Logic

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Logic (from Greek: λογική, logikḗ,

'possessed of reason, intellectual,
dialectical, argumentative')[1][2][i] is the
systematic study of valid rules of
inference, i.e. the relations that lead to the
acceptance of one proposition (the
conclusion) on the basis of a set of other
propositions (premises). More broadly,
logic is the analysis and appraisal of
arguments.[3]

There is no universal agreement as to the

exact definition and boundaries of logic,
hence the issue still remains one of the
main subjects of research and debates in
the field of philosophy of logic (see § Rival
conceptions).[4][5][6] However, it has
traditionally included the classification of
arguments; the systematic exposition of
the logical forms; the validity and
soundness of deductive reasoning; the
strength of inductive reasoning; the study
of formal proofs and inference (including
paradoxes and fallacies); and the study of
syntax and semantics.

A good argument not only possesses

validity and soundness (or strength, in
induction), but it also avoids circular
dependencies, is clearly stated, relevant,
and consistent; otherwise it is useless for
reasoning and persuasion, and is
classified as a fallacy.[7]

In ordinary discourse, inferences may be

signified by words such as therefore, thus,
hence, ergo, and so on.

Historically, logic has been studied in

philosophy (since ancient times) and
mathematics (since the mid-19th century).
More recently, logic has been studied in
cognitive science, which draws on
computer science, linguistics, philosophy
and psychology, among other disciplines.
A logician is any person, often a
philosopher or mathematician, whose
topic of scholarly study is logic.

Types of logic

Upon this first, and in one sense this sole,

rule of reason, that in order to learn you
must desire to learn, and in so desiring not
be satisfied with what you already incline to
capably think, there follows one corollary
which itself deserves to be inscribed upon
every wall of the city of philosophy: Do not
block the way of inquiry.

Charles Sanders Peirce, First Rule of Logic

Philosophical logic …

Philosophical logic is an area of

philosophy. It's a set of methods used to
solve philosophical problems and a
fundamental tool for the advancement of
metaphilosophy.

Informal logic …
Informal logic is the study of natural
language arguments. The study of
fallacies is an important branch of
informal logic. Since much informal
argument is not strictly speaking
deductive, on some conceptions of logic,
informal logic is not logic at all. (See
§ Rival conceptions.)

Formal logic …

Formal logic is the study of inference with

purely formal content. An inference
possesses a purely formal and explicit
content (i.e. it can be expressed as a
particular application of a wholly abstract
rule) such as, a rule that is not about any
particular thing or property. In many
definitions of logic, logical consequence
and inference with purely formal content
are the same.

Examples of formal logic include (1)

traditional syllogistic logic (a.k.a. term
logic) and (2) modern symbolic Logic:

Syllogistic logic can be found in the

works of Aristotle, making it the earliest
known formal study and studies types
of syllogism. Modern formal logic
follows and expands on Aristotle.[8][9]
 Symbolic logic is the study of symbolic
abstractions that capture the formal
features of logical inference,[10][11] often
divided into two main branches:
propositional logic and predicate logic.

Mathematical logic …

Mathematical logic is an extension of

symbolic logic into other areas, in
particular to the study of model theory,
proof theory, set theory, and computability
theory.[12][13]

Concepts
Argument terminology used in logic

The concepts of logical form and

argument are central to logic.

An argument is constructed by applying

one of the forms of the different types of
logical reasoning: deductive, inductive, and
abductive. In deduction, the validity of an
argument is determined solely by its
logical form, not its content, whereas the
soundness requires both validity and that
all the given premises are actually true.[14]

Completeness, consistency, decidability,

and expressivity, are further fundamental
concepts in logic. The categorization of
the logical systems and of their properties
has led to the emergence of a metatheory
of logic known as metalogic.[15] However,
agreement on what logic actually is has
remained elusive, although the field of
universal logic has studied the common
structure of logics.

Logical form …
Logic is generally considered formal when
it analyzes and represents the form of any
valid argument type. The form of an
argument is displayed by representing its
sentences in the formal grammar and
symbolism of a logical language to make
its content usable in formal inference.
Simply put, to formalize simply means to
translate English sentences into the
language of logic.

This is called showing the logical form of

the argument. It is necessary because
indicative sentences of ordinary language
show a considerable variety of form and
complexity that makes their use in
inference impractical. It requires, first,
ignoring those grammatical features
irrelevant to logic (such as gender and
declension, if the argument is in Latin),
replacing conjunctions irrelevant to logic
(e.g. "but") with logical conjunctions like
"and" and replacing ambiguous, or
alternative logical expressions ("any",
"every", etc.) with expressions of a
standard type (e.g. "all", or the universal
quantifier ∀).

Second, certain parts of the sentence

must be replaced with schematic letters.
Thus, for example, the expression "all Ps
are Qs" shows the logical form common to
the sentences "all men are mortals", "all
cats are carnivores", "all Greeks are
philosophers", and so on. The schema can
further be condensed into the formula
A(P,Q), where the letter A indicates the
judgement 'all – are –'.

The importance of form was recognised

from ancient times. Aristotle uses variable
letters to represent valid inferences in Prior
Analytics, leading Jan Łukasiewicz to say
that the introduction of variables was "one
of Aristotle's greatest inventions".[16]
According to the followers of Aristotle
(such as Ammonius), only the logical
principles stated in schematic terms
belong to logic, not those given in concrete
terms. The concrete terms 'man', 'mortal',
etc., are analogous to the substitution
values of the schematic placeholders P, Q,
R, which were called the 'matter' (Greek:
ὕλη, hyle) of the inference.

There is a big difference between the

kinds of formulas seen in traditional term
logic and the predicate calculus that is the
fundamental advance of modern logic.
The formula A(P,Q) (all Ps are Qs) of
traditional logic corresponds to the more
complex formula in
predicate logic, involving the logical
connectives for universal quantification
and implication rather than just the
predicate letter A and using variable
arguments where traditional logic
uses just the term letter P. With the
complexity comes power, and the advent
of the predicate calculus inaugurated
revolutionary growth of the subject.[17]

Semantics …

The validity of an argument depends upon

the meaning, or semantics, of the
sentences that make it up.

Aristotle's six Organon, especially De

Interpretatione, gives a cursory outline of
semantics which the scholastic logicians,
particularly in the thirteenth and
fourteenth century, developed into a
complex and sophisticated theory, called
supposition theory. This showed how the
truth of simple sentences, expressed
schematically, depend on how the terms
'supposit', or stand for, certain extra-
linguistic items. For example, in part II of
his Summa Logicae, William of Ockham
presents a comprehensive account of the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the
truth of simple sentences, in order to show
which arguments are valid and which are
not. Thus "every A is B' is true if and only if
there is something for which 'A' stands,
and there is nothing for which 'A' stands,
for which 'B' does not also stand."[18]

Early modern logic defined semantics

purely as a relation between ideas. Antoine
Arnauld in the Port Royal-Logic,[19][20] says
that after conceiving things by our ideas,
we compare these ideas, and, finding that
some belong together and some do not,
we unite or separate them. This is called
affirming or denying, and in general
judging.[21] Thus truth and falsity are no
more than the agreement or disagreement
of ideas. This suggests obvious
difficulties, leading Locke to distinguish
between 'real' truth, when our ideas have
'real existence' and 'imaginary' or 'verbal'
truth, where ideas like harpies or centaurs
exist only in the mind.[22] This view, known
as psychologism, was taken to the extreme
in the nineteenth century, and is generally
held by modern logicians to signify a low
point in the decline of logic before the
twentieth century.

Modern semantics is in some ways closer

to the medieval view, in rejecting such
psychological truth-conditions. However,
the introduction of quantification, needed
to solve the problem of multiple generality,
rendered impossible the kind of subject-
predicate analysis that underlies medieval
semantics. The main modern approach is
model-theoretic semantics, based on Alfred
Tarski's semantic theory of truth. The
approach assumes that the meaning of
the various parts of the propositions are
given by the possible ways we can give a
recursively specified group of
interpretation functions from them to
some predefined domain of discourse: an
interpretation of first-order predicate logic
is given by a mapping from terms to a
universe of individuals, and a mapping
from propositions to the truth values "true"
and "false". Model-theoretic semantics is
one of the fundamental concepts of model
theory. Modern semantics also admits
rival approaches, such as the proof-
theoretic semantics that associates the
meaning of propositions with the roles
that they can play in inferences, an
approach that ultimately derives from the
work of Gerhard Gentzen on structural
proof theory and is heavily influenced by
Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy,
especially his aphorism "meaning is use."

Inference …

Inference is not to be confused with

implication. An implication is a sentence of
the form 'If p then q', and can be true or
false. The stoic logician Philo of Megara
was the first to define the truth conditions
of such an implication: false only when the
antecedent p is true and the consequent q
is false, in all other cases true. An
inference, on the other hand, consists of
two separately asserted propositions of
the form 'p therefore q'. An inference is not
true or false, but valid or invalid. However,
there is a connection between implication
and inference, as follows: if the implication
'if p then q' is true, the inference 'p
therefore q' is valid. This was given an
apparently paradoxical formulation by
Philo, who said that the implication 'if it is
day, it is night' is true only at night, so the
inference 'it is day, therefore it is night' is
valid in the night, but not in the day.

The theory of inference (or 'consequences')

was systematically developed in medieval
times by logicians such as William of
Ockham and Walter Burley. It is uniquely
medieval, though it has its origins in
Aristotle's Topica and Boethius' De
Syllogismis hypotheticis. Many terms in
logic, for this reason, are in Latin. For
instance, the rule that licenses the move
from the implication 'if p then q' plus the
assertion of its antecedent p, to the
assertion of the consequent q, is known as
modus ponens ('mode of positing')—from
Latin: posito antecedente ponitur
consequens. The Latin formulations of
many other rules such as ex falso
quodlibet ('from falsehood, anything
[follows]'), and reductio ad absurdum
('reduction to absurdity'; i.e. to disprove by
showing the consequence as absurd), also
date from this period.

However, the theory of consequences, or

the so-called hypothetical syllogism, was
never fully integrated into the theory of the
categorical syllogism. This was partly
because of the resistance to reducing the
categorical judgment 'every s is p' to the
so-called hypothetical judgment 'if
anything is s, it is p'. The first was thought
to imply 'some s is p', the latter was not,
and as late as 1911 in the Encyclopædia
Britannica article on "Logic", we find the
Oxford logician T. H. Case arguing against
Sigwart's and Brentano's modern analysis
of the universal proposition.

Logical systems …

A formal system is an organization of

terms used for the analysis of deduction. It
consists of an alphabet, a language over
the alphabet to construct sentences, and a
rule for deriving sentences. Among the
important properties that logical systems
can have are:

Consistency: no theorem of the system

contradicts another.[23]
Validity: the system's rules of proof
never allow a false inference from true
premises.
Completeness: if a formula is true, it can
be proven, i.e. is a theorem of the
system.
Soundness: if any formula is a theorem
of the system, it is true. This is the
converse of completeness. (Note that in
a distinct philosophical use of the term,
 an argument is sound when it is both
valid and its premises are true.)[14]
Expressivity: what concepts can be
expressed in the system.

Some logical systems do not have all

these properties. As an example, Kurt
Gödel's incompleteness theorems show
that sufficiently complex formal systems
of arithmetic cannot be consistent and
complete;[11] however, first-order predicate
logics not extended by specific axioms to
be arithmetic formal systems with equality
can be complete and consistent.[24]

Logic and rationality …

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As the study of argument is of clear

importance to the reasons that we hold
things to be true, logic is of essential
importance to rationality. Here we have
defined logic to be "the systematic study
of the form of arguments;" the reasoning
behind argument is of several sorts, but
only some of these arguments fall under
the aegis of logic proper.

Deductive reasoning concerns the logical

consequence of given premises and is the
form of reasoning most closely connected
to logic. On a narrow conception of logic
(see below) logic concerns just deductive
reasoning, although such a narrow
conception controversially excludes most
of what is called informal logic from the
discipline.

There are other forms of reasoning that

are rational but that are generally not taken
to be part of logic. These include inductive
reasoning, which covers forms of
inference that move from collections of
particular judgements to universal
judgements, and abductive reasoning,[ii]
which is a form of inference that goes
from observation to a hypothesis that
accounts for the reliable data (observation)
and seeks to explain relevant evidence.
American philosopher Charles Sanders
Peirce (1839–1914) first introduced the
term as guessing.[25] Peirce said that to
abduce a hypothetical explanation from
an observed surprising circumstance is
to surmise that may be true because
then would be a matter of course.[26]
Thus, to abduce from involves
determining that is sufficient (or nearly
sufficient), but not necessary, for
.[27][28][29]

While inductive and abductive inference

are not part of logic proper, the
methodology of logic has been applied to
them with some degree of success. For
example, the notion of deductive validity
(where an inference is deductively valid if
and only if there is no possible situation in
which all the premises are true but the
conclusion false) exists in an analogy to
the notion of inductive validity, or
"strength", where an inference is
inductively strong if and only if its
premises give some degree of probability
to its conclusion. Whereas the notion of
deductive validity can be rigorously stated
for systems of formal logic in terms of the
well-understood notions of semantics,
inductive validity requires us to define a
reliable generalization of some set of
observations. The task of providing this
definition may be approached in various
ways, some less formal than others; some
of these definitions may use logical
association rule induction, while others
may use mathematical models of
probability such as decision trees.

Rival conceptions …

Logic arose (see below) from a concern

with correctness of argumentation.
Modern logicians usually wish to ensure
that logic studies just those arguments
that arise from appropriately general
forms of inference. For example, Thomas
Hofweber writes in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy that logic "does
not, however, cover good reasoning as a
whole. That is the job of the theory of
rationality. Rather it deals with inferences
whose validity can be traced back to the
formal features of the representations that
are involved in that inference, be they
linguistic, mental, or other
representations."[30]

The idea that logic treats special forms of

argument, deductive argument, rather than
argument in general, has a history in logic
that dates back at least to logicism in
mathematics (19th and 20th centuries)
and the advent of the influence of
mathematical logic on philosophy. A
consequence of taking logic to treat
special kinds of argument is that it leads
to identification of special kinds of truth,
the logical truths (with logic equivalently
being the study of logical truth), and
excludes many of the original objects of
study of logic that are treated as informal
logic. Robert Brandom has argued against
the idea that logic is the study of a special
kind of logical truth, arguing that instead
one can talk of the logic of material
inference (in the terminology of Wilfred
Sellars), with logic making explicit the
commitments that were originally implicit
in informal inference.[31]

History

Aristotle, 384–322 BCE.

Logic comes from the Greek word logos,

originally meaning "the word" or "what is
spoken", but coming to mean "thought" or
"reason". In the Western World, logic was
first developed by Aristotle, who called the
subject 'analytics'.[32] Aristotelian logic
became widely accepted in science and
mathematics and remained in wide use in
the West until the early 19th century.[33]
Aristotle's system of logic was responsible
for the introduction of hypothetical
syllogism,[34] temporal modal logic,[35][36]
and inductive logic,[37] as well as influential
vocabulary such as terms, predicables,
syllogisms and propositions. There was
also the rival Stoic logic.

In Europe during the later medieval period,

major efforts were made to show that
Aristotle's ideas were compatible with
Christian faith. During the High Middle
Ages, logic became a main focus of
philosophers, who would engage in critical
logical analyses of philosophical
arguments, often using variations of the
methodology of scholasticism. In 1323,
William of Ockham's influential Summa
Logicae was released. By the 18th century,
the structured approach to arguments had
degenerated and fallen out of favour, as
depicted in Holberg's satirical play
Erasmus Montanus. The Chinese logical
philosopher Gongsun Long
(c. 325–250 BCE) proposed the paradox
"One and one cannot become two, since
neither becomes two."[13][iii] In China, the
tradition of scholarly investigation into
logic, however, was repressed by the Qin
dynasty following the legalist philosophy
of Han Feizi.

In India, the Anviksiki school of logic was

founded by Medhātithi (c. 6th century
BCE).[38] Innovations in the scholastic
school, called Nyaya, continued from
ancient times into the early 18th century
with the Navya-Nyāya school. By the 16th
century, it developed theories resembling
modern logic, such as Gottlob Frege's
"distinction between sense and reference
of proper names" and his "definition of
number", as well as the theory of
"restrictive conditions for universals"
anticipating some of the developments in
modern set theory.[iv] Since 1824, Indian
logic attracted the attention of many
Western scholars, and has had an
influence on important 19th-century
logicians such as Charles Babbage,
Augustus De Morgan, and George
Boole.[39] In the 20th century, Western
philosophers like Stanislaw Schayer and
Klaus Glashoff have explored Indian logic
more extensively.

The syllogistic logic developed by Aristotle

predominated in the West until the mid-
19th century, when interest in the
foundations of mathematics stimulated
the development of symbolic logic (now
called mathematical logic). In 1854,
George Boole published The Laws of
Thought,[40] introducing symbolic logic and
the principles of what is now known as
Boolean logic. In 1879, Gottlob Frege
published Begriffsschrift, which
inaugurated modern logic with the
invention of quantifier notation, reconciling
the Aristotelian and Stoic logics in a
broader system, and solving such
problems for which Aristotelian logic was
impotent, such as the problem of multiple
generality. From 1910 to 1913, Alfred
North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell
published Principia Mathematica[10] on the
foundations of mathematics, attempting
to derive mathematical truths from axioms
and inference rules in symbolic logic. In
1931, Gödel raised serious problems with
the foundationalist program and logic
ceased to focus on such issues.

The development of logic since Frege,

Russell, and Wittgenstein had a profound
influence on the practice of philosophy
and the perceived nature of philosophical
problems (see analytic philosophy) and
philosophy of mathematics. Logic,
especially sentential logic, is implemented
in computer logic circuits and is
fundamental to computer science. Logic is
commonly taught by university philosophy,
sociology, advertising and literature
departments, often as a compulsory
discipline.

Types

Syllogistic logic …

A depiction from the 15th century of the square of

opposition, which expresses the fundamental
dualities of syllogistic
dualities of syllogistic.

The Organon was Aristotle's body of work

on logic, with the Prior Analytics
constituting the first explicit work in formal
logic, introducing the syllogistic.[16] The
parts of syllogistic logic, also known by
the name term logic, are the analysis of
the judgements into propositions
consisting of two terms that are related by
one of a fixed number of relations, and the
expression of inferences by means of
syllogisms that consist of two
propositions sharing a common term as
premise, and a conclusion that is a
proposition involving the two unrelated
terms from the premises.

Aristotle's work was regarded in classical

times and from medieval times in Europe
and the Middle East as the very picture of
a fully worked out system. However, it was
not alone: the Stoics proposed a system of
propositional logic that was studied by
medieval logicians. Also, the problem of
multiple generality was recognized in
medieval times. Nonetheless, problems
with syllogistic logic were not seen as
being in need of revolutionary solutions.
Today, some academics claim that
Aristotle's system is generally seen as
having little more than historical value
(though there is some current interest in
extending term logics), regarded as made
obsolete by the advent of propositional
logic and the predicate calculus. Others
use Aristotle in argumentation theory to
help develop and critically question
argumentation schemes that are used in
artificial intelligence and legal arguments.

Propositional logic …

A propositional calculus or logic (also a

sentential calculus) is a formal system in
which formulae representing propositions
can be formed by combining atomic
propositions using logical connectives,
and in which a system of formal proof
rules establishes certain formulae as
"theorems". An example of a theorem of
propositional logic is ,
which says that if A holds, then B implies
A.

Predicate logic …

Gottlob Frege's Begriffschrift introduced the notion of

quantifier in a graphical notation, which here
represents the judgement that is true
represents the judgement that is true.

Predicate logic is the generic term for

symbolic formal systems such as first-
order logic, second-order logic, many-
sorted logic, and infinitary logic. It provides
an account of quantifiers general enough
to express a wide set of arguments
occurring in natural language. For
example, Bertrand Russell's famous barber
paradox, "there is a man who shaves all
and only men who do not shave
themselves" can be formalised by the
sentence

, using the non-logical predicate

to indicate that x is a man, and the non-
logical relation to indicate
that x shaves y; all other symbols of the
formulae are logical, expressing the
universal and existential quantifiers,
conjunction, implication, negation and
biconditional.

Whilst Aristotelian syllogistic logic

specifies a small number of forms that the
relevant part of the involved judgements
may take, predicate logic allows sentences
to be analysed into subject and argument
in several additional ways—allowing
predicate logic to solve the problem of
multiple generality that had perplexed
medieval logicians.

The development of predicate logic is

usually attributed to Gottlob Frege, who is
also credited as one of the founders of
analytic philosophy, but the formulation of
predicate logic most often used today is
the first-order logic presented in Principles
of Mathematical Logic by David Hilbert
and Wilhelm Ackermann in 1928. The
analytical generality of predicate logic
allowed the formalization of mathematics,
drove the investigation of set theory, and
allowed the development of Alfred Tarski's
approach to model theory. It provides the
foundation of modern mathematical logic.

Frege's original system of predicate logic

was second-order, rather than first-order.
Second-order logic is most prominently
defended (against the criticism of Willard
Van Orman Quine and others) by George
Boolos and Stewart Shapiro.

Modal logic …

In languages, modality deals with the

phenomenon that sub-parts of a sentence
may have their semantics modified by
special verbs or modal particles. For
example, "We go to the games" can be
modified to give "We should go to the
games", and "We can go to the games" and
perhaps "We will go to the games". More
abstractly, we might say that modality
affects the circumstances in which we
take an assertion to be satisfied.
Confusing modality is known as the modal
fallacy.

Aristotle's logic is in large parts concerned

with the theory of non-modalized logic.
Although, there are passages in his work,
such as the famous sea-battle argument in
De Interpretatione § 9, that are now seen
as anticipations of modal logic and its
connection with potentiality and time, the
earliest formal system of modal logic was
developed by Avicenna, who ultimately
developed a theory of "temporally
modalized" syllogistic.[41]

While the study of necessity and

possibility remained important to
philosophers, little logical innovation
happened until the landmark
investigations of C. I. Lewis in 1918, who
formulated a family of rival
axiomatizations of the alethic modalities.
His work unleashed a torrent of new work
on the topic, expanding the kinds of
modality treated to include deontic logic
and epistemic logic. The seminal work of
Arthur Prior applied the same formal
language to treat temporal logic and paved
the way for the marriage of the two
subjects. Saul Kripke discovered
(contemporaneously with rivals) his theory
of frame semantics, which revolutionized
the formal technology available to modal
logicians and gave a new graph-theoretic
way of looking at modality that has driven
many applications in computational
linguistics and computer science, such as
dynamic logic.

Informal reasoning and dialectic …

The motivation for the study of logic in
ancient times was clear: it is so that one
may learn to distinguish good arguments
from bad arguments, and so become more
effective in argument and oratory, and
perhaps also to become a better person.
Half of the works of Aristotle's Organon
treat inference as it occurs in an informal
setting, side by side with the development
of the syllogistic, and in the Aristotelian
school, these informal works on logic were
seen as complementary to Aristotle's
treatment of rhetoric.

This ancient motivation is still alive,

although it no longer takes centre stage in
the picture of logic; typically dialectical
logic forms the heart of a course in critical
thinking, a compulsory course at many
universities. Dialectic has been linked to
logic since ancient times, but it has not
been until recent decades that European
and American logicians have attempted to
provide mathematical foundations for
logic and dialectic by formalising
dialectical logic. Dialectical logic is also
the name given to the special treatment of
dialectic in Hegelian and Marxist thought.
There have been pre-formal treatises on
argument and dialectic, from authors such
as Stephen Toulmin (The Uses of
Argument), Nicholas Rescher
(Dialectics),[42][43][44] and van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (Pragma-dialectics).
Theories of defeasible reasoning can
provide a foundation for the formalisation
of dialectical logic and dialectic itself can
be formalised as moves in a game, where
an advocate for the truth of a proposition
and an opponent argue. Such games can
provide a formal game semantics for
many logics.

Argumentation theory is the study and

research of informal logic, fallacies, and
critical questions as they relate to every
day and practical situations. Specific types
of dialogue can be analyzed and
questioned to reveal premises,
conclusions, and fallacies. Argumentation
theory is now applied in artificial
intelligence and law.

Mathematical logic …

Mathematical logic comprises two distinct

areas of research: the first is the
application of the techniques of formal
logic to mathematics and mathematical
reasoning, and the second, in the other
direction, the application of mathematical
techniques to the representation and
analysis of formal logic.[45]
The earliest use of mathematics and
geometry in relation to logic and
philosophy goes back to the ancient
Greeks such as Euclid, Plato, and
Aristotle.[46] Many other ancient and
medieval philosophers applied
mathematical ideas and methods to their
philosophical claims.[47]

One of the boldest attempts to apply logic

to mathematics was the logicism
pioneered by philosopher-logicians such
as Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell.
Mathematical theories were supposed to
be logical tautologies, and the programme
was to show this by means of a reduction
of mathematics to logic.[10] The various
attempts to carry this out met with failure,
from the crippling of Frege's project in his
Grundgesetze by Russell's paradox, to the
defeat of Hilbert's program by Gödel's
incompleteness theorems.

Both the statement of Hilbert's program

and its refutation by Gödel depended upon
their work establishing the second area of
mathematical logic, the application of
mathematics to logic in the form of proof
theory.[48] Despite the negative nature of
the incompleteness theorems, Gödel's
completeness theorem, a result in model
theory and another application of
mathematics to logic, can be understood
as showing how close logicism came to
being true: every rigorously defined
mathematical theory can be exactly
captured by a first-order logical theory;
Frege's proof calculus is enough to
describe the whole of mathematics,
though not equivalent to it.

If proof theory and model theory have

been the foundation of mathematical
logic, they have been but two of the four
pillars of the subject.[49] Set theory
originated in the study of the infinite by
Georg Cantor, and it has been the source
of many of the most challenging and
important issues in mathematical logic,
from Cantor's theorem, through the status
of the Axiom of Choice and the question of
the independence of the continuum
hypothesis, to the modern debate on large
cardinal axioms.

Recursion theory captures the idea of

computation in logical and arithmetic
terms; its most classical achievements are
the undecidability of the
Entscheidungsproblem by Alan Turing, and
his presentation of the Church–Turing
thesis.[50] Today recursion theory is mostly
concerned with the more refined problem
of complexity classes—when is a problem
efficiently solvable?—and the classification
of degrees of unsolvability.[51]

Philosophical logic …

Philosophical logic deals with formal

descriptions of ordinary, non-specialist
("natural") language, that is strictly only
about the arguments within philosophy's
other branches. Most philosophers
assume that the bulk of everyday
reasoning can be captured in logic if a
method or methods to translate ordinary
language into that logic can be found.
Philosophical logic is essentially a
continuation of the traditional discipline
called "logic" before the invention of
mathematical logic. Philosophical logic
has a much greater concern with the
connection between natural language and
logic. As a result, philosophical logicians
have contributed a great deal to the
development of non-standard logics (e.g.
free logics, tense logics) as well as various
extensions of classical logic (e.g. modal
logics) and non-standard semantics for
such logics (e.g. Kripke's
supervaluationism in the semantics of
logic).

Logic and the philosophy of language are

closely related. Philosophy of language
has to do with the study of how our
language engages and interacts with our
thinking. Logic has an immediate impact
on other areas of study. Studying logic and
the relationship between logic and
ordinary speech can help a person better
structure his own arguments and critique
the arguments of others. Many popular
arguments are filled with errors because
so many people are untrained in logic and
unaware of how to formulate an argument
correctly.[52][53]

Computational logic …
A simple toggling circuit is expressed using a logic
gate and a synchronous register.

Logic cut to the heart of computer science

as it emerged as a discipline: Alan Turing's
work on the Entscheidungsproblem
followed from Kurt Gödel's work on the
incompleteness theorems. The notion of
the general purpose computer that came
from this work was of fundamental
importance to the designers of the
computer machinery in the 1940s.
In the 1950s and 1960s, researchers
predicted that when human knowledge
could be expressed using logic with
mathematical notation, it would be
possible to create a machine that mimics
the problem-solving skills of a human
being. This was more difficult than
expected because of the complexity of
human reasoning. In the summer of 1956,
John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Claude
Shannon and Nathan Rochester organized
a conference on the subject of what they
called "artificial intelligence" (a term
coined by McCarthy for the occasion).
Newell and Simon proudly presented the
group with the Logic Theorist and were
somewhat surprised when the program
received a lukewarm reception.

In logic programming, a program consists

of a set of axioms and rules. Logic
programming systems such as Prolog
compute the consequences of the axioms
and rules in order to answer a query.

Today, logic is extensively applied in the

field of artificial intelligence, and this field
provide a rich source of problems in
formal and informal logic. Argumentation
theory is one good example of how logic is
being applied to artificial intelligence. The
ACM Computing Classification System in
particular regards:

Section F.3 on "Logics and meanings of

programs" and F.4 on "Mathematical
logic and formal languages" as part of
the theory of computer science: this
work covers formal semantics of
programming languages, as well as
work of formal methods such as Hoare
logic;
Boolean logic as fundamental to
computer hardware: particularly, the
system's section B.2 on "Arithmetic and
logic structures", relating to operatives
AND, NOT, and OR;
 Many fundamental logical formalisms
are essential to section I.2 on artificial
intelligence, for example modal logic
and default logic in Knowledge
representation formalisms and
methods, Horn clauses in logic
programming, and description logic.

Furthermore, computers can be used as

tools for logicians. For example, in
symbolic logic and mathematical logic,
proofs by humans can be computer-
assisted. Using automated theorem
proving, the machines can find and check
proofs, as well as work with proofs too
lengthy to write out by hand.
Non-classical logic …

The logics discussed above are all

"bivalent" or "two-valued"; that is, they are
most naturally understood as dividing
propositions into true and false
propositions. Non-classical logics are
those systems that reject various rules of
Classical logic.

Hegel developed his own dialectic logic

that extended Kant's transcendental logic
but also brought it back to ground by
assuring us that "neither in heaven nor in
earth, neither in the world of mind nor of
nature, is there anywhere such an abstract
'either–or' as the understanding maintains.
Whatever exists is concrete, with
difference and opposition in itself".[54]

In 1910, Nicolai A. Vasiliev extended the

law of excluded middle and the law of
contradiction and proposed the law of
excluded fourth and logic tolerant to
contradiction.[55] In the early 20th century
Jan Łukasiewicz investigated the
extension of the traditional true/false
values to include a third value, "possible"
(or an indeterminate, a hypothesis) so
inventing ternary logic, the first multi-
valued logic in the Western tradition.[56] A
minor modification of the ternary logic
was later introduced in a sibling ternary
logic model proposed by Stephen Cole
Kleene. Kleene's system differs from the
Łukasiewicz's logic with respect to an
outcome of the implication. The former
assumes that the operator of implication
between two hypotheses produces a
hypothesis.

Logics such as fuzzy logic have since

been devised with an infinite number of
"degrees of truth", represented by a real
number between 0 and 1.[57]

Intuitionistic logic was proposed by L.E.J.

Brouwer as the correct logic for reasoning
about mathematics, based upon his
rejection of the law of the excluded middle
as part of his intuitionism. Brouwer
rejected formalization in mathematics, but
his student Arend Heyting studied
intuitionistic logic formally, as did Gerhard
Gentzen. Intuitionistic logic is of great
interest to computer scientists, as it is a
constructive logic and sees many
applications, such as extracting verified
programs from proofs and influencing the
design of programming languages through
the formulae-as-types correspondence.

Modal logic is not truth conditional, and so

it has often been proposed as a non-
classical logic. However, modal logic is
normally formalized with the principle of
the excluded middle, and its relational
semantics is bivalent, so this inclusion is
disputable.

Controversies

"Is Logic Empirical?" …

What is the epistemological status of the

laws of logic? What sort of argument is
appropriate for criticizing purported
principles of logic? In an influential paper
entitled "Is Logic Empirical?"[58] Hilary
Putnam, building on a suggestion of W. V.
Quine, argued that in general the facts of
propositional logic have a similar
epistemological status as facts about the
physical universe, for example as the laws
of mechanics or of general relativity, and
in particular that what physicists have
learned about quantum mechanics
provides a compelling case for
abandoning certain familiar principles of
classical logic: if we want to be realists
about the physical phenomena described
by quantum theory, then we should
abandon the principle of distributivity,
substituting for classical logic the
quantum logic proposed by Garrett
Birkhoff and John von Neumann.[59]
Another paper of the same name by
Michael Dummett argues that Putnam's
desire for realism mandates the law of
distributivity.[60] Distributivity of logic is
essential for the realist's understanding of
how propositions are true of the world in
just the same way as he has argued the
principle of bivalence is. In this way, the
question, "Is Logic Empirical?" can be seen
to lead naturally into the fundamental
controversy in metaphysics on realism
versus anti-realism.

Implication: strict or material …

The notion of implication formalized in
classical logic does not comfortably
translate into natural language by means
of "if ... then ...", due to a number of
problems called the paradoxes of material
implication.

The first class of paradoxes involves

counterfactuals, such as If the moon is
made of green cheese, then 2+2=5, which
are puzzling because natural language
does not support the principle of
explosion. Eliminating this class of
paradoxes was the reason for C. I. Lewis's
formulation of strict implication, which
eventually led to more radically revisionist
logics such as relevance logic.

The second class of paradoxes involves

redundant premises, falsely suggesting
that we know the succedent because of
the antecedent: thus "if that man gets
elected, granny will die" is materially true
since granny is mortal, regardless of the
man's election prospects. Such sentences
violate the Gricean maxim of relevance,
and can be modelled by logics that reject
the principle of monotonicity of
entailment, such as relevance logic.

Tolerating the impossible …

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was deeply
critical of any simplified notion of the law
of non-contradiction. It was based on
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's idea that this
law of logic also requires a sufficient
ground to specify from what point of view
(or time) one says that something cannot
contradict itself. A building, for example,
both moves and does not move; the
ground for the first is our solar system and
for the second the earth. In Hegelian
dialectic, the law of non-contradiction, of
identity, itself relies upon difference and so
is not independently assertable.
Closely related to questions arising from
the paradoxes of implication comes the
suggestion that logic ought to tolerate
inconsistency. Relevance logic and
paraconsistent logic are the most
important approaches here, though the
concerns are different: a key consequence
of classical logic and some of its rivals,
such as intuitionistic logic, is that they
respect the principle of explosion, which
means that the logic collapses if it is
capable of deriving a contradiction.
Graham Priest, the main proponent of
dialetheism, has argued for
paraconsistency on the grounds that there
are in fact, true contradictions.[61]
Rejection of logical truth …

The philosophical vein of various kinds of

skepticism contains many kinds of doubt
and rejection of the various bases on
which logic rests, such as the idea of
logical form, correct inference, or meaning,
typically leading to the conclusion that
there are no logical truths. This is in
contrast with the usual views in
philosophical skepticism, where logic
directs skeptical enquiry to doubt received
wisdoms, as in the work of Sextus
Empiricus.
Friedrich Nietzsche provides a strong
example of the rejection of the usual basis
of logic: his radical rejection of idealization
led him to reject truth as a "... mobile army
of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms—in short ...
metaphors which are worn out and without
sensuous power; coins which have lost
their pictures and now matter only as
metal, no longer as coins".[62] His rejection
of truth did not lead him to reject the idea
of either inference or logic completely, but
rather suggested that "logic [came] into
existence in man's head [out] of illogic,
whose realm originally must have been
immense. Innumerable beings who made
inferences in a way different from ours
perished".[63] Thus there is the idea that
logical inference has a use as a tool for
human survival, but that its existence does
not support the existence of truth, nor
does it have a reality beyond the
instrumental: "Logic, too, also rests on
assumptions that do not correspond to
anything in the real world".[64]

This position held by Nietzsche however,

has come under extreme scrutiny for
several reasons. Some philosophers, such
as Jürgen Habermas, claim his position is
self-refuting—and accuse Nietzsche of not
even having a coherent perspective, let
alone a theory of knowledge.[65] Georg
Lukács, in his book The Destruction of
Reason, asserts that, "Were we to study
Nietzsche's statements in this area from a
logico-philosophical angle, we would be
confronted by a dizzy chaos of the most
lurid assertions, arbitrary and violently
incompatible."[66] Bertrand Russell
described Nietzsche's irrational claims
with "He is fond of expressing himself
paradoxically and with a view to shocking
conventional readers" in his book A History
of Western Philosophy.[67]

See also
Argument – Attempt to persuade or to
determine the truth of a conclusion
Argumentation theory – Study of how
conclusions are reached through logical
reasoning; one of four rhetorical modes
Critical thinking – The analysis of facts
to form a judgment
Digital electronics – Electronic circuits
that utilize digital signals (also known as
digital logic or logic gates)
Fallacies
List of fallacies – Types of reasoning
that are logically incorrect
List of logicians – Wikipedia list article
List of logic journals – Wikipedia list
article
List of logic symbols – Wikipedia list
article
Logic puzzle
Mathematics – Field of study
List of mathematics articles
Outline of mathematics – Overview
of and topical guide to
mathematics
Metalogic – Study of the properties of
logical systems
Outline of logic – Overview of and
topical guide to logic
Philosophy – Study of the truths and
principles of being, knowledge, or
conduct
List of philosophy topics
Outline of philosophy – Overview of
and topical guide to philosophy
Logos – Term in Western philosophy,
psychology, rhetoric, and religion
Logical reasoning
Reason – Capacity for consciously
making sense of things
Truth – A term meaning "in accord with
fact or reality"
Vector logic
References

Notes …

i. Also related to λόγος (logos), "word,

thought, idea, argument, account,
reason, or principle." (Liddell and Scott,
1999).
ii. On abductive reasoning, see:
Magnani, L. 2001. Abduction,
Reason, and Science: Processes
of Discovery and Explanation.
New York: Kluwer Academic
Plenum Publishers. xvii. ISBN 0-
306-46514-0.
Josephson, John R., and Susan G.
Josephson. 1994. Abductive
Inference: Computation,
Philosophy, Technology. New
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viii. ISBN 0-521-43461-0.
Bunt, H. and W. Black. 2000.
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794-2.
iii. The four Catuṣkoṭi logical divisions are
formally very close to the four
opposed propositions of the Greek
tetralemma, which in turn are
analogous to the four truth values of
modern relevance logic. (cf. Belnap,
Nuel. 1977. "A useful four-valued
logic." In Modern Uses of Multiple-
Valued Logic, edited by Dunn and
Eppstein. Boston: Reidel; Jayatilleke,
K. N.. 1967. "The Logic of Four
Alternatives." In Philosophy East and
West. University of Hawaii Press.)
iv. Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 1976. "Some
Comparisons Between Frege's Logic
and Navya-Nyaya Logic." Philosophy
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JSTOR 2106873 . "This paper consists
of three parts. The first part deals with
Frege's distinction between sense and
reference of proper names and a
similar distinction in Navya-Nyaya
logic. In the second part we have
compared Frege's definition of number
to the Navya-Nyaya definition of
number. In the third part we have
shown how the study of the so-called
'restrictive conditions for universals' in
Navya-Nyaya logic anticipated some
of the developments of modern set
theory."
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External links

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Logic at PhilPapers
Logic at the Indiana Philosophy
Ontology Project
"Logic" . Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
"Logical calculus" , Encyclopedia of
Mathematics, EMS Press, 2001 [1994]
An Outline for Verbal Logic
Introductions and tutorials
"An Introduction to Philosophical
Logic, by Paul Newall" . Archived
 from the original on 3 April 2008.
aimed at beginners.
forall x: an introduction to formal
logic , by P.D. Magnus, covers
sentential and quantified logic.
Logic Self-Taught: A Workbook
(originally prepared for on-line logic
instruction).
Nicholas Rescher. (1964).
Introduction to Logic, St.
Martin's Press.
Essays
"Symbolic Logic" and "The Game of
Logic" , Lewis Carroll, 1896.
 Math & Logic: The history of formal
mathematical, logical, linguistic and
methodological ideas. In The
Dictionary of the History of Ideas.
Online Tools
Interactive Syllogistic Machine A
web-based syllogistic machine for
exploring fallacies, figures, terms,
and modes of syllogisms.
A Logic Calculator A web-based
application for evaluating simple
statements in symbolic logic.
Reference material
Translation Tips , by Peter Suber,
for translating from English into
 logical notation.
Ontology and History of Logic. An
Introduction with an annotated
bibliography.
Reading lists
The London Philosophy Study
Guide offers many suggestions on
what to read, depending on the
student's familiarity with the
subject:
Logic & Metaphysics
Set Theory and Further Logic
Mathematical Logic
Categories public domain audiobook
at LibriVox
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