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Footnote Case Title Date Ponente Facts

Edison Sucro was arrested without a warrant for selling marijuana and was convicted. He appealed, arguing the evidence against him was inadmissible since his arrest was unlawful. The Supreme Court ruled the warrantless arrest was valid under the in flagrante delicto exception and the evidence was admissible, as probable cause existed for the arrest. The conviction was upheld.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
115 views57 pages

Footnote Case Title Date Ponente Facts

Edison Sucro was arrested without a warrant for selling marijuana and was convicted. He appealed, arguing the evidence against him was inadmissible since his arrest was unlawful. The Supreme Court ruled the warrantless arrest was valid under the in flagrante delicto exception and the evidence was admissible, as probable cause existed for the arrest. The conviction was upheld.

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Fahmie Pagayawan
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FOOTNOTE

103
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDISON
CASE TITLE
SUCRO, accused-appellant.
DATE March 18, 1991; G.R. No. 93239
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant: Edison Sucro

2. Action of Accused-appellant: Appellant interposed appeal to the SC


the following errors allegedly committed by the Lower Court; (a)
the Lower Court erred in admitting as evidence for the prosecution
Exhibits "E"-"E-4", tea bags of alleged marijuana, to be the corpus
delicti; Furthermore, that the same were taken without the
required warrant of search and arrest since the accused was not
in the act of committing any offense at the time of his arrest, and
(b) the Lower Court erred in finding the accused guilty of the sale
of prohibited drugs under Section 4, Article II, of the Dangerous
Drugs Act and sentencing him to suffer a penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

Edison Sucro also questions the failure of the police officers to


secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio himself knew of
Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force.
Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three days before the
incident.

3. Subject/Object: Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of


violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act.

4. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

5. Action of Plaintiff-appellee: Judgment is rendered finding the


accused Edison Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug under
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay
a fine of P20,000, and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in
the service of his sentence with the period for which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment to the date of promulgation of
this judgment. All the items of marijuana confiscated in this case
are declared forfeited in favor of the State.

Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the accused is lawful and


ISSUE consequently whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is
admissible.

RULING Yes. The warrantless arrest of Edison Sucro is lawful and the evidence
resulting from such arrest is admissible.

The Constitution provides the right of the people to be secure in their


persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the instant case, the warrantless arrest of Edison Sucor falls under
the in flagrante delicto doctrine. The general rule is that searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful
arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the RCP which provides that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. On the other hand, the failure of the police
officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements
for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that
probable cause existed.

Since the arrest was considered valid, the evidence presented is


admissible. Therefore, the Court is convinced that Edison Sucro had
indeed committed the offense charged. The trial court’s decision must
be upheld.

FOOTNOTE
104
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CASE TITLE
ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARO, accused-appellant.
DATE September 5, 1994; G.R. No. 94953
Justice Camilo D. Quiason
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant: Armando De Lara

2. Action of Accused-appellant: Appellant denied having sold


marijuana to anyone and claimed that the arresting officers merely
planted the marijuana on his person. He testified that on January
9, 1987, he arrived home from work as a security guard of the
Vergara Brothers Agency at around 3:00 P.M. After changing his
clothes, he went out to fetch his son, who was left in the care of a
neighbor. Upon returning to his house with his son, he was
arrested by the police. The police proceeded to search his house,
without any search warrant shown to him. After the search, he and
his wife were brought to the WPD headquarters. He claimed that
in spite of his protestation that he would like to wait for his lawyer
before giving any statement, the police continued their
interrogation.

3. Subject/Object: Appellant was arrested in a buy-bust operation.


During the investigation, he was apprised of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of a counsel.
When asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so
pending the arrival of his lawyer. However, he was still forced to
sign the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill, Receipt of
Property Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet which
were all presented and admitted in evidence. He was
subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Court determined the penalty to be imposed on the appellant.


It divided the amount of 750 grams into three to correspond to the
three applicable penalties, namely, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal.

If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to


be imposed is reclusion temporal. If the marijuana involved is from
250 to 499 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and
if the weight of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the
penalty to be imposed is prision correccional.

Since there is no evidence as to the weight of the two foils and


one plastic bag of flowering tops of marijuana seized from
appellant, we resolve the doubt in favor of appellant and conclude
that the quantity involved was: (i) below 750 grams; and (ii) not
less than 250 but not more than 499 grams.

4. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

5. Action of Plaintiff-appellee: That on or about January 9, 1987, in the


City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized
by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any
prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell or
offer for sale two (2) foils of flowering tops of marijuana and one
(1) plastic bag of flowering tops of marijuana, which are prohibited
drugs.

The Court decided to impose maximum penalty which is prision


mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to appellant,
who was convicted under Special Law.

The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification


that appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)
years and TWO (2) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to
EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Whether or not the arrest of the accused inside his house was valid.
ISSUE
Yes. The arrest of the appellant was valid
RULING
The Constitution provides the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the instant case, the policemen's entry into the house of appellant
without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught
committing an offense in flagrante. Appellant was caught red-handed
in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-
buyer.

As to the legality of appellant's arrest, Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985


Rules on Criminal Procedures dealing with warrantless arrests
provides:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private


person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has


personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it;

Therefore, applying the aforementioned provision of the law, the arrest


that followed the hot-pursuit was valid.

FOOTNOTE
105
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.
CASE TITLE
RICARDO BOHOL y CABRINO, Appellant., GR No.171729
DATE July 28, 2008
PONENTE Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing
FACTS 1. Appellant: Ricardo Bohol

2. Action of Appellant: Bohol claims that his arrest was illegal since he
could not have committed, nor was he about to commit, a crime as
he was peacefully sleeping when he was arrested without a
warrant. Consequently, the search conducted by the police
officers was not incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, and the
confiscated shabu obtained from the search was inadmissible as
evidence against him

3. Subject/Object: On appeal is the decision of CA affirming the


decision of RTC of Manila, Branch 35 in Criminal Cases 02-
205461 and 02-205462. The RTC had convicted appellant
Ricardo Bohol (Bohol) of violating Sections 11 (3)3 and 5,4 Article
II, respectively, of Republic Act No. 91655 also known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

4. Appellee: People of the Philippines

5. Action of Appellee: The OSG (Office of the Solicitor General)


maintains that the arrest of Bohol as well as the search on his
person is legal. The OSG stresses that the search made on the
person of Bohol was incidental to a lawful arrest which was made
when he was caught in flagrante delicto. Further, the OSG
maintains that at the time of Bohol’s arrest, the police officers had
probable cause to suspect that a crime had been committed since
they had received a tip from a confidential informant of the
existence of illegal drug trade in the said place.

Whether or not Bohol’s arrest and the search on his person were
ISSUE illegal.
No. The arrest of Bohol and search on his person is legal.
RULING
The Constitution provides the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the present case, the arresting officers were justified in arresting


Bohol as he had just committed a crime when he sold the shabu to
PO2 Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has
repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of
the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the
arresting police officers are authorized to search and seize from the
offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense. The constitutional
proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. The Court has ruled that the following instances
constitute valid warrantless searches and seizures: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5)
search when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances.

Therefore, considering the legality of Bohol’s warrantless arrest, the


subsequent warrantless search that resulted in the seizure of the shabu
found in his person is valid.

FOOTNOTE 106

CASE TITLE People of the Philippines, accused-appellant vs. Enrique Hindoy and Bella
Negrosa, plaintiff-appellee
DATE May 10, 2001
PONENTE Justice Davide
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant: Enrique Hindoy and Bella Negrosa

2. This was an appeal by the accused-appellants Enrique Hindoy and Bella B.


Negrosa from the decision of the RTC of Pasig, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 4 and 8, Article II of the
Republic Act. 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of 1972), they were sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the attending accessory
penalties, and to pay the costs of the suit.

3. The appellants contended that the trial court erred in finding the search
and arrest of the two (2) accused-appellants without warrant to fall
under the doctrine of warrantless search, an incident to a lawful arrest.

4. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines (State)

5. Appellee argued that under the circumstances, it was the duty of the police
officers to conduct a more thorough search of the premises after such a
successful entrapment, then make the necessary arrest of the suspects
and seizure of suspected contrabands.

ISSUE Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
RULING Yes, there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

The Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation made was a valid in flagrante
arrest. The subsequent search to Enrique and Bella and to their premises
within their immediate control is valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

Therefore, the search being incident to a lawful arrest, was valid


notwithstanding the absence of a warrant of arrest.

FOOTNOTE 107

CASE TITLE People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appelle vs. Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo
Beltran, accused-appellants
DATE G.R.No. 83260 184 SCRA 416 April 18, 1990
PONENTE Justice Regalado
FACTS 1. The accused-appellant is Juan de la Cruz and his co-accused Reynaldo
Beltran.

2. Accused-appellants: Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran were charged by


the RTC of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art 2, in relation to Section
21, Art. 4 of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpertua with the accessory
penalties provided by law.

3. Accused appealed contending that the manner in which the so-called buy-
bust operation is as no different from seizure of evidence from one’s
person or abode without a search warrant.

4. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines (State)

5. The Solicitor General explains that the buy-bust operation is the method
employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the
purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the
criminal intent originated.

ISSUE Whether or not the buy-bust operation made for the enforcement of RA 6425
is constitutional.

RULING Yes, the buy-bust operation made for the enforcement of RA 6425 is
constitutional.

The Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation done was a form of entrapment
since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a
crime. It is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act the
commission of the offense. And since the offense happens right before the
eyes of the officer, there is no need for a warrant either for the seizure of the
goods or for the apprehension of the offender.

Therefore, the buy-bust operation done for the enforcement of RA 6425 is


constitutional.

FOOTNOTE 108

CASE TITLE People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appelle vs. Romeo Gonzales, accused-
appellant
DATE G.R.No. 113255-56, July 19, 2001
PONENTE Justice Pardo
FACTS 1. The accused-appellant is Romeo Gonzales

2. Gonzales appealed from the decision of the RTC finding him guilty of
possession and sale of marijuana and sentencing him to life
imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00

3. In his brief, accused-appellant claimed that he was a victim of frame-up.

4. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines (State)

5. The Solicitor General argues that the defense of frame-up is incredible.

ISSUE Whether or not the defense of frame-up is credible.


RULING No, the defense of frame-up is not credible.

The Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant’s contention of frame-up is


incredible. He claimed that he was inside of the comfort room of a neighbor
whom he borrowed P100.00 to buy medicines for his sick mother and that he
was just wearing underwear when he was brought out of the house, defenses
such as this like an alibi is viewed with disfavor, as it can be easily concocted.
Evidence therefore must be clear and convincing. In the absence of proof of
any ill-motive on the part of the apprehending officers, the defense of frame-
up will not prosper.

Therefore, the accused-appellant’s defense of frame-up is not credible.

Footnote 109
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. YONG FUNG YUEN, Appellant
DATE  February 18, 2004
PONENTE Justice Rome Callejo Sr.
FACTS 1. Accused-Appellant- YONG FUNG YUEN

2. Asserts that the credibility of Campos, Castro, Aquino and Aspe and the
probative weight of their testimonies were debilitated by substantial
self-contradictions and inconsistencies.

3. Fung Yuen further contends that he was arrested and detained without a
warrant of arrest; that his house was searched without any search
warrant and contends that the evidence of the prosecution falls short of
the quantum of proof required for his conviction.

4. Plaintiff-appellee, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

5. According to the OSG (Office of the Solicitor General), such inconsistencies


did not affect the substance of the testimony of the witnesses of the
prosecution, and even served to strengthen their credibility.
Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence and probative weight
ISSUE to the collective testimonies of the police officers over the appellants
testimony and those of his witnesses that he was a victim of a vicious frame-
up and huli-dap.
No. The trial court did not erred in giving credence and probative weight
RULING to the collective testimonies of the police officers over the appellants
testimony and those of his witnesses.

Constitution dictates that the right of the people to be secure in their


persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.

In the case at bar, the inconsistencies in the collective testimonies of the


police officers does not weaken but rather strengthen their credibility as
witnesses and negates the allegation of frame-up and extortion by the
appellant.

Therefore, the trial court did not erred in giving credence and probative
weight to the collective testimonies of the police officers.

Footnote 110
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
LI YIN CHU alias ROBERT LI, appellant.

DATE   February 17, 2004


PONENTE Justice Antonio Carpio
FACTS 1. Accused-Appellant- LI YIN CHU alias ROBERT LI

2. Appellant mainly questions the credibility of prosecution witness Delos


Santos and insists that there was no buy-bust operation conducted
against him.

3. Appellant further contends that the poseur-buyer failed to present to


appellant the buy-bust money in exchange for the shabu.

4. Plaintiff-appellee- THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

5. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, convicted appellant Li Yin Chu alias
Robert Li of violating Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659 grounded upon a buy bust operation
conducted by police officers against the appellant.
Whether or not the failure of poseur-buyer to present to appellant the buy-
ISSUE bust money in exchange for the shabu diminished/obliterates the appellant's
culpability?
No. the failure of poseur-buyer to present to appellant the buy-bust
RULING money in exchange for the shabu does not diminished/obliterates the
appellant's culpability.

Constitution dictates that the right of the people to be secure in their


persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.

In the case at bar, the failure of poseur-buyer to present to appellant


the buy-bust money in exchange for the shabu does not
diminished/obliterates the appellant's culpability because as soon as the
accused commits the illegal sale of drugs consummates the sale transaction,
whether payment precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold

Therefore, appellant's culpability is not diminished or obliterated.

Footnote 111
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant
DATE  February 4, 1992
PONENTE Justice Florence Regalado
FACTS 1. Accused-Appellant- DON RODRIGUEZA

2. After the drug sale transaction involving marijuana between Taduran and
DON RODRIGUEZA, Major Zeidem ordered the apprehension of the
appellant, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. Subsequently Agents
of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid without a
search warrant in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant
and confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe.

3. Appellant then contends the following to wit;


a. That there was no valid buy-bust operation.
b. That the sworn statement made by the appellant without counsel is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
c. That the trial court erred in admitting in evidence against appellant
the articles allegedly confiscated during the raid conducted in the house
of Jovencio Rodrigueza (Father of Appellant).

4. Plaintiff-appellee, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

5. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, finding accused-
appellant Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended)
(Note! Sec. 4 under RA 6425 is the Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs)

Whether or not the arrest and seizure made by NARCOM agents against DON
ISSUE RODRIGUEZA was lawful?
No. The arrest and seizure of made by NARCOM agents against DON
RULING RODRIGUEZA was not lawful.

Constitution dictates that the right of the people to be secure in their


persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.

In the case at bar, the arrest of Don Rodrigueza after a considerable time
from the said drug sale transaction negates a valid buy-bust operation and
the subsequent search made by NARCOM agents in the house of Rodrigueza's
father without a search warrant renders the search and seizure of evidence
unlawful.

Therefore, the arrest and seizure of made by NARCOM agents against


DON RODRIGUEZA was not lawful.

FOOTNOTE 115

CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Rolando De Gracia, et. al.

DATE September 29, 1989; G.R. No. 83988

PONENTE Justice Florenz D. Regalado


FACTS 1. Accused-appellant is Rolando De Garcia. He was charged in two separate
informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion.

2. Appellant questioned his conviction by RTC Quezon City arguing that he


cannot be held guilty for illegal possession for the reason that he did not
have either physical or constructive possession. He is neither the owner
nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were
found, only an errand boy.

3. Subject/Object: Appellant raised that the manner of search and seizure of


the Intelligence Division was questionable. Appellant contended that
there was no sufficient probable cause to warrant the appellee’s action
of warrantless arrest.

4. Plaintiff-appellee is the State represented by the Intelligence Division of the


NCR Defense Command.

5. Action of Respondents: At the height of Coup d’etat in December 5, 1989,


upon intelligence report that rebels and members of RAM-SFP were
occupying the Eurocar Sales Office of QC, the Intelligence Division
conducted a surveillance thereat. The next day, a search was conducted
and several ammunitions, including bombs, were confiscated. Because
appellant was inside the building, the appellant was arrested and made
to sign an inventory of seized items. No search warrant was secured by
the raiding team because at that time there were firings, bombardment
of tora-tora planes and nearby Camp Aguinaldo was mopped up by
rebels.

ISSUE Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted by the raiding team was
valid.

RULING Yes, the warrantless arrest conducted by the raiding team was valid.

The Constitution provides for the right of the people to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the instant case, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the court. All the courts in the surrounding
areas were closed. There was general chaos, disorder, simultaneous firings
and serious threats of mopping up the community by the rebels. Under such
urgency and exigency, the search warrant can be lawfully dispensed with.

Thus, the warrantless arrest conducted by the raiding team was valid.

FOOTNOTE 117

CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Antonio C. Estella

DATE January 21, 2003; G.R. Nos. 138539-40

PONENTE Justice Artemio V. Panganiban


FACTS 1. Appellant is Antonio C. Estella. He was charged for violating the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 for possessing a total of 8.3 kg of marijuana.

2. Appellant raised in his defense that the house, where the raiding team
went into, was not owned by him but by spouses Vicente and Fely
Bakdangan. It only happened that he was standing near the said house.
Furthermore, appellant denied having surrendered tin cans containing
marijuana to SPO1 Buloron, a member of the raiding team.

3. Subject/Object: Appellant contended that there was illegality of the police


search undertaken at the house where the subject cans of marijuana
were seized. Appellant maintained that he was not the owner of the
house and he did not voluntarily surrender the marijuana to the police
officers.

4. Appellee is the State.

5. On November 20, 1996, armed with warrant for search and seizure issued
by the Executive Judge of RTC Zambales, the Operation Group with
members of the PNP and brgy. Council proceeded to enforce the said
warrant. However, while on the way, SPO1 Buloron saw the appellant
near a house and asked if he had in his possession prohibited drugs. The
raiding team claimed that the appellant voluntarily surrendered the tin
cans containing dried marijuana. The appellant was arrested and the
marijuana and the firearms were seized.

ISSUE 1 Whether or not the search is incidental to lawful arrest.

RULING 1 No. The search was not incidental to lawful arrest.

The Constitution provides for the inviolable right of the people to be secure in
their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the instant case, the fact remained that the appellant did not voluntarily
surrender the marijuana to the raiding team. In the absence of his voluntary
surrender there was no way for the police officers to prove that he possessed
the prohibited drugs which could give them the right to arrest him, conduct a
search in his immediate vicinity, and seize unlawful objects as an incident to
the lawful arrest.

Thus, there was no search incident to lawful arrest.

ISSUE 2 Whether or not the scope of the search was within the permissible area of
search.

RULING 2 No. The scope of the search was not within the permissible area of search.

The Constitution provides for the inviolable right of the people to be secure in
their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the instant case, the search was made in the entire house which is not
within the appellant’s immediate control. The search exceeded the bounds of
that which can be considered to be incident to lawful arrest. It was enforced
beyond what is needed to serve the purpose of search.
Therefore, the scope of the search not within the permissible area of search.

FOOTNOTE 118

CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Jesus Neuvas y Garcia, et. al.

DATE February 22, 2007; G.R. No. 170233

PONENTE Justice Dante O. Tinga

FACTS 1. Accused-appellants are Jesus Nuevas, Reynaldo Din, and Fernando


Inocencio who were charged with illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

2. Appellants questioned the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the


trial court. Appellants maintained that they should be acquitted
because the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers
were not valid and the evidence were not admissible by virtue thereof.

3. Subject/Object: Appellants contended that there was no basis for


appellees’ inspections and searches as they were not doing anything
illegal at that time. The searches caused by the police officers did not
fall under warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.

4. Appellee is the State through SPO3 Teofilo Fami and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling.
Both were tasked to conduct stationary surveillance and monitoring of
illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter St. of Olongapo City.

5. Appellees maintained that the appellants voluntarily surrendered the


plastic bags containing the prohibited drugs to them. Nuevas
voluntarily surrendered the item while both officers were monitoring at
Perimeter St and Din and Inocencio at the National Highway.

ISSUE 1 Whether or not the warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest is valid.

RULING 1 No. The warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest is not valid.

The Constitution provides for the right of the people to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the present case, no lawful arrest was made by the officers. In the absence
of a lawful arrest, the latter have no basis to substantially justify their
warrantless search or contemporaneous search. In a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, it is imperative that the lawful arrest must precede the search
and the process cannot be reversed.

Thus, the warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest was not valid.

ISSUE 2 Whether or not the warrantless search was incidental to lawful arrest.

RULING 2 No, the warrantless search was not incidental to lawful arrest.

The Constitution provides for the right of the people to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the present case, the appellants are not committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers nor did they perform overt acts indicating that
they have committed, actually committing or is attempting to commit an
offense. In the absence thereof, the police officers do not have the right to
effect a warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest.

FOOTNOT 120
E

CASE TITLE Padilla v CA, G.R. No. 121917

DATE March 12,1997

PONENTE Justice Ricardo J. Francisco

FACTS 1. Petitioners: ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA figured in a hit and run
accident in Oct. 26,992 and upon arrest was discovered in possession of high-
powered weapons with live ammunition.
(1) One Smith and Wesson.357 Caliber revolver, SN-32919, with six (6) live
ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120, with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120, with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
(4) One Pietro Beretta.380 caliber, SN-A 35723 Y with clip

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner's defenses: that his arrest was illegal, and that the
firearms and ammunition seized as a result are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule; that he is a confidential agent authorized to carry the subject firearms
under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt; and that the penalty for simple illegal
possession is excessive.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that
no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his
apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.

4.Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES

5. Action of Respondents: The authorities discovered petitioner's firearms and


ammunition without even performing an active search, which is described as a
prying into secret places for that which is hidden. The capture of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified because they were in
"plain view" of the police officers who mistakenly found them.

Whether or not objects whose possessions are prohibited by the law inadvertently
ISSUE found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.

RULING Yes, objects whose possessions which are prohibited by the law inadvertently found in
plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.
Section 2 of Art. III of the Constitution states the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever.

In the case at bar, when the authorities conduct a plain view search to the petitioners
vehicle and inadvertently found firearms and ammunition, satisfied the two-tiered test
of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the
arrest.
Therefore, the warrantless search is constitutionally permissible.
FOOTNOT 121
E

CASE TITLE People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 413

DATE December 11, 1992

PONENTE Justice Teodoro Padilla

FACTS 1. Accused-appellant: SANTIAGO EVARISTO and NOLI CARILLO, as private persons not authorized by law,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously manufactured, repaired, and kept in their possession, custody,
and control of:
(a) caliber 38 revolver (paltik) with two live ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, two
(b) 12 gauge home-made shot guns, one (1) caliber 22 revolver (sumpak) and two (2) vise grips and one
(1) plier use in the manufacture and repair of said firearms without any permit or license from
competent authority.

2. Appellant deny the above account of the incidents in question, arguing that they were taken into
custody by police officers without their permission and subjected to physical and mental violence. They
denied knowing or possessing any of the weapons in testimony, alleging that they were planted in their
hands by trial witnesses and other law enforcement officials.
3. Subject/Object: Appellant erred the illegality seized of the evidence, the lower court made grave errors
in determining that the unlawfully confiscated evidence was weapons, as specified by Presidential Decree
No. 1866; and the lower court made grave errors in believing the arresting officer's testimony, which are
patently inconsistent and half-truths.

4.Plaintiff-appelle: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo
Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary

5. Action of Respondents: The Philippine Constabulary's Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta
were on regular patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite, on August 30, 1988. At or around 5:50
p.m., there were many bursts of gunshots heard in the area. They tracked down the source of the
noise and came across Barequiel Rosillo, who was shooting a gun into the air. Rosillo recognizes the
patrol and dashed to the nearby home of appellant Evaristo. Sgt. Romeroso requested Evaristo's
permission to search the house while patrol was still chasing Rosillo, and he was granted. He
discovered a number of weapons and paraphernalia reportedly used in the repair and manufacture
of firearms in the sala, rather than Rosillo, this became the basis for the present indictment against
Evaristo.

Whether or not the search in Evaristo’s house was valid?


ISSUE
RULING Yes, the search was valid.

Section 2 of Art. III of the Constitution states the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar: The appellant Evaristo gave Sgt. Romerosa permission to enter his home. The officer's
aim was to arrest Rosillo, who he claimed had taken shelter there. As a result, it is clear that Romerosa's
entry into the house was not for the purpose of searching for weapons, making his discovery of the subject
firearms inadvertent and even accidental.

Therefore, the search was valid in Evaristo’s house.

FOOTNOT 122
E

CASE TITLE Padilla v Musa, 217 SCRA 597

DATE January 27, 1993

PONENTE Justice Flerida Ruth Romero

FACTS 1. MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant:

2. The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
3. Subject/Object: The appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and
impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The appellant argues that the testimony of Sgt. Ani,
the poseur-buyer, is untrustworthy because: (1) neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents knew the
appellant or vice versa prior to the buy-bust operation; and (2) there was no witness to the appellant's
alleged giving of the two marijuana wrappers to Sgt. Ani.

4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee: represented by NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) 

5. Action of Respondents: After Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents; the
latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the
marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked
money to his wife.Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what
T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen."They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response; they opened it and
found dried marijuana leaves.
Whether or not objects in the plain view of an officer can be presented as evidence?
ISSUE
RULING Yes, objects whose possessions which are prohibited by the law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant.

Section 2 of Art. III of the Constitution states the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever.

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his
house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a
plastic bag hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest,
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

Therefore, objects in the plain view of an officer can be presented as evidence.

FOOTNOTE 123

CASE TITLE The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-appellee vs. Rosa Aruta, Accused-
appellant
DATE G.R.No. 120915. April 3, 1998
PONENTE Justice Romero
FACTS 1. Rosa Aruta,Accused-appellant
2. Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta was arrested and charged with violating
Section 4 (Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs), Art. 2 of the Republic Act No.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. She pleaded not guilty, but
eventually after trial on the merits, the RTC of Olongapo City convicted
and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00.
3. In this appeal, accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred
in not finding the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of
accused-appellant violated the latter’s constitutional rights. She also
argued that prior to arrest, she just watched “Balweg” at the Choice
Theater. She was about to cross the street when an old woman asked
for help in carrying a shoulder bag. Abello and Domingo then arrested
her in the middle of the road and asked her to go with them to the
NARCOM office. She averred that she wasn’t shown a search warrant
by the two (2) officers.
4. The People of the Philippines (State), Plaintiff-appellee
5. The Solicitor General contended that police officers could only secure
a search warrant if Aruta’s name was known, vehicle identified and
date of her arrival is certain.

ISSUE Whether or not there was a lawful seizure in this case.

RULING No, there was an unlawful seizure in this case.


The Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant’s contention that the NARCOM


agents could not apply for a warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger
who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search
warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated and
described is correct. The act done by the NARCOM did not satisfy the
elements of a valid seizure based on the “plain view” doctrine, they are as
follows: a.) a prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b.) the evidence
was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; c.) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d.) “plain view”
justified seizure of the evidence without any further search.

Since the elements were not satisfied, the seizure was unlawful.

FOOTNOTE 124

CASE TITLE Richard Hizon et al., petitioners vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and The
People of the Philippines, respondents
DATE G.R.No. 119619, December 19, 1996
PONENTE Justice Reynato Puno
FACTS 1. Richard Hizon et al., petitioners
2. On the strength of the report submitted by the Task Force Bantay
Dagat, the PNP Maritime Group boarded and inspected a big fishing
boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain. In the course of the
inspection, the police discovered a large aquarium, full of live fishes.
Some of the fishes were tested to contain cyanide.
3. In this appeal, the petitioners contended that the honorable court of
appeals erred in holding that the mere “positive results to the test for
the presence of sodium cyanide” in the fish specimen, albeit illegally
seized on the occasion of a warrantless search and arrest, is
admissible and sufficient basis for the petitioner’s conviction of the
crime of illegal fishing.
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals and The People of the Philippines
(State), respondents.
5. Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the
Task Force Bantay Dagat were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing
expedition.

ISSUE Whether or not the search made on the fishing boat was lawful.

RULING Yes, the search made on the fishing boat was lawful.

The Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

In the case at bar, the search of a moving vehicle, other vessel and aircraft for
violation of laws is one of the exceptions to the constitutional proscription of
a search warrant. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be moved quickly out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may
be sought.

Therefore, the search made on the fishing boat was lawful.


FOOTNOTE 125

CASE TITLE Hon. Arsenio N. Roldan Jr., in his capacity as acting Commissioner, Philippine
Fisheries Commissioner, and the Philippine Navy, petitioners vs. Hon.
Francisco Arca, as presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
Morabe, De Guzman & Company, respondents.
DATE G.R. No. L-25434, July 25, 1975
PONENTE Justice Felix Makasiar
FACTS 1. Hon. Arsenio N. Roldan Jr, Phil. Fisheries Commission and The
Philippine Navy, petitioners.
2. The petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Phil. Navy to
apprehend vessels Tony Lex III and Tone Lex VI for alleged violations of
some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder. The two fishing boats were actually seized
for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fishes caught with dynamite and
actual dynamite sticks were then found aboard the two vessels.
3. The Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to
file criminal charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels.
There were filed in the court a couple of informations, one against the
crew members of Tony Lex III and another against the crew members
of Tony Lex VI for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same
day, the fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as
instruments and therefore evidence of the crime and cabled the
Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels.
4. Hon. Francisco Arca (Presiding Judge of the CFI of Manila), Morabe, De
Guzman & Company, respondents.
5. The respondent judge issued a preliminary writ upon the filing by
private respondent of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two
vessels.

ISSUE
Whether or not the search and seizure of the fishing vessels without a
warrant were unlawful.
RULING
No, the search and seizure of the fishing vessels without a warrant was not
unlawful. The Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall be inviolable. In the
case at bar, the search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air
crafts for violations of the custom laws have been the traditional exception to
the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be
quickly moved out of the locality of jurisdiction in which the search warrant
must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence, it is not
practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected. Therefore, the search and seizure of the vessels
without a warrant does not constitute an unlawful act.

FOOTNOTE 126

CASE TITLE RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO,
RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA,
JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO DUMAYBAG,
DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ANGEL
VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, RICHARD ESTREMOS, JORNIE DELA
PENA, JESUS MACTAN, MARLON CAMPORAZO, FERNANDO BIRING,
MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, JOSEPH AURELIO, RONNIE JUEZAN,
BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO
DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO LANGUYOD,
DODONG DELOS REYES, JOLLY CABALLERO and ROPLANDO ARCENAS
Vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
DATE December 13, 1996
PONENTE Puno, J.
FACTS 1. Petitioners: RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA,
NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK,
EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO
DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO
ESTREMOS, ANGEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, RICHARD
ESTREMOS, JORNIE DELA PENA, JESUS MACTAN, MARLON CAMPORAZO,
FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE, JOSEPH AURELIO,
RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICARDO SALES, MARLON
ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO,
JANAIRO LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, JOLLY CABALLERO and
ROPLANDO ARCENAS

2. Action of Petitioner: The petitioners primarily question the admissibility of


the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the
fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners. More concretely,
they contend that the NBI finding of sodium cyanide in the fish
specimens should not have been admitted and considered by the trial
court because the fish samples were seized from the F/B Robinson
without a search warrant.

3. Subject/Object: In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP)


Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan received reports
of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response
to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to
assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the
laws on fishing.

4. Respondents: Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines


5. Action of Respondents: the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP
Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by
"muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto
Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of
the Task Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr.,
immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in
motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson
within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B
Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the boat
captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw
two foreigners in the captain's deck. SP03 Enriquez examined their
passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police also
discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish
weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. 2 They
checked the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be
in order. Nonetheless, SP03 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew
and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation.
Whether or not the warrantless search was valid.
ISSUE

RULING Yes, the warrantless search was valid

The constitution provides that The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause t
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

In the case at bar, the warrantless search of a fishing boat made by the police
on the strength of a report submitted by the Task Force Bantay Dagat.

Thus, the warrantless search was valid


FOOTNOTE 127

CASE TITLE Valmonte vs. General De Villa (178 SCRA 211)


DATE September 29, 1989
PONENTE Padilla, J.
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People’s Rights (ULAP)

2. Action of Petitioner: The Petitioner filed for a petition seeking the


declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the
alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people

3. Subject/Object: Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said


checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the
benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

4. Respondents: General Renato de Villa and National Capital Region District


Command
5. Action of Respondents: the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive
to the social, economic and political development of the National
Capital Region.1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
ISSUE Whether or not the installing of checkpoints without search warrants is a
violated the constitution.

RULING No, the installing of checkpoints did not violate the constitution

The constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

In the case at bar, stop and search without a warrant at military or police
checkpoints, which has been declared not be illegal per se long as it is
required by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists

Therefore, the installing of checkpoints did not violate the constitution.

FOOTNOTE 128

CASE TITLE Sammy Malacat y Mandar vs. Court of Appeals and People of the
Philippines ( GR No. 123595)
DATE December 12, 1997
PONENTE Davide, Jr., J
FACTS 1. Petitioners : Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged for violating Section 3
of the Presidential Decree No. 1866.

3. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was


invalid due to absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. As such,
the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in
evidence.

4. Subject/Object: . The police officers approached one group of men, who


fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up
with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7
Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul
Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.

5. Respondents: Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

5. Action of Respondents: Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District,


Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police
Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about
6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he
was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury
Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-
looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted
at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury
Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . .
moving very fast. Yu and his companions positioned themselves at
strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes.
ISSUE Whether or not the right of the petitioners against warrantless search was
violated

RULING Yes, the right of the petitioner against warrantless search was violated

The constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

In the case at bar, in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of
Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed. Warrantless search is valid when there is genuine
reason to “stop and frisk” in the light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions to warrant a belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed.

Thus, the warrantless search was valid.

FOOTENOTE 129
CASE DIGEST PAPER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
CASE TITLE: RODOLFO ESPANO,accused-petitioner,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 120431

DATE: April 1, 1998


PONENTE: ROMERO, J.:FACTS:
1. Petitioners;Rodolfo Espano , accused and was charged of illegal position of prohibited drugs.
2. Petitioner’s Action : Accused appealed and said that the arrest was illegally done and the search of his
house is deemed a violation of his constitutional right.
3. The accused was caught in flagrante by herein police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, where they are conducting an investigation in the area reported being rampant of drug
pushing. The agents frisked the accused after he completed his transaction to a buyer and there found with
him 2 tea bags of Marijuana. Accused denied all the allegations against him and made an
alibi that he was in his house sleeping when the police officer went to his house looking for his brother in
law and instead handcuffed him to take his part for allegedly having in his possession 10 teabags of
Marijuana.
4. Respondents; Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

5. Respondents: The trial court did not believe his alibi and found him guilty of violation of Article II,
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
RULING: YES. the warrantless arrest is valid.
Constitution states that the right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches, and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath of affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
At the case at bar, A person caught in flagrante delicto and lawfully arrested may be searched provided
that the search is contemporaneous to the arrest and within permissible area of search, or the place within
the immediate control of the person being arrested.

Therefore, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. and the warrantless arrest is valid.
FOOTENOTE 130
CASE DIGEST PAPER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 128222

DATE: June 17, 1999


PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
1. . Petitioners;CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused and was charged with illegal possession of
methaphetamine hydrochloride
2. Petitioner’s Action : Chua Ho San the appellant prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the
judgment of the RTC.
3. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC
after he was caught during CID began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline in response to reports of rampant
smuggling of firearms and other contraband.

4. Respondents; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

5. Respondents: The RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Off cers
institute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement

RULING: NO. The Court held n the negative

Constitution states that the right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches, and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath of affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
At the case at bar, It is essential that a valid arrest must precede the search.

Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
FOOTENOTE 131
CASE DIGEST PAPER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

CASE TITLE: HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, as Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila;
and MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,

vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.G.R. No. L-27360

DATE: February 28, 1968


PONENTE: ZALDIVAR, J.:
1. Petitioners; HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
as Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and
MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
2. Petitioner’s Action : Petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department
had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending
termination of the seizure proceedings.
3. Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting
upon a reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded
on two trucks,
4. Respondents; REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23,
Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.G.R. No. L-27360
5. Respondents: respondent Mago filed for prohibition and certiorari.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 67496 (regarding restraining respondents from opening 9 bales), Judge
Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the petitioners. However, when the restraining
order was received by herein respondent, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of
the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.

ISSUE: WON an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant.

RULING: YES.automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant.

Constitution states that the right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches, and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath of affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
At the case at bar, Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the
seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or  to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases.
Therefore, the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in
accordance with law and by that seizure, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods
for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws. Customs searches however are not
available in dwelling places.

FOOTNOTE 132

CASE TITLE SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DATE G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
PONENTE Justice Nachura

FACTS 1. Petitioner: SR. INSP. Jerry C. Valeroso

2. Action of Petitioner: Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal


imploring this Court to once more take a contemplative reflection and
deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure.
3. Subject/Object: Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest
allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was
sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by
the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of
the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his
hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco.43 The other police
officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet44
where they found the subject firearm and ammunition.45 With such
discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.
4. Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

5. Action of Respondents: the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon
City, convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day,
as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed 16 the RTC decision but the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2)
months.
is the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
ISSUE
RULING No. the warrantless search and seizure of the fire arm and ammunition is not
valid.

According to the Law, The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.

In the case at bar, the raiding team where supposed to serve warrant of
arrest issued against Valeroso but they ransacked the room and conduct
search for evidence against Valeroso which they found the firearm and
ammunition.

Therefore, the warrantless search and seizure of the fire arms and
ammunition is no valid.

FOOTNOTE 133

CASE TITLE EDDIE GUAZON, petitioner vs


MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA,
respondents.

DATE G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990


PONENTE GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS 1. Petitioner: EDDIE GUAZON residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and
leaders in their respective communities.

2. Action of Petitioner: The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow
a common pattern of human rights abuses.

3. Subject/Object: the police action of the nature described by the


petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
4. Respondents: MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM,
and COL. JESUS GARCIA,

5. Action of Respondents: Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to


the government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the
maintenance of peace in the state.
the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. They
allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate
disregard for human rights are total lies. The aerial target zoning was
intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted.
Respondents averred that they have intelligently and carefully planned
months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media
joined the operation to witness and record such event.
WON the areal target zoning and the saturation drive is legal
ISSUE

RULING YES. The conduct of areal target zoning or saturation drive is a valid exercise
of the military powers of the President.

According to the Law, The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.

In the case at bar, in the conduct of areal target or saturation drive made by
the military was the exercise of military powers of the President intended to
flush the flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities.

Therefore, areal target zoning or saturation drive is legal.

FOOTNOTE 134

CASE TITLE Board of Comissioner, CID, petitioners vs.


HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29,
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.

DATE G.R. No. 95122-23 May 31, 1991


PONENTE BIDIN, J.:
FACTS 1. Petitioner: Board of Comissioner, CID

2. Action of Petitioner: The board of commissioners was directed by the


Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the
ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of
William.The Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the
arrest of William Gatchalian because of his citizenship.

3. Subject/Object: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian,


was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino
citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian.
Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong
together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them
certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate
in Hongkong

4. Respondents: HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila,


Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.

5. Action of Respondents: contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies


and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.

Whether or not the warrant of arrest by the commissioner of immigration


ISSUE was valid

RULING No, the warrant of arrest by the commissioner of immigration is not valid.

According to the Law, The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.

In the case at bar, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of


arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other
words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be
valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation

Therefore, the arrest by the commissioner of immigration is not valid.

FOOTNOTE 135

CASE TITLE Esteban Morano, et. al. v Hon. Martinano Vivo in his capacity as the Acting
Commissioner of Immigration

DATE June 30, 1967; G.R. No. L-221196

PONENTE Justice Conrado V. Sanchez


FACTS 1. Petitioners-appellants are Esteban Morano, Chan Sau Wah, and Fu Yan Fun.
Chan Sau Wah is the wife of Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino, while
Fu Yan Fun, a minor, is Chan Sau Wah’s son by her first marriage. Both were
permitted under a temporary visitor’s visa for two months.

2. Action of Petitioner: Instead of leaving the country, Chan Sau Wah and her
son petitioned the CFI to prohibit the Immigration from issuing any process.
Petitioners appealed the case to the SC.

3. Subject/Object: Petitioner-appellants contended that the Constitution


limits only to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest. The
legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is
violative of the Bill of Rights.

4. Respondent-appellant is the State represented by Hon. Martiniano Vivo in


his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration.

5. Because petitioners prolonged their stay and their last extension had
already expired, Commissioner Vivo warned them that the Commission will
issue a warrant for their arrest and deportation, and confiscation of their
bond.
ISSUE Whether or not the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation can validly
issue a warrant of arrest to carry out a final finding of violation.

RULING Yes. The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation can validly issue a
warrant of arrest to carry out a final finding of violation.

The Constitution provides that, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall


issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.

The instant case does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a
final order of deportation in accordance with law. Requiring that the
probable cause be determined by a judge does not extend to deportation
proceedings. Determination of probable cause as understood is not
necessary. Judicial exercise of power is not contemplated but only the
carrying out of a valid decision by the Commissioner of Immigration in
pursuance of a valid legislation.

Therefore, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may issue a


warrant of arrest to carry out a final finding of violation.
FOOTNOTE 136

CASE TITLE Martiniano P. Vivo, et. al v Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, et. al.

DATE July 29, 1968; G.R. No. L-24576

PONENTE Justice Jose Benedicto Luna Reyes

FACTS 1. Petitioners are Martiniano P. Vivo as Acting Commissioner of Immigration,


the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, and the
Deportation Officer. The Commission initially allowed private respondents
entry to the Philippines on the ground of their declaration as sons of a
Filipino citizen.

2. Upon disclaiming of Isaac Calacday, under oath, paternity of the private


respondents, Commissioner issued warrants of arrest against the latter
stating their deportability and on the ground that they were not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry not being properly documented.

3. Subject/Object: Petitioners contended that the court is without jurisdiction


to restrain the deportation proceedings of the respondents Calacdays.
Arrests and deportation are well within the jurisdiction of the Immigration
authorities.

4. Respondents are Hon. Agustin P. Montesa as Judge of the CFI of Manila and
Jose Calacday, et. al.

5. Private respondents filed before respondent court a petition to prohibit the


arrest and deportation of all the petitioners. Consequently, the court
resolved it to their favour by reasoning that the Commission cannot
summarily order the arrest and deportation without giving them a chance
to be heard as Filipino citizens.

ISSUE Whether or not the Commissioner erred in the issuance of the warrants of
arrest against the private respondents.

RULING No, the Commissioner did not err in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

The Constitution provides that, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall


issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.

In the instant case, the court misapprehended the import of the warrants
issued by the Commissioner. There was no case of “summarily arresting and
deporting” the respondents Calacdays, as unwarrantedly assumed by the
court. The Commissioner has jurisdiction to issue warrants of arrest for
respondents to be brought to the immigration authorities for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of violation of law and not for sole purpose of
investigation and prosecution.

Therefore, the Commissioner of the Immigration did not err in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.

FOOTNOTE 138

CASE TITLE In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo
L. Sabio v Hon. Senator Richard Gordon, et. al.

DATE October 17, 2006; G.R. No. 174340

PONENTE Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez

FACTS 6. Petitioner is Camilo L. Sabio, Chairman of the Presidential Commission on


Good Government (PCGG). He was invited by the Senate to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on
Public Services. The purpose was to deliberate a senate resolution on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporations (POTC), Philippine Communications Satelite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corp. (PHC).
7. Petitioner declined the invitation because of prior commitment and
invoked Section 4(b)1 of E.O.1.
8. Subject/Object: Petitioner filed with the SC a petition for habeas corpus
against the Senate Committees2 on the ground, among others, that the
respondents disregarded the provision in E.O 1 and violated the right to
privacy.
9. Respondents are Hon. Senator Richard Gordon in his capacity as Chairman,
and the Hon. Members of the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services of the Senate:
1
Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 —“No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.” Purpose is to ensure PCGG's unhampered performance of its task.
2
(1) Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, (2) Committee on Public Services
Hon. Senator Juan Ponce-Enrile, Hon. Senator Manuel Villar, Senate
Sergeant-at-arms, and the Senate of the Philippines.
10. Respondent Senator Gordon issued 3 successive subpoenas to entreat
the appearance of the petitioner but were all refused of. Consequently, the
petitioner was ordered to show cause why he should not be cited in
contempt of the Senate. And by approval of the Committee members,
petitioner was arrested and detained at the Senate premises.

ISSUE 1 Whether or not the imperative order for the director and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation to appear before the Senate is a violation of
the right to privacy.

RULING 1 No, the imperative order to appear before the Senate is not a violation of the
right to privacy.

The Constitution provides that the privacy of communication and


correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court.

In the case at bar, the director and officers of the PHC have no reasonable
expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation
where the government has substantial interest. These matters are of public
concern and the people have the right to information. For a claim of violation
of right to privacy to prosper, the persons must exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy. For PHC, the Supreme Court deems it otherwise. The
right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest.

Therefore, the imperative order for the director and officers of Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation to appear before the Senate is not a violation of the
right to privacy.

ISSUE 2 Whether or not Chairman Sabio’s refusal to the invitation of the Senate is
valid.

RULING 2 No, Chairman Sabio’s refusal to the invitation of the Senate is not valid.

The Constitution provides that the privacy of communication and


correspondence shall be violative except upon lawful order of the court.

In the case at bar, Chairman Sabio’s invocation of Section 4(b) of E.O. 1 is


baseless. Because Section 4(b) of E.O. 1 is repugnant to the power of inquiry
of the Congress, the provision cannot be countenanced. It constitutionally
offensive for Chairman Sabio to suppose that a member of the PCGG could not
be required to testify before the Congress. It simply runs counter to
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government.

Hence, Chairman Sabio’s refusal to the invitation of the Senate is not valid.

FOOTNOTE 139
CASE TITLE Socorro D. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia
DATE September 28, 1995; 248 SCRA 590, G.R. No. 93833

PONENTE Justice Santiago M. Kapunan

FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: Socorro D. Ramirez

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the information on


the ground the facts charged were not a violation of RA 4200. She
contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of
a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication. Petitioner also argues that R.A.4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with
private respondent was not illegal under the said act.

3. Subject/Object: Ramirez filed a civil case for damages alleging that the
private respondent during a confrontation in the latter’s office, insulted
and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy. To support her claims, Ramirez
submitted a verbatim transcript on their conversation which was based
from a tape recording during the confrontation.

4. Respondents: Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia

5. Action of Respondent/s: As a result on the recording, respondent file a


criminal case to the petitioner for violation of RA 4200 (An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.) on secretly taping the
confrontation.

ISSUE Whether or not the applicable provision of RA 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

RULING NO. It does apply to all or any parties to the conversation.

According to Art. III, Section 3 of the Constitution, 1) that the privacy of


communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. 2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

In the case at bar, the law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private conversation. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section
1 of RA 4200.

Therefore, the recorded conversation was a violation to RA 4200.

FOOTNOTE 141
CASE TITLE Edgardo A. Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the
Philippines

DATE October 16, 1986; 145 SCRA 112, G.R. No. L-69809

PONENTE Justice Hugo Gutierrez Jr.

FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: Edgardo A. Gaanan

2. Action of Petitioner: The petitioner contends that extension telephones


were not included nor belong to the same class of enumerated
electronic devices under RA 4200.

3. Subject/Object: It is when Atty. Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly


listen to the conversation between him and Atty. Pintor through a
telephone extension to personally hear the proposed conditions of
settlements made by Atty. Pintor.

4. Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines

5. Action of Respondent/s: The respondents files a criminal case that argues


that extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term “device”
in RA 4200 (An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes.)

ISSUE Whether or not “any other device or arrangement” includes extension


phones and listening thru is a violation of RA 4200.

RULING NO. Extension phones is not included on the devices enumerated in Sec. 1
RA 4200.

According to Art. III, Section 3 of the Constitution, 1) that the privacy of


communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. 2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

In the case at bar, The extension telephone is not of the same category as a
Dictaphone, dictagraph or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 in
which cannot be considered as a “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone
line. Since the telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the
provisions of the Act. And the telephone extension in this case was not
installed for this purpose but it just happened to be there for ordinary office
use.

Therefore, the use of telephone extension does not violate the RA 4200.

FOOTNOTE 143

CASE TITLE Cecilia Zulueta v Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

DATE February 20, 1996; G.R. No. 107383


PONENTE Justice Vicente Mendoza

FACTS 1. Petitioner is Cecilia Zulueta, the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin.

2. Petitioner questioned the decision of the CA affirming the trial court’s


decision on the ground that the documents and papers, in cases of
disqualification from practice, are admissible as evidence. Petitioner
forcibly took these documents, consisting of private correspondence
between respondent and his paramours, cancelled checks, diaries,
passport, and photographs, from the clinic of her husband.

3. Subject/Object: The documents and papers seized from private


respondent’s clinic were to be used as evidence in a legal separation
case and disqualification from the practice of medicine, which petitioner
had filed against her husband.

4. Respondents are the Court of Appelas and Alfred Martin.

5. Private respondent Dr. Mrtin brought an action to recover the documents


and papers, as well as damages from his wife before the RTC. The RTC
ruled in his favour declaring him to be the exclusive owner thereof and
petitioner were enjoined from using the documents as evidence.

ISSUE Whether or not the documents in question are admissible as evidence.

RULING No. The documents in question are not admissible as evidence.

Under the constitution, the privacy of communication and correspondence


shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court.
In the instant case, the wife cannot just invoke her right just because she
thinks that she is aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity. The intimacies
between them do not justify any one of them to break the drawers and
cabinets of the other for tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity. A person
does not shed his or her right to privacy by contracting marriage. Any
violation of this provision renders the any evidence inadmissible.

Therefore, the documents in question are not admissible as evidence.

FOOTNOTE 144

CASE TITLE Ma. Paz Krohn v CA and Edgar Krohn, Jr.

DATE June 14, 1994; G.R. No. 108854

PONENTE Justice Josue N. Bellosillo


FACTS 1. Petitioner is Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn. She underwent psychological
testing in 1971 in an effort to ease the marital strain between her and
her husband. Consequently, they separated in fact.

2. Petitioner questioned the presentation of her Confidential Psychiatric


Evaluation Report in the annulment proceeding as this constitutes
violation on privileged communication. Petitioner sought the SC to
prohibit the trial court from allowing its presentation and disclosure.

3. Subject/Object: Petitioner contended that a physician is prohibited from


testifying on matters which have been acquired in attending to a patient
in a professional capacity. With more reason should third person, like
respondent-husband in this particular instance, be prohibited from
testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient.

4. Respondents are the Court of Appelas and Edgar Krohn, Jr. Private
respondent initiated an annulment proceeding, grounded on
psychological incapacity, against his wife.

5. Private respondent contended that the prohibition from testifying on the


privileged communication only applies to a physician. It is not
applicable to him as he is the husband and not the physician of the
petitioner.

ISSUE Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct.

RULING No. The contention of the petitioner is not correct.

Under the constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the right to


privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inadmissible.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not a
physician. He is simply the patient’s husband. Plainly and clearly, he does not
fall within the prohibition. In an annulment on the ground of psychological
incapacity, the wife’s confidential psychiatric report can be testified to by
the husband.

Therefore, the contention of the petitioner is not correct.

FOOTNOTE 145

CASE TITLE Waterous Drug Corporation and Ms. Emma Co v NLRC and Antonia Catolico

DATE October 16, 1997; G.R. No. 113271

PONENTE Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.


FACTS 1. Petitioners are the Waterous Drug Corporation and the VP-General
Manager of the said company, Ms. Emma Co. Petitioner noticed
irregularities in the purchases, delivery, as well as discrepancies in
prices by private respondent.

2. Petitioner placed respondent Catolico on preventive suspension then later


on terminated. After the case was brought to the NLRC, petitioner
questioned its decision in affirming the finding of the Labor Arbiter on
the ground that the private respondent was denied due process and
was illegally dismissed.

3. Subject/Object: Petitioner contended that the check, amounting P640.00,


drawn by YSP in favour of respondent Catolico which her co-employee
saw when the latter opened the envelope, is an admissible evidence.

4. Respondents are the National Labor Relations Commission and Antonia


Melodia Catolico. Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug
Corporation.

5. Private respondent protested Clerk Saldaña’s invasion of her privacy when


the latter opened the envelope containing the difference between the
genuine price and the jack-up price from supplier YSP Pharmaceuticals.

ISSUE Whether or not the search and seizure made by private individual Saldaña is a
violation of the right of privacy of communication.

RULING No. The search and seizure made by private individual Saldaña is not a
violation of the right of privacy of communication.

Under the constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the right to


privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inadmissible.
In the instant case, the opening of the envelope of the private individual does
not warrant the application of the constitutional provision against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The private individual as an employee of
the Waterous company is justified in assuming that it is a business
communication in which the company has substantial interest. Despite lack
of consent on the part of the private respondent, and because it is not a
violation to the right to privacy, the check is deemed admissible in evidence.

Therefore, the search and seizure made by the private individual is not a
violation of the right of privacy of communication.
FOOTNOTE Footnote 149

CASE TITLE Guingguing vs CA, GR No. 128959

DATE September 30, 2005

PONENTE Ponente: Justice Tinga

FACTS Facts: 1. The petitioner is Ciriaco "Boy" Guingguing, editor-publisher of Sunday Post.
2. The petitioner seeks to nullify his conviction of the crime of libel. 3. The petitioner
contends that the Court's finding constitutes infringement of his constitutional right
to freedom of speech. 4. The respondent is the Court of Appeals and Cirse Choy
Torralba, broadcast journalist. 5. The respondent asserted that he has been acquitted
and that the case referred to in the publication had been settled. Issue: WON the
publication infringes the freedom of speech. Ruling: No. The publication does not
infringe freedom of speech. The constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech. In the case at bar, the publication of statements
involving and against public figure prevents proliferation of untruths if unrefuted.
Therefore, the publication does not infringe freedom of speech.

ISSUE Issue: WON the government may interfere in the affair of the press.

RULING Ruking: No. The government cannot interfere in the affair of the press. The
constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of the
press. In the case at bar, participation in the affair and operation of the publication
or management thereof is an obvious threatening the protected and guaranteed
press freedom. Therefore, the government cannot interfere the affair of the press.
Footnote :151

Case Title:

Salonga vs Paso, 134 scra 438

Date: February 18, 1985

Ponente : justice Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:

1. The petitiomer

2. The petitioner seeks to nullify the conviction of subversion against him.

3. The counsel of the petitioner contends that there is no established Prima facie case against him to
justify the contention of the respondent.
4. The respondents are Hon. Ernani Paso, presiding judge of CFI of Rizal branch XVIII, Hon. Judge Rodolfo
Ortiz, presiding judge of CFI of Rizal Branch XXXI, City Fiscal Sergio Apostol, Col.Balibino Diego and
Col.Roman Madella.

5. The respondent issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of petitioner of
Revised Anti-Subversion Act.

Issue: WON political discussion is within the protection of the freedom of speech.

Ruling : Yes. Political discussion is within the protection of the freedom of speech. According to the
Constitution, no law shall be passed abridging freedom of speech. In the case at bar, mere political
discussion even among those opposed the present administrator cannot be construed as subversive
activities or an evidence of membership in a subversive organization. Therefore, political discussion is
within the protection of the freedom of speech.

153

CASE: IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.: Philippine Long


Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), per its First Vice-President,
Mr. Vicente R. Samson, appellant,

DATE: April 6, 1995


Ponente: Chief Justice Andres de la Rosa Narvasa

Facts:

1. Petioner: Supreme court

2. Action of the Petitioner: Chief Justice, constituted the Ad


Hoc Committee, to seek to ascertain the truth respecting
said reports and statements, and to this end, forthwith
interview at closed-door sessions or otherwise, such
persons as may appear to it to have some knowledge of
the matter and who may be appealed to to share that
knowledge with the Court, and otherwise gather such
evidence as may be available.

3. Object/subject: Jurado a journalist had been writing


about alleged improperties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992
to March, 1993). 

(Kung mangutana si dean unsay labot sa PLDT, basaha ang


naa sa ubos, dayon ang next paragraph ang gipublish ni
hurado about sa nahitabo anang next paragraph. )

In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the "Philippine


Daily Inquirer" and one or two other newspapers published,
on January 28, 1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a
Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This
gentleman, it appears, had been commissioned by one of
the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI), to examine and analyze the decision of Justice
Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias  and the
writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay,
to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in
part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the
Gutierrez decision "looks, reads and sounds like the writing
of the PLDT's counsel,"

Jurado wrote in his column on February 8, 1993, an item


entitled, "Who will judge theJustices?" referring among other
things to. report that six justices, their spouses, children and
grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in
Hong Kong some time last year — and that luxurious hotel
accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a
pubic utility firm  and that the trip  was arranged by the
travel agency patronized by this public utility firm."

4. Petitioner: Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO, a journalist who


writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the "Manila
Standard." And he is also a lawyer, but a practicing full-
time as journalist.

5. Action of the Petitioner: Jurado filed a "Manifestation"


under date of March 31, 1993. He moved for the
termination of the proceeding on the following posited
premises:

The court has no administrative supervision over him as a


member of the press or over his work as a journalist.

ISSUE: Whether or not court has administrative supervision over


Emil Jurado as a member of the press or over his work as a
journalist.

RULING:

YES, court has administrative supervision over Emil


Jurado as a member of the press or over his work as a
journalist.

Article 3, section 4 states that no law shall be passed


abridging the freedom of speech.

In the case at bar, Jurado demonstrate gross


irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and
the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation
of those of whom he wrote. The publish writings of Jurado
constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do
to degrade the administration of justice and the judges
engaged in that function.

Thus, Supreme Court has jurisdiction over anyone for


Offensive utterances against its dignity, honor or
reputation.

154

CASE: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE


SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. G.R. No. 115455
DATE: October 30, 1995
PONENTE: Justice Jose Mendoza

FACTS:

1. Petitioner: Arturo M. Tolintino, PHILIPPINE PRESS


INSTITUTE, INC.; et, al.

2. Action of Petitioner:Petitioners suits for certiorari and


prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, on
various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6,
1994 of this Court, in which Claims of press freedom and
religious liberty was raised.,

3. Subject/Object: Republic Act No. 7716 amended Section


103 by deleting subsection (f) with the result that print
media became subject to the VAT with respect to all
aspects of their operations

4. Repondent: THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE


COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

5. Action of Repondent: Respondents issued Revenue


Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting
the "circulation income of print media pursuant to § 4
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing
against abridgment of freedom of the press, among
others." The exemption of "circulation income" has left
income from advertisements still subject to the VAT.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imposition of taxes violates


freedom of press.
RULING:
NO, Imposition of Taxes does not violates freedom of
press.

Article 3, section 4 states that no law shall be passed


abridging the freedom of speech.

In the case at bar, the press is not immune from non-


discriminatory taxes imposed on business from the
application of the general rules. In similar way, other
business transactions which were previously exempt from
VAT have also been subjected to it.

Thus, the Imposition of taxes to PHILIPPINE PRESS


INSTITUTE, INC.; et, al. does not violates press freedom.

155
CASE: Babst,  et.  al. vs. National Intelligence
Board, et.  al., 132 SCRA 316, 330 (1984),
DATE: September 28, 1984
PONENTE:Justice Plan

FACTS:
1. Petitioner:Arlene Babst, et. al
2. Action of the Petitioner:  Petitioners on March 3, 1983,
seeking to prohibit the respondents from issuing
subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and
interrogating them.

3. Subject/Object: At different dates since July, 1980,


some of them have allegedly been summoned by military
authorities who have subjected them to sustained
interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private
lives to shed light on confidential matters.
4. Repondent:National Intelligence Board
5. Action of the Repondent: respondents counter that
what they have sent to petitioners were neither
subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to
dialogues which were completely voluntary, without any
compulsion employed on petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not Press refusing to an invitation


from a military personnel to shed light on confidential
matters during Martial Law is legal.
RULING:

YES, Press refusing to the invitation from a military


personnel to shed light on confidential matters during
Martial Law is legal.

Article 3, section 4 states that no law shall be passed


abridging the freedom of speech.

In the case at bar, the petitioners who is invited refuse on


their pleasure. An invitation given to a journalist by the
military personnel to shed light on confidential matters
during martial law has a chilling effect even on future
writing

Thus, an invitation to answer questions sent to Press


during Martial Law by military amounts to prior restraint
and to refuse such invitation as press is legasl.

FOOTNOTE 156
CASE TITLE In re Vicente Sotto (for contempt of court), 82 Phil. 575
DATE January 21, 1949

PONENTE Justice Jose Yusay Feria

FACTS 1. Respondent: Atty. Vicente Sotto (Senator)

2. Action of Respondent: Atty. Sotto contends that Section 13, Art. VIII of
Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the Supreme Court
has no power to impose. According to Sotto, he made his statement
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending nor
attacking the honesty and integrity of the members of the court, in
exercise of the freedom of speech guarantee

3. Subject/Object: Atty. Sotto was required to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt in connection with his malicious statement of
the SC’s decision in the matter of Angel Parazo’s (news reporter) case
which was published in Manila Times and in other newspapers in the
locality.

4. The Court held in affirmative that the power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts. Any publication, pending suit, reflecting upon the
court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc. with
reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the
controversy is contempt of court and is punishable.

ISSUE Whether or not the act done by Atty. Sotto was an exercise of freedom of
speech.

RULING No, Atty. Sotto’s act was not an exercise of freedom of speech.

Section 4 of Art. III of the Constitution states that, No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.

In the case at bar, Atty. Sotto’s malicious branding statement to the Supreme
Court was a disrespect and brought embarrassment to the judiciary. Freedom
of speech is not an absolute right and is subject to restrictions.

Therefore, Atty. Sotto’s act was not an exercise of freedom of speech.

Important terms:
*contempt of court- seen as a form of disturbance that may impede the
functioning of the courts.

Doctrine of Canon 10: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
Court.

FOOTNOTE 157
CASE TITLE ABS CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486
DATE January 28, 2000

PONENTE Justice Artemio Villaseñor Panganiban Jr.

FACTS 1. Petitioner: ABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation- Philippine based media and
entertainment company

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner argued of holding exit polls and nationwide


reporting of results are valid exercises of the freedom of speech and of
the press

3. Subject/Object: COMELEC prohibited the conduct of exit polls by ABS-CBN


on the ground of clear and present danger it poses to the integrity of
elections

4. Respondents: Commission on Elections- principal government agency


tasked by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations concerning the conduct of regular and special elections.

5. Action of Respondents: The COMELEC released a resolution which


approved the issuance of a restraining order against ABSCBN to conduct
an exit survey. It acted upon reports that the network plans to conduct
a TV-radio coverage of the elections and make an exit survey of the
votes cast for President and Vice President and broadcast the results
immediately

ISSUE Whether or not ABSCBN exit survey violates the freedom of expression.

RULING No, ABSCBN exit survey does not violates the freedom of expression.

Section 4 of Art. III of the Constitution states that, No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.

In the case at bar, the holding of exit polls and nationwide reporting of
election results are means of assuring individual, self-fulfilment, of attaining
the truth, of securing participation by the people in social and political
decision making and of maintaining the balance between stability and
change.

Additional info that may help: In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot
are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has
voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to
reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the COMELEC, so as to minimize or suppress incidental
problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental
rights of our people.

Therefore, ABSCBN exit survey does not violate the freedom of expression.

FOOTNOTE 159
CASE TITLE Emilio M. R. Osmeña vs. The Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132231

DATE March 31, 1998

PONENTE Justice Jose Catral Mendoza

FACTS 1. Petitioners: Emilio M. R. Osmeña and Pablo P. Garcia, as candidates’ for


public office in the forthcoming elections. Osmeña is a candidate for
President of the Philippines, while Garcia is a governor of Cebu
Province, seeking re-elections

2. Action of Petitioners: Petitioners request a re-examination or questions the


constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,
prohibiting the mass media from selling or giving free of charge print
space or airtime for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
COMELEC

3. Subject/Object: Petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) works to the


disadvantage of candidates who do not have enough resources to pay a
campaign outside of mass media can hardly apply to them

4. Respondent: Commission on Election- principal government agency tasked


by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
concerning the conduct of regular and special elections.

5. Action of Respondent: The validity of regulations of time, place and


manner, under well-defined standards, is well-nigh beyond question.
What is involved is simply the regulation of its nature. Instead of leaving
candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the laws provides for
allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and air time to give all
candidates equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring “free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections”

ISSUE Whether or not Section 11 (b) of RA 6646 was constitutional.

RULING Yes, Section 11 (b) of RA 6646 was constitutional.

Section 4 of Art. III of the Constitution states that, No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.

In the case at bar, Section 11 (b) of RA 6646 in prohibiting the mass media
from selling or giving free of charge print space or airtime for campaign or
other political purposes does not suppressed political ads but only regulates
the time and manner of advertising, thus, does not violate the freedom of
speech, expression and or the press.

Therefore, Section 11 (b) of RA 6646 was constitutional.

CASE: 160 Page: 82


G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Ponente: Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
2. Action of the Petitioner: Assailed the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 98- 1419 in
restraining the ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting exit survey during the May 11, 1998 elections;
3. Cause of Action: ABS-CBN to conduct a radio-TV coverage of the elections and make
an exit survey of the vote during elections for national officials particularly for President
and Vice President
4. Repsondent: Commission on Elections
5. Action of the Respondent: Issued said resolution to halt operations of the ABS-CBN and
other groups to conduct said exit surveys.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the
petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the
. . . May 11 elections.
RULING:
Yes, the respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the
restraining order against herein petitioners.
The constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC granted the restraining order against the ABS-CBN and other
groups since the COMELEC claims that exit surveys will transgress sanctity or secrecy of the
ballots. The conduct of exit surveys does not violate the sanctity of the ballots for the reason
that the contents of the ballot are not actual exposed and the revelation of whom the elector has
voted for is not compulsory, but rather voluntary. In addition, voters may choose not to disclose
their identities.
Thus, the Commission deemed acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it approved the restraining order against the petitioners.

CASE: 161 Page: 83


MERLINDA JACINTO, ADELINA AGUSTIN, et al. v. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, and the SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS
Ponente: Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS:
1. Petitioners: Merlinda Jacinto and Susan Agustin were public teachers from various
schools in Metropolitan Manila.

2. Action of the Petitioner: Petitioners absented themselves from their classes in


furtherance of or in connection with the mass action for the purpose of pressuring the
government to grant their demands.

3. Cause of Action: DECS Secretary Isidro Cario issued a return-to-work order addressed
to all public school teachers and other DECS personnel which cautions those public
teachers who are engaged to strikes, unauthorized mass leaves and other forms of
mass actions to return to work within 24 hours. Non-compliance would result to dismissal
proceedings.

4. Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Civil Service Commission, and the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports

5. Action of the Petitioner: The Secretary of DECS sanctioned herein petitioner Jacinto 6
month suspension from work and reprimanded Adelina Agustin due to their absences in
connection with the mass actions between the period September 17 to 21, 1990; both
CSC and CA upheld said decision by the DECS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court erred when it upheld the resolutions of the CSC that
penalized all the petitioners whose only offense was to exercise their constitutional right
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
RULING:
No, the respondent court did not err in upholding the resolutions of the CSC that
penalized all the petitioners.
The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of freedom of speech,
freedom of press and freedom to peaceful assembly.
In the case at bar, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario upheld the resolutions against the
petitioners since the said public teachers are engaged in strikes, unauthorized leaves and other
forms of unauthorized mass actions. The petitioners, being civil servants, postulates that the
absences incurred during their active participation in a strike are valid exercise of freedom of
assembly. The exercise of peaceful assembly should not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The temporary
stoppage of classes resulting from the activity of herein petitioners necessarily disrupted public
services, which is the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition.
Thus, the respondent court did not err in upholding the resolutions of the CSC that
penalized all the petitioners.

FOOTNOTE Footnote 167

CASE TITLE Ang Ladlad V Comelec G.R. No. 190582

DATE

PONENTE DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS Facts: 1. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON
REMOTO, Petitioner.
2. Action of the Petitioner :
It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said
petition.

3.Object/Subject:
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of
accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
4. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
5. Action of the Respondent:
The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941,
and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s
field personnel
ISSUE Whether or not respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the
Constitution

RULING Ruling:
Yes, the COMELEC violated the non-establishment clause of the Constitution.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” In the case at bar, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. Our non-establishment clause calls
for the government to be neutral in religious matters. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Thus, there was a grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to dismissed establishment or
registration of Ang Ladlad on moral ground. The government should be
neutral when it comes to religious matters.

FOOTNOTE 170

CASE TITLE GREGORIO AGLIPAY vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent. G.R. No. L-45459 

DATE March 13, 1937

PONENTE LAUREL, J.
FACTS 1. GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, represented by Vicente Sotto
2. Action of the Petitioner :
The Petitioner filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the
Director of the Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the 33 rd Intl Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic.

3. Subject/Object:
The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by
Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose- for
the benefit of a particular sect or church.

4. JUAN RUIZ, respondent. Represented by Office of the Solicitor-General


Tuason

5. Action of the Respondent:


In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that
he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. 

ISSUE Whether or not the authorized stamp issue is declared invalid for violating the
principle of separation of Church and State.
RULING No, the authorized stamp issue is not a violation to the principle of separation
of Church and State.
The constitution provides that no public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or
for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired
by any sectarian denomination. The only purpose was “to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist to this country.” The stamps were not issue and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. 
Hence, the authorize stamp issue is not a violation to the principle of separation of
Church and state. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply
felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime
of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him
who guides the destinies of men and nations. 

Footnote 172

CASE: ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, A.M. NO. P-02-1651


DATE:June 22, 2006

PONENTE: JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO

FACTS:

1. Complainant- Alejandro Estrada (private individual). He is not personally related either


to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Piñas City but of Bacoor, Cavite.
2. Complainants Action- Estrada believes that Respondent is committing an immoral act
that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
as it might appear that the court condones her act.
3. A compliant was initiated against respondent alleging that she should be dismissed from
service on the ground of immorality because she is living with a married man- Luciano
Quilapio Jr. [disgraceful and immoral conduct, under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec.
46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.]
4. Respondent- Soledad Escritor, a Court Interpreter of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court
of Las Piñas City who was living with a man [Luciano Quilapio, Jr.] not her husband,
and having borne a child within live-in arrangement.
5. Respondent Escritor invoked religious freedom as her main defense and as a member of
their religious sect Jehova’s Witnesses, she and her live-in partner [Luciano Quilapio, Jr.]
executed a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness within which the elders of their
congregation allowed them to live together as husband and wife until they obtained the
proper legal remedy to marry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Escritor’s claim about her religious freedom is valid.

A- Yes. Respondent Escrotor’s claim about her religious freedom was valid.

L- The Constitution states that, no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

A- In the case at bar, the conduct of respondent who was living with a man under a
Declaration Pledging Faithfulness that they executed as part of their religious sect is an
exercise as a preferred freedom which they can enjoy.

C-Thus, respondent Escritor’s claim about her religious freedom is valid.

DEANS BOOK:

PAGE: 85 PARAGRAPH: 1
Footnote 173

CASE: Reli German, Ramon Pedrosa, Tirso Santillan, Jr., Ma. Luisa Andal, Nieva
Malinis, Ricardo Laviña, Cesar Cortes, Danilo Reyes, Jose Reyes, Josefina Mate,
Lourdes Calma, Mildred Juan, Olive Guanzon, Fernando Cochico, Sherman Cid,
Nazareno Bentulan, Roslina Donaire, Mario Martinez, Beatriz Teylan, Angelina
Lapid, Rosemarie Flores, Daniel Van Soto, Edgardo Mercader, Nelly Agustin,
Marily Magcalas, David Chan, Arsenio Salansang, Nelson De Guzman, Marciano
Araneta, Cesar Meneses, Dionisio Rellosa, Mario Santiago, Severino Santos,
Leonora Santos, Nimfa Doronilla, Florence Guinto, Rosalina Manansala, Percival
Ostonal, Tommy Macaranas, Roger Nicandro versus GEN. SANTIAGO
BARANGAN and MA. JOR ISABELO LARIOSA, G.R. No. L-68828

DATE: March 27, 1985

PONENTE: Justice Claudio Teehankee, (dissent)

FACTS:

1. Petitioners [composed of businessmen, students and office employees] meet at the point
of J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude
Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street.
Additional facts: [Wearing an inscribed yellow T-shirts, petitioners started to
march down JP Laurel Street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-
government invectives.]
2. Petitioners claimed that the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid and that mass
action may not be characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship.
3. However, petitioners were barred by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of
his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on
the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area.
4. Respondents GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN and MAJOR ISABELO LARIOSA.
5. Respondents maintained that the intention of petitioners was not really to perform an act
of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to
the residence and offices of the President of the Republic.
Additional Facts: Respondents further expressed that the yellow T-shirts worn by
some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-government
slogans strongly tend that petitioners' attempted to disguise their true motive with
a sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the claim of petitioners of their freedom of belief and the exercise of their
religion is valid.

A- YES. Petitioners claim of their freedom of belief and the exercise of their religion was
valid.
L- The Constitution states that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship shall forever be allowed.
A- In the case at bar, petitioners movement and their sincere intention as Christians to gather
together in prayer at St. Jude Church is a preferred right that enjoys precedence and
primacy.

C-Therefore, Petitioners claim of their freedom of belief and the exercise of their religion is
valid.

DEAN’S BOOK

PAGE: 85 PARAGRAPH: 2

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