are als ‘ationality, Consists of the mental faculY to construct ideas and thoughts that our immedi 7 Surroundings, Ths is the 66 __tahies Foundations of MoImmanuel Kant (1724-1804) Immanuel Kant (1724~1804) was a German enlightenment plosopher who i thought to herald the “Copemican Revolution in Philosophy.” What is meant by Copemican Revolution? Nicolaus Copernicus ‘was the 15th century astronomer who proposed the helocenric model of the universe in his book De Revolutonibus Orbium Coelestium. This was a major event in the history of ideas because it heralded a radical paredigm shift in the way humans considered their place in the universe. Akin to Copernicus, Kant developed revolutionary insights concerning the ‘tuman mind and the conditions for the possibility of ‘nonledge. In this chapter, the primary text of Kant, Groundwork towards a Metaphysics of Morals, shows tis conrbutons in moral philosophy. By itself, this ‘ets aso revolutionary, insofar as Kans ambition in the texts radical. He intends to develop what he calls the ‘supreme principle of morality.” It is supposedly Supreme because by basing ton the faculty of reason, it a Seg for all creatures that have that faculty. vente ens herent metal capacty) This rar eof obigatonis no longer relative Netra longer depends on what a persons 23 ong Eis or religious creumstances ar. For lat person has the faculty of reason, the Moral Law js Rie 'ew is binding, Hence, Kant has become a key rin moral reflection, capacity for mental abstraction, which arises from the operations of the faculty of reason. Thus, we have the ability to stop and think about what we are doing. We can remove ourselves mentally from the immediacy of our surroundings and reflect on our actions and how such actions affect the world. We can imagine a different and better world, and create mental images of how we interact with other people in that world. In the same way, an architect “first” constructs her blueprint of a house in her mind. When the draft of that construction is drawn, she can then give instructions to masons and carpenters on how to build the actual house, which becomes the “second” construction. This happens often in our lives such as when a young gitl puts on her nice dress and makeup, when a student writes the outline for an English essay, or when a painter makes initial sketches on a canvass. The first construction consists in how we imagine things can be, then we implement that in the second construction. Through the capacity for imagination and reflection, we conceive of how we could affect, possibly even change, the world we live in, Thus, we do not only have the capacity to imagine and construct mental images, but we also have the ability to act ‘on—to enact and make real—those mental images. This ability to enact our thoughts is the basis for the rational will. The rational will refers to the faculty to intervene in the world, to act in a manner that is consistent with our reason. As far as we know, animals only act according to impulses, based on their natural instincts. Thus, animals “act” with immediacy (from Latin: i + medius, or stern brent 67pulse and the action. They do ng y that animals do not “act” Th “no middle") with nothing that intervenes between the im and cannot deliberate on their actions. In fact, we May 52 ‘ontrast, we humare_ only “react” to their external surroundings and internal impulses. n ¢ wast wer mang have reason, which intervenes between impulse and act: We have the ability ee a think about what we are doing to evaluate our actions according to as les. Simply. stated, we are not only reacting to our surroundings and internal impulses, but are also conceiving of ways to act according to certain rational principles. Right now, for example, you may feel lethargic. Your head feels heavy and your eyes are droopy. The corresponding impulse is to close your eyes and then fall asleep. However, your rational will demand something else. Perhaps, you have to finish reading this chapter for a quiz tomorrow. That quiz is part of the big picture, that is, your formation as a student to earn a degree and do productive work. So you struggle to stay awake; you stand up briefly to stretch your legs. You may have already taken some coffee. Right now, as you struggle to stay awake and understand the words on this page, your rational will is victorious over your bodily impulses as long as you stay awake. This demonstrates the triumph of your rational will over your base impulse to just go to sleep. This triumph clarifies the meaning of rational will, the capacity of a person to be the cause of her actions based on reasons and not merely to mindlessly react to the environment and base impulses. In philosophical discussions about human freedom, this capacity is called agency, which is the ability of a person to act based on her intentions and mental states. Let us go back to Reggie. The moment he discovered that Trent had left his suitcase in the taxi cab, Reggie reacted according to his rational will—to return the suitcase. He determined that it was his duty to return it inasmuch as his rational will had conceived such aduty. Hence, to act according to a duty is a specifically human experience. Animals, if itis true that they do not possess the faculty of rational will, cannot conceive of having duties. This is the starting point of deontology. We may claim that as long as we have rationality, there will always be the tension between our base impulses and our rational will. AUTONOMY Kant claims that the property of the rational willis autonomy (Ak 4:440), which ® the opposite of heteronomy. These three Greek words are instructive: autos, he te 9s, and nomos, which mean “self,” “other,’ and “law, respectively, Hence, when we 5 ee ne autos and nomos, we get autonomy; heteros and nomos to heteronomy,. Crudel 5 ae ine oe means selflaw (or selflegislating) and heteronomy means other law. Y stated auto Consider the trivial example of brushing one’s teeth, wt . hich is ‘lemma but is sufficient to explain the difference between autono; Not yet a moral dilem! my and heteronomy. When YU © can tell, children do not like were a child, did you like to brush your teeth? As far as wy a a a iN as a teledannctto brush their teeth, but parents know that children should, to maintain oral hygiene. So parents try to find ways to get their small children to brush their teeth before going to bed, using a variety of incentives or threats of undesirable consequences. “Hey, Ryan; a mother tells her boy, “go and brush your teeth now or else your teeth will rot!"*Come on now, Liza,’ a father tells his daughter, “If you brush your teeth in five minutes, I will let you play your computer game tonight”’In the case of Ryan and Liza, are they autonomous? Certainly not, as their parents are the ones that legislate the principle that children should brush their teeth before they go to bed and impose such a principle by using threats or incentives. Now think about Ryan and Liza twenty years later when they are in their mid- twenties. Suppose they brush their teeth every night before they go to bed, and they do so without the prodding of their parents, Ata certain point, perhaps when they were growing up as teenagers, they both reflected on the whole business of brushing one’s teeth. Both concluded that they (1) agree with the principle behind it (oral hygiene) and thus, (2) every night they impose it upon themselves to brush their teeth before going to bed. Number 1 refers to the act of legislating a principle, while number 2 refers to the enacting of the principle. Thus, it also refers to the willing of the adopted principle into reality. Are they autonomous? Yes, certainly. Kant describes this as follows: The will is thus not only subject to the law, but it is also subject to the law in such a way that it gives the law to itself (self-legislating), and primarily just in this way that the will ‘can be considered the author of the law under which it is subject. (Ak 4:431) This description of autonomy is unusual. When we think of someone being “subject to the law, we usually think of an imposing authority figure that uses his power to control the subject into complying with his will. Imagine a policeman who apprehends a suspected criminal by forcing him on the ground and putting handcuffs on his wrists. Incidentally, “subject”comes from the Latin words sub (under) and jacere (to throw). When combined, the two words refer to that which is thrown or brought under something, The will must comply with the law, which is the authority figure. Surprisingly though, the will must give the law to itself. Therefore, the will is, at the same time, the authority figure giving the law to itself. How can the rational will be subordinate to that which is simultaneously its own. authority figure? Isn't that contradictory to be subject to the law and yet also be the authority figure for itself? Thus, Kant describes autonomy as the will that is subject to a principle or law. This apparent contradiction is entirely possible to exist, but only for self-reflexive human beings that have rational will. Remember Ryan and Liza, and the principle of brushing their teeth, On one hand, heteronomy is the simple legislation and imposition of a law by an external authority (a person must brush her teeth before going to bed).Their parents are the authority figures, and the law is imposed externally by rewards or punishments. On the other hand, autonomy belongs to the grown-up and already rational Ryan and Liza, who ChaptertV:Deontology 69i such a k have adopted such a law about brushing their teeth, They regularly impose Won, themselves out of the enactment of the will to follow the law. The distinguishing point here is the locus of the authorship of the law. In any sive Scenario where a person complies with the law, we ask where the author is, whether it is external or internal. If the author of the law is external, the willis subjected Loc extemal authority, thus heteronomous will. In contrast, if the author was the will itself, imposing the ‘aw unto itself, then we describe the will as autonomous. For the 25-year-old versions of Ryan and Liza who brush their teeth before going to bed without any prompting from their Parents, their adoption of the childhood law about toothbrushing makes the locus of the authorship internal. Thus, they are autonomous. However, trivial actions such as brushing one's teeth can hardly be considered“moral? Real moral issues often involve actions like stealing, lying, and murder, in that they havea Certain gravity, insofar as those actions directly harm or benefit the well-being of persons. Reggie's case, seen in this light, is clearly a moral issue, Let us remember that alternative scenario that we imagined earlier: What if Reggie did not return the suitcase, destroyed the lock, then took and sold its valuable contents? an autonomous agent? Reggie could have easily c should benefit from Trent's loss because people who lose their things are careless, and thus do not deserve to keep those things. Therefore, Reggie may have concluded, "I am entitled to benefit from this lost suitcase. lam the author of this Principle. lam acting autonomously!” He may conclude this since no external authority is legislating laws for him by using rewards OF punishments. However, this kind of reasoning is mistaken from a Kantian understanding as we will show below, What do you think of Reggie's principle that he should benefit from other peoples loss because they are careless, and thus do not deserve tg keep those things? Ist sill autonomous agency when a person enacts any apparently selt-legisited Cat We may argue that the locus of the authorship of the law was Certainly internal, wh, Pi a himself, “I am entitled to benefit from this lost suit » When he case’ based on ho ed the difference between autonomy and heteronomy.—. w we have describ properly means? Certainly not. selfand other. is that what autonomy | 7 70 __ Ethics: Foundations of Moral ValuationKant claims that there is adifference between rational will and animal impulse. Take a close look at how he describes the distinction in this passage The cholee that ‘can be determined by pure reason is called free choice. That which is determinable only by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be animal choice {arbitrium brutum). Human choice, in contrast, isa choice that may indeed be affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore in itself (without an acquired skill of reason) ‘not pure, but can nevertheless be determined to do actions from pure will (Ak 6:213). Thus, there is a difference between what determines a choice or decision, whether it, is caused by sensible impulse or by pure reason. On one hand, sensible impulses are usually bodily and emotional. Bodily instincts and desires, such as the urge to eat, drink, sleep, or have sexual intercourse, comprise the set of human compulsions for survival and the propagation of the species. Emotions and sentiments also make up what Kant considers sensible impulses. Practical examples are the jealousy from seeing your girlfriend or boyfriend make eyes at someone, and the rage from being pushed foully by your opponent ina basketball game. As we previously claimed, when we discussed the difference between animals and humans, there is immediacy to sensible impulses. There is hardly anything that comes between the stimulus and the reaction. Kant calls this set of actions that are caused by sensible impulse animal choice or arbitrium brutum, On the other hand, there is a choice or action that is determined by pure reason. Kant calls this kind of action free choice, and one may argue that human freedom resides in this capacity of reason to intervene, to “mediate” within arbitrium brutum. Previously, rationality was described as the mental capacity to construct ideas and thoughts that are beyond one’s immediate surroundings. This mental capacity is what makes the intervention possible between stimulus and reaction. With the faculty of reason, a person can break the immediacy of stimulus and reaction by stopping to deliberate and assess possible alternative actions. ‘The above-described jealous partner and raging basketball player, if they had enough self- possession, could refrain from reacting mindlessly to the triggering stimuli and instead construct rational response. For instance, you may open up with your partner to talk about trust and setting boundaries, or you may tell the guarding opponent to take it easy and play the game well, In both cases, you orient your actions toward an overall aim that you aspire for trust and sportsmanship, respectively. These aims are mental constructions of the faculty of reason, These examples do not imply that people are not affected by sensible impulses. The jealous feelings and anger are present, but they do not immediately and automatically cause the actions. Based on the quote above (Ak 6:213), Kant describes that human choice can be affected but is not determined by sensible impulses. man to be affected but is not determined by sensible but we cannot be reduced to but also” is useful. When What does it mean for a hu impulse? It implies that we are indeed basically animals, mere animality. This is where the correlative conjunction “not only, ji we claim, “The human person is not only an animal, but is also rational,’ we admit to two ct troniony 71ity of reason. Human freedg Possible causes of our actions: sensible impulses and the faculty " resides in that distinction. a io when he tells himsey Let us return once again to Reggie and the alternative scenario self, “lam entitled to benefit from this lost suitcase’'fs Reggie acting ae We ail on did not return the suitcase and instead sold its contents for his own benet son a this at the beginning of this section: Is it always autonomous agency whena cs rail “ any apparently self-legislated principle? Certainly not. The difference betwe tuman choice | and animal choice is crucial to giving a correct answer here. Autonomy is a pr He Y ofthe will only during instances when the action is determined by pure reason. When the actions determined by sensible impulses, despite the source of those impulses being nevertheless | internal itis considered heteronomous. Why heteronomous? Because a sensible impulses “external” to one's self-legislating faculty of reason, Kant confirms this point when he states that the action caused by sensible impulses results always only in the heteronomy of the will because it is what he calls“a foreign impulse” (Ak 4:444), insofar as the will does not give itself the law. Therefore, Reggie is not acting autonomously, supposing he was to take and beneft from the contents of the suitcase, Why would we consider his will as being heteronomous? Because a sensible impulse would be the cause of such an action, whether it is greed or the excitement of obtaining easy money without working for it, or the shame that arises from being unable to provide for his family. In any of those causes, a sensible impulse is akin toa “foreign impulse” that has the same immediacy of an external au its will on Reggie. t t ‘ ithority figure that imposes We can thus make the conclusion that heteronom impulse, whether it is external (as in other persons or i the agent) or sensible (as in bodily instincts or base et act. In contrast, autonomy is the property of the will i the cause of the action. y of the will occurs when any foreign institutions that impose their will on ‘motions) is what compels a person to n those instances when pure reasons But what consists in an action that is done by of the action is pure reason? What does it mean t UNIVERSALIZABILITY To figure out how the faculty of reason can be the cau: 7 se of an igawa need to learn a method or a specific procedure that wi demonstrat lutonomous action, z But before explaining this procedure, it will be helpf ' autonomy of the will: ul to first m ate dd of moral theories, namely, substantive and formal moral theones, Actetnetion bowtie Asubstantive moral theoryimmediately promy} \ gates the: i i js that theory. As such, it identifies the particular duties ina straights that compl adherents of the theory must follow. The set of fen c, ghtforward manner that t! ‘ommandments of the Judeo-Christian 72. _tahies: Found. 1 of Moral Valuation | | |tradition is an unambiguous example of a substantive moral theory. The specific laws are articulated mostly in the form of a straightforward moral command:*Honor your father and mother’*Vou shall not kill” and so forth, In contrast, a formdfmoral theory does not supply the rules or commands straightaway. it does not tell you what you may or may not do. Instead, a formal moral theory provides us the “form” or “framework” of the moral theory. To provide the “form” of a moral theory is to supply a procedure and the criteria for determining, on one’s own, the rules and moral commands. Metaphorically, we can think of a cookbook as akin to a formal moral theory. In using a cookbook, we are given instructions on how to cook certain dishes, but we are not given the actual food themselves, which would be “substantive: In following a recipe {or sinigang, for example, we may add a slight variation to the ingredients and sequence of steps. But if we want the dish to remain sinigang and not transform it into some. other kind ofviand like pochero, we need to follow the steps that are relevant to making sinigang. To be exact, a formal moral theory will not give us alist of rules or commands. Instead, it will give usa set of instructions on how to make a list of duties or moral commands. Kant endorses this formal kind of moral theory. The Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, which he wrote in 1785, embodies a formal moral theory in what he calls the categorical imperative, which provides a procedural way of identifying the rightness or wrongness of an action. Kant articulates the categorical imperative this way: ‘Act only according to such a maxim, by which you can at once will ‘that it become a universal law. (Ak 4:421) ae There are four key elements in this formulation of the categorical imperative, namely, action, maxim, will, and universal law. Kant states that we must formulate an action as a maxim, which he defines as a “subjective principle of action” (Ak 4:422). In this context, a maxim consists of a “rule” that we live by in our day-to-day lives, but it does not have the status of a law or a moral command that binds us to act in a certain way. Rather, maxims depict the patterns of our behavior. Thus, maxims are akin to the “standard operating procedures” (SOPs) in our lives. We act according to a variety of maxims, even if we are not aware of them. Actually, we become aware of our maxims when we talk about ourselves, when we reveal our habits and the reasons behind them. For example, we tell our friends in specific situations: When the weekend comes, | usually go what we ordinarily do in certs When the exam week begins, | go to mass so that | will to the beach with my family to relax. be blessed with good luck. Whenever | meet my crush, | wear my hair ina braid so that he will notice me, These are usually personal policies” that may or may not be unique to us, but We act according to these maxims nonetheless. Tis is why Kant calls a maxim a subjective principle of action. We have many maxims in our daily lives, and we live according to them. Chapter IV:Deontology 73In the formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant calls our attention a the king of maxims that we live by. He claims that we ought to act according to the maxim “by which vous can at once will thatit become a universal law: What does it mean to will a maxim thay can become a universal law? It means that the maxim must be universalizable, whichis what it means to“will that it become a universal law This means nothing other than imagining world in which the maxim, or personal rule, that live by were adopted by everyone as thei oun maxim. In this formulation, Kant is telling us to conceive of the maxim as ifit obligate Sveryone to comply. This mental act of imagining a universalized maxim does not mean we picture a world in which everyone actually followed the maxim. Instead, we merely imagine the maxim as a law that everyone ought to follow. The proper way to imagine the universalized maxim is not by asking, “What if everyone did that maxim?” but by asking, “What if everyone were obligated to follow that maxim?" Here isa clear example. In Groundwork towards a Metaphysics of Morals, Kant takes up the issue of making false promises (Ak 4:422), He narrates the predicament of a man who needs money, but has no immediate access to obtain it ‘except by borrowing it from a friend. This man knows that he will not be able to pay the money back, but ifhe says he cannot return the money, then no money will be lent to him. Hence, the predicament is simply about him borrowing money, while knowing that he cannot pay it back. This is a specific act under the general category of acts called false promising. Kant says that the man would like to make such a Promise, but he stops and asks himself if what he is about to do is right or wrong: Is it really wrong to borrow money without intending to pay it back? If we were to formulate this act as a maxim, it would go this way:“When | am in need of money, | shall borrow it even when I know I cannot pay it back” Remember that Kant states that we should act according to a maxim by which we can at once will that it become a universal law. What does it mean to universalize the maxim about borrowing money without intending to return it? It is simple. Imagine a hypothetical world in which each person, whenever she is in need of money, is obligated to borrow from another even when she knows she cannot pay it back. We do not imagine that people actually borrowed money without intending to return it. Instead, we think of them as obligated to do so. Now, there are two possibilities in this hypothetical world where people are obligated to borrow money without intending to pay: the maxim can either make sense or not make sense asa universal law, By’making sense we refer tothe logical plausibility of the universalized maxim. The opposite of logical plausibilty is selfcontradiction or logical impossibility. Let us assess that hypothetical world. If borrowing money without intending "2 pay were everyone's obligation to comply with, what would happen to the statue of the tniversalized maxim? The purpose of borrowing money would be defeated becouse n® one will lend money. In a world where it is an obligation to borrow back, all lenders would know that they will not be paid and they wil The institution of money-borrowing would lose its meaning if eve Money without paying I refuse to lend money: Tyone was obligated (0 74 _ Ethics: Foundations of Moral Valuationborrow money without intending to pay it back. As a universalized maxim, it would self- destruct because it becomes impossible. This is how Kant assesses it: Here | see straightaway that it could never be valid as a universal law of nature and be _consistent with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law that each person, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intent not to keep it, would make the promise and the purpose that he may have impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as futile pretense (Ak 4:422). In the passage above, Kant distinguishes between being “consistent with itself” and “contradict itself.” Look at the maxim again: “When | am in need of money, | shall borrow it ‘even when | know | cannot pay it back." The meaning of the act “to borrow” implies taking and using something with the intent to return it. In the maxim, the claim is to borrow “even when I know | cannot pay it back,’ which contradicts the very meaning of “to borrow: The contradiction is evident: to borrow (implies returning) but the intention is not to return. Of course, in the real world, many people borrow money without intending to pay, but it is the logical plausibility of the universalized maxim that is at stake. Here, we reveal the contradiction that occurs when we scrutinize the maxim because, after all, one contradicts oneself when one borrows money (implies intent to return) without intending to pay it back. It makes no sense. This is why Kant claims that the universalized maxim “could never be valid as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself” Thus, we can conclude that the act of borrowing money without intending to pay is rationally impermissible. Here, we discover two ways by which Kant rejects maxims. The universalized maxim becomes either (1) self-contradictory or (2) the act and its purpose become impossible. What is the result of all these? We reveal the rational permissibility of actions insofar as they cannot be rejected as universalizable maxims. In contrast, those universalized maxims that are rejected are shown to be impermissible, that is, they are irrational and thus, in Kant’s mind, immoral. But what does rationalpermissibility' mean? Simply put, it refers to the intrinsic quality of an action that it is objectively and necessarily rational. Using the universalizability test, we can reveal the objective necessity of an action as rational, Observe, for example, the quality of the arithmetical claim, "1 + 1= 2" It is objectively necessary because the quality of the claim is universally and logically valid, and we understand this to be always true as rational beings. Observe the differenc quality of objectively necessary claims e between the with contingent claims, such as claims about the world like “The sky is blue’ the truth of Which depends on the actual situation in the world. Therefore, we have demonstrated that borrowing money without intending to pay, a5 @ kind of false promise, is objectively and unters Necessarily wrong, insofar as it enco! a self-contradiction and logical impossibility When it is universalized as a maxim. cep ss Gnaeer nn beemitogy 75SUMMA | tegorical impera a formal, Not substantive, moral philosophy. We have shown ho\ tion can be testadondvis ete, itcan also be distinguished whether such an action i permissible OF DO 1A being given a list of substantive moral commands, we now have @ sort of tool, like a measuring instrument, that tells us whether an action is morally permissible or not. Hence, we have the capacity to make our own list of moral commands. Instead of receiving them from others, We use our own rational faculty to produce our own list of moral duties. Returning to Reggie and the suitcase that was left in his cab, he can now test on his own the moral permissibility of the formulated maxim: “When a suitcase that does not belong to me is left in my cab, | shall take its contents and sell them for my own. benefit” He can now assess this maxim by imagining it as everyone's obligation. Does the universalized maxim encounter a self-contradiction, or does it remain self-consistent? Certainly, the meaning of ownership, when a suitcase belongs to someone, is to have the right to possess, use, and dispose of the thing as one pleases. So what happens when a person is obligated to take possession of an object that does not belong to her? The universalized maxim of Reggie becomes contradictory, for the meaning of ownership is contradicted. How is it that everyone is obligated to take a suitcase and sell its contents, despite the fact that they do not have the right to possess, use, and dispose of that suitcase? At this juncture, it has become clear how Kant’ © wan acl Now, imagine applying this procedure to other scenarios in which a person encounters moral problems, such as lying, cheating in an exam, murder, and adultery, among others. You may also test positive actions, such as paying for something that you are buying, returning something you borrowed, or submitting a school project on time. Can the maxims in the specific actions under those moral issues be universalized without encountering sel contradiction? It is for each one of us to test on our own, not for Kant or any other authority figure to determine for us. On your own, try identifying an action that is considered lying or cheating in an exam, formulate the maxim, then test that maxim for universalizability.'s there a contradiction that is revealed in the universalized maxim? In summary, this procedure is properly used when one wishes to determine the moral permissibility of an action. Indeed, we are often already told which actions are right or wrong, but this knowledge is usually based on what authority figures say. Our parents priests, school rules and regulations, and government ordinances already prescribe cleat determined moral commands. So what is the categorical imperative for, if we already kno" whether or not an action is right? rh The categorical imperative is precisely forthe rational will that is autonomous. Re! that autonomy implies a self-legislating will. The test for universalizabil a ossible that self-legislation, for the result of the categorical imperative, i nothin, makes ps we capacity to distinguish between permissible and impermissible merat a er etl 76 _ethics:Foundations of Moral Valuation . ath| | i | ¥ can then begin the work of producing a list of duties, what a rational and autonomous will believes to be right and wrong actions, In conclusion, what can deontology contribute to our lives, specifically to our moral reflection? The answer lies in one concept: enlightenment morality. This kind of morality is opposed to paternalism, which evokes the metaphor of father (from the Latin pater). A father is a benevolent authority figure who takes care and provides safety and sustenance for his children. In this metaphor, the father has the power to make decisions for and enforce obedience on the children, as long as the children are dependent and may not know yet what is best for them. Thus, the father makes decisions on behalf of and in the interest of the children. It is his duty to raise and nurture them for their own good. The children are expected to comply and obey because they are still unfit to make good decisions on their own. Children, when let on their own, would likely follow base impulses because they lack the necessary experience and rational will to survive and flourish in this world, But what happens when children grow and become mature adults? When they move on to develop their minds and live their own lives? Certainly, paternalism has to give way toa more mature rational will when the children are no longer children, when they mature, and can begin to navigate the complex world. This is therefore the place of deontology in the spirit of enlightenment morality. Deontology is based on the “light” of one’s own reason when maturity and rational capacity take hold of a person's decision-making, Reason is depicted as having its own light in contrast to our long experience of “paternalism” in human history, in which we find dictatorship and authority figure that claim to be benevolent, but have proven to be oppressive and exploitative of those who do not have political power. With deontology, particularly the method of universalizability, we can validate and adopt those rules and laws that are right and reject those that are irrational, thus impermissible because they are self-contradictory. This is then the practical value of deontology in our moral reflection: we are encouraged to have courage to think on our own, to use our rational will against external authorities as well as internal base impulses that tend to undermine our autonomy and self-determination. KEY WORDS STEN + Autonomy versus Heteronomy + Rational Will + Agency + Arbitrium Brutum versus Free Choice + Duty + Substantive versus Formal Moral Theory + Maxim + Rational Permissibility Enlightenment Morality versus Paternalism + Universalizability SBR es ape cerctogy 77