JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA

FACULTY OF LAW

RULE OF INTERPRETATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HARMONIOUS

RULE OF INTERPRETATION

SUBJECT TITLE: INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AND PRINCIPLES OF

LEGISLATION

SUBMITTED BY: -
NAME: ANKIT SINGH RAJPUT
STUDENT ID: 20188895
CLASS ROLL NO. - 10

B.A. LL.B. (HONS.) (VI SEMESTER, SELF FINANCE)

BATCH: 2018-23

SUBMITTED TO: -
DR. QAZI MOHD. USMAN
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR

DATE OF SUBMISSION: 10TH APRIL, 2021

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am highly indebted to Prof. Dr. Qazi Mohd. Usman at Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia
University, New Delhi for providing me with constant encouragement and guidance
throughout the preparation of this project. My cardinal thanks are also for my parents, friends
and all teachers of the law department in our college who have always been the source of my
inspiration and motivation without which I would have never been able to unabridged my
project. Without the contribution of the above said people I could have never completed this
project.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. INTRODUCTION 3
B. RULE OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE 5
C. RULE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION 6
Historical Background Of This Rule 7
Principles of rule of Harmonious construction 8
Indian Judiciary Approach Towards Rule Of Harmonious Construction 8
Padma Ben Banushali and Ors. vs. Yogendra Rathore and Ors.
Krishan Kumar v. State of Rajasthan and Ors
Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore
Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore
Calcutta Gas Company Pvt. Limited v State of West Bengal
Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishna
Sirsilk Ltd. v Govt. of Andhra Pradesh
Ishwari Khaitan Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh
M.S.M Sharma v. Krishna Sinha
Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. vs. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of India
See Jay Engineering Works Ltd., vs. Industry Facilitation Council
State of U.P. vs. Prem Singh Vahi and Ors.1
Sriniwas Prasad Singh vs. Sub Divisional Officer Compensation Officer and Ors

Overseas Judicial Approach Towards This Principle 14

1. Ceylon Tobacco Company Plc vs. Maithripala Sirisena and Ors.
2. Citiwall Safety Glass Pvt Ltd vs. Mansource Interior Pvt Ltd
3. Thacker and Ors., R. v (29.01.2021 - UKCR)
4. Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
D. CONCLUSION 16

E. BIBLIOGRAPHY 17

1
MANU/UP/0242/1986

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 RULE OF INTERPRETATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
HARMONIOUS RULE OF INTERPRETATION

“The Judge is not a Knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty and
goodness. Great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline
in observing their limitations”
- Justice Cardozo2

A. INTRODUCTION

The premise of the doctrine of interpretation is that the court has to interpret the law as it
stands.3According to these doctrines, the court's function is to read the wording of a law,
whilst the government and the court are responsible for enacting those legislation.4. It is a
settled proposition of interpretation of statutes, and other rules and regulations of delegate and
subordinate legislation, that the interpretative authority should always put such construction
which leads to harmonious results, and such a finding should be avoided which would reduce
the legislation to futility, and fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation. This view
is supported by no less an authority than Maxwell On the Interpretation of Statutes, where it is
recorded on page 45 that:-

"Where two alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which
will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute proposes to be
regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or
confusion, into the working of the system" and that "we should avoid a construction which
would reduce the legislation to futility".5

2
Benjamin N. Cardozo,The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press,5th edn., 1921)
3
Abdul Hasan v. Mahmuda Begum AIR (1935)Lah 364, p 367.
4
Sohan lal v. Atal Nath, AIR 1933 846, p. 849
5
S. Kumar and Ors. v. Collector of Central Excise and Ors, MANU/CE/0106/1983

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In the State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s Hindi Stone Etc.6the Supreme Court, while interpreting
Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, made by the State in the exercise of
powers conferred under Section 15 of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)
Act, 1957, following State of U.P. Vs. Babu Ram Upadhya7 observed that "A statutory rule,
while ever subordinate to the parent statute, is, otherwise, to be treated as part of the statute
and as effective. "Rules made under the Statute must be treated for all purposes of
construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as
if contained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or
obligation". Under our Constitution, the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary all have their
own broad spheres of operation. Ordinarily, it is not proper for any of these three organs of the
State to encroach upon the domain of another, otherwise, the delicate balance in the
Constitution will be upset, and there will be a reaction. Judges must know their limits and
must not try to run the Government. They must have modesty and humility, and not behave
like Emperors. There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution and each organ of
the State ' the legislature, the executive and the judiciary ' must have respect for the others and
must not encroach into each other’s domains.8 Thereby, Interpretation of statutes is the
correct understanding of the law. This process is commonly adopted by the courts for
determining the exact intention of the legislature. Since the court's goal isn't only to interpret
the rule, but to apply it in a substantive way to each event. It is often used to determine the
exact connotation of any Act or document in relation to the legislature's actual purpose. There
can be mischief in the statute which is required to be cured, and this can be done by applying
various norms and theories of interpretation which might go against the literal meaning at
times.

B. RULE OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE

I. Literal or Grammatical Rule: It is the first interpretation rule. The words used in
this text must be provided or translated in their normal or ordinary sense, according to
this law. If the intent of a statute clause is absolutely plain and unambiguous after
reading, the provision may be given effect, regardless of the implications.The basic

6
AIR 1981 SC 711.
7
AIR 1961 SC 751.
8
D. M., Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass 2007 (14) SCALE 1 )

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 concept is that whatever the legislature's purpose was when making a provision, it was
conveyed by sentences, which must be read according to grammar standards. That is
the best guideline for interpreting laws since the legislature's meaning can be inferred
from the terms and vocabulary used. According to this principle, the court's sole
responsibility is to give substance to the statute's plain text, and it has no need to
investigate any potential effects. The court's sole responsibility is to interpret the
statute as written, and if any harsh repercussions occur, the legislature must seek and
oversee a solution.

II. The Golden Rule: It's recognized as the golden law and it resolves all interpretation
issues. The rule states that we must first follow the literal rule; but, where the literal
rule's interpretation causes misunderstanding, inequality, inconvenience, suffering, or
inequity, the original sense shall be ignored, and interpretation shall be done in such a
manner that the purpose of the legislation is fulfilled. The literal law is based on the
idea of reading the statute's terms in their natural context. However, if reading natural
language results in any repugnance, irony, or suffering, the court shall change the
meaning only to the degree that the injustice or absurdity is incurred, and not any more
to avoid the effect. This rule assumes that the implications and results of interpretation
are much more significant than the terms themselves because they reveal the true
meaning of the legislature's words and its purpose. When following this law, the
meaning can be completely opposite to the literal rule, but it would be justified
according to the golden rule. The presumption here is that the legislature does not
intend certain objects. Thus, any such interpretation which leads to unintended objects
shall be rejected

III. The Mischief Rule: Mischief Rule was originated in Heydon’s case9 in 1584. It is the
rule of purposive construction because the purpose of this statute is most important
while applying this rule. It is known as Heydon’s rule because it was given by Lord
Poke in Heydon’s case10 in 1584. It is called a mischief rule because the focus is on
curing the mischief. In the Heydon’s case, it was held that there are four things which

9
(1584) 76 ER 637
10
Ibid.

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 have to be followed for true and sure interpretation of all the statutes in general, which
are as follows-
a. What was the common law before the making of an act.
b. What was the mischief for which the present statute was enacted.
c. What remedy did the Parliament sought or had resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth?The true reason for the remedy.

C. RULE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

The word "harmonious creation" refers to the process of achieving peace or oneness within
the various provisions of a statute. Where there is a question over which interpretation should
prevail where the terms of a statutory clause have more than one definition, the meaning that
best harmonises with the subject and subject of the enactment should be followed. It is
assumed that the government has passed legislation with a specific goal in mind. It's also
assumed that politicians used precise terminology to open their eyes and leave little doubt in
the enactment's language. It is often assumed that all of a statute's laws are well-written and
coherent with one another, so the government is not expected to contradict itself by enacting
legislation. Hence, the statute should be construed in such a manner so as to avoid any
repugnancy. An difference should not be generated or inferred easily. When all other options
are exhausted, the construction that achieves continuity should be approved, while those that
result in uncertainty should be refused. When two or more clauses of the same act are
incompatible, the court, if possible, would attempt to construe the provisions in such a way
that all provisions are given effect while preserving balance between them. It can be
impossible to decide whether two provisions of the same act differ or are mutually exclusive.
The legislature expresses its meaning by the terms contained in the statute's clause. As a
result, the fundamental theory of harmonious construction holds that the legislature should not
have attempted to contradict itself in this case. The rule of harmonious construction is often
extended in cases of constitutional interpretation. Since all provisions were framed by the
legislature and absorbed equal power of statute, it should be inferred that if the legislature

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wished to grant anything in one side, it did not wish to take it away with the other. A clause of
the same act cannot render another provision of the same act ineffective. As a result, the
assembly cannot be compelled to contradict itself in certain conditions.

❖ Historical Background Of This Rule

The evolution of this law under the Indian constitution can be traced back to the very first
amendment in the case of Shankari Prasad v. Union of India,11 where part III and part IV of
the constitution were in dispute. Fundamental Rights and State Policy Directive Principles are
two separate sections of the constitution, but they are the foundation of the document. The
Supreme Court resolved the case using the theory of harmonious construction, holding that
constitutional rights are rights granted against the state, while directive concepts for state
policy are granted to the state in order to meet the country's social and economic growth. So,
in terms of fundamental rights, the state has the authority to strip them down in certain cases,
and Parliament has the power to amend them to put them into compliance. As a result, the law
of harmonious construction was applied, granting priority to both since they were seen as two
sides of the same coin. They need to work together for the public welfare.12 If we look back at
the past of this law, the rule of reconciliation was first proposed in the case of re C.P. and Bera
Act. Courts have used this provision to read the Entries of two lists together to prevent any
inconsistencies in deciding the scope of the topics. Furthermore, courts can use the language
of one Entry to interpret and modify the language of another. Through applying this provision,
the court read State List Entries 24 and 25 and concluded that it is the court's responsibility to
resolve and add continuity between Entries that are in direct dispute and may overlap.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that ‘gas and gas works’ of Entry 25 are different from
‘Industry’ under Entry.13 Thus, it was often found in this case that more attention should be
placed on the vocabulary of the Entries, and that if there is a clear disagreement between
Entries or where these Entries intersect, the courts have the responsibility to put clarity
between them and resolve them. Following this case, a lot of other lawsuits have been settled
using this doctrine, and they have all turned out well.

11
AIR 1951 SC 458
12
Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore 1958 AIR 255.
13
AIR (2003) SC 3942

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❖ Principles of rule of Harmonious construction

In the landmark case of CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers14 (2003) the supreme court laid
down five principles of rule of harmonious construction:
1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they
must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in
another unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their
differences. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in
contradictory provisions, the courts must interpret them in such a way so that effect is
given to both the provisions as much as possible.
3. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a
useless number or dead is not harmonious construction.

❖ Indian Judiciary Approach Towards Rule Of Harmonious Construction

● Padma Ben Banushali and Ors. vs. Yogendra Rathore and Ors.15
(1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the Act
and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a
manner as to harmonise them.
(2) The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other
provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them.
(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two
conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they
should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. That is the
essence of the rule of "harmonious construction".
(4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of
the provisions as a "dead letter" or "useless lumber" is not harmonious construction.
(5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose.

14
Appeal (civil) 7966-67 of 1996.
15
MANU/SC/2235/2006.

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 ● Krishan Kumar v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.16
The Supreme Court has reiterated the harmonious principle by holding that where
there appears to be inconsistencies in two sections of the same Act, the principle of
harmonious construction should be followed in avoiding a "head on clash". The
Supreme Court further held that the provision of one section of statute cannot be used
to deviate those of another unless it is impossible to reconcile the same. The Supreme
Court in this decision also placed reliance on its earlier decision in Venkataramana
Devaru v. State of Mysore17. It is apposite to quote Para 11 of the decision of Krishna
Kumar (supra), which reads thus:
It is settled principle of interpretation that where there appears to be inconsistency in
two sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction should be
followed in avoiding a head on clash. It should not be lightly assumed that what the
Parliament has given with one hand, it took away with the other. The provisions of one
section of statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to
reconcile the same.

● Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore18,

The Court observed:The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an
enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be
so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as
the rule of harmonious construction. The essence of harmonious construction is to
give effect to both the provisions. Bearing these principles in mind it is legitimate to
hold that Section 100(4) prescribed period of limitation of one year in respect of the
scheme proposed under the provisions of the new Act, while in the case of a scheme
under Section 68-C of the old Act, pending on the date of enforcement of the new Act,
namely, 1-7-1989, the period of one year as prescribed under Section 100(4) should be
computed from the date of commencement of the new Act. This interpretation would
give full effect to both the Sections- Section 100(4) and Section 217(2)(e) of the new
Act.

16
AIR 1992 SC 1789.
17
AIR 1958 SC 255
18
AIR 1958 SC 255

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 ● Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore19
In this case the Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction in
resolving a conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution and it was
held that the right of every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its
own affairs in matters of religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a State
providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus [Article
25(2)(b)].

● Calcutta Gas Company Pvt. Limited v State of West Bengal20

The Legislative Assembly of WB passed the Oriental Gas Company Act in 1960. The
respondent sought to take over the management of the Gas Company under this Act.
The appellant challenged the validity of this act by holding that the state Legislative
Assembly had no power to pass such an under Entries 24 and 25 of the State List
because the Parliament had already enacted the Industries (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1951 under Entry 52 of the Central List dealing with industries. It
was observed by the Supreme Court that there are so many subjects in three lists in the
Constitution that there is bound to be some overlapping and it is the duty of the courts
in such a situation to yet to harmonise them, if possible, so the effect can be given to
each of them. Entry 24 of the State List covers entire Industries in the State. Entry 25
is only limited to the Gas industry. Therefore Entry 24 covers every industry barring
the Gas Industries because it has been specifically covered under Entry 25.
Corresponding to Entry 24 of the State List, there is Entry 52 in the Union List.
Therefore, by harmonious construction it became clear that the gas industry was
exclusively covered by Entry 25 of the State List over which the state has full control.
Therefore, the state was fully competent to make laws in this regard.

● Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishna 21

Under section 46 (1) c of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, criminal
prosecution of the respondent partners was sanctioned in this case by the
Commissioner when even after repeated demands the assessee did not pay the sales

19
Ibid.
20
1962 AIR 1044
21
1970 AIR 732

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 tax. The respondent challenged this provision on the ground that there were two
separate provisions under the Act, namely, section 22 (4 – A) and section 46 (1) c
under which two different procedures were prescribed to realize the amount due but
there was no provision of law which could tell that which provision should be applied
in which case. According to the Supreme Court, the provision prescribed u/s 46 (1) c
was more drastic. It was held that by harmonious construction of these two provisions,
the conclusion drawn is that the Commissioner had a judicial discretion to decide as to
which procedure to be followed in which case. Whenever the Commissioner will fail
to act judicially, the court will have the right to intervene. However, in this case, the
Commissioner had correctly decided that the more drastic procedure under section 46
(1) c deserved to be followed because of the failure of the assessee firm in paying
sales tax despite the repeated demands by the sales tax officer.

● Sirsilk Ltd. v Govt. of Andhra Pradesh 22

An interesting question relating to a conflict between two equally mandatory
provisions, viz., ss 17(1) and 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a good
illustration of the importance of the principle that every effort should be made to give
effect to all the provisions of an act by harmonizing any apparent conflict between two
or more of its provisions. Section 17(1) of the Act requires the government to publish
every award of a Labour Tribunal within thirty days of its receipt and by sub – section
(2) of section 17 the award on its publication becomes final. Section 18(1) of the Act
provides that a settlement between employer and workmen shall be binding on the
parties to the agreement. In a case where a settlement was arrived at after the receipt of
the award of a Labour Tribunal by the Government but before its publication, the
question was whether the Government still required u/s 17(1) to publish the award. In
construing these two equally mandatory provisions, the Supreme Court held that the
only way to resolve the conflict was to hold that by the settlement, which becomes
effective from the date of signing, the industrial dispute comes to an end and the
award becomes infructuous and the Government cannot publish it.

● Ishwari Khaitan Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh23,

22
1964 AIR 160
23
1980 AIR 1955

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 In this case, the State Government proposed to acquire sugar industries under the U.P
Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971. This was challenged on the ground that
these sugar industries were declared to be a controlled one by the union under the
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. And accordingly, the state did
not have the power of acquisition of requisition of property which was under the
control of the union. The Supreme Court held that the power of acquisition was not
occupied by Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The state had a
separate power under Entry 42 List III.

● M.S.M Sharma v. Krishna Sinha24

Facts of the case are as follows- Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and expression. Article 194(3) provides to the Parliament for
punishment for its contempt and it is known as the Parliamentary Privilege. In this
case, an editor of a newspaper published the word -for- word record of the proceedings
of the Parliament including those portions which were expunged from the record. He
was called for the breach of parliamentary privilege. He contended that he had a
fundamental right to speech and expression. It was held by the court that article
19(1)(a) itself talks about reasonable freedom and therefore freedom of speech and
expression shall pertain only to those portions which have not been expunged on the
record but not beyond that.

● Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. vs. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of India25
In case of such conflict, the general rule is that the later Act or provision will override
the earlier one unless it is found that the latter one is a general statute and the earlier
one is a special statute.

● See Jay Engineering Works Ltd., vs. Industry Facilitation Council26,

However, Indian Supreme Court held that if the two Acts containing wide
'notwithstanding' clauses covering 'any other law for the time being in force' operate in
different fields, harmonious construction has to be applied, and, when in a given

24
AIR 1959 SC 395.
25
1993 (2) SCC-144
26
(2006) 8 SCC-677

13
 case, the application of the earlier Act is attracted, the question of its giving way to the
later Act would not arise.

● State of U.P. vs. Prem Singh Vahi and Ors.27 (17.07.1985 - ALLHC) :
In view of the aforesaid discussions of the relevant case-laws and the interpretation of
statutes, it is clear that in order to ascertain the meaning of a clause of a statute, it is a
settled rule or in other words, a compelling rule that the entire statute must be read as a
whole and thereby the intention of the legislature and the meaning of different
provisions can be ascertained and all efforts must be made to make a harmonious
interpretation of the different parts of the statute and thereby to reconcile the different
parts of the statute even though they apparently appear to be conflicting or
contradictory.

● Sriniwas Prasad Singh vs. Sub Divisional Officer Compensation Officer and Ors28
It is a cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes that while construing a provision
harmonious interpretation to all the provisions in the same Act must be given in
order to make the various provisions of the act consistent with each other.29

❖ Overseas Judicial Approach Towards This Principle

● Ceylon Tobacco Company Plc vs. Maithripala Sirisena and Ors.30

It is a well known principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not
be put upon a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility,
palpable injustice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly. To avoid absurdity or
incongruity grammatical and ordinary sense of the words can, in certain
circumstances, be avoided. There is no obligation on a court of law to construe a
clause as would lead to a clear absurdity which would not possibly be regarded as
contemplated by the legislating authority or agency. Since the basic and underlying
purpose of all legislation, at least in theory, is to promote justice, it would seem that

27
MANU/UP/0242/1986
28
MANU/UP/0303/1960
29
Pheku Chamar v. Harish Chandra AIR 1953 All. 406.
30
LEX/SLCA/0261/2014

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 the effect of the statute should be of primary concern. If this is so, the effect of a
suggested construction is an important consideration and one which the court should
never neglect. As a result, the court should strive to avoid a construction which would
tend to make the statute unjust, oppressive, unreasonable, absurd, mischievous or
contrary to public interest. One should avoid construction which would result in
absurdity and give a harmonious construction so as to avoid making one provision
of the Act conflict with the other."

● Citiwall Safety Glass Pvt Ltd vs. Mansource Interior Pvt Ltd31
Since the SOPA states explicitly that documents may be lodged by leaving it during
normal business hours at the usual place of business of the person, a harmonious
reading of ss 15(1) and 37(1)(b) would clearly indicate that there is nothing wrong in
the SMC prescribing by its rules (ie r 2.2 of the SMC Rules) what are its business
hours. Section 37(1)(b) does not envisage that the SMC should remain open until
11.59pm, as the Judge seemed to have thought, in order to enable a party who has
business with the SMC to lodge the relevant documents. Pursuant to s 37(1)(b) and s
28(4)(e), SMC has by r 2.2 prescribed a clear and sensible arrangement as to how it
would discharge its functions under the SOPA. With respect, we think it is wrong to
fault the SMC for fixing the closure of its office hours for the business under SOPA
earlier than 11.59pm. In our opinion, r 2.2 is wholly consistent with s 37(1)(b) and is
therefore not ultra vires.

● Thacker and Ors., R. v (29.01.2021 - UKCR)32

The essential considerations are that an international instrument should be constructed
in a uniform and harmonious manner across the contracting states, and that "if it be
possible" (per Lord Scarman in Fothergill at 290G) to do so our courts should speak in
harmony. A clear and unambiguous provision will not lend itself to this method but
wording that is unclear, ambiguous or, if construed literally, would lead to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, will.

● Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation33

31
MANU/SGCA/0073/2015
32
MANU/UKCR/0013/2021
33
MANU/AUSH/0019/1981

15
 It is an elementary and fundamental principle that the object of the court, in
interpreting a statute, "is to see what is the intention expressed by the words used":
River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson34. It is only by considering the meaning of the
words used by the legislature that the court can ascertain its intention. And it is not
unduly pedantic to begin with the assumption that words mean what they say: cf. Cody
v. J. H. Nelson Pty. Ltd.35 Of course, no part of a statute can be considered in isolation
from its context - the whole must be considered. If, when the section in question is
read as part of the whole instrument, its meaning is clear and unambiguous, generally
speaking "nothing remains but to give effect to the generally speaking "nothing
remains but to give effect to the unqualified, words": Metropolitan Gas Co. v.
Federated Gas Employees' Industrial Union36 There are cases where the result of
giving words their ordinary meaning may be so irrational that the court is forced to the
conclusion that the draftsman has made a mistake, and the canons of construction are
not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution in such a case: see per Lord Reid in
Connaught Fur Trimmings Ltd. v. Cramas Properties Ltd.37. Examples of that sort of
case may be found in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed., (1969), et
seq., and Craies on Statute Law, 7th ed., (1971), et seq. However, if the language of a
statutory provision is clear and unambiguous, and is consistent and harmonious with
the other provisions of the enactment, and can be intelligibly applied to the subject
matter with which it deals, it must be given its ordinary and grammatical meaning,
even if it leads to a result that may seem inconvenient or unjust. To say this is not to
insist on too literal an interpretation, or to deny that the court should seek the real
intention of the legislature. The danger that lies in departing from the ordinary
meaning of unambiguous provisions is that "it may degrade into mere judicial
criticism of the propriety of the acts of the Legislature", as Lord Moulton said in
Vacher & Sons Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors38 ; it may lead judges to put their
own ideas of justice or social policy in place of the words of the statute. On the other
hand, if two constructions are open, the court will obviously prefer that which will
avoid what it considers to be inconvenience or injustice. Since language, read in its

34
(1877) 2 App Cas 743
35
[1947] HCA 17; (1947) 74 CLR 629
36
[1925] HCA 5; (1925) 35 CLR 449
37
(1965) 1 WLR 892, ; (1965) 2 ALL ER 382
38
[1912] UKHL 3; (1913) AC 107

16
 context, very often proves to be ambiguous, this last mentioned rule is one that not
infrequently falls to be applied.

D. CONCLUSION

The aim of interpretation is to explain the context of terms used in laws that aren't entirely
plain. The general principles of interpretation set out in Article 367(1) of the Indian
Constitution can be used to produce this purpose. It is therefore stated that general legislative
interpretation rules will be extended to the interpretation of constitutional provisions. As a
result, one of the rules used by courts in reading constitutional provisions is the doctrine of
harmonious construction. When there is a discrepancy with two or more laws or two or more
clauses of the Constitution, this doctrine is used. So, to prevent some sort of dispute with
provisions or statutes, harmonious construction is used, and peace is preserved within such
provisions or statutes through judicial interpretations. As a result, it can be deduced that the
courts use the harmonious construction rule to achieve two goals: to ensure continuity within
the enactments and to prevent some kind of confusion or repugnancy within the different
clauses and statutes.

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 E. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Referred:
• M. P. Tandon, Interpretation of Statutes & Legislation (Allahabad Law Agency,
Allahabad, 2006).
• P. M. Bakshi, Statutory Interpretation of Statutes (Orient Publishing Company, Orient
Publishing Company, 2002).
• Avtar Singh & Harpreet Kaur, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes (LexisNexis
India, 2015).

Databases Referred:
• https://www.manupatrafast.com.
• https://indiankanoon.org.
• https://www.scconline.com.
• https://home.heinonline.org.
• https://www.lexisnexis.com.
• https://www.lawctopus.com.

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