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DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA
NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

SABBAVARAM, VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

NAME OF THE PROJECT:

Interpretation and Construction Under Criminal Act

SUBJECT:
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

NAME OF THE FACULTY:

Mr. R. Bharat Kumar

NAME OF THE STUDENT:

P.RAJ KUMAR

ROLL NO:
18LLB068

SEMESTER VI
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. DIFFRENCE BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

2. CASE ANALYSIS
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DIFFRENCE BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION:

The statute is defined as the will or order of legislature, which is expressed in the form of
text. The traditional way to interpret or construe a statute is to understand the intention of the
legislature. The intention of the legislature could incorporate the actual meaning and the
object. The process of interpretation and construction assist the judiciary body in determining
the meaning and purpose of the legislature. Interpretation helps in determining the real
meaning and intention of the legislature. On the other hand, construction is used to ascertain
the legal effect of the legal text. The two terms are used interchangeably, but there exists a
fine line of difference between interpretation and construction in their connotations. So,
check out this article in which we’ve simplified it for you.

DIFFRENCE:
Interpretation: Interpretation implies the identification of true sense of the statute.
Construction: Construction means drawing inferences about the subject, that are above the
direct expression of text.

DETERMINES:
Interpretation: Linguistic meaning
Construction: Legal effect

USED WHEN:
Interpretation: Court complies with simple meaning of the legal text.
Construction: Legal text exhibits ambiguous meaning and the court has to decide whether the
words used in the legal text covers the case or not.

DEFINITION OF INTERPRETATION:
The term ‘interpretation of the statute’, means an understanding of the law. It is the process
adopted by the courts to determine the meaning of legislature, by way of legislative form. It is
used to ascertain the actual connotation of the act or document along with the intention of the
legislature. It tends to clarify the meaning of those terms and writings which are difficult to
understand. The process of enactment of the law and its interpretation takes place at different
points of time and performed by two different government bodies. The interpretation of an
act creates an understanding between these two and bridges the gap. It aims at finding out the
intention of the author, i.e. the court needs to identify, what the author means by the words
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he/she has used in the text, that helps in getting what is written in the document. In short,
interpretations object to ascertain the intention of the statute by the words used.

DEFINITION OF CONSTRUCTION:

In law, ‘construction’ means the process of legal exposition which determines the sense and
explanation of abstruse terms, writings etc. in the statute and draws a conclusion on the basis
of logical reasoning, with respect to the subject that lies above the direct expression of the
legal text. The basic principle of construction of a statute is to read it in a literal manner,
meaning that by elucidating the words used in the statute, ordinarily and grammatically, if it
results in ambiguity and is likely to convey another meaning then the court can opt for its
literal meaning. However, if no such absurdity is possible, the fundamental rules of
interpretation can be adopted.

CONCLUSION:

When it comes to the legal exposition of the statute, act or any agreement, interpretation
precedes construction. While the interpretation of the statute, is all about exploring the
written text, whereas construction is used in the broader sense, i.e. it not only helps in
determining the sense and explanation of the provisions of the act but also elucidates its legal
effect.
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CASE ANALYSIS:

1.Father Thomas Shingare And Others vs The State Of Maharashtra 

FACTS

The applicant No. 1 is the Principal of the Little Flower High School at Aurangabad and the
applicant No. 2 is the President of the Saint Francis De Sales Education Society, Aurangabad
and he is also the Bishop of Aurangabad Diocese, whereas, the applicant Nos. 3 and 4 are the
members of the Saint Francis De Sales Education Society, Aurangabad. The daughter of the
respondent No. 2 - Deelip Balrang Bedekar was studying in the Little Flower High School
which is run by Saint Francis De Sales Education Society (Hereinafter referred to as the
education society for short) which is a public trust, registered under the Bombay Public
Trusts Act.

3. It is alleged that on 11-10-1993, the applicant No. 2 recovered from the respondent No. 2
an amount of Rs. 180/- towards the School Maintenance Fees vide receipt No. 0018156 and
this receipt was issued by R.C. Church, Cantonment, Aurangabad, which is another public
trust and has no concern with the Little Flower School or the education society. It is further
alleged that subsequently on four different occasions, different amounts were demanded and
recovered from the respondent No. 2 by the applicant No. 2 and similar receipts of R.C.
Church Cantonment, Aurangabad, were issued.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the act committed by the person proceeded against is sufficient to invite
penal action, such an act must be construed and resolved in favour of the person who
would be liable to the penalty?

REASONING

The private complainant, aggrieved on the alleged ground of demand and recovery of illegal
fee or fee in excess, is free to approach the Government and invoke the Government's power
of initiating enquiry and if the Govt. concludes that the given amount of fee is not consistent
with the semblance of capitation it may order suitably, including the refund of amount or its
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appropriation suitably. As an extension to this argument, it is further contended that the

domain of State in the matters of prosecution cannot be diminished and destroyed by
permitting a private complaint to be entertained when the law with all its sharp teeth does not
provide in an expressed manner for filing of a private complaint and for putting the process of
criminal law into motion. The rule of beneficial construction cannot be extended to enlarge or
escalate the scope of provision of a penal law and general rule of interpretation of criminal
law i.e. rule of strict interpretation will govern the field and whenever there is a special
enactment regulating investigation, enquiry or trial into an offence created by a special
statute, procedure prescribed therein must be followed to the exclusion of the procedure laid
down in the general law like the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of this argument,
reliance has been placed on the provisions of section 4(2) of the said Code. If the
interpretation, as is being advanced by the learned Counsel for the applicants is accepted, the
penal provisions in the Act may be rendered ineffective in as much as it would be left to the
sweet will of the authority either to file or not to file a criminal complaint before the
Magistrate. In addition, if the Act had intended that such a complaint is necessarily required
to be filed by or under the permission of the competent authority/officer, it would have
provided for a prescribed period within which such permission would be granted or such a
complaint would be filed within a stipulated period, after the investigation and if the
permission was not granted within a fixed period, it would be deemed to have granted the
permission. In the absence of such a deeming provision, the interpretations as advanced
would defeat the purpose of curbing the social evil of collecting exorbitant capitation fee or
illegal collection of fee. If the statute had made a penal provision, such provision must be
allowed to flow its natural course of giving justice in public interest so that the aim behind
providing such penalty is fully achieved without any impediments or obstacles.

The Supreme Court in the case of Swantraj v. State of Maharashtra, , held that legislation is a
social document and judicial construction seeks to decipher the statutory mission and what
must tilt the balance is the purpose of the statute, its potential frustration and judicial
avoidance of the mischief by a construction whereby the means of licensing meet the ends of
ensuring pure and potent remedies for the people. The Apex Court also quoted the rule for
construction from the age old (Heydon's) case 1976 ER 637, which resolved.

"That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general [be they penal or beneficial,
restitutive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered;
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1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.

2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.

3rd. What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth. and 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges
is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy,
and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and,
proprivato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true
intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico."

CONCLUSION

In the said case, this Court further noted that the demand or collection of capitation fee is not
only prohibited but also it is a cognizable offence with imprisonment upto a term of three
years as per the scheme of the Act. If the above quoted aims have to be achieved by the State
viz. the educational institutions be run as a mission and it be run as a charitable activity and
not a commercial venture, the law enacted by the Legislature to curb the social evil of illegal
collection of fee must not only have its teeth but the teeth must be strong enough to bite. If
regards be had to these intentions, to make the Act more effective, it must be concluded that a
private complainant has the remedy to directly approach the Magistrate, complaining that the
institution or the person responsible for the management of the institution has demanded or
collected illegal fee and hence, must be penalized by involving the powers under section 7 of
the Act and it is not necessary for him to first approach the competent authority of the
Government, requesting for investigation or in alternate seeking permission of such
competent authority to file a complaint before the Magistrate. It is also not known as to
whether as on today the Govt., has exercised its powers under section 12 of the Act and
framed rules for carrying out the purpose of the said Act. It would be for the State Govt. to
clarify the methodology for investigation and filing complaints before the Magistrate by
framing such rules. As at present, it must, therefore, be reiterated that there is nothing in the
provisions of the Act to indicate that a person aggrieved could approach the Magistrate only
after exhausting the remedies with the Govt. The orders passed by courts below and which
are impugned in this application do not suffer from any infirmities in law or on facts and
hence, the challenge to the said orders is devoid of merits. The application is, therefore,
rejected. Rule is discharged. No costs.
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2. Navendra Kumar vs The Union Of India & Ors on 6 November, 2013

FACTS

A criminal case being RC No. 39(A)/2001/CBI/SIL was registered, on 31-07-2001,

under Sections 120B IPC/420 IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in the office of the Superintendent of Police, Central
Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as 'CBI'), Silchar, Assam, against the
petitioner, who is an employee of Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, New Delhi. Having
investigated the case, the CBI laid a charge sheet, dated 25-11-2004, in the Court of the
learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam, Kamrup, Guwahati.

(ii) With the help of the writ petition, bearing WP(C) No. 6877 of 2005 aforementioned, the
constitutional validity of the very formation of the CBI and its powers to carry out the
functions of police, namely, registration of First Information Report (in short, 'FIR')
under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Cr.P.C'),
arrest of a person, as an accused, investigation of offences, filing of charge-sheets against
alleged offenders and to prosecute them were put to challenge.

ISSUES:

1. Whether 'Central Bureau of Investigation', popularly called CBI, is a constitutionally

valid police force empowered to 'investigate' crimes?
2. (ii) Could a 'police force', empowered to 'investigate' crimes, have been created and
constituted by a mere Resolution of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
in purported exercise of its executive powers?
3. (iii) Could a 'police force', constituted by a Home Ministry Resolution, arrest a person
accused of committing an offence, conduct search and seizure, submit charge-sheet
and/or prosecute alleged offender?
4. (iv) Whether CBI is a 'police force' constituted under the Union's Legislative powers
conferred by List I Entry 8?

REASONING
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As a general principle of interpretation, where the words of a statute are plain, precise and
unambiguous, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the
statute itself and no external evidence such as parliamentary debates, reports of the
Committees of the Legislature or even the statement made by the Minister on the introduction
of a measure or by the framers of the Act is admissible to construe those words. It is only
where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or
susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning, that external evidence as to the
evils, if any, which the statute was intended to remedy, or of the circumstances which led to
the passing of the statute may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the object which
the Legislature had in view in using the words in question."

The key issue which arises for determination in this case is: whether on the facts and the
circumstance of this case, the Director, CBI, who has not given his own independent opinion,
was right in referring the matter for opinion to the Attorney General for India, particularly
when the entire investigation and law officers' team was ad idem in its opinion on filing of
the charge-sheet and only on the dissenting opinion of the Director of Prosecution, whose
opinion is also based on the interpretation of the legal evidence, which stage has not even
arrived. The opinion of the Director, CBI is based solely on the opinion of the Attorney
General after the reference.

The well-recognized principle of interpretation accepted by the Courts in England, therefore,

is:

"Any judgment of any Court is authoritative only as to that part of it, called the ratio
decidendi, which is considered to have been necessary to the decision of the actual issue
between the litigants. It is for the Court, of whatever degree, which is called upon to consider
the precedent, to determine what the true 'ratio decidendi' was..... Judicial opinions upon such
matters, whether they be merely casual, or wholly gratuitous or (as is far more usual) of what
may be called collateral relevance, are known as 'obiter dictum' or simply 'dicta', and it is
extremely difficult to establish any standard of their relative weight." (Alien in his Law in the
Making).

CONCLUSIONS

In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal partly succeeds. We hereby set
aside the impugned judgment and order, dated 30.11.2007, passed, in WP(C) No. 6877/2005,
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and while we decline to hold and declare that the DSPE Act, 1946, is not a valid piece of
legislation, we do hold that the CBI is neither an organ nor a part of the DSPE and the CBI
cannot be treated as a 'police force' constituted under the DSPE Act, 1946.

180. We hereby also set aside and quash the impugned Resolution, dated 01.04.1963,
whereby CBI has been constituted. We further set aside and quash the impugned charge-
sheet, submitted by the CBI, against the appellant and, consequently, the trial, which rests on
the impugned charge-sheet, shall stand set aside and quashed.

181. We would, however, make it clear that quashing of the proceedings, pending in the CBI
Court, would not be a bar to any further investigation by police having jurisdiction over the
subject-matter.

3.Drangdhuran Hydro Power ... vs Chenab Valley Power Projects ... on 28 January,
2017

FACTS:

Chenab Valley Power Projects Private Limited - respondent No.1, which is a Joint Venture of
National Hydro Power Corporation Limited (NHPC), J&K State Power Development
Corporation Limited (JKSPDC) and Power Trading Corporation India Limited (PTC),
responsible to plan, promote and organise an integrated and efficient development of Pakal
Dul, Kiru and Kwar Hydroelectric Projects in Chenab River Basin in all its aspects in the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, intends to implement Pakal Dul (Drangdhuran) Hydroelectric
Project 1000 MW (4 x 250 MW) in J&K and, as such, invited sealed tenders vide Invitation
of Bid (International Competitive Bidding) bearing No.CVPP/ PD/MW/RB/TK/ 2013 dated
19th June 2013, for ―Turnkey Execution‖ of Pakal Dul (Drangdhuran) Hydroelectric Project
from Consortia/Companies through International Competitive Bidding (ICB). The scope of
work included all necessary additional investigations, planning, design and engineering,
supply of equipments and materials, civil construction, design, manufacturing, supply
installation, testing and commissioning. The project was to be handed over to respondent
No.1. One of the conditions contained in Invitation of Bid, at condition No.13, was that the
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―Owner shall have the right to reject all or any Bid and shall not be bound to accept the
lowest or any other Bid or to give any reason for such decision.

Petitioner and proforma respondents 2 and 3 as well responded to above Invitation of Bid. In
all, five tenderers responded. Of five, four tenderers were found sound, including petitioner.
However, respondent No.1 vide letter No.CVPP/PD/MW/RB/TK-07/2016/2383 dated 16th
February 2016, informed petitioner that prices quoted by it were substantially higher than
estimated cost of works, based on CEA cleared/Government of India sanctioned estimate of
the project, the manner in which the price bid had been structured involving unbalanced
distribution among various work components, large amount of front loading and hedging of
risks against Owner (respondent No.1) did not infuse confidence on the consortium for
successful completion of project works and accordingly conveyed cancellation of both
―Turnkey Tender‖ as also ―petitioner's bid‖.

ISSUES:

a)Whether respondent No.1 is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court?

b) Whether impugned decision of respondent CVPP, cancelling "turnkey tender" as also

petitioner's bid, and issuing fresh tender notices on "package mode", is arbitrary and
unreasonable?

REASONING

Article 12, the Constitution of India, does not define the word 'State'. It is merely an inclusive
definition. It includes all other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of
the Government of India. It does not say that such other authorities must be under the control
of the Government of India. The word 'or' is disjunctive and not conjunctive. The expression
"authority" has a definite connotation. It has different dimensions and, thus, must receive a
liberal interpretation. What is necessary, is to notice functions of the body' concerned. A
State' has different meaning in different contexts. In a traditional sense, it can be a body
politic, but in modern international practice, a State is an organisation, which receives general
recognition, accorded to it by existing group of other States. The expression "other
authorities" in Article 12, the Constitution of India, is 'State' within territory of India as
contradistinguished from a State within control of Government of India. The concept of
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‗State' under Article 12, is in relation to fundamental rights guaranteed by Part-III of the

Constitution and Directive Principles of the State Policy contained in Part-IV thereof. The
contents of these two parts manifest that Article 12, is not confined to its ordinary or
constitutional sense of an independent or sovereign meaning, so as to include within its fold
whatever comes within purview thereof, so as to instil public confidence in it.

The confusion and uncertainty at the heart of the concept stems from its origin. It has grown
from two separate roots, natural justice or fairness and estoppel., but the stems have become
entwined to such an extent that it is impossible to disentangle them. This makes it that it is
very difficult to predict how the hybrid will develop in future. This could be regarded as
giving the concept a healthy flexibility, for the intention behind it is being it has been
fashioned to protect the individual against administrative action which is against his interest.
On the other hand, the uncertainty of the concept has led to conflicting decisions and
conflicting interpretations in the same decision."

CONCLUSION

In view of the aforesaid analysis, especially in absence of mala fide, prejudice,

unreasonableness, arbitrariness, extraneous consideration or the decision being against public
interest, the decision of respondent CVPP, cancelling ―turnkey tender‖ as also petitioner's
bid and issuing fresh tender notices for ―package mode‖, need not be interfered with by this
Court, is immune from judicial review in the given facts and circumstances. As a corollary,
writ petition is devoid of any merit.

For all what has been discussed above, writ petition is dismissed. Interim direction(s) is/are
vacated. However, it may not be out of place to mention here that it is expected that
respondent CVPP will allow petitioner company, proforma respondents, or for that matter
any other individual/company, to participate and compete in fresh bids on package mode, so
that more competitors/bidders participate in the fresh bids, which will ultimately have a better
result

4. K C MATHEW AND OTHERS VS THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE AIR 1956 SC

241
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LEGISLATION CITED/REFERRED TO: Penal Code, section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, section 225 of the Criminal Procedure Code, section 342 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. S. 149 of Indian Penal Code
ADVOCATES APPEARED: S. Mohan Kumara Mangalam and S. Subramaniam, Advocates
for Appellants. Sardar Bahadur, Advocate for Respondent.
Facts - This is a case of rioting in which two police constables were killed. Thirty-one
persons were put up for trial. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted twenty-one of them on all
the charges and acquitted the remaining ten of the most serious charge of all, namely the
offence falling under the sections of Travancore Penal Code which correspond to s. 302 of
the Indian Penal Code read with s. 149. But she convicted them on several of the lesser
charges and imposed sentences ranging from two to five years on each count and directed
that the sentences should run consecutively except in the cases of accused 5 to 8 and 18. She
sentenced each of them on only one count and so there was only one sentence., The accused
are said to be communists. Two of them, namely numbers 30 and 31, were arrested on 27-2-
1950 at about 1 P.m. and were confined in the Edappilly police lock up. The prosecution case
Page 9 of 22 is that the other 29 accused entered into a conspiracy to release their comrades
and in pursuance of that conspiracy attacked the police station at about 2 A.M. on the 28th
armed with deadly weapons such as choppers, knives, bamboo and other sticks and a dagger.
Two police constables,
ISSUES:
1) Whether the charges against the accused or not according to law and has prejudiced the
appellants in their defence. The complaint on this score is that each accused has not been told
separately what offences he is being tried?
2) Whether the examination of each accused u/s. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code was
defective and that that caused prejudice in investigation?
Held: It was held by Supreme Court that where the body of the charge set out the fact that the
accused formed an unlawful assembly and stated the common object; and then the charge
specified in detail the part that each accused had 7played, in the circumstances each accused
was in a position to know just what was charged against him because once the facts are
enumerated the law that applies to them can easily be ascertained, and in this particular case
it was just a matter of picking out the relevant sections from among he ten mentioned.
Section 225 of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly covers a case of this kind. The purpose
of section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code is for the purpose of enabling the accused to
explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.? If the accused is not
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afforded that opportunity, he is entitled to ask the Appellate Court to place him in the same
position as he would have been in had he been asked. In other words, he is entitled to ask the
appellate Court, which is the ultimate Court of fact, to take the explanation that he would
have given in the first Court into consideration when weighing the evidence in just the same
way as it would have done if it had been there all along. But if he does not ask this in the last
Court of fact he is in little better position when the case comes to the Supreme Court than he
would have been in had he, say, omitted to call, in his defence, a witness who, he says, would
have deposed in his favour. In very exceptional cases he may be allowed to call such a
witness even at such a stage, but if he does not ask for that when his case is under appeal, he
would normally have but slender hope of succeeding in the Supreme Court. It is true he is in
a stronger position when section 342 is in question because the section places a solemn and
serious duty on the Court, and the accused can very rightly and properly complain if the
Court fails to do its duty; but when all is said and done he cannot claim to be Page 10 of 22
placed in a better position than he would have been in had the Court discharged its duty at the
outset. Therefore, all he is entitled to say on appeal is, I was not asked to explain this matter.
Here is my explanation; this is what I would have said; please consider it.? But if he does not
take up that position at the appellate stage and complains of prejudice for the first time in the
Supreme Court, the inference is strong that the plea is an afterthought and that there was no
real prejudice.

5)HUKUM SINGH VS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AIR 1961 SC 1941

Bench - Raghubar Dayal, K. Subba Rao

LEGISLATION CITED/REFERRED TO:

Indian Penal Code – Section 302 and 149

ADVOCATES:
For the Appellant: Jai Gopal Sethi, C.L. Sarin, R.L. Kohli. For the Respondent: G.C. Mathur,
C.P. Lal, Advocates.
Facts- The appellants, along with three other persons, were alleged to have forcibly taken two
carts loaded with sugarcane from the field-of Suraj Bhan through the field of Harphool, in
transporting the sugarcane from the field, about a furlong and a half away, to the public
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passage running by the side of Harphool's field, and to have beaten Harphool and others on
Harphool's protesting against the conduct of the appellants' party at the damage caused to his
wheat and gram crop. Ram Chandar, one of the appellants, was armed with a hatchet
(kulhari) and the others were armed with lathis. Harphool and others On the concurrent
findings of facts by the Sessions Judge and he High Court it was held: (i) There was no
passage through that field; (ii) it was the appellants party that began the attack; (iii) they had
no right of private defence of

person but had formed into an unlawful assembly with the common object of criminal
trespass and use of force to the extent of causing death; if necessary, if they were prevented
from taking the carts through the field. They were accordingly convicted of the various
offences. In this appeal against the conviction the appellants? contentions were; (i) Any right
of private defence of property, Harphool had. had ceased when the trespass was over; (ii) if
one of the rioters caused injury for which others are to be liable under section 149 , Penal
Code, the injury must be caused in pursuance of the common object; (iii) an assembly ceases
to be unlawful after the completion of the common object and the , section 149 would not
then apply; (iv) the High Court misdirected themselves in raising certain inferences from the
facts found.

Held: The criminal trespass had not come to an end and there is also no such finding by the
Courts when the two carts of the appellants were well inside Harphool’s field with growing
crops, and had not reached the public passage. Harphool had the right to prevent the
appellants party from continuing to commit criminal trespass for whatever short distance they
had still to cover to reach the passage. It was held that when several persons are armed with
lathis and one of them is armed with a hatchet and are agreed to use these weapons in case
they are thwarted in the achievement of their object, it is by no means incorrect to conclude
that they were prepared to use violence in prosecution of their common object and that they
knew that in the prosecution of such common object it was likely that some one may be so
injured as to die as a result of those injuries. Harphool did receive seven injuries one of which
was an incised wound, bone deep, on the right side of the head. Another injury consisted of a
contused wound, bone deep, on the left side of the head. Harphool died within twenty-four
hours of his receiving injuries. The death was due to shock and haemorrhage caused by the
injuries of the skull bone and brain on account of the wounds on the head. The offence made
out on account of the death of Harphool caused by the concerted acts of the members of the
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appellants party has been rightly held to be the offence of murder. In view of what we have
stated we do not see any force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.

6.IQBAL VERSUS STATE OF UP (AIR 2017 SC 1127)

Facts - In the night of 23rd/24th March 1985, the complainant-Netrapal, along with his father
Sonpal, was sleeping in the veranda of their sitting room and his uncle Raghuvar Dayal,
along with the brother of the complainant, viz., Bhoop Singh, was sleeping inside of the said
sitting room. At about 12.30 am, six accused, viz., Genda Lal, Ganpat, Sripal, Virendra, Ram
Shankar Lodha and Iqbal came there armed with rifles and Katta. They woke up the
complainant’s

father-Sonpal. On seeing Bhoop Singh, Ganpat shouted loudly that he was Bhoop Singh and
he could be killed as he was their enemy. On hearing this, Genda fired with his rifle at Bhoop
Singh which hit Bhoop Singh and as a result thereof he fell down on the spot. Other persons
also started firing from their rifles/weapons. Bhoop Singh succumbed to the injuries suffered
by him. The two appellants along with four other persons, were charged and convict for
committing offences under sections 148, 302, 302/149 as well as section 307/149 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine
JUDGEMENT OF TRIAL COURT

After analysing the evidence, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that five of the accused
persons were armed with rifles and one with Katta and they had formed an unlawful
assembly with the common object of killing the persons from the victim’s side. It is with this
common object; they had fired on the family members of the complainant which resulted in
the death of Bhoop Singh and the nature of injuries of PW-2 and PW-3 showed that there was
an attempt to commit their murder as well. On the basis of these findings, all the six accused
were convicted for offences under section 148, section 302 read with section 149 as well as
section 307 read with section 149 IPC.
All the six convicted persons filed appeal in the High Court at Allahabad which has been
dismissed by the High Court confirming the conviction as well as sentences imposed by the
Trial Court. Four of the convicted persons have died in the meantime. It is for this reason that
there are only two appellants in the present appeal viz, Iqbal and Virendra.
JUDGEMENT OF SUPREME COURT
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In the instant case, where the moot question is as to whether there was common objective, if
that is proved, then, in any case, the separate roles played by all the accused persons need not
be examined as all the members of unlawful assembly would be vicariously liable for the acts
done by the said assembly. There is a clinching evidence produced by the prosecution to
show that all the six persons had come to the place of occurrence armed with deadly
weapons. The moment they reached the house of the complainant and found the complainant
along with his father Sonpal (PW-3) sleeping there, they woke them up and first asked as to
where Chandra pal was. When they were told that Chandra pal was away to Delhi, they
immediately asked for the whereabouts of Bhoop Singh. The moment Bhoop Singh appeared
on the scene, Ganpat pointed out at him and told other members of the assembly

7.KATTUKULANGARA MADHAVAN VS MAJEED (AIR 2017 SC 2004)

Facts - There was some dispute between people belonging to RSS and CPI (Marxist) party in
connection with the festival at Korattikara Vishnu Bhagwati Temple in Thrissur, Kerala. In
the night of 3 March 1993 deceased Suresh Babu was travelling in a bus. When the bus
reached Ottappilavu junction, a group of persons entered the bus, pulled Suresh Babu out of
the bus and took him to the front side of the bus and attacked him. A1 inflicted a stab injury
on the back of the left side of the chest of Suresh Babu. The deceased fell down and A1
inflicted two more stab injuries. When the deceased was struggling to stand up and escape the
other accused indiscriminately beat him with a reaper cutting machine and sticks. The time of
attach was 08:25 pm Suresh Babu died. The post-mortem certificate referred to 26 injuries on
the body of the deceased Suresh Babu and the cause of death was stated as “the deceased died
of multiple injuries sustained to chest”. The Trial Court convicted the group of accused but
the High Court of Kerala acquitted a few while making subjective inquiry of individual role.
The High Court referred to the clash between the supporters of CPI (M) and BJP workers. It
held that the deceased was attacked due to political rivalry. But the High Court found that
there is no evidence to show that the members of the unlawful assembly (especially A3, A4,
A14, A15 and A18) had a common object to commit murder of Suresh Babu. The reasoning
given by the High Court was
(a) the accused were not aware that the deceased was travelling in the bus
 P a g e | 18

(b) there was no evidence to show that they formed an unlawful assembly with a view to
attack and commit his murder.
Held - The Supreme Court through, L Nageswara Rao, J, rightly held that the deceased and
accused belong to two political parties opposed to each other. There were three other
incidents of clashes between the rival groups. The existence of a CPI (M) office at
Ottappilavu junction near incident place is proved. The accused along with others assembled
and were searching for BJP workers travelling in the buses that were passing through the
junction. The common object of the members of the unlawful assembly was to attach any BJP
supporter who was passing through Ottappilavu junction. Unfortunately, Suresh Babu was in
the bus and he was killed in the attack. Justice SA Bobde, who rightly limited himself only to
this issue, also explained the joint liability jurisprudence which will be a beacon in future
decision making. His ratio decidendi can be found in this statement. But having participated
and gone along with the

others, an inference whether inculpatory or exculpatory can be drawn from the conduct of
such an accused. The following questions arise with regard to the conduct of such an accused:
—
(i)What was the point of time at which he discovered that the assembly intended to kill the
victim?
(ii)Having discovered that, did he make any attempt to stop the assembly from pursuing the

Under section 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 the prosecution is required to prove three
things beyond reasonable doubts. One, the accused was a member of unlawful assembly
(section 142). Crime was committed in prosecution of common object (141/149). A curious
onlooker or a bystander is not a member of unlawful assembly because he lacks intention to
become member of unlawful assembly (section 142).
The court also said that if a Once it is proved that a person Y was member of unlawful
assembly, he is responsible for everything that any member does if it is done “in prosecution
of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be
likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.

8.RAM TAHAL Vs STATE OF UP (AIR 1972 SC 254)

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Facts - Six accused were charged with offences under section 302 read with sections 148,
149 and 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 for having formed an unlawful assembly with the
common object of demolishing the thatched roof of the complainant’s house, and having
committed the murder of two persons.
Judgement - The Court held that There is no doubt that a common intention should be
anterior in time to the commission of the crime showing a prearranged plan and prior concert,
and though, it is difficult, in most cases to prove the intention of an individual, it has to be
inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. This inference
can be gathered by the manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the
attack, the determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries caused
by one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries, the
concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence for instance, that all of them
had left the scene of the incident together and other acts, which all or some may have done, as
would help in determining the common intention. The totality of the circumstances must be
taken into

consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to
commit an offence with which they could be convicted.

9.Barendra Kumar Ghosh V. Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1

Facts: On August 3, 1923, the Sub-Postmaster at Sankaritolla Post Office was counting money
at his table in the back room, when several men appeared at the door which leads into the room
from a courtyard, and, when just inside the door, called on him to give up the money. Almost
immediately afterwards they fired pistols at him. He was hit in two places, in one hand and near
the armpit, and died almost at once. Without taking any money the assailants fled, separating as
they ran. One man, though he tried his pistol several times, was pursued by a post office
assistant and others with commendable tenacity and courage, and eventually was secured just
after he had thrown it away. This man was the appellant; the others escaped. The pistol was at
once picked up and was produced at the trial.

Issue: Whether the Appellant can be convicted under Section 302 r/w S. 34(Joint liability)
(or) not?
 P a g e | 20

Reasoning : Section 34 deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse,by several
persons; if all are done in furtherance of common intention, each person is liable for result of
them all, as if he had done them himself; for ‘that act’ and ‘the act’ in the latter part of the
section must include the whole action covered by a criminal act ‘in first part because they refer
to it…In other words, ‘criminal act’ means that unity of criminal behavior which results in
something for which an individual would be responsible if it were all done by himself alone, that
is, in a criminal offence.

Judgment: The Appellant was found guilty and was convicted under S, 302 r/w S.34. Though
he has not committed the murder but waiting for the assailants amounts to abetting the murder
and they were sharing the common intention to kill the post man. Moreover, it was pre planned
not incidental.

10. Mehboob Shah V. Emperor (1945) 47 BOMLR 941

Facts: On August 25, 1943, at sunrise, Allah Dad, deceased, with a few others left their village
by boat for cutting reeds growing on the bank of Indus River. About a mile downstream, they
saw Mahbub Shah, father of Wali Shah (absconder) who warned them against collecting reeds
from land belonging to them. Ignoring which they collected reed from their land. While
returning, Ghulam Quasim Shah, nephew of Mahbub Hussain Shah stopped them and pulled the
boat with a rope and asked to return the reeds. Allah Dad picked up the Iari from the boat and
struck Quasim Shah. Quasim Shah then shouted out for help and Wali Shah and Mahbub Shah
came up. When Allah Dad and Hamidullah tried to run away, Wali Shah and Mahbub Shah
came in front of them and Wali Shah fired at Allah Dad who fell down dead and Mahbub Shah
fired at Hamidullah, causing injuries to hint.

Issue: Whether the Appellant can be convicted under Section 302 r/w S. 34(Joint liability)
(or) not?

Reasoning: Ghulam Quasim had no common intention of killing any member of the
complainant party as he did no more than ask his companions to come to his assistance when he
was attacked with a pole by the deceased: and that "he could not have been aware of the manner
in which assistance was likely to be rendered to him or his friends were likely to shoot at and
kill one man or injure another. Mahbub Shah and Wali Shah stood in different footing. It is
difficult to believe that when they fired the shots they did not have the common intention of
 P a g e | 21

killing one or more of the complainant party. If so, both of them are guilty. Common intention
within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan, and to convict the accused of an
offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in concert
pursuant to the pre- arranged plan. There was no evidence and there were no circumstances from
which it might be inferred that the appellant must have been acting in concert with Wali Shah in
pursuance of a concerted plan when he along with him rushed to the rescue of Ghulam Quasim.
The sole point which requires consideration now is whether a common intention to commit the
crime came into being when Ghulam shouted to his companions to come to his rescue and both
of them emerged from behind the bushes and fired their respective guns. The appellant and Wali
Shah had the same intention, vis, the intention to rescue Quasim if need, be by using the guns,
Evidence falls far short of showing that the appellant and Wali Shah ever entered into a pre-
meditated concert to bring about the murder of Allah Dad. Care must be taken not to confuse
“same or similar intention” with “common intention”.

JUDGMENT: For the reasons indicated above their Lordships have humbly advised His
Majesty that the appellant having succeeded in his appeal, his appeal should be allowed and his
conviction for murder and the sentence of death set aside.

11. Dukhmochan Pandey v. State of Bihar AIR 1998 SC 40

Facts: The complainant had sent about 20 labors to his field for transplanting paddy. On
midday, the accused party came as a mob of about 200 people armed with various deadly
weapons. They asked laborers to stop the work, and when the complainant objected to this, the
two accused directed the mob to kill laborers. The mob started assaulted the laborers as a result
of these two labors died. When the police party reached, the mob fled from the spot. The death
was established to have caused by injuries inflicted by shock and hemorrhage caused by injuries
inflicted with sharp pointed weapons.

Issues:: Whether the Appellant can be convicted under Section 302 r/w S. 34(Joint
liability) (or) not?

Reasoning: The Supreme Court, in this case, held that: “Common intention which developed at
the spur of the moment is different from the similar intention actuated a number of person at the
same time….the distinction between a common intention and similar intention may be fine, but
is nonetheless a real one and if overlooked, may lead to miscarriage of justice….”
 P a g e | 22

Judgment: The mere presence of accused together is not sufficient to hold that they shared the
common intention to commit the offence in question. It is necessary that the intention of each
one of ‘several persons’ be known to each other for constituting common intention

12. Rangaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1989 SC 1137

Facts: The occurrence took place at about 11.45 pm on 16.08.1973 in Big Bazaar Street, in
which one Jayaram was murdered. In this case, session court convicted A-1 under s. 302 and
sentenced him to death. A-2 and A-3 were charged under S. 307 with S.34, and sentenced
rigorous imprisonment of 8 years by session judge. While the High Court considering the fact
altered the decision of session court and enhanced the sentence of A-2 and A-3 to imprisonment
for life under s. 302 with s.34. And the death sentence of A-1 was modified for imprisonment
for life. Against this conviction, A-3 appealed in Supreme Court and contended that he was only
in friendly relation with A-1 and A-2 but he did not share common intention with them.

Issues: Whether the Appellant can be convicted under Section 302 r/w S. 34(Joint
liability) (or) not?

Reasoning: It was by mere chance that he appeared at the spot of occurrence and he did not
participate in offense. In this case, there was a prior enmity between deceased and A-1 and A-2,
because the deceased was accused of murdering the brother of A-1, and he was actually on the
bail. Judgment: The Supreme Court held that even though the presence of A-3 was established
but he did not share common intention and he was unfamiliar with the plan. Therefore, he was
acquitted all of the charges.

13.Muthu Naicker and others v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1978 SC 1647

Facts: The dispute arose among the village community of Karpakkam village when accused no.
A-11 Kuppu Naicker who has a well in land bearing Survey No. 102, wanted to lay a pipe-line
to take water to the field bearing No. 186/2 belonging to his wife, Dhanammal. There was
another well sunk by the local Panchayat in Survey No. 170 for the use of the village community
and when A-11 wanted to take water from his well in Survey No. 102, an apprehension was
entertained by the residents of the village that there would not be enough water in the well in
Survey No. 170 and there would be water shortage. Gripped by this apprehension, a majority of
the village community resisted the attempt of A-11 to take water by laying pipelines. Some
villagers approached the collector on March 6, 1967, the collector suspended the permission
 P a g e | 23

granted to A-11 to lay the pipelines. A-11 and his companions ignored the order of collector and
continued the digging of the channel. The matter arose on 27 November 1968 at around 2.30 pm
when deceased Gajarajan brother of P.W. 31 was returning from Madras by bus, a crowd of 50-
60 persons including A-1 to A23 and A-28 attempted to waylay the deceased. Deceased tried to
escape but was chased by them and encircled by the crowd near a well and was attacked. After
completing the investigation police submitted challan against 28 accused for various offences.
The learned session judge giving the benefit of reasonable doubt rejected the prosecution case
and acquitted all the accused. The state of Tamil Nadu preferred an appeal in High Court of
Madras against A-1 to A-27. While the acquittal of A-28 were considered as final. The High
Court convicted A-1 to A-7 and A-19 for charge under S.302 with S.34 and sentenced them for
life imprisonment. They preferred a criminal appeal in the Supreme Court. The conviction of
accused A-1, A-2, A-4, A-5 under S.302 with S.34 was confirmed and sentenced to life
imprisonment. While the conviction of A-3, A-6, A-7, A-19 under this charge of S.302 was set
aside and were charged with others under Hurt and Grievous Hurt differently.

Issues: Whether the Appellant can be convicted under Section 302 r/w S. 34(Joint liability)
(or) not?

Reasoning: Supreme Court held that in a local community when something unusual occurs, a
good number of people appear on the scene not with a view to participating in occurrence but as
curious spectators.

Judgment: In such event, mere presence in the unlawful assembly should not be treated that
person concerned was a member of unlawful assembly.

14.Omanakuttan vs. The State of Kerala1

Facts :

The prosecution case has been that, the Accused-Appellant and the injured victim Sunil
Kumar (PW-1) were neighbours. Allegedly, the Appellant and the victim had previous
enmity due to which, the Appellant poured acid, causing serious injuries over the head, neck,
shoulder and other parts of the body of the victim. The Accused persons were charge-sheeted
for the offence under Section 326 read with Section 34 of IPC. After scrutinizing the relevant

1
Omanakuttan vs. The State of Kerala, (2019) 6 SCC 262.
 P a g e | 24

evidence, the Judicial Magistrate First Class, convicted the Appellant for the offence under
Section 326 of IPC and sentenced him. However, the Accused No. 2, wife of the Appellant,
was acquitted for absence of evidence against her. Further, the revision petition preferred by
the Accused-Appellant was dismissed by the High Court after finding no ground to interfere
in the concurrent findings of the subordinate Courts.

Held, while dismissing the appeal

1. Appellant has rightly been convicted for the offence under Section 326 of IPC; and though
the punishment awarded to him, being of simple imprisonment for a term of one year and fine
of Rs. 5,000 with default stipulation, is rather towards the side of inadequacy.

2. Fact,that the Appellant poured acid on the body of the victim stands proved beyond any
doubt by the evidence on record, including the testimony of the victim PW-1 as also his
mother PW-2. The fact that, the victim sustained extensive acid burns on the left side of his
body also stands duly proved in his testimony read with the testimony of the doctor PW-8.
The subordinate Courts as also the High Court have thoroughly examined the material on
record and have returned concurrent findings against the Appellant.

3. In the present case, the extensive injuries suffered by the victim, being of acid burns
involving forehead, scalp, neck, back of chest, left buttock and front of left thigh are
distinctly stated in the wound certificate Ex. P/5.

4. The victim sustained the aforesaid injuries due to the effect of the acid poured upon him by
the Appellant. The acid is undoubtedly a corrosive substance within the meaning of Section
326 of IPC. The victim remained hospitalised for more than 50 days. Trial Court specifically
noticed the fact that, the victim had suffered permanent disfigurement on the head, when he
was examined in the Court. In the given set of circumstances and the facts available on
record, the statement of the doctor PW-8 to the effect that the patient could carry on his daily
affairs without any aid while being treated in the hospital, does not take away the substance
of the matter that the case was clearly covered under clauses 'Sixthly' and 'Eighthly' of
Section 320 of IPC. In fact, even the doctor PW-8 stated that, there was no immediate
disfigurement during the time the skin was healing; and that the scars would develop only
later.
 P a g e | 25

5. Act of causing grievous hurt by use of acid, by its very nature, is a gruesome and
horrendous one, which, apart from causing severe bodily pain, leaves the scars and untold
permanent miseries for the victim. The legislature having taken note of the gravity of such an
offence has, by way of Act No. 13 of 2013, inserted Sections 326A and 326B of IPC,
providing higher punishment with minimum imprisonment for the offences of voluntarily
causing grievous hurt by use of acid and voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid.

6. However, in facts and circumstances of the case, the offence was committed in the year
1997 and the Accused-Appellant is now said to be 63 years of age, present Court is not
enhancing punishment.

7. Appeal dismissed.

15) NALLA BOTHU v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [(2002) 7 SCC 117]

Facts - The accused formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and caused the death of
the deceased by hurling bombs and causing bodily injuries by axes, knives and spears. The
trial court convicted the accused 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 under section 302 read with section
149, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. The High Court, confirmed the conviction
of the accused 1 under section 302, I.P.C. The present appeal has been preferred by accused
1, the appellant. Page 20 of 22

Issue before the Supreme Court- Whether the appellant could be convicted under section
302, I.P.C. without aid of section 149, I.P.C. in the absence of substantive charge under
section 302, I.P.C.?

Judgement - a) The conviction under section 302 implicatory without the aid of section 149
is permissible if overt act is attributed to the accused resulting in the fatal injury which is
independently sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased
and is supported by medical evidence; (b) Wrongful acquittal recorded by the High Court,
even if it is stood, that circumstances would not impede the conviction of the appellant under
section 302 read with section 149, I.P.C.; (c) Charge under section 302 read with the aid of
section 149 could be converted into one under section 302 read with section 34 if the criminal
act done by several persons less than five in number in furtherance of common intention is
proved. It was held that the acquittal of the other accused rendered by the High Court, was
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wrong and based on mis appreciation of record clearly establish the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt for causing the death of the deceased.

CONCLUSION: The concept of joint liability is embodied in section 34 of Indian penal

Code. This section just gives the definition of joint liability and it does not give any
punishment for the same. This section has to be read with various other sections of IPC like
section 120A which gives definition of criminal conspiracy, section 120 B which gives
punishment for criminal conspiracy and section 149 which deals with unlawful assembly.
This section 34 cannot be Page 21 of 22 applied on its own and has to be applied with some
other section so as to make a person jointly liable for that offence. Here we have assumed the
fact that the presence of a person at the site of offence is not conclusive evidence that he is a
part of the offence. The hypothesis of the researcher stands true that it is not necessary that all
the persons who are present at the site of the offence are some way or other related to the
crime committed. With the help of cases, the hypothesis of researcher stands true. In all the
above cases the accused persons were present when the crime was committed and at the first
instance, they were charged for committing the offence but later on they were acquitted by
the higher court. It is also not necessary that the persons always share the common intention
and commit crime. It may be possible that they are present at the scene just by chance and
shared no common intention which is a vital ingredient. At last, the section also says that at
any site of offence it is not at all necessary that only two persons are present i.e. accused and
victim, but a number of other persons like witnesses are also present at the scene of crime
most of the time. So, making a person liable just because he was present at the scene of crime
or was near to the victim is not justified