Callo vs. Commissioner Morente
Callo vs. Commissioner Morente
FACTS: Danielle Tan Parker is a holder of Philippine Passport No. XX5678508 issued
by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on March 5, 2010 and valid until March 4,
2015. On January 15, 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for being an
undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in relation to Rule XVI, Office
Memorandum No. ADD-01-004. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a fugitive
from justice in the United States of America with an outstanding arrest warrant issued
against her. On January 24, 2013, a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issued
against Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker,
upon verification that she arrived in the Philippines on March 23, 2011 under the
Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a period of one year. Parker was not
in the list of approved applications of the DFA for dual citizenship and her American
Passport had been revoked by the United States Department of State. Parker was
arrested in Tagaytay City on the premise that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan
Parker are one and the same person.
On September 12, 2014, Parker, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
before RTC of Pasig City. The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of
Parker was legal. Parker then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA
affirmed the RTC and found that Parker failed to prove that she was a Filipino citizen
to warrant judicial intervention through habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker is threatened by
the respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and subsequently the
award of the interim reliefs
In Navia v. Pardico, this Court clarified that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the
constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory
definition of "enforced or involuntary disappearance." Further, elements constituting
enforced disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this
Court, viz:
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case.
There is also no threat of such enforced disappearance.While there is indeed a
detention carried out by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and
fourth elements are not present. There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo
admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau
of Immigration had produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings for
the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker herself. Similarly, there is no
intention to remove Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. As the Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case
against her in Davao City, which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting
her from the country. Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or
any threats thereof, that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. In this
case, Parker has not disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently justified by the
Bureau of Immigration, given that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case
against her.