CASE OF Bernardo v Legaspi

FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action to recover damages for
injuries sustained by plaintiff‘s automobile by reason of defendant‘s negligence in
causing a collision. Court also dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant,
praying for damages on the ground that the injuries sustained by his automobile, and
those to the plaintiff‘s car were caused by plaintiff‘s own negligence.
HELD: Court found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in handling
their automobile so both cannot recover. Where plaintiff in a negligence action by his
own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence as one of the determining
causes thereof, he cannot recover.
RULE: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant is the
proximate cause of the accident, they cannot recover from each other.
“Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness
contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the
determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally true of the defendant;
and as both of them, by their negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of
the accident, neither can recover.”(DOCTRINE)

CASE OF PLDT v. CA
Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their jeep ran over a
sand of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT
for the installation of its underground conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping
darkness and the lack of warning light or signs. Respondent spouses suffered physical
injuries and their jeeps windshield was shattered. PLDT alleged that the respondents
were negligent and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and
Company which undertook said conduit system to be the one liable. The latter claimed
to have complied with its contract and had installed necessary barricades.

Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
RULING: NO. The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of
diligence of Antonio, and was not imputable to the negligent omission of placing
warning signs on the site of the excavation on the part of PLDT.
Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family as he drove
the jeep on a dim light quite fast on the inside lane where it had to swerve suddenly to
the right and had to climb over the accident mound which was relatively big and visible,
being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. The perils of the road were known to the spouses as
they have seen it many previous times.  Hence, negligence of Antonio was not only
contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of
the accident and there by precludes their right to recover damages. 
The court also ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove any
negligence on the part of PLDT as there was no police report and medical report from
hospital where respondents were allegedly treated. Only self-serving testimony of
respondent Antonio Esteban and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the
scene of the accident.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of
proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.
Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first
instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must
fail. (DOCTRINE)

CASE OF Bernal v House

FACTS: Mother and child were walking along a street, with the child a
few steps ahead. She got startled by an automobile and ran back to her mother.
She fell into a ditch with hot water and later died. CFI denied damages to
parents because they were negligent.
HELD: SC held they were not. Mother and child had a right to be on that
street. There was nothing abnormal in letting a child run along a few paces
ahead of the mother. Contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if
any, does not operate as a bar to recovery but could only result in reduction of
damages.
No contributory negligence of mother & kid. Even if they did have contributory
negligence, it is not a bar to recovery; only mitigates

Art. 2214, NCC In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff

shall reduce the damages that he may recover.(DOCTRINE)

CASE OF LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. No. 184905,
August 28, 2009, DOCTRINE” CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Facts:

Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving the Ford
Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a Corrolla Altis
driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by Respondent COL Realty. Due to the impact of the
vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.

A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver. Ramos in his
opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is Aquilnio's negligence
that is the proximate cause of the accident. He further argued that when the accident
happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting the crossing is the place
where the accident happened.
RULING: There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the
accident.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation

The Supreme Court concluded, applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant
case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes
negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of
the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent
from the accident as it embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the
plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages.

As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to delve
into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has
relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever
damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating
the award of damages in his favor.

Ilocos Norte v CA
FACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, Isabel went out of her house to
check on her grocery store. She waded in waist-deep flood and
got electrocuted. According to the NPC Engr, there were no
INELCO linemen who were going around.

HELD: Court said that contrary to petitioner‘s claim, the maxim

―violenti non fit injuria‖ does not apply here. Isabel should not
be punished for exercising her right to protect her property
from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable
presumption that she assumed the risk of personal in injury.

A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he

voluntarily assents to a known danger, he must abide by the
consequence, if an emergency is found to exist, or if the life or
property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.

In the case at bar the doctrine of Emergency Rule applies.

 Afialda v Hisole
FACTS: Caretaker of carabaos was gored by a carabao and he
later died as a consequence of his injuries.

HELD: The court ruled in this case that there was assumption of
risk involved because it was his business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury to anyone, including himself. Being
injured by the animal under these circumstances was one of the
risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and
for which he must take the consequences.

The question to be resolved no longer starts with the determination if

the risk was voluntarily assumed but goes directly into the question of
whether the risk that the plaintiff took is an inherent part of the activity.
IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK ON EMPLOYMENT