Title RAMON GONZALES vs. GO TIONG and LUZON SURETY CO., INC.
,
G.R. No. L-11776, August 30, 1958
Ponente MONTEMAYOR, J.
Doctrine GENERAL BONDED WAREHOUSE AND WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS
Facts Appellant-Defendant Go Tiong owned a rice mill and warehouse, located at
Pangasinan. He obtained a license to engage in the business of a bonded
warehouseman. He later secured from Luzon Surety Co. a Guaranty Bond No.
294 in the sum of P18,334, conditioned particularly on the fulfillment by Go
Tiong of his obligation to deliver to the depositors the palay received by him for
storage, at any time demand is made, or to pay the market value thereof, in
case he was unable to return the same.
Prior to the issuance of the license to Go Tiong to operate as bonded
warehouseman, he had received 368 sacks of palay for deposit from plaintiff
Gonzales for which he issued receipts. After he was licensed as bonded
warehouseman, Go Tiong again received various deliveries of 492 sacks of palay
from plaintiff, for which he issued the corresponding receipts, all the grand total
of 860 sacks, valued at P8,600 at the rate of P10 per sack.
Defendant Go Tiong failed to return the value of deposits in the amount of
P8,600 despite repeated demands from plaintiff Gonzales. Then, the warehouse
burned to the ground.
Before the fire, Go Tiong had been accepting deliveries of palay from other
depositors and at the time of the fire, there were 5,847 sacks of palay in the
warehouse, in excess of the 5,000 sacks authorized under his license. The
receipts issued by Go Tiong to the plaintiff were ordinary receipts, not the
"warehouse receipts" defined by the Warehouse Receipts Act (Act No. 2137).
After the burning of the warehouse, the depositors of palay, including plaintiff,
filed their claims with the Bureau of Commerce, but plaintiff's counsel later
withdrew his claim, because his claim was denied by the Bureau. Thereafter,
Gonzales filed the present action against Go Tiong and the Luzon Surety for the
sum of P8,600, the value of his palay, with legal interest, damages in the sum of
P5,000 and P1,500 as attorney's fees. Gonzales later renewed his claim with the
Bureau of Commerce.
While the case was pending in court, Gonzales and Go Tiong entered into a
contract of amicable settlement to the effect that upon the settlement of all
accounts due to him by Go Tiong, however, the settlement was never
consummated because Go Tiong failed to settle the accounts of Gonzales to the
latter's satisfaction.
Lower Courts CFI of Manila rendered condemning defendant Go Tiong and Luzon Surety Co.,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P4,920 with legal interest from the
date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
Appellate Court Court of Appeals, indorsed the case to SC on the ground that the issues raised were
purely questions of law.
Issue 1. W/N the transaction was governed by the Civil Code or not by the Bonded
Warehouse Act for the reason that the receipts issued are ordinary receipts, not
the warehouse receipts contemplated by the Warehouse Receipts Law?
2. W/N the obligation is extinguished by reason of fortuitous event?
SC Ruling 1. GOVERNED BY BONDED WAREHOUSE ACT. Act No. 3893 as amended is
a special law regulating the business of receiving commodities for storage and
defining the rights and obligations of a bonded warehouseman and those
transacting business with him. Consequently, any deposit made with him
as a bonded warehouseman must necessarily be governed by the
provisions of Act No. 3893. The kind or nature of the receipts issued by
him for the deposits is not very material much less decisive. Though it is
desirable that receipts issued by a bonded warehouseman should conform to the
provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law, said provisions in our opinion are not
mandatory and indispensable in the sense that if they fell short of the
requirements of the Warehouse Receipts Act, then the commodities delivered for
storage become ordinary deposits and will not be governed by the provisions of
the Bonded Warehouse Act. Under Section 1 of the Warehouse Receipts Act, one
would gather the impression that the issuance of a warehouse receipt in the
form provided by it is merely permissive and directory and not obligatory.
As the trial court well observed, as far as Go Tiong was concerned, the fact
that the receipts issued by him were not "quedans" is no valid ground for
defense because he was the principal obligor. Furthermore, as found by the trial
court, Go Tiong had repeatedly promised plaintiff to issue to him "quedans" and
had assured him that he should not worry; and that Go Tiong was in the habit of
issuing ordinary receipts (not "quedans") to his depositors.
2. NO. As correctly decided by the lower court, the defense that the palay was
destroyed by fire neither does the Court consider to be good for while the
contract was in the nature of a deposit and the loss of the thing would exempt
the obligor in a contract of deposit to return the goods, this exemption from the
responsibility for the damages must be conditioned in his proof that the loss was
by force majeure, and without his fault. The Court does not see from the
evidence that the proof is clear on the legal exemption. On the contrary, the fact
that he exceeded the limit of the authorized deposit must have increased the
risk and would militate against his defense of non-liability. For this reason, the
Court does not follow La Sociedad vs. De Los Santos, 55 Phil. 42 quoted by Go
Tiong.
Considering the fact, as already stated, that prior to the burning of the
warehouse, plaintiff demanded the payment of the value of his palay
from Go Tiong on two occasions but was put off without any valid
reason, under the circumstances, the better rule which we accept is the
following:
. . . . This rule proceeds upon the theory that the facts surrounding the
care of the property by a bailee are peculiarly within his knowledge and
power to prove, and that the enforcement of any other rule would impose
great difficulties upon the bailors. ... It is illogical and unreasonable to hold
that the presumption of negligence in case of this kind is rebutted by the
bailee by simply proving that the property bailed was destroyed by an
ordinary fire which broke out on the bailee's own premises, without regard to
the care exercised by the latter to prevent the fire, or to save the property
after the commencement of the fire. All the authorities seem to agree that
the rule that there shall be a presumption of negligence in bailment cases
like the present one, where there is default in delivery or accounting, for the
goods is just a necessary one. . . .
