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VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 189

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES

ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,FLORENCIO
PADRIGANO,RUFINO, ROXAS,MARIANO DE
LEON,ASENCION PACIENTE,BONIFACIO
VACUNA,BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD,
petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

Political and Constitutional Law; Basic concepts and principles

underlying a democracy.—In a democracy, the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person."
Same; Purpose of Bill of Rights.—The Bill of Rights is designed to
preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience
with general principles." The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts..."
Same; Same.—The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as
the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the
sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect
the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as

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Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but
also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the
liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
Same; Same.—The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in
the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also
in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection
as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers
and employees.
Same; Same; Human rights supreme to property rights.—While the
Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine

Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need

breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless
attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a
preferred position.—In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential
to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
such "priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
Same; Same; Same; Why human civil liberties more superior than
property rights disclosed.—The superiority of these freedoms over property
rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose—that the
law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice to
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validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand,
a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely, existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been
stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs.
Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. It
should be noted that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, like
Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan,
believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," even as Mr.
Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interest test. Chief Justice Vinson is
partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned
Hand, viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Workers who joined a demonstration
against police abuses did not violate CBA "no-strike no-lockout" provision.
—Tested against the foregoing principles, the

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc

conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations that the petitioners by their

"concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of Work," are
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining
agreement cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm. Said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of
expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency,
the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the duty of employer to protect
employees against police abuses.—As a matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members
from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation
or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
to enhance its productivity as well as profits.

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Same; Same; Same; Demonstration against police abuses not a

violation of collective bargaining agreement.—As heretofore stated, the
primacy of human rights—freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and
of petition for redress of grievances—over property rights has been
sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon—at
once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality,
the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization—becomes Our Duty,
if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so
that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all.
To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent
means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal
wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition.
Same; Demonstration against police abuses could not have been
enjoined by any court.—The mass demonstration staged by the employees
on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal
picketing or strike.
Same; Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those
belonging to a particular shift may join demonstration.—The respondent
firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and
regular shift from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. should report for work in order that loss
or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the
sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union,
namely, the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total
presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
persuasive force that will gain for them not only public sympathy for the
validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they
raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom
of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much
the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. ... At

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any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their
projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the
absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day shift employees who will join the
demonstration. ... There was a lack of human understanding or compassion
on the part of the firm in rejecting the request... And to regard as a ground
for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join
demonstration against police abuse guilty of unfair labor practice.—
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight petitioners from the
service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of petition for redress of
grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined
in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known
as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for xxx mutual

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine

Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice

for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three." xxx The insistence on
the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular
shifts should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore state, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
Evidence; Lack of finding the company did not suffer any loss means
not such loss was sustained.—While the respondent Court found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant
company," the said court did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only means
that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage.
Constitutional and Political Law; Labor Law; Dismissal from work of
leaders of demonstration against police abuses constitutes denial of social
justice.— Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State
"the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other

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directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor xxx". Respondent Court as an agency of the State
is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes
of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-
being." It is most unfortunate that said court failed to implement this
policy.xxx
Same; When a court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and
orders become null and void.—Having violated the basic human rights of
the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction
and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Same; CIR rules against late filing of a motion for reconsideration
cannot prevail over basic constitutional rights.—Does the mere fact that the
motion for reconsideration was filed two days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees for their

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

reinstatement? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited

cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations,
but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and
superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid court procedural
rule of necessity should be affirmed.
Same.—It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the
Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress,
must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners
even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them
and in their defense to the said charge. In the case at bar, enforcement of the
basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a CIR rule which impinges on
such human rights.

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Same; Civil Procedure; Court may suspend its own rules.—It is an

accepted principle that the Supreme Court has inherent power to "suspend
its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice requires." Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion
in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this principle and added that "Under
this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need
to do justice..." If we can disregard our own rules when justice requires it,
obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a
CIR rule that classes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law.
Same; Same; Suspension of CIR rules authorized by C.A. 103.—The
suspension of the application of Section 15 of the CIR rules with reference
to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of C.A. 103, the CIR
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms."

PETITION FOR REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Industrial

Relations.

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

L.S. Osorio & P. B. Castillon and J. C. Espinas & Associates
for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization

(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of
the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano
de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage
a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their
proposed demonstration.

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The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge

Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following
stipulation of facts of the parties—

"3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the

projected mass demonstration at Malacanang in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by
the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well as those
working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM
to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
"4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at
about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present
were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthus L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S.
de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano

de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
"5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said
projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969.
PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the
union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that
the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further
that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
"6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel
manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For
which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work
the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike;
"7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was
convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The
Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo
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Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this

afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and
appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may
join the Malacanang demonstration, the workers for the first and
regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the
workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the
provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO LOCKOUT
- NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's
warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the
organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered
that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacanang demonstration will be held the following morning; and

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

"8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a

cablegram to the Company which was received 9.50 A.M., March
4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING
REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' " (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F",
pp. 42-43, rec)
.

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400

proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in
the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company filed
on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift,
charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to
Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No.
875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' "
(Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec). The charge was accompanied by the
joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex
"B", pp. 21-24, rec). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was
filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T.
Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-
30, rec.).
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that
they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the

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respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on

March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid
exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration
was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.).
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order
dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor

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Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for

perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a
consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.).
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23,
1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on
September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p.
59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September
15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence,
as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their
arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the
CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.).
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11,
1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein
petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated
September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section
15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein
petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until
September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration
was two (2) days late,
1
it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking
Bien vs. Castillo, which held among others, that a motion for
extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period
elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their
written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion
for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).

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In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent Court en

banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 1969 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).

________________

1 L-7428, May 24, 1955.

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969,

which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the
counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of
Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed
within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an
appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en
banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p.
76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent
court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on
the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration
on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office
clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said
president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief
from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on
November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal
(Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).

There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles

which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.

(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the

dignity and worth of the human personality is the central
core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent

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in his thoughts
2
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person."
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of

_______________

2 American Com. vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 421.

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small encroachments, and the scorn and derision3

of those
who have no patience with general principles."

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of

the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property,
to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be 4submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections." Laski proclaimed that "the
happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the
criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not 5
its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the

right to petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism
of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate
more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated,
not only to protect the minority who want 6to talk, but also
to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice
Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the
liberties of all; and the liberties7 of one are not safe unless
the liberties of all are protected.
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition,
are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full
and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens
can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of
the
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_______________

3 Justice Cardoso, Nature of Judicial Process, 90-93; Tañada and Fernando,

Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed., 71.
4 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, italics
supplied.
5 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, 35-36.
6 See Chafee on Freedom of Speech and Press, 1955, pp. 13-14.
7 Justice Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights (1961), p. 64, cited by Justice Castro in
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA, 663, 692.

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

government through their suffrage but also in the

administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline
of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for
the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the8
primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as
well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat
of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as
the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting
9
government regulation only
"with narrow specificity."

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit
the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and
of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to 10
the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
such priority "gives these liberties
11
the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational

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_______________

8 Marsh vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509; Tucker vs. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 519-
520.
9 NACCP vs. Button (Jan. 14, 1963) 371 U.S. 415, 433, 9 L.Ed. 2nd 405, 418.
10 Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1.
11 Thomas vs. Collins (1945), 323 U.S., 516, 530, cited by Mr. Justice Castro in
his concurring opinion in Gonzales vs. Comelec, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 895.

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relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose—that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive—would suffice12
to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed
in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs.
Comelec13
and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs.
Ferrer. It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, like Justices
14
Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y.
Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of
the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or
"when exercised in relation to our right 15
to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed," 16even as Mr. Justice Castro
relies on the balancing-of-interests test. Chief Justice Vinson is
partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by
its improbability, justifies such
17
invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger.

II

The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the

mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike,

_________________

12 Edu vs. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 489; Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1165-66, 1175.
13 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835; L-32432, Sept. 11, 1970, 35 SCRA 28;
Ignacio vs. Ela (1965), 99 Phil. 346; Primicias vs. Fugoso (1948), 80 Phil 71;

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Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1; Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 639; 87 Law. Ed. 1628, 1638.
14 March 9, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 270; Greenbelt, etc. vs. Bresler (May 18, 1970),
398 U.S. 6, 20; see also Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 78-81, 96-113.
15 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
16 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
17 Dennis vs. U.S. (1951), 341 U.S. 494.

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a

temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining
agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc. Set against and tested by the foregoing principles governing a
democratic society, such a conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen,
not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and
of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the
police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their
civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from
what they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was
the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers.
It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they
can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the
local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expense of its
workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it
encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure
to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of
its laborers vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have
been all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly
employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well
as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution
of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
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respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only
the weapons afforded them by the Constitution—the untrammelled
enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees

from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea
for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between
the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality—abused, harassed
and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of
the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was
a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as
well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or
adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being—
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit—can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights—freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for18 redress of
grievances—over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon—at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-
consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization—becomes Our duty,
if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who
toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means
of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal
wound on the constitutional guarantees
19
of free expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition.

_______________

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18 Marsh vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker vs. Texas, 326 U.S. 517.
19 Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts

of the employees, according to the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty x x x to
observe regular working hours." The strained construction of the
Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated working shifts
deny the workers the right to stage a mass demonstration against
police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny
over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be
predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4,
1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, for such an
injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the
workers,
20
even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or
strike. The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at
bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a
strike "as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although
there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage
of work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage
to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine
qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union,
namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the
maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediate action on the part of the corresponding government
agencies

_______________

20 Security Bank Employees Union-NATU vs. Security Bank and Trust Co., April
30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503-515; Caltex vs. Lucero, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1196, 1198-
99; Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO vs. ESSO, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 801, 806,
807; De Leon vs. National Labor Union, 100 Phil., 792; PAFLU vs. Barot, 99 Phil.
1008; Continental Manufacturing Employees Assoc., et al. vs. C.I.R., et al., L-26849,
Sept. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 204.

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with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
21
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished.
The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in
their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued
alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and
the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent
whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated
in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of
March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.).
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part
of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from
work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration.
And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as
it is unconstitutional.

III

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.

Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all
its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the

______________

21 Sotto vs. Ruiz, 41 Phil. 468; Shuttleworth vs. Birmingham (1969), 394 U.S.
147; Largent vs. Texas, 318 U.S. (1943) 418; Jamison vs. Texas, (1943) 318 U.S. 413;
Lovell vs. Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444; Grosjean vs. American Press Co. (1936) 297
U.S. 233; Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil., 383; Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed.,
pp. 90-93.

208
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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of

expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress
of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the
right "to engage in concerted activities for x x x mutual aid or
protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their rights guraranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration
staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was
for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses,
denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the
employees to engage in such a common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on
the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and
regular shifts should not participate in the mass demonstration,
under pain of dismissal,
22
was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech."
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection,
deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of
employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank
president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination
23
in the appointment and promotion of bank employees. We further
ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the
employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as 24long as the concerted activity is for
the furtherance of their interests.

_______________

22 Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574, 20 L.Ed. 2nd, 811, 820.
23 Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., et al., Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226, 232,
233, 661, 662, 663-664.
24 21 SCRA 233.

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine

Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the

questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the
company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is
an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution,"
nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company"
and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong
to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are
the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work
the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such
threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the
mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised
against the local police, were more important to them because they
had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such
threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a
day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to
forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would
bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management
was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their
right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for
redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it
necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the
alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby
concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be
submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over
their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the
President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with
a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent

Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact
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of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance

can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It
did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for
failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties
were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled
that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled
by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials
ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were
damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the
contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric
consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated
for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason
of the absence of its workers for only one day.

IV

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and

assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of
the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers
for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5
of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
pomotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that
"the State shall afford protection to labor x x x". Respondent Court
of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation
at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional
guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to
eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of

collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social
and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar
that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental

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agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed

to keep faith with its avowed mission—its raison d'etre—as
ordained and directed by the Constitution.

It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional

right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the
remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by
final judgment through a forced confession, 25
which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; or who is denied the
right to present evidence in his26 defense as a deprivation of his liberty
without due process of law, even 27after the accused has already
served sentence for twenty-two years.
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private
firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners.
Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the
inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic
human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted
itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant
case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are
imperative on all public offices including

_______________

25 Justice Sanchez in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 692, Aug. 19,
1968; see also concurring opinion of Justice Castro; Camasura vs. Provost Marshall,
78 Phil. 131.
26 Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 1949.
27 Fay vs. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
28
the courts as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise
and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by a mere procedural
rule promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations exercising a
purely delegated legislative power, when even a law enacted by
Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human
rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The
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right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech,

the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity, to be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise, these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would
be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he
cannot employ the best and dedicated counsel who can defend his
interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the 28-a
financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services.

VI

The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that a motion for

reconsideration of its order or writ should be filed within five (5)
days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said
motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of
such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these
rules of procedure were promulgated by the 29
Court of Industrial
Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation.
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969,
or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order
dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late.

_____________

28 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, supra.

28-a Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. W.C.C., L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285-
298.
29 Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103, as amended.

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Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28,

1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed
two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or
more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to
comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule
governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative
delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be
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obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to

the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic
human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible
with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The
dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the
aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity
should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as
applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen
the constitutional rights affected, but instead constrict the same to
the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning
employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it
was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers,
who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of
the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec.
1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in
the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one
day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations rule insofar
as circumstances of the instant case

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration
dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order
sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence
and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an
extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were
actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex
"I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the
filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the
motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on
October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing
the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
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It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to

reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in support of
such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period
provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or
decision subject29-a
of reconsideration becomes final and
unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of
free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and
defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the
complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not
raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived.

______________

29-a Elizalde & Co., Inc. vs. C.I.R., et al., September 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 58, 61-
63; Bien vs. Castillo, 97 Phil. 956; Pangasinan Employees, etc. vs. Martinez, May 20,
1960, 108 Phil. 89; Local 7, etc. vs. Tabigne, Nov. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 276; Luzon
Stevedoring vs. C.I.R., July 26, 1963, 8 SCRA, 447; Manila Metal, etc. vs. C.I.R.,
July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 552.

215

VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 215

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the
first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the
constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which 30
no final and
complete determination of the dispute can be made. It is thus seen
that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives
way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule
of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must
likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein
petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice
charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to
deny application of a Court 30-a of Industrial Relations rule which
impinges on such human rights.
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular 30-b
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require."
Mr. Justice
30-c
Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo reiterated this principle and added that

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"Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations
without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with
the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that
the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.
Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other
words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and
all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the
court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction, We can then and there render

_______________

30 People vs, Vera, 65 Phil. 56. 82; Mercado vs. Bio O.G. 5360
30-a See Workmen's Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Augusto, L-31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123, 127.
30-b Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304, 312-312; Ordoveza vs.
Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275.
30-c L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 933-34.

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216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

the appropriate judgment. It is within the contemplation of this doctrine that

as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in
an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave
abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the ambit of its authority, in
appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceeding any error of judgment
of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether
or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals
are short of being jurisdictional nullities or excesses, this Court would still
be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and
now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or
only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary
return of this case to the lower courts for the sole
30 d
purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal." (Italics supplied.) -

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial

Relations rule in this particular case at bar would be an unreasoning
adherence to "procedural niceties," which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to
survive, must be accorded supremacy over the property rights of
their employer firm, which has been given a full hearing on this
case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material
damage has been demonstrated as having been inflicted on its
property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it,
obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
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suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clashes with

the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolute concern by
the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be
stressed that the application in the instant case of Section 15 of the
Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent
firm, is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor
union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at bar,

____________

30-d 28 SCRA 933-934.

217

VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 217

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the

C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms x x."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-
stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the30-eCourt, in the 1970
case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et al., thus:

"As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the
motion for new trial is not 'newly discovered,' as such term is understood in
the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is
not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt
its rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain
to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation
and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any
duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.'
By this provision, the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the
technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted
to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as
may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang
Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R., No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply

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Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this
provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider
whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was
founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly
discovered evidence.x x x x (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong
v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578)." (italics supplied.)

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with

"pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect

______________

30-e L-23714, June 13, 1970, 33 SCRA 887, 907-908.

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218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert and competent
lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of the human freedoms
secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their
counsel—erroneously believing that he received a copy of the
decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969—
filed his motion for reconsideration on September 29, 1969, which
practically is only one day late, considering that September 28, 1969
was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedural technicalities
when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of
which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence
on this score, Mr. Justice
30-f
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court
in Palma vs. Oreta, stated:

"As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16

Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register
of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, L-14243, June 30, 1961, 2
SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, 'technicality, when it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.' (Ibid., p, 322.) To that
norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco
v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the
interpretation of procedural rule should never 'sacrifice the ends of justice.'
While 'procedural laws are no other than technicalities' to view them in their
entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends in themselves for the compliance
with which courts have been organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization of the administration of the law and of justice.

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(Ibid., p. 128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly

rhetorical language of Justice Felix, to 'a sacrifice of substantial rights of a
litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the
sacred principles of justice.' (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156,
161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they 'should give way
to the realities of the situation.' (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962,
5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point, promulgated in 1968,
(Udan v. Amon, L-24288, 1968, 23 SCRA 837 citing McEntee v. Manotok,
L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an
earlier formulation of Justice

______________

30-f L-27807, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 738, 742-3.

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VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 219

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

Labrador that rules of procedure 'are not to be applied in a very rigid,

technical30-g
sense'; but are intended 'to help secure substantial justice.' (Ibid., p.
843).xx"

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule

were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh
for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include
the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the
same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the
Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the
Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were
not dismissed, and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers
were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice
charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief;
Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent
firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employees participated in
the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen
(13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice
charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not
all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4,
1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that
day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty—if it deserves any penalty at all—
should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against
their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of
the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the
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Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as

well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a
lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the
oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
"The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those

_______________

30-g 34 SCRA 742-743.

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220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

who consciously seek to destroy our system of government, but

from men of goodwill—good men who allow their proper concerns
to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish
involves an impairment of liberty.

"x x The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must
remember, however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on
motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor
be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is
constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in
our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment
makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a
never ending one.
"x x The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
"x x In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.
"x x But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if
we feel secure because we belong to a group that is important and
respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for
the less 31fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be
observe.

The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good
intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the
plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
indignities by the local police. It was more expedient for the firm to
conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their
fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies
of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company

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assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure

and simple selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank

_____________

31 A Living Bill of Rights (1961), pp. 61, 62, 64; 24 SCRA, 690-692; italics
supplied.

221

VOL. 51, JUNE 5, 1973 221

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
32
vs. C.I.R., where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees
for having written and published "a patently libelous letter x x x to
the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of
immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru
Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:

"It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents.
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote
the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act x x x). This is the view of some members of this Court.
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a
small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a
concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).

XX XX XX XX XX

"Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the

respondents to air their grievances.

xx xx xx xx xx

"The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what
it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge.
To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited
(Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of
the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of
Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The
Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely

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against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of
self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 [1941]).
XX XX

_______________

32 21 SCRA 226-241, Sept. 27, 1967.

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222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

xx xx xx xx xx

"In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the
Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of
self-organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain
collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and 33
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act." (Italics supplied.)

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify

labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the
complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president
no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free
assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable
and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and
October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the reinstatement of the herein eight (8)
petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
separation from the service until reinstated, minus one day's
pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from
other sources during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming

Company, Inc.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., dissents.

______________

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33 21 SCRA 232-237.

223

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

Antonio, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.

BARREDO, J.: Dissenting—

I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty

compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the
stipulation of facts upon which the decision under review is based. It
is as follows:

"1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company,

Inc., is a corporation existing and operating under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines with corporate address
at 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer
of respondent;
"2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization,
PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and
the respondents herein are either officers of respondent
PBMEO or members thereof;
"3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the
projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers
as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to
4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of
March 4, 1969;
"4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,
1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L.
Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all
department and section heads. For the PBMEO: (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de
Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
"5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny
said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on March
4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed
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upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the

demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

224

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

"6. That Management, thru Atty. C. S. de Leon, Company

personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however,
that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which
reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March
4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike;
"7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting
was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C. S. de
Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969,
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and
regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from
joining the demonstration and should report for work; and
thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order
not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly
Article XXIV: "NO LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE". All those
who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that
the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it
was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held the following
morning; and
"8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO
sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50
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A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:

'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4,
1969.' "

Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration

did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company".(p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of

225

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair

Labor Practice against petitioners charging that:

"3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein)

particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the
existing collective bargaining agreement and without filing
the necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report
for work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
"4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a) sub-
paragraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement." (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)

After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part
of which reads:

"IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees

Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby ordered
to cease and desist from further committing the same and its representatives
namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino
and Rodulfo Munsod who are directly responsible for perpetrating this
unfair labor practice act, are hereby considered to have lost their status as
employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc." (p. 8, Annex F.)

Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were

notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be
no serious question that they were actually served therewith on
September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice
in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969
and filed with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex
K.)

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It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or

seven (7) days after they were notified of the court's decision, that
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial
court; as it is also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in
Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was filed

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided for
the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial Relations,
whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days after the
expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one
raised by respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the failure
of petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but
also their arguments in support thereof within the periods
respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial
Relations acted correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing
its impugned order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely
applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of1 this Court in Elizalde
& Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations wherein it was ruled
that:

"August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then

Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set
forth earlier in this opinion.
"August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No
arguments were advanced in support thereof.
"August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its
arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.
"August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its
aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.
"September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for
reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the arguments were 'filed out of
time'.
"October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same
time lodged the present petition with this Court.
"Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief

______________

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1 25 SCRA 58.

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(respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before us for
resolution.

"1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment—not merely

an interlocutory order—there is no doubt. The fact that there is
need for computation of respondent Perlado's overtime pay would
not render the decision incomplete. This in effect is the holding of
the Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines) vs.
Pan American Employees Association, which runs thus: 'It is next
contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or
his representative to compute the compensation due, the Industrial
Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered
an incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the
overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most. And the
report would still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its
approval, by the very terms of the order itself. That there was no
specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not
make it incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be made
clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see Malate
Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).'
"2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that
it can no longer be disturbed?

"CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this

Court both answer the question in the affirmative.
"Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider
the judgment of the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from the date
on which he received notice of the decision, subject of the motion. Next
follows Section 16 which says that the motion must be submitted with
arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could not be
submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands that
'the movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the date of the
filing of his motion for reconsideration'. Section 17 of the same rules
admonishes a movant that '(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods
shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or
striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may
be'.
"Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since
stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo,

228

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(97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma motion for reconsideration
was filed out of time its denial is in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless
of whether the arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed
on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA)
vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of
reconsideration becomes final. And so also, where the arguments in support
of the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary
period, the pro forma motion for reconsideration although seasonably filed
must nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press
& Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon
Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the
motion for reconsideration is denied upon the ground that the arguments in
support thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision subject of the
motion becomes 'final and unappealable'.
"We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and
pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On August 6, petitioner
received a copy of the judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider—without arguments in support thereof—of
August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration, was a Sunday. But,
actually, the written arguments in support of the said motion were submitted
to the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to August 27, is a
space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said arguments were filed out of
time—five (5) days late. And the judgment had become final.
"3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963 seeking
extension of time within which to present its arguments in support of its
motion. Counsel in his petition before this Court pleads that the foregoing
motion was grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of
counsel' which would not enable him to do so within the stated ten-day
reglementary period. The arguments were only filed on August 27—five (5)
days late, as aforesaid.
"The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be
noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed only on August 21,
that is, one day before the due date which is August 22. It was petitioner's
duty to see to it that the court act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire
as to the fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely
filed its arguments on the 27th.
"To be underscored at this point is that 'obviously to speed up

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

the disposition of cases', CIR 'has a standing rule against the extension of
the ten-day period for filing supporting arguments'. That no-extension
policy should have placed petitioner on guard. It should not have simply
folded its arms, sit by supinely, and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on August 27,
1953, knowing full well that by that time the reglementary period had
expired.
"Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September 16, 1963
dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the supporting
arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect denied the motion for
extension.
"We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and unappealable. We
may not review the same."

Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent,

which has not been in any way modified, much less revoked or
reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go
into the merits of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in
holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately
uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are
predicated on an exposition of the constitutional guarantees of
freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of grievances,
so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm Us unless
We note carefully the real issues in this case, I am constrained, over
and above my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr.
Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as
presented by petitioners themselves and in the light of its attendant
circumstances, this case does not call for the resolution of any
constitutional issue. Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional
guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual freedoms
enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this
Court. It is my understanding of constitutional law and judicial
practices related thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our
constitutional rights may be protected by the courts only when their
jurisdiction over the subject matter is unquestionably established and
the applicable rules of

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procedure consistent with substantive and procedural due process

are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in

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the altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly

downgraded as niceties, but as far as I know, this principle is applied
to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a
possible denial of due process. I have not come across any instance,
and none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main
opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been
invalidated and set aside upon the ground that the same has the
effect of sanctioning the violation of a constitutional right, unless
such violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any
law or from any judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main
opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally
established and accepted as an absolute rule, that "a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights".
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned
almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
after the finality of the judgment".
2
And, of course, Chavez is correct;
as is also Abriol vs. Homeres, which, in principle, served as its
precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of those cases, the
accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was
compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution;
in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to
present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the
People's evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in
those cases are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here,
petitioners do not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they
pretend that in denying their motion for reconsideration, "the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched
upon any of their constitutional immunities . . .,"

______________

2 86 Phil. 525.

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contrary to the statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed,

neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other pleading of
petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be found assailing the

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impugned decision of the respondent court as being null and void

because it sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as
follows:

"Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or

not the respondent Court en banc under the facts and circumstances, should
consider the Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
"Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari,
humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65
of the Rules of Court."
"x x x x x.
"The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the
strict and narrow technical rules of procedure without taking into account
justice, equity and substantial merits of the case."
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on
this point in their brief runs thus:

"III
ISSUES

"1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right
to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
constitute bargaining in bad faith? and,
"Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and
conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad faith meriting the
dismissal of the persons allegedly responsible therefor?
"2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court
refused to act one way or another on the petition for relief from

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the resolution of October 9, 1969?

IV
ARGUMENT

The respondent Court erred in finding the petitioner union guilty of

bargaining in bad faith and consequently dismissing the persons allegedly
responsible therefor, because such conclusion is contrary to the evidence on
record; that the dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
"As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to
assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities for redress of their
grievances, the petitioners were charged and then condemned of bargaining
in bad faith.

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"The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were
not borne out by the records. It was not even alleged nor proven by
evidence. What has been alleged and which the respondent company tried to
prove was that the demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation
of the provisions of the 'no-lockout—no strike' clause of the collective
bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and proof submitted by the
respondent company were practically resolved when the respondent court in
the same decision stated categorically:

'The company alleges that the walkout because of the demonstration is tantamount to
a declaration of a strike. We do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of work.' (Italics supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)

"The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union bargained in

bad faith is not tenable because:
"First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company;
"Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the
respondent company convened twice in a meeting to thresh out the matter of
demonstration. Petitioners requested that the employees and workers be
excused but the respondent company instead of granting the request or even
settling the matter so that the hours of

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work will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass

dismissal;
"Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the
company that the first shift shall be excluded in the demonstration is not
tantamount to bargaining in bad faith because the company knew that the
officers of the union belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go
and lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be stated that the
company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join the demonstration
because most of them belonged to the first shift; and
"Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if
allowed will practically give the union the right to change the working
conditions agreed in the CBA is a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not
borne by any evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically
change the terms or conditions of employment because it was only for one
(1) day and the company knew about it before it went through. We can even
say that it was the company who bargained in bad faith, when upon
representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the employees
demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the same and yet while the
demonstration was in progress, the company filed a ULP Charge and
consequently dismissed those who participated.

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"Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union
participated in the demonstration and yet, the respondent court selected the
eight officers to be dismissed from the union thus losing their status as
employees of the respondent company. The respondent court should have
taken into account that the company's action in allowing the return of more
or less three hundred ninety two (392) employees/members of the union is
an act of condonation and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of
discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees
Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the opinion
stated in the decision by the court, while there is a collective bargaining
agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it
will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in the CBA. It
follows that the CBA is over and above the constitutional rights of a man to
demonstrate and the statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in
Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because it will appear that
the rights of the union is solely dependent upon the CBA.
"One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in

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proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that 'the decision

must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.' (Interstate
Commerce Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57
Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to know
and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496,
February 27, 1940.)
"The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla
of evidence to support the findings of the respondent court that the
petitioner union bargained in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of
the individual petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law."

Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:

"1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been

guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their
status as employees of the respondent company did not
meet the meaning and comprehension of 'substantial merits
of the case.' Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in
the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the
hearing of the case. The important and substantial merit of
the case is whether under the facts and circumstances
alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the
demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on
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'illegal strike' and therefore in violation of the 'no strike—

no lock out' clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that
the respondent court had altogether opined and decided that
such demonstration does not amount to a strike. Hence,
with that findings, petitioners should have been absolved of
the charges against them. Nevertheless, the same
respondent court disregarding, its own findings, went out of
bounds by declaring the petitioners as having 'bargained in
faith.' The stand of the respondent court is fallacious, as it
follows the principle in logic as 'non-siquitor';
"2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom
to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the duly
constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution is
subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the
petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such
attempt to override the constitutional provision

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would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not
taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by the respondent
court;"

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are

not raising any issue of due process. They do not posit that the
decision of the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional
ground. True it is that they fault the respondent court for having
priced the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein
involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of their grievances against the
abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege or
contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that
renders the proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners
themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere
error of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main
opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and indignantly condemn
private respondent now for the grievous violation of the fundamental
law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to
join the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not
been duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair
and unjust, for the simple reason that the manner this case was
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brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be heard in regard

to such supposed constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court
committed an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of
bargaining in bad faith when the charge against them alleged in the
complaint was for having conducted a mass demonstration, which
"amounted to a strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question has no
constitutional color. Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of
argument, that the trial judge did err in not giving preferential
importance to the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners
over the management and proprietary attributes claimed by the
respondent private firm—still, We cannot rightly hold that such
disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties divested His Honor of
jurisdiction in the premises. The unbending doctrine

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of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after

the period fixed by law; litigations would be endless; no questions
would be finally settled; and titles to property would become
precarious if the losing
3
party were allowed to reopen them at any
time in the future".
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the
interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional precept,
not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any
difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured by an
overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary
statute than by a misconstrued or misapplied constitutional
injunction affecting his individual freedoms. In both instances, there
is injustice which should be intolerable were it not for the more
paramount considerations that inform the principle of immutability
of final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have
already noted, the main opinion does not cite any constitutional
provision, law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting
its basic holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees, other
than denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render
valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of
Philippine 4Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary
5
of
Education, following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting, is that
"it is one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that
unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar,
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the petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less
have they adequately argued the constitutional issues so extendedly
and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court
to hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a

_______________

3 Daquis vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913, reiterated in Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA
474. See also Vicente vs. Lucas, 95 Phil. 716
4 97 Phil. 806, at p. 816.
5 73 Phil. 408.

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constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process renders

its judgment or decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to
attack even after said judgment or decision has become final and
executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with
the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the main
opinion, if only to avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis,
but its obvious incongruity with settled jurisprudence always comes
to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could
go along with petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally
irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section
6
2(5) of Article VII of
the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines (reenacted practically
ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) (e) of the 1973 Constitution), only
to realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to Us
to review decisions of lower courts involving questions of law (and
these include constitutional issues not affecting the validity of
statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has
to be exercised only in the manner provided in the law or the Rules
of Court. In other words, before We can exercise appellate
jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how important they
may be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the
applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those governing
appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations involved herein.
Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial court is
already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power
and authority to review, much less alter or modify the same, absent
any denial of due process or fatal defect of jurisdiction. It must be
borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now is not merely
whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not
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specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could

be enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the
same; rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have
jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated
earlier, no less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez,
supra., which is being relied upon by the main

_______________

6 Under which this case was filed.

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opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court,

supra, which for its four-square applicability to the facts of this case,
We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of the failure of
the petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but
even their argument supporting the same within the prescribed
period, "the judgment (against them) has become final, beyond
recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the
finality and enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on
the correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in
truth, whether or not they are correct is something that is always
dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the Supreme
Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members
themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more
pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than
the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or
want of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of
such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than
those expressly allowed by Rule 38 7
and that of extrinsic fraud under
Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code. And just to emphasize the policy
of the law of respecting judgments once they have become final,
even as this Court has ruled that final8 decisions are mute in the
presence of fraud which the law abhors, it is only when the fraud is
extrinsic and
9
not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be
set aside, and this10 only when the remedy is sought within the
prescriptive period.
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Tho vs. Go Sin
Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of

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_____________

7 Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159, cited by Moran in Vol. II, p. 246 (1970
ed.).
8 Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25.
9 Amuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Javier vs. Paredes, 52 Phil. 910; Domingo vs.
David, 68 Phil. 134.
10 Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100.

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justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be
not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong
them."
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy
Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:

"x x x. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to
put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily,
certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes
ever within his power, to determine and redetermine them term after term, to
bandy his judgments about from one party to the other, and to change his
conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may change its
hues, then litigation might become more intolerable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18
Phil., 257.)."

My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los

Angeles, L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the
unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the
correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question
therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:

"The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my
attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding
the dangerous and inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the
revision, amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want
to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not detract a whit from
the soundness, authority and binding force of existing doctrines enjoining

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any such modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith and respect
in judicial decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the
highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying
to put forth for execution a decision that I believe should have been rather
than what it is. All I am doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco
but the decision of this Court in G.R. No.

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and, by this

opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my honest view,
is the true and correct meaning and implications of the decision of this
Court, not that of Judge Tengco's."

The main opinion calls attention to many instances, precisely

involving cases in the industrial court, wherein this Court refused to
be constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to
accord substantial justice to the parties. I still believe in those
decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however,
that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment
already final and executory. It is too obvious to require extended
elucidation or even reference to any precedent or authority that the
principle of immutability of final judgments is not a mere
technicality, and if it may be considered to be in a sense a procedural
rule, it is one that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore,
yield to the ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial
justice.
Apparently bent on looking for a constitutional point of due
process to hold on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain that the
long existing and constantly applied rule governing the filing of
motions for reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as
applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen
the constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the same to
the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning
employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as
it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers,
who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of
the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec.
1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in
the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one
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day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule
insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned."

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
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I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the
conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that
there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical
view of the rule in question. Said rule provides:

"MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

"Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5)
days from the date on which he receives notice of the order or decision,
object of the motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath
with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy
thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter
may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath.
"Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with
arguments supporting the same. If the arguments can not be submitted
simultaneously with said motions, upon notice to the Court, the movant
shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion
for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten
(10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments submitted by
the movant.
"Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10)
days from the receipt of the arguments in support of said motion having
been filed, the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the Court
in banc, unless it is considered necessary to hear oral arguments, in which
case the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to that effect.
"Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause
for dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer
and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended April 20,
1951, Court of Industrial Relations.)."

As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as

everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court well
knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file
no more than a pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any
argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of
the fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to
supplementing the

242

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

same by making the necessary exposition, with citations of laws and

authorities, in the written arguments to be filed ten (10) days later. In
truth, such a pro-forma motion has the effect of just advising the
court and the other party that the movant does not agree with the
judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and general
terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise
everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a
reconsideration is to be sought, and thereby enable the parties
concerned to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the
situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It must
be borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve or
affect the operation of vital industries in which labor-management
problems might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best
interests of justice and all concerned that the attitude of each party at
every important juncture of the case be known to the other so that
other avenues for earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by
the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed by petitioners
was no more than the following:

"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

"COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable

Court most respectfully moves for the RECONSIDERATION of the Order
of this Honorable Court dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the
same is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the
hearing of the above-entitled case.
"Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their
respective arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to Sections 15, 16 & 17
as amended of the Rules of Court.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for
Reconsideration be admitted.
"Manila, September 27, 1969."

To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of
such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible. What is

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worse in this case is that petitioners have not even taken the trouble
of giving an explanation of their inability to comply with the rule.
Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their
written arguments in support of their motion, and, the only excuse
offered for such delay is that both the President of the Union and the
office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to do what they
were instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as I
shall explain anon, "is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge
employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural
requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines,
Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion
would want the Court to overlook such nonchalance and
indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the
rules fixing periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more
substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation
they have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant
to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And the fact that
the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of
jurisdiction or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such
substantive character. Moreover, because they have the effect of
terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that
said rules partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which
again are substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are
inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed
period. On the other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is
unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is not or
cannot be sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party
may be lost by prescription, and he has no reason to complain
because public policy demands that rights must be asserted in time,
as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-
evident principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined
to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of
this case the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Besides, I have grave doubts as to

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

whether we can suspend rules of other courts, particularly one that is

not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being an administrative
agency under the Executive Department. Withal, if, in order to
hasten the administration of substantial justice, this Court did
exercise in some instances its reserve power to amend its rules, I am
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positively certain, it has never done it for the purpose of reviving a

case in which the judgment has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred in their
petition, in a belated effort to salvage their cause, petitioners filed in
the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a petition for relief alleging
that their failure to file their "Arguments in Support of their Motion
for Reconsideration" within the reglementary period or five (5), if
not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest
mistake committed by the President of the respondent Union and of
the office clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown and attested
in their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, K-1, and K-2) which
in brief, consisted allegedly of the said President's having forgotten
his appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions" and
of the said office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to
do the work as instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he
"was too busy with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked
by these allegations, for, under probably more justifying
circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation in a
previous case this wise:

"We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered by respondent Santos
as reason for his fail ure to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment
of the Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court
notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants
who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of
Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of commonplace excuses, in
the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither
credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L
4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, 17
December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of judgment as to be a
grave abuse of discretion." (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs. Arca, 19 SCRA
300.)

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court
sought to be reviewed in the present case has already become final
and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no
matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it
is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.

SEPARATE OPINION

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TEEHANKEE,J., concurring:

For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on

March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police
department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer 1
company, as against the latter's insistence that the first shift should
not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal,
the industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the
eight individual petitioners as union officers and organizers of the
mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on
respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor
practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration,
notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of strike
nor directed in any manner against respondent employer, and
ordering the dismissal of the union officers, manifestly constituted
grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair
labor practice since respondent firm conceded that "the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution" and the union up to the day of the demonstration
pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse the first shift and
allow it to join the demonstration in accordance with their previous
requests.

_____________

1 The first shift comprised the workers from 6 A. M. to 2 P.M. Respondent

company had no objection to the two regular shifts workers (7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and 8
A.M. to 5 P.M.) being excused from work for the mass demonstration.

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Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective

bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the
union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself
the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being
no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely "the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers
to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable
assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged police
excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners'
motion for reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after
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expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due

to the negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president
should likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse
consequences of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration
due to such negligence—which was not acted upon by respondent
court—should have been granted, considering the monstrous
injustice that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their
summary dismissal from employment, simply because they sought
in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the
Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss
from the oneday stoppage of work was shown by respondent
company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise that its
insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for having included the
first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was
but an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual
petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford protection to
labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be
deprived of such basic rights without due process—which is but
"responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided . . . Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom

247

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Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
2
from arbitrariness."
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of
the respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as
set forth in the main opinion.
Judgment set aside and directing the re-instatement of the herein
eight (8) petitioners.

Notes.—The rule is that the law forms part of, and is read into,
every contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases
where such exclusion is allowed (Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, L-25389, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA
1105; National Development Company vs. Unlicensed Crew
Members of Three Doña Vessels (PMIU), L-25390, June 27, 1968,
23 SCRA 1105).
It has also been held that as a matter of principle the provisions
of the Industrial Peace Act granting freedom to employees to
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organize themselves and select their representatives for entering into

bargaining agreements, should be subordinated to the constitutional
provision protecting the sanctity of contracts. (Victorias Milling Co.,
Inc. vs. Victorias Manapla Workers Organization PAFLU, L-18467,
Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 154).

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 1, page 375 on

Constitutional Law.
See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 2, page 1167 on
Labor Laws.
Fernando, E.M., The Bill of Rights, 1972 Edition with 1973
Supplement.
Carlos, G.R., and Fernando, E.M., Labor and Social

______________

2 Ermita-Malate Hotel Operators Ass'n. vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967), per
Fernando, J.

248

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Burca vs. Republic

Legislation in the Philippines, 1964 Edition.

CBSI Editorial Staff, Compilation of Labor and Social
Legislation.
Fernandez, P.V. and Quiason, C.P., Labor and Social Legislation,
1964-71 Edition.

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