SECOND DIVISION

June 21, 2017

G.R. No. 226846

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JEFFREY MACARANAS y FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For consideration of this Court is the appeal of the Decision 1 dated October 29, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing appellant Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez's
appeal and affirming with modification the Judgment2 dated August 22, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 79, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 38-M-
2008, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.

The facts follow.

Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes were at Meyland
Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the evening of February 18, 2007, aboard Frank's
motorcycle, a green Honda Wave 125 with Plate No. NQ 8724, registered under the
name of Jacqueline Corpuz Langaman. When they were about to leave the place, two
(2) men, both wearing jackets and bonnets suddenly approached them, followed by a
third man who was earlier standing at a post. One of the three men held Frank by the
neck and shot Frank causing the latter to fall down. The same man pointed his gun at
Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her cellphone. After Kathlyn gave her
cellphone, the same man hit her on the back. Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be
unconscious and saw that the men searched the body of Frank for any valuables. While
the incident was taking place, the second man took Frank's motorcycle, while the third
man, herein appellant, just stood to guard them and acted as the look-out. Afterwards,
the three men left together riding Frank's motorcycle. It was then that Kathlyn was able
to seek help and Frank was taken to the hospital.

According to Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon, Frank sustained a gunshot injury traversing the
neck area which necessitated surgery. Eventually, Frank died on the 27th post-operative
day or on March 30, 2007. The cause of Frank's death was "cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to the spinal cord injury with retained metallic foreign body secondary
conjunction injury status post the surgery done which is laminectomy infusion with rods
and screws," as shown in the Post-Mortem Certificate.

Thus, an Information was filed against appellant, Richard Lalata and a certain John Doe
charging them of violation of R.A. No. 6539, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of February, 2007, in the City of Meycauayan, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with gun, by means of violence and intimidation, with intent of
gain and without the consent of the owner, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away with them one Honda Wave 125 motorcycle with Plate No. NQ 8724
valued at ₱59,000.00 belonging to Jacqueline Corpuz [Langaman], to her damage and
prejudice in the aforesaid amount of ₱59,000.00, and by reason or on the occasion of
the commission of the said carnapping act, the said accused in furtherance of their
conspiracy and with intent to kill did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot Frank Karim Langaman with the gun they were then provided,
hitting the latter on his neck which caused his death.
Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his arraignment and after the pre-trial ended, the
trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jacqueline Langaman, Kathlyn Irish Mae
Cervantes, Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon and SPO 1 Hernan Roble Berciles, Jr.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified in his defense and denied the charges against
him claiming that on February 18, 2007, he fetched his cousin Richard Lalata before
proceeding to his father Eming Macaranas' house at Brgy. Lawa, where they usually eat
and sleep. According to him, they left early in the morning of the following day' and just
slept the whole day at their house in Brgy. Daungan. Thereafter, sometime in June,
2007, barangay officials arrested him and claimed that they beat and mauled him in
order to admit that he killed Frank, and under coercion, he pointed to his cousin Richard
Lalata as the perpetrator.

The RTC, in its decision, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and disposed the case, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused Jeffrey Macaranas,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Carnapping.

Accordingly, accused Jeffrey Macaranas is hereby SENTENCED:

(a) To suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

(b) To indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman Corpuz the amount of
Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Frank Karim Corpuz Langaman;

(c) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of PhpS0,000.00
as temperate damages;

(d) To restore to the offended party, Jacqueline Langaman, the subject motorcycle or in
default thereof, to indemnify said offended party in the sum of Php25,000.00; and

(e) To pay the costs of the suit.

The case against accused Richard Lalata who remained at large since the filing of the
Information is ordered ARCHIVED to be revived upon his apprehension. Issue an alias
warrant of arrest for the arrest of accused Lalata.

SO ORDERED.3

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the

Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch79, Malolos, Bulacan, dated 22 August
2012 is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:

xxxx

Accordingly, accused Jeffrey Macaranas is hereby SENTENCED:

(a) To suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

(b) To indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman [y] Corpuz the amount
of seventy-five thousand (Php75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity forthe death of
Frank Karim Corpuz Langaman;

(c) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of fifty thousand
(Php50,000.00)pesos as moral damages;
(d) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of thirty
thousand (Php30,000.00)pesos as exemplary damages;

(e) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of twenty-five
thousand(Php25,000.00) pesos as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages;

(f) To restore to the offended party, Jacqueline Langaman, the subject motorcycle or in
default thereof, to indemnify said offended party in the sum of Php25,000.00; and

(g) To pay the costs of the suit.

The damages awarded shall earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of judgment until fully satisfied.

The case against accused Richard Lalata who remained at large since the filing of the
Information is ordered ARCHIVED to be revived upon his apprehension. Issue an alias
warrant of arrest for the arrest of accused Lalata.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.4

Hence, the present appeal.

Appellant insists that the trial court and the CA committed an error in giving full
credence to the testimony of the lone witness and in rejecting his defense of denial and
alibi.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using
force upon things. 5 By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of
the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:

SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof (Emphasis supplied)

Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping
Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the
inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the
carnapping" to "in the course of thecommissionof the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof" This thirdamendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal
Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last
clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the
essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping
and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on theoccasion thereof" Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are
notproved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and
the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.6
"There is no arguing that the anti-camapping law is a special law, different from the
crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and
theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking,
intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and
robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when
it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking
was done with or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law,
such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or
robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute."7

So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it becomes
qualified or aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on the occasion of the
carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is killed or raped. 8 As we have ruled
in People v. Mejia: 9

The killing or the rape merely qualifies the crime of carnapping x x x and no distinction
must be made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is
committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof' makes no difference
insofar as the penalty is concerned.

It is similar to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and in People v.
Bariquit, 10 it was ruled that:

In the present case, the accused-appellants were charged with, tried, and convicted for
the crime of robbery with homicide. In our jurisdiction, this special complex crime is
primarily classified as a crime against property and not against persons, homicide being
a mere incident of the robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object of the
criminal.

Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is applicable only to crimes
against persons. Accordingly, inasmuch as robbery with homicide is a crime against
property and not against persons, cannot treachery be validly considered in the present
case.

Thus, the elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as
amended are the following:

1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things; and

4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 11

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended, the prosecution
has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the
victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit
was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." 12 In other words, to prove the special
complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the
essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the
culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof. 13
In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets,
together with the appellant who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and
employed force and intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim's
motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck causing his death.

Appellant argues that the RTC, as well as the CA, erred in appreciating the testimony of
the lone witness of the prosecution because of its inconsistencies and the improbability
of her imputations.

This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the
witness[es], considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a
witness on the stand. 14 From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to
determine the truthfulness of witness[es]. 15 The factual findings of the appellate court
generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the
findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion. 16

The CA, therefore, did not err when it concurred with the RTC on the following:

The testimony of Kathlyn satisfies the aforementioned test of credibility. More

importantly, during her time at the witness stand, Kathlyn positively and categorically
identified accused-appellant as one of the three (3) men who committed the crime. We
agree with the court aquo's observation on this, thus -

xxx

The testimony of the Prosecution witness Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes reveals that she
came face to face with accused Jeffrey Macaranas. Though the other two (2) accused
wore bonnet at the time of the shooting incident, she was able to identify accused
Jeffrey Macaranas and narrate to the court his specific participation in the carnapping
incident. She testified that before the two (2) male persons approached her and Frank
Karim, she saw accused Jeffrey Macaranas who was then standing beside a post,
staring at them while they were moving slowly on board the motorcycle. Again, she saw
Jeffrey following the two male persons who approached her and Frank Karim. Jeffrey
Macaranas was just a meter away from her because he was near the person holding
the motorcycle. Jeffrey Macaranas boarded the motorcycle together with his two (2)
male companions immediately after the incident.

xxx

There was indeed a positive and unequivocal identification of the accused. It has long
been settled that where the witnesses of the prosecution were not actuated by ill motive,
it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit. Herein, no imputation of improper motive on the part of Kathlyn was ever
made by the accused-appellant, as the latter even testified he was without knowledge of
any grudge Kathlyn might have against him. Further, relationship per se of Kathlyn with
the victim does not necessarily mean that her testimony is biased and/or fabricated.

xxxx

Moreover, as correctly held by the People, through the OSG, any inconsistency, if at all,
was already superseded by Kathlyn's positive identification of the accused-appellant in
court. x x x

x x x17

Conspiracy was also proven in this case. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, 18 which
are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. 19 In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with
the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to
the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated. 20 As the CA correctly ruled:

In the present case, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the
three accused. Accused-appellant was seen standing by the post looking at Kathlyn and
the victim aboard the motorcycle. When his co-accused approached the former,
accused-appellant followed suit and was standing guard nearby, while his companions
committed their criminal acts. After the victim fell down, and apparently thinking Kathlyn
to be unconscious, the trio left together taking with them the victim's motorcycle. Clearly,
the accused-appellant and company all acted in confabulation in furtherance of their
common design and purpose, i.e., to carnal the motorcycle. As aptly held by the court a
quo thus -

xxx

From the acts of accused Jeffrey Macaranas, there was unity in his action with his co-
accused and a concerted effort to commit the crime charged. The simultaneous acts of
Macaranas and his two (2) companions indicate a joint purpose and concurrence of
intentions on their part. x x x

x x x21

Anent appellant's defense of denial and alibi, this Court has consistently ruled that
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-
serving evidence, which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters22 and that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime23 during its
commission.24 In correctly ruling that the defense of denial and alibi of appellant is
inconsequential, the CA stated the following:

In the face of the serious accusation, accused-appellant merely interposed the defense
of denial and alibi to prove his innocence.1âwphi1 Time and again, this Court held that
denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by
the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a
defense crumbles in the in the light of positive identification of the accused-appellant, as
in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution's
evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is not the
case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than
the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified on affirmative matters. The Court
finds inadequate the accused-appellant's defense of alibi absent any credible
corroboration from disinterested witnesses, to exculpate him of the crime charged. 25

As to the imposable penalty under Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended, it is

provided that:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.
Thus, the RTC did not commit an error in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua considering that there was no alleged and provenaggravating circumstance. In
line, however, with the recent jurisprudence,26 in cases of special complex crimes like
carnapping with homicide, among others, where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are
pegged at ₱75,000.00 each. The appellant is also ordered to pay ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of the award of ₱25,000.00 as actual damages to the private
complainant.27 All the other dispositions of the CA stays.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez

is DISMISSED. Consequently, the Decision dated October 29, 2015 of theCourt of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellant is ordered to
indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of ₱75,000.00
instead of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱75,000.00 instead of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages and the amount of ₱50,000.00 instead of ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
 On wellness leave.
**
 Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017.
***
 On leave. Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 12, Sec. 4. - Leaving a
vote. - A Member who goes on leave or is unable to attend the voting on any
decision, resolution, or matter may leave his or her vote in writing, addressed to
the Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson, and the vote shall be counted,
provided that he or she took part in the deliberation.
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez; rollo, pp.
2-11
2
 Penned by Presiding Judge Olivia V. Escubio-Samar; CA rollo, pp. 66-74.
3
 Id. at 74. (Emphasis in the original)
4
 Rollo, pp. 14-15. (Emphasis in the original)
5
 Section 2, R.A. No. 6539.
6
 People v. Fabian Urzais y Lanurias, G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016,
citing People v. Santos, 388 Ph;J. 993, 1005-1006 (2000).
7
 Tan v. People, 379 Phil. 999, 1009 (2000).
8
 People v. SPO/ Lobitania, 437 Phil. 213, 222 (2002).
9
 341 Phil. 118, 143 (1997).
10
 395 Phil. 823, 855-856 (2000).
11
 People v. Bernabe and Garcia, 448 Phil. 269, 280 (2003).
12
 People v. Fabian Urzais y Lanurias, supra note 6.
13
 People v. Enrile Donia, G.R. No. 212815, March 5, 2017, citing People v,
Aquino, 724 Phil. 739, 757 (2014).
14
 People v. Enrile Donia, supra.
15
 People v. A bat, 731 Phil. 304, 311 (2014).
16
 Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 391 (2014).
17
 Rollo, pp. 9-10.
18
 People v. Panida, 369 Phil. 311, 341 (1999).
19
 People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999).
20
 People v. Bato, 401 Phil. 415, 424 (2000).
21
 Rollo, p. 12.
22
 People v. Manalili, 608 Phil. 498, 516-517 (2009).
23
 People v. Mosquerra, 414 Phil. 740, 749 (2001).
24
 People v. Ramos, et al., 715 Phil. 193, 206 (2013).
25
 Rollo, pp. 12-13.
26
 People v. lreneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.
27
 People v. Enrile Donia, supra note 13.
 THIRD DIVISION

G. R. No. 148233             June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding
appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft2 for the
unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.

In an information3 dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:

The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified

Theft, committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9th day of January,

1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused being then employed
as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi
cabs with business address at corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue, iliman
(sic), this City, and as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with
grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry
away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth
₱303,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of
₱303,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment4 on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered
a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.

Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the
taxicab business of his father, hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive
a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant would drive
the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transport’s
garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per day.5

On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but
he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as
taxi driver of the taxi company?

A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.

Q: How much is your boundary?

 A: ₱780.00, sir.

Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with
that company?

A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we
also sign something, sir.

Q: What is that something you mentioned?

A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.

Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then
the procedure reflect (sic) by your company when you return a taxi?

A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.

Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of taxi?

A: Daewoo taxi, sir.

Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?

A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir.6

The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellant’s house to ascertain
why the taxi was not returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find the taxi
there, appellant’s wife telling him that her husband had not yet arrived.8 Leaving nothing
to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that
his taxi was missing.9

On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed
that the taxi had been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.10 Cipriano
lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi.11

Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on
December 25, 1996 as he was short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not
abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January 5, 1997;12 and that on December
27, 1996, he gave the amount of ₱2,000.0013 to his wife whom he instructed to remit the
same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee14 and to tell the latter that he could
not return the taxi as he still had a balance thereof.15

Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage
to remit the boundary fee on the very same day (December 27, 1996),16 Cipriano was
already demanding the return of the taxi.17

Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the
record book,18 which was company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and
gave his employer ₱2,500.0019 as partial payment for the boundary fee covering the
period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he left
his driver’s license with Cipriano;20 that as he could not drive, which was the only work
he had ever known, without his driver’s license, and with the obligation to pay the
balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife started working on February 18, 1997
as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of ₱1,300.00,21 until March 26,
1997 when Cipriano told her that she had worked off the balance of his obligation;22 and
that with his obligation extinguished, his driver’s license was returned to him.23

Brushing aside appellant’s claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and that
he had in fact paid the total amount of ₱4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft by Decision of May 17, 2001, the dispositive portion
of which is quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond

reasonable doubt as charged, and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of
the preventive imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he
agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners.

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT

CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN
WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS GARAGE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED
THEFT.25

It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be
found in the judgment even if they have not been specifically assigned.26

Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been
modified, with respect to certain vehicles,27 by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING."

When statutes are in pari materia28 or when they relate to the same person or thing, or
to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,29 or have the same purpose or object,30 the rule dictates that they should be
construed together – interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi
modus.31 Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence,32 as this Court explained in City of Naga v.
Agna,33 viz:

. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates
that they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same
legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform
system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in
mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act
with reference thereto. Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
 same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to
have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and
they all should be construed together. In construing them the old statutes
relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the new
provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However,
when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be
reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the
legislative will . . .34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.35

Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is
committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of
confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle;
(4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5)
the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.36

On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines
"carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a
motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the
owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon
things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.37

Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,38 the concept of

unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.39

In the 2000 case of People v. Tan40 where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in
the later case of People v. Lobitania41 which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized
tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the
anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.

There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different

from the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It
particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging
to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison
of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their
common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and
that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's
consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft
and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been
carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's
consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon
things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was
certainly the case before the enactment of said statute. 42 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)

It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful
taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as
roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and
cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and
tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural
purposes. By implication, the theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be
covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and the provisions on
robbery, respectively.43

From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo
sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would
apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-
carnapping law.

The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for
qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of
carnapping. For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the
information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of
the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts
alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the crime.44

In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi
owned by Cipriano without the latter’s consent.45 Thus, the indictment alleges every
element of the crime of carnapping,46 and the prosecution proved the same.

Appellant’s appeal is thus bereft of merit.

That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the
same day as he was supposed to is admitted.47

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent
of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.48

While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired
as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its
owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the owner’s consent
transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one.49 Appellant himself
admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s
consent as the latter was already demanding its return.

Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife
the ₱2,500.00, you also told her to go to the company to ask the company for
permission for you to use the taxi since you were then still short of the boundary.
Alright, after telling that to your wife and after seeing your wife between
December 27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your wife what was the
answer of the company to that request of yours?

A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me.

Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making
use of the taxicab without first returning it to the company?

A: Before the new year, sir.

Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997?

A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.

Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not
agreeable to your making use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the
same to the company, you still went ahead and make (sic) use of it and returned
it only on January 5, 1997.

A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere
taking of the taxi without the owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to
return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee, his earnings that day not
having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was
not permanent in character, he having returned it.

Appellant’s position does not persuade.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of
the motor vehicle.51 Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent
to gain.52 The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the
benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s
consent constitutes gain.54

In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission55 which was reiterated in Association of Baptists

for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56 Justice Claudio
Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of an insurance policy,
explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s
consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to
gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:

Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking

was "temporary" and for a "joy ride", the Court sustains as the better view57 that
which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to a certain place,
or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of
theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to
another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom
utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino
cites in his work Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes
gain and Cuello Calon who calls it "hurt de uso."58 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he in fact returned the taxi
on January 5, 1997.

The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject vehicle
on January 5, 1997 to the garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of ₱4,500.00
in partial payment of his unremitted "boundary" for ten (10) days. He could not even be
certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner. On direct-examination,
he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of
₱2,000.00 and it was his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-
examination, he claimed that he gave ₱2,500.00 to his wife on that date for payment to
the taxicab owner.59

The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing
that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would alter the result of
the case.60 The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the distinct advantage of
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial.61

Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any scintilla of
evidence that he indeed returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.

Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?
 A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you have any copy of that record?

A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left
my driver’s license with them, sir.

Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic)
boundary, did you turn over any money to your employer when you returned the
taxi?

A: I gave them [an] additional ₱2,500.00, sir.

Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short
indebtedness (sic) or short boundary (sic)?

A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay ₱4,500.00.

Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this ₱4,500.00?

A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our
agreement was that I have to pay the balance in installment. 62 (Emphasis
supplied)

While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating
that he returned the taxi on the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of ₱4,500.00 as
partial payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not produce the documentary
evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such alleged record book is in the
possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant has the right
to have compulsory process issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf.63

The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it
erred in the imposition of the penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was
attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as the
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of
said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of application, either by
express provision or by necessary implication.64

Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without
reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no
suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under the said Code or by
other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said rules for
felonies under the Code.65

Thus, in People v. Panida66 which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty
imposed was the indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17
years and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides for its own penalties which
are distinct and without reference to the said Code.

The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for
not less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4
months. There can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of
penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory
provisions based on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the
Code. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years
and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is
not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for
carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do
not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code,
therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of
 the same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be
imposed on each of accused-appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years
and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum.67 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less
than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17 years and 4 months,68 for, as discussed
above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily and,
therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be
appreciated.

Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,69 as amended, otherwise known as the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punishable by a special law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty imposed being a range.70

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in
Crim Case No. Q-97-71956, finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another
judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
 Records at 90-94.
2
 ART. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle
or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
3
 Records at 1-2.
4
 Id. at 36.
5
 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), July 10, 2000 at 8.
6
 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 5-8.
7
 TSN, July 10, 2000 at 14.
8
 Id. at 9.
9
 Ibid.
10
 Id. at 9-10.
11
 Id. at 10.
12
 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 8.
13
 Ibid. On cross-examination however, appellant later claimed that the amount
he gave was ₱2,500.00.
14
 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 18.
15
 Id. at 8.
16
 Id. at 21.
17
 Id. at 20.
18
 Id. at 9.
19
 Ibid.
20
 Id. at 26.
21
 Id. at 29.
22
 Id. at 30.
23
 Ibid.
24
 Records at 93.
25
 Rollo at 40.
26
 People v. Salvador, 398 SCRA 394, 412 (2003); People v. Napalit, 396 SCRA
687, 699 (2003); People v. Galigao, 395 SCRA 195, 204 (2003).
27
 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended defines motor vehicle as
follows:

"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power
using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-
sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles,
which run only on rails or tracts, and tractors, trailers and reaction engines
of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a
motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
28
 Statutes which are in pari materia may be independent or amendatory in form;
they may be complete enactments dealing with a single, limited subject matter or
sections of a code or revision; or they may be a combination of these. [2B N.
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 140 (5th ed., 1992)]
29
 Natividad v. Felix, 229 SCRA 680, 687 (1994).
30
 Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova, 145 SCRA 385, 394
(1986); City of Naga v. Agna, 71 SCRA 176, 184 (1976).
31
 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed., 1990) translates the maxim as "to interpret,
and [in such a way as] to harmonize laws with laws, is the best mode of
interpretation."
32
 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
276 SCRA 681, 696 (1997); Natividad v. Felix, supra; Corona v. Court of
Appeals, 214 SCRA 378, 392 (1992).
33
 71 SCRA 176 (1976).
34
 Id. at 184.
35
 People v. Sison, 322 SCRA 345, 363-364 (2000).
36
 Id. at 364.
37
 People v. Napalit, supra at 700; People v. Calabroso, 340 SCRA 332, 342
(2000).
38
 People v. Lobitania, 388 SCRA 417, 432 (2002).
39
 People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 132788, October 23, 2003; People v. Sia, 370
SCRA 123, 134 (2001); People v. Santos, 333 SCRA 319, 334 (2000).
40
 323 SCRA 30 (2000).
41
 388 SCRA 417 (2002).
42
 People v. Lobitania, 388 SCRA 417, 432 (2002); People v. Tan, 323 SCRA 30,
39 (2000).
43
 Vide Izon v. People, 107 SCRA 118, 123 (1981) where this Court said the
following:

From the definition cited by the Government which petitioners admit as

authoritative, highways are always public, free for the use of every person.
There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway
to make the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given the anti-
carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required
license, same comes within the protection of the law, for the severity of the
offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same
is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it
is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or
unregistered as when they have just been bought from the company,
or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the
anti-carnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under
the provision of the Revised Penal Code. This obviously, could not
have been the intention of the anti-carnapping law.

Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be

noted that any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are
public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor
vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the exception, is thus
deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as defined in the law the
stealing of which comes within its penal sanction. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
44
 People v. Bali-balita, 340 SCRA 450, 469 (2000); People v. Banihit, 339 SCRA
86, 94 (2000); People v. Elamparo, 329 SCRA 404, 416 (2000); People v. Diaz,
320 SCRA 168, 175 (1999).
45
 Records at 1-2.
46
 It should be noted that appellant cannot be charged with estafa as it was not
alleged in the information that he had juridical possession of the motor vehicle.
In Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487, 492 (1990), this Court distinguished
between theft and estafa to wit:

Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief

Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code,
"The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the
thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and
converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft
even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was
entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de
facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of
the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citation omitted)

Moreover, in People v. Isaac, 96 Phil. 931 (1955), this Court convicted a

jeepney driver of theft and not estafa when he did not return the jeepney
to its owner since the motor vehicle was in the juridical possession of its
owner, although physically held by the driver. The Court reasoned that the
accused was not a lessee or hirer of the jeepney because the Public
Service Law and its regulations prohibit a motor vehicle operator from
entering into any kind of contract with any person if by the terms thereof it
allows the use and operation of all or any of his equipment under a fixed
rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the "boundary
system," legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an employee of
the owner. Thus, the accused’s possession of the vehicle was only an
extension of the owner’s.
47
 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 5-8.
48
 People v. Ellasos, 358 SCRA 516, 527 (2001).
49
 Vide People v. Isaac, supra, where this Court convicted Isaac, who was hired
as a temporary driver of a public service vehicle – a jeepney –of the crime of theft
when he did not return the same.
50
 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 22-23.
51
 People v. Ellasos, supra; People v. Gulinao, 179 SCRA 774, 780 (1989).
52
 Venturina v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 40, 46 (1991); People v. Seranilla,
161 SCRA 193, 207 (1988).
53
 3 R. Aquino & C. Grino-Aquino, The Revised Penal Code 206 (1997).
54
 Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co,
Inc., 124 SCRA 618, 620-621 (1983); Villacarta v. Insurance Commission, 100
SCRA 467, 474-475 (1980).
55
 100 SCRA 467 (1980).
56
 124 SCRA 618, 620-621 (1983).
57
 According to Justice Florenz Regalado [F. Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus
543-544 (2003)], historically, opinion as to whether or not the unlawful taking of
the personal property belonging to another must be coupled with the intent of the
offender to permanently deprive the owner of the said property has been divided:

(1) In one robbery case, it was held that there must be permanency in the
taking, or in the intent for the asportation, of the stolen property (People v.
Kho Choc, CA, 50 O.G. 1667).
 (2) In several theft cases, there were divided opinions, one line of cases
holding that the intent of the taking was to permanently deprive the owner
thereof (People v. Galang, CA, 43 O.G. 577; People v. Rico, CA, 50 O.G.
3103, cf. People v. Roxas, CA-G.R. No. 14953, Oct. 31, 1956). The
contrary group of cases argued that there was no need for
permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere disturbance of
the proprietary rights of the owner was
already apoderamiento (People v. Fernandez, CA, 38 O.G. 985; People
v. Martisano, CA, 48 O.G. 4417).

(3) The second line of cases holding that there need be no intent to

permanently deprive the owner of his property was later adopted by
the Supreme Court, in construing the theft clause in an insurance policy,
and ruling that there was criminal liability for theft even if the car was taken
out only for a joyride but without the owner’s knowledge or consent.
(Villacorta v. Insurance Comm., et al., G.R. No. 54171, Oct. 28,
1980; Ass’n of Baptists for World Evangelism v. Fieldmen’s Ins. Co, Inc.,
G.R. No. L-28772, Sept. 21, 1983). (Emphasis supplied)
58
 Villacorta v. Insurance Commission, supra.
59
 Records at 93.
60
 People v. Muros, G.R. No. 142511, February 16, 2004.
61
 Ibid.
62
 TSN, October 9, 2000 at 9-10.
63
 Rules of Court, Rule 115, sec. 1, par. (g); Vide People v. Woolcock, 244 SCRA
235, 255-256 (1995), where this Court said the following:

Just like appellant Williams, she sought to buttress her aforesaid

contention by lamenting the alleged failure of the State to present in the
trial court her baggage declaration and the confiscation receipt involving
these pieces of her baggage. In the first place, it was not the duty of the
prosecution to present these alleged documents on which she relies for
her defense. And, just as in the case of appellant Williams, it is a
source of puzzlement why she never sought to compel either the
prosecutors to produce the aforesaid documents which were
allegedly in the possession of the latter or the customs office where
such declarations are on file. Contrary to her argument hereon, since
such pieces of evidence were equally available to both parties if
sought by subpoena duces tecum, no presumption of suppression of
evidence can be drawn, and these considerations likewise apply to
the thesis of appellant Williams. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citation omitted)
64
 People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, 574 (1994).
65
 Id. at 576.
66
 310 SCRA 66 (1999).
67
 Id. at 99-100. It should be noted, however, that the passage of Republic Act
No. 7659, otherwise known as "AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY
ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," introduced three amendments to the anti-
carnapping law: (1) the change of the penalty of life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the
commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof." [People v. Latayada, G.R. No. 146865,
February 18, 2004; People v. Santos, supra at 333; People v. Paramil, 329
SCRA 456, 464 (2000); People v. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127, 153 (1997)] With the
amendment of the penalty to life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code can be suppletorily applied in qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form as defined in Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659 –
whenever the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
In People v. Simon [234 SCRA 555, 574 (1994)], this Court said that when an
offense is defined and punished under a special law but its penalty is taken from
the Revised Penal Code, then the provisions of the said Code would apply
suppletorily. In the case at bar however, appellant is not being charged with
qualified or aggravated carnapping, but only carnapping under the first clause of
the anti-carnapping law. Since the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less
than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily.
68
 SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. – Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective
of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years
and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not
less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when
the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle
is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
69
 SECTION 1. Hereinafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punishable by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied).
70
 People v. Panida, 310 SCRA 66, 99 (1999).

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 232624, July 09, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENATO CARIÑO Y
GOCONG AND ALVIN AQUINO Y RAGAM*, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

This treats of the Notice of Appeal1 under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure filed by Renato Cariño y Gocong (Cariño), and Alvin
Aquino y Ragam (Aquino) (collectively referred as accused-appellants),
seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated September 14, 2016, rendered
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06217, convicting them
of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), and Carnapping under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539,3 as amended.

The Antecedents

An Information was filed against the accused-appellants, charging them with

Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines,

the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, with intent of gain, by means of force, violence
and/or intimidation against person, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rob one MIRKO MOELLER of the following personal items:

One (1) cellphone, wallet, small camera, video camera and VCD player, and
by reason and on the occasion of the said robbery, said accused pursuant to
their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of MIRKO MOELLER by then and there mauling him
with the use of a dumbbell, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Another Information was also filed against the accused-appellants for the
crime of Carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as
amended, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines,

the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, with intent to gain and without knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) Unit of Nissan Sentra with
Plate No. PN-USD-666 colored silver/pink, of undetermined amount
belonging to MIRKO MOELLER, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner thereof.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

The accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial ensued

thereafter.6

Evidence of the Prosecution

On August 28, 2002, Leonardo Advincula (Advincula) was driving an R&E
Taxi with plate number TVH 298, and traversing through East Avenue,
Quezon City, when he was flagged down by Cariño in front of the Social
Security System building. Cariño asked Advincula to take him to Ortigas.
Upon arriving at Ortigas, Cariño asked Advincula to stop along the comer of
Julia Vargas and Meralco Avenue. While parked thereat, a silver Nissan
Sentra with plate number USD 666 arrived. Cariño alighted and approached
the Nissan Sentra. Upon returning to the taxi, Cariño asked Advincula to
follow the Nissan Sentra. After driving for a short distance, the Nissan
Sentra entered Gate 1 of the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision in Quezon
City.7

At around 10:39 p.m. of August 28, 2002, Jimmy Caporado (Caporado), a

security guard at the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision was manning Gate 1 of
the said subdivision. Caporado noticed a Nissan Sentra with plate number
USD 666, pass through Gate 1. Trailing behind the Nissan Sentra was an
R&E taxi with plate number TVH 298. Upon passing through the gate, the
driver of the Nissan Sentra, who Caporado recognized as Mirko Moeller
(Moeller), a resident of the said subdivision, opened the car window to
inform the former that the passenger inside the taxi was his visitor. During
this time, Caporado noticed that Moeller was with Aquino. Obeying Moeller's
instructions, Caporado flagged down the taxi cab to take the driver's license,
and then let the taxi pass.8 Caporado identified the passenger of the taxi as
Cariño, who he pointed to in open court.9

Meanwhile, Advincula dropped off Cariño at No. 11 Young Street, Corinthian

Gardens Subdivision. Cariño alighted from the taxi and asked Advincula to
wait for his payment. Moeller, the victim, alighted from the Nissan Sentra
and approached the taxi to pay for Cariño's fare.10 Advincula drove away
without a passenger.

Subsequently, at around 7:30 a.m. of August 29, 2002, Nena Taro (Taro),
the housemaid of Moeller arrived at the latter's home. Taro noticed that the
main gate and the door of the house were unlocked. Upon entering the
house, she was surprised to see dried blood on the wall beside the light
switch. She walked to the backdoor leading to the swimming pool to look for
Moeller. There, she was horrified to see him lying face down in front of the
swimming pool. Shocked by what she had seen, she rushed out of the house
to ask for help. Moments later, the security guards and the police arrived.11

Months after the incident, on September 4, 2002, Senior Police Officer 4

Celso Jeresano (SPO4 Jeresano), together with other police officers, arrested
the accused-appellants in Bagaquin, Baguio City. They were tipped off by an
informant about the whereabouts of the said accused-appellants. During the
arrest, the police recovered a camera, video camera, and charger from the
accused-appellants. The police also tracked down the stolen Nissan Sentra in
Isabela, after Cariño pointed to its location.12 Cariño also surrendered the
keys of the Nissan Sentra.

During the trial, Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez), Medico-Legal Officer,
testified that the victim's cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage, as a
result of traumatic injuries in the head.13

Version of the Defense

The accused-appellants vehemently denied the charges leveled against

them.
Aquino claimed that on September 4, 2002, while he was waiting for a
jeepney bound for Manila, a tinted Tamaraw FX suddenly stopped in front of
him. He was forced to board the said vehicle. While inside, he was
handcuffed and shown a cartographic sketch, and was asked if the image
was familiar. He said that he did know who the person in the sketch was.
Suddenly, he was hit on his right temple and on the back of his head. This
caused him to pass out. When he regained consciousness, he found himself
inside an unfamiliar small house, with his t-shirt bearing blood stains.
Thereafter, he was placed inside a van, where he was subjected to physical
abuse. Later on, he was brought to Camp Karingal, where he was again
physically abused by the police officers. He was later on brought for inquest
proceedings, where he learned that he was being charged with Robbery with
Homicide.14

In the same vein, Cariño claimed that on September 19, 2002, between
6:00 and 7:00 a.m., a group of police officers suddenly barged inside the
house where he and his girlfriend were staying. He was arrested and brought
to Isabela. He was photographed while seated in a car, and was told that he
stole the same. Then, he was brought to Camp Karingal where he was
accused of killing a German national. Cariño denied knowing Aquino.15

Ruling of the Trial Court

On April 29, 2013, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a

Decision16 convicting the accused-appellants for the crimes of Robbery with
Homicide, and Carnapping. The RTC concluded that there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict them. In particular, the RTC noted that
the prosecution witnesses confirmed that the accused-appellants were the
last persons to be seen with the victim.17 Added to this, the RTC observed
that the victim's stolen properties were recovered from the accused-
appellants.18 Also, when the police officer asked them about the stolen car,
they were able to pinpoint its exact location.19 Finding these as sufficient
proof of their guilt, the RTC sentenced them to a penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the crime of robbery with homicide; and the maximum
sentence of life imprisonment for the carnapping, considering that Moeller,
the owner of the vehicle, was killed on the occasion of the carnapping.20

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-02-111947, judgment is hereby

rendered finding [the accused-appellants] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery with homicide, and imposing on said accused the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

The Court likewise adjudges [the accused-appellants] jointly and severally

liable to pay the heirs of the victim Mirko Moller,21 represented by Anthony
Q. Paguio, the following amounts:

1. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.

2. P75,000.00 as moral damages.
3. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. 75,000.00 as temperate damages.
5. The costs of suit.

In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111948, judgment is also rendered finding [the

accused-appellants] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping, in
violation of [R.A.] No. 6539, and imposing on said accused the penalty of life
imprisonment.
The accused shall be fully credited with their respective periods of preventive
detention, pursuant to Article 29 of the [RPC]. They shall henceforth be
committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City to commence the
service of their sentence.

SO ORDERED.22

Dissatisfied with the ruling, the accused-appellants filed an appeal with the
CA.

Ruling of the CA

On September 14, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,23 affirming

the RTC's conviction against the accused-appellants for Robbery with
Homicide, and Carnapping. Echoing the trial court's findings, the CA affirmed
that all the facts proven, and taken together, created an unbroken chain of
circumstances proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.24 The CA held
that their defense of alibi was unavailing, and faltered against the positive
identification of the prosecution witnesses.25 Likewise, the CA found that the
results of the police investigation revealed that violence was employed
against the victim, which resulted to the latter's death. Also, the camera,
video camera and charger, which all belonged to the victim, were found in
the possession of the accused-appellants when they were arrested in Baguio
City.26 They were not able to explain the reason why they possessed the said
items.27 Added to this, they knew the location of the stolen
vehicle.28 Consequently, the CA concluded that all these established
circumstances show that the accused-appellants conspired with each other
to commit the crimes charged.29

As for the penalties, the CA affirmed the sentence of reclusion perpetua for

the charge of Robbery with Homicide, but modified the amount of damages
awarded by the RTC. Specifically, the CA deleted the award of exemplary
damages finding that there were no aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the crime. Also, the CA reduced the amount of
temperate damages to Php 50,000.00, to conform with recent
jurisprudence.30

As for the crime of Carnapping, the CA found that the RTC erred in imposing
the maximum penalty for the said crime. The CA pointed out that the
Information charging the accused-appellants of carnapping, failed to indicate
that the victim was killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof. Neither was there an allegation that the
carnapping was committed with violence or intimidation of persons. The CA
surmised that based on the attendant circumstances, the victim was
presumably dead when the accused-appellants unlawfully took the vehicle as
a means to escape the crime scene. Thus, there being no causal connection
between the carnapping and the killing, the accused-appellants should be
meted with the lesser sentence of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, for the crime
of carnapping.31

The decretal portion of the assailed CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated April 29, 2013 of the Quezon City [RTC], Branch 219, in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-02-111947 and Q-02-111948 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that:
1.) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111947, the award of exemplary damages
is DELETED and the award of temperate damages is
hereby REDUCED to Php 50,000.00.

In addition, accused-appellants are jointly and

severally ORDERED to PAY interest on all the damages imposed at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until
fully paid.

2.) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111948, the accused-appellants are

sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) years and
Eight (8) months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4)
months, as maximum.

All other aspects of the fallo of the assailed Decision STAND.

SO ORDERED.32

Aggrieved, the accused-appellants filed the instant Notice of Appeal under

Rule 124 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crimes of
Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping.

In a Manifestation33 dated January 25, 2018, the accused-appellants

dispensed with the filing of their Supplemental Brief, and prayed that their
respective Appellant's Brief filed before the CA, be considered in lieu of their
Supplemental Brief.

In support of their plea for exoneration, the accused-appellants assert that

the trial court erroneously convicted them on the basis of insufficient
circumstantial evidence. They point out that none of the prosecution
witnesses specifically identified them as the ones who actually robbed and
killed the victim, and carnapped the latter's vehicle.34 In fact, they stress
that no less than the trial court stated that no one witnessed the killing of
the victim or the taking of the latter's properties.35 They harp on the fact
that the absence of any eyewitness engenders doubt on their culpability.36

Second, the accused-appellants claim that the trial court erred in concluding
that they took the stolen articles, simply because they were found in
possession thereof. Added to this, they point out that the ownership of the
personal items was not even definitely determined.37

Third, anent their conviction for carnapping, they aver that the prosecution
failed to prove the presence of all the elements of the said crime. The trial
court erred in concluding that the act of changing the vehicle's plate number
constitutes proof of intent to gain.38 They posit that at most, the vehicle was
merely used as a means to escape.39 Also, they question how they could be
convicted of carnapping with homicide, when the victim was already dead
when the car was taken.40

Finally, the accused-appellants bewail that there was no evidence proving

that they conspired to commit the crimes. There was no showing that they
were in fact motivated by a common purpose to perpetrate the crimes.41

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
(OSG) counters that the prosecution sufficiently proved the guilt of the
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG avers that the trial
court correctly found the nexus between the robbery and the killing of the
victim. There is no doubt that Moeller was killed. The fact of death was
established through the Medico-Legal Report, and the testimony of Dr.
Marquez, who described the killing of Moeller as brutal and intentional.
Likewise, the OSG points out that Aquino admitted to SPO4 Jeresano that he
killed Moeller.42

In the same vein, the OSG maintains that the trial court also correctly found
Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping. Records show that all
the elements of carnapping were present in the instant case. Aquino, in
conspiracy with Cariño, without the consent of Moeller, and with intent to
gain, and by means of violence against the person of the victim, took the
latter's Nissan Sentra. The OSG posits that intent to gain is evident when
one takes property belonging to another against the latter's will.43

Ruling of the Court

The instant appeal is bereft of merit.

The Prosecution Established

Beyond Reasonable Doubt the Guilt
of the accused-appellants for the
Crime of Robbery with Homicide

The RPC defines and penalizes the crime of robbery as follows:

Article 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any person who, with intent to
gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything shall be
guilty of robbery.

Article 295. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons;

Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on

occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

Parenthetically, to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide under

Article 294 of the RPC, the prosecution must prove the existence of the
following elements, namely, (i) "the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (ii) the property
taken belongs to another; (iii) the taking is [with] animo lucrandi; and (iv)
by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed."44

Notably, the phrase "by reason of the robbery," covers a situation where the
killing of the person is committed either before or after the taking of
personal property.45 It is imperative to establish that "the intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery."46 Remarkably, homicide is said to be committed: (i) "to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (ii) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; (iii) to prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or (iv) to eliminate witnesses in the commission
of the crime."47 Thus, a conviction for robbery with homicide requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery.48 Consequently, once it has been established with certainty that a
person was killed on the occasion of the robbery, the accused may be
convicted of robbery with homicide.

It is equally important to note that a conviction for robbery with homicide

need not be proven solely through direct evidence of the malefactor's
culpability. Rather, the offender's guilt may likewise be proven through
circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (i)
there must be more than one circumstance; (ii) the inference must be based
on proven facts; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.49 Imperatively, all the
circumstances taken together must form an unbroken chain of events
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.50 To rule otherwise, would
lead to the pernicious situation wherein felons would be set free to the
detriment of the judicial system, and thereby cause danger to the
community.51

In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding the fateful day of August
28, 2002, when the victim was robbed and killed, lead to an unbroken chain
of facts, which establish beyond reasonable doubt the accused-appellants'
culpability, to wit:

i. At 10:39 p.m. of August 28, 2002, security guard Caporado saw

Moeller pass through Gate 1 of Corinthian Gardens Subdivision in his
Nissan Sentra. Moeller was accompanied by Aquino, who Caporado
recognized and identified in open court.
ii. The Nissan Sentra was trailed by the R&E taxi driven by Advincula.
iii. Caporado recognized Cariño as the passenger of the taxi.
iv. Advincula, the driver of the taxi, confirmed that Cariño was his
passenger. He testified that he dropped off Cariño at the house of a
foreigner in Corinthian Gardens Subdivision.
v. Moeller's Nissan Sentra was seen to have exited Gate 4 of Corinthian
Gardens Subdivision at around 12:00 midnight on August 29, 2002.
vi. In the morning of August 29, 2002, Taro, the victim's housemaid,
found the latter at the backyard of his home, lifeless.
vii. A dumbbell was found near the body of the victim.
viii. The Medico-Legal Report showed that Moeller died due to intra-cranial
hemorrhage, which was caused by a blow inflicted using a hard and
blunt object.
ix. During their arrest, Cariño and Aquino were caught in possession of a
camera, video camera and charger.
x. Taro confirmed that the said items belonged to Moeller.
xi. Cariño admitted to the police officers that the Nissan Sentra was in
Isabela. True enough, the said vehicle was recovered in the said
location.
xii. SPO4 Jeresano testified that the accused-appellants admitted that the
Nissan Sentra belonged to Moeller.
xiii. Aquino even surrendered the keys of the Nissan Sentra to the police.

The fact that the accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Moeller
prior to his demise was clearly confirmed through the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses Caporado and Advincula.

Moreover, the accused-appellants' unexplained possession of the stolen

articles gave rise to the presumption that they were the taker and the doer
of the robbery.52 This presumption applies considering that (i) the property
was stolen; (ii) the crime was committed recently; (iii) the stolen property
was found in their possession; and (iv) they were unable to explain their
possession satisfactorily.53 It must be noted that during their arrest, the
police officers found Moeller's camera, video camera and charger in their
hideout. They were unable to offer any satisfactory and believable
explanation justifying their possession of the subject articles. All that they
did to rebut this presumption was to question the ownership of the said
articles. This defense fails considering that Taro identified the said items and
confirmed that they indeed belonged to Moeller. Her familiarity with the said
items cannot be doubted considering that she was the personal maid of the
victim for several years, and had cleaned the said items on a regular basis.

The accused-appellants are also

Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt
for the Crime of Simple Carnapping

Carnapping is defined and penalized under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, or the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, as "the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things."

Notably, the elements of carnapping are: (i) the taking of a motor vehicle
which belongs to another; (ii) the taking is without the consent of the owner
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force
upon things; and (iii) the taking is done with intent to gain. Essentially,
carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle.54

Significantly, the taking of the motor vehicle is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.55 The intent to gain or the animus
lucrandi, being an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the
motor vehicle.56 Notably, " [a]ctual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain."57 Likewise, the term gain is not limited to
a pecuniary benefit, but also includes the benefit which in any other sense
may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere
use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent already
constitutes gain.58

In the case at bar, the prosecution proved the existence of all the elements
of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt. The Nissan Sentra, which was
owned by Moeller, was stolen by the accused-appellants from the victim's
house, and brought to Isabela. To eradicate all traces of its previous
ownership, the accused-appellants even changed the vehicle's plate number.
However, despite their attempt to conceal their crime, the police discovered
that the retrieved vehicle bore the same engine and chassis number as the
victim's stolen vehicle.

Likewise, the police found the stolen vehicle in Isabela, no less from the
information supplanted by Cariño himself. Certainly, Cariño's knowledge
about the vehicle's exact location shows his complicity in its taking. Added to
this, Cariño was in possession of the car keys, which he surrendered to the
police.
The accused-appellants Conspired
and Confederated with Each Other
to Commit the Said Crimes.

It becomes all too apparent that all the interwoven circumstances form a
chain of events that lead to the inescapable conclusion that the accused-
appellants robbed and killed Moeller, and took his Nissan Sentra. It is
evident that the accused-appellants conspired and confederated with each
other to commit the said horrid crimes.

It bears stressing that direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a

crime is not indispensable in conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint
purpose and design.59 Undoubtedly, from the moment the accused-
appellants met in Ortigas, went to Moeller's home, took his valuables and
car, up to the time when they were both arrested in possession of the said
valuables, lead to no other conclusion than that they hatched a criminal
scheme, synchronized their acts for unity in its execution, and aided each
other for its consummation. Consequently, once a conspiracy has been
established, the act of one malefactor, is the act of all.60

The Defenses of Denial and Alibi

are Weak and Easily Crumble
Against the Positive Identification
Made by Reliable and Credible
Witnesses

In seeking exoneration from the charges filed against them, the accused-
appellants interpose the defenses of denial and alibi.

The Court is not convinced.

Time and again, the Court has consistently ruled that a denial and alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the assailants made by a
credible witness.61 In fact, a denial is often viewed with disfavor especially if
it is uncorroborated.62 Also, an alibi will only prosper, if the accused can
show that it was physically impossible for him/her to be at the scene of the
crime.63 Thus, as between the categorical testimony which has a ring of truth
on the one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.64

This said, the accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi falter in light
of the positive identifications made by Caporado and Advincula, who saw
them at the house of Moeller on the night that the latter was killed. It bears
noting that Caporado confirmed that he saw Aquino riding with Moeller in his
Nissan Sentra on the fateful night of August 28, 2002. Similarly, Caporado
confirmed that he saw Cariño on board the taxi that trailed the Nissan
Sentra. There was no reason for Caporado, a disinterested witness, to falsely
testify against the accused-appellants.

Equally telling is the fact that Advincula corroborated Caporado's testimony,

by affirming that he dropped off Cariño at the victim's home in Corinthian
Gardens Subdivision. In fact, Advincula related that the driver of the Nissan
Sentra was a foreigner, which fit the description of the victim.

Moreover, the Court finds that Cariño lied about not knowing the victim.
Taro affirmed on the witness stand that she saw Cariño one month before
the victim's death, at the latter's home.65 This fact is significant because it
established the relationship between Cariño and the victim, which the former
denied. Clearly, Cariño's denial is nothing but a vain attempt to exculpate
himself from liability.

All told, there was no reason for the prosecution witnesses to lie and falsely
testify against the accused-appellants. Hence, absent any proof of ill-motive
on their part, there can be no doubt that their testimonies certainly bear the
earmarks of truth and candor.

The Penalty for Robbery with Homicide

The trial court correctly sentenced the accused-appellants with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC,66 for
their crime of robbery with homicide.

As for the amount of damages imposed, the Court affirms the awards of civil
indemnity of Php 75,000.00, and moral damages of Php 75,000.00.67 The
Court likewise agrees that the victim's heirs should be awarded temperate
damages of Php 50,000.00. Temperate damages may be recovered when
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but definite proof of its amount was
not presented in court.68

However, the Court finds that the CA erred in deleting the award of
exemplary damages. Remarkably, exemplary damages should be granted as
a punishment for the reprehensible act committed against the victim. This is
in consonance with the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,69 where
exemplary damages worth to Php 75,000.00 was awarded to the victim's
heirs.

The Penalty for Carnapping

R.A. No. 6539, as amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, provides the
penalties for carnapping, as follows:

SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of

carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping
is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle
is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

It must be noted that the Information charging the accused-appellants with

carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as amended, failed to allege that the
carnapping was committed by means of violence against, or intimidation of,
any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were proven at
the trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the
Information. Hence, pursuant to the strict constitutional mandate that an
accused must always be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him,70 the accused-appellants may only be convicted of
simple carnapping. Accordingly, the CA was correct in modifying the
maximum sentence of life imprisonment originally imposed by the RTC, and
reducing the same to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. This
term of imprisonment imposed by the CA is likewise in consonance with
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which ordains that if the
offense committed is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate penalty expressed at a range whose
maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and
the minimum term not be less than the minimum prescribed.71

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated
September 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06217,
convicting accused-appellants Renato Cariño y Gocong and Alvin
Aquino y Ragam of the crimes of Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping,
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. Q-02-
111947 for Robbery with Homicide, the accused-appellants are ordered to
pay exemplary damages worth Php 75,000.00 to the heirs of victim Mirko
Moeller. All the amounts due shall earn a legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this ruling until the full satisfaction
thereof. The assailed decision is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Also referred/spelled as "RAGMA" in some parts of the rollo.

1
 CA rollo, pp. 235-236.

2
 Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate Justices
Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, concurring; id.
at 200-222.

3
 AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZlNG CARNAPPING. Approved on August
26,
1972.

4
 CA rollo, p. 32-33.

5
 Id. at 33.

6
 Id.

7
 Id. at 36.

8
 Id.

9
 Id. at 208.

10
 Id. at 35-36.

11
 Id. at 35.

12
 Id. at 36.

13
 Id.
14
 Id. at 37.

15
 Id.

16
 Rendered by Hon. Maria Filomena D. Singh; id. at 49-67.

17
 Id. at 54; 60.

18
 Id. at 60.

19
 Id. at 63.

20
 Id. at 67.

21
 Spelled as Moller in the RTC decision.

22
 CA rollo, p. 67.

23
Rollo, pp. 2-24.

24
 CA rollo, p. 209.

25
 Id. at 208-209.

26
 Id. at 216.

27
 Id.

28
 Id. at 216-217.

29
 Id. at 217-218.

30
 Id. at 220.

31
 Id. at 221.

32
 Id.

33
Rollo, pp. 43-44.

34
 CA rollo, pp. 38-39; 145-147.

35
 Id. at 39; 146.

36
 Id. at 40.

37
 Id. at 42; 149-150.

38
 Id. at 44; 150-151

39
 Id. at 44; 151.

40
 Id. at 44.

41
 Id. at 44; 151.

42
 Id. at 83.
43
 Id. at 84-85.

44
People v. Barra, 713 Phil. 698, 705 (2013), citing People v. Quemeggen, et
al., 611 Phil. 487, 497 (2009).

45
People v. Diu, et al., 708 Phil. 218, 236 (2013).

46
People v. Torres, 743 Phil. 553, 564 (2014), citing Crisostomo v.
People, 644 Phil. 53, 61 (2010).

47
People v. Balute, 751 Phil. 980, 986 (2015), citing People v. Cachuela, et
al., 710 Phil. 728, 743-744 (2013).

48
People v. Torres, et al., supra, at 561, citing Crisostomo v. People, supra.

49
 REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 133, Section 4.

50
People of the Philippines v. Hermie Paris y Nicolas and Ronel Fernandez y
Dela Vega, G.R. No. 18130, February 14, 2018, citing Dungo v. People, 762
Phil. 630, 679 (2015).

51
People v. Quitola, 790 Phil. 75, 87-88 (2016), citing People v. Uy, 664 Phil.
483, 499-500 (2011).

52
People of the Philippines v. Enrile Donia y Untalan, G.R. No. 212815, March
1, 2017; RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(j).

53
People v. Lagat, et al., 673 Phil. 351, 367 (2011), citing Litton Mills, Inc. v.
Sales, 481 Phil. 73, 90 (2004).

54
People v. Bustinera, 475 Phil. 190, 203 (2004).

55
People of the Philippines v. Enrile Donio y Untalan, supra note 52,
citing People v. Lagat, et al., supra note 53.

56
People v. Bustinera, supra, at 208 (2004), citing People v. Obillo, 411 Phil.
139, 150 (2001).

57
People v. Bustinera, id., citing Venturina v. Sandiganbayan, 271 Phil. 33,
39 (1991).

58
People v. Bustinera, id.

59
People v. Napalit, 444 Phil. 793, 806 (2003), citing People v. Pulusan, 352
Phil. 953, 974-975 (1998).

60
People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 720 (2009).

61
People v. Peteluna, et al., 702 Phil. 128, 141 (2013).

62
 Id.

63
People v. Ramos, et al., 715 Phil. 193, 203 (2013).

64
People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527-528 (2013).

65
 CA rollo, p. 53.

66
 REVISED PENAL CODE.
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons;
Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on

occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

xxxx

67
People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 807, 839 (2016).

68
 Id. at 846-847.

69
 783 Phil. 807 (2016).

70
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14, paragraph 2.

71
Act No. 4103, Section 1.