FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 209264. July 5, 2016.]

DAMASO T. AMBRAY and CEFERINO T. AMBRAY, JR. , * petitioners, vs.

SYLVIA A. TSOUROUS, CARMENCITA AMBRAY-LAUREL, HEDY
AMBRAY-AZORES, VIVIEN AMBRAY-YATCO, NANCY AMBRAY-
ESCUDERO, MARISTELA AMBRAY-ILAGAN, ELIZABETH AMBRAY-
SORIANO, MA. LUISA FE AMBRAY-ARCILLA, and CRISTINA AMBRAY-
LABIT , respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated April
25, 2013 and the Resolution 3 dated September 24, 2013 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95606, af rming the Decision 4 dated June 11, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 32 (RTC) in Civil Case No. SP-5831
(01).

The Facts
The subject matter of the present controversy is a parcel of land described as
Lot 2-C of subdivision plan Psd-04-009554, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title
(TCT) No. T-41382 5 of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City (Lot 2-C) in the name of
petitioners Damaso T. Ambray (Damaso) and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr. (Ceferino, Jr.;
collectively, petitioners).
Petitioners and respondents Sylvia A. Tsourous, 6 Carmencita Ambray-Laurel,
Hedy Ambray-Azores, Vivien Ambray-Yatco, Nancy Ambray-Escudero, Maristela
Ambray-Ilagan (Maristela), Elizabeth Ambray-Soriano, Ma. Fe Luisa Ambray-Arcilla (Ma.
Fe Luisa), 7 and Cristina Ambray-Labit are siblings. With the exception of Sylvia, 8 they
are the children of the late Ceferino Ambray (Ceferino, Sr.) and Estela Trias (Estela),
who passed away on February 5, 1987 and August 15, 2002, respectively.
During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several properties, one of
which was a parcel of land located in San Pablo City, Laguna denominated as Lot 2 of
subdivision plan Pcs-12441, with an area of 4,147 square meters, more or less, covered
by TCT No. T-11259 9 of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City (Lot 2). On December
28, 1977, Ceferino, Sr. mortgaged Lot 2 with Manila Bank for the amount of
P180,000.00. The mortgage was discharged on September 16, 1984. 10
Prior to the discharge of the mortgage or sometime in August 1984, Lot 2 was
subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot 2-A, Lot 2-B, and the subject property, Lot 2-C ,
resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-11259. Lot 2-C was registered in Ceferino,
Sr.'s name in accordance with his letter 11 dated August 29, 1984 requesting the
Register of Deeds of San Pablo City to register Lot 2-C in his name. Thus, TCT No. T-
22749 12 was issued covering the said parcel under the name of Ceferino, Sr., married
to Estela. 13
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 In June 1996, Maristela discovered that TCT No. T-22749 covering Lot 2-C had
been cancelled and in its stead, TCT No. T-41382 was issued in the name of petitioners.
It appears that by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale 14 (Deed of Sale) dated
January 16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr., with the consent of Estela, allegedly sold "a portion of
lot 2 of the consolidation subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-12441" 15 to petitioners for a
consideration of P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds of San Pablo City only on February 5, 1996. 16
This prompted respondents to le a criminal case for falsi cation of public
document against petitioners, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Damaso T. Ambray
and Ceferino T. Ambray" and docketed as Criminal Case No. 39153 (falsi cation case)
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City. In a Decision 17
dated October 30, 2000, the MTCC acquitted petitioners of the charge for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, respondents led the instant complaint 18 for annulment of title,
reconveyance, and damages against petitioners and Estela (defendants), docketed as
Civil Case No. SP-5831 (01), alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were
null and void because the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries.
aDSIHc

In a motion to dismiss, 19 defendants claimed that the issue on the authenticity

of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale had already been
passed upon in the falsi cation case where petitioners were eventually acquitted;
hence, the matter was res judicata. In an Order 20 dated June 6, 2002, the RTC granted
the motion and dismissed the case on said ground.
On appeal, 21 however, the CA reversed the said disposition in a Decision 22
dated September 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75507, nding that res judicata does not
apply. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Before the RTC, petitioners led their answer 23 and disclosed the death of their
co-defendant and mother, Estela, who passed away on August 15, 2002. 24 By way of
defense, they averred, inter alia, that respondents were aware of the conveyance of Lot
2-C to them through the Deed of Sale. They also claimed that respondents' action has
prescribed, and maintained that it was barred by prior judgment and res judicata. 25
Subsequently, citing an Af davit 26 dated February 18, 2008 executed by Ma. Fe
Luisa, the rest of the respondents moved 27 that she be dropped as a plaintiff, which
the RTC granted. 28 Thereafter, she was ordered 29 impleaded as a party-defendant in
respondents' supplemental complaint. Later, she adopted 30 petitioners' answer with
counterclaim in response thereto.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 31 dated June 11, 2010, the RTC nulli ed the Deed of Sale as well as
TCT No. T-41382 in the name of petitioners and rendered judgment in favor of
respondents as follows:
a. Declaring Lot 2-C, Psd-04-009554, covered by Transfer Certi cate
of Title No. T-41382, as common property of the Heirs of Ceferino Ambray, Sr.
and Estela Trias, to be divided equally among the heirs;
b. Declaring as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 16, 1978, purportedly executed between Ceferino Ambray and Estela
Trias, as vendors, and Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino Ambray, Jr., as vendees,
of the portion of Lot 2, Pcs-12441, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. T-
11259;
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 c. Declaring as null and void Transfer Certi cate of Title No. T-41382
in the name of Damaso T. Ambray, married to Mary Ann Loyola, and Ceferino T.
Ambray, Jr.; ATICcS

d. Directing the defendants Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino T.

Ambray, Jr. to reconvey Lot 2-C, Psd-04-009554 covered by Transfer Certi cate
of Title No. T-41382 to the co-ownership of the Heirs of Ceferino Ambray, Sr.
and Estela Trias, for distribution in equal shares among the said heirs; and
e. Directing the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City, to cancel
Transfer Certi cate of Title No. T-41382 in the name of Damaso T. Ambray and
Ceferino Ambray, Sr., and cause the issuance of a new Transfer Certi cate of
Title, in the name of the Heirs of Ceferino Ambray, Sr. and Estela Trias.
The RTC found that respondents were able to prove, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the Deed of Sale executed by Ceferino, Sr. conveying Lot 2-C in favor of
petitioners was spurious and of dubious origin. 32 It held that at the time of its
execution in 1978, Ceferino, Sr. could not have sold a speci c portion of Lot 2 to
petitioners, considering that it was subdivided only in 1984. Moreover, after the
subdivision of Lot 2 in 1984, Ceferino, Sr. requested the Register of Deeds of San Pablo
City to register Lot 2-C in his name, which he would not have done had he already sold
Lot 2-C to petitioners. 33
Furthermore, Ceferino, Sr. leased Lot 2-C to MB Finance Corporation from 1986
to 1989 in his capacity as the owner of the subject property. Subsequent thereto, as
administrator of Ceferino, Sr.'s properties upon the latter's death, Damaso executed a
contract renewing the lease of Lot 2-C to MB Finance Corporation. The RTC opined that
the foregoing facts militate against petitioners' purported ownership of Lot 2-C
pursuant to the Deed of Sale. 34
Finally, when confronted with the belated registration of the Deed of Sale in 1996,
petitioners could only offer the excuse that their mother, Estela, kept the copy thereof
until she became sickly and nally gave the same to Damaso. The RTC declared the
same to be a mere afterthought. 35
With respect to the issue of forgery of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela
on the subject Deed of Sale, the RTC took note of the CA's opinion in CA-G.R. CV No.
75507 that the MTCC, in the falsi cation case, made no categorical nding as to the
existence of falsi cation. Instead, the MTCC merely concluded that the prosecution
failed to establish petitioners' participation in the alleged falsification. 36
Petitioners and respondents separately appealed 37 to the CA. Petitioners
imputed error upon the RTC in declaring null and void the subject Deed of Sale and TCT
No. T-41382, 38 while respondents questioned the RTC's refusal to grant damages and
attorney's fees in their favor. 39
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 40 dated April 25, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision and found
that respondents were able to suf ciently discharge the required burden of proof that
the subject Deed of Sale is spurious.
The CA also denied the award of moral damages for lack of factual basis.
Consequently, without moral damages, it found that no exemplary damages may be
given. 41 Finally, the CA held that the award of attorney's fees was not warranted under
the circumstances of the case, the same being an exception and not the general rule. 42
Both petitioners 43 and respondents 44 moved for reconsideration of the CA's
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 Decision, which were denied in a Resolution 45 dated September 24, 2014; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
af rming the RTC's nulli cation of the Deed of Sale dated January 16, 1978 and TCT
No. T-41382 covering Lot 2-C in the name of petitioners.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious. TIADCc

At the outset, it should be pointed out that, as a general rule, a re-examination of

factual ndings cannot be done by the Court acting on a petition for review on certiorari
because it is not a trier of facts and only reviews questions of law. 46 This rule, however,
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when the ndings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible ; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the ndings of
facts are con icting; (6) when in making its ndings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its ndings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the ndings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the ndings are conclusions without citation of speci c evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the ndings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record ; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion. 47 Finding a con uence of certain exceptions in this case,
the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, and the Court retains the authority
to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom. 48
At the core of the present controversy is the validity of the Deed of Sale, the
execution of which purportedly conveyed Lot 2-C in favor of petitioners. To gauge the
veracity thereof, it is imperative to pass upon the genuineness of the signatures of the
seller, Ceferino, Sr., and his wife, Estela, who gave her consent to the sale, as appearing
thereon, which respondents, in the present complaint, assert to be forgeries.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who
alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or
evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between
the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person
whose signature is theorized to have been forged. 49
Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting
may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge. 50 Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the
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 presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As
against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically
present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
51

In this case, the only direct evidence presented by respondents to prove their
allegation of forgery is Questioned Documents Report No. 266-397 52 dated March 24,
1997 issued by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner II Antonio R.
Magbojos (Magbojos), stating that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the
Deed of Sale, when compared to standard sample signatures, are not written by one
and the same person.
In refutation, petitioners offered in evidence, inter alia, the testimony of their
mother, Estela, in the falsi cation case where petitioners were previously acquitted. In
the course thereof, she identi ed 53 the signatures on the Deed of Sale as hers and
Ceferino, Sr.'s, which was fully corroborated 54 by Atty. Zosimo Tanalega (Atty.
Tanalega), the notary public who notarized the subject Deed of Sale and was present at
the time the Ambray spouses affixed their signatures thereon.
Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by respondents and the
testimony given by Estela in the falsi cation case in support of petitioners' defense, the
Court nds greater evidentiary weight in favor of the latter. Hence, respondent's
complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages in Civil Case No. SP-5831
(01) should be dismissed.
While the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,
as espoused by petitioners, 55 is of doubtful application in this case — considering that
the MTCC, in the falsi cation case, failed to categorically pronounce that the Deed of
Sale was not falsi ed and merely concluded that petitioners had no participation in any
alleged falsi cation — the Court nonetheless observes that petitioners, through the
testimony of Estela thereat, were able to establish the genuineness and due execution
of the subject Deed of Sale which effectively conveyed title over Lot 2-C to them.
Estela's testimony constitutes direct evidence of the authenticity of the signatures on
the Deed of Sale, having personal knowledge thereof, which undeniably prevails over the
written ndings of a purported handwriting expert that can only be considered indirect
or circumstantial evidence. AIDSTE

Notably, the admissibility of Estela's former testimony in the present case nds
basis in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence or the "rule on former testimony"
which provides:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had
the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Case law holds that for the said rule to apply, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition
was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same
subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue
testi ed to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present
case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
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 former case. 56 The reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or
proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However,
before the former testimony can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must rst lay
the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission
of testimony in the realm of admissible evidence. 57
Records show that Estela died during the pendency of these proceedings before
the RTC or on August 15, 2002. Her death transpired before the presentation of the
parties' evidence could ensue. However, she was able to testify on direct and cross-
examination in the falsi cation case and af rmed that the alleged forged signatures
appearing on the Deed of Sale were, indeed, hers and her deceased husband, Ceferino,
Sr.'s. The parties in the falsi cation case involved respondents and petitioners herein,
and the subject matter therein and in this case are one and the same, i.e., the
genuineness and authenticity of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela.
Clearly, the former testimony of Estela in the falsi cation case, being admissible
in evidence in these proceedings, deserves signi cant consideration. She gave positive
testimony that it was Ceferino, Sr. himself who signed the Deed of Sale that conveyed
Lot 2-C to petitioners. She likewise veri ed her signature thereon. By virtue of these
declarations, she con rmed the genuineness and authenticity of the questioned
signatures. Thus, it follows that the Deed of Sale itself is valid and duly executed,
contrary to the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that it was of spurious nature.
Further lending credence to the validity of the Deed of Sale is the well-settled
principle that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public
instrument. To overturn this legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a
spurious contract. 58
Hence, for the above-state reasons, whatever inferences the RTC had observed
tending to defeat the existence of a valid sale in favor of petitioners are rendered
inconsequential.
In particular, the RTC noted, and found it puzzling, that the Deed of Sale did not
speci cally mention the exact area that was being sold to petitioners, disposing only of
"a portion of lot 2" without specifying the metes and bounds thereof. As such, the RTC
concluded that Ceferino, Sr. could not have sold a speci c portion of Lot 2 to
petitioners, having been subdivided only in 1984. However, Article 1463 of the Civil
Code expressly states that "[t]he sole owner of a thing may sell an undivided interest
therein." As Ceferino, Sr. was the sole owner of the original Lot 2 from whence came Lot
2-C, he is therefore allowed by law to convey or sell an unspeci ed portion thereof.
Hence, the disposition of Lot 2-C to petitioners, a portion of Lot 2 yet to be subdivided
in 1978, was therefore valid.
That Ceferino, Sr. requested the registration of the title of Lot 2-C in his name in
1984, while the property was supposed to have already been sold to petitioners in
1978, was likewise fully explained during trial. Damaso clari ed 59 that their parents
were apprehensive that he and Ceferino might mortgage or squander the property while
they were still alive. Moreover, despite knowledge of the sale, they did not demand for
its immediate registration because during their father's lifetime, they never questioned
his decisions. This further explains why, despite the disposition in petitioners' favor, it
was Ceferino, Sr. himself who leased Lot 2-C to third parties, which Damaso renewed in
his father's name after the latter's death. The delay in the transfer of the title over Lot 2-
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 C to petitioners was also occasioned by the fact that Estela kept the Deed of Sale in her
custody and gave it to petitioners only later on, by reason of her poor health. 60 Be that
as it may, and to reiterate, the delay in the registration of the sale in favor of petitioners
neither affects nor invalidates the same, in light of the authenticity of the Deed of Sale
itself.
In ne, the CA and the RTC both erred in nding that the Deed of Sale was of
spurious origin. The authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Sale must be upheld
against the assumptions made by the RTC in its Decision. Accordingly, TCT No. T-
41382 covering Lot 2-C in the name of petitioners remain valid. AaCTcI

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The assailed April 25, 2013 Decision
and the September 24, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
95606 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The instant complaint for annulment of
title, reconveyance, and damages is DISMISSED .
SO ORDERED .
Leonardo-de Castro, *** Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Sereno, ** C.J., is on official leave.
Footnotes

* Estela T. Ambray had already died on August 15, 2002. See rollo p. 9.
** On official leave.
*** Per Special Order No. 2358 dated June 28, 2016.
1. Rollo, pp. 7-29.

2 . Id. at 32-40. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices
Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser concurring.
3 . Id. at 42-43. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices
Ramon R. Garcia and Manuel M. Barrios concurring.
4. Id. at 44-67. Penned by Judge Agripino G. Morga.

5. Folder of Exhibits, p. 6, including dorsal portion thereof.

6 . Sylvia A. Tsourous died during the pendency of the case before the RTC and was
substituted by her heirs, namely: Kristina Tsourous-Reyes, Mark Tsourous, Keith
Tsourous, and Steven Tsourous. See records, Vol. I, pp. 156-159 and 163-164.

7. Also referred to in the records as "Ma. Luisa Fe." During the proceedings before the RTC,
she withdrew as plaintiff, and the complaint was amended to implead her as co-
defendant of Damaso and Ceferino, Jr. Id. at 181-186.
8. See id. at 4.
9. Folder of Exhibits, pp. 2-3.

10. Rollo, p. 34.

11. Folder of Exhibits, p. 4.
12. Folder of Exhibits, p. 5, including dorsal portion thereof.
13. Rollo, p. 34.
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 14. Id. at 79-80.
15. Id. at 79.

16. Id. at 34-35.

17. Id. at 81-86. Penned by Judge Iluminado C. Monzon.
18. Records, Vol. I, pp. 3-10.
19. Id. at 47-53.
20. Id. at 99-102. Penned by Judge Zorayda Herradura-Salcedo.

21. See Notice of Appeal dated June 19, 2002; id. at 103.
22. Id. at 105-117. Penned by Associate Justice Mari or P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate
Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this
Court).

23. Id. at 123-128.

24. See Order dated January 30, 2007; id. at 145-146.
25. Id. at 124.
26. Id. at 184-185.
27. Id. at 181-186.

28. See Order dated April 28, 2008; id. at 201-203.

29. Id. at 263-265.
30. Id. at 287.
31. Rollo, pp. 44-67.
32. Id. at 66.

33. Id. at 61.

34. Id. at 61-62.
35. Id. at 62.
36. Id. at 63-64.

37. CA rollo, pp. 82-106 and 136-152.

38. Id. at 139.
39. Id. at 87.
40. Rollo, pp. 32-40.
41. Id. at 38-39.

42. Id. at 39.

43. CA rollo, pp. 236-243.
44. Id. at 246-255.
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 45. Rollo, pp. 42-43.
46. See Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Avestruz , G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015, 751
SCRA 161, 171, citing Jao v. BCC Products Sales, Inc., 686 Phil. 36, 41 (2012).
4 7 . New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC , 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005), citing Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86.
48. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Avestruz, supra note 46, at 172.
49. Gepulle-Garbo v. Garabato, G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015, 746 SCRA 189, 198-199.
50. Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of a person may
be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person
because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of
the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
51. Bautista v. CA , 479 Phil. 787, 792-793 (2004), citing Vda. de Bernardo v. Restauro , 452
Phil. 745, 751-752 (2003).

52. Folder of Exhibits, pp. 9-10.

53. See Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) dated September 10, 1998; rollo, pp. 107-
108.
54. Id. at 89-91.
55. Id. at 19-21.
56. Samalio v. CA, 494 Phil. 456, 463 (2005).
57. See Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 678 Phil. 358, 414 (2011).

58. Bautista v. CA, supra note 51. See also Bernardo v. Ramos , 433 Phil. 8 (2002); and
Manzano v. Perez, Sr., 414 Phil. 728 (2001).
59. TSN, August 3, 2009, pp. 14-15.
60. Id. at 19-21.

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