Magno, Emely R.

MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)

Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

Ismael vs. Guanson, 2 Phil. 347

Facts: The applicants contended that the court erred in refusing to receive as evidence
certain documents certified by the president of the municipality of Balasan, it being
claimed by the appellant that, as official documents, they should have been admitted.
These documents certify that certain persons appeared before the president, at the
request of the appellant, and made the statements contained in the documents. These
statements were declarations as to what the persons making them knew concerning the
matters in controversy in this action.
Section 381 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: "The testimony of all
witnesses, except such as has been taken in writing in the form of depositions as
otherwise provided by law, shall be given on oath in open court orally, and each witness
may be orally cross-examined by the adverse party."
The testimony contained in these documents was not taken in the manner provided for
taking depositions in sections 353-376 of said Code. Neither were said documents official
or public writings as that phrase is defined in section 299 of the same Code. Neither by
the Municipal Code nor by any other law has a president of a municipality now any
authority to receive declarations and make a record of them in the manner followed in this
case. The documents were properly rejected by the court.
The appellant accepts the established doctrine of this court that the decision of the court
below, with the admissions in the pleadings, must contain facts sufficient as a matter of
law to support the judgment.
Further, the appellant claims that under this doctrine the decision should have stated facts
showing that the two other defendants, in whose favor judgment was rendered, were not
liable to the plaintiff, the release of his codefendants being prejudicial to the Appellant.
When a judgment is rendered for the defendant, a simple finding, express or implied, that
the complaint is not true, is sufficient. The court finds that the appellant cut and ground
the cane. This is a finding that he alone appropriated it to his own use, and necessarily
excludes the idea that the other defendants participated in the appropriation. It was a
sufficient finding on which to base a judgment in their favor. But it is claimed that the court
found, also, that the appellant did these acts under the direction of his codefendants and
divided the property with them. This claim is not supported by the record.
The decision states not that this was a fact, but that the appellant alleged it to be a fact.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the court below erred in refusing to receive as evidence certain
documents certified by the president of the municipality of Balasan.
2. Whether or not the decision should have stated facts showing that the two other
defendants, in whose favor judgment was rendered, were not liable to the plaintiff.

Held: Statements concerning a litigated question made out of court and reduced to writing
in the presence of a municipal president and certified by him are not public writings as
defined by sections 353-376 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but are hearsay, and
inadmissible. A finding that an act of conversion was committed by one of several
defendants excludes the idea that the others participated in the appropriation, and is
sufficient to support a judgment in their favor.
Where no express findings of fact are made and the evidence is omitted from the record,
such findings will be presumed as are necessary to support the judgment. The right to
require the trial court to make separate findings of fact is a substantial right accorded by
section 133 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a refusal to accede to a demand for
findings on all the material facts in issue is a reversible error. If the decision of the trial
court does not contain findings and it does not appear that any demand for findings has
been made, it will be presumed that the right has been waived, and objection to the
omission of such findings can not be raised for the first time in the appellate court. An
objection to the decision of the trial court, on the ground of the omission of findings on the
material facts in issue, should specifically indicate the defects or omissions complained
of, in order that the trial court may have an opportunity to correct the same.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

Pastor vs. Gaspar, 2 Phil. 592

Facts: On November 1900, Macario Nicasio and the defendant Gaspar entered into a
contract of partnership under the name “Nicasio and Gaspar”. Th said partnership owned
the steam launch Luisa, and its only business was relating to this launch. On November
24, 1900, with the desire to enlarge their business, a contract was made between the firm
of Nicasio and Gaspar on the one side, and on the other side the plaintiff and four others
from whom Nicasio and Gaspar secured a sum of P28, 000 in order to finance the
purchase of six (6) additional launches.
In the contract, Nicasio and Gaspar undertakes to return the amount loaned to the
plaintiff within a period of ten years from the date of the instrument and to guarantee the
fulfillment of the said payment they pledge to the same parties the six (6) launches. Seven
months after the execution of the contract, it was terminated and was sold by mutual
consent. The plaintiff brought action alleging that the contract was one of partnership, and
that the consent of his agent to terminate the contract and the sale of the launches was
obtained by fraud and the dissolution of the partnership was null and void.

Issue/s: Whether or not the transaction between the parties a loan or a contract of
partnership

Held: A loan. An agreement under which one of the parties advances to the other a sum
of money to be repaid within a certain time, secured by a pledge of vessels owned and
operated by the borrower, with the stipulation that the liability for the return of the money
is not personal to the borrower but limited to the security given by the pledge of the
vessels, and a further stipulation that the profits and losses arising from the operation of
the vessels are to be shared by all the parties to the agreement, constitutes a contract of
loan and does not produce a partnership relation between the parties to the agreement.
Where it appears that the agreement between contracting parties has been reduced to
writing in an instrument free from all intrinsic ambiguity, it is not error to exclude parol
testimony as to the contemporaneous opinion of the parties with respect to the legal effect
of the writing, or intended to prove other terms not included therein.
Article 1127 of the Civil Code establishes a presumption, not a rule, that the period
allowed for the performance of the obligation is for the benefit of both parties, but when
the evidence discloses that the period was established for the benefit of the debtor he
need not wait for the expiration of the term, but may discharge the debt at will.
Statements contained in a letter are not admissible as evidence, unless they are
competent as part of the res gestae or as admissions, or under some other general rule

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

of evidence constituting an exception to the exclusion of hearsay. It is not error-to exclude

parol testimony of the opinion of the witness as to the construction of the pleadings or
documents already in evidence. It is not error to refuse to allow a party to show by a
second witness what he has already been allowed to show without objection by a former
witness. A question tending to elicit from a witness, not testifying as an expert, a statement
as to what course he would have pursued under certain circumstances presented
hypothetically to him is properly excluded as irrelevant. A question tending to elicit from
a witness, not testifying as an expert, a statement as to what course he would have
pursued under certain circumstances presented hypothetically to him is properly excluded
as irrelevant.

In the absence of a motion for a new trial in conformity with the provisions of section 497,
paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an exception to the denial of the same
by the trial court, the Supreme Court can not review the evidence, and it is useless to
include it in the bill of exceptions. An agreement under which the parties undertake that
money advanced by the one shall be used by the other in the operation of certain vessels
and that they are to be entitled "in like proportion to the profits . . . realized from the
exploitation of said vessels," and that losses and other expenses incident to the operation
of the vessels are to be shared by each party "in proportion to his investment" constitutes
a partnership as between the parties, notwithstanding the fact that the vessels were
pledged as security for the money advanced, and which was designated as a loan.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

Richmond vs. Anchuelo, 4 Phil. 596

Facts: The defendant, who was blind, employed the plaintiff, a doctor, to treat his eyes.
Plaintiff did so, without success, and brought this action to recover for his services. The
plaintiff claimed that he was to receive 200 pesos in any event, and if he effected a cure
he was to receive 500 pesos more. The defendant claimed that if a cure was effected
plaintiff was to receive 200 pesos, but if no cure was effected he was to receive nothing.

Issue: What was the contract between the parties?\

Held: The court found upon the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, and we affirmed that this
finding is supported by the proof. At the trial the defendant presented a witness, Jose
Pastor, and offered to prove by him that the defendant, on returning from the plaintiff's
office, had stated to the witness that the plaintiff had agreed to cure him for 200 pesos,
and not to charge anything if no cure was effected. The judge excluded this evidence, to
which ruling the defendant excepted. It will be noticed that the witness did not offer to
testify to anything which the plaintiff had said, but offered to testify to what the defendant
said that the plaintiff had said. The witness did not know that the plaintiff had made these
statements; he only knew that the defendant said that the plaintiff had made them. Such
evidence is inadmissible, according to the provisions of section 276 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

Gonzalez vs. Palanca Tan-Guinlay, 12 Phil. 617

Facts: The plaintiff, claiming that Germann & Co., Limited, were indebted to the
defendant Tan-Guinlay in the amount of 7,741.17 pesos took these proceedings for the
purpose of having that debt applied in payment of its judgment against Tan-Guinlay.
The manager of Germann & Co. in 1893 ceased to be such manager and did not testify
at the trial, nor did any persons so testify who were then connected with that concern.
The evidence in the case practically consisted of the books of Germann & Co. kept at that
time and parts of the records of various proceedings in the litigation then had between
Quiros, the present plaintiff, and Tan-Guinlay, and between Germann & Co. and Tan-
Guinlay. The books above mentioned show that Germann & Co. not only did not owe
Tan-Guinlay anything but that he owed them 7,358.83 pesos. It was also proven that
Germann & Co. then obtained judgment against Tan-Guinlay for that amount; that the
judgment never was collected, and that it was charged off as loss upon the books of
Germann & Co. It seems to be admitted by the plaintiff and appellant that Tan-Guinlay
did, in fact, owe Germann & Co. this amount of 7,358.83 pesos. And the whole case of
the plaintiff rests upon the proposition that Tan-Guinlay was entitled to credit upon that
sum to the amount of 15,100 pesos, money paid by Tan-Guinlay, or on his account,. to
Germann & Co. Deducting the admitted balance of 7,358.83 from this amount of 15,100
pesos, there is left 7,741.17 pesos, which is the amount claimed in these proceedings to
be due from Germann & Co. to Tan-Guinlay, with interest. virtua1aw library

The theory of the plaintiff, however, is that Germann & Co. received by reason of these
documents 15,100 pesos in cash from someone on account of Tan-Guinlay and that
7,358.83 pesos of the amount was applied in payment of the debt then due from Tan-
Guinlay to Germann & Co., leaving a balance of 7,741.17 pesos still due from Germann
& Co. to Tan-Guinlay. There is no direct evidence to show these facts.

It seems apparent that these documents were at one time in the possession of Tan-
Guinlay, and that they were afterwards delivered by Tan-Guinlay to Germann & Co., who
later redelivered them to Tan-Guinlay. The books of Germann & Co., kept at the time,
were examined at the trial of this proceeding and they contained no entry whatever
relating to these papers. There was no entry in any of the books showing that any money
had ever been received by Germann & Co. on account thereof, either from Tan-Guinlay
or Tan-Tuco or the other persons ultimately bound to pay them. That the obligations were
never paid by Tan-Tuco is clearly proven by the fact that the papers were found in the
office of Tan-Guinlay, an indorser. If they had been paid by Tan-Tuco to Germann & Co.,
the latter would have delivered the documents to Tan-Tuco and they would be in his
possession and not in the possession of Tan-Guinlay. It is also apparent that the

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz
obligations were never paid by any other of the persons primarily responsible thereon, for
the reason that they are not found in the possession of Tan-Guinlay, one of the indorsers.
Not only were they never paid by any of the parties this responsible, but it is very evident
that they never will be paid and are worthless.

Issue: Whether or not the reports of the experts are admissible in evidence

Held: The report of experts appointed in 1896 in a Criminal Case against the then
manager of the appellee amounted to nothing more than their legal opinion and was not
evidence of any fact. Statements in the said report with respect to admissions made at
the time by the manager are inadmissible as they are merely hearsay evidence.

The plaintiff relies to a great extent upon all opinion given by two expert book-keepers,
who were appointed by the Court of First Instance of Binondo to examine the books and
accounts of Germann & Co. These experts were appointed in a criminal action for estafa
which had been instituted by the plaintiff against Tan-Guinlay and the then manager of
Germann & Co. They reported the facts which have been set forth above in regard to the
notes amounting to 15,100 pesos, held that, under the circumstances, Germann & Co.
should be charged with the amount of these notes, and that therefore they owed Tan-
Guinlay 7,741.17 pesos. Two other experts appointed in the same proceeding made a
similar report on the 22d of March, 1898. These reports amounted to nothing more than
the legal opinion of the experts as to the liability of Germann & Co. for the amount of these
notes and bills of exchange and as such can not be considered as evidence of any facts.
In the report of the first two experts, it is stated that Germann & Co. recognized that these
notes and bills had been paid by Tan-Guinlay.

Nothing is said upon this subject in. the report of the second experts, one of whom was a
witness at the trial of this proceeding. He testified that the then manager of Germann &
Co. was not informed by the experts of the results of the investigation and that they had
no communication with him. These experts were appointed to examine the books of
Germann & Co. Their faculties were limited to a report of what appeared from the books
and anything inserted in the report relating to statements made by the then manager of
Germann & Co. would be purely hearsay. None of the first board of experts was examined
as a witness in this proceeding.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

Aldecoa & Co. vs Warner, Barnes, & Co.., 16 Phil. 423

Facts: From the fourth to the twelfth paragraph of the complaint, the plaintiff set forth that,
prior to December 1, 1898, Warner, Barnes and Co. were conducting a business in Albay.
The principal object of the business was the purchase of hemp in the pueblos of Legaspi
and Tobacco for the purpose of bringing it to Manila to sell if for exportation. On the same
date, the plaintiff company became interested in the business of Warner, Barnes and Co.
in Albay and formed therewith a joint-account partnership in which Aldecoa and Co. were
to share equally in the gains and losses of the business.The defendant is the successor
to all the rights and obligations of Warner, Barnes and Co., among which is that of being
manager of the joint-account partnership with Aldecoa and Co., It is a recognized fact,
and one admitted by both parties that the partnership herein concerned concluded its
transactions on December 31, 1903. Wherefore the firm of Warner, Barnes & Co. Ltd.,
the manager of the partnership, in declaring the latter's transactions concluded and in
rendering duly verified accounts of its results, owes the duty to include therein the property
and effects belonging to the partnership in common.

Issue: Whether or not this litigation concerns the rendering of accounts pertaining to the
management of the business of a joint-account partnership formed between the two
litigants companies.

Held: It is a general rule of law that he who takes charge of the management of another's
property is bound immediately thereafter to render accounts of his transactions; and that
it is always to be understood that all accounts must be duly supported by proofs. The
acceptance and approval of any account rendered from a certain date does not excuse
nor relieve the manager of a joint-account partnership from complying with the
unquestionable duty of rendering accounts covering a period of time prior to the said date.
They must be rendered from the time the partnership was actually formed and its business
actually commenced.
Once certain accounts have been approved, which were duly rendered by the manager
of a joint-account partnership, the member of the entity not vested with the character of
manager is not entitled afterwards to claim the revision of the accounts already approved,
unless it shall be proved satisfactorily, by the production of evidence, that there was fraud,
deceit, error, or mistake in the approval of the said accounts. One of the duties of the
manager of a joint-account partnership is that of liquidating the assets of the common
ownership and to state the result obtained therefrom in the final rendering of accounts

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

which he is to present at the conclusion of the partnership, as no person should enrich

himself unjustly at the expense of another.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

U.S. vs. Orera, 11 Phil. 596

Facts: Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila of the crime charged in the complaint, namely, of having falsified, to the
damage of a Chinese theatrical company of the Philippine Islands, called Eng Ning, "a
Chinese theater ticket which entitled the bearer thereof to admission to a performance
held in the theater of the above company at Manila, on the 7th of October, 1906, by
counterfeiting and simulating the signature and rubric of Eng Ning on the said ticket, and
stamping, writing and placing on the said ticket the same figures, letters, dragons,
ornaments, and signatures, as placed by Eng Ning and the above-mentioned Chinese
theatrical company . . ." The accused was sentenced to be imprisoned at the Insular
Prison of Bilibid for the period of six months and one day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas,
Philippine currency, and the costs of the suit, from which judgment the accused appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant could be convicted of the falsification of six tickets,
as declared and held in the judgment appealed from, inasmuch as the complaint was
restricted to one ticket only

Held: The counterfeiting and simulation of the signature and rubric and the imitation of
the figures, letters, and other characters contained in a Chinese theater ticket to the
damage of the company issuing the same, constitutes the crime of falsification of a private
document, punishable under the provisions of article 304 of the Penal Code. Where the
complaint was restricted to one ticket only, the accused can not be convicted of
falsification of six tickets, and judgment must conform to the charge.
The Court held:
1. That, in effect, as argued by the appellant, he could not be convicted of the
falsification of six tickets, as declared and held in the judgment appealed from,
inasmuch as the complaint was restricted to one ticket only.
2. That the court did not err in qualifying such ticket as a document in order to
prosecute and punish the crime of falsification, the subject-matter of the complaint,
because if, according to the authority cited by the appellant, a document is "a deed,
instrument or other duly authorized paper by which something is proved,
evidenced or set forth," and a private document is, according to another authority
cited by the same appellant, "every deed or instrument executed by a private
person, without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally
authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved,

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

evidenced or set forth," it follows that the ticket in question, being an authorized
document evidencing an agreement for the rent of a place in a theater to enable

the possessor to witness a theatrical performance, is a private document. The error

has been in the penalty imposed, an error which necessarily must be remedied by
this court in the present appeal, in order that the judgment may be in conformity
with the law. Said penalty, according to the provisions of article 304 of the Penal
Code, should be that of presidio correccion in its minimum and medium degrees,
and a fine, plus the corresponding indemnification for the damage caused, which
in the present case was P1 the price of the true ticket. We, therefore, sentence
Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) to one year, eleven months, and twenty-one days
of presidio correccional, and to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, as imposed in the
judgment, With the accessory penalty provided for in article 58, the indemnification
of P1 to the offended party, or, in default thereof, to subsidiary imprisonment, and
the payment of the costs of both instances.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

Barreto vs. Cabreza, 33 Phil. 112

Facts: Antonio M.a Barretto brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, alleging
that, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila
between him and Vicenta Limjuco and Vicente Pamatmat, the sheriff attached a tract of
coconut land belonging to Vicenta Limjuco, situated in the barrio of Alipit of the pueblo of
Santa Cruz, the said land was sold at public auction to the plaintiff, to whom the proper
certificate of title was issued at the expiration of the legal period of one year allowed for
redemption; that when plaintiff attempted to take possession of the land purchased, the
defendant Cabreza objected to his so doing on the ground that it belonged to him,
Cabreza; that the titles on which the later and his co-defendants based their claim of
ownership were simulated and fictitious and therefore ineffective, null and void. The
defendants Tomas Cabreza answered the complaint and denied all the allegations
thereof. In special defense he alleged that prior to the issuance of the writ of attachment
of the land in question he and Ponciano Llamas had been the owners and were in
possession thereof, as they had purchased it from Vicenta Limjuco. He therefore asked
that he be absolved from the complaint.
On the same date Ponciano Llamas prayed to be allowed to intervene; he also filed an
answer to the complaint in which he made the same allegations as Tomas Cabreza.
On motion of these defendants the court ordered the inclusion of Vicenta Limjuco, the
vendor of the land, as defendant herein, by reason of her warranty of the sale.
After trial and hearing of evidence adduced by both parties, the court rendered the
judgment mentioned, to which the plaintiff excepted and moved in writing for a rehearing
and a new trial. This motion was overruled, the appellant excepted, and the proper bill of
exceptions was filed, approved, and transmitted to the clerk of this court.

Issue: Whether the land belonged to the judgment debtor, Vicenta Limjuco, at the time
of its attachment on October 12,1910, and if it did, whether the execution sale thereof,
made by the sheriff to the herein plaintiff, is legal and valid.
Held: When land belonging to a debtor has been attached by virtue of a final judgment
and sold at public auction and its sale recorded in the property registry, and no third-party
claim to its ownership has been filed, the presumption is that the vendee is the absolute
owner of such land thus acquired by him at the execution sale.
When the defendants present at the trial a deed of sale of the land in question, sold nine
months before its judicial sale and adjudication to the vendee, for the purpose of proving
that such property then no longer belonged to the judgment debtor, but to a third person
who had acquired it long prior to the purchase made at the public sale; and when once it
is proven that the said deed is null and void and contains substantial and formal defects

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

by reason of its execution before a notary who was the son and the grandson of the
vendors, then the alleged notarial deed of prior date cannot serve as a ground for setting
aside and annulling the said judicial sale. Even though a deed of sale executed before a
notary by near relatives of his be not avoided and be considered as a private document
only, yet as it was not presented until July 28, 1913, it cannot in any wise affect the rights
acquired by the vendee and recorded in a public instrument on October 10, 1910.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz

People vs. Paz, 11 SCRA 667

Facts: Raiders disguised in army-fatigue uniform, surprised commando-like the drivers,

conductors and other employees in the RIZ-MAN TRANSIT, Inc. (Rizal-Manila) garage in
Pililla, a town in the remote hills of Rizal Province and after killing one Antonio Lee, an
employee of the Transit and looting the place, they set the vehicles and garage on fire.
The properties burned or set fire. An amended information for arson alleging conspiracy
and aggravating circumstances of nighttime deliberately sought. On the same date, also
an amended information for robbery with homicide, was filed against the same accused,
alleging therein conspiracy, intent to kill, shot with firearms Antonio Lee, causing his
death; and that the accused on the occasion thereof, with intent of gain and in the
furtherance of their conspiracy, unlawfully carried away the sum of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P2,750.00), which Lee had in his custody, belonging to the
company, to the damage of the latter in said amount. The information likewise alleged the
same aggravating circumstances. The trial court found the accused were guilty of the
crimes charged; and in view of these aggravating circumstances, with no mitigating
circumstance to appreciate, the trial court sentenced all the accused to life imprisonment
in the arson case and to suffer the death penalty in the robbery with homicide case.
State witnesses Vidanes, Quitalig and Miranda were participants in the preliminary
activities of the appellants. In fact they had served as contracts and errand boys for the
Huks. They knew whereof they spoke — and they testified in a direct, clear and
straightforward manner; so sincere and convincing were their testimonies that the trial
court, not withstanding the intensive and extensive cross- examination by the defense,
had given them faith and credence. The findings and conclusions of the trial court on the
question of credibility of witnesses, command great respect, especially, as in these
particular cases, the same are fully supported by the evidence of record.
The defense claims that (1) these witnesses being as guilty as the other appellants, their
testimony has little, if any value and (2) that the conversation had between Comdr. Romy,
Villasanta and Villapando, on one hand and said three witnesses, on the other,
particularly the instructions given by the Huks to them are hearsay and inadmissible,
because the appellants had no opportunity to cross- examine these Huk leaders. Vidanes
and the two other witnesses were victims of circumstances; they just happened to work
in hacienda Gonzales, a Huk infested territory and had to fraternize and obey the Huks,
for self-preservation; which circumstance can not be said of the appellants.

PUBLIC
 Magno, Emely R.
MLQU School of Law (2019-00241)
Trial Technique
Prosecutor Florencio Dela Cruz
Issue: What is the effect of the failure to object to a hearsay evidence?

Held: Failure to object to hearsay evidence is a waiver of the right to cross-examine and
said evidence becomes admissible. Conspiracy implies concert of design and not
participation in every detail of execution. It is sufficient that there is a general plan to
accomplish the result sought, by such measures as may from time to be found expedient.
The truth of desistance of a proven conspirator cannot be inferred from the mere fact that
he was not seen in the conferences of the conspirators and in the actual commission of
the offense. A vicarious declaration of a conspirator, made after the termination of the
conspiracy, may bind his co-defendants. Although a co-conspirator’s extrajudicial
confession is ordinarily not admissible against his co-defendants, the same becomes
admissible against them, if corroborated by other evidence of record.
A defense that if at all the appellants may be liable it is for simple rebellion only,
and not for robbery and homicide must be established by appellants, in the same manner
that the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave an offense, is a
matter for the defense to prove (Sec. 13 [3] Rev. Penal Code). Where in the commission
of the crimes, the appellants were aided by Huk band in the locality, but the Huks were
merely recruited by appellants "to help execute their criminal design to settle a grudge
against a private individual," and there was no taint of political complexion in the crimes,
it is held that the Huks’ aid did not alter the intrinsic nature of said crimes and reduce them
into simple rebellion.

PUBLIC