Republic of the Philippines capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.

ABAD,
SUPREME COURT JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
Manila and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity
as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
EN BANC
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 196271               October 18, 2011
G.R. No. 197282
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in
representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, 
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI vs.
MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE
ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL- PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
SAUPI, Petitioners, 
vs. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru G.R. No. 197392
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
LUIS "BAROK" BIRAOGO, Petitioner, 
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
vs.
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 196305

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner, 
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,
PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives, Respondents. MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-
Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
G.R. No. 197221
BRION, J.:
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, 
vs. On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled "An Act
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondents. Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the
National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes" was
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every
three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s
G.R. No. 197280
regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the
President the power to "appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP- Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
LABAN), Petitioners,  Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
vs. said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, elections shall have qualified and assumed office."
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An
10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in as Amended") was the next legislative act passed. This law
petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first
RA No. 10153 was passed. defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday
Factual Antecedents of September 2001.

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140 1 -
Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states: originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001.
It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in than August 15, 2001.
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14,
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join
economic and social structures, and other relevant ARMM on the same date.
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the RA No. 93332 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
Republic of the Philippines. ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005,
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a
to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to plebiscite.
concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates
regional consultative commission composed of representatives of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular
structure of government for the region consisting of the national and local elections of the country.
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which
shall be elective and representative of the constituent political RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as
units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22,
with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with
one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011.
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the
Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 signed RA No. 10153 into law.
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No.
6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." A plebiscite was through a petition filed with this Court – G.R. No. 196271 3-
held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No.
X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement.
provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi- Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305
tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the filed another petition4 also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after its ratification. With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave
RA No. 9054 (entitled "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 5 filed by Rep. Edcel requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Lagman as a member of the House of Representatives against Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of
Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to
and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197221; adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the
executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition 6 filed by Atty. petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power
Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
docketed as G.R. No. 197282; ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013
regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and also argue that the power of appointment also gave the
Preliminary Injunction7 filed by Louis "Barok" Biraogo against President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete
the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and
The Issues
8
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus  filed by Jacinto Paras
as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were
Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of
G.R. No. 197454. August 9 and 16, 2011:

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
as registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido of elections
Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with
candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2),
August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Mandamus9 against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No.
197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a
9333 and RA No. 10153. supermajority vote and plebiscite

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections
Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No.
filed their own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for 9054?
Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18, 2011.
On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and
petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153. corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days. Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to
restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. the ARMM
10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM
to continue to perform their functions should these cases not
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
The Arguments
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus,
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9094 in order to become effective. VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is
constitutional and legal.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
above. elective officials, done among others through the shortening
the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number
OUR RULING of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections –
whether national or local – to once every three years. 12 This
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the intention finds full support in the discussions during the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto. Constitutional Commission deliberations.13

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
that the Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: This Court was not left behind in recognizing the
synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission on
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
Elections,14 we explained:
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be
the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President
determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include
same hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.
the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in
the Metropolitan Manila area.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned
Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
occasion.  This common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year
and the remaining twelve for three years.
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)
xxx will have to be synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992. Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should
be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President "local" election based on the wording and structure of the
under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of Constitution.1avvphil
May, 1992.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words
We agree with this position. used should be understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent thus attached to them prevails. 15 As this Court explained in
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory People v. Derilo,16 "[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, 10which show the lawyer’s document, its language should be understood in the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
sought to attain synchronization of elections. 11 employed."
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing
limited district, often a community or minor political and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
subdivision.17 Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the
of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with
representatives obviously fall within this classification, since the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed
they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the on second and third readings in the House of Representatives
limited region of ARMM. on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified
by the President as urgent.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions
are considered one of the forms of local governments, as In the present case, the records show that the President wrote
evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
Government." Autonomous regions are established and necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article the ARMM elections with the national and local
wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous elections.20 Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s
region is considered a form of local government is also certification exempted both the House and the Senate from
reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which having to comply with the three separate readings
provides: requirement.

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back
regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter to our ruling in Tolentino:
provided.
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ
Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section
mandated by the Constitution does not include the regional 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the
elections of the ARMM –unmeritorious. We shall refer to delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art.
synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
concept permeates the consideration of the various issues rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of
posed in this case and must be recalled time and again for its presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away
complete resolution. with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit
II. The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153 a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise
RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section of their legislative discretion – gave full recognition to the
26(2), Article VI of the Constitution18 which provides that before President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.
bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of
laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify
The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of our intrusion under our power of judicial review. 21
the bill’s immediate enactment.
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
19
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,  explained the justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial
effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of
following manner: the President's certification by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government
not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a
days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the stay of the judicial hand.22
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable
three days before it is finally approved. our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to
intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
xxx respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators
of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.
that a measure is in progress through the enactment process. 23 Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any
plebiscite for ratification.
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law,
that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law
measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be
this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter,
ground. Congress passed RA No. 914030 to reset the date of the ARMM
elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No.
RA No. 9054 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA
No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, No. 9333,31 which further reset the date of the ARMM regional
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
provisions require:
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent
this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
voting separately. amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act
shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for
vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
We find no merit in this contention. requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.
905432 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153
the Constitution demands.
amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will
show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first
ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by business." In other words, as long as majority of the members
enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these subsequent laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 – these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and
cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally
not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by
providing the date of the subsequent regular elections. In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a
vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately,
determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3
legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history. voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution
requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that
it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of Davao v.
rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA
GSIS33 on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent
unconstitutionality:
elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM
elections,24 leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, 25RA No. 8176,26 RA No. Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
8746,27 RA No. 8753,28 and RA No. 901229 were all enacted by principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these actions of future legislative body, considering that both
laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they
do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean
the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous
enactments labors under delusions of omniscience. regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic
xxx Act – require ratification through a plebiscite. These
amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region’s
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family,
territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of
the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. 36
cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that
the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its the supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are
progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed
bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent require compliance with these requirements.
legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon
existing statutes.34 (Emphasis ours.) IV. The synchronization issue

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local
it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must
the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM
significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already exists –
and flexibility. RA No. 7166 – as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153.
RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged elections with the national and congressional elections. Thus,
the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local
Constitution governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian
Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already
unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality
requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that local elections by express constitutional recognition.37
Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point reconcile the schedule of the ARMM’s regular elections (which
of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution. should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333)
with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous
regions and for determining which provinces, cities and During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three
geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem.
While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the
have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to
become effective,35 questions on the extent of the matters Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in
requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the the synchronized elections assume office;38 (2) to hold special
seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to
absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required expire when those elected in the synchronized elections
for every statutory amendment. assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs,
pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that "The in the synchronized elections assume office.
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose." With these choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs,
chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions.
completely valid law. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the
Constitution intends – the idea of self-rule or self-government,
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social,
economic and administrative matters. But equally clear under
A. Basic Underlying Premises these provisions are the permeating principles of national
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as
expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying
15.44 In other words, the Constitution and the supporting
material premises must be fully understood. The first is the
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the
imperium et imperio45 in the relationship between the national
constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections;
and the regional governments.
and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are recognized
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
and established constitutional mandates, with one being as
comprehensive.39 The legislative body possesses plenary power
compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all,
for all purposes of civil government. 40 Any power, deemed to
the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on
be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy – as
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
the term suggests – directly carries a narrower regional effect
elsewhere.41 Except as limited by the Constitution, either
although its national effect cannot be discounted.
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects
and extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.42 These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and
limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To
succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then,
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either
its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the
express or implied. The express limitations are generally
national, congressional and all other local elections (save for
provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and
barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the
State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights
problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the
(Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative
intervening period between the expiration of the term of those
and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-
autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express
one (21) months away – of those who will win in the
limitations. The implied limitations are found "in the evident
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
purpose which was in view and the circumstances and
historical events which led to the enactment of the particular
provision as a part of organic law." 43 The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this
period, consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its
established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due
The constitutional provisions on autonomy – specifically,
to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is
Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution – constitute
not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
express limitations on legislative power as they define
The Constitution’s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively
autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting
provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the
what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate
new46 and for the introduction of new concepts. 47 As previously
on the governance of the autonomous region.
mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of elections
towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look
limitations posed by the prescribed basic structure of far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems
government – i.e., that the government must have an executive that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail;
department and a legislative assembly, both of which must be thus, the present problem is with us today.
elective and representative of the constituent political units;
national government, too, must not encroach on the legislative
The creation of local government units also represents
powers granted under Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as
instances when interim measures are required. In the creation
expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, "all powers and
of Quezon del Sur48 and Dinagat Islands,49 the creating statutes
functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
authorized the President to appoint an interim governor, vice-
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan
Government."
although these positions are essentially elective in character;
the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise provincial officials shall have been elected and qualified. 50 A
serve as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing with
similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a beyond the period as limited by the Constitution." [Emphasis
local government from a sub-province to a province. 51 ours.]

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the
necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates that where
adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its
sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated should
and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by
choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to amendment or repeal through the applicable constitutional
congressional discretion. process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three
branches of government can deviate from the constitutional
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow. 53 If at
serve as the guideposts and markers in our discussion of the all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully
options available to Congress to address the problems brought operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it
about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections, properly by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other
understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is
The proper understanding of the options as interim measures appropriate and called for.54
assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the
passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e., given the In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been
constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself
the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should
necessarily brought with it? stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot
be extended by holdover by Congress.
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively
We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
during the 2008-2011 term – as an option that Congress could the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective
have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do
the Constitution. This provision states: indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly,
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be then all laws would be illusory. 55 Congress cannot also create a
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position
consecutive terms. [emphases ours] for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. 56 Hence,
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are
holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally
covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. As this Court put in Osmeña v. COMELEC: 52
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases
where the question of holdover was brought before, and given
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of
the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case
officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
though differs significantly from past cases with contrary
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has
rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, 57 Adap v.
in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when
Comelec,58 and Montesclaros v. Comelec,59where the Court
the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall
ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions
begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office
in a hold over capacity.
beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify
within the time.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
provided for in the Constitution; the present case, on the other
hand, refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor,
"It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional
act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year
limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot President, Members of Congress and local officials, except
legislate an extension beyond the term for which they were when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders
originally elected. of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated
either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, details in the execution of that power.63
and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7,
Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, 60 we have to remember Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by
that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. 61 synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not
it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that call special elections as an adjustment measure in
prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within
the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly,
legislation,62 except where an attendant unconstitutionality or cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the
grave abuse of discretion results. legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been
exercised in grave abuse of discretion. 64 But our power rests on
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act
is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor
special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881. exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the
petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel COMELEC
to call for special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in
nature, as evident from, and exemplified by, the following
provisions of the Constitution: Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional
power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress
to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election.65 Statutorily, COMELEC has no
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular power to call for the holding of special elections unless
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant,
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to
[Emphasis ours]
postpone elections to another date. However, this power is
limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious
xxxx cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free,
election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours] political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides: and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours] cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or
failure to elect.
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may
be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous special elections.
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective
by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and officials
during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis
or suspension of election would affect the result of the likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the
petition by any interested party and after due notice and synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the
reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later
to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be
than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
exercised only in the case of barangay officials, 67 is specifically
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such
[Emphasis ours]
power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of
twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,68 and extended the
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to terms of the President and the Vice-President 69 in order to
address instances where elections have already been scheduled synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same
to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution
(b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election paraphernalia cannot be changed by mere statute. 70 More particularly, not
or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to
such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or
election should become impossible in any political subdivision. more, than the constitutionally mandated three years 71 as this
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
causes" will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections.
These "analogous causes" are further defined by the phrase "of
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials
such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be
election should become impossible."
shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three
(3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special
where elections have already been scheduled but do not take elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is
place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express
(d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causesthe election in any provision of the Constitution.
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
on their term (where the "term" means the time during which
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in
the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the
Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
elections do not occur or had to be suspended because
another, while the "tenure" represents the term during which
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
the incumbent actually holds the office). 72 As with the fixing of
the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They
is by law – i.e., by congressional policy – and is pursuant to the would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local discretion if they do so.
elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these reasons be
given the same character as the circumstances contemplated
E. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs
by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to
extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts,
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim
to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the
measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President
guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor
of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization
intended by the lawmakers. 66 Clearly, neither Section 5 nor
period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only
Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court
measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged
should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity. constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in read as a law that changes the elective and representative
nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does
of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What
recognized.73 The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge
Article VII of the Constitution, which states: for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers qualified and assumed office." This power is far different from
and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall May 2013 elections.
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those As we have already established in our discussion of the
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153,
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And
ours] this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. 75 Aside
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
President can appoint. These are: interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors;
other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim
of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; measure is an unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given
and other officers whose appointments are vested in the the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably
President in this Constitution; brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on the
above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of
providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional
Second, all other officers of the government whose
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power
to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the
appoint; and Constitution – an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for
Congress to make?
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.74 Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under
other situations or where the power of appointment would
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization
RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the would be to foster a government that is not "democratic and
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the republican." For then, the people’s right to choose the leaders
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to
constitutional basis. the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant
that would frontally breach the "elective and representative"
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the
authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is Constitution.
the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be "elective and But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
representative of the constituent political units." This circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non- is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance – both
observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054
constitutionally defective. – will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat
what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern
unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with localized cancellation of elections and call for special elections
the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated
measures that synchronization of elections requires. by Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot
temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of
the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders, but their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to
this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the
interim measure in the manner that interim measures have dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
been adopted and used in the creation of local government
units76 and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not
provinces.77 These measures, too, are used in light of the wider be forgotten that a period of 21 months – or close to 2 years –
national demand for the synchronization of elections intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective
(considered vis-à-vis the regional interests involved). The officials’ terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective
adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our
from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of Mindanao history – past and current – teach us, many
the State, where one of the essential tests is the developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire
reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the in the country’s Muslim areas in this span of time in the way
given circumstances. they transpired in the past.78 Thus, it would be reckless to
assume that the presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an
Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional
leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily.
OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
process; only the "elective" aspect shall be supplanted by the circumstances is an absolute necessity.
appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly
seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, OICs to undertake the functions of the elective members of the
concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative.
Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications. We hark back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v.
Petilla, etc., et al.:79
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 –
viewed in its proper context – is a law that is not violative of It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and
the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
that is reasonable as well under the circumstances. empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we
oral arguments that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the
10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The
the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct
allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs. appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board provided by law and the members of the board who are junior
cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers President, until the law provides otherwise.
of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even
Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
legislatively undertake with respect to elections. approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it government.
was for a very specific and limited purpose – the
synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a In a republican form of government, the majority rules through
lasting end – the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No. their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent,
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent,
likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or applied may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent
to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if
the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.80 (Emphasis As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous
ours.) regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the
Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the
Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause policies set by the national government, save only for those
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional
people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the
government, and in responding to critical developments that constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous
may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President regions:
in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment
power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation
measure to take. from the central government, but rather an efficient working
relationship between the autonomous region and the central
B. Autonomy in the ARMM government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a
separation.
It is further argued that while synchronization may be
constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really
impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the thought of as complete independence.
ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there
exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within
mandates – synchronization and regional autonomy – such that the larger political framework of the nation. 84[Emphasis
it is necessary to choose one over the other. supplied.]

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the
principle in constitutional construction – ut magis valeat quam above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by
pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that
whole,81 and one mandate should not be given importance over autonomy shall be "within the framework of this Constitution
the other except where the primacy of one over the other is and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity
clear.82 We refer to the Court’s declaration in Ang-Angco v. of the Republic of the Philippines."
Castillo, et al.,83 thus:
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary
isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon
should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the
give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.] provision in order to "make it clear, once and for all, that these
are the limits of the powers of the autonomous government.
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the
entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this national government[.]"85 Of note is the Court’s
Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre 86 which we
Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to quote:
transit to synchronized regional elections with the least
disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of government has not completely relinquished all its powers over
being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
modify its governing features, except in a very temporary administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
manner and only as necessitated by the attendant political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
circumstances. governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections the smaller political units are expected to propel social and
should not be synchronized with the national and local economic growth and development. But to enable the country
elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common
of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies
from convinced of its merits. in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the questions and to presume that the acts of the political
synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain.
granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
from having to act in accordance with a national policy powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
mandated by no less than the Constitution. respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is
that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Conclusion Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to
be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a enacted.95 [Emphasis ours.]
constitutional mandate – the synchronization of national and
local elections – when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of confirm its validity.
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. 87 As judges, we can
only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it. 88 consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for
lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our
Congress should address what is essentially a legislative Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
problem. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or
abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the SO ORDERED.
exclusive prerogative of Congress.89 The petitioners, in asking
this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite ARTURO D. BRION
its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to Associate Justice
venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is abhorrent
to one of the most basic principles of a republican and WE CONCUR:
democratic government – the separation of powers.
I join the dissent of J. Velasco with respect to the appointment
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because of the OIC Governor and vote to hold the law as
Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA unconstitutional
No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and RENATO C. CORONA
whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to Chief Justice
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and I join the dissent of J.
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 90 Carpio but disagree on the
power of the Pres. to
See Dissenting Opinion
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly appoint OIC-Governor of
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it ARMM
Associate Justice
acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that JR.
synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be Associate Justice
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to
perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the I join the dissent of Justice
petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion. Velasco
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
Associate Justice
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we DE CASTRO
can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is Associate Justice
presumed valid.91 Congress, thus, has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party MARIANO C. DEL
challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTILLO
rebutting this presumption.92 Any reasonable doubt about the Associate Justice
Associate Justice
validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.93 As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive
I join the dissent of J. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
Secretary:94
Velasco JR.
 ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. I join the dissent of J.

MARIA LOURDES P. A.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
SERENO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice