Realist Constructivism

Author(s): J. Samuel Barkin

Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep., 2003), pp. 325-342
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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International Studies Review (2003) 5, 325-342

Realist Constructivism

J. SAMUEL BARKIN
Department of Political Science, University of Florida

Constructivism appears to have taken a place in the literature on

international relations (IR) theory in direct opposition to realism.
Constructivists who claim their methodology is incompatible with
realism focus on the association between realism and both materialism
and rationalism. Realists who claim their paradigm is incompatible with
constructivism focus for the most part on a perceived tendency for
constructivists to be idealists or utopians. Neither argument, however,
holds up. This essay examines constructivist epistemology and classical
realist theory, contending that they are, in fact, compatible; not that
constructivism is necessarily realist, but that constructivist research is as
compatible with a realist worldview as with any other. Having a realist
constructivism could prove useful in IR theory beyond clarifying
methodological debates, including helping to specify the relationship
between the study of power in international politics and the study of
international relations as a social construction.

Constructivism appears to have taken a place in the literature on international

relations (IR) theory in direct opposition to realism. Examples of this opposition
can be found in a number of places. Constructivist theory came into the IR
mainstream as a critique of a variant of realism: structural realism (Wendt 1987;
Dessler 1989; Onuf and Klink 1989). Self-proclaimed constructivists often have (or
at least are seen to have) worldviews that fall within liberalism, broadly defined, and
often accept that categorization. Moreover, some recent constructivist theorizing
argues explicitly that constructivism and realism are logically incompatible (for
example, Wendt 1999; Patomaki and Wight 2000) or, at least, antagonistic (Lebow
2001). International relations pedagogy is also increasingly defining realism and
constructivism as being categorically distinct, as witnessed by the increasing
tendency in IR textbooks, even at the introductory level, to define realism and
constructivism as two of three or more distinct paradigms in the field (for example,
Hughes 2000; Kegley and Wittkopf 2001; Lieber 2001).
To claim that constructivism is an IR paradigm in the way that realism or
liberalism are is misleading, and the tendency to do so in textbooks is rarely
mirrored in the scholarly literature. In the latter, constructivism is usually identified
as an ontology, epistemology, or methodology. As such, it is usually defined as being
distinct from either materialism or rationalism. Recent state-of-the-field exercises
(Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; Ruggie 1998), in fact, identified the
rationalism-constructivism controversy as the central debate in contemporary IR
theory. Constructivists who claim their methodology is incompatible with realism
focus on the association between realism and both materialism and rationalism.
Realists who claim their paradigm is incompatible with constructivism focus for the
most part not on the methodology per se but on a perceived tendency for
constructivists to be idealists or utopians.

? 2003 International Studies Review.

Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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326 Realist Constructivism

Neither argument, however, holds up to car

vists that realist theory is incompatible wit
methodologies are based on either caricature
realism. And realist critics of constructivism ar
the worldviews of some (perhaps many) practicin
is inherently biased toward liberalism. An exa
ogy and classical realist theory suggests tha
of course, that good constructivism is necess
research is as compatible with a realist worldv
The purpose of this essay is to conduct suc
doing so is to define terms and to clear up so
surrounding the discourse connecting constru
is to make the argument that a realist const
constructivist realism) is epistemologically, m
viable. The final step is to discuss what a realist
where it fits in the study of international re
approach could, among other things, fulfill seve
to clear up a number of debates in the field
rather than to, each other. Another function is
on the one hand, the study of power and th
relations and, on the other, the study of the
politics. A final function is to act as a bridge
international relations and critical and postm
constructivism and realism as problematic, alb

Definitions

Part of the reason so many scholars in the field talk past each other when discussing
issues of paradigm and epistemology is terminological confusion. Scholars tend to
redefine terms frequently, creating a situation in which the same term is used by
different authors with very different meanings. This observation holds for most of
the key terms in this essay-and certainly for the two main concepts: realism and
constructivism. The confusion is exacerbated by individual authors who provide
different definitions for the same words. For example, Alexander Wendt (1999)
speaks of both political and scientific realism, arguing that the two are incompatible.
He also provides two definitions of idealism, as the 'ism of ideas and the 'ism of
ideals-two quite different concepts. We will address idealism and scientific realism
shortly. The first step, however, is to define the two terms most central to this
essay-constructivism and realism (political)-and to specify how they will be used
here. Both terms are defined in a way that includes as many scholars in the self-
defined constructivist and realist research communities as possible.
Constructivism is the easier of the two terms to define inclusively. Most (possibly
all) self-described constructivists would agree that the defining feature of this
approach is a focus on the social construction of international politics. Con-
structivists see the facts of international politics as not reflective of an objective,
material reality but an intersubjective, or social, reality (Onuf 1989). In other
words, what actors do in international relations, the interests they hold, and the
structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and ideas rather
than by objective or material conditions.
Within this broad definition, constructivists differ considerably. One plane on
which they differ is the extent to which there is an empirically identifiable reality to
be identified and studied. Opinions tend to coalesce into one of two epistemologies:
one argues that an identifiable reality exists out there and can be accessed through
empirical research; the other contends that we can never know for sure if what we
observe really exists independently of our observation of it and, therefore, no true

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 J. SAMUEL BARKIN 327

reality exists for empirical research to find. These tw

variously as "neoclassical" and "postmodernist" constr
as well as "thin" and "thick" constructivism (see Wen
realist constructivism will be made in this essay by f
variant of constructivism because it is the more difficult case to make. Postmodern
constructivism is generally more accepting of the centrality of power in politics, and
power, as is argued below, is the core concept of realism. The postmodernist
response, that realism is inherently foundationalist, will be addressed later in this
section and in the next.
The harder to define of the two basic terms is realism because so many
definitions abound that seem, on their face, to be mutually incompatible. To get to
the point, the common feature of realism-that is, the concept which is to realism
as intersubjectivity is to constructivism-is power. This observation may seem to
some readers obvious to the point of banality. But many contemporary definitions
of realism give power little prominence and fail to indicate the extent to which they
ultimately rely on it (for example, Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Jervis 1998; Legro and
Moravcsik 1999). Power, to other readers, may seem too broad a category to be
particularly useful in the analysis of international relations; this criticism will be
addressed below. To make the case that power is the core concept of realism, we
must look at the range of definitions of realism that exist, noting the extent to which
they are ultimately derived from propositions about the centrality of power in
international relations.
The term realism came into the IR discourse in reference to the need to study
international politics as they are, not as we feel they should be (see Schuman 1933;
Rommen 1944; Kirk 1947; Morgenthau 1948; Carr 1964). The logic behind this
need centered around power. We cannot, by wishing politics were different, make
them so because we do not have the power; therefore, we must work within the
existing power structure (Lasswell 1935; Wight 1946; Morgenthau 1948; Carr
1964). The seminal works developing realist theory in the United States explicitly
defined realism as being about power. Hans Morgenthau (1985:31-32), for
example, made all the study of international politics about power by definitional
fiat. He defined political science as the social science concerned with power. If we
were to study some element of international relations that did not revolve around
power, we would be studying international economics, or international law, or
international sociology rather than international politics. In taking this stance,
Morgenthau (1948:15) was not arguing that international law, economics, or
sociology are irrelevant. What he was saying, however, is that, in the international
domain, politics defined as power is important and merits study in its own right.
In the more than half a century since Politics among Nations (Morgenthau 1948)
was first published, this basic definition of realism has been built upon to the point
that power, the original kernel of the definition, has occasionally gotten lost.
Beyond power, contemporary definitions of realism usually contain some combi-
nation of the following: the analytic centrality of states, their interest in survival, the
primacy of material capabilities, and rationality (for a review of definitions of
realism, see Donnelly 2000). Together these elements show a clear lineage from the
core realist concept of power, but often with little recognition of how they relate to
the ideas from which they descend. Looking at these concepts one at a time allows
us to reconnect them.
Many contemporary definitions of realism assume that the state is the central
actor in international politics. For early realists, this premise was more a matter of
observation than of deduction. The major political events during the first half of the
twentieth century were the two world wars, and these wars were fought by and
between states. States were the organizations in international politics with power.
Indeed, no other organizations had much effective power internationally; therefore
states mattered. But E. H. Carr (1964:224-235) concluded that though states were

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328 Realist Constructivism

currently the locus of power in global politics,

central actor. Since then, however, states have,
presented as a definitional element of realism
Jervis 1998). One effect of this removal of state
centrality is the argument, advanced by both cr
that what happens within states does not matte
(and few seminal neorealist theorists, for that m
theory, what goes on within the state both dete
powerful and defines what their goals for that
in fact, very much a first image theory, wh
critique of it. Attempts by IR theorists, such as
(1999), to draw the distinction between realist
the former was a third-image theory and t
second-image theories are, thus, misplaced. In
have power; people and domestic institutions
much power states will have, and how that p
The assumption that states share an interes
discussed premise of state centrality. For rea
survival is a generalization rather than a
interested in their own survival are not li
Therefore, we can assume that those state
contemporary world are those with an inter
Waltz 1979:74-77; Jervis 1998:980-981). Surviv
key, motivator of state behavior; however, in si
states are likely to take it into account. Some
assumption that states value survival borders
must be some further implicit assumptions in
for example, Legro and Moravcsik 1999:14; W
this assumption is precisely the point. In a w
need only have in common a basic concern for s
power (see, for example, Waltz 1979; Grieco
The third concept that often appears in con
rationality. To many, perhaps most, current
rationality invokes rational choice theory (se
and Krasner 1998). This approach to the stud
that we can usefully study political actor
preferences, as if they were instrumentally r
context of realist theory, however, does no
choice theory. Two elements concerning rati
first is that we, as scholars, should be rat
"scientific" in a loose usage of that term, in our
should look for general patterns of behavior
range of (though certainly not by all) social
rationality is discussed in realism is more p
statespeople necessarily will behave rationall
interests of their states they should. That is, if
difference rather than just a statement in inter

'Note that Kenneth Waltz (1979:121-122) refers to this sort o

from the systemic study of international politics and argues th
never dismisses it as unimportant.
2This admonition, however, does not imply a commitment to a
ascribed to rationalists by constructivists such as Ruggie (199
fact, used the term "scientific man"-one who would deduce soluti
first principles-as his polemical foil to realists in the same w

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 J. SAMUEL BARKIN 329

marshal their power resources. In Morgenthau's (198

ought to be rational in view of its own moral and pra
often read as an assumption of rationality is, in poin
rationality based on an assumption of the centrality o
The fourth concept, the assumption of the primac
something more often ascribed to realist theory by its c
themselves (see, for example, Kratochwil 1984:310; W
true, often focus more on military power than on ot
economic, organizational, or moral (for example, Me
predisposition can be attributed to the assumption th
adversary can threaten the very existence of a state, wh
cannot. (Of course, whether or not this assumption is
also be ascribed to the context in which much of the sem
the Cold War (see Oren 2000), or to the ease with whi
can be counted. But in situations in which no immine
currently the case among many of the world's majo
exists within realist theory to privilege military pow
During the Cold War, there was a cottage indust
manpower and hardware that owed more to the beh
realist theory, and it is, perhaps, from this developmen
associated with material capabilities.3 But few realist
assumption, and many argue explicitly that the sour
(see, for example, Waltz 1979:131; Morgenthau 1985
When the assumption of materialism is ascribed to real
has to wonder why this particular straw man is being
to make realism more compatible with rational choice th
to treat power the way that formal theorists treat pr
theory, however, power is at least partially endogen
much power one has without knowing how it is bein
power resources has the effect, though, of making p
becomes something that is out there, measurable and
political activity. Formal theory must similarly take
exogenous to the game being played. So through th
realism becomes "rationalized" both for rationalists a
Legro and Moravcsik 1999 and Wendt 1999 respectiv
The previous discussion implies that power is the co
realist theory. Of the four concepts imbedded in co
realism, the analytic centrality of states and an inte
from the original realist focus on power; the third conc
the realist rather than the rational choice manner, sugg
The fourth, the primacy of material capabilities, is mor
turn in political science research during the mid-Cold
turn in the late-Cold War period than an expression o
it is this fourth feature, rather than a focus on power,
argue that constructivism and realism are incompati

Realism and Constructivism

Many constructivists explicitly accept that power matters in international relations.

Wendt (1999:13-14), for example, notes that to the extent realism is about powe
he too is a realist. He and other constructivist theorists often part company wi

3It is important to note, however, that the most dedicated of the counters of material capabilities, such as those
involved in the Correlates of War project, described themselves as peace theorists or conflict resolution theorists an
as anti-realist (see, for example, Singer 1990; Vasquez 1998).

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330 Realist Constructivism

realists because of the belief that, at its core,

material rather than a social basis" (Wen
parts: that realist theory (1) focuses on mater
as materialistic, and (3) emphasizes empiri
from one another, and, if any of them
incompatibility between realism and constr
them are sustainable.
The first of these charges, that the realist understanding of power favors a focus
on material capabilities, has already been alluded to above. It is certainly true that
many self-described realist researchers have attempted to reduce the idea of power
to quantitative measures. But no reason exists to believe that such a procedure is
inherent to realist theory. Indeed, the behavioral, and thus quantitative, turn in IR
is generally considered to have happened decades after the realist turn, suggesting
that the latter cannot be inherent to the former (Bull 1972; Vasquez 1983; Holsti
1985). Many seminal realist theorists, furthermore, have argued explicitly that
nonmaterial factors are central to a complete understanding of power in
international relations (see, for example, Morgenthau 1948; Wolfers 1962; Carr
1964; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Strange 1987). Moreover, students of power
analysis, some of them self-described realists, have pointed out how complex and
multifaceted power analysis can be (see, for example, Lasswell and Kaplan 1950;
Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Baldwin 1989; Hall 1997). Even studies of military
issues conducted by those calling themselves realists after the behavioralist turn
often focused on such nonmaterial elements as doctrines (see, for example,
Mearsheimer 1983; Posen 1984). The fact that some realist researchers use
quantitative measures of brute material capabilities should, therefore, not be
interpreted to mean that this sort of materialism is inherent in realism.
The second charge is that realist logic requires certain materialist assumptions
about human nature and human needs that govern the behavior of actors in
international politics (Wendt 1999:30, 131-133). The particular assumptions
ascribed to realist understandings of human nature often include the presence of
insecurity and fear (Waltz 1959; Wendt 1999). It is true that realists must begin with
some theory of human nature. Indeed, as Wendt (1999:131) has observed, all social
theory must begin with some theory of human nature, even if it is that human
nature is infinitely malleable. There exist theories of human nature that are
incompatible with political realism, including those that argue that human nature is
infinitely malleable or ultimately perfectible. But we can also identify a broad range
of theories of human nature that are compatible with both realist and constructivist
theory, including those that suggest that individuals differ. (For a general discussion
of this literature, see Sterling-Folker 2002). Realist logic does not require that all
individuals be aggressive or self-interested, simply that some of them are. In other
words, the theory requires that all individuals cannot be nonaggressive and other-
oriented. As long as some people will try to accumulate power, and no
countervailing power stops them, other people face insecurity. This logic is, for
example, the heart of Randall Schweller's (1998) distinction between status quo and
revisionist states. Critics might respond that, phrased as such, realist logic is
sufficiently broad and obvious as to be banal; this criticism will be addressed below.
The third charge is that political realism is, variously, "positivist" or "empiricist"
and, as a result, incompatible with constructivist methodology (see, for example,
Pettman 2000 and Wendt 1999 respectively). This charge seems on its face to be
methodological, but a number of constructivist theorists have recently taken to
making it at the ontological level. This criticism is made via a reference to
"scientific" (Wendt 1999) or "critical" (Patomaki and Wight 2000) realism, a
concept in the philosophy of science that bears no relationship to "political"
realism. The essence of scientific realism as applied in the social sciences is the idea
that real social structures exist out there, independent of our observation of them.

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 J. SAMUEL BARKIN 331

In short, the view is that a "there" actually exists o

Leplin 1984; Bhaskar 1986; Archer et al. 1998). This pe
logical positivist-empiricist notion that we can only
example, Ayer 1959; Lapid 1989) and the postmodern-
because all social knowledge is discursively created,
out there independent of our discourses about them
Both the logical positivist and deconstructivist posit
there can be no knowledge of social phenomena s
whereas the scientific realist position is that social ph
the observer and can be adduced even when not dire
Wight 2000). The constructivist critique political rea
these anti-scientific realist positions.
This last charge has evolved over time. Postpositivis
Walker 1990a) in the positivist-postpositivist deb
positivist and, as a result, incompatible with new tren
from a constructivist perspective, such a dismissal i
definition of positivism broad enough to capture the ran
for example, Walt 1987; Snyder 1988) is broad e
contemporary constructivist thinking as well. Many crit
with neorealism, understandable given the prominen
the last two decades of the last century, but problematic
an explicit critique of classical realism.4
Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight (2000) argue that
to both the logical positivist position and the deconst
share an anthropocentric view of knowledge that is inco
realism that they argue should underlie constructivis
2000:219-223) trace this anthropocentrism back throu
middle of the twentieth century, all the way back to
Hume and Kant in the eighteenth century.5 In d
development of political realism, and its introductio
States by Morgenthau, both with the empiricism of H
of Nietzche. The point of this genealogy is to posit
thought between the realms of the empirically observ
a sense, it provides a way of restating the charge tha
and of arguing that positivism understood narrowly i
realism.
Morgenthau's writing on the "science" of political science can, indeed, seem
confusing at first reading. In Scientific Man versus Power Politics, he (Morgenthau
1946) argues that "scientific man," who would solve the problems of politics
through the application of reason, is incapable of successfully addressing those
problems. In contrast, in Politics among Nations, Morgenthau (1985:5) speaks of
political realism as "believing ... in the objectivity of the laws of politics" and
"the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects" those laws. Some
constructivist critics of political realism posit that Morgenthau underwent a radical
change of mind in the period between writing the two books. Patomaki and Wight
(2000:222), for example, interpret the earlier work as an expression of skepticism
that we can find scientific knowledge about the world, an interpretation that seems
irreconcilable with the Morgenthau of Politics among Nations.
But to make this claim is to confuse predictive with prescriptive rationality, as was
discussed above. What Morgenthau (1946:122-131) is arguing against in Scientific

4On the "rationalization" of realism suggested by neorealism, see Spegele (1996), who speaks of "commonsense"
and "concessionary" realism rather than classical and neorealism.
5This genealogy is contestable; in some places Morgenthau seems quite dismissive of the phenomenal-noumenal
distinction that they accuse him of implicitly sharing (see, for example, Morgenthau 1946:170-171).

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 332 Realist Constructivism

Man is the attempt to understand the world

rationally understand the world. What he (Mo
Politics among Nations is that there is a pr
understand the world, when the world is not
words, both books are arguing the same poin
directions. This interpretation does suggest a
realism and rational choice theory, or what Ru
It also, however, suggests a compatibility betw
or thin, constructivism. The antipathy to "sci
importance of ideas, and the insistence that histo
works of Morgenthau (see 1946:130 for a discu
well into a statement of constructivist epis
postmodern. And the ontology of classical re
from subjective opinion but not, as a result, deny
as morality, is hardly the sort of brute mate
sometimes associate with realism.
All of this leaves us having dealt with the proposed incompatibilities between
constructivism and political realism, the latter being defined as the study of IR that
focuses on power relations in the international sphere. Many readers, no doubt, will
have begun to wonder by this point, so what? Has realism been made compatible
with constructivism by defining the concept so broadly that it fails to exclude
anyone. To answer this question, we return to an earlier observation about the
terminological confusion in the field. Recall, we noted that Wendt (1999) uses the
terms realism and idealism in two different ways. The distinction between realisms,
political and scientific, was the subject of this section. The distinction between
idealisms, a focus on ideas versus a focus on ideals, is the subject of the next.

Ideas, Utopias, and Liberals

"Ever since Carr's devastating critique, 'idealist' has functioned in IR primarily
as an epithet for naivete" (Wendt 1999:33). Wendt makes this point after
distinguishing between idealism as a theory of social politics and Idealism (which
he capitalizes) as a theory of IR. The first idealism refers to social theory that looks
at the importance of ideas, whereas the second refers to a theory of IR based on
ideals rather than on realism. Wendt makes the claim that he is involved in doing
the former, not the latter. This claim is disputed below. Interestingly, in The Twenty
Years' Crisis, Carr (1964) does not use the term idealism at all; instead, he discusses
utopianism. Similarly, Moravcsik (1997:514) tries explicitly to distance himself from
"liberalism's historical role as an ideology" in his redefinition of liberal theory in IR.
Liberalism is the foil to realism in Morgenthau's (1946) Scientific Man versus Power
Politics. Both Wendt (1999:39) and Moravcsik (1997:514) share in common a desire
to liberate the label each applies to himself, idealist and liberal respectively, from
normative associations in an attempt to create "scientific" and, presumably
therefore, value-free, social science.
Both these scholars are, in fact, trying to rehabilitate the terms idealism and
liberalism (although in very different ways) from the charge that these concepts
reflect a normative approach to social science: an ideology. The goal in this section
is to rehabilitate the normative approach to IR from which both Moravcsik and
Wendt are striving to distance themselves. As rhetorical foils to realism, Carr (1964)

6This observation speaks to some recent attempts, such as that by Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999),
to redefine realism in rationalist terms. Such attempts can be seen in the context of this essay more as entries in the
rationalist-constructivist debate than as entries in interparadigmatic debates. In effect, redefining classical realism in
rational choice terms can be viewed as a way of associating the traditional approach to postwar IR with rational
choice, thereby increasing the marginalization of critics of rationalist approaches.

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 J. SAMUEL BARKIN 333

used "utopianism" and Morgenthau (1946) used "liber

Although the terms that Carr and Morgenthau employed
were, in fact, referring to the sort of liberal idealism an
associated with political scientists in the tradition of
1993; Schmidt 1998). The essence of this school of t
consistent and reasonable (or at least predictable) pre
rationally.7 As a result, well-designed political institu
rationally pursue their preferences in a way that interf
the abilities of others to do so will appeal sufficiently to
obviate any necessity for power politics. In other wor
right political structure can, indeed, insure perpe
Kant's phrase (1957).
The classical realist response is that no ultimate solu
subject to the conditions of time and space and must
by different methods and under different conditions
relations of concrete nations. The problem of internat
for the philosopher" (Morgenthau 1946:217). That is, t
successfully with particular political problems at a partic
nexus of problem, time, and place is historically un
other problems in other times and places. To the ext
international political problems have at least some dis
relative gains or preferential distributions in the so
problems in different times and places, will likely refle
best able to stake their claim to those gains, that is
power. As such, no matter how well designed the stru
power will always be the ultimate arbiter of outcome
So, then, is there ultimately nothing other th
international relations? Quite the contrary, for
people are inherently moral as well as political an
ethical significance. For Carr (1964:235), "it is an un
ignores the element of morality in any world order
theory in the absence of a recognition of power is
power in the absence of morality is an empty exercise. T
reasons, one practical and one philosophical. The pra
humans are moral beings, they will not accept power
political domination will recognize the distinction w
between power used for good and power used for evil
and oppose the latter (see, for example, Morgen
discussion of Thucydides in Johnson Bagby 1994). Th
power for its own sake is hollow; it gets you nowher
what to do with it. Indeed, "the characteristic vice
the realist, sterility" (Carr 1964:12). Classical real
international politics as the practical balancing of the
hand and morality on the other-as a dialectic betwe
Kubilkovi 1998).
In short, from its inception realism has been viewed
idealism, but not as a replacement. Idealism, for the c
inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pur
but realism will always remain a necessary part of r
lies the difference between realists and "utopians" or

7A key difference between this school of thought and contemporary ratio

that in the latter the assumption of reasonableness falls out. People are as
are not necessarily assumed to respect the rights and well-being of others w
instrumentally rational.

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334 Realist Constructivism

latter believe that we can ultimately build

the realist believes that we cannot. For
international institutions, however well alig
well intentioned our ideas, power will re
the ultimate source) of outcomes. Because n
institutions are ultimately perfectible, we will
identifying those who would subvert the sy
with them effectively.
Well and good, but does anyone actually dis
in this way? "The proposition that the natur
power relations invariably is listed as one of th
This cannot be a uniquely Realist claim, ho
international politics would be a Realist" (W
Wendt would seem to preempt the usefulne
being used in this essay. But it can be argued t
Wendt identifies as accepting the centrality of
himself, in the end do not. Moravcsik (1997:
scientific approaches to liberal theory prop
peace.8 The logical conclusion of the presen
countries were to become democratic, there
the right domestic political structures, in o
posed by military power. This idealist conclu
incompatible with realism. Neoliberal insti
cooperation in specific issue areas can happ
tional institutions (see Keohane and Nye 19
Levy 1993; Keohane and Martin 1995).9 Once
is no longer an issue. Thus, at least in refere
institutionalists are idealists; they claim that p
need for national power.
All of which is to say that there are still idea
normative or ideological definition. Not ever
realist. But what of constructivists? Despite th
paragraph, an argument can be made that
working in the United States are, in fact, liber
can be presented in two ways: through what
and through the microperspective. The
constructivism is, and has been, characteri
looks specifically at the work of leading constr
Using a macroperspective, reviews of cons
critics tend to characterize it, either expli
Moreover, such characterizations are rarely, if
study of norms in IR (Finnemore and Sikki
explicitly distances the contemporary study of
argues that a fundamental part of the rein
"aimed precisely at showing how the 'ou
distance from Carr's utopianism is based on
research employed by today's scholars, mak
the systematic use of empirical evidence rat
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:890). In essen

"He calls this variant more broadly "republican liberalism." On

route to peace more generally, see Doyle (1983a, 1983b) and
"None of these scholars make a universal idealist claim; but th
cooperative effects of international institutions. This school of
part of its label, being more often referred to simply as "insti

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 J. SAMUEL BARKIN 335

contending is that Carr's utopians failed in methodo

clearly imply that the study of norms and ideas in
constructivism, involves examining the ways in
independently make the world better. Another recen
one of its originators, Nicholas Onuf (2001), clearly
liberal institutionalism (see also Sterling-Folker 2000
Critics of constructivism, from both the neorealist an
also associate constructivism with a liberal idealism that
of the role of power in international relations. For exam
relationship between postmodernism and feminism
Prfigl (2001) compliment constructivism for its "tra
but criticize it for not accepting the central role of
international politics. This observation sounds very
critique of liberal idealism, that it puts too much stock
without power, to change the world.
Neorealist criticism of constructivism is remar
Promise of International Institutions," for instance
1995:37-47) characterizes critical theory, in which h
focusing on the transformation of world politics w
power in creating and disseminating ideas and mode
missive resulted in a set of responses in a later issu
them by self-described constructivists. In one,
traditionally liberal perspective that the right internati
make the world a better place, aside from considera
other, Wendt (1995) corrected Mearsheimer's polem
vism, but in doing so he showed the sensitivity to be
have already seen.
Which brings us to the microperspective approach t
theorists are, in fact, predominantly liberal idealis
constructivist literature is, of course, impossible here. I
on two specific tendencies toward liberal idealism i
contemporary constructivists.10 The first tendency inv
areas compatible with liberal idealism in relatively nonc
use as philosophical touchstones theorists of a libera
We cannot, of course, reasonably ascribe a normat
approach based on the topical foci of some of its pr
note a tendency to approach certain types of issues
The fact that many of the well-known mainstream cons
human rights (Sikkink 1993; Klotz 1995; Keck and Si
Sikkink 1999; Burgerman 2001), security communit
or multilateralism (Ruggie 1993) does not make them
the way in which they focus on such issues that makes
first of these issues, constructivists who write about hu
the role of international civil society, however u
behavior of states for the better. This work is applie
tive norms affect definitions of interest. But it is also
these norms are accepted largely uncritically as good
international civil society involved in spreading thes

'OThe purpose of this discussion is not to imply that those includ

constructivist theory than those not included-the selection is, in this sen
"Sikkink (1993) speaks of principled issue-networks, Keck and Sikk
Burgerman (2001) simply of activists. None would likely object to having wh
element of global civil society. Burgerman speaks uncritically both of the a

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336 Realist Constructivism

Similarly, we cannot reasonably ascribe a

approach based on the theoretical antecedent
draw. But to the extent that constructivists in the United States draw on the work of
political theorists (as opposed to the social theorists upon which they draw
methodologically and epistemologically), these theorists often have liberal-idealist
leanings. A good example is Wendt. He claims to accept the role of power in
international relations and, thus, the basic realist premise as defined here. But he
also argues, with reference to Kant, that the endogenous dynamic of international
anarchy is progressive. In other words, absent exogenous shock, the culture of
anarchy will tend to evolve from the Hobbesian world of enemies to the Lockean
world of rivals and, ultimately, to the Kantian world of friends (Wendt 1999:
308-312). Once we have arrived in the Kantian "role relationship" (Wendt
1999:309) of friend, international politics is unlikely to regress. Changing the social
construction of anarchy can thereby obviate the worry that our neighbors will
become enemies or rivals.
Another example involves constructivist research that draws on the work of
Jiirgen Habermas (for example, Linklater 1990, 1998; Lynch 1999; Risse 2000).
Using ideas such as communicative rationality, Habermas argues that commu-
nicative action and a well-structured public sphere can be an emancipatory force.
He is generally identified as a critical theorist, but in certain respects he is a liberal
idealist. Idealist in the sense that he has a clear notion of what constitutes political
progress and the political good life, and liberal in the sense that this notion of the
political good life is based on individual self-expression and a form of rationality
(albeit not an instrumental rationality). Constructivist research that draws on
Habermasian theory cannot easily separate the social theory (public spheres matter)
from the normative theory (public spheres are good).
To be sure, neither of these tendencies-to choose particular issue areas or to
rely on philosophical touchstones sympathetic to the liberal-idealist project-is
universal. For example, Rodney Bruce Hall (1997) speaks explicitly of legitimacy as
power; Martha Finnemore (1996) takes liberal theory to task for its ideological
commitments. Perhaps, more telling, all of the constructivists discussed above work
in the United States; it is probably both fairer and more accurate to ascribe the
liberal-idealist tendency only to US constructivism, not constructivism more
broadly. Indeed, for surveys of constructivist theory by scholars not working in
the United States, see Ralph Pettman (2000) and Karen Fierke and Knud Erik
Jorgensen (2001). The relationship between US constructivism and liberal idealism
itself is something that a realist constructivism might do well to examine.

Realist Constructivism

This discussion leaves us with the observation that constructivism as a methodology

in the study of international relations need not be idealist, but that in practice in
the United States it tends to be liberal-idealist. Such a statement is in no way a
derogation of either constructivism or liberal idealism. The classical realists argued
quite explicitly that moral ideals are an integral and necessary part of the practice of
international politics and that political realism in the absence of morality, in the
absence of a vision of utopia, is both sterile and pointless. A realist constructivism
would, thus, serve to help rehabilitate idealism by requiring as its corollary a self-
consciously idealist constructivism and by contending that the study of ideals,
as well as ideas, is integral to a full understanding of international politics. The
original constructivist starting point was more a critique of the "structural" part of
structural realism than of classical realism; the former allows much less scope for
incorporating moral ideals than the latter. The classical realist argument is that to
have an impact, any politics of moral ideals must be tempered by a politics of power.

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 J. SAMUEL BARKIN 337

A corollary of this argument is the observation tha

compromise between power and morality" (Carr 1964:
address the phenomenon of political change. Interestin
for change is one of the standard charges leveled agai
Waltz's (1979) variety (for example, Ruggie 1983; Walk
has come full circle to meet the Wilsonian idealists wh
Carr and Morgenthau. Waltz's theory of the structure
morality, becomes static in the same way that theories of
without power do. Neither pure realism nor pure ideal
change, only the interplay of the two, subject to the
contextual rather than universal.
Therefore, to the extent that constructivist methodology can illuminate the
workings of international politics, both an idealist constructivism and a realist
constructivism-distinct from, but in a dialectical relationship with, each other
-are necessary to account for and explain change in the international system. The
idealist constructivism would be freed from any perceived need to claim to study
only ideas in an attempt to distance itself from the study of ideals. The realist
constructivism would look at the way in which power structures affect patterns of
normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in which a
particular set of norms affect power structures. Many of the theorists labeled above
as idealist constructivists could respond that they already do one or the other of
these things. Someone studying human rights networks in Latin America, for
example, might respond that he or she is explicitly arguing that human rights
norms are changing the power structure by empowering nongovernmental
organizations at the expense of traditional governing elites. But underlying this
research is inevitably a moral idealism that sees power in the hands of such
organizations as better than power in the hands of the traditional elites. Therefore,
the more power that flows from the latter to the former, the better.
We may well agree with this moral perspective. But the realist response is that
power will ultimately be used by those who accrue it for a specific set of ends.
Furthermore, not all ends toward which power can be invested, even if used in
the interest of a moral ideal, will be compatible, because not all moral ideals are
compatible. In other words, even once the human rights norms in question
are generally accepted in the relations among countries, power will still matter. The
specific groups that have been empowered by the norms will at some point find that
their goals differ; at that time the relative power among them will begin to become
important. Even if all actors in the international system at a given point in time
accept the same basic set of normative structures, they will differ in their
interpretations of those structures, whether for rationally self-interested reasons
or for psychological reasons (see, for example, Jervis 1976; Rosati 2000; Shannon
2000). When interpretations differ, the power of the interpreter continues to
matter. The role of a realist constructivism, then, is to examine, skeptically from a
moral perspective the interrelationships between power and international norms
(see Loriaux 1992).
In this moral skepticism lies a key difference between idealism and realism.
Idealism recognizes a single ideal, a universal political morality toward which we
should strive. Realism argues that no universal political morality exists and,
therefore, if we want ours to triumph, we must arrange to have it do so through the
application of power. But the classical realists, particularly Carr, warn us that the
relationship can be used both ways: morality can also be used as a tool of power. So
that when we apply power to promote our preferred political morality, others
might see it as a use of power simply to promote our interests. Political psychology
(see, for example, Jervis 1976) suggests, furthermore, that when we justify a use of
power to ourselves as being for moral purposes, we may simply be fooling ourselves
and rationalizing an action as moral that we want to take for other reasons. As

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 338 Realist Constructivism

such, even though power is hollow without

argument is that we must, nonetheless, apply
a certain skepticism when it is used to justify
Stated as such, classical realism begins to soun
theory as applied in IR (see, for example, As
Crisis (Carr 1964), in fact, sound like a Fouc
(Foucault 1980; see also Der Derian 1990; As
These sections include the argument that p
domain, even when motivated by the best o
distribution of power that can affect both the
and the way those actions are viewed by oth
if it was created by the status quo powers
viewed by others as an exercise in supportin
created it. The tendency of US constructivis
be viewed from outside the central status q
that status quo-and clearly has been by som
for example, George 1994:127).
A realist constructivism could specifically
study the relationship between normative
morality, and uses of power. And, as a resul
issues of change in international relatio
constructivism (with its ultimately static vi
materialist realism (with its dismissive view
doing so, a realist constructivism could fil
mainstream theorizing and critical theory.12 I
power found in most critical theory without t
emancipatory project with its interest in eman
Spegele 1996; Wever 1996; Patomiki and
could also do so by including in any explor
theory's study of subjective text and po
phenomena, but also constructivism's study
social rules.
What, in the end, does this line of argument have to say about the conduct of
research and discourse in the field of IR? To constructivists, it suggests that con-
structivism--whether understood as a methodology, epistemology, or ontology-
should not be understood as a paradigm in the way that realism and liberalism and,
for that matter, Marxism are. By paradigm is meant here a set of assumptions about
how politics work. Constructivism is a set of assumptions about how to study
politics. As such, it is compatible (as are other sets of assumptions about how to
study politics, such as rationalism) with a variety of paradigms, including realism.
To idealist constructivists (idealism here referring to ideals rather than ideas), this
line of argument suggests that a realist constructivism should be seen as an
opportunity. By distinguishing questions concerning the role of ideals from
questions about the role of ideas, it allows idealists to focus on the ideals specifically
and encourages them to be explicit about their idealism, to move beyond the stigma
that has been associated with utopianism since The Twenty Years' Crisis (Carr 1964).
In other words, it suggests that they not hide their ideals behind the claim of
objective science. To realists, it says not only that constructivism can be a useful
research methodology, but that addressing constructivist epistemological and
ontological premises can provide a useful corrective to the assumptions of

'2The relationship between mainstream constructivism and critical theory is itself open to dispute. See, for
example, Price and Reus-Smit (1998) and Kubalkova, Onuf, and Kowert (1998) for different perspectives on this
relationship.

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 J. SAMUEL BARKIN 339

individual rationalism and materialism that have be

realism for the past few decades.

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