THE MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF

GRANADA (1350–1492)

Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea

PRIMARILY CREATED TO FIGHT THE MUSLIMS, the Iberian military orders 1 engaged
in both the practices of defensive war and the deployment of the characteristic art
of offensive war. The Iberian military orders’ first century of existence was
marked by their fight against the Almohads 2 and their participation in key
Christian conquests of the first half of the thirteenth century. By the latter part of
the century, the expansion of the Kingdom of Castile, by then the only one sharing
a border with Al-Andalus, slowed down. Confrontations with the Muslims
resumed during what came to be known as the War of the Strait (of Gibraltar, c.
1291–1350), 3 which broke out between Castile and an alliance comprised of the
North African Benimerines 4 and the Nasrids of Granada, 5 the sole Muslim-ruled

1
The military orders are religious orders of the Catholic Church. Most of its members were allowed to use
violence against the enemies of Christianity. See, for example, Alan Forey, The Military Orders from the
Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries (London, 1992); Alain Demurger, Chevaliers du Christ. Les
ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Age (XIe–XVIe siécles) (Paris, 2002).
2
The Almohad Caliphate had its origin in a religious movement created by Ibn Tnjmart. His followers are
known as Almohads. They conquered the Maghreb (1146–1269) and al-Andalus (1146–1228). See
Ambrosio Huici Miranda, Historia política del imperio almohade, 2 vols. (Tetuán, 1956–7); María Jesús
Viguera, coord., El retroceso territorial de al-Andalus. Almorávides y almohades. Siglos XI al XIII,
VIII—vol. 2 of Historia de España. Menéndez Pidal (Madrid, 1997).
3
B. Rosenberger, “El problema del Estrecho a fines de la Edad Media,” Actas del II Congreso de
Historia de Andalucía. Historia Medieval (I) (Córdoba, 1994), 245–87; Manuel Rojas Gabriel, “De la
estrategia en la ‘Batalla del Estrecho’ durante la primera mitad del siglo XIV (c. 1292–1350),” El siglo
XIV: el alba de una nueva era (Soria, 2001), 223–69; Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, “La guerra del
Estrecho,” Guerra y Diplomacia en la Europa Occidental. 1280–1480. XXXI Semana de Estudios
Medievales (Pamplona, 2005), 255–93.
4
The Benimerines or Marinids were a Berber dynasty. They dominated the western Maghreb between
mid-thirteenth century and mid-fifteenth century. See Mohammed Kably, Societé, pouvoir et religion au
Maroc à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris, 1986); and G. Chiauzi, F. Gabrieli, Guichard, et alii, Maghreb
Médièval: l’apogée de la civilisation islamique dans l’Occidente arabe (Aix-en-Provence, 1991).
5
The study of the Nasrids of Granada in Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Granada. Historia de un país
islámico (1232–1571) (Madrid, 1989); Rachel Arié, L’Espagne musulmane au temps des nasrides
(1232–1492) (Paris, 1990); L. P. Harvey, Islamic Spain. 1250 to 1500 (Chicago-London, 1990); María
Jesús Viguera, ed., El reino nazarí de Granada (1232–1492), vol. VIII—3 and 4 of Historia de España.
Menéndez Pidal (Madrid, 2000); Rafael G. Peinado Santaella, ed., Historia del reino de Granada. I. De
los orígenes a la época mudéjar (Granada, 2000).

14
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 15

territory left on the Iberian Peninsula. 6 The military orders based in the Castilian
kingdom also took part in this conflict.
During the mid-fourteenth century instead, the Benimerines entered a period
of decline and this allowed the Nasrids to regain the last peninsular towns under
African control: Marbella (1361?), Ronda (1361) and Gibraltar (1374). 7 The loss
of Gibraltar and the internal power struggle of the Marinids ended the possibility
of a renewed outbreak of the so-called War of the Strait. The North Africans were
in no condition to embark on new expeditions into Castilian territory and even less
so to reconquer towns along the Iberian coast. From then on out, the war was
exclusively waged against the Nasrid Emirate of Granada, which could no longer
expect North Africa to provide valuable assistance to tilt the balance. This is why
the series of military episodes that took place between then and the final conquest
of the emirate can collectively be referred to as the War of Granada, even though
military actions were often followed by long-lasting truces. In this article, we will
examine the participation of the military orders in this armed conflict, the only one
that could justify the original reason for which the orders were created. 8

THE FRONTIER WAR DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

Pedro I of Castile’s rise to power (1350) brought an end to the frontier war and
initiated a lasting truce. This atmosphere of peace grew stronger during the rule of
the emir Muতammad V, who favoured an alliance with Castile that would allow

6
D. W. Lomax, The Reconquest of Spain (London, 1978), chapter 7.
7
Miguel Ángel Manzano Rodríguez, La intervención de los benimerines en la Península Ibérica
(Madrid, 1992), 293–305.
8
For the bibliography of the Iberian Military Orders see Derek W. Lomax, Las Órdenes Militares en la
Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media (Salamanca, 1976); Carlos de Ayala et al., “Las Órdenes
Militares en la Edad Media Peninsular. Historiografía 1976–1992, I. Reinos de Castilla y León,” and “II.
Corona de Aragón, Navarra y Portugal,” Medievalismo. Boletín de la Sociedad Española de Estudios
Medievales, 2 (1992), 119–69, and 3 (1993), 87–144; Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, “La investigación
sobre Órdenes Militares en la Edad Media hispánica durante los últimos decenios: Corona de Castilla y
León,” Las Órdenes Militares en la Península Ibérica, I. Edad Media, ed. Ricardo Izquierdo Benito and
Francisco Ruiz Gómez (Cuenca, 2000), 9–31; Philippe Josserand, “L’historiographie des Ordres
Militaires dans les royaumes de Castille et de León. Bilan et perspectives de la recherche en histoire
médiévale,” Atalaya. Revue française d’études médiévales hispaniques 9 (1998), 5–44; Carlos de Ayala
Martínez, “Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la Edad Media. Aproximación bibliográfica,” Estudios
sobre las Órdenes Militares. Lux Hispaniarum, Madrid, 1999, 425–57; Carlos de Ayala Martínez and
Carlos Barquero Goñi, “Historiografía hispánica y órdenes militares en la Edad Media, 1993–2003,”
Medievalismo. Boletín de la Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales 12 (2002), 101–61; Luis
García-Guijarro Ramos, “Historiography and History: Medieval Studies on the Military Orders in
Spain since 1975,” The Military Orders. 3: History and Heritage, ed. Victor Mallia-Milanes
(Aldershot, 2008), 23–43.
16 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

him to consolidate power. 9 This period of peace was reflected in the internal
reorganization of the emirate, a time of thriving cultural growth and the
construction of the madrassah of Granada and some of the most splendid buildings
of the Alhambra. At the same time, internal problems in Castile and confrontations
with Aragon and Portugal diminished the importance of the frontier war and led to
the military orders’ involvement in other conflicts.
Even so, occasionally an incident would interrupt the otherwise peaceful
relations, providing the military orders with the opportunity to face the Muslims in
battle. A situation of this nature arose between 1359 and 1362, brought on by a
power struggle within the Granadan emirate. Muতammad V had been removed
from power and replaced, first by IsmƗ ‫ލ‬Ưl II and then by Muতammad VI. The latter
tried to take advantage of the Castilian-Aragonese War to gain ground along the
frontier, but the Castilians struck back effectively with an expedition consisting of
6,000 knights, including the masters of the military orders. In January of 1362, the
orders also participated in a new Castilian incursion, the goal of which was the
taking of Guadix, an important fortified town. The offensive was badly planned
and ended in disaster for the Christians. The military orders were particularly
affected by the consequences of this unfortunate foray. The Santiago commander
of Biedma was killed in battle, and the Calatravan master and eight of his brothers
were taken prisoner, although they were released shortly thereafter. Perhaps it was
this display of inefficacy on the military orders’ part that made Pedro I forgo their
participation in the two successful expeditions he led into the Granadan plain,
which resulted in a truce being requested by the emir of Granada. The meeting
between the rulers of Castile and Granada was arranged by Gutierre Gómez,
Hospitaller prior and adelantado mayor (governor) of Murcia. The Castilian
monarch then ordered the capture of Muতammad VI, an operation the master of
Santiago took part in, and his subsequent assassination. 10
After he was restored to power, Muতammad V was named a knight of the
Order of the Band. 11 From then on the emblem of this monarchical order became
the basis for the coat of arms of the Nasrid dynasty, represented in the plasterwork
of the Alhambra. 12 This serves as evidence of the solid alliance that formed

9
Clara Estow, “War and Peace in Medieval Iberia: Castilian-Granadan Relations in the Mid-Fourteenth
Century,” The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay
(Leiden, 2005), 151–78.
10
Pero López de Ayala, Crónica de Pedro I, in Crónicas, ed. J. L. Martín (Barcelona, 1991), 263–70 and
272–5; Francisco de Rades y Andrada, Chronica de las Tres Ordenes y Cauallerias de Sanctiago,
Calatraua y Alcantara (Toledo, 1572), Chronica de Calatraua, f. 57.
11
The Order of the Band was a secular order of knighthood established by Alfonso XI of Castile in 1332.
See D’Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton, The Knights of the Crown. The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood
in Later Medieval Europe, 1325–1520 (Rochester, New York, 2002), 46–95. The Ordenamiento de la
Banda (compilation of rules of the order) in Alfonso Ceballos-Escalera y Gila, La orden y divisa de la
Banda Real de Castilla (Madrid, 1993).
12
Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Las guerras de Granada en el siglo XV (Barcelona, 2002), 217.
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 17

between the Castilian monarch and the Granadan emir. It therefore comes as no
surprise that Muতammad V backed Pedro I during the Castilian civil war (1366–
1369). The emir declared holy war against the troops of Enrique of Trastamara,
attacking Jaén and Úbeda and devastating Algeciras, which he held until 1379.
During the course of this conflict, in 1368 to be exact, the Granadan troops and
those of Pedro I jointly placed Cordoba under siege. Amongst those defending the
town were Gonzalo Mejía of the Order of Santiago and the Calatravan Pedro
Muñiz de Godoy, both masters fighting on the side of Trastamara. However, in this
case we are mainly looking at an episode of the Castilian civil war and not an
incident directly related to the War of Granada. 13
Once Enrique II of Trastamara’s victory in the civil war had been cemented,
the aforementioned masters of Iberia’s two most important military orders were
asked to negotiate an eight-year truce with the emir of Granada. Thus ensued a
long period of peace, given that the custom of renewing or prolonging the truces
lasted until practically 1406. This overall climate of peace was peppered with
occasional military episodes, which usually took place during the months between
the end of the previous truce and the signing of the next one. This is exactly what
happened in 1379, when the Santiago commander of Caravaca informed the
council of Lorca that they were at war with the Moors. In August of that same
year, the Calatravan master Pedro Muñiz de Godoy, who was the adelantado
mayor of the frontier, signed a peace treaty in the name of Juan I of Castile (1379–
1390) with the rulers of Granada, Fez and Tlemcen for a period of four years,
under the condition that the prisoners and livestock captured during the past truce
would be returned to Granada. This incident demonstrates that occasional bursts of
violence also occurred during the truces. In October of 1382, the master of
Calatrava renewed the signed peace treaty for yet another four years. 14
The good relationship between the Castilians and Nasrids worried Pedro IV of
Aragon, who feared that the Granadan offensive could affect his territory.
Therefore, in April of 1384, the monarch put pressure on the Orders of the
Hospital, Montesa, and Santiago to defend the southern frontier of the kingdom.
The king’s fears were not unfounded since the Granadan incursions into Valencian
territory during the first few months of 1386 were undeniably devastating.
However, in the end, a willingness for peace gained the upper hand on both
sides. 15 These campaigns also affected the Kingdom of Murcia, which was located
between the emirate and the southern frontier of Aragon. In this context, it is worth
mentioning a document issued by Pope Clement VII in June of 1386. In this

13
López de Ayala, Crónica de Pedro I, 408–9; Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Granada. Historia de un
país islámico, 157–62.
14
Francisco de Asís Veas Arteseros, Colección de Documentos para la Historia del Reino de Murcia,
XII. Documentos del siglo XIV (Murcia, 1990), no. I, X, XI, CXXVII and CXXX.
15
Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, La frontera amb l’Islam en el segle XIV. Cristians i sarraïns al País
Valencià (Barcelona, 1988), 167–70.
18 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

document, issued upon the request of the Order of Santiago, the pope conceded a
full indulgence for three years to anyone who contributed to maintaining the
order’s frontier fortresses, which were mainly located in Murcia or along the
frontier extending into Jaén. 16 Frontier problems of a more serious nature,
however, were not registered. Only after the death of Muতammad V in 1391 did
occasional raids affect the Santiago seigniory of Caravaca, but this issue did not
impede the on-going and overall tendency towards peace between Castile and
Granada. 17
However, in April of 1394, with the recently renewed truces in full effect, the
Portuguese master of Alcantara, Martín Yáñez de Barbudo, led an expedition into
the Granadan lowlands. The expedition was atypical and exceptional among the
orders’ military activities. The master sent two of his squires to challenge the
Granadan emir Muতammad VII in his name. The goal was to have the emir
acknowledge the falseness of Islam and recognise Christianity as the true faith. If
he did not do so, the master of Alcantara would challenge him to a battle in which
he would use only half as many men as those fighting on the Nasrid side. The
squires were treated rudely at the Granadan court, resulting in the master’s
decision to carry out his enterprise.
When an emissary of the master informed Enrique III of Castile (1390–1406)
of the expedition, the king and his royal council voiced their opposition. They did
not want to risk a break in the freshly signed truce with the emir. The fact that the
number of troops accompanying the master was low—consisting of 300 lances and
1,000 rather unprepared foot soldiers—did not bode well for the venture having a
positive outcome. Nevertheless, Martín Yáñez decided to continue with his
expedition, setting out with a raised cross alongside his banner, because for him it
was a question of honour. During his march towards the frontier, he was joined by
many foot soldiers from the city of Cordoba and its surrounding lands. The master
was accompanied by a hermit, Juan del Sayo, who had prophesied a guaranteed
victory and that no Christian would perish in battle. The master firmly believed
that he would be victorious and receive divine assistance in battle, given the just
nature of his cause. The common people who had joined him were also imbued
with the message transmitted by the hermit. Conversely, the knights in his
company, just like other Castilian magnates, tried in vain to dissuade the master
from his objective.
In the end, the expedition crossing the frontier into Granadan territory
consisted of the aforementioned 300 lances and 5,000 foot soldiers. After
surrounding the frontier tower of Ejea (in Puerto Lope), they were confronted by a

16
Antonii Francisci Aguado de Cordova et al., Bullarium Equestris Ordinis S.Iacobi de Spatha (Madrid,
1719), 355.
17
Pero López de Ayala, Crónica de Juan I, in Crónicas, ed. J. L. Martín (Barcelona, 1991), 693; Pero
López de Ayala, Crónica de Enrique III, in Crónicas, ed. J. L. Martín (Barcelona, 1991), 800.
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 19

Muslim army of 5,000 knights and 120,000 foot soldiers. The Granadan army
separated the Christian infantry from the cavalry and completely massacred the
latter. Every last member of the cavalry died, including the master himself. Only
1,500 Castilian foot soldiers managed to flee towards Alcalá la Real, while another
1,200 were taken prisoner. All of the others were killed. The Muslim side only lost
500 foot soldiers.
Upon hearing the news, Enrique III immediately apologised to the emir of
Granada and asked that the truce be maintained. He argued that the master of
Alcantara’s adventure had been undertaken without his permission. The master of
Santiago, Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa, was also in favour of prolonging the peace.
Muতammad VII accepted the proposal. The truce was later extended until the
death of the Castilian monarch in 1406. 18

THE CHANGE IN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EMIRATE OF GRANADA DURING THE

FIFTEENTH CENTURY

For decades the Emirate or Sultanate of Granada had survived as the only Muslim
territory on the Iberian Peninsula, because, in part, the Kingdom of Castile had a
vested interest in this arrangement. As a vassal of Castile, the emirate paid the
kingdom a sizeable annual tribute, a permanent necessity for a royal treasury
facing the herculean task of financing the building of a strong, centralized,
monarchical power. On the other hand, the existence of an Islamic frontier gave
the Castilian monarchs the option of pushing the nobility towards a war with
Granada, with the promise of vast monetary rewards in return, whenever it suited
them. This model was based on a war of attrition, which did not aim for the
destruction of the Nasrid emirate, but sought to profit from its existence.
With the arrival of the fifteenth century, the Castilian attitude towards the
Granadan sultanate began to shift. Gradually, the idea that the Nasrid emirate
should be destroyed completely and its territory integrated into the kingdoms under
the Castilian Crown began to take root amongst the political society. The reasons
for this transformation were ideological, economic, and political in nature.
First of all, there were ideological reasons based on a revival of the crusader
spirit. Interest in the values of chivalry, which emphasised the importance of
courage and fame, had been reawakened. It was difficult to imagine a better stage
on which to display these values than the Granadan war, a sacralized battle against
the enemies of faith, and hence the most just battle possible at the time.

18
López de Ayala, Crónica de Enrique III, 849–56 and 888. For the expedition of Martín Yáñez de
Barbudo see too Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, “Portugueses en la frontera de Granada,” En la España
Medieval 23 (2000), 75–85.
20 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

Secondly, reasons of an economic nature arose. The pontificate of Martin V

established a fixed fee for the obtainment of indulgences, the collection of which
was to be directed by the political powers. This intermediary role provided the
monarchs with guaranteed profits, given that in 1430 the pope granted indulgences
to anyone who helped the king in his campaign against Granada by contributing
eight ducats. 19
Thirdly, there were politically motivated reasons. The Castilian monarchs
strengthened their power through political arrangements that increasingly
resembled absolute royal authority, making way for a monarchical
authoritarianism with an absolutist calling. At this point, the Christian creed also
became an instrument for political affirmation and legitimization. Power was
increasingly perceived as religiously exclusory, and non-Christian vassals did not
fit into this model. The Catholic Monarchs would take this idea to its ultimate
conclusion, but its development stretched across the decades preceding their reign.
As a result, the aggression towards vassals that did not practice the Christian
orthodoxy was increasingly seen as legitimate. 20
Hence, the fifteenth century was marked by a re-evaluation of the Granadan
war as well as the culmination of the medieval Castilian monarchy’s process of
consolidation. The royal power used the military orders to thoroughly and
adequately fulfill both of these undertakings. Therefore, a resurgence of the
Granadan conflict usually coincided with milestones of the authoritarian monarchy
as well as with particularly significant attempts to assert royal control over the
military orders. In the end, both undertakings and the exploitation of the military
orders would reach their fullest expression during the reign of the Catholic
Monarchs.
As previously indicated, the destruction of the Emirate of Granada was the
ultimate goal of this new approach. The military campaigns undertaken to achieve
this goal are what is known in historiography as the War of Granada, which had
four significant milestones 21: the campaigns of Fernando of Antequera, the crusade
of La Higueruela, the crusade led by Enrique IV, and the final conquest of the
Nasrid sultanate by the Catholic Monarchs between the years 1482 and 1492. 22

19
Archivum Secretum Vaticanum, Reg. Vat. 365, ff. 76v–7; Reg. Vat. 372, ff. 224v–5v; José Goñi
Gaztambide, Historia de la bula de la cruzada en España (Vitoria, 1958), 342.
20
Carlos de Ayala Martínez, Las Órdenes militares Hispánicas en la Edad Media (siglos XII–XV)
(Madrid, 2003), 471–7.
21
Luis Suárez Fernández, Las Órdenes Militares y la guerra de Granada (Sevilla, 1992), 6 and 10.
22
For the war and the frontier see Juan de Mata Carriazo y Arroquia, En la frontera de Granada (Sevilla,
1971); Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada (ed.), La incorporación de Granada a la Corona de Castilla
(Granada, 1993); Manuel Rojas Gabriel, La frontera entre los reinos de Sevilla y Granada en el siglo XV
(1390-1481): Un ensayo sobre la violencia y sus manifestaciones (Cádiz, 1995); Miguel Ángel Ladero
Quesada, “La frontera de Granada, 1265-1481”, Revista de Historia Militar, número extraordinario, año
XLV (2002), 49-121; Ladero Quesada, Las guerras de Granada en el siglo XV.
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 21

Precisely these four landmarks in the conflict with Granada coincided with events
that were particularly important to the solidification of monarchical power. In this
case, the logic at work is as clear as day. Only when the monarchy’s power was
solid within the kingdom, and it could risk all of the necessary economic and
military resources, were the offensives against the emirate effective.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF FERNANDO OF ANTEQUERA (1407 AND 1410)

During the first few years of the fifteenth century, Muতammad VII carried out
several frontier campaigns that particularly affected certain seigniories of the
military orders. This was the case in 1404 when he attacked Morón, an enclave of
the Order of Alcantara, or when, two years later, the same fate befell Caravaca,
Bédmar and Estepa, all of them encomiendas of Santiago. In October of that same
year, 1406, the Granadan troops won an important victory against the Castilians at
Los Collejares. 23
The Castilian response to these attacks was coordinated by infante (prince)
Fernando, brother of Enrique III, who, following the death of the monarch in late
1406, became the regent for his nephew Juan II of Castile (1406–1454). The
campaign against Granada took place during the year 1407, and the military orders
played a crucial role. Thus, the comendador mayor of Alcantara occupied the
fortress at Pruna in coordination with the master of Santiago, Lorenzo Suárez de
Figueroa, who was in charge of frontier operations. In the meantime, the infante
had blocked the Strait of Gibraltar to prevent Granada from receiving help from
Africa. He then, with the symbolic sword of Fernando III, 24 conquered Zahara and
prepared the siege of Setenil, all with the support of the Orders of Santiago,
Alcantara and Calatrava. It was precisely the master of this latter order who, at the
helm of 400 knights and in collaboration with the local militias of Cordoba and
Jaén, led an incursion into the Granadan plain to prevent the besieged from
receiving help. However, in October the Granadan forces managed to break the
siege. In 1408 a truce was signed, which lasted until 1410. 25
Once the peace accord expired, infante Fernando made it his goal to undertake
a massive campaign against the Nasrid emirate with the ultimate aim of
conquering it completely. At this political juncture, the regent was interested in
gaining legitimacy in order to solidify his privileged position at the forefront of
Castilian politics. To this end, the infante wanted to associate himself with the

23
Alonso de Torres y Tapia, Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1763), II, 194; Ladero
Quesada, Granada. Historia de un país islámico, 167–8.
24
Crónica de Juan II de Castilla, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo y Arroquia (Madrid, 1982) 129–31.
25
Rades, Chronica de Sanctiago, f. 54; Rades, Chronica de Calatraua, f. 68v; Torres y Tapia, Crónica
de la Orden de Alcántara, II, 195–6.
22 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

most highly prized symbols of the Hispanic crusade such as the sword of Fernando
III and the banners of St. James and of San Isidoro of León 26. It goes without
saying that the military orders, institutions that represented the essence of the
crusader spirit, had to form part of this enterprise. The Orders of Santiago and
Alcantara participated, 27 whereas the Calatravans did not. Their lack of
involvement might have been due to the internal schism dividing the order at the
time. Furthermore, the masterships of Santiago and Alcantara had been handed to
two sons of the infante, Enrique and Sancho, both minors at the time, as a clear
indication of the tight control the regent wanted to wield over the orders. The
campaign culminated in the taking of Antequera (1410), an outstanding military
performance, earning the infante the surname with which he would enter the annals
of history. The victory occurred during an extremely delicate time of the Western
Schism and had the support of the Avignon papacy of Benedict XIII, whom the
Castilian kingdom answered to, and even of the Pisa pope, John XXIII. The
success was skillfully used by infante Fernando who, thanks to a convincing
propaganda campaign, managed to heighten the effects of this resounding military
victory, thus achieving the ideological objectives of the enterprise. 28
Furthermore, the potential military and territorial repercussions of the victory
were few, because a truce was once again signed that same year, 1410, and
extended over subsequent years. As we have already seen, the truces did not mean
that absolute calm reigned along the frontier. Occasional skirmishes were not
uncommon. One of these took place in October, 1424 when the commander of
Morón, of the Order of Alcantara, led his vassals into battle against the Granadan
enclave of Ronda. The booty they obtained vanished before any of the
corresponding taxes were paid. 29

THE CRUSADE OF LA HIGUERUELA (1431)

The second important milestone in the War of Granada, the crusade of La

Higueruela, was not an exception to the overall tendency and also corresponded to
a moment of reinforcement in monarchical power. It took place immediately
following Álvaro de Luna’s important victory over his main rivals, the Infantes of
Aragon, which was sealed by the truce of Majano (1430). That same year, taxes

26
With these symbols, the infante triumphantly entered in Antequera and later in Seville. See Crónica de
Juan II de Castilla, 394 and 400. Too Juan Torres Fontes, “Don Fernando de Antequera y la romántica
caballeresca,” Miscelánea Medieval Murciana, 5 (1980), 105.
27
Rades, Chronica de Sanctiago, f. 54v; Torres y Tapia, Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara, II, 212–15.
28
Luis Suárez Fernández, Juan II y la frontera de Granada (Valladolid, 1954), 14–15.
29
Archivo Municipal de Morón de la Frontera, 1, ff. 93v–4; Bonifacio Palacios Martín, ed., Colección
Diplomática Medieval de la Orden de Alcántara (1157?–1494), 2 vols. (Madrid, 2000–3); I, no. 826, 827,
and 830; Torres y Tapia, Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara, II, 250–1.
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 23

were collected in the Castilian kingdom, which had been approved by the Cortes in
order to cover the expenses of the war with Granada. This fiscal measure,
completed with the swift obtaining of loans to finance the enterprise, was
accompanied with preparatory military actions such as the efficient recruitment of
troops and the repairing of frontier fortresses. 30 The campaign was officially a
crusade since it had the necessary spiritual approval of Pope Martin V. 31 The
crusade’s objective was to strengthen the monarchy’s authority and legitimize the
position of the condestable of Castile (the armies’ highest dignitary) as the
quintessence of royal authoritarianism. There was no better tactic than leading a
holy war, particularly against the Muslims, 32 since it represented the very essence
of the highly praised chivalric values.
The end goal of the campaign was the city of Granada itself. On July 1, 1431,
the Castilian army won an important victory in the battle known as La Higueruela,
fought in the areas surrounding the city. It is significant that the crusade’s banner
was carried by Alonso de Estúñiga, a knight belonging to the house of Álvaro de
Luna. Upon their victorious return to the Castilian camp, the clerics came out to
meet Juan II of Castile and his condestable, holding crosses aloft and singing the
Te Deum. The monarch dismounted, knelt before the cross and thanked God for
his victory. Afterwards, he sent letters to all of the cities, notifying them of the
victory and ordering processions as an expression of gratitude for the divine
assistance. 33
It is truly difficult to imagine a military climate this closely identified with
holy war. In reality, the victory was a political and ideological one above all else.
The legitimizing approval of the Church and the religious paraphernalia inherent to
a crusade contributed to the enterprise being imbued with the elements necessary
for the battle—regardless of its insignificant material results—to have the
resonance and repercussions sought by the condestable. One of Álvaro de Luna’s
main objectives was to gain ideological support for his cause. The new pope,
Eugene IV, celebrated the victory as a triumph of Christendom as a whole. It
finally seemed like control over the last Muslim-ruled corner in the Christian West
was within reach. Don Álvaro’s popularity soared and with it the credibility and
legitimacy he needed to consolidate his position as the veritable strongman of
Castile and the executorial arm of monarchical power. Thus, the objectives coveted

30
Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de Castilla y León (Madrid, 1861–1903), 5 vols., III, 98, 100, 102, and
119; Juan Abellán Pérez, Colección de Documentos para la Historia del Reino de Murcia, XVI.
Documentos de Juan II (Murcia-Cádiz, 1984), no. 167.
31
Archivum Secretum Vaticanum, Reg. Vat. 365, ff. 76v–7; Reg. Vat. 372, ff. 224v–5v.
32
The spiritual approval of new Pope Eugene IV (June 13, 1431) in Archivum Secretum Vaticanum,
Reg. Vat. 371, ff. 62v–4v and ff. 120–1v.
33
Crónica del Serenísimo Príncipe Don Juan, segundo Rey deste nombre por Fernán Pérez de Guzmán,
ed. Cayetano Rosell, Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla, II, “Biblioteca de Autores Españoles” (Madrid,
1953), 277–695, 498–9; Goñi, Historia de la bula de la cruzada en España, 342–5.
24 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

by the royal favorite had been accomplished, not so, however, the ultimate goal of
the crusade and the military enterprise. The memory of the triumph of La
Higueruela far surpassed the life of Don Álvaro and was captured for posterity in
the frescoes that adorn the Sala de Batallas (Hall of Battles) in the monastery of El
Escorial.
In this holy and just war, the military orders, symbolizing the full embodiment
of the crusader spirit, had to be present. Of the four Castilian-based military orders
only the Order of Santiago remained at the sidelines during the Granadan crusade,
because the order’s master, infante Enrique of Aragon, was the main adversary of
Álvaro de Luna and his monarchical politics. The other Castilian-based orders—
Calatrava, Alcantara, and Hospitaller—were all directly involved in the crusade.
Their symbolic value as well as the fact that they constituted permanent armies
made their involvement in an enterprise that required the mobilization of all
available human and material resources practically essential. On the other hand,
the orders also had a personal interest in participating in a crusade that justified
their very existence.
Of the aforementioned military orders, the Order of Calatrava, and its master
Luis González de Guzmán, played a particularly crucial role. In the absence of the
Order of Santiago, the Calatravans represented the most notable order amongst
those making up the Christian army. Thus, it was only natural that their role would
be important. The Calatravan master prepared his contribution with the solemnity
required of someone participating in a crusade. The order contributed a total of 800
knights and 1,000 foot soldiers to the royal army, of which 160 were brother
knights. The others were vassals from the order’s seigniories of Martos and
Porcuna. All of the Calatravan troops participated in a traditional parade through
Porcuna, a township of Jaén, where the banner was blessed in the church of the
Calatravan priory of San Benito. Once they had joined the rest of the royal troops,
the master Guzmán was chosen to head one of the battalions or units that the
Christian army was divided into. 34 The collaboration of the remaining orders, on
the other hand, was far more modest. The Hospitallers participated under their
prior Rodrigo de Luna, 35 whereas the brothers of Alcantara who joined the crusade
did so without their master, who had been removed from power in early 1431. 36
The Calatravan master’s significant role was also due to the fact that he had
supported Álvaro de Luna since 1429. Luis González de Guzmán belonged to the
Consejo Real, an advisory council to the king, and held the post of frontier captain
in the bishoprics of Cordoba and Jaén. In the aftermath of Castile’s resounding
victory, both the Calatravan master and the adelantado Diego de Ribera played a

34
Rades, Chronica de Calatraua, ff. 68v–9r.
35
Crónica del Serenísimo Príncipe Don Juan, 496–9.
36
Torres y Tapia, Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara, I, 276–7.
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 25

decisive role in Ynjsuf IV’s rise to power in the Nasrid emirate 37 In early 1432, the
new emir, a puppet of Castilian interests, lost no time in signing a humiliating and
costly vassalage agreement with Juan II of Castile. At that time, Álvaro de Luna,
who had turned all of the events of the preceding months in his favor, was at the
height of his popularity. In return for supporting the cause of the condestable, the
master Guzmán was given the important city of Andújar that same year.38
However, Ynjsuf IV was weak and his government did not last long. His
successor Muতammad IX resumed the hostilities with the Castilians. The conflict
once again took on the characteristics of a war of attrition, without definitive
results. Don Álvaro, however, had no interest in ending a conflict that benefited
Castile and helped increase his popularity. The situation was drawn out until 1439
when the royal favorite was provisionally removed from the court and a new truce
was signed with the Nasrid emirate.
The war of attrition resulting from the triumph at La Higueruela also saw the
participation of the Castilian military orders. Successful episodes involving
members of the Orders of Calatrava and Santiago—who were participating at this
point—stood in marked contrast to the disaster of Écija (1434), which cost a dozen
commanders of Alcantara their lives, led to defeat by their master Gutierre de
Sotomayor, who was also acting frontier captain. On the other hand, that same year
the Order of Santiago took the castles of Solera and Huéscar, while in 1435 the
comendador mayor of Calatrava, along with other noblemen, went on a rampage
across the plain of Guadix 39

THE CRUSADE OF ENRIQUE IV (1455)

Upon assuming the Castilian throne, Enrique IV decided to resume the war against
Granada in an effort to divert the ambitions of the nobility and increase his own
popularity. 40 Since the enterprise supposedly had the lofty goal of eliminating the
Nasrid emirate—and required the customary tax collection to pay for it—the
monarch sought the assistance of Pope Callistus III. On the day of the monarch’s
coronation, the pope granted the expedition the privileges bestowed upon a crusade
for a period of four years. For the first time the Bull of Donation mentioned James
the Apostle, who had preached the gospel across Iberia, which would finally be
completely free from Muslim rule. The pope granted indulgences to those

37
Crónica del Serenísimo Príncipe Don Juan, 503 and 548.
38
Emma Solano Ruiz, La Orden de Calatrava en el siglo XV. Los señoríos castellanos de la Orden al fin
de la Edad Media (Sevilla, 1978), 75 and 79.
39
Ladero Quesada, Granada. Historia de un país islámico, 174–9; Crónica del Serenísimo Príncipe Don
Juan, 516–7 and 519–21.
40
Ana Echevarría Arsuaga, “Enrique IV de Castilla, un rey cruzado,” Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Historia
Medieval 17 (2004), 143–56.
26 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

participating in the campaign and to anyone providing it with financial assistance.

He also extended all of the privileges and immunities to the Granadan war that had
previously—following the fall of Constantinople—been granted to the general
crusade against the Turks. 41 The results of the initial campaign of 1455 were rather
meager. Nevertheless, and for the first time ever, the Castilian monarch managed
to have the payment of indulgences applied to releasing the dead from purgatory as
well. In this way, an enormously significant quantity of money was collected, 42
which, it seems, was only very sparsely invested into the Granadan war effort.
In fact, Enrique’s campaigns never grew into a war to conquer the sultanate,
despite what the overall resources and troops might lead one to believe. The
Castilians followed a strategy that involved four destructive expeditions between
1455 and 1458, combined with their intervention in the internal civil confrontation
of the emirate. The fact is that there were no grand military triumphs. In 1456 the
Castilians took Jimena de la Frontera, a fortified town in the region of Cádiz, but in
return Granada captured Solera, an enclave of Jaén. A sense of failure hung over
the crusade, which never met its initial, ambitious goals. Furthermore, the
monarch’s opposition spread rumours about the fraudulent use of collected funds,
the king’s cowardice and his close relationship to the Muslims. 43
The participation of the military orders in Enrique’s crusade did not bear the
same spectacular overtones displayed on previous occasions, partly because the
nature of the expeditions was quite different. That being said, it is worth noting the
important role played by the Order of Calatrava, whose master, Pedro Girón, was
one of the monarch’s key supporters and brother of the royal favorite. 44 He was an
essential factor in planning the war and the campaigns against Granada. 45 Neither
the brothers of Santiago nor of Alcantara could be led by their highest dignitaries
since both masterships were vacant at the time. Nevertheless, the comendador
mayor of Alcantara participated in the crusade with his knights and vassals 46,
while several members of Santiago—Gonzalo de Saavedra, comendador mayor of
Montalbán, Juan Fernández Galindo, commander of Reina, and Garcilaso de la
Vega, commander of Montizón—also took part. The latter’s heroic deeds against
the Muslims were particularly noteworthy. Furthermore, Fernán Gómez de

41
Crónica de Enrique IV de Diego Enríquez del Castillo, ed. A. Sánchez Martín (Valladolid, 1994),
146–7.
42
Archivum Secretum Vaticanum, Reg. Vat. 457, ff. 52v–3v; Crónica de Enrique IV de Alonso de
Palencia, introduction of A. Paz Meliá (Madrid, 1973), 3 vols., I, 66; Goñi, Historia de la bula de la
cruzada en España, 355–8.
43
Crónica anónima de Enrique IV de Castilla, 1474–1474 (Crónica castellana), ed. Mª Sánchez-Parra
(Madrid, 1991), 58–77.
44
In 1457, for example, the King sent instructions to the master for the campaign of the Vega de Granada.
See José Antonio García Luján, Treguas, guerra y capitulaciones de Granada (1457–1491). Documentos
del Archivo de los Duques de Frías (Granada, 1998), 79–81.
45
Crónica de Enrique IV de Diego Enríquez del Castillo, 151.
46
Torres y Tapia, Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara, II, 337.
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 27

Guzmán, the comendador mayor of Calatrava, participated in an expedition in

1455 that invaded the plain of Antequera and destroyed the fields of Archidona. 47
In any case, the military orders were very present on an ideological level and
in the political propaganda, given that the campaign was based on the founding
principles of the crusades. Therefore, Enrique IV took advantage of the vacant
masterships of Santiago and Alcantara and asked the pope to assign him the
temporary administration of both orders. In January of 1456, in response to the
Castilian monarch’s request, Callistus III named Enrique IV administrator and
governor in both spiritual and temporal matters of the two military orders due to
his “love of justice and piety, his fearlessness in defending the Christian faith and
his singular devotion to the Orders of Santiago and Alcantara.” In addition, the
pope gave the king permission to wear the cross on his chest as well as the habit
and insignias of the most glorious Apostle James, patron and advocate of the
Hispanic lands. He was also granted the same spiritual and temporal privileges as
the crusaders, masters, and knights of Santiago. That same year, the Roman pontiff
reduced the amount the Kingdom of Castile had to pay in general tithes—imposed
by the pope to finance the fight against the Turks—to 200,000 florins, and he later
gave half of this amount to Enrique IV for the Granadan war. 48
As administrator of the two military orders, the Castilian monarch went after
the extraordinary economic resources of these masterships, which, when applied to
the war and other activities, alleviated the fiscal pressure on the population. At the
same time, he had access to a perfect ideological tool with which to link royal
politics directly to the crusades. Thus, the identification between the military
orders—the quintessence of militant Christianity—and the monarchy was
complete and could be used to benefit the spreading of monarchical propaganda.
Despite all of this, the war continued in the same vein and showed a lack in
remarkable military results. Once again, the crusade had achieved its ideological
ambitions, but had failed utterly in terms of its territorial objectives.

THE CONQUEST OF THE EMIRATE OF GRANADA (1482–1492)

Due to the internal problems plaguing the reign of Enrique IV and the war of
succession that broke out following his death, an end to the Granadan question did
not come about until the definitive triumph of the Catholic Monarchs. 49 The idea
of eradicating the emirate was not new, but the monarchs heeded the vast wealth of

47
Crónica anónima de Enrique IV de Castilla, 26–30 and 40–4.
48
Archivum Secretum Vaticanum, Reg. Vat. 457, ff. 101–5; Reg. Vat. 442, f. 131; Reg. Vat. 422, f. 153;
José Rius Serra, Regesto ibérico de Calixto III (Barcelona, 1948), 2 vols., I, no. 1402–5, II, no. 2034;
Goñi, Historia de la bula de la cruzada en España, 363–5.
49
The Conquest of the Emirate of Granada (1482–1491) in Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, La guerra de
Granada (1482–1491) (Granada, 2001).
28 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

past experience and continuously and systematically mobilized and united troops
and resources in quantities heretofore unseen. The ideological argument remained
the same: the crusade against Islam. However, the threat posed by the Turkish
advance across the Mediterranean further reinforced this line of reasoning. More
importantly, the Catholic monarchy had embarked on an ideological project, which
required the conversion of the people of his territory to the Christian faith. In 1482,
Pope Sixtus IV granted the corresponding crusade bull, which favored the
participants of the enterprise as well as anyone providing it with financial
assistance. These circumstances attracted crusaders from France, Germany,
Poland, England, Ireland, and particularly Switzerland, 50 who were used as
auxiliary troops, given that most of the army consisted of Castilians. The financial
means provided by Castile, including donations by the nobility and cities, were
added to the crusade alms collected in Aragon. Calculations indicate that the war
incurred an overall cost of five million ducats. In the end, the contingents
mobilized for the campaign included between 11,000 and 13,000 knights and
40,000 and 50,000 infantrymen (maximum amounts), which, in combination with
the systematic use of artillery starting in 1485 51, explained the military success of
these operations. The final conquest of the entire emirate was made possible by a
combination of military victories, the widespread capitulation of the most
important cities—thus reducing the time needed to conquer towns—and taking
advantage of the political in-fighting in Granada to benefit the interests of the
Catholic Monarchs 52.
The military orders had to play a role in the last Granadan crusade, given that
its ideological overtones were far stronger and the calls for achieving a united faith
more fervent than in previous campaigns. The permanent availability of their
troops and their contribution to the campaign’s crusading spirit led to the orders’
active participation in the conquest of the Nasrid emirate. Obviously, the four
military orders based in Castile took part in the campaigns: Santiago, Calatrava,
Alcantara, and Hospital. They were joined by the Order of Montesa, led by the
order’s master, Philip of Navarre. The order’s troops fought in important military
actions in 1487. The political situation borne from the union of Castile and Aragon
greatly contributed to making this collaboration a reality.
Naturally, not all of the orders participated in this colossal military effort in
the same way 53. More than any other order, the contribution by the Order of

50
Archivum Secretum Vaticanum, Reg. Vat. 621, ff. 2v–13v; Goñi, Historia de la bula de la cruzada en
España, 374–8 and 656–68.
51
In 1485, Pope Innocent VIII granted the other crusade bull. See Archivo General de Simancas,
Patronato Real, 19, 10.
52
Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada (Granada, 1987); Miguel
Ángel Ladero Quesada, “Ejército, logística y financiación en la guerra de Granada,” La incorporación
de Granada a la Corona de Castilla, ed. Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada (Granada, 1993), 675–708.
53
The details of the contribution of the military orders in the Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 29

Santiago was particularly noteworthy. Its importance makes sense; after all, it was
the military order with the most economic resources and the greatest number of
troops. Furthermore, their contribution far exceeded that of any other lay or
ecclesiastical magnate. From 1482 onwards, when the military operations for the
conquest began, the master of Santiago, Alonso de Cárdenas, was sent to Écija,
whereas the master of Calatrava was placed in the region of Jaén. From his base in
Écija, Alonso de Cárdenas took charge of the western section of the frontier,
contributing, alongside other nobles, to the capture and subsequent defense of
Alhama, which he accomplished with 250 lances and the garrisons of the frontier
fortresses. 54
On the other hand, in 1483, the Santiago order played a leading role in the
crushing defeat at Ajarquía in the Malaga region. The order’s master was almost
killed and more than thirty of his commanders either died or were taken prisoner
by Granadan troops. Two years later, at the height of the war’s deciding phase, the
master managed to capture the town of Cártama. In 1486, the commander Martín
Vázquez de Arce died in the plains of Granada while accompanying his master, the
duke of the Infantado. He is remembered by posterity thanks to the lavish sculpture
that crowns his tomb, known as the Doncel de Sigüenza, a rendition of his likeness
in alabaster, a flamboyant cross of Santiago on his chest. During the summer of
1487, the troops of Santiago actively participated in the conquest of Malaga.
Gutierre de Cárdenas, the comendador mayor of Leon, was in charge of placing
the order’s cross and the standard of the Apostle James on the highest point of
Malaga’s citadel. 55 Finally, the troops of Santiago were directly involved in the last
phase of the conflict, with their master frequently leading the vanguard of the
Castilian army.
Next in terms of its involvement in the Granadan war was the Order of
Calatrava, which also came in second amongst the kingdom’s orders as far as
resources and troops were concerned. The master Rodrigo Téllez Girón answered
the royal summons in 1482 with 400 knights and several foot soldiers. However, in
July of that same year, the wounds he sustained during the failed siege of Loja cost
him his life. 56 The following year, the new Calatravan master, García López de
Padilla, participated in the destruction of the Vega of Granada. In 1485 he was

54
Crónica de los Señores Reyes Católicos don Fernando y doña Isabel de Castilla y de Aragón escrita
por su cronista Hernando del Pulgar, ed. Cayetano Rosell, Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla, III
(Madrid, 1953), 355, 365, 371–2, 375–6 and 382–5; Historia de los Reyes Católicos don Fernando y
doña Isabel escrita por el bachiller Andrés Bernáldez, ed. Cayetano Rosell, Crónicas de los Reyes de
Castilla, III (Madrid, 1953), 610; Suárez Fernández, Las Órdenes Militares y la guerra de Granada, 23–
4.
55
Crónica de los Señores Reyes Católicos don Fernando y doña Isabel de Castilla y de Aragón escrita
por su cronista Hernando del Pulgar, 415, 471 and 481; Rades, Chronica de Sanctiago, f. 72v.
56
Alonso de Palencia, Guerra de Granada, ed. Antonio Paz Meliá and study of Rafael G. Peinado
Santaella (Granada, 1998), 239.
30 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

present at the second disaster of Moclín, the same year in which a crucial
Calatravan Chapter approved the handover of the mastership to the Crown. Don
García served the Catholic Monarchs well, and they named him their chief
steward, member of the Consejo Real and considered him “the most loyal friend of
our house.” 57 From then on out, and due to his advanced age, he rarely, if ever,
fought on the front, and the Calatravan troops were led by the comendador mayor
Diego García de Castrillo or the clavero (key-bearer) 58 Gutierre de Padilla. 59
The participation of the Order of Alcantara in the Granadan conflict was
similar to that of the Order of Calatrava, occasionally even surpassing it, despite the
fact that its master, Juan de Zúñiga, did not play a particularly important role. At the
outset of the war, he could not participate, because he was underage, but by 1483 he
joined his troops in the destruction of the Granadan plain. Two years later, he was at
the battle of Ronda, leading 500 knights from his seigniories in Extremadura. In
1487, the master Zúñiga participated in the conquest of Malaga, during which the
order’s commander of Eljas died. He was also at the conquest of Vélez-Malaga,
where the commander of Heliche stood out for his spectacular performance. During
the campaign of Baza of 1489, on the other hand, the comendador mayor’s
performance alongside approximately thirteen commanders of the order was truly
exceptional. The other participating commanders presided over the encomiendas of
Almorchón, Lares, Belvís, Santibáñez, Elches, García Dávila, Patezuelo, Zalamea,
Morón, Peña, Quintana, Hierro and La Magdalena60.
Compared to the contributions made by the Hispanic military orders, the
Hospitaller Order barely participated at all. The only recorded involvement
occurred during the campaign of 1491, 61 when the Hospitaller prior participated
with 62 knights. Years earlier, during the expedition of 1485, the Order of St. John
had contributed 135 foot soldiers, who were vassals from their priory.
The military orders not only contributed troops to the Granadan war effort, but
also provided financial loans. Thus, in 1487, the master of Santiago issued a loan
in the amount of 2,000,000 maravedis for this purpose, much like the prior of St.
John did two years later, in the amount of 390,000 maravedis.

57
Ignatii Josephi Ortega et Cotes et al., Bullarium Ordinis Militiae de Calatrava (Madrid, 1761), 286.
58
In 1490, for example, the clavero was captain of the army of the Catholic Monarchs. See García Luján,
Treguas, guerra y capitulaciones de Granada, 118–19.
59
Crónica de los Señores Reyes Católicos don Fernando y doña Isabel de Castilla y de Aragón escrita
por su cronista Hernando del Pulgar, 365, 372, 386–7, 389 and 426; Rades, Chronica de Calatraua, ff.
80v–2v.
60
Torres y Tapia, Crónica de la Orden de Alcántara, II, 504–6, 518, 529, and 537; Crónica de los
Señores Reyes Católicos don Fernando y doña Isabel de Castilla y de Aragón escrita por su cronista
Hernando del Pulgar, 399, 403, 407, 412, 425, 429, 436, 447–50, 457, 463, 467, 469–70, 481, 485, 490,
493–6, and 499–503.
61
In 1491, Pope Innocent VIII renewed the crusade bull. See Archivum Secretum Vaticanum, Reg. Vat.
757, ff. 134v–40.
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 31

In conclusion, the contribution of the military orders to the war of Granada was
very important, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The orders participated in the
most important battles of the war. The contribution of the orders of Santiago,
Calatrava and Alcantara was especially significant. The Castilian monarchy always
wanted the collaboration of the orders in the war for his ideological and material
contribution. Nevertheless, the information regarding the real participation in the
war of Granada provides us with a clearer picture of the true contribution the
orders made to the Castilian troops overall, as can be seen in the following tables.
The troops belonging to the Iberian military orders were a noteworthy contingent
amongst those provided by the nobility and the ecclesiastical prelates during the
Granadan war. 62

62
Tables compiled by author from information in the Archivo General de Simancas (Valladolid), collected
by Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada, 31–3, 227–82 and 294.
32 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

TABLE 1
TROOPS OF THE MILITARY ORDERS O THE GRANADAN WAR (1482–1491)

1482 1483 1484 1485

FOOT FOOT FOOT FOOT
KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS SOLDIERS
SANTIAGO 270 – 300 – 196 1,486 600 1,230
CALATRAVA – – 450 1,000 – – – 1,000
ALCANTARA With other troops 519 253
HOSPITAL 135
TOTAL 270 750 1,000 196 1,486 1,119 2,618

1486 1487 1488 1491

FOOT FOOT FOOT FOOT
KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS SOLDIERS
SANTIAGO 612 1,000 1,214 2,061 1,760 2,355 962 1,915
CALATRAVA 321 1,175 381 507 400 700 266 263
ALCANTARA – – 755 427 105 –
HOSPITAL 62
TOTAL 933 2,175 2,350 2,995 2,265 3,055 1,290 2,178

TABLE 2
ARMY OF THE MILITARY ORDERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GRANADAN
CAMPAIGN OF 1487

LANCES FOOT SOLDIERS

MASTER OF SANTIAGO 1,200 2,500
MASTER OF CALATRAVA 400 1,000
GREAT COMMANDER OF CALATRAVA 150 –
MASTER OF ALCANTARA 700 500
 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 33

TABLE 3
TROOPS OF THE MILITARY ORDERS IN THE LAST MONTHS OF THE GRANADAN
WAR

JULY– AUGUST NOVEMBER– JANUARY– MARCH MARCH

1491 DECEMBER 1491 1492 1492
FOOT FOOT FOOT
KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS SOLDIERS KNIGHTS
SANTIAGO 787 1,512 400 500 1,181 2,079 200
ALCANTARA – – 100 – 294 – 200
HOSPITAL – – 30 – 30 – –

TABLE 4
TROOPS OF THE MILITARY ORDERS, THE ARISTOCRACY, AND THE CLERGY IN THE
GRANADAN WAR (1483-1491)

KNIGHTS KNIGHTS FOOT FOOT SOLDIERS FOOT SOLDIERS

KNIGHTS OF THE OF THE SOLDIERS OF THE OF THE
TOTAL MILITARY MILITARY TOTAL MILITARY MILITARY
ORDERS ORDERS (%) ORDERS ORDERS (%)
1483 4,546 770 16,93 % 3,640 1,000 27,47 %
1485 4,863 1,163 23,91 % 2,536 1,120 44,16 %
1486 3,509 933 26,58 % 3,256 1,175 36,08 %
1487 6,727 2,350 34,93 % 5,377 2,977 55,36 %
1489 7,461 2,265 30,35 % 5,795 3,055 52,71 %
1491 4,244 1,228 28,93 % 3,120 2,178 69,80 %
34 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

Map 1. The Military Orders and the War of Granada (1350-1410)

Map 2. The Military Orders and the War of Granada (1424-1456)

 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 35

Map 3. The Military Orders and the War of Granada (1482-1492)

Figure 1. The coat of arms of the Nasrid dynasty, represented in

the plasterwork of the Alhambra (Granada). All photographs by
the author with permission.
36 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

Figure 2. Citadel of Antequera.

Figure 3. Citadel of Antequera (detail).

 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 37

Figure 4. Luis González de Guzmán, Master of Calatrava. Miniature from the Bible of Casa de
Alba (f. 25v) (Biblioteca de la Casa de Alba, Palacio de Liria, Madrid). With permission.
38 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

Figure 5. Citadel of Archidona.

Figure 6. Citadel of Loja.

 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 39

Figure 7. Moclín.

Figure 8. Citadel of Moclín.

40 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

Figure 9. Doncel de Sigüenza (Sigüenza cathedral, Guadalajara).

Figure 10. Detail of the Doncel de Sigüenza (Sigüenza cathedral, Guadalajara).

 MILITARY ORDERS AND THE WAR OF GRANADA 41

Figure 11. Alhambra (Granada).

Figure 12. Citadel of Alhambra.

42 ENRIQUE RODRÍGUEZ-PICAVEA

Figure 13. Citadel of Alhambra (detail).

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