Mendoza v. People, G.R. No.
197293, 21 April 2014
Facts:
Juno Cars Inc. hired Petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza as a Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. A partial audit
conducted by its dealer/operator led to a discovery that five cars had been sold and released by the
Petitioner without the dealer’s or the finance manager’s permission. The said audit showed that the
buyers of the cars made payments but Petitioner Mendoza failed to remit the payments. Respondent
Juno Cars filed a complaint for qualified theft and estafa against Mendoza, alleging that the latter
pilfered an amount to its prejudice and damage. The RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint
stating that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses.
Respondent Juno Cars then filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court right
fully belongs to the Public Prosecutor.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the information filed by the prosecutor on basis of its
own independent finding of lack of probable cause?
Held
No, the RTC may dismiss the information filed by a prosecutor upon its own independent finding
of lack of probable cause.
While the information filed by the prosecutor was valid, the RTC Judge still had the discretion to
make her own findings of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the Petitioner and
proceed with the trial. The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest
where the judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the
judge ex parte. For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
mandates the judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish
probable cause."
People v. Villanueva and Durana, G.R. No. 114266, 4 December 1996
FACTS
On 12 November 1992, around ten-thirty in the evening, at Barangay Tagpuro, Tacloban City, Diosdado
Meniano and his wife Gloria were awakened by a loud voice from outside their house challenging
Diosdado to a fight. Gloria Meniano readily recognized the voice as that of accused Mamerto Durana. It
was not heeded initially by Diosdado until after Durana threatened to go up the house if the former
would not go down. Diosdado decided finally to go down but not without arming himself with a short
bolo. Gloria remained inside the house. She peeped through the bamboo slats which served as external
walls of their house. Since the moon was bright she was able to see Durana clearly as the intruder. She
also saw the accused Rogelio Villanueva hiding near the San Francisco plants. As soon as Diosdado went
out of his house he was immediately hacked by Villanueva. Despite the hacking, Durana continued
challenging Diosdado to a fight. He even taunted the victim, You cannot bear a wound. Villanueva and
Durana then ran away.
Issue : WON the court erred (a) in failing to consider the fact that appellant was not a party respondent
during the preliminary investigation of the case
Held:
The argument is without merit. It is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective; neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case, nor does it constitute a ground for quashing the information. If no
preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused,
order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings on the criminal case in abeyance. In
this case, accused-appellant failed to invoke such right to preliminary investigation before or at the time
he entered his plea at arraignment. He can no longer invoke that right at this late stage of the
proceedings.
Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth Commission
G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010
Facts: After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. 1) on July
30, 2010 creating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough
fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers
during the administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Private citizen Louis
Biraogo and a group of congressmen led by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the
Supreme Court separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 1
based on their belief that the creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to
create public office, threatens the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the
equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the
Arroyo administration.
Issue: Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
of the laws..
Held: The Decision stressed that the clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration, according
to the ponencia, is just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression
that the PTC is just being used “as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution” and that E.O. 1
is only an “adventure in partisan hostility.”
While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was inspired with noble intentions, the
ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical principle that “the end does not justify
the means.” It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the truth must be within
constitutional bounds, for “ours is still a government of laws and not of men.”
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ET. AL.
G.R. No. 199082 JULY 23, 2013
FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, COMELEC and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases.
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation on the results in the May 14,
2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed
perpetrated. It recommended that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected
to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the
COMELEC but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction
RULING:
The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of “concurrent jurisdiction”
authorized by the amendatory law. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to
deal with the same subject matter. There is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between
two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a
respondent initially with one office (such as the COMELEC) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of the same complaint with another office (such
as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over cases filed will not be
allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.Hence, DOJ can exercise concurent jurisdiction
with COMELEC and not only to conduct preliminary investigation when deputized by said office.
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, 14 July 2000
FACTS
The case involves a special civil action assailing the Sandiganbayan’s resolution on account that it
committed grave abuse of discretion.The petitioner is one Oscar G. Raro, PCSO’s Corporate
Secretary and Acting Department Manager of the Special Projects Department, who was accused
(with probable cause) of violating Section 3 of RA 3019. Raro, who was tasked to supervise the Small
Town Lottery (STL) Experimental Project of the PCSO, was accused to have “willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally demanded and received on four different occasions the amount totaling to Php 116,
799.99 from Luis Abaño, provincial manager of the STL operations in CamNorte
ISSUE Whether or not the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation erroneously and
irregularly?
Held: No. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention that the Ombudsman (and Sandiganbayan) failed to
examine the complainant personally and procedurally. The referral of the complaint to the NBI is not
equivalent to the Ombudsman’s abdication of its constitutional and statutory duty to conduct
preliminary investigation. what was delegated was only the fact finding function, in preparation for the
preliminary investigation proper, still to be conducted by the Ombudsman (Art XI, Sec. 13).
Rule II, sec. 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 07, “the investigating officer has the option to forward the
complaint to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November 2015
Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, G.R. No. 191567, 20 March 2013
FACTS:
The petitioner is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but
bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the
carport of a residential house located at No.10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. Allegedly,
Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) less than an hour
before the discovery of his lifeless body.Resolution of the Office of City Prosecutor – dismissed the
complaint for murder due to lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence to charge Philip with
homicide, much less murder Resolution of the Secretary of Justice (petition for review) – affirmed the
dismissal holding that the only circumstantial evidence connecting Philip to the crime was the allegation
that at between 7:00 to 7:30 o’clock of the evening in question, Chase had boarded the white Honda
Civic car driven by Philip; that the witnesses’ positive identification of Philip as the driver of the car was
doubtful, however, considering that Philip did not alight from the car, the windows of which were
tinted; and that the rest of the circumstances were pure suspicions, and did not indicate that Philip had
been with Chase at the time of the commission of the crime
Issue: . WON the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to warrant the indictment of the
respondents for murder?
Ruling: NO. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances
must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty
thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were
probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were
innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient,
therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147932, 25 January 2006
Quisay v. People, G.R. No. 216920, 13 January 2016
FACTS: On December 28, 2012, Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued Pasiya or Resolution
finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of R.A No. 7610 (Special Protection
of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) Consequently a Pabatid or Information
was filed to RTC charging petitioner such crime.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of
authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support to her motion, petitioner pointed
out that the Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal were issued without the approval or authority from the City
Prosecutor. As such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that
cannot be cured.
The RTC ruled to deny the petitioner’s motion to quash due to the lack merit since it found that
the certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal have sufficienty complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City
Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration but denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA that consequently, affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly held that RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s
motion to quash.
HELD: NO. CA erred in affirming CA’s ruling. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that
the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of
the complaint.
Okabe v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185, 27 May 2004
Facts:
Charged for Estafa, Petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to
defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information
submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa
and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant,
the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached
thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor
were not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable cause for estafa against her.
The court denied the petitioners motions .
ISSUE:
If the RTC judge may rely on investigating prosecutor’s resolution in the determination of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.
HELD:
NO. In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the
judge should not rely solely on the said report.[The judge should consider not only the report of the
investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties,
the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor
upon the filing of the Information. The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to the
issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the investigating prosecutor
that he had conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as
amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the Information.
People v. Dela Torre-Yadao, G.R. No. 162144-54, 13 November 2012
Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, 11 February 1992
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove
off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the
same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting,
petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him.
Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the
case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor
reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and
that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5,
Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules
and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for
certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however
constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There
was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were
not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information
regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85468, 7 September 1989
Villarin v. People, G.R. No. 175289, 31 August 2011
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all
in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was
allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin commissioned Boyatac to inquire from
Sudaria about the availability of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the
specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the same. When
the timber was already available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber
flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by
Vera Cruz, the security guard on duty. RTC found them guilty. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON mere possession of timber without criminal intent is punishable.
HELD:
"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations."
The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is consummated by the mere
possession of forest products without the proper documents.
Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644, 13 March 1998
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegaldetention before the
RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained withoutthe filing of the necessary Information and
warrant of arrest. The petitioner allegedthat he must be released and be subject to a preliminary
investigation. However, pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari, prohibitionand
mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filedby the petitioner, RTC
judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner.
Issue :1.Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation
Held:
1.Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned onOctober 14, 1997. The
rule is that the right to preliminary investigation iswaived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at
the time of entering aplea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively andconsistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before hewas charged in court. Also, petitioner
refused to enter a plea during thearraignment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding
hisright to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are
inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminaryinvestigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be
waived unlessthe waiver appears to be clear and informed.
Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, 3 August 2010
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael
de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner was
placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond
which the trial court approved,he was released from detention, and his arraignment was set.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an
Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public
prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the
proper offense.
Issue:
Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary
investigation belongs only to the accused.
Held:
No. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and
not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the
information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the
control of the prosecution of the case.Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to
intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private
complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for
reinvestigation.
