Dreamwork Construction, Inc., Petitioner, Vs - Cleofe S. Janiola and Hon. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents
Dreamwork Construction, Inc., Petitioner, Vs - Cleofe S. Janiola and Hon. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents
Dreamwork Construction, Inc., Petitioner, Vs - Cleofe S. Janiola and Hon. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents
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* THIRD DIVISION.
467
Same; Same; Same; The issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were
later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22.
—In Lee v. Court of Appeals, 448 SCRA 455 (2005), is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the
issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for
insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Br.
253.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
J.C. Yrreverre Law Firm for petitioner.
Samuel M. Salas for private respondent.
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008
Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas City.
The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case
Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-
President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated
October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent
Cleofe S. Janiola
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with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-
2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil
complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed
with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably,
the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated
July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved
facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words,
private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated
Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial
Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of
the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the
issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of
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470
Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case
having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, and reasoned that:
“Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the
same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be
dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of
her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution
rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).”8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the
RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
“Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a “previously” filed civil case is intended merely
to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to
delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the
civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was
instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.”10
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8 Id., at p. 67.
9 Id., at pp. 75-76.
10 Id., at p. 90.
471
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO
SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF “PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION” IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions
dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in
Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
“SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question.—The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.”
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as
stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:
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11 Id., at p. 11.
12 Carlos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109887, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 25, 33; Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 110544, October 17, 1995, 249 SCRA 342, 351; Apa v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 112381, March 30, 1995, 242 SCRA 509,
512; Yap v. Paras, G.R. No.101236, January 30, 1994, 205 SCRA 625, 629; Umali v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 63198, June 21, 1990, 186 SCRA 680, 685.
13 G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.
472
“The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.”
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and
the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
“SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial
question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was
filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard
against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a
pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decidedbefore any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate
and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase “before any criminal prosecution may be instituted
or may proceed” must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil
action is filed either before the institution of the
473
criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that
there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the
latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case
preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a “change in phraseology by
amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that it originally had.”14 In the instant case, the phrase, “previously instituted,”
was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation
to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of “subsequent”
directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments
except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:
“Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their
omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed
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474
in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be
rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action
must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was
filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC
in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.” (Emphasis supplied.)
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475
VOL. 591, JUNE 30, 2009 475
Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only
when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase
“previously instituted civil action” in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of
alternative interpretations. The clause “before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed” in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to
suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations
when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during
the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
“SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor
or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests.”
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the
Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing
of the civil action and the
476
subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial
question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for
specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the
resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:
“Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a
ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.”19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and
from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it
is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the
time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid
reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement
for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the
construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here
show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent
and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions cannot be
left to stand.
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477
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is,
still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present
controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the
parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of
such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal
prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
“(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor for the same reason
478
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of
the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the
elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP
22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:
“It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement
surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the
reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the
faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the
mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.”
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of
valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient
funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
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20 Mejia v. People, G.R. No. 149937, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 209, 213-214.
21 Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 451, 461; Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
132552, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 336, 341; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105461, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA
723, 726-727, citing People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 84-85 and Que v. People, Nos. L-
75217-18, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 161, 165.
22 Supra note 20, at pp. 214-215.
23 G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455.
479
“Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable consideration,
in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the
contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given,
suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who
makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check
included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. This
is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation
nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private
complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting
July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has
severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing
check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and
putting them into circulation.”24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement
between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of
private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed
issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is
subject of prosecution under BP 22.
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480
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal
action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the
rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August
26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders
dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch
79 in Las Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61 with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted, judgment of Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Br. 253 reversed and set
aside.
Note.—Prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 485 SCRA 473 [2006])
——o0o——