Copyright Material – Provided by Taylor & Francis

14 Residential Relocation
Processes in
Coastal Areas
Tacloban City after
Typhoon Yolanda
Kanako Iuchi and Elizabeth Maly

CONTENTS
14.1 Introduction...................................................................................................209
14.2 Typhoon Yolanda and Reconstruction Challenges........................................ 211
14.2.1 Typhoon Yolanda and Reconstruction Strategies.............................. 211
14.2.2 Challenges of Coastal Housing Reconstruction................................ 212
14.3 Tacloban City: Coastal Rebuilding through Housing Relocation.................. 214
14.3.1 Tacloban City and Urban Development Trends................................. 214
14.3.2 Rebuilding Safer: A Two-Step Plan for Relocating Coastal
Families Inland.................................................................................. 214
14.3.3 Implementation of Housing Relocation: From Temporary to
Permanent Housing............................................................................ 215
14.3.3.1 Temporary Housing............................................................ 217
14.3.3.2 Permanent Housing............................................................. 219
14.3.3.3 Emerging Issues.................................................................. 221
14.4 Discussion and Conclusions........................................................................... 222
14.5 Acknowledgments.......................................................................................... 223
References............................................................................................................... 223

14.1 INTRODUCTION
Relocating communities is difficult. It disrupts people’s lives, burdens them
­financially, and erodes social networks. Because disadvantaged populations with
informal land tenure are often the ones forced to relocate, they are pushed further
into poverty. Effects are also felt in host communities; they experience increased
job competition and added strain on public and social services as a result of accom-
modating newcomers, which often leads to disputes (Correa et al. 2011). Thus, both
displaced people and their hosts are likely to face negative socio-economic conse-
quences of relocation in both the short and long term (Badri et al. 2006). Experts,

209
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210 Coming Home after Disaster

therefore, suggest avoiding community relocation if at all possible (Scudder 1985;

Cernea 1997; ADB 1998; Jha 2009).
However, relocation in coastal areas is frequently considered after large-scale nat-
ural events—such as tsunamis and storm surges—that result in considerable losses
and damages. In this context, relocation of communities away from risk is increas-
ingly discussed as a way to protect against future losses and save lives from large-
scale disasters (Kim and Olshansky 2014). Research on the usefulness of preventive
relocation (see Correa 2011) which is relocation as part of the rebuilding process to
prepare for future disasters is gaining attention. For instance, the Indonesian gov-
ernment developed a recovery master plan* 3 months after the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami that included a land-use plan with a 3-km coastal setback zone to regulate
development (Republic of Indonesia 2005). Although this plan was adopted by the
national government through Presidential Regulation No. 30 of 2005 (Peraturan
Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 30 Tahun 2005), local resistance and lack of
coordination among key stakeholders, including national and local governments,
international donors, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and
communities, resulted in residents building back in place. Similarly, in tsunami-
affected Sri Lanka, a presidential decree (PD) introduced a buffer zone with a maxi-
mum setback of 300 m; and people who had been living in that buffer zone were to
be relocated to donor-provided permanent houses (Muggah 2008). However, tourism
industry developments permitted in the buffer zone were viewed as unfair to former
residents and effectively undermined the relocation efforts. In addition, the donor-
driven relocation was not participatory, further alienating residents (Muggah 2008).
Meanwhile, Japan is also pursuing rebuilding with strict land-use controls of coastal
land after the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, utilizing centralized,
top–down processes (Iuchi et al. 2015). In all cases, massive relocation takes time,
raises social and economic concerns, and the long-term effects of preventive reloca-
tion remain unclear.
The concept of rebuilding better is also increasingly emphasized, yet adopting the
concept in practice is challenging because the recovery process itself often exacer-
bates various existing pre-disaster problems (Wisner et al. 2004; Pyles 2007; Iuchi
2014). Issues include haphazard development, poor land management, and substan-
dard infrastructure as a result of urbanization pressures, all of which create further
vulnerabilities to natural events (Dickson et  al. 2012; Esnard and Sapat 2014). In
addition, inequitable financial, political, and participatory opportunities of disas-
ter-affected populations aggravate pre-existing poverty and inequality (Bolin and
Stanford 1998; Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris 2004; Wisner et al. 2004). Studies on
the impact and dynamics of the recovery processes have begun gaining more under-
standing, but how these dynamics function in relocation after major disasters need
further research. With such understanding, the intent of this study is to examine
the actual implementation of preventive relocation in recovery at the early stages

* A post-disaster interim organization, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency of Aceh and Nias
(BRR: Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi NAD-Nias), and the Planning Agency (BAPPENAS:
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional) were responsible for developing the recovery master plan
for Aceh.
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Residential Relocation Processes in Coastal Areas 211

and hopefully contribute to future policy inputs to reduce stresses on populations

affected by disasters and to support more resilient livelihoods.
The study was initiated immediately after the landfall of Typhoon Yolanda (inter-
national name Haiyan) in November 2013, by first reviewing media sources and
official documents available online to understand the extent of typhoon-related dam-
age and devastation, as well as government responses to the event. Semi-structured
interviews and informal conversations with community members, and with govern-
ment officials at national, city, and local (barangay) levels were conducted over four
fieldwork trips between March 2014 and October 2015. Official documents with
statistical information on Typhoon Yolanda and housing recovery and reconstruc-
tion plans were also collected from national and local governments during these
fieldwork trips. To confirm the implementation progress of relocation and rehous-
ing reconstruction, reconnaissance surveys were carried out in the affected coastal
areas as well as in temporary and permanent housing areas. Data collected were then
reviewed and analyzed to structure a logical narrative. The study was supplemented
by the authors’ extensive past work experience on disaster risk management in the
Philippines, and benefited from existing personal connections.
This chapter focuses on the first 2 years of relocation and housing efforts in
Tacloban after the destruction caused by Typhoon Yolanda. The ongoing recovery
process in Tacloban City entails large-scale relocation programs to move coastal
residents into new permanent housing provided in the northern part of the city. This
chapter discusses dilemmas faced when relocating the population away from haz-
ardous areas, including coordination challenges that emerge while implementing
rehousing and relocation, and the unintended increase in vulnerability of the relo-
cated population as time progresses. The chapter also documents the implementation
status of multiple phases of different housing recovery projects before concluding
with discussing emerging issues and further challenges.

14.2 TYPHOON YOLANDA AND

RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGES
14.2.1 Typhoon Yolanda and Reconstruction Strategies
Typhoon Yolanda, one of the strongest typhoons in history, made the first of six
landfalls in Guiuan on November 8, 2013. The typhoon unleashed wind speeds over
300 km/h and storm surges over 4 m, and devastated regions in its path (National
Economic and Development Authority [NEDA] 2013). Damage was extreme; the
government of the Philippines reported more than 6300 casualties, 1.5 million fam-
ilies affected, and 920,000 families displaced (Office of the Presidential Assistant
for Rehabilitation and Recovery [OPARR] 2014b). Of the 1.2 million houses dam-
aged, 600,000 were completely destroyed (NEDA 2013). Economic losses were
also substantial with direct damage calculated at PhP 132.36 billion (US$3 billion*)
(NEDA 2014).

* Exchange rate is calculated based on US$1 = PhP44.135 as of December 12, 2013.

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212 Coming Home after Disaster

Region VIII (Eastern Visayas), which includes Tacloban, was one of the hard-
est hit along with Region VI (Western Visayas) and Region VII (Central Visayas).
Approximately 90% of affected families were from these regions (NEDA 2013; The
World Bank 2014). Region VIII is historically one of the poorest in the nation; in 2012,
it ranked as the third poorest (National Statistical Coordination Board [NSCB] 2013).
Poverty levels in this area were exacerbated when the majority of the poor living along
the coast without legal land titles lost all of their assets to the storm surge (see e.g.,
NEDA 2013). The poverty rate increased from 41.2% to 55.7% a year after the typhoon,
making Region VIII the nation’s poorest (The World Bank 2014; Gabieta 2015).
Based on an understanding that poor coastal residents were the hardest hit, the
national government decided to “build back better” and published “Reconstruction
Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better (RAY)” (NEDA 2013) within a month
after Yolanda. Together with information on economic loss and recovery budgets,
this document provided rebuilding principles, procedures, and institutional arrange-
ments for recovery. Some key principles included were: (1) local governments are
the principal actors for recovery, and work with the national government in coor-
dinating with international donors and civil organizations; (2) promote recovery in
partnership with the private sector; and (3) avoid hazardous zones and include nec-
essary resettlement for future risk reduction in the rebuilding process. In December
2013, President Aquino III created the OPARR* to coordinate and implement RAY.
Funds from various sources were collected including PhP 14.6 billion (US$256
billion) in December 2013 (Republic of the Philippines 2013, No. 3423) from a
supplementary governmental budget, PhP 26.2 billion (US$594 million) pledged
by civil organizations including about 1300 private organizations and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and PhP 19.36 billion (US$439 million) committed
by international donors as of October 2014 (OPARR 2014a).
The national recovery plan, “Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery
Plan (CRRP),Ӡ included four cluster plans led by different national departments: (1)
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for infrastructure; (2) the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for social services; (3)
the National Housing Authority (NHA) for resettlement; and (4) the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) for livelihood (OPARR 2014a). Among these, the resettle-
ment cluster had the largest budget of PhP 75.67 billion (US$1.71 billion), which was
approximately 45% of the total (OPARR 2014a).

14.2.2  Challenges of Coastal Housing Reconstruction

The national government initially pushed for a coastal setback. RAY called for a
40-m “no-build zone” buffer prohibiting any building construction. This concept has
its root in the PD 1067, the Water Code of the Philippines (1976, PRIME-M4) that
prohibits private buildings in a 40-m zone from the shore for forest areas, a 20-m

* Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 62 of December 6, 2013.

† The CRRP included the recovery plan of 14 affected regional governments: Palawan, Masbate, Aklan,
Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Cebu, Leyte, Biliran, Eastern Samar, Western Samar,
Southern Leyte and Dinagat Islands.
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Residential Relocation Processes in Coastal Areas 213

zone for agricultural areas, and 3-m zone for urban areas. However, actual imple-
mentation of a no-build zone became more complicated and significant concerns
emerged as time passed.
In the Philippines, the president or local government can issue a declaration of
calamity for a certain period of time after a devastating disaster (National Disaster
Coordinating Council [NDCC] 1998). When the declaration is in effect, there are
price controls to avoid inflation and no-interest loans available for recovery. In addi-
tion, the area can receive calamity funds* and foreign donations for emergency
response and reconstruction. A portion of calamity funds received is often invested
in the recovery of the housing sector, including temporary and permanent hous-
ing construction. Depending on the scale of devastation, disaster location, and the
rebuilding stage, different procedures and actors are involved. Key actors using funds
allocated to the housing sector often include national departments and agencies such
as the DSWD, the DPWH, the NHA, and the Social Housing Finance Corporation
(SHFC). These departments and agencies collaborate with civil society organiza-
tions, international donors, and local governments. Nevertheless, no clear framework
exists for housing recovery procedures, and haphazard responses and processes have
often led to unfinished projects in housing construction (Environmental Science for
Social Change [ESSC] 2014).
Resettlement is not a new task for the Philippine government. The Urban
Development Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992 (Republic Act [RA] 7279) designated
the NHA as the primary government agency to work with local governments in pro-
viding social housing† and preparing land for relocation of underprivileged popula-
tions. People “living in dangerous areas such as esteros [coastal lagoons], railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, river banks, shorelines, waterways, and in other public places
as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds” (Republic of the Philippines 1992: RA
7279, pp. 23) are eligible for resettlement in social housing in safer areas. However,
past experiences in many cases in Metro Manila have shown that the provision of
basic infrastructure and livelihood opportunities often do not match the timing of
housing allocation to residents or needs of residents. As a result, relocated individu-
als eventually return to familiar areas (ESSC 2014; NEDA 2014).
Housing and relocation post-Yolanda was even more challenging. The number
of affected households needing assistance significantly exceeded that of past events
(ESSC 2014). Supporting resettlement for all affected coastal communities seemed
overly unrealistic given few successful cases from the past (NEDA 2014). In addi-
tion, the issue of setbacks was raised, including the need for scientific evidence to
identify safe and unsafe zones based on geographic conditions. After a 4-month
* The calamity fund in the Philippines is a lump sum fund appropriated every year at the national level
for emergency use, including aid, relief, and rehabilitation after disasters. PhP 7.5 billion (US$169.9
million) was appropriated for 2012 and 2013, and increased to PhP 13 billion (US$294.6 million) in
2014 (Department of Budget and Management [DBM] 2015; Diaz 2014).
† “Social housing” in the Philippines aims to make available “decent housing at affordable cost” for

“the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in resettlement areas” (Republic of the
Philippines 1992, RA 7279, pp. 1). Programs for socialized housing “refers to housing programs and
projects covering houses and lots or home-lots only undertaken by the Government or the private sec-
tor… which shall include sites and services development, long-term financing, liberal terms on interest
payments, and such other benefits” (Republic of the Philippines 1992, RA 7279, pp. 6).
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214 Coming Home after Disaster

debate, instead of the “no-build zone,” the 40-m zone was reclassified by OPARR as
a no-dwell zone with adoption by local governments to be made on a case-by-case
basis (OPARR 2014a).

14.3 TACLOBAN CITY: COASTAL REBUILDING

THROUGH HOUSING RELOCATION
14.3.1 Tacloban City and Urban Development Trends
Before Yolanda, Tacloban City was already facing development challenges. As the
first highly urbanized city in Region VIII, Tacloban is a regional economic center
and attracts many people from throughout the region. Together with natural popula-
tion growth, the city’s population increased 2.43% from 1990 to 2010, a much higher
rate than that of the national capital region (Census of Population and Housing [CPH]
2010). Located in one of the poorest regions in the country, many poor residents in
Tacloban do not own land or rent in formal housing markets; instead they mainly
occupy lands along shores, riverbanks, and esteros. An estimated 30,513 people
or 13.8% of the city’s population were living in informal settlements pre-Yolanda
(Tacloban City 2012).*
To address population increase and growing urban informal settlements, there
had been plans to develop Tacloban’s northern agricultural areas. Plans for an
Economic Zone of 237 ha in the north were already approved in 1998 (Presidential
Proclamation No. 1210, 1998) to boost the regional economy (Tacloban City 2012).
In addition, 124 ha of land on multiple sites, most in the north, were planned for the
construction of social housing before Yolanda (Tacloban City 2012).
Tacloban was one of the cities most severely impacted by Typhoon Yolanda;
2603 people were killed or missing and 28,734 houses were totally damaged, 90%
of which were in coastal areas (Tacloban City 2014b). About 28 of Tacloban’s 136
barangays,† are in low-lying areas with an average elevation of 3 m, where the major-
ity of Tacloban’s informal settlers were residing (Tacloban City 2014a).

14.3.2 Rebuilding Safer: A Two-Step Plan for

Relocating Coastal Families Inland
In response to the destruction and loss of lives by Yolanda, Tacloban City adopted
a “no-build zone” ordinance 4 months after Yolanda, even while the national
­government was still discussing implementation of a 40-m setback. It aimed to
­“prevent repetition of [the] large number of casualties that occurred after Super
Typhoon Yolanda [which] brought massive storm surges that flattened seaside com-
munities” (Tacloban City 2014a,b, Ordinance No. 2013-12-15A). With this ordinance,

* According to the Philippines Statistics Authority, the population of Tacloban City in 2010 was 221,174
(PSA 2013).
† Barangay is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines, often representing village, district, or

ward.
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Residential Relocation Processes in Coastal Areas 215

Tacloban City replaced temporary “no-building zone” signage with permanent

markers 40 m from the shore in 28 coastal barangays to communicate the boundary
to residents.
Along with the no-build zone, Tacloban focused on relocating coastal families
inland. Tacloban City planned housing relocation in two steps. In the first step, resi-
dents would move into temporary housing, locally called “bunkhouses” or “transi-
tional shelters,” as soon as these units were ready, after staying for several months in
evacuation shelters such as schools, municipal buildings, or tents. Residents would
then relocate to permanent housing to be built in the north of Tacloban.* When plan-
ning the two-step relocation, locations for both temporary and permanent housing
were taken into consideration to reduce stress on the beneficiaries. Constructed on
three sites near the city center, entry into the bunkhouses prioritized vulnerable
populations, including single mothers, disabled, and elderly residents, among other
evacuees. The majority of transitional shelters and permanent housing, meanwhile,
was built in the north where more land is available. Locating transitional shelters
and permanent housing in proximity was intended to make adjustment easier for the
relocating residents (see Figure 14.1). To address the need for permanent housing in
a safer area, the city’s initial target was 10,000 permanent housing units in the recov-
ery plan† (Tacloban City 2014b). Due to the limited amount of temporary housing
available and the time needed to construct permanent housing, the city planned to
reuse the temporary units after households moved to permanent housing to accom-
modate as many residents as possible.

14.3.3 Implementation of Housing Relocation: From

Temporary to Permanent Housing
Typhoon-affected coastal residents began moving into temporary housing after stay-
ing in evacuation shelters‡ for a little more than a month (DPWH 2013). Evacuation
shelter sites then closed before the 1-year anniversary of Yolanda in November
2014 (International Research Institute of Disaster Science 2015). Eight months into
rebuilding, residents began relocating to permanent housing located in the north of
Tacloban. Two years after Yolanda, the majority of typhoon-affected coastal house-
holds were living in temporary housing, including bunkhouses, transitional shel-
ters, and other housing such as rented rooms or self-built structures. Only around

* Preparing a detailed schedule and timing of housing relocation in both temporary and permanent hous-
ing phases was difficult for Tacloban City because housing construction and procurement depended
heavily on donations and support from private sector, INGOs and NGOs, as well as NHA. In addi-
tion, land use and acquisition agreements and approvals were also needed. Under such circumstances,
Tacloban City’s plan for housing did not focus on detailed timeframes; rather on keeping track of and
understanding the actual status and counts of housing commitments and construction, while continu-
ing to work toward provision of the target number of housing units (see IRIDeS 2015).
† The initial target for housing units was less than the calculated 14,443 households in the no-dwell zone

reflecting the city’s own capacity and early commitments of partners (International Research Institute
of Disaster Science 2015).
‡ Evacuation shelters in Tacloban included nearby schools, municipal buildings, and tents provided by

different donors and religious groups.

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216 Coming Home after Disaster

Area with concentration

of temporary shelters
and permanent housing
in resettlement sites

Downtown
Tacloban City

Barangay
88
Area with
bunkhouse
sites

Legend
Coastal area targeted for relocation

FIGURE 14.1  ​Map of Tacloban City showing the location of downtown, temporary housing
sites, and permanent relocation sites. (Data from modified OSM Map. Open Street Map. 2013.
Open Street Map: Typhoon Haiyan. http://www.openstreetmap.org/#map=15/11.2461/124.99
75&layers=H [accessed February 16, 2016]).

470 households, or less than 5% of target beneficiaries, had moved into permanent
houses in the relocation area (Tacloban City 2015).
Tacloban City’s plan for two-step housing relocation remains the core of the
recovery program, and the city continues to take the central coordination role for
providing temporary and permanent housing through different combinations of sup-
port. The residents’ paths to permanent housing, however, are diverging with various
options that emerged as alternatives to the city’s housing plan (Figure 14.2).
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Residential Relocation Processes in Coastal Areas 217

Rental
support
Evacuate to Temporary
friends/family Materials for housing Permanent
Independent house repair housing
support
Back to community

Tents
Primary plan
coordinated by Transitional shelters
Permanent housing
Tacloban city Evacuation in resettlement sites
Legend centers/school
Bunkhouses
Steps in goverment plan
NGO/independent support
Process occurred
Process planned Evacuation Temporary housing Permanent housing

FIGURE 14.2  Coastal residents’ relocation process in Tacloban.

14.3.3.1  Temporary Housing

Temporary housing support after Yolanda included: (1) bunkhouses; (2) transitional
shelters; (3) rent assistance and building materials; and (4) self-built housing in for-
mer communities (see Table 14.1); 2 years after Yolanda, people are still living in
each of these types of temporary housing. Multiple actors provided housing support,
including the national and Tacloban City government, international and local NGOs,
and residents through their own efforts. While Tacloban City is the main coordi-
nator of temporary housing construction and management, some NGOs provided
independent housing assistance without coordinating with Tacloban City. Temporary
housing organized by different actors has resulted in some residents taking paths
different from the city’s plan. Locations and the land used for temporary housing by
different actors also varied.

14.3.3.1.1  Bunkhouse Settlements

Coordinated by Tacloban City, bunkhouses were the earliest temporary housing,
built by DPWH and managed by DSWD. Bunkhouses are wooden row house or
barracks structures, with 12, 17.28 m2 housing units in each building.* Two years
after Yolanda, over 1000 households were still living in bunkhouses in three sites,
located near the center of Tacloban City, with the farthest site about 2.5 km inland.
These sites used both public and privately owned lands that were available in a short
time. Residents benefited from good access to working places and schools as these
sites are relatively close to the city center, although outside former neighborhoods.
However, the crowded and unsanitary living conditions of bunkhouses are pressing
issues for residents after living in the bunkhouses for almost 2 years.

* The nearly 250 bunkhouse units build by early 2014 were initially too small according to international
standards; the calculation of 8.64 m 2 per household was later doubled to 17.28 m 2 (Official Gazette,
2014).
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218 Coming Home after Disaster

TABLE 14.1
Temporary Housing Types: Coordinator, Funding Sources and Activities,
Location, and Land Used
Funding Sources
Housing Types Coordinator and Activities Location Land Used
Bunkhouses City DPWH: bunkhouses Close to city City government’s
provision; DSWD: center land; land leased
welfare support from private
owners
Transitional City Public agencies, Tacloban City government’s
shelters private donors, North land; land leased
INGOs, NGOs: from private
shelter provisions owners
NGO NGOs: shelter Close to city Private land
provisions center
Rent assistance NGO NGOs (i.e., CRSa): Throughout Land/apartment
rental assistance the city owners, host family
Temporary housing NGO/ NGOs (i.e., CRS; In or near Near original land,
in or near former residents UPAb): housing/ original including formal
communities material provisions; communities and informal
repair support inhabitation
Temporary housing Residents Resident: self-built Original Governments’ land
in former themselves communities with informal
communities inhabitation

a CRS: Catholic Relief Services.

b UPA: Urban Poor Associates.

14.3.3.1.2  Transitional Shelter Settlements

Through partnerships between various actors such as private and public donors,
INGOs and NGOs, around 950 units of transitional shelter were built in the north
part of Tacloban (Tacloban North) by October 2015 (Tacloban City 2015). Most are
made of bamboo with various foundations to elevate the houses off the ground, on
land already owned by Tacloban City or rented from private owners. Transitional
shelter sites were located mainly in the north so that residents’ ongoing relocation
process will be smooth. After some residents move from transitional to permanent
housing, reuse of these transitional units was planned, along with the construc-
tion of additional transitional housing toward the city’s target of 1500 units total
(Tacloban City 2015).

14.3.3.1.3  Rental Assistance

The international humanitarian agency Catholic Relief Services (CRS), funded
by the United States Agency for International Development and the US Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance, has provided the widest variety of options to sup-
port residents in the transitional housing phase. With a mission to find housing
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Residential Relocation Processes in Coastal Areas 219

solutions close to residents’ former neighborhoods, CRS’s programs complemented

the city’s relocation efforts, including: (1) rent to own land; (2) land rental; (3) apart-
ment rental; or (4) host family. In each option, households received 3000 pesos per
month, or 72,000 pesos total for 2 years of support (CRS 2015). As it was paid in
advance for 2 years, residents are still benefitting from rental assistance although
CRS’s program ended in December 2015. CRS supported residents from both inside
and outside the no-build zone; about 60% of their 3000 beneficiaries were from the
no-build zone (CRS 2015).* Since CRS’s programs focused on temporary housing
support, residents may face challenges in transitioning to permanent housing after
their rental assistance ends.

14.3.3.1.4  Self-built Temporary Housing in Former Communities

As of October 2015, only approximately 1600 of the households targeted for reloca-
tion had moved into temporary housing† away from coastal areas (Tacloban City
2015); a majority of other affected residents returned to their former informal set-
tlements in heavily damaged coastal areas. Although Tacloban City policy forbids
construction in the no-build zone, many residents have rebuilt lightweight shelters
despite the knowledge that they are forbidden to stay permanently. Interviews with
barangay officials and residents indicated that some people were waiting to find out
if and/or when permanent housing will be available from the city or NGO programs;
some returned from temporary housing because bunkhouses were crowded and
unsanitary, or transitional shelter sites were too far away.

14.3.3.2  Permanent Housing

Major permanent housing approaches include: (1) national government housing; (2)
city-NGO housing; (3) NGO-independent housing, and (4) NGO-donor-social hous-
ing programs (see Table 14.2). Combinations of different actors provided housing
support, including national and local governments, international and local donors,
and NGOs. Funding sources also varied: for example, funding for one type of hous-
ing provision originates from the private sector while in others it comes from the
national government via social housing programs. Tacloban City coordinates the
overall management of beneficiaries, and collaborates closely with permanent hous-
ing construction projects by the national government and NGO partners. However,
some NGO-driven housing construction programs are independent from the city’s
programs.

14.3.3.2.1  National Government Housing

The NHA is providing the largest share of permanent housing, with the construc-
tion of more than 13,000 units planned (Tacloban City 2015). In collaboration with
Tacloban City, the NHA assesses land conditions and decides on construction sites

* For the 1230 dwell-zone households, CRS provided cash or building materials for on-site house repair
according to damage level, along with technical guidance (CRS, 2015).
† As of October 2015, there were approximately 1000 households in bunkhouses, 600 in transitional

housing, and 470 in permanent housing (Tacloban City 2015).

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220 Coming Home after Disaster

TABLE 14.2
Permanent Housing Types: Coordinator, Funding Sources and Activities,
Location, and Land Used
Funding Sources and
Housing Types Coordinator Activities Location Land Used
National National NHA: housing Tacloban City government’s
government government provision, land North land; purchased
and city acquisition private land
City: land provisions
City-NGO City and City: land provisions; Tacloban City government’s
NGO NGO (i.e., GMAKFa, North land
Habitat for Humanity):
housing provision
NGO-independent NGO NGOs (i.e., UPAb): land North of city Purchased private
acquisition and Center land
housing construction
NGO-donor-social NGO NGO: program North of city Purchased private
housing program coordinator, Center land, using SHFC
SHFC: funding
provision for
CMP Donors: housing
construction

a GMAKF: Global Media Alliance Kapuso Foundation.

b UPA: Urban Poor Associates.

and contractors for housing construction. As contractors, private developers play a

large role in NHA projects; following NHA design requirements, developers acquire
land, develop and build on the site, and then NHA compensates them for the com-
pleted efforts. Construction of the first NHA housing development in Tacloban North
was completed in mid-2015. Other NHA funded settlements are currently in various
stages of development, including site planning, ground preparation, and building
construction. The NHA (2015) planned for the initial group of households to move
into the earliest completed settlements by the end of 2015.

14.3.3.2.2  City-NGO Housing

For city-NGO housing, Tacloban City provides land and NGO donors prepare houses
conforming to the National Building Code and Design for Socialized and Economic
Housing. For instance, the Global Media Alliance Kapuso Foundation (GMAKF),
a nonprofit foundation created by the Global Media Alliance (GMA), built the first
housing units in Tacloban North using land that was already owned and being devel-
oped by Tacloban City when Yolanda struck. Having a site already under develop-
ment fostered quick housing construction—by July 2015, GMAFK had completed
all 403 planned housing units and accommodated more than 3000 residents (Manila
Times 2015). A similar process was evident on an adjacent site; Tacloban City
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Residential Relocation Processes in Coastal Areas 221

prepared the land for permanent housing and Habitat for Humanity constructed 200
houses. The city plans for the construction of about 1600 more housing units with
similar partnerships with donors (Tacloban City 2015).

14.3.3.2.3  NGO-Independent Housing

After the initiation of government-organized housing construction, other NGOs
planned smaller-scale permanent housing developments closer to the city center, and
supported one-step relocation to minimize displacement and adverse impact on the
livelihood of relocating residents. For instance, projects organized by Urban Poor
Associates (UPA), a national nonprofit organization advocating for the rights of the
urban poor, has called for housing redevelopment close to the city center due to the
importance of jobs and livelihood (UPA 2015). With a consortium of supporters,*
the project was initiated in August 2015, with plans to accommodate 550 households
and include cooperative agriculture projects for livelihoods (Caritas 2015). UPA has
already built temporary housing near residents’ former coastal communities in hard-
hit Barangay 88. UPA’s one-step housing relocation approach has created contro-
versy, leading residents to disagree with the city’s two-step relocation process.

14.3.3.2.4  NGO–Donor–Social Housing Program

The last option combines support from various sources, with funding from the
Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the SHFC playing an important role.
This program helps informal settlers attain formal land tenure and home owner-
ship through acquiring land, after becoming members of a homeowners association
with support of a SHFC-accredited community mobilizer. In Tacloban, the Brigham
Estates housing development, located 7 km north of the city center, is an example
of this type of housing provision. After acquiring land with the CMP, funding for
housing construction comes from various sources, including the Philippine Disaster
Relief Fund and crowd funding for some residents’ groups.†

14.3.3.3  Emerging Issues

Two years after Yolanda, about 16% (1600 households) and 5% (500 households) of
the initial target of beneficiary households‡ were still living in temporary housing, or
had moved into permanent housing, respectively. In addition to people living in tem-
porary and permanent housing provided by the government or donors, the majority
of other residents from areas targeted for relocation went back to live in their original
neighborhoods in self-built temporary housing.
Beyond the construction of housing, the city continues to face other coordina-
tion challenges related to infrastructure, which is delaying the actual relocation

* The consortium is called FRANCESCO (Pope Francis for Resilient and Co-Empowered Sustainable
Communities), and includes the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, NASSA/
Caritas Philippines, UPA, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Palo, and the Congregation of the Most
Holy Redeemer (Caritas Philippines 2015).
† To learn more about the Anibong Cluster crowdfunding on GoFundMe, visit https://bagacayhousing.

wordpress.com/
‡ Over time, as housing providers committed to the construction of additional permanent housing units,

the target has increased to over 15,200 (Tacloban City 2015).

 Copyright Material – Provided by Taylor & Francis

222 Coming Home after Disaster

of residents. At the same time, affected residents are increasingly seeing unequal
opportunities, such as relocation options prioritized for residents from certain areas,
and limitations leading to growing doubts about relocation. As implementation of
relocation plans proceeds, some critical issues for residents’ life and housing recov-
ery have emerged.
First, although NGOs’ varied assistance for temporary housing created multiple
options, choices were not equally provided to beneficiaries. For instance, not all resi-
dents received equivalent information or access to rental assistance or other unique
housing initiatives. Those from certain areas were prioritized for early and limited
support. Depending on the type of housing they received, residents faced different
problems, such as crowded and unsanitary living conditions in bunkhouses. While
those in transitional shelters in the north have a more comfortable living environ-
ment with more space, they must adapt to a vastly different lifestyle. For example,
they lack employment opportunities given the distance to downtown.
Second, the anticipation of moving into permanent housing has been tempered by
the lack of utilities such as electricity and water; as the supply to the north has been
delayed. Education is also a major concern, as additional school buildings have not
yet been constructed to accommodate the influx of children, and the host barangay
schools are becoming overcrowded. In the first year, some households continued to
send their children back to their original schools, even though transportation costs
were a significant economic burden.
Third, households currently living in temporary or permanent housing provided
under the relocation scheme only represent some of those in need of housing. Most
households have decided to wait back in their communities; the lengthy waiting time
fosters increasing doubts about the reality of relocation. In addition, due to UPA
urging one-step relocation, some barangays have requested direct relocation to per-
manent housing, conflicting with the city’s plan, and making it difficult to convince
residents to participate in two-step housing relocation.

14.4  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter focused on the initial stage of relocation efforts and implementation
status of post-Yolanda Tacloban City to explain opportunities and challenges of pre-
ventive relocation in rebuilding. Two years into recovery is too early to speculate on
future outcomes, but there are several useful observations.
On a positive note, relocation processes were initiated at an early stage of
rebuilding. This is rare because preventive relocation in recovery is not usually
implemented, as during the time that it takes to make plans, actors start recon-
struction on the ground. In Tacloban, there are several reasons behind the imple-
mentation of relocation strategies and initiatives. First, Tacloban City passed the
“no-build zone” ordinance, aligning with the national reconstruction strategy, RAY,
at an early stage of recovery and shared this information with coastal residents.
From the very beginning, the city set a priority to relocate informal coastal resi-
dents, as they are the least privileged and most vulnerable population. Second, the
local government took on the central coordination role, as called for in RAY and
in the UDHA. Throughout the process, Tacloban City coordinated and advanced
 Copyright Material – Provided by Taylor & Francis

Residential Relocation Processes in Coastal Areas 223

housing reconstruction by managing various actors representing international agen-

cies, national governments, NGOs, and civil society organizations. So far, they have
successfully built partnerships with nongovernmental actors during both the tem-
porary and permanent phases of housing relocation, thereby leveraging varied sup-
port to provide housing to a larger population. Lastly, pre-Yolanda, the city had a
general consensus and pre-existing plan to develop the northern part of the city to
accommodate a growing population. This overall development direction allowed
for a relatively quick initiation of large-scale relocation.
However, several concerns remain. First, although multiple actors in housing
relocation provided more housing options to relocating residents, this also created
confusion and difficulties in coordination. While two-step relocation out of the no-
building zone was Tacloban City’s main policy, the emergence of other solutions
such as one-step relocation—to stay near the original neighborhoods and then move
directly into permanent housing—fueled residents’ growing doubts about the city’s
program. Second, residents in both temporary and permanent houses are becoming
more vulnerable with time as their former social networks and livelihoods have been
disrupted. They face urgent and unmet needs to reestablish their way of life. Basic
infrastructure such as electricity and potable water systems, and public facilities such
as schools are still lacking in new settlements, and the lack of economic opportunities
is a serious long-term issue. Without appropriate development and strategies to sup-
port the livelihoods of both new and host-community residents, increasing competi-
tion for employment and strained social relations will negatively impact both groups.
Although earlier efforts in preventive relocation after disasters, such as in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka, did not materialize, more and more disaster-stricken areas
are likely to consider the types of development controls and planning processes used
in Tacloban. The case of Tacloban City demonstrates that providing housing alone
will not secure sustainable conditions for displaced residents. For residents to be
able to recover their quality of life, it is critical that relocation is treated as a holistic
effort that includes the development of social and livelihood opportunities as well as
housing and infrastructure.

14.5 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors extend appreciation to those who shared their time and knowledge,
especially Tacloban City, captains of coastal barangays, residents of Tacloban City
in temporary and permanent housing as well as in their former coastal communities.
We would also like to extend our gratitude to local universities, NGOs, and interna-
tional organizations working on the ground. This work was supported by the funding
provided by Tohoku University and JSPS KAKENHI Grant number 16H05752.

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