Week 3

Chapter 2: UTILITARIANISM

Lesson 4 – The Principle of Utility

Lesson 5 – Principle of the Greatest Number
Lesson 6 – Justice and Moral Rights

Dip:
Battle of the Brain

Deepen:
Read the attached lecture notes on “Utilitarianism, Lesson 4”.

Do:
1. To check your understanding on the topic, do the activity to be posted and submit it back to
me using your official UZ email or in the streaming on Google Classroom (GCR).
2. Answer the Google form quiz. Please take note of the due date posted with the quiz.

Discern:
Prepare your questions, queries, or clarification, regarding our lesson today, to be discussed
next meeting

CHAPTER II
UTILITARIANISM
Chapter Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

● discuss the basic principles of utilitarian ethics;

● distinguish between two utilitarian models: the quantitative model of Jeremy Bentham and the
qualitative model of John Stuart Mill; and
● apply utilitarianism in understanding and evaluating local and international scenarios.

Lesson 4 THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

Definition of Terms:

⮚ Utilitarianism – is a family of normative ethical theories that prescribe actions that maximize
happiness and well-being for all affected individuals. It is an Ethical theory which holds that the
right action is the one that maximizes aggregate well-being.
⮚ Utility – refers to the usefulness of the consequences of one's action and behavior. It is the state
of being useful, profitable, or beneficial.
INTRODUCTION

On January 25, 2015, the 84th Special Action Force (SAF) conducted a police operation at Tukanalipao,
Mamasapano in Maguindanao. Also known as Oplan Exodus, it was intended to serve an arrest warrant
for Zulkifli bin Hir or Marwan, a Malaysian terrorist and bomb-maker who had a $5 million bounty on his
head. This mission eventually led to a clash between the Philippine National Police's (PNP) SAF, on one
hand, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
on the other. Although the police operation was "successful" because of the death of Marwan, the
firefight that ensued claimed sixty-seven lives including forty-four SAF troopers, eighteen MILF Fighters,
and five civilians. However, the relatively high number of SAF members killed in this operation caught
the attention of many Including the Philippine media and the legislature.

In one of the Congress investigations that followed this tragic mission, then Senate President
Franklin Drilon and Senator Francis Escudero debated the public hearing of an audio recording of an
alleged conversation that attempted to cover up the massacre of the PNP-SAF commandos. Drilon
questioned the admissibility of these recordings as evidence under the Anti-Wire Tapping Law whereas
Escudero cited the legal brief of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) arguing that the Anti-Wire
Tapping Law protects only the recording and interception of private communications. Drilon cited
Section 4 of the Anti-Wire Tapping Act (RA 4200) and explained that "any communication or spoken
word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation," Senator Grace Poe, previous chairperson of the Senate committee on public
order and dangerous drugs, argued otherwise, "Sinabi na ni Senator Drilon na ito ay illegal na hindi daw
pwede, na ako daw ay pwedeng maging liable kung ito daw ay ipapakinig sa Senado, ako nman naman,
ano ba itong mga batas na ito? … Ang mga batas na ito ay para malaman natin ang katotohanan at
magkaroon tayo ng hustisya. Itong mag anti-wiretapping or mga recording na ganito, kung hindi
pwedeng ilabas sa publiko, pwede naming gawing basehan sa executive session.”

Senator Poe's response leads us to ask: Can the government infringe individual rights? If it is
morally permissible for the government to infringe individual rights, when can the government do so?
Does it become legitimate to sacrifice individual rights when considering the greatest benefit for the
greatest number of people?

This case exposes the aftermath of the Mamasapano incident and the Senate investigations. The
Senate inquiry proceedings raised questions on the possibility of wire-tapping and the intrusion to one's
right to privacy, While the 1987 Philippine Constitution does protect one's right to private
communication, it did provide some exemptions to its inviolability. These exemptions include a lawful
order of the court and/or issues involving public safety and order. In fact, RA 1200 (or the Anti-Wire
Tapping Law) and RA 9372 (or the Human Security Act of 2007 both provided exemptions to the
inviolability of the right to privacy in instances of treason, espionage, rebellion, and sedition. While this
is certainly a legal issue, can it also constitute a moral concern? By raising the distinction between moral
and legal Issues and concerns, do you think that these two are different? To simplify things, let us put
aside the question of law and let us assume that you were asked to decide whether wiretapping is
morally permissible or not. On what instances is wiretapping morally permissible and on what instances
is it not morally permissible?
 When considering the moral permissibility of wiretapping, we calculate the costs and benefits of
wiretapping. If we calculate the costs and benefits of our actions, then we are considering an ethical
theory that gives premium to the consequences of actions as the basis of morality and as such is
utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that argues for the goodness of pleasure and the
determination of right behavior based on the usefulness of the action's consequences. This means that
pleasure is good and that the goodness of an action is determined by its usefulness. Putting these ideas
together, utilitarianism claims that one's actions and behavior are good inasmuch as they are directed
toward the experience of the greatest pleasure over pain for the greatest number of persons. Its root
word is "utility which refers to the usefulness of the consequences of one's action and behavior. When
we argue that wiretapping is permissible because doing so results in better public safety, then we are
arguing in a utilitarian way. It is utilitarian because we argue that some individual rights can be sacrificed
for the sake of the greater happiness of many. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873) are the two foremost utilitarian thinkers.

Their system of ethics emphasizes the consequences of actions. This means that the goodness or
the badness of an action is based on whether it is useful in contributing to a specific purpose for the
greatest number of people. Utilitarianism is consequentialist. This means that the moral value of actions
and decisions is based solely or greatly on the usefulness of their consequences; it is the usefulness of
results that determines whether the action or behavior is good or bad. While this is the case, not all
consequentialist theories are utilitarian. For Bentham and Mill, utility refers to a way of understanding
the results of people's actions. Specifically, they are interested on whether these actions contribute or
not to the total amount of resulting happiness in the world. The utilitarian value pleasure and happiness;
this means that the usefulness of actions is based on its promotion of happiness. Bentham and Mill
understand happiness as the experience of pleasure for the greatest number of persons, even at the
expense of some individual's rights.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)

Jeremy Bentham was born on February 15, 1748 in London,
England. He was the teacher of James Mill, latter of John Stuart Mill.
Bentham first: wrote about the greatest happiness principle of ethics
and was known for a system of penal management called panopticon.
He was an advocate of economic freedom, women's rights, and the
separation of church and state, among others. He was also an
advocate of animal rights and the abolition of slavery, death penalty,
and corporal punishment for children. Bentham neither denied
individual legal rights nor agreed with the natural law. On his death on
June 5, 1832, Bentham donated his corpse to the University College

In the book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Jeremy Bentham
begins by arguing that our actions are governed by two “sovereign masters” –which he calls pleasure
and pain. These “masters” are given to us by nature to help us determine what is good or bad and what
ought to be done and not; they fasten our choices to their throne.
 Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. If it is for them alone to point
out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On
the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other, the chain
of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in
all we do, in all we say, in all we think every effort we can make to
throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.
In words a man may pretend to abjure the empire: but in reality he will
remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this
subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the
The principle of utility is about our subjection to these sovereign masters: pleasure and pain. On
one hand, the principle refers to the motivation of our actions as guided by our avoidance of pain and
our desire for pleasure. It is like saying that in our everyday actions, we do what is pleasurable and we
do not do what is painful. On the other hand, the principle also refers to pleasure as good if, and only if,
they produce more happiness than unhappiness. This means that it is not enough to experience
pleasure, but to also inquire whether the things we do make us happier. Having identified the tendency
for pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the principle of utility, Bentham equates happiness with
pleasure.

Mill supports Bentham’s principle of utility. He reiterates moral good as happiness and,
consequently, happiness as pleasure.’ Mill clarifies that what makes people happy is intended pleasure
and what makes us unhappy is the privation of pleasure. The things that produce happiness and
pleasure are good; whereas, those that produce unhappiness and pain are bad, Mill explains:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility or the
greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion
as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the
absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.
To have a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much
more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the
ideas of pain and pleasure, and to what extent, this is left an open
question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the
theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded - namely, that
pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends:
and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian
as any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in
Clearly, Mill argues that we act and do things because we find them pleasurable and we avoid
doing things because they are painful. If we find our actions pleasurable, Mill explains, it is because they
are inherently pleasurable in themselves or they eventually lead to the promotion of pleasure and the
avoidance of pain. Bentham and Mill characterized moral value as utility and understood it as whatever
produced happiness or pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The next step is to understand the nature of
pleasure and pain to identify a criterion for distinguishing’ pleasures and to calculate the resultant
pleasure or pain, it is in relation to these aforementioned themes that a distinction occurs between
Bentham and Mill.

What Bentham identified as the natural moral preferability of pleasure, Mill refers to as a theory
of life. If we consider, for example, what moral agents do and how they assess their actions, then it is
hard to deny the pursuit for happiness and the avoidance of pain. For Bentham and Mill, the pursuit for
pleasure and the avoidance of pain are not only important principles-they are in fact the only principle
in assessing an action’s morality. Why is it justifiable to wiretap private conversations in instances of
treason, rebellion, espionage, and sedition? Why is it preferable to alleviate poverty or eliminate
criminality? Why is it noble to build schools and hospitals? Why is it good to improve the quality of life
and the like? There is no other answer than the principle of utility, that is, to increase happiness and
decrease pain.
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
John Stuart Mill was born on May 20, 1805 in Pentonville, London,
United Kingdom. He was the son of James Mill, a friend and disciple of
Jeremy Bentham. John Stuart Mill was home-schooled. He studied
Greek at the age of thee and Latin at the age of eight. He wrote the
history of Roman Law at age eleven, and suffered a nervous
breakdown at the age of twenty. He was married to Harriet Taylor after
twenty- one years of friendship. His ethical theory and his defense of
utilitarian views are found in his long essay entitled Utilitarianism
What kind of pleasure is morally preferable and valuable? Are all pleasures necessarily and
ethically good? Does this mean that because eating or exercising is good, it is morally acceptable to eat
and exercise excessively? While utilitarian supporters do not condone excessive pleasures while others
are suffering, it cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds why some persons indulge in extravagant
pleasures at the expense of others. Suppose nobody is suffering, is it morally permissible utilitarian
principles to maximize pleasure by wanton intemperance? While Bentham and Mill agree on the moral
value of pleasure, they do not have the same view on these questions.

In determining the moral preferability of actions, Bentham provides a framework in evaluating

pleasure and pain commonly called felicific calculus. Felicific calculus is a common currency framework
that calculates the pleasure that some actions can produce. In this framework, an action can be
evaluated on the basis of intensity or strength of pleasure; duration or length of the experience of
pleasure: certainty, uncertainty, or the likelihood that pleasure will occur; and propinquity, remoteness,
or how soon there will be pleasure. These Indicators allow us to measure pleasure and pain in an action.
However, when we are to validate bur tendency to choose these actions, we need to consider two more
dimensions: fecundity or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind, and purity
or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind. Lastly, when considering
the number of persons who are affected by pleasure or pain, another dimension is to be considered-
extent. Felicific calculus allows the evaluation of all actions and their resultant pleasure. This means that
actions are evaluated on this single scale regardless of preferences and values. In this sense, pleasure
and pain can only quantitatively differ but not qualitatively differ from other experiences of pleasure and
pain accordingly.

Mill dissents from Bentham’s single scale of pleasure. He thinks that the principle of utility must
distinguish pleasures qualitatively and not merely quantitatively. For Mill, utilitarianism cannot promote
the kind of pleasures appropriate to pigs or to any other animals. He thinks that there are higher
intellectual and lawyer base pleasures. We, as moral agents, are capable of searching and desiring
higher intellectual pleasures more than pigs are capable of. We undermine ourselves if we only and
primarily desire sensuality; this is because we are capable of higher intellectual pleasurable goods. For
Mill, crude bestial pleasures, which are appropriate for animals, are degrading to us because we are by
nature not easily satisfied by pleasures only for pigs.” Human pleasures are qualitatively different from
animal pleasures. It is unfair to assume that we merely pursue pleasures appropriate for beasts even if
there are instances when we choose to pursue such base pleasures. To explain this, Mill recognizes the
empirical tact that there are different kinds of pleasures:
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact
that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable
than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other
things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of
pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.
Contrary to Bentham, Mill argues that quality is more preferable than quantity. An excessive
quantity of what is otherwise pleasurable might result in pain. We can consider, for example, our
experience of excessive eating or exercising. Whereas eating the right amount of food can be
pleasurable, excessive eating may not be. The same is true when exercising. If the quality of pleasure is
sometimes more important than quantity then it is important to consider the standards whereby
differences of pleasures can be judged. The test that Mill suggests is simple. In deciding over two
comparable pleasures, it is important to experience both and to discover which one is actually more
preferred than the other. There is no other way of determining which of the two pleasures is preferable
except by appealing to the actual preferences and experiences. What Mill discovers anthropologically is
that actual choices of knowledgeable persons paint that higher intellectual pleasures are preferable than
purely sensual appetites.

In defending further the comparative choice between intellectual arid bestial pleasures, Mill
offers an imaginative thought experiment. He asks whether a human person would prefer to accept the
highly pleasurable life of an animal while at the same time being denied of everything that make him a
person. He thinks that few, if any, would give up human qualities of higher reason for the pleasures of a
pig in the most famous quote in Mill’s Utilitarianism, we read:

It is better to be human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to

be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig,
is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of
the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.
While it is difficult to understand how Mil was able to compare swinish pleasures with human
ones, we can presume that it would be better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Simply put,
as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that are actually within our grasp. It is easy to compare
extreme types of pleasures us in the case of pigs and humans. But it is difficult to compare pleasures
deeply Integrated in our way of life. The pleasures of an Ilonggo eating chicken inasal and an Igorot
eating pinikpikan is an example. This cannot be done by simply tasting inasal or pinikpikan. In the same
way, some people prefer puto to bibingka or liking for the music of Eraserheads than that of the APO
Hiking Society.

Lesson 5 THE PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST NUMBER

Equating happiness with pleasure does not aim to describe the utilitarian moral agent alone and
independently from others. This is not only about our individual pleasures, regardless of how high,
intellectual, or in other ways noble it is, but it is also about the pleasure of the greatest number affected
by the consequences of our actions. Mill explains:
 I have dwelt on this point, as being part of a perfectly just conception of
utility or happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct.
But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of
the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest
happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it
may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the
happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other
people happier, and that the world in general is immediately a gainer by
it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general
cultivation of nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is
concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare
Utilitarianism cannot lead to selfish acts. It is neither about our pleasure, happiness alone; it
cannot be all about us. If we are the only ones satisfied by bur actions, it does not constitute a moral
good. If we are the only ones who are made happy by our actions, then we cannot be morally good. In
this sense, utilitarianism is not dismissive (feeling or showing that something is unworthy of
consideration). of sacrifices that procure more happiness for others.

Therefore, it is necessary for us to consider everyone’s happiness, including our own, as the
standard by which to evaluate what is moral. Also, it implies that utilitarianism is not at all separate from
liberal social practices that aim to improve the quality of life for all persons. Utilitarianism is interested
with everyone's happiness, in fact, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Mill identifies the
eradication of disease, using technology, and other practical ways as examples of utilitarianism.
Consequently, utilitarianism maximizes the total amount of pleasure over displeasure fur the greatest
number. Because of the premium given to the consequences of actions, Mill pushes for the mural
irrelevance of motive in evaluating actions:
He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally
right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his
trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime,
even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under
greater obligations. But to speak only of actions done from the
motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a
misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as
implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality
as the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions
are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of
individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the
thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions
travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is
Utilitarianism is interested with the best consequence for the highest number of people. It is not
interested with the intention of the agent. Moral value cannot be dissemble in the Intention or
motivation of the person doing the act; it is based solely and exclusively on the difference it makes on
the world's total amount of pleasure and pain. This leads us to question utilitarianism's take of moral
rights. If actions are based only on the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is it justifiable to let
go of some rights for the sake of the benefit of the majority?
 Lesson 6 JUSTICE AND MORAL RIGHTS

What is a right? Mill understands justice as a respect for rights directed toward society's pursuit
for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For him, rights are a valid claim on society and are
justified by utility. He explains

I have, throughout, treated the idea of a right residing in the injured

person, and violated by the injury, not as a separate element in the
composition of the idea and sentiment, but as one of the forms in
which the other two elements clothe themselves. These elements are,
à hurt to some assignable person or persons on one hand, and a
demand for punishment, on the other. An examination of our minds, I
think, will show that these two things include all that we mean when we
speak of violation of a right. When we call anything a person's right, we
mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the
possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and
opinion. If he has what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever
Mill expounds that the above mentioned rights referred are related to the Interests that serve
general happiness. The right to due process, the right to free speech or religion, and others are justified
because they contribute to the general good. This means that society Is made happier if its citizens are
able to live their lives knowing that their interests are protected and that society (as a whole) defends it.

Extending this concept to animals, they have rights because of the effect of such principles on
the sum total of happiness that follows as a consequence of instituting and protecting their interests. It
is not accidental, therefore, that utilitarians are also the staunchest defenders of animal rights. A right is
justifiable on utilitarian principles inasmuch as they produce an overall happiness that is greater than
the unhappiness resulting from their implementation.

Utilitarians argue that issues of justice carry a very strong emotional import because the
category of rights is directly associated with the individual's most vital interests. All of these rights are
predicated on the person's right to life. Mill describes:

To have a right, then is, I conceive, to have something which society

ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask
why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility. If that
expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the strength
of the obligation, nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling, it
is because there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational
only but also an animal element, the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst
derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification, from the
extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is
concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to everyone's
In this context, our participation in government and social interactions can be explained by the
principle of utility and be clarified by Mill's consequentialism. Mill further associates utilitarianism with
the possession of legal and moral rights.
 We are treated justly when our legal and moral rights are respected. Mill enumerates different
kinds of goods that he characterized as rights and is protected by law. Mill understands that legal rights
are neither inviolable nor natural, but rights are subject to some exceptions:

... It is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one of his personal

liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law.
Here, therefore, is one instance of the application of the terms just and
unjust in a perfectly definite sense, namely, that it is just to respect,
unjust to violate, the legal rights of anyone. But this judgment admits of
several exceptions, arising from the other forms in which the notions of
justice and injustice present themselves. For example, the person who
suffers the deprivation may (as the phrase is) have forfeited the rights
Mill creates a distinction between legal rights and their justification. He points out that when
legal rights are not morally justified in accordance to the greatest happiness principle, then these rights
need neither be observed, nor be respected. This is like saying that there are instances when the law is
not morally justified and, in this case, even objectionable.

… The legal rights of which he is deprived may be rights which ought not
to have belonged to him; in other words, the law which confers on him
these rights may be a bad law When it is so, or when (which is the same
thing for our purpose) it is supposed to be so opinions will differ as to the
justice or injustice of infringing it. Some maintain that no law, however
bad, ought to be disobeyed by an individual citizen; that his opposition to
it, if shown at all, should only be shown in endeavoring to get it altered
by competent authority. This opinion (which condemns many of the most
illustrious benefactors of mankind, and would often protect pernicious
institutions against the only weapons which, in the state of things
existing at the time, have any chance of succeeding against them) is
defended, by those who hold it, on grounds of expediency; principally on
that of the importance, to the common interest of mankind, of
maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law.. When,
however, a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded
as being so in
Mill seems thesuggesting
to be same ways inmorally
that it is whichpermissible
a breach to of
notlaw is even
follow unjust, namely,
violate, an unjust
by infringing somebody's right; which, as it cannot in this case be a legal
law. The implication is that those who protest over political policies of a morally objectionable
government act in a morally obligatory way. While this is not always preferred.
Mill thinks that it is commendable to endure legal punishments for acts of civil disobedience for
the sake of promoting a higher moral good. At an instance of conflict between moral and legal rights,
Mill points out that moral rights take precedence over legal rights.

While it can be justified why others violate legal rights, if is an act of injustice to individual's
moral rights. However, Mill seems to provide some extenuating circumstances In which some moral
rights can be overridden for the sake of the greater general happiness. Going back to the case of
wiretapping, it seems that one's right to privacy can be sacrificed for the sake of the common good. This
means that moral rights are only justifiable by considerations of greater overall happiness. He qualifies
moral rights in violate this way:
All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except
when some recognized social expediency requires the reverse. And
hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered
expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of
injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how
they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves
perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of
expediency, the correction of which would make that which they
 In this sense, the principle of utility can theoretically obligate us to steal, kill, and the like. We
say "theoretically" because this merely constitutes a thought experiment and need not be actualized.
Since what matters in the assessment of what we do is the resultant happiness, then anything may be
justified for the sake of producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people.
Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty to steal or
take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel
to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as we
do not call justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice
must give way to some other moral principle, but that what is just in
ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the
particular case. By this useful accommodation of language, the
character of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are
While there Is no such thing as a laudable and praiseworthy injustice, Mill appeals to the
utilitarian understanding of justice as an act justified by the greatest happiness principle. There is no
right to violate where utility is not served by the social protection of Individual interests. While he
recognizes how utilitarian principles can sometimes obligate us to perform acts that would regularly be
understood as disregarding individual rights, he argues that this is only possible if it is judged to produce
more happiness than unhappiness.

In short, Mill's moral rights and consider actions of justice are not absolute, but are only justified
by their consequences to promote the greatest good of the greatest number.

With these understanding of rights in place, Mill explains his understanding of Justice and it is
with this that we end this section. For Mill, justice can be interpreted in terms or moral rights because
justice promotes the greater social good. He explains:

… the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct and a

sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common
to all mankind, and intended for their good. The other (sentiment) is a
desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.
There is involved, in addition, the conception of some definite person
who suffers by the infringement; whose rights (to use the expression
appropriated to the case) are violated by it. And the sentiment of justice
appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or
damage to oneself, or to those with whom one sympathizes, widened so
as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy,
and the human conception of intelligent self-interest. From the latter
elements, the feeling derives its morality; from the former, its peculiar
SUMMARY

Bentham and Mill see moral good as pleasure, not merely self-gratification, but also the greatest
happiness principle or the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. We are compelled to
do whatever increases pleasure and decreases pain to the most number of persons, counting each as
one and none as more than one. In determining the greatest happiness for the greatest number of
people, there is no distinction between Bentham and Mill. Bentham suggests his felicific calculus, a
framework for quantifying moral valuation. Mill provides a criterion for comparative pleasures. He
thinks that persons who experience two different types of pleasures generally prefer higher intellectual
pleasures to base sensual ones.

Mill provides an adequate discourse on rights despite it being mistakenly argued to be the
weakness of utilitarianism. He argues that rights are socially protected interests that are justified by
their contribution to the greatest happiness principle. However, he also claims that in extreme
circumstances, respect for individual rights can be overridden to promote the better welfare especially
in circumstances of conflict valuation.

Utilitarian Ethics

1. Act-Utilitarianism – Act in such a way as to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. (Actor/Agent
defines pleasure and pain)

2. Rule-Utilitarianism – Act following rules that maximize happiness and minimize unhappiness.
(Actor/Agent defines satisfaction/ happiness)

3. Preference-Utilitarianism – Act to maximize satisfaction or minimize dissatisfaction of all. (Agent does

not define satisfaction; everyone’s preferences do)

The idea of utilitarianism is tightly intertwined with the philosophy of consequentialism. The
philosophy of consequentialism is based on the belief that the moral and ethical value of one’s action
should be judged by the consequence of such action. This philosophy states that the morality of an
action is best judged by the utility or usefulness of such an action. In essence, therefore, the premises of
utilitarianism can be referred to as a variation or extension of the philosophy of consequentialism.