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Sophie Olu Wole Her Men Eu Tic

This document discusses Sophie Oluwole's hermeneutic approach to African political philosophy. It outlines her use of interpretation of Yoruba oral traditions like proverbs and Ifa corpus to develop her philosophical ideas. The author analyzes Oluwole's views on democracy and human rights within the hermeneutic tradition. While acknowledging her scholarly contributions, it also critically examines some limitations of her heavy reliance on hermeneutics. The paper aims to establish Oluwole's place within the emerging trend of hermeneutics in contemporary African political philosophy.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
104 views21 pages

Sophie Olu Wole Her Men Eu Tic

This document discusses Sophie Oluwole's hermeneutic approach to African political philosophy. It outlines her use of interpretation of Yoruba oral traditions like proverbs and Ifa corpus to develop her philosophical ideas. The author analyzes Oluwole's views on democracy and human rights within the hermeneutic tradition. While acknowledging her scholarly contributions, it also critically examines some limitations of her heavy reliance on hermeneutics. The paper aims to establish Oluwole's place within the emerging trend of hermeneutics in contemporary African political philosophy.

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Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM1

Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in


African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

Abstract: The intent of this paper is to discuss hermeneutics as one of the current
trends in African political philosophy using the works of the erudite female African
philosopher, Sophie A. Oluwole, as an exemplar. This paper explores the nitty-
gritty of the political thoughts of Oluwole on the riveted issues of democracy and
human rights in contemporary African socio-political discourse. It identifies the
limit of Oluwole’s hermeneutic approach and critically exposes some of the
shortcomings of hermeneutic thoughts on the subject-matter. Concerned about
the dearth of literatures by female African professional philosophers in the area of
African political philosophy, the paper concludes that Oluwole’s scholarly
erudition should inspire more female African professional philosophers in working
within any identified emerging trend(s) in African political philosophy, in so far
they are moved by it.

Keywords: political philosophy, human rights as hermeneutically given

Introduction

In his paper, “Four Trends in Current African Philosophy,” Odera


Oruka (1979) identified ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity,
professional philosophy and nationalistic ideological philosophy as the
defining trends that have contoured the discourses on African
philosophy2.The earlier political reflections, thoughts and juggling of
African nationalists and scholars in the mid-1950s to the 90s have been
described by Odera Oruka as the ‘African nationalist ideological
philosophy.’ This trend is an attempt in the area of African political
philosophy; it consists of works with focus on evolving new and unique
political theories that are pro-independence and anti-colonial in nature;
traditional and authentic in identity; as well as first-order reflections on how
best to arrange African collective life, political institutions and social
practices.

1Department of Philosophy, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos State, Nigeria,


[email protected]
2 In his Sage Philosophy (1990), Oruka added two more trends to the list of four making the

number to six trends in African philosophy. The addenda are African literary/Artistic
philosophy and African hermeneutic philosophy.
Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

Much as the political and discursive moods of the time when Oruka
wrote his piece on trends in African philosophy seems supportive of his
categorizations, some questions are left hanging as to the appropriateness or
otherwise of such delineation today. Theorizing in African socio-political
philosophy has come of age. Beyond the corpus of political thoughts of
African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, L.S. Senghor,
Sekou Toure, Kenneth Kaunda, Obafemi Awolowo, and Nnamdi Azikiwe
amongst others, today, there is growing avalanche of scholastic interests in
African political philosophy with diverse trends and focuses. This
development necessarily raises doubts as whether or not Oruka’s
identification of nationalistic ideological philosophy as a (and the only)
trend in African political philosophy still subsists.
We may ask: What are the general directions of discourse in African
political philosophy today? Are they in anyway fundamentally different from
the anti-colonial and post-colonial structuring of African states, which
defined the trend of nationalistic ideological discourse? Are there views that
can be authentically called ‘philosophical’ as well as ‘African’ in the works of
scholars that are brandished ‘nationalistic ideologists’ in Oruka’s typology?
Who can be termed an African political philosopher? Are there female
African philosophers who have made significant contributions within and
outside Oruka’s nationalist-ideological trend? What are the new (emerging
or well established) issues and orientations in contemporary African political
philosophy?
This paper is an attempt to respond to the above posers by locating
and bringing to the fore, an emerging trend in current African political
philosophy. This is the hermeneutic trend. Foremost representative of this
trend in contemporary African political philosophy are Tsenay
Serequeberhan, Theophilus Okere, Bruce B. Janz and Sophie A. Oluwole.
In de-gendering the African politico-philosophical space as a purely male-
dominated affair, this paper seeks to critically discuss the political
philosophy of a prominent African female philosopher, Sophie Abosede
Oluwole3. Our aim in this regard is to expose and establish her thoughts
3 Sophie Abosede Olayemi Oluwole is a leading figure in Yoruba philosophy. Born (and
bred) in 1935, Igbara-Oke, Ondo State, Oluwole’s parents were from Edo State, Nigeria.
Though by virtue of ancestral lineage, she is an Edo woman, but her deep grounding in
Yoruba culture makes her more of a Yoruba person. She had her primary education at St.
Paul’s Anglican Primary School, Igbara-Oke; from there she proceeded to Anglican Girls
modern school, at Ile-Ife in 1951. In 1953, she enrolled at the Women Training College,
Ilesha, where she finished with a class IV certificate in 1954. She had her first degree in
Philosophy in 1970; her Master of Arts degree in philosophy in 1974 and completed her
Ph.D thesis on Meta-ethics and the Golden Rule in 1984. With the successful defence of
her thesis, Oluwole broke the ice by being the first Ph.D in Philosophy awarded by a
Nigerian university, the University of Ibadan. Upon completion of her Ph.D with
specialization in metaphysics and ethics in Western philosophy, Oluwole started

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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

within the hermeneutic trend in a motley array of other new trends beyond
Oruka’s ‘nationalist ideological philosophy’ in contemporary African
political philosophy.
The rest of our discussion in this paper is organized in four sections. In the
first section, a discussion of the hermeneutic tradition in African philosophy
in which Oluwole’s political ideas find expression is attempted. The second
section takes us through her political thoughts and how they subsume
within the hermeneutic trend. In furtherance of our discourse, the third
section is a critical appraisal of Oluwole’s hermeneutical predilection and
some concluding remarks features in the last section.

Sophie Oluwole and the hermeneutic tradition in African philosophical discourse

Oluwole accepts the study of African oral tradition as a


precondition for the discovery of cogent philosophical principles. And
central to such a study is the hermeneutic method. The method of
hermeneutics does not guarantee truth, nor does it merely focus on the
analysis of propositions, rather, it makes different forms of life and thought
accessible to reflection through interpretation of life-world. Oluwole’s
interest is in the interpretation of the rich oral tradition using the Yoruba
exemplar of proverbs and Ifa corpus. In this hermeneutic study, as
Kolawole Owolabi (Kolawole A. Owolabi 2001, 158) rightly noted,
Oluwole attempts a deeper analysis and hermeneutic interpretation of the
various positions taken in the oral narratives, insisting that the philosopher’s
priority is to identify the primary concern of the Ifa verses in an attempt to
characterize the goal the thinkers wish to attain through thought. In
Oluwole’s words:

researching and writing on African philosophy, which is her area of interest. Oluwole has
enviable contributions to the enterprise of philosophizing in Africa. An incredible scholar
by all standards, Oluwole is one of the most prominent Nigerian philosophers in the world
today. The breadth and the depth of her scholarship are not only impressive but also
widely acknowledged through many awards and honours from institutions in African and
beyond. Being a philosopher is her profession; writing, publishing and speaking at public
gatherings are her passions; and living up to what she preaches is a habit. Oluwole’s
consummate passion for the teaching and critical promotion of African culture both in her
philosophical writings and outward advocacy is unflinchingly second to none. Given her
linguistic training in German and English languages together with cultural grounding in
Yoruba language, and her analytical philosophical background, Oluwole is theoretically
rigorous, methodologically nuanced and sophisticated in the art of criticism. Oluwole has
written on a wide variety of philosophical issues and her works cut across different areas of
Yoruba philosophy: metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, science, religion, jurisprudence,
gender studies and political philosophy. Our interest in this paper is to discuss her ideas on
African political philosophy, with emphasis on democracy and human rights. Her thoughts
on these issues necessarily partake in the hermeneutic tradition to which Oluwole belongs.

160
Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

My approach is to stay within the


disciplinary orientation of
philosophy. Contrary to the focus
of history and the social sciences,
philosophy’s primary endeavour is
not with what people do but what
they say, that is, verbal expressions
by human beings. That is why we
find that one of the most
commonly used phrases in
philosophy is “X said ….” Hardly
do we hear “Plato did” or “Russell
did.” Our references are always to
what some people said….Given
the undeniable fact that we have
little or no written documents in
which the actual sayings of our
progenitors are passed down to
us…, the words of our sages will
be used as the common
referential phrase, the Yoruba
people say. (Oluwole 2003, 423)

What drew Oluwole’s attention to studying African thought in the


authenticity of the languages in which they are expressed is the centrality of
the concern with what people say in the intellectual endeavour known as
philosophy. Employing therefore, the hermeneutic approach for the
reinterpretation of the deep reflection underlying the proverbial narratives
of what the Yoruba say, Oluwole discusses some philosophical themes:
justice, time, human rights, democracy, development, sexism, knowledge
and reality.
In what follows, we shall present selectively, some specific expositions of
how Oluwole partakes in the hermeneutic trend in African political
philosophy. In this regard, we will focus our discussion on the issues of
democracy and rights in Oluwole’s thoughts. We are aware that her political
thought is not simply encapsulated in these themes; we only focused on
these twin issues in this paper because they lurk beneath current discourse
in African political philosophy, and have indeed gained ample attentions of
scholars working in the field.
For Oluwole, Western philosophical study of law, legal and
democratic systems and human rights is not the only possible jurisprudence.
This is because oral tradition offers a veritable literature and database from
which traditional African thoughts and notions of law, democracy justice
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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

and human rights can be hermeneutically understood. Her thoughts on


these issues can be found in her works: “Democracy and Indigenous
Governance: The Nigerian Experience” and Democratic Patterns and
Paradigms: Nigerian Women’s Experience. Her other essays in African socio-
political philosophy include: “The Legislative Ought” (1988),“Democracy
or Mediocrity” (1989),“Culture, Nationalism and Philosophy” (1997),“The
Cultural Enslavement of the African Mind” (2001), “The Centrality of
Culture to Economic and Social Development” (2008) amongst others.

Sophie Oluwole’s political thoughts on democracy and rights

Two basic popular but erroneous views on democracy, in Oluwole’s


submission, are discussed in these works. One, contrary to the popular
conception of democracy as the “government of the people, by the people
and for the people,” which has led to the common view that democracy
itself is a form of government; Oluwole does not conceive democracy as
such. She faults this popular definition not just on the basis of the
ambivalent construal of the term “people” but essentially on the ground
that “the definition gives no inkling about the specific structure of the
political organization in a particular society” (ibidem, 419). The second
erroneous view of modern times, which Oluwole observes and discusses
through the hermeneutic method, is that a monarchy cannot be democratic.
With respect to the first issue, democracy, in her view, adequately
understood, is a theory that sets some basic [socio political] principles
according to which a good government, whatever its form, must be run.
(ibidem, 420) Such principles, which as she notes, exist in all African
traditional societies include those of justice, freedom, equity, accountability,
rule of law and liberty. These social principles are universal criteria for
distinguishing between good and bad governments. In other words, they are
features of democracy that are not culturally specific, and whose abrogation
inevitably produces tyranny.
To give a few examples; accountable government, the citizens’
rights to decide, speak and organize are essential to free political expression.
The universality of these principles notwithstanding, Oluwole notes that
African conception of her own interest, hopes, aspirations, etc. may
determine her own peculiar pattern of democracy without violating any of
the principles of freedom, liberty, rights and justice as these are embedded
in democracy generally.
It is against this background that Oluwole attempts to study in situ the
principles underlying the cultural, political, economic, social and justice
institutions in an African culture, with a view to showing explicitly, the
understanding of existing axioms within the historical African culture.

162
Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

Concentrating on the Yoruba, Oluwole hermeneutically explores a quantum


number of the principles of democracy and human rights in the peoples’
oral tradition.
Her conviction is that such approach will allow us to discover the
democratic nature of political organization in pre-colonial Yoruba culture; it
will also open our lenses to the principles that guided social relationship in
the people’s cultural milieu. She believes also that through a hermeneutic
understanding of such principles, and the adherence to them, we can arrive
at an authentic socio-political African theory that can be used as basis for
the entrenchment and development of democratic norms in contemporary
Africa. She is against the culture of swallowing hook and sinker some
foreign democratic patterns and paradigms and equally opposed to the idea
of going back to everything traditional.
According to her, “a total dependence on the paradigms and
patterns of democracy as practiced in many countries of Europe may not be
the only ideal way to progress” (Oluwole 1996, 28) because several
traditional socio-political systems in pre-colonial Africa hold some lessons
for contemporary Africa. Her urge is the need to critically examine and re-
evaluate different democratic systems in Africa pre-colonial times. (ibidem,
21) In this critical exercise, “there is the need to identify, analyse and
formulate specific paradigms which respect the positive values in our
different cultures and at the same, are not blind to new experiences”
(ibidem, 31). This is important because it will allow us to see better what
wrongs need righting and which rights have been wronged by the
contemporary system. Not until we have established this, we may be unable
to develop cogent new democratic structures and social habits that will
satisfy our cultural aspirations as well as development.
In Oluwole’s analysis, a distinction can be made between
“governance” and “rulership.” Among the Yoruba, the act of organizing
society is ijoba, which literally means “rulership.” The act of state
management by a group of (s)elected people is referred to as iselu. The
fundamental difference between ijobaand iseluis that while the Oba (king)
rules, and not expected to be involved in politics, that is, iselu, but to
exercise political power and authority, the political management of society
lies with the selected group of people, that is the oselu. This group, which
the Oba traditionally chairs, actually manages the political affairs of the state
(Oluwole, 2003, 421). But in contemporary times there is this distortion in
the usage of the word ijobato mean governance/government, especially
democratic type.
Given the traditional political roles and responsibilities attached to
distinction between ijoba (rulership) and oselu (state management), there is
the temptation to think that a monarchical system, which is typified of the
Yoruba political society, cannot be democratic. Oluwole shows this
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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

temptation as false by her analysis of the processes involved in the


appointment of an Oba in Yoruba societies. She describes the traditional
Yoruba political as constitutional monarchy though with some negative
aristocratic elements (Oluwole 1996, 23).
Pre-colonial Yoruba societies were kingdom based. Each of kingdoms
comprised a central town and several villages. The ruler of the whole
kingdom is called the Oba (king). A subordinate ruler, called Baale (village
head), ruled each of the subordinate towns and villages, and acknowledged
the suzerainty of the king. Every town was divided into quarters, and each
quarter is under the control of a quarter chief. Each quarter was made up of
many large family compounds each of which housed many nuclear families
(a nuclear family being a man and his wife or wives and their children) all of
whom claimed descent from one ancestor (Akintoye,
www.YorubaNation.org. Par. 1). The leader or head of a family compound
is called Oloriebi (family head). Each of these stratifications is interconnected
with the other with respective internal governments. The choice of who
governs at these various levels is done through democratic means. The
choice of the Baale and the Oloriebi is mostly based on age and prominence
in the ancestral tree of the village or compound, and each has a number of
royal families among which the Oba is chosen (Salami 2006, 69).

Contrary to popular belief, an Oba, in most Yoruba societies, is


neither arbitrarily appointed nor regarded solely as a divine representative
on earth. Ruling houses are traditionally established along the lines of the
number of wives a founding Obahad (Oluwole 1996, 23). So the title of king
was hereditary in the royal family group. So too were the titles of village
heads and quarter chiefs in their own particular family groups (Akintoye,
par. 3). Nevertheless, in the appointment of a king, the Yoruba political
system was decidedly democratic. When a king died, he was not
automatically succeeded by his son as in many other monarchical systems.
Candidates for Obaship would emerge from the royal families, involving all
male members of the royal family group. Thus, sons (and even grandsons)
of former kings, were eligible for selection as king. When they emerged,
they are all treated as equal candidates to the stool, hence subject to the
same rules and treatment. The power to carry out the selection on behalf of
the people was vested in a standing committee of chiefs now known as the
Council of Kingmakers in consultation with the Ifa oracle. The Ifa oracle
guides and authenticates the Council of kingmakers in their selection
process.
The Council of Kingmakers was all-powerful in this matter of selecting a
king. Their decisions were not arbitrary as there were laid down principles
and norms that stringently guided their final decision on who became the

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Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

Oba (king). First, they investigated the historical family background of each
of the candidates and their respective characters as well as moral disposition
to the members of the society. They allowed the general populace to lobby
individually and collectively and to express opinions on the princes, whether
for good or bad. The kingmakers were obliged to listen to the people and
due considerations were given to the peoples’ complaints, opinions and
wishes.
To be successful at these tedious processes of screening by the
Council of Kingmakers, a candidate’s choice must have been supported by
the majority of the Council of Kingmakers upon overwhelming merit in the
historical, moral, and good personality yardsticks used. It was not until these
mundane requirements had been fulfilled by the candidate, that the spiritual
guidance of the Ifa oracle would be sought. When supported by the Ifa
oracle, other ritual processes would then commence for the ascension of
the king to throne of his forefathers.
The Oba as the head of the political organization of traditional
Yoruba society had political, juridical, and executive power, which he did
not exercise alone. While the King occupied the highest seat of the
kingdom, there existed an elaborate organization of palace officials and
council of chiefs with whom the King directed the affairs of kingdom with.
This council of chiefs included civil chiefs, the military chiefs, the ward
chiefs and heads of compounds and extended families. The councils of
chiefs met with the king daily in the palace to take all decisions and to
function as the highest court of appeal. After its decisions were taken, they
were announced as the king’s decisions. The functions of the King as the
head of the council of society include the protection of the general interests
of members of the society, which called for overseeing the general health of
the society and her citizens, including the internal security of members,
issues of peace and war, and the administration of justice, with the King as
the last court of appeal for the whole Kingdom, and also concerned with
the conduct of the relationship with other regional Kingdoms and societies
(Fadipe 1970, 206).
The power arrangement in traditional Yoruba political setting was
such that it provided checks and balance mechanisms. For instance, the
powerful institution of the Iya Oba (mother of the Oba) in conjunction with
some chiefs constituted a team of advisers. It often functions as an
opposition, and not as sworn enemies, which must always disagree with the
Oba. The Iya Oba institution supports good policies but had the power to
check the Oba excesses (Oluwole 2003, 422).
If a king became over-ambitious and tried to establish personal power
beyond the limited monarchy system, or if he became tyrannical, greedy, or
otherwise seriously unpopular, some chiefs bore the constitutional duty of
cautioning, counselling, rebuking him in private. If he would not mend his
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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

ways, the chiefs might take his matter before a special council of spiritual
elders called Ogboni, where he would be seriously warned. If he still would
not change, the quarter chiefs might alert the family heads, and the latter
might inform their compound meetings. The final action would then be that
certain chiefs, whose traditional duty it was to do it, would approach the
king and symbolically present him with an empty calabash or parrot’s eggs.
The meaning of this sign is that he must compulsorily evacuate the throne
and commit suicide usually by poisoning (Oluwole 1996, 29). This final
action against a king was very rarely taken, but every king was informed at
the time of his installation that it was in the power of his subjects.
According to Oluwole, an ancient Yoruba oral text expresses this:
(i) Ajuwa,Ajuwa,
Apo eran o juko
O un lo d’ifaAlakoleeju,
Ti o ko won je n ifeOodaye.
Won niki o so gboitad’ode;
Won niki o ma so igboigbaled’oje,
Won niki o ma f’ ígboOsun se de.
NjeAlakoleeju o gbo
NjeAlaakoleju o gba.
A o feon’ileyimo, ma a lo.

I am greater than everyone; I am more important than all.


In me, public mismanagement is not easily discoverable
These were the principles of public management which the greedy operated
upon when s/he cheated in the primordial society.
S/he was told to be careful in handling political affairs, and not to act as if
s/he is hunting in a game forest.
S/he was warned not to turn political associations into fraudulent
organizations
S/he was cautioned against converting public funds into personal use.
The greedy did not listen, the greedy did not yield.
“We do not want you in this society anymore” (the people say) go away!
(ibidem)

In the above quote from Ifa oral literature as translated and


interpreted by Oluwole, politicians who cheated in pristine Ife society
believed they were so powerful and clever such that the people would not
easily detect their atrocities. However they received signals and warnings
not to treat citizens the way they hunt animal in the forest. They were
advised not turn to political associations into cheating organizations. In fact,
they were cautioned against embezzling public funds and converting public

166
Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

property to personal use. The cheating politicians did not listen. They
refused to play the game according to the set rules. In the end, the people
were left with no option other than to chase them out of office. Evidently
illustrated in the above excerpt from Ifa corpus is the democratic principle
of responsibility, accountability and sovereignty of the people in democracy.
These are inter-related with the issue of human rights, rule of law and
justice between the governed and the machineries of the state.
The democratic import of the traditional Yoruba mode of social
organization and governance is discernible from the fact that there were
rules set for a choice of leaders, and governance was based on the rules and
laws of the community. It was democratic to the extent that the rules were
strictly followed, which made it impossible for anyone to impose himself on
the society as it ensured that to become an Oba, both the spiritual and
material criteria were observed (Salami 2006, 74). It is believed among the
Yoruba that for there to be social order, law must not only be clearly stated
and enforced, but also all the constituent organs of the state must work
harmoniously to the progress of the society. For this reason, the Yorubas
will say:
(ii) Ilu ti o siofin, eseosi
(A society with no law, has no punishment)
There was the recognition of peoples’ rights and freedom. The
people had the freedom to express their opinion to the Oba and the rulers
either directly or through songs and other forms of symbolism during
various festivals. Other host of rights recognized by the Yoruba democratic
monarchical system is the right to property ownership, right to life, right to
labour, right to fair hearing, rights of women, rights of children, rights of
slaves, among others.
The traditional political society accommodated the participation of both the
rulers and the ruled; although the Oba was the supreme commander, every
cadre of the society was in various ways included in operating the Kingdom
to the point that the activities of the Oba-in-council at the societal level were
replicated at the ward and compound levels to indeed establish a
participatory democratic process in traditional Yoruba society (Salami 2006,
75). A proverbial evidence in support of this is:
(iii) Agbamerinl’oonse’ lu: Agbaokunrin, agbaobinrin, agbaomode, agbaalejo
(Four experienced groups of people manage the affairs of state: experienced
men, experienced women, experienced youths and experienced sojourners)
(Oluwole 2003, 426).
Proverb (iii) encapsulates traditional Yoruba theory of political
leadership, which is quadrant in dimension: wise men, experienced women,
intelligent youths and veteran foreigners. Much as traditional Yoruba society
was guided by this leadership principle, it must however be stated at this

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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

point, that the continuum of the Yoruba indigenous system of governance,


was historically truncated by the advent of colonialism.
Though, peradventure it was not disrupted by the contact of the Yoruba
with the Western powers, the sustainability of the traditional democratic
system was uncertain in view of the serious tensions and conflicts that
resulted from the synthesis of monarchism and democracy in traditional
Yoruba culture. The Yoruba social history is replete with cases of power
tussles between the executive power of the Oba and some other democratic
institutions meant to check the absoluteness and excesses of the Oba. These
institutions were sometimes weak in the face of the powerful and
immensely influential Oba superstructure within the Yoruba traditional
society (Salami 2006, 76).
Besides these shortcomings, Oluwole (Oluwole 1996, 26) noted that
different operators of the modern democratic system at the formal level
have done a lot to destabilize and corrupt this traditional system by
supporting candidates not recommended by members of their societies to
become rulers. The justification is too often rested on some ill-founded
claims of democracy: the right of the government to be involved in the
selection of an Oba. In this situation, political leaders now hand over staff of
office to traditional rulers and by extension; many rulers are nothing more
than glorified warrant chiefs (Ibidem).
In view of the above shortcomings of the notion and institution of
monarchical democracy in traditional Yoruba culture, some brief note on
human rights as hermeneutically given by Oluwole is apposite.
Human Dignity (Fundamental Human Rights):
(iv) Erukuni’ le won lo sin s’oko
Omokul’oko, won lo sin s’ile
Beeniibi o juibi,
Bi a se b’eru
L’a se b’omo
Eruni baba,
Onal’ojin
Ma f’iya je mi
Nitorimo je alejo,
biiwonaaba de ibomiran,
Alejol’o o je.

When a slave dies at home, s/he is buried at the farmstead.


When the true born dies in the farm, the corpse is brought home for burial.
Yet one birth is not greater than the other.
The way the slave’s child is born,
So also the master’s child is born.

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Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

The slave has a father.


Only he is far away.
Do not oppress me
Because I am a stranger.
If you get to another land,
You too will be a stranger. (Oluwole 1997,105-106)

The philosophical import in the above Ifa verse is according to


Oluwole, the respect for human dignity, which is the core of human rights.
The verse shows the critical expression of a thinker against the Yoruba
conventional view and attitude to slaves. Construing philosophy as the
criticism of the ideas we live, what this anonymous Yoruba thinker (who is
most likely to be a slave) has done is to offer critic with evidence of reason
against the maltreatment of slaves, and in defence of human dignity and
equality. This Ifa verse, in Oluwole’s view, is nothing short of philosophy.
Though, one major criticism that has been customarily levelled against the
possibility of human rights in traditional Africa is that of the prevalence of
the practice of slavery, which even predated African contact with an
experience of the Western trans-Atlantic slave trade. This criticism can
easily be disposed on the basis of the distinction between trans-Atlantic
trade and the slavery of the traditional Africa. The former was a total
dehumanization of man by man. In the case of the later, C. Williams rightly
noted that “the African slaves were considered as members of the
community, they learnt crafts, had rights to farm, held important offices of
state, and had virtually all the rights and privileges of a freeborn” (Williams
1976, 129). This truism of this position is well illustrated in the above verse
of Ifa corpus cited by Oluwole.
But one can probe further the superior veracity of the Ifa verse over
and above other contrasting views on slaves, discrimination and unequal
treatment of humans as latent in the people’s proverbial repertoire. There
are some Yoruba proverbs that argue against equal treatment of slaves and
the freeborn as well as against allowing equal doors of opportunities to
them:
(v) Imado ‘obaj’obaabaluje; bi eruba je oba, ijoyekobakuikan.
Peradventure a wild boar is made a king, the community would have been
ruined; if a slave had been crowned, the rank of chiefs would have been
depleted.

(vi) Kosibi a se ma se ebolo, tikoninruigbe.

Irrespective of how sumptuous the spices in cooking the ‘ebolo’ vegetable


are, its aroma will remain offensive.

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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

The surface interpretation popularly given to the immediately cited


proverbs is that slaves are of no intrinsic worth, and that any attempt to
elevate them to the status of a freeborn will bring about fatal consequences.
Proverb (v) is an analogical indication that by nature, slaves are unfit to pilot
the affairs of the society because they will desecrate existing institutions of
political leadership. Extenuating the unequal treatment of slaves and the
freeborn in being opened to windows of opportunity in social/political
network, proverb (vi) is a figurative expression that knocks out any attempt
to polish the personality of the slaves as a futile endeavour because the
dispositional nature of a slave is irredeemable. In effect, proverbs (v) and
(vi) are contraries to Oluwole’s thesis of recognition of human dignity and
equal opportunities of the slave and the freeborn in traditional Yoruba
culture.
Gender Equality:
The idea of predominance of gender imbalance and inequality in
traditional African culture as widely held in Western social anthropological
findings is a deluge. While there was male chauvinistic proverbial
oppression of women, such did not translate into suppressed gender role of
women in Yoruba African society. Women are neither inferior nor superior
to their male counterpart. While women in traditional African society were
given the unrestrained opportunities to develop to their greatest capacities,
the emphasis was on complementarity of gender relations and roles
(Balogun 1999, 42). This is demonstrated in an Ifa verse, Ose Itura that reads:
(vii) Da gike, da gike
Aakekanko le e da gike
Da’ gi la, Da’ gi la
Eelekan o le ledagi la;
B’ o s’erelu
Osugbo o le e da awo se

Cutting alone, cutting alone,


The axe cannot cut alone,
Splitting alone, splitting alone;
The wedge cannot split alone;
Without the Erelu (the female member), the cult of Osugbo cannot operate
(Oluwole 1997, 110).
The above Ifa verse is an argument about the complementary roles
of the male and female in society. The Osugbo, generally operated as a
secret society, is the legal arm of government among the Ijebu people of
Yoruba land. And there is always a woman representative. The argument
here is that no one section of society can rule alone just as the axe or the
wedge cannot function alone. True democracy, in the thinking of the author

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Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

of this proverb, does not justify the proscription of women participation in


decision making processes.
(viii)
Atodunmodunl’erinti n rin.Erino f’ara k’asa.Atosumosut’efonti n rin, be eni o
t’esebopoolo. Eeyanti o onil’eni, ti o m’eeyanl’eeyan, eeyanti o koede de ‘le, niipet’obinrin
o sil’aye

(Leaders and self-respecting personalities who recognize the importance of


women go through life without a hitch. Those who refuse to respect the
rights of women and/or despise them do so because they are shallow in
knowledge) (Oluwole 2003, 426).

Oluwole interpreted from the above oral texts that the Yoruba
believe that wise people who recognize the importance of women go
through life with minimum difficulties. Only those who have a poor sense
of human values would fail to appreciate the centrality of women’s role in
creating a peaceful and harmonious society.
Children’s Rights:
The Yoruba, according to Oluwole, give pivotal interest to children’s rights.
She cited such proverbs as:
(ix) Omode o j’obi, agba o j’oye
Adults who deny children their rights do not earn social respect
The Right to Fair Hearing:

In the Ifa verse of IworiMeji, it is stated that:


(x)
Owoomode o to pepe, t’ agbalagba o woakeregbe, ise ewe be agbaki o masekomo,
gbogbowani a nise a jo n be ‘rawa. A dia fun Orunmilaeyitiakapoo re o
pelejol’odoOlodumare,
OlodumarewaaransesiOrunmilapeki o wa so idinaatiko le fi be akapoo re.
NigbatiOrunmila de iwajuOlodumare Oniounsagbogboagbaraoun fun akapoo, o
niipinakapoonikogbo. Nigbanaanioronaa to waa ye Olodumareyekeyeke. Inuureesi dun
wipe ounko da ejoeekunkan. Ni Eledaabanilatiojonaa lo omoedakankogbodo da
ejoeekunkan.Anikandajo, o oseun:anikandajo, o oseeyan, nigbati o ogbot’enuenikeji,
emil’odajo se?

A child’s hand does not reach up to the mantelpiece that of an adult


cannot enter into a gourd. When a child appeals to an adult for help, s/he
should not refuse; we all live to complement each other. This is the oracular
message for Orunmila whose priest sued him before Olodumare. And
Olodumare sent for Orunmila to come to explain why he refused assistance to
his priest. When Orunmilacame before Olodumare, he said he tried his best for
his priest; but that it was the priest’s “nature” that is his problem. Then
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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

Olodumare was completely enlightened and he washappy that he did not give
judgment after listening to the complainant alone. That is why the Creator
made it a law from that day; no human being should give judgment after
listening to only one side. He, who judges without hearing the other side,
does wrong; he who judges without listening to the other side is inhuman.
When you have not heard the other side why did you give your judgment?
(Oluwole 2001, 94)

There are two ideas of jurisprudential relevance that could be


discovered from this Ifa verse. One is that which expresses the
complementary qualities and responsibilities that adult and the young have
to each other. Both have rights and obligations that must be respected and
observed. Second is the legal principle of Audi alteram partem. This principle
states that parties involved in litigation must always be heard before a
verdict is given.

The Right to Property Ownership:


(xi) A ki i gbaokitilowoakiti, a ki i gbaile baba enil’owoeni

(Just as you do not deny a wrestler the right to summersault, you do not
deprive a person of his/her father’s property) (Oluwole 2003, 424).

Environmental right:

(xii)
Bi a ba be ‘gini ‘gbo, ki a fi ro‘ raeniwo; lo d’ifa fun alasokannioye. Won nikiof’asokan
a ru ‘bo. O n “bi o bi se iwonaa n ko, fi orororaarewo

(Put yourself in the shoe when dealing with all things that have life. If you
do, you will understand what it means to give up an only dress during the
harmattan) (Oluwole 2008, 8).

The aim of Oluwole in proverbs (xi) and (xii) is to show that


traditional Yoruba-Africans were not oblivion of the right to own property
as well as the right to protect bios and the environment at large.

Sophie Oluwole and the Hermeneutic Trend in African Philosophy: Some Comments

Before appraising Oluwole’s hermeneutical thought on the issues of


human rights and democracy in Yoruba context, it is apt to first question
the hermeneutic method itself, which she employed in the course of her

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Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

analysis. If the method is perhaps marred, the outcome may be more


suspicious. Given the history of hermeneutics as it were in the West, as it is
rooted and developed in the works of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger,
Gadamer, Ricoeur amongst others, one may begin to ask whether or not the
hermeneutic approach is not too alien to the African tradition. Though it is
not enough that a method must be indigenously rooted before being
philosophical, even where it risks being tagged as ‘derivative’; it can be
adapted with modifications, if need be. What is more important is to
interrogate if the factors that necessitated the emergence and development
of Western hermeneutics are the same for the adoption of hermeneutics in
the African context.
Hermeneutics has its root in German thought and evolved as a
response to the pervasive reduction of reason to technique, rise in
positivistic social science among others. But from all indications, there are
no elements in Oluwole’s works pointing either to the exigency of
warranting factors for the hermeneutic method in African philosophy or
recognizing that the challenges that dictated the emergence of the method
in the West are the same in the African context. But in no way should
Oluwole’s silence on this query suggest that African hermeneutic approach
is inherently flawed. It may just be that she is trying to weave the identity of
African philosophy around the kind of method it adopts in its investigation,
without some further justification. Problematic as this may be, our task in
the main is not to probe this further; we are more concerned with the
concatenation of her political views in relation to human rights and
democratic principles.
Two basic points can be made on Oluwole’s hermeneutic
interpretation of oral texts on human rights and democratic principles in
Yoruba thought. One is that each of these texts is the result of deep
reflections and historical experiences. Many of them are critical reactions to
some existing ideas, beliefs and practices of the traditional people in their
cultural milieu. With the understanding of philosophy as the criticism of the
ideas we live by, and given the critical stance of the oral text as reactionary
to certain norms of belief, behavour, ideas and assumptions of the people at
a given time, the philosophical composition of each text is not in doubt.
The various texts analyzed and discussed aptly reveal that Yoruba-African
intellectual heritage is neither mythical nor unscientific.
Oluwole does not even seem to claim that the ideas are unique; only
that the ideas and principles expressed in them are rational in the
conventional sense and cogent within a conceptual structure that is in no
way inferior to Western tradition of thought. Thus the temptation of
regarding her presentation on the themes as ethno-philosophical rather than
philosophical may be resisted. Her hermeneutic engagement in African
political philosophy does not necessarily depict the no-philosophy,
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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

especially since it suggests that members of a particular school of thought in


traditional Yoruba culture held some beliefs and principles in common, and
not holistic attribution to a whole people.
Be that as it may, concomitantly, one major problem, which has a
paralyzing effect on the outcome of the hermeneutic approach adopted by
Oluwole, is the foreign language in which the interpretation has been done.
Had the issues discussed been presented, analyzed, explained and
interpreted within their own warranted intellectual culture and language in
which they originally exist, the cogency of the discussions would have been
more discernible.
Another critical problem in the hermeneutic approach of Oluwole
in her discussion of democracy and human rights is that she made no effort
to justify any of the democratic and human rights principles she presented.
Explanatory justification is essential to any philosophical discussion, but we
find this in its limited form in Oluwole’s hermeneutic discourse on the
themes. This is where Serequeberhan’s horizon of hermeneutics differs
from that of Oluwole. Serequeberhan is of the view that African
hermeneutics must engage itself with praxis and emancipation of the
Africans out of the “politico-existential crisis interior to the horizon of
post-colonial Africa.” (Serequeberhan 1994, 18)
It is on the above basis that we think hermeneutics of ancient
thought is not enough without being complemented with reconstruction of
the thought in question for contemporary use.
Re-constructionism involves first an extrication of anachronistic
idea or practices from a whole lot of traditional thought and beliefs.
Secondly it entails an identification of relevant ideas in traditional corpus of
thought and practices that can still be rehabilitated and improved upon for
immediate or future use. Thirdly re-constructionism involves a juxtaposition
of identified relevant idea in traditional thought with contemporary
perceptions and practices with a view to integrating and evolving anew,
cogent idea for solving basic problems confronting our world today. Re-
constructionism dwells on a concern for human interest; for practical
relevance in order to mitigate fundamental problems of existence, be it
political, social, cultural, economical, and technological amongst others. On
this showing, Oluwole’s hermeneutic discussion of democracy and human
rights in African political philosophy could have been more cogent, if the
traditional political ideas so interpreted have been reconstructed for
contemporary African use.

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Fayemi Ademola KAZEEM

Conclusion
The thrust of trends in African philosophy today is simply not
wholly definable in terms of the challenges of anti-colonial violence, identity
and self-definition, nor in terms of liberation struggles and national
reconstruction, which strictly informed the early post-independence works
of scholars and nationalists in African political philosophy. The then trends
provided a basis for today’s discourse. This is unassailable in the sense that
one can still find such issues like African socialism, communalism, Pan-
Africanism, development among others as recurring decimals in today’s
discourse in African political philosophy; though with re-invigorative
perspectives and dimensions.
While it is arguable that many of the works of the nationalist
scholars are not ‘philosophical’ in the strict sense of the word (with the
exception of Nkrumah’s classics), I think the pioneering intellectual legacies
of these nationalist scholars are worthy of further philosophical study. This
is imperative bearing in mind that many of them (such as Senghor, Azikiwe,
and Kenyatta) owed much of their inspiration both at the levels of
philosophy and ideology, to figures of the Diaspora, such as Aime Cesaire,
Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, Frantz Fanon, Walter
Rodney, and others (Wiredu 2002, 23). For contemporary African political
philosophy to therefore be holistically robust, the insightful contributions of
all these scholars cannot be carpeted.
Though it is true that some of the issues that instigated the interests
of the first generation of scholars in African political philosophy are now
partially settled and won (such as the formal liberation struggle from
colonialism), no doubt, we are still left with an array of many others, which
have constituted the focus of the second generation of scholars working in
African political philosophy today. These issues include among others: the
problem of violence, conflicts and terrorism, nationalism and social order,
democracy, human rights, reparation, justice, Africa and globalization, etc.
All these socio problems seem to indicate the necessity for fresh
ruminations in African political philosophy beyond the wall of the
nationalist-ideological trend identified by Oruka.
While the contributions of second generation of scholars (such as:
K. Wiredu, T. Serequeberhan, O. Taiwo, P. Boele van Hensbroek, M. P.
More, K. M. Kalumba, O. Oladipo, J. A. I. Bewaji, D. A. Masolo, A. K.
Appiah, E. Eze, I. A. Menkiti, S. Gbadegesin, T. Kiros, E. Wamala, K.
Ogundowole, K. Owolabi, M. Falaiye, O.A. Balogun, S. O. Opafola, etc.,
who are predominantly male) working on these and other related issues in

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Sophie Oluwole’s Hermeneutic Trend in African Political Philosophy: Some Comments

current African political philosophy are laudable, it remains to be seen, the


complementary insights of female African philosophers on the themes.
It is on the above lacuna that this paper has attempted bringing to
fore, the thoughts and views of a prominent African female philosopher,
Sophie Oluwole, on the issues of democracy and human rights. This should
not suggest that the themes of democracy and human rights exhaust the
political ideas that occupied the thought of Oluwole. We only focused on
these twin issues in this paper because they lurk beneath current discourse
in African political philosophy, and have indeed riveted a lot of attention.
The point is made clear in the paper that rather than being motivated by
the concerns of the nationalist ideological trend, Oluwole opts for the
hermeneutic trend in her discussion of democracy and human rights.
Insightful has her views are on the themes under reference, they are not
without possible objections. Such objections notwithstanding, in our
submission, we think Oluwole’s attempt should inspire more female African
professional philosophers in dispensing socio-political ideas not necessarily
by following the paths of the nationalist ideological trend, nor the
hermeneutic orientation; but by working within any other identified
emerging trend(s) in African political philosophy, in so far they are moved
by it.

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