CONFLICT RESEARCH GROUP

COLLAPSE OR ORDER?
QUESTIONING STATE COLLAPSE IN AFRICA
Working Paper N° 1 May 2005

Timothy Raeymaekers
Research Fellow

Abstract

In the aftermath of 9/11, the problem of state ‘collapse’ appears again on the agenda as an important question of global security.
Nevertheless, the academic discussion has not come much further than pof conflict dynamics inrgence of various new ‘orders’ that move
beyond traditional state capacities. The discussion on state collapse thus seems to be placed in a growing deadlock between classical
state-centrist approaches – which keep pointing at functional problems – and more society-oriented insights that try to explain other
political and economic loyalties that have emerged in the context of weak state performance. Both approaches nonetheless appear
increasingly incapable of defining and delimiting the notion of political order absent of an overarching state framework. While often
contradictory explanations exist about what may lead states to collapse, little grounding is provided as to what actually lays beyond
this witnessed breakdown of public authority. Besides the global war on terror, such grounding appears more necessary than ever if we
look at the continuing problematic nature of statehood in many parts of sub-Sahara Africa, a continent hitherto beset with endemic
warfare. Instead of a transition to peace and democracy, many conflict-ridden regions in Africa seem to evolve rather towards a situation
of ‘neither-war-nor-peace’, but in which the evolution of political (dis)order increasingly escapes our analytical and intervention
capacities.
This paper makes a first attempt to fill these blank spaces on the analytical map. It does so by explaining, first, the obstacles that
appear to be blocking an integrative approach towards the problem of state implosion. Second, it offers a first step into developing an
alternative framework for studying political order in situations of post state collapse’. The argument provided in this paper is not new: it
builds extensively on earlier theoretical and empirical insights into the limits of (particularly Third World) state capacities. What is new
though, is that it tries to integrate these views into the analysis of post-collapse situations.

Central to this approach is the notion of political power (or social control): taking as an entry point the “areas of domination and
opposition” that exist in the midst of state-society relations, it specifically looks at the different forces in society that try to monopolize
the three domains that are traditionally connected to modern state performance: the monopoly over violence, the allocation of economic
resources and the representation of a more or less ‘fixed’ population. Although obviously more sympathetic to more society-oriented
approaches, the presented view nonetheless tries to combine these with a more integrative model of state-society relations, which serves
to analyze how states and societies continue to constitute and transform one another in a context of withering of state capacities.
Introduction disparities of state performance in the modern state system
(including the normative and practical implications resulting
In the aftermath of 9/11, the problems of state collapse and from malfunctioning governments), the emergence of state
state failure have moved centre stage on the academic and collapse still seems to be considered almost as and end
policy agenda. While during the early 1990s, the implosion of state, or the product of a “degenerative disease” that ends
governments in countries like Somalia, Zaire and Burundi was with an extreme case of governance problems (Zartman,
still largely viewed as a ‘marginal’ phenomenon –associated 1995). As I will argue, this analytical opposition between
primarily with the incapacities of Third World rulers and the ‘normal’ states and ‘pathological’ state collapse is sustaining
effects of economic dependency (Ayoob, 1996; Mazrui, 1995; a dangerous metaphor, which increasingly obstructs our
Zartman, 1995; Zolberg, 1992) – today these events are raising analysis of political order in the absence of an overarching
concerns of an entirely different order. First, state failure is state framework. Moreover, it appears that international
believed to have evolved from a regional phenomenon to one interventions in such contexts of endemic state collapse is
reaching almost global proportions1. In recent analysis, the suffering from a conceptual crisis that cannot be overcome by
weak state capacities of countries like Sudan or Afghanistan simply limiting the problem of state collapse to institutional
are identified with the emergence of non-state actors who and societal failure. I believe that new insights are needed to
appear hostile to the “fundamental values and interests” explain, not only the different factors and trajectories that
of international society. Simultaneously, these actors are are leading to the implosion of the state and its structures,
exploiting the “power vacuum” left by malfunctioning but also and primarily, what lays beyond this perceived
governments to challenge the principles of the international breakdown of authority – and how we should visualize and
system itself (Yannis, 2002). handle the connections between state collapse and the larger
processes of social change.
Second, this shift of focus has also acquainted state
collapse and failure with an important strategic dimension. As a starting point of this essay, I have taken te discussion
In contrast to the early 1990s – when the world seemed launched some three years ago in the issues of Development
primarily preoccupied with the humanitarian and regional and Change and the Third World Quarterly, and which have
consequences of state failure – failing and collapsing states raised these points in detail. Furthermore, I have taken the
are now progressively interpreted as a potential source of suggestion raised by Spanger (2000) to treat state collapse
international instability. Put bluntly, the perception of state as a “process” rather than as an end state. In my opinion, it
failure has moved from a “strategic threat” to global stability is in this sense – namely as a process of social transformation
(Helman and Ratner, 1993), to a threat to the international resulting from specific institutional arrangements, that the
system of states as such. One view that has thus gained issue of state collapse should be understood. This insight
increasing popularity amongst strategic thinkers is to should enable us, not only to re-evaluate the connection
describe failed or collapsed states as dangerous breeding between state collapse and state formation in the modern
grounds of “instability, mass migration, and murder” world (in other words, to question what makes states work,
(Rotberg, 2002a), and – in the extreme case – as reservoirs and what fails to do so), but also to place the issue of state
and exporters of terror (Dorff, 1996; Rotberg, 2002a-b). This collapse in its specific social setting. As my main focus, I shall
vision has acquired a particularly acute dimension during the concentrate on sub-Sahara Africa, for the simple reason that
interventions of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are most cases of state collapse are situated on this continent.
both described as extreme cases of state collapse and failure. The aim here is to learn probably not so much about then to
Both countries have also become the subject of considerable learn from Africa, as this continent gradually seems to have
state-building efforts from the part of the international lost its monopoly in this area while nonetheless providing
community – but the results of which remain yet uncertain lessons to other cases.
(Cramer and Goodhand, 2002; Reno, 2003; Roy, 2004).
Defining the problem
Besides the analysis of the Global War On Terror, the current
policy and academic analysis of state collapse still suffers from
a number of considerable weaknesses. In the past, a number Three ideas currently dominate the vision on state ‘collapse’.
of analytical models have been proposed within the existing The first idea is that of institutional breakdown. In William
categories of analysis (Gurr et al., 2000; Carment, 2003), but Zartman’s meanwhile famous definition, state collapse refers
which do not specifically address the issue of state collapse to “a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate
as distinct from general political crises (Spanger, 2000). power), law and political order have fallen apart and must
Similarly, and as suggested by Milliken and Krause (2002) and be reconstituted in some form, old or new.” (Zartman,
Martin Doornbos (2002), the literature on state collapse and 1995: 1). Following this description, state collapse is thus
failure suffers from a number of dangerous flaws, the most primarily interpreted in terms of a collapse of government,
important of which are obscure definitions, and a blurring of and the reaffirmation of the structures of public authority is
causes and consequences. Most importanly: while academic subsequently seen as the prime garantor of the functioning
and policy analysis has mostly concentrated on the functional of society at large. An important consequence of this view is

Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa - Timothy Raeymaekers 2

that academic analysis should primarily look at possibilities contenders that start operating on their own account. The
for post-collapse intervention. To paraphrase the same author, immediate result is often an increase of armed violence and
the most important objective of the analyst should be to ‘Put lawlessness as well as a loss of political and economic space
Humpty Dumpty back together again’; the reconstitution of to the advantage of non-state armed actors: rebels, militias,
state power is thus seen as primary to the sometimes thriving bandits etc., that emerge from the authority crisis left by
survival of societal forces during situations of state collapse. withering government. In their search for economic advantage
In the last chapter of his book (called Putting Things Together (and in the absence of a regulating framework), these actors
Again), Zartman reaffirms this view, saying that the first commonly develop a number of extremely lucrative alliances
precondition for succesful analysis is a reaffirmation of the with external players including transnational crime syndicates
state: “in the search for answers, it is first necessary to reaffirm and armies from neighbouring states, which at the same time
that reconstruction of the state is necessary.” In addition, provide an important incentive for the prolongation of armed
because he believes that both the cause and the remedy to struggle. Breaking this “conflict trap” (Collier, 1995) thus
state collapse relate to “socio-political structures” rather becomes the prime concern for anyone interested in restoring
than the state itself, it is better in his opinion to reaffirm legitimate authority in such places affected by state collapse
the validity of the existing political unit in both theoretical and prolonged armed conflict.
and practical terms. In general, he concludes, “restoration
of stateness is dependent on reaffirmation of the precollapse
Interventionism and Transnationalism
state.” (Ibidem: 268)

The second feature of this analysis is that it generally The first problem regarding this analysis of state ‘collapse’
connects institutional breakdown to a breakdown of society, concerns the international intervention in today’s collapsing
which are consequently seen as two sides of the same coin. states. As argued by Reno, Duffield and others, the structural
The reason, according to Zartman, is that in a “weak” society, adjustment and privatization measures during the 1980s have
there exists a general inability to refill the institutional gaps contributed to a great degree to state collapse, essentially
left by withering government structures: the organization and because incumbent state leaders used these resources to skim
allocation of political assets thus easily fall into the hands of off profit for their own personal advantage. As soon as bilateral
“warlords and gang leaders”, who often make use of “ethnic aid fell away, some of these states quickly collapsed as a result
elements” as a source of identity and control in the absence of decreasing resources (Somalia and Zaire are a case in point).
of an overriding social contract that binds citizens to the state Contrary to the 1980s, aid is now increasingly seen as a second
(Ibidem: 7). Although technically speaking about the causes opportunity “to make modernity work” and hence to counter
of state ‘failure’, this view is also expressed in Baker and the inequalities and impoverishment that resulted from these
Ausink (1996), Gros (1996) and Dorff (1996), who all mirror structural adjustment and privatization measures during the
the societal breakdown associated with state collapse against 1980s (Schuurmans, 2000). Especially since the latter part
a fracturing of the principles of ‘good governance’. A good of the 1990s, NGOs and international agencies have become
summary of this view is offered by Robert Dorff, who asserts more and more prepared to intervene in the world’s conflicts,
that in relatively ‘weak’ states, “democratic institutions and with interventions that go from massive humanitarian and
processes can easily fall prey to the forces of uncertainty development aid to co-ordinated programmes for re-creating
and fear, especially when there are indigenous actors ready, political space and accelerating political and economic reform
willing, and able to exploit human emotions for the sake (Doornbos, 2002). Apart some notable exceptions – some of
of redirecting or killing democratic reforms.” (Dorff, 1996: which offer a particularly apocalyptic and anti-interventionist
21) State failure, society failure and state collapse are thus view on contemporary conflicts (Kaplan, 1994), state collapse
essentially placed on a development ‘continuum’, where one is currently understood as forming part of a development
stage of failure almost automatically leads to another. While malaise, to be reversed by a combination of smart sanctions,
the difference between these stages is primarily one of degree, external assistance and institution-building. At the same
the common feature of these accounts is that they trace both time, this new development ideology has progressively
state collapse and state failure to a common origin, namely made development into an extension of the global quest
“an overall breakdown of the corpus of formal and informal for security, of which the general aim is to “reconcile the
rules governing society, accompanied by the disappearance of inevitable disruption of progress with the need for order.”
formal authority or its emaciation.”2 (Duffield, 2002)

A final feature of this analysis is its preoccupation with armed More often than not, however, these interventions have
conflict. Countries like Somalia and the Democratic Republic involved a radical shift in the political and economic
of the Congo are commonly described as extreme examples of structures of the societies that stand on the receiving end,
a Hobbesian battle of ‘all against all’, in which national state including sometimes the wholesale take-over of a number of
agents are incapable of restoring a monopoly over the means services that are traditionally associated with the functioning
of force, and the provision of wealth and security gradually of the modern state (Clapham, 2002; Duffield, 2001; Ottaway,
become fragmented amongst a number of extremely violent 2002). Consider for example a city like Goma in eastern DR

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Congo, where a wide range of services that are traditionally of governance: “with collapse,” says Doornbos, “new kinds
connected to state performance (such as water supply, housing, of situations arise… novel forms of domination may emerge
and infrastructure) have all been taken over by non-state around the introduction of new frameworks of political and
actors, including sometimes religious institutions (Verhoeve, economic accountability and control.” (Doornbos, 2002).
2004). To build a house, open a business or pick up a drivers
licence, people do not to address themselves anymore to the Some recent case material suggests that the combination of
malfunctioning or abandoned state administration, but instead withering statehood and violent armed conflict sometimes
try their worth through the different parallel institutions that have given leeway to the formation of new, non-state centres
ensure their access to valuable public resources. Similarly, of authority based on alternative models of social control.
international aid can also confirm existing imbalances that Though regarded as a classic example of state ‘collapse’,
form the basis of state collapse: in Sudan, southern refugees Somalia has seen the emergence of a mosaic of local polities
have been assisted by international aid agencies during their evolving around new arrangements between local strongmen,
stay in the north, while simultaneously taking away their family and clan elders and political (militia) leaders that provide
chances to development in their home region (Duffield, Somali citizens with variable levels of ‘governance’, if not
2002). In some cases, this neglection of the internal dynamics ‘government’ (Menkhaus, 2003a-b, 2004). Such arrangements
of communal conflict can even lead to situations that prolong have included the reassertion of community leaders in the
situations of state implosion, in that it disregards the changes establishment of sharia courts, a demobilisation of militias to
in the definition and negotiation of power and authority at a the advantage of private security forces, and cross-regional
local level (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). This lack of arrangements in the area of informal commerce. Similarly,
contextuality inevitably has consequences for the quality of in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Vlassenroot and
both policy and academic analysis, since a good understanding Raeymaekers, 2004) – and to a lesser extent also in Sierra
of the processes underlying armed conflict and state collapse Leone (Richards, 1996), the Sahel countries (Roitman,
is crucial to determine the ways in which to approach the 2002) and Nigeria (Reno, 2002), the conflict environment
problem of political reconstruction in ‘post-conflict’ situations resulting from public authority collapse seems to have led to
(Milliken and Krause, 2002) the emergence of new institutional arrangements between
grassroots populations, armed actors and various ‘elites’ at
This problem becomes especially evident when we analyse a local and national (or regional) level that are fostering
the many ‘transition’ processes that are currently underway new strategies of social, economic and political integration.
in various parts of sub-Sahara Africa – but which have so Although no single designation appears capable of capturing
far produced very mixed results (Menkhaus, 2004). While these “cross-currents and contradictions” (Young, 2004), the
the sudden “outbreak of tranquility” in countries like Sierra new configurations of politics and violence in contemporary
Leone, Liberia and Angola might have been welcome news Africa have nonetheless raised renewed questions about the
for a continent that has hitherto been beset by seemingly interconnection between international and local networks
unending violence, it remains evident that, more often than of negotiation and authority, as well as central state power
not, these countries will continue to live the consequences of (Callaghy, Kassimir and Latham, 2001; Newbury, 2002).
communal violence in ways that will be determining for their
respective political futures; other regions – like the eastern The previous examples essentially tell us two things. First,
parts of the DR Congo, northern Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and they suggest that for the communities inhabiting these areas,
Sudan – seem to evolve on the contrary into a permanent participation in state structures is not self-evident. This
situation of low-intensity, low-casualty conflict, which could observation has a particular relevance for our understanding
be described ‘neither-war-nor-peace’3. Although it is too early of post-colonial statehood in sub-Sahara Africa which, as we
to draw definitive conclusions, a thorough understanding of know, did not always fulfil the empirical elements by which
both these ongoing conflict dynamics, ánd of their possible states are ordinarily recognized (Jackson and Rosberg,
consequences for post-conflict reconstruction, thus remain a 1982). In particular, it resonates with earlier observations,
matter of utter concern to both analysts and policy-makers made amongst others in Ghana, Guinea and Congo-Zaire, on
interested in the impact of armed conflict and state implosion the growing disengagement of citizens from state structures
in the global ‘periphery’. to the advantage of more ‘informal’ political and economic
arrangements (Azarya and Chazan, 1987; see also: MacGaffey,
The State versus Society? 1987, 1991). The comments of Azarya and Chazan are useful
for our analysis, in that they cut right throught the state-
The second problem relates to the fact that state collapse society divide that has characterized so many studies on
cannot automatically be equalized with society collapse. Africa for the last three decades. Essentially, they say that
Martin Doornbos explains that there is often a misplaced both the hailers and the critics of the African state suffer from
tendency to look for single causes and explanations of an “engagement paradigm”, i.e. they primarily focus on the
state collapse, and similarly to propose single, preferably political center and examine post-colonial developments in
‘quick-fix’ solutions as to its reconstitution. In other words, terms of the differential participation of various groups and
collapse of government does not necessarily include collapse their influence on state performance. What this paradigm

Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa - Timothy Raeymaekers 4

neglects, however, is that the engagement in state-related in terms of the representation of the ‘national’ population
operations may not always be worthwile. In some cases, and the state’s autonomy in providing security and welfare.
the risks of (over)exposure and (over)dependence on the The second reason, scarcely hinted at in some recent case
state may even outweigh the spoils of participation. Hence, studies, is that in the continuing negotiation of local ‘order’,
subscription to state functions (commonly summarized in three elements commonly dominate the local debate,
the monopoloy on violence, the allocation of welfare and the namely: the monopoly on violence, the allocation of wealth,
representation of the population in terms of their political and the representation of local populations (or the issue of
participation) will always form the subject of a ‘rational’ but legitimacy); notable attention in this respect is being paid to
embedded calculation both from the part of ‘elites’ as well as the provision of security and protection (Reno, 2003). What
the ‘grassroots’ population. is needed in order to understand the continued importance
of more ‘private’ or informal ways of creating political order
So, rather than an accomplished fact, the state seems to more in sub-Sahara Africa is not so much a reaffirmation or a
of an ideal to which state agents might have aspired, but rejection of the African state as such, but rather a detailed
which they seldom achieved (Milliken and Krause, 2002). Even analysis of societal responses to processes of state implosion;
state-centrists now accept the idea that policy outcomes are elementary insights into the workings of authority, ánd of the
necessarily contingent upon forces emanating from both the actors engaged in its formulation, should thus enable us to
domestic and the international field. For example, according give additional insights into the continuing struggle between
to Teda Skocpol, “‘state autonomy’ is not a fixed structural the state, society and their relation to social change.
feature of any governmental system,” because government
organizations necessarily undergo important transformations An important question that arises from this is where we
both in relation to other organizations as to societal groups. have to locate authority in such contexts (for a discussion,
(Skocpol, 1985: 8, 14). In order to reach their ideal, state see Callaghy, Kassimir and Latham, 2001). In the past, most
agents have to weigh their actions against the projects and attention appears to have gone to the external dimensions of
desires of other social forces (such as the church, the mafia, civil conflict and its connection to state implosion or formation.
economic entrepreneurs), but which do not necessarily share In today’s ‘complex emergencies’, NGOs have gradually taken
the same view on how to establish an integrated domination over a range of social services that are traditionally connected
over society. To paraphrase again Azary and Chazan, the to the state. This is obviously going to have a decisive impact
persistence of these social forces in sub-Sahara Africa clearly on how political order is being interpreted and organized
“indicates how conditional allegiance to the state apparatus in situations of ‘post-collapse’. Meanwhile, local actors
really is.” By continuing to withold resources from the state, (traders, militia leaders, economic and political elites) have
by locating authority at ever lower levels of society, and by developed new linkages with the outside world that are meant
combining traditional roots with modern additions, these to strengthen their advantage over competitors, and reduce
forces may continue to form “innovative organisms capable state interference in their internal affairs. Such insights
of achieving self-sufficiency and generating new experiments serve very much to define the different obstacles local and
at communal definition.” To the extent that they continue to national actors face in terms of their participation in state-
resist state control, these forces may even “[contain] the seeds building projects. However, we are still largely in the dark as
of a more massive realignment of power relations predicated to the internal dimension of power relations in the context of
on the dispersion of state functions to (…) collectivities that state collapse. In other words, these external dimensions and
the state claims to represent.” (Azarya and Chazan, 1987: influences do not explain how we should visualize the internal
128-129). organization of political constituencies in the context of state
implosion. Immediate questions that arise in this regard are
A second lesson, maybe paradoxically, is that is that the thus, first, how do local elites and societies adapt to a context
decline of state influence does not necessarily have to mean of growing state absence and civil war? In other words, what
its total collapse in terms of future orders. On the contrary, the strategies are developed at a ‘grassroots’ level of society to
focus on societal responses to state policies seems to reassert confront the physical and economic insecurity resulting from
the continued importance of the state in understanding social state collapse? Second, what is the impact of such adaptation
processes in Africa. There are two reasons for this. The first processes on the changing notion of political ‘order’? As this
reason is that withdrawal from the state cannot be treated analysis suggests, it might not be very useful to confront
as an immoral fact: while on the one hand, engagement in opposing concepts like the ‘state’ and ‘society’, order and
informal economies or withdrawal from public institutions disorder or even traditional and modern. What seems to be
might underline the possibility of preserving a certain called for in such situations is rather a detailed analysis of
standard of living – and sometimes even create a number actors and their interests – i.e. “whose interests are served
of political and economic opportunities – these decisions and whose interests matter” – and of the relation between
will simultaneously deplete the state apparatus of its core the representatives of ‘old’ and ‘new’ orders. Let me end by
functions. Therefore, the calculations of ‘grassroots’ actors is proposing a model to support this analysis.
sure to have a decisive influence on how sovereign statehood
is going to be formulated in any future ‘order’, and this both

Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa - Timothy Raeymaekers 5

Beyond State Collapse: Towards an Integrated same time integrate them into political frameworks associated
Approach with more ‘traditional’ forms of authority (for an illustrating
example, see De Boeck, 1996). To evaluate the impact of such
An alternative model, drawing on earlier insights put forward mobilization on the definition of authority, we must look once
by authors like Azarya and Chazan, Timothy Mitchell and Joel again at the role of different ‘borderguards’, i.e. strongmen,
Migdal, views state ‘collapse’ not so much as an end state or community leaders and other actors that determine the
breakdown, but rather as a culmination point in the continuous interaction between aspiring individuals and the outside
struggle, between various forces in society, to control the world. I will come back to this point further in this paper.
three core functions that are generally connected to state
performance. In my earlier notes, I identified these functions What this view proposes, therefore, is to look at the state and
as (1) the provision of security – commonly supported by a modernity not as a one-way process but as a contradictory
monopoly over the means of force; (2) the allocation of welfare entities that often acts against themselves. One view that has
– or the ability to extract and allocate economic resources; and thus been proposed is to compare the state to the international
(3) the representation of a ‘national’ population inhabiting a ‘anarchical society’ (Reno, 2003), in which the unifying idea
fixed territory4. This model could be identified as the state-in- of an international ‘society’ is constantly being confronted
society model. According to Migdal: with its fractionizing parts (this is the international system
of ‘states’). However, such view might again offer a distorted
“The state-in-society model… zeroes in on the conflict- image of reality because in most cases, even the idea of a
laden interaction of multiple sets of formal and informal unified society seems absent. What is needed, therefore, seems
guideposts for how to behave that are promoted by different not so much an affirmation of societal values that confirm
groupings in society. These multiple groupings, all of the persistence of patronage or plunder logics, but rather a
which use subtle and not-so-subtle rewards and sanctions detailed analysis of the conflict-laden interaction between the
– including, at times, out-and-out violence – to try and get forces in society that are trying to establish social control.
their way, comprise loose-knit informal collections of people
as well as highly structured organizations with manifold This brings me to the second idea, which is the idea of society.
resources at their disposal. In short, all societies have In analyzing society response to state ‘collapse’, we should
ongoing battles among groups pushing different versions be careful not to fall in the trap layed by classical liberal and
of how people should behave. The nature and outcomes of marxist theorists, and who explain societal forces essentially
these struggles give societies their distinctive structure and in terms of shared norms or class interests. As I said, part of
character.” (Migdal, 2001, p. 11-12: my stress) the problem might indeed be that a common set of norms
may be completely absent in situations of violent state
Two ideas dominate this approach. The first concerns the implosion. In this, I could agree partly with the argument of
state. The rather straitforward proposal offered by Migdal Zartman and other state-centrists, who say that in situations
and the state-in-society model is to abandon the Weberian of state collapse, societal forces are generally incapable to
inspired analysis of the state that has hitherto disconnected rebound and fill the positions left by withering government.
theory from practice. As I suggested, this sort of analysis is However, at second sight this might not be due to the absence
unlikely to provide understanding into the survival of informal of binding norms (which were already absent before state
politics in Africa, because it persistently sets out an ideal collapse), but rather because certain actors choose not to
model of (unexisting) statehood against conceptually derived participate in state-related operations6. Rather than limiting
forms of state authority that are consequently described as ourselves to a discussion on norms, what seems to count then
‘failed’, ‘weak’ or ‘collapsed’5. Such concepts could maybe be are more the interests and calculations of those people for
useful for constructing typologies of existing states (be it in or whom participation in state structures is not considered as
outside historical contexts), but they are rather unuseful if we worthwile. The basis of these calculations might be much more
want to analyze the workings of authority at an inner level of down-to-earth than anybody has so far assumed.
society. As I also suggested, this ideal view of statehood and
its derivants is based on a rather unidirectional interpretation Finally, it has to be emphasized that the absence of a common
of modernity that is largely contrasted by the facts. Contrary set of norms or interests does not mean that there are no rules
to the classical view on social mobilization, which views the governing society. On the contrary, what emerges in situations
adherence of individuals to modern values in terms of their of state ‘collapse’ in sub-Sahara Africa, in many cases could
‘culture contact’ and rational benefits, a growing number be described as a continuation of neopatrimonialism without
of cases seem to demonstrate a rather peculiar coexistence the state. What I mean by this is that the social ‘contract’
of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ lifestyles that binded citizens to the state – and which in many cases
in modern societies (Migdal, 1974). Especially in situations consisted of citizens ‘fending for themselves’ – has tended
where state structures are absent (or almost absent), the to devolve completely to the individual level. Thus, in
participation in such modern things as urban life, trade and the eastern parts of the DRC – amongst other places – the
resource exploitation appears to create a thriving ability of “reciprocal assimilation” (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999) that
individuals to internalize basically ‘modern’ values, but at the often existed between local ‘strongmen’, national politicians

Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa - Timothy Raeymaekers 6

and the state administration appear to have been replaced by outcome of the ongoing process of state formation (Milliken
more individual arrangements between local actors seeking and Krause, 2002). This observation could be summarized
economic and political advantage. The state-in-society in the statement of Eisenstadt about empires. According to
model offers a first step to also analyse the meaning of these Eisenstadt, “collapse, far from being an anomaly, both in
arrangements for the (re)constitution of social order. the real world and in social evolutionary theory, presents in
dramatic form not the end of social institutions, but almost
always the beginning of new ones”: 1988: 293). As proposed
Applicability
by Milliken and Krause, the points of dialogue for future
analysis could thus be twofold. On the one hand, we should
The advantages of this state-in-society model for analysing start thinking hard about the possibility that state collapse
situations of ‘state collapse’ are manifold. First, it finally enables presents a plausible, and perhaps even likely, outcome for
us to abandon the asphyxiating state-society dichotomy that some states in the system. One way to approach this question
has hitherto characterized so much of the analysis of state- could be to examine the possibility that the forces that produce
society relations in Africa. Instead, it forces us to look at strong and legitimate states in some contexts can – interacting
the various arena’s of “domination and opposition” between with different local and historical conditions – generate weak
the forces that are competing for social control. The central and collapsed states in others. On the other hand, it becomes
question one has to pose when confronting state ‘collapse’ more and more important in this context to look at what lies
is thus not: how and when did the state stop performing beyond state collapse: this analysis would not only include an
its functions, but how have particular social forces adapted identification of the forces that are arising out of the depths of
themselves to incremental changes in the state framework, public authority crisis generated by state implosion, but also
and what has been the effect of these accommodations on the how these forces are competing to establish a society-wide
process of social change. So, instead of looking at institutional domination. As suggested, this analysis should focus both on
strengths and weaknesses, this analysis looks at two-way the ‘old’ political framework including (remnants of) the state
state-society struggle for political domination; as said, this apparatus, national politicians and local strongmen, as well
struggle does not occur between the state and society as such, as ‘new’ forces emerging from public authority crisis including
but rather between different social forces that are competing warlords, militias and rebel forces (or so-called ‘non-state
for social control. These forces include various layers of actors armed actors’) and the grassroots population.
such as national and local politicians, the (remnants of) state
administration, as well as local ‘strongmen’, crime groups and
religious institutions.

Following this line of thought, the implosion of state

structures is thus understood, not merely as an institutional
‘collapse’ or breakdown, but as a culmination point in the
struggle, between various forces in society, to establish an
integrated social control over society. Within this scope, we
could possibly draw up two analytical extremes that result from
this struggle for domination. The first possible outcome is that
one force emerges which can mobilize the necessary resources
and support (or normative framework) to dominate locally,
and extend its power towards a society-wide domination. The
second, more probable option, however, is that the struggle
for social control remains undecided, which thus results in a
dispersed domination and a fragmentation of social control. In
such case, the conflict for social control is likely to devolve to
ever lower levels of society, and – as suggested by the Somalia
and DRC case – by a strengthening of communal boundaries
to the advantage of more ‘ethnic’ or ‘clan’ based polities.
Whatever the outcome of this struggle, what one has to look
for are thus not merely the institutional arrangements that
are hollowed out at the national level, but first and foremost,
how local communties are adapting themselves to a situation
of state absence, and what these accommodation strategies
are telling us about the redefinition of authority.

A second advantage of this model is that it does not look at

state collapse as an ‘abnormal’ event, but as one possible

Collapse or Order? Questioning State Collapse in Africa - Timothy Raeymaekers 7

Endnotes

1
Consider for example the statement by Helman and Ratner (1993): “From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia in Europe, from
Somalia, Sudan, and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of
sustaining itself as a member of the international community.” (my stress)

2
What distinguishes Gros’ account is that he distinguishes both between various types of state ‘failure’, as well as the conditioning factors that lead to its
emergence. First, his taxonomy of failed states offers an interesting first step to differentiate between states that meet none of the criteria that are commonly
connected to modern statehood, and those that meet some of them. Gros thus differentiates between five types of failed states that are subsequently placed
on a ‘continuum’. These are the anarchic state (exemplified by Somalia), the anaemic state (whose energy is sapped by counter-insurgency groups seeking
to take over authority, such as Haiti), the phantom of mirage state (characterized only by a “semblance of authority” like Congo-Zaire), the captured state
(which only represents part of the polity, like Rwanda and Burundi), and the aborted state (which failed even before the state was consolidated, like Bosnia
and Angola). An important last note is that the categories mentioned by Gros should not be interpreted as fixed stages: states may “straddle them at particular
points in their history”, and they may linger on in a stage without necessarily jumping to another. Second, he names five conditioning factors that lead states to
fail. These factors are economic malperformance, lack of social synergy (or the pervasiveness of patronage), authoritarianism, militarism and environmental
degradation caused by rampant population growth.

3
The term ‘violent peace’ might offer an approximative sense of such contexts, since it refers to the relative difference that often reigns between long periods
of low-intensity war and ever shorter periods of limited physical and economic ‘security’ (Duffield, 2001)

4
These functions are generally accepted as three core functions of the state (Giddens). In an alternative vision, Del Rosso (1995) and Gros (1996) add some
aditional elements such as the control over the natural environment and private sector activities. However, these authors immediately stress that redistributive
and regulative functions (such as the regulation of labour relations and the redistribution of capital) cannot be part of this categorisation, lest one wants to run
the risk of rendering the concept “almost meaningless” (Gros, 1996).

5
As suggested, Weber would certainly not agree with such an extension of his concept: see Granovetter and Swedberg (2001).

6
A useful example in this respect was offered by René Lemarchand (1997) in his discussion on the democratisation process in Zaire.

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