Power Politics and Security in Ethiopia
Power Politics and Security in Ethiopia
Power Politics and Security in Ethiopia
CRU Report
Erwin van Veen
Perpetuating power
Ethiopia’s political settlement and the
organization of security
CRU Report
September 2016
Cover photo: Tapestry of the battle of Adwa between Ethiopian and Italian forces in 1896
© Wikimedia Commons
Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user
download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial
use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original
material or on any copies of this material.
Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed,
distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the
Clingendael Institute as its source. Permission is required to use the logo of the Clingendael
Institute. This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute
(press@clingendael.nl).
The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may present
trademark and copyright infringement issues: links that involve unauthorized use of our logo,
framing, inline links, or metatags, as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL.
Erwin van Veen is a senior research fellow with Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit who focuses
on the power dynamics of the organization of security and justice in conflict-prone environments,
conducts political-economy analysis of conflicts in the Middle East and examines how security and
justice programs can be improved.
About CRU
The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ is a think tank and diplomatic
academy on international affairs. The Conflict Research Unit (CRU) is a specialized team within the
Institute, conducting applied, policy-oriented research and developing practical tools that assist
national and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organizations in their engagement
in fragile and conflict-affected situations.
mail: cru@clingendael.nl
Website: http://www.clingendael.nl/cru
Contents
Abstract 1
Executive Summary 2
Acknowledgement 6
Map of Ethiopia (2009) 7
Introduction 8
Conclusion 38
References 40
Abstract
This report examines the evolution of Ethiopia’s ‘political settlement’ and its implications,
consequences and risks with regard to the organization and provision of security by
state forces. The report’s analysis leads to three key insights. First, the TPLF/EPRDF
strategically controls state security forces which, given the party’s quasi-monopoly
on political power, often makes it difficult to distinguish instruments of the state from
the party. This creates a situation in which state security forces may serve national
interests but in which these interests are defined on the basis of a particular ideology
and they also sustain existing power structures. Second, the combination of de facto
centralization of authority and security with de jure decentralization of autonomy to
Ethiopia’s regions, in recognition of their social and developmental diversity, creates
inconsistency in matters of security, in terms of both intent and performance. Third, the
military serves both as a combat force and as a vehicle for development. This happens
mainly through the vehicle of ‘METEC’, a military-run conglomerate. While this seems
sensible from the perspective of strengthening party rule and enhancing implementation
capacity for development strategies, it also increases the risk of corruption, nepotism
and inefficient resource allocation.
1
Executive Summary
Ethiopia’s foreign affairs and national security policy and strategy document states that
“work carried out on the basis of studies has a better chance of bringing good results”.1
In the spirit of this encouraging statement, the present report seeks to contribute to a
productive debate on the relationship between political power and security in Ethiopia in
order to inform international initiatives aimed at supporting the country’s development.
More specifically, it examines the evolution of Ethiopia’s ‘political settlement’ and its
implications, consequences and risks with regard to the organization and provision of
security by state forces. The report is part of the growing body of research on the role
of elites and leadership in the politics of developmental processes, and as such it adds
value to the domains of political science, development and conflict studies.
The report analyses a number of historical and contemporary factors that have
influenced the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement in order to understand the
broad political parameters that govern the organization of security. On this basis, it
subsequently identifies and unpacks three major implications for the organization
of security. The figure below provides a schematic overview of the approach and
headline findings:
1 Ministry of Information (2002), Ethiopia’s National Security and Foreign Affairs Policy and Strategy,
Addis Ababa, 2002. Accessible here: http://www.mfa.gov.et/docs/Foreign%20Policy%20English.pdf
(consulted 22 February 2016).
2
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
The picture that emerges from the analysis of factors influencing the evolution of
Ethiopia’s political settlement shows that the TPLF/EPRDF has acquired and maintained
a significant level of control over the structures, resources and instruments of the
Ethiopian state during the past 25 years. The party’s centralized hold on power is based
to a large extent on the interlinked dynamics of generating legitimacy through output
in terms of social service delivery and economic growth, using economic and security
incentives to maintain loyalty to the party, and limiting meaningful political competition.
As a political party, the EPRDF comprises inner and outer layers. The outermost layers
have strengthened over time, align with regional (sub-state) leading groups and provide
a platform that extends the party’s authority and legitimacy into Ethiopia’s regions.
Resources are managed through a state-led economy with a key role for parastatal
companies, many of which are run by party-associated individuals. These companies
are harnessed to a state-led vision of economic development and poverty reduction. As
robust security measures continue to be used as a common instrument of rule, political
3
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
dialogue and compromise characterize the government’s policy agenda only to a limited
extent. This situation has three particular implications for the organization of security:
– The EPRDF/TPLF strategically controls state security forces which, given the party’s
quasi-monopoly on political power, often makes it difficult to distinguish instruments
of the state from the party. This creates a situation in which state security forces
may serve national interests but in which these interests are defined on the basis of
a particular ideology and they also sustain existing power structures. This view has
been reinforced by the fact that some leading security professionals remain party-
affiliated. The top ranks of the security forces also still tend to be dominated by
people of an Tigrayan ethnic background.
– The military serves both as a combat force and as a vehicle for development.
As a disciplined organization, it is entrusted with running, and providing strategic
advisory support for, significant business enterprises contributing to the country’s
development. This happens mainly through the vehicle of ‘METEC’, a military-run
conglomerate. While this seems sensible from the perspective of strengthening
party rule and enhancing implementation capacity for development strategies, it also
increases the risk of corruption, nepotism and inefficient resource allocation.
4
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
On a final note, it should be noted that this research proved to be a difficult endeavour.
This was partly because Ethiopia’s political and economic model differs significantly
from the framework of the liberal peacebuilding agenda. On the one hand, present-
day Ethiopia is a world away from the country in 1991 that was suffering the effects of
decades of civil war, droughts and poor governance. In a single generation, Ethiopia
has become a fairly secure, economically fast-growing and well-regarded member
of the international community. On the other hand, it has reached current levels of
performance and activity by way of a more centralized and control-oriented approach.
Regardless of the fact that insufficient evidence is available on the extent to which exits
from fragility need to be centralized and controlled in order to ‘succeed’, normative
views tend to dominate the framing of development processes such as those in Ethiopia.
In particular, tension exists between the developmental and political realities of Ethiopia
and the global political and human rights agenda. This matter is beyond the scope of
the present report, but it suggests that analysis should be conducted with caution.
The complex processes of political and social change in Ethiopia invite discussion, but
they are ongoing and multifaceted.
Another problem was that there is only a very modest analytical base for research on
security matters in Ethiopia, given the limited scholarly work and public data available.
In addition, because political discourse in Ethiopia between the ruling party and the
opposition is polemicized, and significant grievances exist in sections of the population,
there is an absence of objective, evidence-based sources of data. This makes it difficult
for research to navigate across different perceptions and experiences. It is for these
reasons that interviews supporting the analysis are not attributed or referenced.
Data has of course been triangulated between interviews and with existing research
where possible. It is likewise for these reasons that the report should be read as an
exploratory effort to stimulate discussion as well as further research.
5
Acknowledgement
I am extremely grateful to the people who supported the production of this report
by providing their guidance, time and insights. This particularly includes those who
graciously agreed to free up their busy schedules for an interview to share their views.
It was encouraging to experience broad support for this research among government,
opposition and non-government representatives alike, a willingness to engage in critical
reflection, and an appreciable degree of frankness about both the progress made and
the ongoing challenges that characterize the organization of security in Ethiopia. As it
took a significant amount of time to reconcile these views as far as possible, it should be
noted that the field work underpinning the research concluded in June 2015 while the
report itself remained a work in progress until May 2016.
I am also indebted to the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) for its generous
support that made possible the field work on which many of the observations in this
report are based.
I also wish to underline how much this report benefited from the insights of professor
Ann Fitz-Gerald. As a respected international scholar who has worked in Ethiopia for
many years, her understanding of the reforms, changes and initiatives in the Ethiopian
security sector as well as across the country’s wider public sector has enriched the
report. Without having been exposed to her more nuanced and informed views on key
issues, this paper would have been less balanced and accurate. Thank you.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge Nick Grinstead and Madina Diallo (both at
Clingendael) for having conducted excellent background research, while my thanks for
copy-editing go to Jane Carroll and for typesetting to Textcetera.
6
Map of Ethiopia (2009)
7
Introduction
In the context of these paradoxes, the report examines the relationship between political
power and security in Ethiopia to inform international initiatives designed to support the
country’s development. More specifically, it examines the evolution of Ethiopia’s ‘political
settlement’ and its implications for the organization and provision of security by state
forces.7
2 Wondifraw, A. et al., Ethiopia 2015, African Economic Outlook, AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2015.
3 United Nations Development Programme, Accelerating Inclusive Growth for Sustainable Human
Development in Ethiopia, National Human Development Report, Addis Ababa, 2014. About 25 out of
100 million Ethiopians lived below the national poverty line of USD 0.60 a day in 2013.
4 For example: Abbink, J., “The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile Social Contract”, Africa Spectrum,
vol. 44, no. 2., pp 3-28, 2009; Markakis, J., Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, Woodbridge, James Currey, 2011.
5 President Obama’s visit in July 2015 strongly emphasized US support for Ethiopia because of the latter’s role
in the region. See: The Guardian, 27 July 2015.
6 Illustrative are: Pausewang, S., Local Democracy and Human Security in Ethiopia, Structural Reasons for the
Failure of Democratisation, Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2004; Abbink, J., ‘The Ethiopian Revolution after 40 Years
(1974-2014): Plan B in Progress?’, Journal of Developing Societies, vol. 31, no. 3, pp 333-357, 2015.
7 In this report, state security organizations include the military, police (federal and regional) and intelligence
services. See box 2 for more details.
8
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
Although imperfect, the concept of ‘political settlement’ offers a useful analytical lens
because it focuses on the negotiation process, as well as the agreement that may
result from it, between a country’s various powerful groups on the division and use
of power.8 In fragile societies, coercive capacities, including state security forces, are
drivers of such political settlements and at the same time instruments for maintaining
and implementing them. On the one hand, powerful groups that can avail themselves
of coercive capacities such as militias, factionalized security forces or even criminal
elements, enjoy an advantage when competing for political power. On the other hand,
when such groups reach agreement on the distribution of power, the administrative
machinery of state usually plays a significant role in implementing its terms.9 State
security forces are a vital part of this equation beause of their ability to enforce the
political settlement vis-à-vis those that are not included or represented.
Ethiopia reached a fairly stable political settlement, after the overthrow of its military
dictatorship, in the period 1991–95, and the settlement is still in place today. This
resulted in both a de jure, and a significant measure of de facto, state control over
the means for violence, meaning that the use of coercive capacity as an independent
variable that influences the terms of the country’s political settlement has largely ceased
to be relevant. There is no question about the ability of the Ethiopian state to defend
itself effectively by force should the need arise and none of the groups excluded from its
political settlement currently possesses adequate force to challenge it. Therefore, it is
appropriate and relevant to focus on how, and to what effect, state security institutions
implement the existing political settlement.
The paper is part of a larger project that analyses how political settlements – as
expressions of elite interests – influence the way in which security is organized.
This project is co-funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish
Folke Bernadotte Academy and includes another case study (on Lebanon) and a more
general synthesis paper. The present report is based on literature research and 27 semi-
structured, qualitative interviews with Ethiopian individuals who have agenda-setting
8 A political settlement is the set of (in)formal representation, control and distribution rules that guide
governance and resource allocation in a particular country. It is usually based on the interests of powerful
groups led by a country’s elites. They negotiate the extent to which they can pursue their interests on
the basis of their relative power and skill within the boundaries of what their constituencies tolerate.
The settlement that is the outcome of these negotiations influences the type of institutions that can
exist and the nature of their performance. See for example: Parks, T. and W. Cole, Political settlements:
Implications for International Development Policy and Practice, Occasional paper no. 2, The Asia Foundation,
2010. For a useful overview of the issues and usefulness of the concept: Bell, C., What we talk about
when we talk about political settlements: Towards inclusive and open political settlements in an era of
disillusionment, Edinburgh, Political settlements research programme, 2015.
9 Putzel, J. and J. Di John, Meeting the challenges of crisis states, London, LSE, 2012.
9
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
influence on the conception and use of a nation’s tangible and intangible security
resources. The interviews took place in Addis Ababa in February and June 2015, with
additional validation meetings conducted in March 2016.10 Shortcomings of the interview
data include limited coverage of the opposition, a lack of interviews with representatives
of state security forces outside of Addis Ababa and the fact that non-state security
actors were not included. In addition, the second part of the analysis relies more on the
limited set of interviews than ideally would be the case. This is largely because not much
is written about Ethiopia’s security sector. This makes the report an explorative effort to
stimulate discussion as well as further research.
10 Seven of these interviewees were political leaders (senior government officials, opposition and trade union
leaders), five were opinion-makers (academics, journalists, think-tank analyst) and fifteen were senior
officials across the security sector).
10
1 Dynamics of political
power in Ethiopia:
past and present
However, taking 1991 as a starting point risks putting too much emphasis on
contemporary factors that influence Ethiopia’s political settlement, and too little on
historical ones, producing an unbalanced understanding of its evolution. Indeed, a more
appropriate historical marker is the reign of Menelik II (1889–1913) as it was under his
rule that the Ethiopian empire was consolidated administratively and became a lasting
political fixture of modern East Africa after the defeat of Italian colonial forces at the
battle of Adowa (1896). It acquired more or less its present form through a series of
campaigns resulting in the conquest of both the highland periphery of the Ethiopean
plateau and the lowlands surrounding it.12 Ethiopia’s ability to avoid all but a very short
period of direct colonial rule has enabled its rulers to chart an autonomous path of
national development, which has involved dealing with friction between its diverse social
forces, and experimenting with various modes of governance and the organization of
security.
11 The period of the ‘Red Terror’ (1977–78) stands out in particular, i.e. the violent campaign of the military
junta against Ethiopia’s civilian population and its various rebel-cum-liberation movements.
12 International Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents, Africa report no. 153, Brussels,
ICG, 2009; Markakis (2011), op.cit.; Pankhurst, R., ‘Menelik and the Foundation of Addis Ababa’, The Journal
of African History, vol. 2, no. 1, 1961, pp 103-117. Addis Ababa became the empire’s permanent capital in
around 1890–91, and this stimulated administrative consolidation, central taxation and a programme of road
construction.
11
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
Sources: 2007 population census of Ethiopia’s Central Statistical Agency, IMF, World Bank
database, UNDP, Geohive
12
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
The Tigrayan/Amharan polities situated on the northern side of the Ethiopean plateau
form the historical core of present-day Ethiopia. Traditionally, these polities were
run in authoritarian fashion, their rulers infused by religious legitimacy through the
Christian Orthodox church and their wealth derived from the extraction of surplus
from agricultural produce. Their societies were stratified and hierarchical, featuring
both social inequality and opportunities for social mobility through successful military
performance.13 Since land was the most valuable resource in these densely populated
societies, its acquisition became the key driver of the process of imperial expansion from
c. 1889 to 1913.14
A first historical factor that influences the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement is
the centralization, control and coercion that characterized both the process of imperial
expansion and the governance of the country afterwards. Historically, the Amhara-
dominated core of the empire gradually annexed the highland periphery of the Ethiopian
plateau and then its surrounding lowlands, in a classic pattern of empire-building that
imposed different modes of governance on annexed territorities.15 The generally fertile
and productive areas of the Ethiopian plateau were largely integrated into the empire
and administered through a centralized bureaucracy that sought to maintain control and
extract rents via a feudal system of land management, military mobilization and political
loyalty. The local peasantry was subjected to serfdom and tied to its land by an elaborate
mechanism of taxes and services, while local elites were either suppressed or co-opted
into the existing feudal Amharan hierarchy, depending on the level of resistance they
had offered in the process of their subjugation. In contrast, the lowland areas, which
generated much less revenue, were typically administered through local elites that
13 Markakis (2011), op.cit.; Tronvoll, K., War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia: The Making of Enemies and
Allies in the Horn of Africa, Suffolk, James Currey, 2009.
14 On the importance of land: Vaughan, S. and K. Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian
Political Life, Sida Studies no. 10, Stockholm, Sida, 2002; Markakis (2011), op.cit. Timewise, this process of
expansion happened more or less in parallel with the European ‘scramble for Africa’. The clash of these
parallel developments in the form of the battle of Adowa (1896) is well described in: Pakenham, T., The
Scramble for Africa, New York, Abacus, 1991.
15 The highland periphery of the Ethiopian plateau consists of parts of the present-day ‘nations’ (the Ethiopian
term for federal states) of Oromia and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. The lowlands
consist of the present-day nations of Somali, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela, as well as parts of the
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples and Oromia. Plates 85 and 91 of the Times Atlas of the World
provide an arresting visual of highland–lowland boundaries (Times Books, The Times Comprehensive Atlas
of the World, 14th edition, London, 2014). See also: Markakis (2011), op.cit.
13
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
served as proxies for their Amharan overlords.16 Both modalities were underpinned by
the cultural sense of superiority felt by the core Amharan/Tigrayan highland population
– its leadership in particular – vis-à-vis other inhabitants of the empire.17
Indirect and direct control and centralization have continued as modes of governance
since Imperial Ethiopia ceased to exist in 1974. Significant aspects of this approach were
reproduced in varying forms by the military junta between 1974 and 1991 and some
aspects by the EPRDF between 1991 and 2015, in particular the continuation of top-
down decision-making and implementation, especially in the realms of ‘high politics’
and security, with little scope for dissent or adaptation to local circumstances. 21 Even
today, decision-making takes a ‘committee-style’ form, usually involving small groups of
well-connected individuals who, by and large, are not representative of the population at
large. 22 That said, it should be noted that this centralized approach to governance seems
16 Markakis (2011), op.cit., see also: Clapham, C., ‘Ethiopean Development: The Politics of Emulation’,
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 44, no. 1, 2006, pp 108-118.
17 Tronvoll (2009), op.cit.
18 While this is by no means dissimilar from the behaviour of Western colonizing powers during the same
period, the latters’ use of violence occurred largely in overseas territories away from their domestic
populations. Tronvoll (2009), op.cit.; Markakis (2011), op.cit.
19 For example, the ‘red terror’ under the military junta or the repression of the Ogaden and Oromo Liberation
Fronts.
20 Such as electoral violence in 2005 or the recent violence associated with the government’s decision
to expand the city limits of Addis Ababa into the state of Oromia. See: Pausewang (2004), op.cit.;
Tronvoll (2009), op.cit., Abbink (2015), op.cit. The general trend is that the use of violence has shifted
from indiscriminate application against large groups to more selective targeting of smaller groups and
individuals. See also: See: Keller, J., Identity, Citizenship and Political Conflict in Africa, Indianapolis, Indiana
University Press, 2014.
21 On concepts and styles of rule between 1991 and 2012: Abbink, J. and T. Hagmann (eds), Reconfiguring
Ethiopia: The Politics of Authoritarian Reform, London, Routledge, 2013.
22 Usually, there is scope for internal discussion and dissent; however, once a decision is taken there are
few or no opportunities for reconsideration, adjustment based on additional (popular) input, or recourse.
Markakis (2011), op.cit.; Clapham (2006), op.cit. For an anecdotal account of the imperial period:
Kapuscinski, R., The Emperor, London, Penguin Books, 2006.
14
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
to have served Ethiopia’s ruling elites well in terms of resisting colonization, facilitating
significant surplus extraction from vast areas with diverse populations and enabling a
focused mobilization of resources for economic growth today.23
A second historical factor that infuences the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement
is a legacy of exclusionary rule with ethnic undertones. More specifically, Ethiopia’s
ruling elites have largely come from two ethnic groups – Amharan and Tigrayan – which
represent respectively a sizeable and a small fraction of the total population (see Box 1).
While the Ethiopian empire of the past was dominated by Amharans, the contemporary
Ethiopian federal state has been dominated by Tigrayans for most of the time. 24 The
origins of rule by the Amharan-Tigrayan imperial core can be understood through the
power dynamics of the growth of the empire. In short, rapid expansion meant that a
growing diversity of populations needed to be administered and governed. Because
land ownership was vital to political control and wealth, land acquired through conquest
was typically allocated to elites from the core if it was sufficiently valuable, so that it
could be used as a resource to perpetuate their rule. This helped create a legacy of not
only central but also elite-cum-ethnic dominance over key resources, which in certain
respects still prevails today. 25
23 Leslie, P., Chapman-Andrews and the Emperor, London, Leo Cooper Ltd, 2005.
24 Vaughan and Tronvoll (2002), op.cit.; Markakis (2011), op.cit.
25 Keller, for example, argues that the persistence of strong central policy guidance, limited fiscal
decentralization and variable capacity at different levels of the administration have imposed limits on the
extent to which the federal model truly empowers its constituent states – meaning that power continues
to reside in the TPLF/EPRDF-dominated centre. Keller (2014), op.cit.; Keller, E., ‘Ethnic federalism, fiscal
reform, development and democracy in Ethiopia’, African Journal of Political Science, vol. 7, no. 1, 2002.
26 Markakis (2011), op.cit.
15
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
surprising that this situation has continued to generate criticism as well as resistance
from those who feel politically and economically excluded. Given the country’s diversity,
it is remarkable that the Ethiopian state has not just survived such centrifugal dynamics,
it has also enjoyed relative stability since 2000, as well as making substantial economic
progress. Nevertheless, two recent developments are making ethnicity more prominent
as a future source of strife.
To start with, ethnicity was more or less inadvertedly politicized by the military junta
as a by-product of its large-scale repression of national movements, such as student
associations and trade unions, that were considered political risks. This effectively
meant that other groups that were more territorially and ethnically based became key
channels of resistance. The ‘profile of ethnicity’ was further reinforced by the 1995
Constitution which explicitly turned Ethiopia into a federation of nine ethnic nations but,
as some have argued, without a corresponding devolution of authority and resources
in real terms. 27 A consequence of this situation of partial federalization is that a number
of states are not yet equipped with the capacities or funds they need to deliver more
than limited social services (such as housing, water and electricity) of variable quality. 28
The resulting discontent serves as a driver for identity-based mobilization, despite a
generally shared sense of ‘Ethiopian-ness’.
16
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
A third and final historical factor influencing the evolution of Ethiopia’s political
settlement is the volatile and insecure nature of the region in which the country is
situated. This both requires and perpetuates securitized approaches to (political)
conflict. The origins of this volatility are too complex to discuss here in detail, but they
include decades of cross-border violent activity, competing cross-border claims on
resources, territory, loyalty and legitimacy, the quest for greater autonomy by some
ethnic groups, the seasonal migration of the region’s sizeable nomadic populations, and
the illicit movement of people and goods across porous borders.31 Given its size, location
and interests, Ethiopia is at the heart of a ‘regional conflict complex’.32 It could be argued
that many of the drivers of this complex have been situated outside of the country since
the start of EPRDF rule in 1991. Although Ethiopia is no mere spectator or passive victim
of regional insecurity, recognizing this state of affairs helps to understand the need to
keep political power and state security organizations centralized and under control.
Any departure from this model could unintentionally jeopardize national security. 33
In such circumstances, the number of political dialogues Ethiopia is engaged in actually
represents a positive sign of its willingness to search for peaceful resolutions to the
region’s troubles. It is worth noting, for example, the country’s role in the Nile Basin
Initiative dialogue and in the Sudanese national dialogue, and its mediation efforts in the
South Sudan power struggle.
31 The Ethiopian–Somali war of 1977–78 is a high-profile example of such cross-border claims. Somalia sought
to annex Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State in pursuit of the ‘Greater Somalia’ notion. After the Somali defeat,
the government of Siad Barre was overthrown and the Somali state effectively collapsed, which further
complicated the situation. See for instance: Dehéz, D. and B. Gebrewold, ‘When Things Fall Apart – Conflict
Dynamics and an Order Besides the State in Post-collapse Somalia’,:African Security, vol. 3, 2010, pp 1-20.
On these themes, see also: Debiel, T., ‘Introduction’, in: Debiel, T. with A. Klein (eds), Fragile peace: State
failure, violence and development in fragile regions, London, Zed Books, 2002. For analysis that focuses
more on the positions and relations between the key states of the region (such as Egypt, Somalia and
Saudi Arabia): De Waal, A., ‘Africa’s $700 billion problem waiting to happen’, Foreign Policy, 17 March 2016;
Barnes, C., A wake-up call for Eritrea and Ethiopia, Brussels, International Crisis Group, 15 June 2016.
32 A conflict complex is understood analogous to a security complex, meaning: ‘a set of units whose major
processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.’ Buzan, B. and O. Waever, Regions and power:
The structures of international security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
33 Indicative of this are, for example, the various reports of the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia
and Eritrea, online: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/751/work-and-mandate/reports
(accessed 12 November 2015). More pointedly, the United Nation’s Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea, Report S/2011/433 of 18 July 2011, outlines a plan by Eritrean intelligence to detonate an explosive
device during a 2011 African Union summit in Addis Ababa.
17
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
However, it can also be argued that the combination of Ethiopia’s political culture of
militarism, history of violence and its control-oriented approach to power tends to
prioritize the use of force in response to regional insecurity over softer conflict resolution
methods, such as negotiation and dialogue.34 Here, one could point to Ethiopia’s bilateral
interventions in Somalia and its training of Somali militia along its border, which is
separate from its engagement with the Somali National Army through AMISOM.35
The ‘global war on terror’ has added another layer to this conflict complex over the
past 15 years, arguably with three major effects. The first is that additional, mostly US,
resources have become available to countries in the region in the form of diplomatic
support and funding. This has generally resulted in the regression of civil liberties
and prioritized security concerns over quality-of-governance concerns.36 The second
effect is that that countries in the region, Ethiopia included, have been enabled
to brand as ‘terrorists’ groups that have domestic grievances but do use violent
methods. This branding has happened mainly through associating such groups with
the transnationalism, radicalism and extreme violence of Al-Qaeda’s jihad, which was
the central theme of the war on terror. This makes it difficult to engage in more open
and introspective reflection on the source of these groups’ domestic grievances, their
objectives and the nature of their underlying conflict with the state. Examples in the case
of Ethiopia include the suppression of the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ogaden National
34 Tadesse, M., ‘Overcoming challenges for Security Sector Reform in the Horn of Africa’, in: Le Roux, L. and
Y. Kidane (eds), Challenges to Security Sector Reform in the Horn of Africa, (Monograph Series no. 135),
Pretoria, ISS, 2007. Histories of violence and cultures of militarism echo across the region: Gebrewold, B.,
‘Civil Militias and Militarisation of Society in the Horn of Africa’, in: Francis, D. (ed.), Civil Militia: Africa’s
Intractable Security Menace?, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005.
35 The most significant being the Ethiopian military’s crossing into Somalia in 2006 to oust the UIC. This,
however, triggered a protracted insurgency by the UIC’s youth wing, Al-Shabaab, that thrived on projecting
Ethiopia as foreign occupier to justify counter-violence and radicalization. See: International Crisis Group,
Ethiopia: Prospects for Peace in Ogaden, Africa Report no. 207, Nairobi/Brussels, ICG, 2013; Albrecht, P.,
Fragmented Peacekeeping: Regional Interests Define the African Union Mission in Somalia, Copenhagen,
Policy Brief, DIIS, 2015; Dersso, S., The Somalia Conflict: Implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping
efforts, ISS Paper no. 198, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2009; Civins, B., ‘Ethiopia’s Intervention
in Somalia, 2006-2009’, Yonsei Journal of International Studies, vol. 2, issue 2, 2010. For a brief overview of
Ethiopia’s various military engagements in Somalia: http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-analyse-788_fr.html
(accessed 12 November 2015).
36 See for example: Kassa, W., ‘Examining Some of the Raisons d’Être for the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law’,
Mizan Law Review, vol. 7, no. 1, 2013.; Tadesse (2007), op.cit.
18
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
Liberation Front 37 and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia, which has played a
role in cutting off alternative conflict-resolution channels such as peace talks.38 The third
effect, noted by a number of interviewees, is that the ‘war on terror’ has increased the
feeling of marginalization among some groups within Ethiopia’s Muslim community.
They observed that the country’s security forces had recently made a number of
mistakes in their dealings with this community, including interference in the elections of
the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council, and a disproportionate response to the
resulting demonstrations.39 It is often overlooked that over 30% of Ethiopians are Muslim
who, to date, have mostly lived in peaceful coexistence with Ethiopia’s other nations,
nationalities and peoples.
In short, while regional insecurity has historically required strong centralization and
control over power and security, the resulting use of force also perpetuates regional
insecurity.40 Both centralization and use of force simultaneoulsy also strengthen
perceptions that historical patterns of central dominance continue, which generates
both grievances and demands for change.41
37 For example, the Ethiopian state brought the uprising in the region under control between 2007 and 2012
through a combination of a political ‘divide and rule’ approach to different Ogaden elite and opposition
groups and a tough counter-insurgency campaign against the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).
This has included arbitrary arrests, blockages of movement and trade, and cutting villages off from water
and food supplies. Such tactics, largely applied by locally recruited paramilitary police forces, but also
the Ethiopian military, proved to be effective. Hagmann (2014), op.cit. provides a range of supporting
sources. See also: International Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Prospects for Peace in Ogaden, Africa Report no. 207,
Brussels/Nairobi, 2013.
38 Kagwanja, P., ‘Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old Strategies’, Africa Security
Review, vol. 15, no.:3, 2006, pp 72-86.
39 For example: http://www.theafricareport.com/Society-and-Culture/ethiopian-muslim-election-turns-
violent.html (accessed 12 November 2015); International Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Governing the Faithful,
Brussels/Nairobi, ICG Africa Briefing No. 117, 2016.
40 For example, Ethiopia is one of the lead contributors to the AU Mission in Somalia and has acquired a
reputation as respected and engaged troop contributing nation to UN missions. Such missions generally
act as a temporary conflict stabilizer. This engagement continues a longer Ethiopian track record of
intermittently fielding a sizeable military presence in Somalia on the basis of national security interests,
both with and without UN or AU mandate. Dehéz and Gebrewold (2010), op.cit.
41 On this point see: Pausewang, S., ‘Ethiopia: Crisis of State, Good Governance and the Reform of the Security
Sector’, in: Debiel, T. with A. Klein (2002), op.cit.; Hagmann (2014), op.cit.
19
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
The historical factors that influence Ethiopia’s political settlement point to the following
broad parameters for the organization of security:
– A legacy of exclusionary rule with ethnic undertones suggests that partisan control
over state security organizations is a long-standing characteristic of governance and
a necessity for maintaining existing power and privileges.
The first contemporary factor influencing Ethiopia’s political settlement is the partial
and ongoing transition of the TPLF from ‘liberation movement’ to political party. A brief
42 Tronvoll (2009), op.cit.; Markakis (2011), op.cit. For a deeper analysis of relations between the TPLF and the
other EPRDF parties: Vaughan, S., ‘Revolutionary democratic statebuilding: party, state and people in the
EPRDF’s Ethiopia’, in: Abbink and Hagmann (2013), op.cit. Despite the justification offered, this approach
is somewhat reductionist in the sense that the EPRDF is a coalition of parties and therefore subject to
coalition dynamics and negotiations. The matter is in need of further research.
20
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
excursion into history shows that the TPLF emerged in 1975 as a military-movement-
cum-party that sought to liberate Ethiopia from its military junta. The overthrow of
the junta has been described as an “intellectually-led and ideology-driven revolution”,
and in this light the TPLF can be classified as an “integrated insurgent organization”,
characterized by strong central leadership, unity/cohesion and high levels of local
support/compliance among the Tigrayan people.43 These characteristics made the TPLF
a formidable adversary for the military junta which, lacking the sophisticated means
necessary for a comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign,44 actually boosted the
TPLF’s initial strengths by resorting to indiscriminate counter-population warfare.45
The TPLF’s organizational characteristics also made it a movement/party with strong
internal discipline and the ability to retain popular support.46 Existing research offers
a four-point general framework for understanding the transition of the TPLF from
liberation movement to political party post-1991: 47
The extent to which a political party structure has been developed: After 1991 the TPLF/
EPDRF expanded its already formidable (though all-Tigray) party organization to achieve
national scale. It has successfully developed into a national party whose structure
today extends far into many Ethiopian communities. This greatly facilitates party
outreach, campaigning and understanding of local needs. At the same time, however,
such outreach also appears to serve the purpose of maintaining control and political
alignment.48
43 The first quotation is taken from Tronvoll (2009), op.cit. Staniland differentiates between four types of
insurgent organizations, namely 1) integrated, 2) vanguard, 3) parochial and 4) fragmented on the basis
of two criteria: a) the extent of central control that such organizations are able to exercise (horizontal
leadership ties and cohesion), and b) the extent of their local control (vertical ties of trust and support
between leadership and communities). Staniland, P., Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion
and Collapse, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2014.
44 Following Staniland’s (2014), op.cit. views on this matter, a comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign
would have simultaneously targeted the TPLF’s leadership through military means while also weakening its
popular support base through mostly non-military means (such as social programmes).
45 Tronvoll (2009), op.cit.
46 See for example: Vaughan, in: Abbink and Hagmann (2013), op.cit.
47 The framework is derived from: De Zeeuw, J. (ed.), From soldiers to politicians: Transforming rebel
movements after civil war, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008.
48 For example, the large TPLF/EPRDF recruitment drive in the wake of the 2005 elections was primarily
an effort to shore up the party’s support base. Various accounts suggest, however, that this was not an
entirely voluntary process. Although it was not necessarily the case that direct pressure was used to
get households to affiliate themselves with the party, in a poor society like rural Ethiopia, when party
membership gives access to particular services and preferential treatment, such as greater security of
land tenure, cheaper/better access to fertilizer and better administrative treatment, does create indirect
pressure. See: Markakis (2011), op.cit.; Vaughan, in: Abbink and Hagman (2013), op.cit. Yet, according to
the 1995 Constitution, all Ethiopians are already entitled to such services on the basis of their citizenship
(see e.g. articles 25 (right to equality) and 41 (economic, social and cultural rights).
21
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
The degree to which military structures have been dissolved: According to some
observers, the TPLF’s military structures were not really disbanded after 1991, but
rather they replaced the army of the junta to be reincarnated as the Ethiopian National
Defence Force (ENDF).49 A complex process of disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration followed, a feat that had to be repeated once more after the 1999 war
with Eritrea. In short, the TPLF’s military structures and forces were in in a constant
state of transition for at least the first decade after the overthrow of the junta. An army
in the modern sense started to emerge in the early 2000s and is still in the process
of professionalization and transformation in terms of the representativeness of its
composition.50
The extent to which decision-making has been internally democratized: Despite the
adoption of a federal governance model and a new constitution (1995), efforts
to increase internal democratization of EPRDF decision-making since 1991 have
been limited. Some reports and a number of interviews actually suggest increased
centralization of power and a growing dominance of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi within
the party after its restructuring in 2001, following the resolution of the divergence within
the TPLF that had appeared on the conclusion of the Ethiopian–Eritrean war.51 According
to a number of interviewees, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s dominance appears to have
persisted until his death in 2012, after which the TPLF’s internal cohesion weakened,
with several factions emerging.
The level to which a political/civilian strategy has been developed: The TPLF has been
partially successful in replacing its military philosophy and securitized approach to
governance as liberation movement with more civilian, pro-development strategies. The
forward-looking policies that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his inner circles crafted
in areas like agriculture, education and foreign and security affairs stand out, in a
positive way. Such policies explain much of the party’s enduring support from (parts of)
the Ethiopian population. However, their implementation has not been uncontested.
On the basis of this ‘transition framework’ it can be observed that the TPLF espoused
a clear vision for governance and development in Ethiopia after 1991 while retaining a
closed hierarchical culture, firm internal control, and control over key security levers.
22
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
This vision has been driven forward with determination and varying degrees of success,
but without much transparency or public accountability.52
The above notwithstanding, the new ‘People’s Forum’ that Prime Minister Hailemariam’s
(who succeeded Meles Zenawi in 2012) has convened, arguably represents a positive
step towards enhanced transparency. This Forum has gathered together leaders of
sectors such as health, transport and construction throughout 2015 and 2016 with
the aim of getting senior policy-makers to listen and hear from sectoral leaders
about the impact of government policies on the functioning of their particular sector.
Although feedback obtained through interviews suggests that the government has
shown commitment to follow-up meetings and policy amendments in some areas, the
programme is still new and will need to be monitored. A Forum dedicated to discussing
more sensitive issues such as security, justice and human rights has yet to be formed.53
Some analysts portray a model of concentric circles, with the TLPF at the core of
power and dominating the EPRDF coalition, followed by a second ring, composed of
the ANMD, OPDO and SEPDF, which act as more junior partners of the EPDRF,55 and
a third ring made up of EPRDF satellite parties, such as the Afar People’s Democratic
Organization and Beni Shangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Party. The second and third
23
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
rings are said to enhance ethnic representation and government authority, but to enjoy a
decreasing measure of status, representation and influence in how Ethiopia is ruled.56
A final contemporary factor that influences Ethiopia’s political settlement is the fusion of
political power and economic interests in a governance model in which both state and
economy are led by the party ‘for the people’ through the state. The Ethiopian approach
to its economy is not unique, and is modelled on that of countries such as China, South
Korea (under its dictatorship) and Singapore, which mixes statist, planning and quasi-
liberal features that are welded together in a long-term, state-led effort to stimulate
economic growth and development out of poverty.57 A number of analysts argue that
a significant feature of this model is that resources and rents are centralized in the
56 Markakis (2011), op.cit.; Vaughan, in: Abbink and Hagmann (2013), op.cit.; Tronvoll (2009), op.cit.. For a
more in-depth analysis of such EPRDF allies: Vaughan and Tronvoll (2002), op.cit.; see also: Kefale, in:
Abbink and Hagmann (2013), op.cit.
57 Statist elements include direct government control over key sectors of the economy, as well as a
prominent economic role for party-established endowment funds, parastatal companies and the military.
Planning elements include multi-year year development plans to stimulate growth through major
infrastructure initiatives (such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) and by organizing the economy
in accordance with ideological concepts. Quasi-liberal elements include large land leases to multinational
companies. For illustrations of these different aspects of Ethiopia’s economic management: see:
Verhoeven, H., ‘Africa’s Next Hegemon: Behind Ethiopia’s Power Plays’, Foreign Affairs, April 2015; Lefort,
R., The great Ethiopian land-grab: feudalism, Leninism, neo-liberalism... plus ça change, openDemocracy,
December 2011, online: https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren%c3%a9-lefort/great-ethiopian-land-grab-
feudalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%c3%a7-change; Davison, W., ‘Ethiopian Military-Run Company
Seeks More Foreign Partners’, Bloomberg, February 2013, online: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2013-02-18/ethiopian-military-run-corporation-seeks-more-foreign-partners (both accessed
31 August 2016).
24
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
hands of either business leaders with political connections, or senior party officials
themselves.58
On the positive side, such continuity of rule and effort has created regulatory stability,
enabled long-term investment and generated a productive version of patrimonialism
in which rents appear to be used largely for developmental purposes.59 This approach
has been instrumental in stabilizing poverty, increasing education and maintaining high
overall growth rates.60 On the negative side, the fusion of political power and economic
interests gives the country’s leading figures privileged access to resources that can
also be used to further the interests of selected constituencies61 and/or their own.62
This exacerbates existing tension between those included in and those excluded from
present governance arrangements. As the former seek to maintain the status quo, the
latter push for change.63
58 See: Jones, W., R. de Oliveira and H. Verhoeven, Africa’s illiberal state-builders, Working Paper Series no. 89,
Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, 2013. For example, Azeb Mesfin, the wife of Meles Zenawi, became CEO
of EFFORT (an endowment fund for Tigray) in 2011, only to be removed from this position in 2013 shortly
after her husband’s demise. Her appointment as CEO coincided with her entry into the TPLF’s executive
committee, a position she has, however, managed to retain. See: Africa Intelligence, The rise and rise of
Azeb Mesfin, Ethiopia business circles, no. 1320,12 November 2011, online: http://www.africaintelligence.
com/ION/business-circles/2015/10/15/the-rise-and-rise-of-azeb-mesfin,94354134-GRA (accessed
18 November 2015).
59 Vaughan, S. and M. Gebremichael, Rethinking business and politics in Ethiopia: The role of EFFORT, the
Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, Research Report no. 2, London, Overseas Development
Institute, Africa Power and Politics Programme, 2011; Jones et al. (2013), op.cit. On the notion of
‘developmental patrimonialism’: Booth, D., Development as a collective action problem: Addressing the
real challenges of African governance, London, Overseas Development Institute, Africa Power and Politics
Programme, 2012.
60 Lenhardt, A. et al., One foot on the ground, one foot in the air: Ethiopia’s delivery on an ambitious
development agenda, London, ODI Development Progress and ECDPM, 2015.
61 It is remarkable, for example, that Tigray is the only region in Ethiopia that scores well above the national
average on the Human Development Index: UNDP (2014), op.cit. (see in particular the map on page 31).
Jones, de Oliveira and Verhoeven (2013), op.cit. also suggest that economic growth has been concentrated
in the core of the former Ethiopian empire (Amhara and Tigray), leading to rising inequalities between the
core and the country’s rural periphery.
62 Corruption is reported to be growing in volume and salience as it extends beyond small-scale individual
self-enrichment to acquire larger proportions. Especially land acquisition, (non)payment of tax and
government procurement have been mentioned. See: Vaughan and Gebremichael (2011), op.cit.; Lefort
(2011), op.cit.
63 For example, the Oromo constitute over 30% of Ethiopia’s population but have little influence. See also
Box 1.
25
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
The point here is not to discuss whether this approach to economic governance is
efficient or sustainable, but to underline the fact that Ethiopia’s leading groups use
economic resources and rents to create output legitimacy. The approach is akin to that
taken by China and some of the Gulf states, and the EPRDF/TPLF’s popular political
support is in part dependent on its ability to raise standards of living and to provide a
growing range of economic opportunities to its citizens. At the same time, the party also
uses the ability to withhold such opportunities as a tool of control, in part to limit and
discourage its citizens from political engagement.
These contemporary factors that influence Ethiopia’s political settlement point to the
following broad parameters for the organization of security:
– The partial transition from liberation movement to political party indicate that
security principles, policies and initiatives still lack transparency and are set by a
small group of insiders whose background is one of military struggle and strong
party loyalties.
– The conflation of government – and to some extent the state – with the party
indicates that instruments of state, such as security institutions, are used in pursuit
of partisan objectives. While these may be developmentally oriented and positive for
the country, they also reflect and maintain existing structures of power and authority,
and can be used for less benign purposes.
26
2 The nature and
organization of state
security in Ethiopia
The picture that emerges from the previous section is one of TPLF/EPRDF control over
the structures, resources and instruments of the Ethiopian state that have been acquired
and maintained over the past 25 years. The party continues to enjoy an undisputed
hold over national political power and has used its position in part to advance state-led
development efforts.
This situation also presents challenges for Ethiopia’s state security organizations.
Box 2 below provides a brief overview of the Ethiopia’s main state security organizations
as understood in this report. The section itself focuses on analysing key implications of
this situation for the organization of security.
For the purpose of this paper, ‘state security organizations’ include the military,
police (federal and state), and the intelligence services.
The Ethiopian National Defence Force is about 140,000 personnel strong (army
and air force) and maintained at the estimated cost of 0.8% of GDP (2015). It has
a reputation for quality and effectiveness despite its limited means. It is also
among the top four contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions (Somalia,
Abyei and South Sudan) (2015). Finally, it has been accused of past human rights
violations during operations in Somalia and Ogaden. Its legal basis is article 51 of
the Constitution.
The Ethiopian Federal Police force was created in 1995 to maintain law and order
at the federal level (including riot control) and to investigate organized crime.
It estimates its own size at around 30,000 personnel. The federal police force
comes under the Federal Police Commission that reports to the Ministry of Federal
Affairs (until recently the Ministry of Justice). Its legal basis is article 51 of the
Constitution.
27
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
Ethiopia’s State Police Forces (regional police) maintain law and order in Ethiopia’s
consituent states. While their numbers, structure and even uniforms may vary,
they each report to a Regional Police Commission that works loosely together
with the Federal Police Commission. The federal police can intervene in regions
by invitation of the state police. However, Oromia Regional State and in particular
the city of Addis Ababa have seen uncoordinated police interventions. Petty
corruption is especially a problem at the level of state police (traffic bribes and
bribes to avoid arrest). The state police forces’ legal basis is article 52 subsection 2
of the Constitution.
The Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service was established in 1995
and currently enjoys ministerial status, reporting directly to the Prime Minister.
It is tasked with gathering information necessary to protect national security. Its
surveillance capacities have been used both to prevent terrorist attacks, such as
those by Al-Shabaab, and to suppress domestic dissent.
Sources: SIPRI, United Nations Peacekeeping online, Real Clear Defense, Plummer, J.
(ed.), Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia: Perceptions, Realities, and the Way Forward for Key
Sectors, Washington DC, The World Bank, 2012, Hagmann (2014), op.cit., All Africa online,
the Guardian, NISS
At the heart of the analysis of the organization of security in Ethiopia lies the fact that
both peaceful and more forceful challenges to the rule of the TPLF/EPRDF have been
either disabled or suppressed.64 According to a substantial number of interviewees
(including some policy-makers and security officials), one consequence is that it has
become difficult to distinguish the government from the party, and the security services
are easily perceived as partisan executive agencies. This is mostly because the national
interest continues to be defined and decided on the basis of a particular ideology and
set of individual/group interests that brooks no competition and allows little public
debate. In addition to the party’s more strategic control over the security forces, the
research also identified several practical examples of how such control manifests itself
in operational terms.
64 See for example Gebrewold (2005), op.cit.; Hagman (2014), op.cit.; Abbink and Hagman (2013), op.cit.
28
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
Interviews also indicated a broadly shared perception that the top ranks of the security
forces remain dominated by party members of Tigrayan origin. For example, although the
authors were unable to obtain hard data from the Ethiopian National Defence Forces on
their staffing, feedback suggested that Tigrayans currently make up approximately 15%
of their overall strength.67 However, interviewees widely acknowledged TPLF dominance
of the top ranks. The question is how this situation should be interpreted. If one recalls
the replacement of the military junta’s army with the TPLF’s armed forces in 1991 and
the two massive demobilization exercises that took place between 1991 and 2001,
today’s Ethiopian National Defence Forces feature a significant level of ethnic diversity
in their lower and middle ranks.68 Given Ethiopia’s limited resources and the uneven
development of its regions, this can be seen as an achievement. However, with some
interviewees clearly taking the view that the 15 years following the Ethiopian–Eritrean
war should have been long enough to ensure rough proportionality of representation at
all levels, Tigrayan dominance at the top does appear to be reflective of the interests of
the party.
29
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
Many of the interviews also suggested that this situation of party political control over
the security forces contributes to a loss of popular confidence in both the intent and
the ability of these forces to provide security on an impartial and entitlement-oriented
basis. While some writers have argued that co-opting local leaders and groups, ensuring
a degree of executive influence on the judiciary and using the party apparatus at
different administrative levels to influence loyalty and behaviour are the more commonly
used tools for ensuring political compliance,69 a significant number of interviewees
saw Ethiopia’s security institutions as ‘guardians’ of TPLF/EPRDF political dominance.
Reinforcing this perception are regular instances of security forces arresting leaders
of the opposition, restricting opposition political activity and silencing unfavourable
reporting.70 The 2005 elections remain a landmark in this regard and continue to
influence international and opposition interpretative frames.71
69 For a more in-depth analysis of such strategies and tools for maintaining party control see: Markakis
(2011), op.cit.; Abbink and Hagman (2013), op.cit. (on the use of co-optation), Hammergren, L., ‘Justice
Sector Corruption in Ethiopia’, in: Plummer, J. (ed.), Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia: Perceptions, Realities,
and the Way Forward for Key Sectors, Washington DC, The World Bank, 2012; Fiseha, A., ‘Separation of
powers and its implications for the judiciary in Ethiopia’, in: Abbink and Hagmann (2013), op.cit. (use of
judiciary), Jones, De Oliveira and Verhoeven (2013), op.cit.; Abbink and Hagmann (2013), op.cit. (nature of
political competition), Markakis (2011), op.cit. (use of party apparatus).
70 For example: Vaughan and Tronvoll (2002), op.cit.; Hagman (2014), op.cit.; Human Rights Watch, ‘Ethiopia
Country Summary’, World Report 2015: Events of 2014, 2015, online: https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2015/country-chapters/ethiopia (accessed 9 November 2015).
71 See for example: Abbink, J., ‘Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and
its Aftermath’, African Affairs, 105/419, pp 173-199, 2006; Yibeltal, K., Ethiopia: Policing Ethiopia – the
Force vs. Service Dilemma, 2015, online: http://allafrica.com/stories/201508051502.html (accessed
9 November 2015).
72 For example: ICG (2013), op.cit.; Hagman (2014), op.cit.; HRW (2015), op.cit.
30
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
The second issue is corruption. Interviewees across the spectrum opined that corruption
does occur throughout the Ethiopian security forces, particularly in the military and the
police, but that it is largely of an individual nature. They did not see it as institutionalized
or systemic and considered its extent to be relatively modest. Only a small subset of
interviewees perceived corruption to be increasing. This view is supported by a large
mixed-methods study published by the World Bank in 2012, which suggests that the
levels of corruption not only in the security forces but in a broad range of sectors in
Ethiopia are relatively low when compared with similar contexts, albeit with significant
variation across sectors.74
Finally, the interviews identified two imminent challenges to the TPLF/EPRDF’s ability to
continue organizing security on the basis of the principle of party control. First, many
of the original ‘revolutionary’ leaders of the TPLF are reaching retirement age and will
need to be succeeded.75 The challenge here consists of ensuring that a new generation
of leaders balances continuity with change. Many interviewees suggested that the death
of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has resulted in a number of older TPLF leaders stepping
up to play a key role in safeguarding his vision and policy legacy that may inhibit
necessary changes in both policies and staffing. Second, the post-1991 emphasis on
Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity is at odds with any over-representation of particular groups in
any part of the federal administration (perceived or real) – but especially in the country’s
security forces. A sustained discourse of valuing ethnic diversity, when this is still not
reflected in appointments, policies and initiatives requires effective communication on
progress being made, to avoid pushing dissatisfied groups towards unrest.
73 Hammergren, in: Plummer (2012), op.cit.; Fiseha, in: Abbink and Hagmann (2013), op.cit.
74 Applying a sector approach, the World Bank assesses corruption as low in basic service sectors, medium
in ‘old sectors’ (like mining, construction and land), and high in ‘new sectors’ (such as telecoms and
pharmaceuticals). Applying a value chain approach, it identifies most instances of corruption in the
procurement and delivery phases of the policy cycle rather than in its policy-making, regulatory or planning
phases. Plummer (2012), op.cit. However, it should be noted that the quality of data used for this study was
relatively poor. Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perception Index ranks Ethiopia 110th out
of 176 countries (rank 176 is the most corrupt): Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index,
Berlin, TI, 2014.
75 For a fascinating glimpse into the effort to renew the EPRDF’s leadership through a staged succession
plan (‘Metekatat’) by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi: http://hornaffairs.com/en/2013/02/20/
ethiopia-eprdf-transition-confusion/ and http://hornaffairs.com/en/2013/04/05/ethiopia-eprdf-leadership-
organs-election/ (both accessed 18 November 2015).
31
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
The organization and provision of security in Ethiopia are caught in a paradox that is
well expressed by the contrast between a politically dominant, Marxist-oriented party
and a federal constitution that not only recognizes socio-ethnic diversity, but also
gives Ethiopia’s regional states appreciable powers to govern and provide security.76
The former points to centralized direction-setting and party-political control whereas
the latter points to local autonomy and the federal government serving in a function of
last resort. The interviews suggested that, on balance, this results in a patchwork of
security provision in terms of its quantity and quality that radiates out from Ethiopia’s
core, serves to preserve the present political order, limits de facto regional security
autonomy and is lacking in mechanisms for enabling citizens’ security concerns to be
reflected in state security policy and operations. In short, it appears that the balance tilts
towards central dominance, but given Ethiopia’s incredible diversity it is not clear that
this is a sustainable position. A few points that emerged from the interviews stood out in
particular and are briefly analysed below.
To start with, a number of interviews indicated that the policies, methods of operation,
budgets and interventions of Ethiopia’s state security forces are managed from the
centre in a top-down fashion and less-than-public manner. Some security policies have
been perceived to be rolled out across the country, when further reflection, consultation
or adjustment to local realities would have been useful.77 This approach creates a
substantial risk of ‘policy misfit’ – in short, a situation in which the stated intent of a
policy is significantly at odds with its popular perception and/or experience.
76 For a deeper analysis of the totalitarian aspects of Marxism and Leninism: Ryan, A., On Politics: A History
of Political Thought from Herodotus to the Present, London, Penguin, 2013. Note that the Marxist/Leninist
views on leadership, ‘democratic centralism’ and the permissiveness of using coercion as a means towards
greater ends are not dissimilar from the fundamental tenets of rule by empire. See also: Clapham (2006),
op.cit.
77 Also on this point: Vaughan and Tronvoll (2002), op.cit.
32
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
capacity to guide and control it, resulting in local administrators (ab)using the ‘one-in-
five’ network and the information this (can) generate(s) to increase or maintain their
power. In contrast, other interviewees largely continued to consider ‘one-in-five’ as an
effort to establish ‘deeper control’ over their daily lives, and to perceive many of the
‘one-in-five’ households as party-affiliated. Such suspicion is understandable, given
Ethiopia’s history of centralized rule supported by powerful law enforcement agencies,
selective law enforcement and poor treatment of suspects. It suggests that either the
way the policy is implemented ought to be adjusted, or more time and effort needs to be
spent on bridging the perception gaps.78
A second part of the problem is that Ethiopia’s states have primary responsibility for the
provision of regional security within their boundaries, but are not necessarily capable
of providing it and/or face sporadic/regular (depending on the region) intervention
from the centre. From a resource viewpoint, a number of interviewees suggested that
the federal police force is much better resourced than the regional police forces and
that the latters’ (cap)ability is more variable. It tends to be lower especially in Ethiopia’s
periphery (e.g. Somali state, Afar and Beni Shangul) compared with the country’s
highland core. This situation results in a recurrent need in the states for intervention
by federal forces for capacity reasons alone. While an argument can be made that the
ability to provide such support is helpful and constitutes a strength, differences in levels
of competence, professionalism and experience between federal and regional forces will
remain if primacy of the latter is not respected and resource allocation not improved.
Addressing human rights violations in regional states also requires greater attention to
the professional development of the forces that operate there.79
At the same time, however, many interviewees also pointed to the gap that exists
between the legal and policy frameworks that regulate the organization and delivery
of security across the country, and reality. Regional police have primacy and federal
police or military forces intervene only at the invitation of the regional government.
However, federal forces, as well as the armed forces, were said to intervene in situations
that are legally beyond their remit or jurisdiction. A number of interviewees furthermore
opined that these interventions tended to happen when regional forces were unable
to deal with certain issues owing to a lack of operational clarity in their mandates,
insufficient resources or when (conflicting) political interests of sufficient import were
at stake. An important aspect of such central ‘interference’ in regional security provision
78 ICG (2009), op.cit.; Vaughan, S., ‘Revolutionary democratic state-building: party, state and people in the
EPRDF’s Ethiopia’; R. Emmenegger, S. Keno and T. Hagmann, ‘Decentralization to the household: Expansion
and limits of state power in rural Oromiya’, both in: Abbink, J. and T. Hagmann (2013), op.cit.
79 Consider also, for example, the general reporting on Ethiopia by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International; Smith, L., Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia, Special report no. 192,
Washington DC, United States Institute for Peace, 2007.
33
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
is the fact that the federal police are responsible for fighting terrorism, the 2009 anti-
terrorism law has a broad remit and it has been used to silence unfavourable reporting
and political opposition.80 This development has been analysed by several organizations
including Reporters without Borders, Human Rights Watch and a number of UN
bodies.81 A recent example of the rhetoric this can involve is the government’s labelling
of the protesters in Oromia who demonstrated against its intended expansion of the city
limits of Addis Ababa as “linked to terror groups”.82 It creates a situation in which the
federal police and armed forces have a broad licence to intervene across the country –
in keeping with the letter of the law but perhaps not so much the spirit.
In this unavoidably fragmented mix that results from the friction between the
centralization of power and regional autonomy, a key flaw is the failure to consult
with the Ethiopian people on what they see as their security priorities. A number of
interviewees indicated that there is little space and ability for critical thinking at local
levels of government. The absence of space for political dialogue beyond the confines
of party doctrine and government policy, combined with the party’s penetration of the
lowest levels of the administration, means there are few mechanisms to ensure that
Ethiopia’s diverse inhabitants can express their perceptions of and concerns about
security issues and that their voices will be heard. This creates the risk that important
regional and local security concerns are not adequately addressed.83 The current
absence of feedback loops to translate people’s security concerns into security policy
and operations is also at odds with the Constitutions’ clear affirmation of support for
Ethiopia’s regional diversity.
80 Kassa, W., ‘Examining Some of the Raisons d’Être for the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law’, Mizan Law Review,
vol. 7, no. 1, 2013. See also: Vaughan and Tronvoll (2002), op.cit.; Smith (2007), op.cit.; Hagmann (2014),
op.cit.
81 As far as the United Nations is concerned see for instance: http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID =11793&LangID =E (2012) http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID =15056&LangID =E (2014) (both accessed 9 November 2015).
82 Al-Jazeera, 22 February 2016, online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/ethiopia-accused-bloody-
crackdown-protesters-160222061910090.html (accessed 25 February 2016). Another example is the
government’s moves against the Friday protests and the Ethiopian Muslim Arbitration Committee that led to
a number of convictions on the grounds of attempted terrorism in 2012, following government interference
with the Mejlis selection (the religious body leading Ethiopia’s Muslims). See: International Crisis Group,
Ethiopia: Governing the Faithful, Africa Briefing no. 117, Brussels/Nairobi, ICG, 2016.
83 See also on this point: Markakis (2011), op.cit.
34
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
operational capability. Its competence and its international standing make it a positive
exception to the lack of ‘technocratic integrity’ that has been observed in respect
of other aspects of the Ethiopian administration, i.e. the prevalent lack of alignment
betweeen bureaucratic capability and bureaucratic autonomy that is required for
effective policy implementation.84 Moreover, in the development of the fighting capacity
of its military forces, Ethiopia has paid significant attention to the problem of resources.
In short, given the country’s other developmental challenges, funds are scarce and while
the military is essential, it is not typically a productive asset. The 2002 national security
policy articulated two responses to this challenge. First, it stipulated a focus on human
resources rather than material resources in the development of the armed forces.
Second, it sought to relate defence capability requirements to the national economy.85
These policy responses depart from the trend in the wider region to ‘build up’ military
spending/equipment regardless of high levels of poverty. They also suggest a sizeable
economic and developmental role for the military. The level of political control discussed
earlier, in combination with the noted fusion of political and economic interests, also
makes it strategically sensible to give the military a stake in the Ethiopian economy.
The resulting business advantages and monopoly rents that accrue to it help create
long-term stability.86 At the same time, though, such rents, tolerance of a certain lack of
accountability and a measure of economic inefficiency also carry costs.87 The balance
between these two aspects unfortunately cannot be gauged with the present level of
publicly available data.
The main vehicle through which military involvement in the economy takes shape
is the Ethiopian Metals & Engineering Corporation (METEC), a parastatal business
conglomerate run by the military. It is reported to have a stake in about a dozen
84 Vaughan and Gebremichael (2011), op.cit..; see also: Norbrook, N., Ethiopia, The Africa Report no. 40,
2012, online: http://www.alfredobini.com/sites/default/files/The_Africa_Report.pdf (accessed
6 November 2015).
85 Ministry of Information (2002), Ethiopia’s National Security and Foreign Affairs Policy and Strategy,
Addis Abeba, 2002. Accessible here: http://www.mfa.gov.et/docs/Foreign%20Policy%20English.pdf
(consulted 22 February 2016); also: Gebrehiwot Berhe (2016), op.cit.
86 On this point: Giustozzi, A., Double-Edged Swords: Armies, Elite Bargaining and State-Building, Crisis States
Working Papers Series, no. 2, London, London School of Economics, 2011. Prime Minister Meles makes
this motive explicit here: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-18/ethiopian-military-run-
corporation-seeks-more-foreign-partners (accessed 5 November 2015).
87 It is a topic of debate to what extent economic efficiency should be gauged against liberal market-economy
assumptions of perfect competition that seem hardly applicable in fragile contexts, or against a more
realistic benchmark that reflects Ethiopia’s current level of economic development and its associated
challenges. For the general argument: Chang, H-J, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in
Historical Perspective, London, Anthem Press, 2003; in respect of Ethiopia: Oqubay, A., Made in Africa:
Industrial Policy in Ethiopia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.
35
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
industries and several dozen companies.88 The company was developed in a previous
incarnation during the military junta’s rule for the purpose of manufacturing munitions
to ensure that the regime could sustain a supply-based military advantage. Some
respondents suggested that the organization has grown extensively since its
establishment in 2010 (data to verify this could not be obtained) because it is both an
organized and a loyal ‘force’ with a history of business operations and because it enjoys
preferential political access and business advantages. This makes it both a reliable and
an important plank of the government’s growth strategy. Interviewees also underscored
how METEC has mentored and developed a number of small to medium-sized
enterprises to support the development of a more competitive domestic manufacturing
sector. Some interviewees stated that even some foreign direct investors supporting the
manufacturing sector were required to partner with METEC to ensure continuity with
existing growth plans and to retain its economic position.
While this model works no differently from that of several other socialist post-communist
states, the combination of EPRDF/TPLF control over the military, military influence over
economic resources, and low public accountability regarding the management of such
resources raises questions about the extent to which METEC serves as a vehicle for
the enrichment of the party or leading party members.89 The difficulty of providing any
answers to these questions, given the absence of data and access, points to the need
for better analysis and more transparency if national development is to be advanced
credibly.90 In addition, many interviewees drew attention to the risky combination
of METEC’s growing activity, capital and project portfolios and an apparent trend
of (retired) security leaders moving into business while maintaining good political
connections that can secure preferential treatment.91 Even when general intentions
36
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
remain firmly developmental, this creates a risk of perceived abuse of position, poor
allocation of funds and/or poor implementation of agreed programmes/projects. A final
risk lies in the phenomenon of ‘crowding out’ that can happen when private sector
investment by parastatals such as METEC, backed by government expenditure, reduces
credit available for private entrepreneurship. While this risk is not limited to METEC,
and private sector development so far represents only a limited feature of Ethiopia’s
economic growth model, future diversification plans for METEC should be considered in
this light as well.92
In short, an increasingly competent and trusted military is and will be used to stimulate
economic growth. This serves the interests of Ethiopia’s leadership on a number of
fronts, including delivering its long-term economic vision of Ethiopia, maintaining the
loyalty of the leadership of a key security organization and generating rents that can
be used for a variety of purposes. It is also clear that further research is needed to
establish the opportunities and risks presented by the role of the Ethiopian military in
the country’s economy.
92 Both the availability of risk capital and the level of risk acceptance are factors that influence Ethiopia’s
score on the Global Entrepreneurship Index. See: https://thegedi.org/global-entrepreneurship-and-
development-index/ (accessed 11 July 2016).
37
Conclusion
The preceding analysis has shed some light on a number of historic and contemporary
factors that influence the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement, which in turn
carries implications for how state security institutions are organized and operate.
What transpires is that the country’s political settlement has been stable since 1991, in
contrast to much of the region surrounding it. In part this has been the case because
of the continued dominance of the TPLF/EPRDF in the form of single-party rule and in
part because of its effective monopolization of the use of force. The former has enabled
both a prioritized and a resource-empowered development strategy that has achieved
a number of successes, faces appreciable challenges and has resulted in the closure of
most space for meaningful political competition for ideas, power and votes. This ‘closure’
has helped keep Ethiopia largely safe from the many threats that emanate from its
volatile neighbours and it has enabled the TPLF/EPRDF to maintain party political control
over the Ethiopian state.
Although it is both too early and inappropriate for this research to offer any thoughts
on how these issues add up, the report can point to future security problems that this
approach of political-economic governance is likely to face. These problems result less
from the existing quasi-monopoly on political power and security in itself, but rather
from two of its implications that introduce long-term unpredictability. First, there are
no guarantees that the present concentration of power and authority will continue to
be largely harnessed for the purpose of national economic development. Second, there
seem to be few mechanisms that the Ethiopian population can be confident will at least
roughly align the party’s priorities and ideas with those of key social groups and the
population in general. As every development strategy is inevitably contested, since such
processes are not cost-free in terms of their impact and nor can they be all-inclusive,
this situation could create perceptions and grievances that struggle to find peaceful
expression in a meaningful way. In turn, this might ultimately push individuals, groups or
segments of society into unrest and violence.
In the short term, it seems essential to provide greater transparency around security
thinking, policies and operations that should not, however, undermine the political
dominance of the TPLF/EPRDF. To be meaningful, transparency will have to transcend
merely technical – or worse, ideological – justifications for actions already decided, and
include space for consultations that allows for adjustment and change, however modest.
The purpose would be to balance, on the one side, greater accommodation of popular
concerns by state security forces and improved relations between security forces and
citizens with, on the other side, greater public understanding of the trade-offs involved
38
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
in providing security with limited means in an insecure region and within present
political parameters. Specific actions could include making good data on security
policies and initiatives publicly available, providing more transparency on succession
planning in the security forces, and engaging in more meaningful public consultation on
security-related matters. Extension of the People’s Forum into the area of security could
be a possible starting point.
39
References
Abbink, J., ‘The Ethiopian Revolution after 40 Years (1974-2014): Plan B in Progress?’, Journal of
Developing Societies, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 333-357, 2015.
Abbink, J., ‘The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile “Social Contract”’, Africa Spectrum,
vol. 44, no. 2., pp. 3-28, 2009.
Abbink, J., ‘Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and its Aftermath’,
African Affairs, 105/419, pp. 173-199, 2006.
Abbink, J. and T. Hagmann (eds.), Reconfiguring Ethiopia: The Politics of Authoritarian Reform,
London, Routledge, 2013.
Africa Intelligence, The rise and rise of Azeb Mesfin, Ethiopia business circles, no. 1320,
12 November 2011, online: http://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/business-
circles/2015/10/15/the-rise-and-rise-of-azeb-mesfin,94354134-GRA.
Albrecht, P., Fragmented Peacekeeping: Regional Interests Define the African Union Mission in
Somalia, Policy brief, Copenhagen, DIIS, 2015.
Barnes, C., A wake-up call for Eritrea and Ethiopia, Brussels, International Crisis Group, 15 June
2016.
Bell, C., What we talk about when we talk about political settlements: Towards Inclusive and Open
Political Settlements in an Era of Disillusionment, Edinburgh, Political settlements research
programme, 2015.
Booth, D., Development as a collective action problem: Addressing the real challenges of African
governance, London, Overseas Development Institute, Africa Power and Politics programme,
2012.
Buzan, B. and O. Waever, Regions and power: The structures of international security, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Chang, H-J, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London,
Anthem Press, 2003.
Civins, B., ‘Ethiopia’s Intervention in Somalia, 2006-2009’, Yonsei Journal of International Studies,
vol. 2, issue 2, 2010.
Clapham, C., ‘Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation’, Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, vol. 44, no. 1, 2006, pp. 108-118.
Davison, W., ‘Ethiopian Military-Run Company Seeks More Foreign Partners’, Bloomberg, February
2013, online: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-18/ethiopian-military-run-
corporation-seeks-more-foreign-partners.
De Waal, A., ‘Africa’s $700 billion problem waiting to happen’, Foreign Policy, 17 March 2016.
De Zeeuw, J. (ed.), From soldiers to politicians: Transforming rebel movements after civil war,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008.
Debiel, T. with A. Klein (eds), Fragile peace: State failure, violence and development in fragile
regions, London, Zed Books, 2002.
40
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
Dehéz, D. and B. Gebrewold, ‘When Things Fall Apart – Conflict Dynamics and an Order Besides
the State in Post-collapse Somalia’, African Security, vol. 3, 2010, pp. 1-20.
Dersso, S., The Somalia Conflict: Implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, ISS Paper
no. 198, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2009.
Feinstein, A., The shadow world: Inside the global arms trade, London, Hamish Hamilton, 2011.
Ferras, P. (ed.), La corne de lAfrique, Évolutions politiques et sécuritaires (tome 1), e-book,
Observatoire de la corne de l’Afrique, 2015.
Gebrehiwot Berhe, M., ‘The Ethiopian Post-Transition SSR Experience: Building a National Army
from a Revolutionary Democratic Army’, February 2016, unpublished.
Gebrewold, B., ‘Civil Militias and Militarisation of Society in the Horn of Africa’, in: Francis, D. (ed),
Civil Militia: Africa’s Intractable Security Menace?, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005.
Giustozzi, A., Double-Edged Swords: Armies, Elite Bargaining and State-Building, Crisis States
Working Papers Series no. 2, London, London School of Economics, 2011.
Hagmann, T., Talking Peace in the Ogaden: The search for an end to conflict in the Somali Regional
State in Ethiopia, Nairobi, Rift Valley Institute, 2014.
Human Rights Watch, ‘Ethiopia Country Summary’, World Report 2015: Events of 2014, 2015, online:
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/ethiopia.
International Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Governing the Faithful, Africa Briefing No. 117, Brussels/
Nairobi, ICG 2016.
International Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Prospects for Peace in Ogaden, Africa Report No. 207,
Brussels/Nairobi, 2013.
International Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents, Brussels, Africa Report
no. 153, ICG, 2009.
Jones, W., R. de Oliveira and H. Verhoeven, Africa’s illiberal state-builders, Working Paper Series
no. 89, Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, 2013.
Kagwanja, P., ‘Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old Strategies’, Africa
Security Review, vol. 15, no. 3, pp 72-86, 2006.
Kapuscinski, R., The Emperor, London, Penguin Books, 2006.
Kassa, W., ‘Examining Some of the Raisons d’Être for the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law’, Mizan Law
Review, vol. 7, no. 1, 2013.
Keller, E., ‘Ethnic federalism, fiscal reform, development and democracy in Ethiopia’, African Journal
of Political Science, vol. 7, no. 1, 2002.
Keller, J., Identity, Citizenship and Political Conflict in Africa, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press,
2014.
Le Roux, L. and Y. Kidane (eds), Challenges to Security Sector Reform in the Horn of Africa,
Monograph Series no. 135, Pretoria, ISS, 2007.
Lefort, R., The great Ethiopian land-grab: feudalism, Leninism, neo-liberalism... plus ça change,
openDemocracy, December 2011, online: https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren%c3%a9-lefort/
great-ethiopian-land-grab-feudalism-leninism-neo-liberalism-plus-%c3%a7-change
Lenhardt, A. et al., One foot on the ground, one foot in the air: Ethiopia’s delivery on an ambitious
development agenda, London, ODI Development Progress and ECDPM, 2015.
Leslie, P., Chapman-Andrews and the Emperor, London, Leo Cooper Ltd, 2005.
Markakis, J., Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, Woodbridge, James Currey, 2011.
41
Perpetuating power | CRU Report, September 2016
Ministry of Information (2002), Ethiopia’s National Security and Foreign Affairs Policy and Strategy,
Addis Ababa, 2002. online: http://www.mfa.gov.et/docs/Foreign%20Policy%20English.pdf.
Norbrook, N., Ethiopia, The Africa Report no. 40, 2012, online: http://www.alfredobini.com/sites/
default/files/The_Africa_Report.pdf.
Oqubay, A., Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.
Pakenham, T., The Scramble for Africa, New York, Abacus, 1991.
Pankhurst, R., ‘Menelik and the Foundation of Addis Ababa’, The Journal of African History, vol. 2,
no. 1, 1961, pp. 103-117.
Parks, T. and W. Cole, Political settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and
Practice, Occasional paper no. 2, The Asia Foundation, 2010.
Pausewang, S., Local Democracy and Human Security in Ethiopia, Structural Reasons for the Failure
of Democratisation, Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2004.
Plummer, J. (ed.), Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia: Perceptions, Realities, and the Way Forward for
Key Sectors, Washington DC, The World Bank, 2012.
Putzel, J. and J. Di John, Meeting the challenges of crisis states, London, London School of
Economics, 2012.
Ryan, A., On Politics: A History of Political Thought from Herodotus to the Present, London, Penguin,
2013.
Smith, L., Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia, Special report no. 192,
Washington DC, United States Institute for Peace, 2007.
Staniland, P., Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 2014.
Times Books, The Times Comprehensive Atlas of the World, 14th edition, London, 2014.
Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, Berlin, Transparency International, 2014.
Tronvoll, K., War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia: The Making of Enemies and Allies in the Horn
of Africa, Suffolk, James Currey, 2009.
United Nations Development Programme, Accelerating Inclusive Growth for Sustainable Human
Development in Ethiopia, National Human Development Report, Addis Ababa, 2014.
Vaughan, S. and M. Gebremichael, Rethinking business and politics in Ethiopia: The role of EFFORT,
the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, Research report no. 2, London, Overseas
Development Institute, Africa Power and Politics programme, 2011.
Vaughan, S. and K. Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida
studies no. 10, Stockholm, 2002.
Verhoeven, H., ‘Africa’s Next Hegemon: Behind Ethiopia’s Power Plays’, Foreign Affairs, April 2015.
Wondifraw, A. et al., Ethiopia 2015, African Economic Outlook, AfDB, OECD and UNDP, 2015.
Yibeltal, K., Ethiopia: Policing Ethiopia - the Force vs. Service Dilemma, 2015, online: http://allafrica.
com/stories/201508051502.html.
42