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An investigation into the psychoanalytic concept of envy

Article  in  The International Journal of Psychoanalysis · May 1994

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(1994). International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 75:217-234
An Investigation Into the Psychoanalytic Concept of Envy
Eliahu Feldman and Heitor De Paola
ABSTRACT
The authors describe the evolution of the concept of envy since Freud's first account of penis envy.
Influenced by Abraham, Klein stressed the importance of envy 'lato sensu', turning it into a major
issue in both psychoanalytic theory and practice. Her final proposition that envy is a direct
expression of the death instinct was criticised from many quarters. These critiques, as well as her
followers' contributions to the theme, are examined. Although the Kleinian conceptualisation
contributed greatly both to psychoanalytic theory and practice, the time has come to re-evaluate it in
the light of later clinical and theoretical developments. The authors consider envy to be a complex
feeling, not an impulse or a drive derivative. The object of envy is not the good object but the
omnipotent-idealised object, thought to have qualities felt by the infant as unattainable. The
newborn's mind is overwhelmed with a sense of loss that cannot be mourned. The coping is done
through a process called Precocious Mourning, at a stage in which there is barely any self-object
differentiation, leading to sensations that the authors call precursors of envy. Envy (proper) is a
universal feeling, whose strength depends on subject–object (complementary series) interactions
occurring when differentiation is under way.
And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover, To entertain these fair well-spoken days, I am determined
to prove a villain, And hate the idle pleasures of these days.
(Shakespeare, Richard III, Act 1, Scene 1)
INTRODUCTION
The concept of envy greatly antedates the establishment of psychoanalysis as a science. Observations,
comments, popular sayings and other references, historical or literary, on the subject are profuse, showing that
this human phenomenon has been known since mankind was able to record its own history.
From the psychoanalytical point of view the concept of envy was derived either from the observation of
patients in analysis, or from the direct observation of children in their natural development. In his descriptions,
Freud made clear the importance of envy in the development of children, but he gave special weight to its
consequences for the prognosis of a psychoanalytical treatment (1937).
Abraham (1919) and Ferenczi (1927) also put stress on the importance of envy in determining poor
responses to the psychoanalytic process, but serving otherwise as a guideline concerning the end of the therapy.
Reich (1933) and Horney (1936) also made contributions to the theme, and other authors worked on the concept
of 'penis envy', leaving aside envy in its broader sense.
Although its importance in clinical work had been well established since Freud, who defined the limits of
psychoanalytic therapy relating to envy, it was only with Melanie Klein's concept of 'constitutional envy' (1957)
that envy became a 'quasi-nuclear' concept, a real touchstone in the psychoanalytic process. Klein herself
thought that no psychoanalysis
—————————————
(MS. received February 1994)
Copyright © Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London 1994

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could be considered complete without the unearthing and working through of the deep roots of envy, its spoiling
and destructive quality, in order to render it less deleterious.
The immediate consequences of Klein's work seemed to be a broadening of the theoretical understanding of
envy and its working through in the psychoanalytic process, together with the gratitude and reparative processes
that can mitigate these destructive tendencies (1957). Nevertheless, conceiving of envy as a direct expression of
the death instinct, Klein focused her thought on the analysis of the anxieties and defences attached to it, but did
not envision the possibility of analysis this complex feeling in itself. This led her to abandon other possible
means of approaching and coping with envy, with consequent hindrances in understanding and helping the
difficult envious patient.
In our view, some of Klein's followers took her conclusion about the 'quasi-organic' character of envy to an
extreme—whereby the envious patients were seen essentially as 'morally' or 'ethically' wrong, 'bad' people—
and the issue went down the path of quasi-moral judgements on the patients. The 'envious attacks' made by the
patient were brought to the fore, without any apparent analysis (dismembering) of this complex feeling, probably
because of its quasi-biological status in Klein's theory. Thus envy became a kind of a 'dead end' in
psychoanalytic work, resembling, in that sense, what Freud had stated (1937) with reference to penis envy in
females and the repudiation of femininity in males.
However, the development of psychoanalytic thought made clear the need to abandon many of these
theoretical 'dead ends', in order to bring theory in line with a renewed view of clinical data. We suggest that the
time has come to re-evaluate this concept in the light of new theoretical knowledge and clinical experience
accumulated in the last decades of psychoanalytical research. It is our aim in this paper to discuss the evolution
of the concept of envy from its first formulations until today, and present some ideas about its psychopathology.
In a future paper we shall focus our attention on its clinical implications.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW
Freud's first reference to penis envy was in 1905 (pp. 195, 239). In 1908 (p. 218) he stated that girls 'feel
unfairly treated'; in 1918 that 'many neurotic women … feel at a disadvantage and humiliated because of the
lack of it' (p. 204, our italics), and that only later is the little girl's libido directed towards her father, and then,
instead of wanting to have a penis, she wants a child. The masculine phase in which the girl envies the boy for
his penis is 'closer to the original narcissism than it is to object-love', and 'behind this envy for the penis,
there comes to light the woman's bitterness against the man', related to her 'wish to castrate her young husband
and to keep his penis for herself' (1918p. 205, our italics).
Penis envy was mentioned in many of Freud's papers (1905), (1908), (1915), (1916a), (1916b), (1918),
(1920), (1923), (1925), (1933), in which he broadened his views, describing the wealth of associated
emotional phenomena related to it. It was in 1937 that Freud suggested that 'two themes come into especial
prominence and give the analyst an unusual amount of trouble' (p. 250), both being tied to the distinction
between the sexes, one characteristic of males, the other of females. In females, an envy for the penis, and in
males, a struggle against passive or feminine attitudes to another male; both of these are attitudes to the
castration complex.
From the start, these two themes have, different dynamics, for
[i]n males the striving to be masculine is completely ego-syntonic from the first; the passive attitude,
since it presupposes an acceptance of castration, is energetically repressed, and often its presence is
only indicated by excessive overcompensations. In females too, the striving to be masculine is ego-
syntonic at a certain period—namely in the phallic phase, before the development of femininity has set
in. But it then succumbs to the momentous process of repression whose outcome, as has so often been
shown, determines the fortunes of a woman's femininity … The appeased wish for a penis is destined
to be converted into a wish for a baby and for a husband who possesses a penis … the wish for
masculinity has been retained in the unconscious and … exercises a disturbing influence (1937pp.
250-1).

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 Freud (1937) discussed Ferenczi's opinion (1927) that these two envy-linked complexes should be mastered
in order for an analysis to be considered finished and successful. For Freud, though desirable, this mastering
was impossible: the rebellious overcompensation of males produces one of the strongest transference
resistances. He (the patient) refuses to subject himself to a father-substitute, or to feel indebted to him for
anything, and consequently refuses to accept his recovery from the doctor. In the case of female patients, their
strongest motive for coming to analysis—to obtain the male organ—leads to outbreaks of depression due to the
internal conviction that nothing can be done for them and,
we can only agree that she is right … We often have the impression that with the wish for a penis and
the masculine protest we have penetrated through all the psychological strata and have reached bed-
rock, and that thus our activities are at an end(Freud, 1937p. 252, our italics).
Freud thought of these phenomena as being biologically determined and as important from the prognostic
point of view as the 'repetition compulsion' and the 'unconscious sense of guilt'. What seemed to be the main
factor in Freud's view was 'an attitude towards the castration complex', that is, a particular feeling of lack.
At that moment, nevertheless, Freud was talking about an analysis where the analyst is a male, and did not
mention the possible reactions of patients of both sexes to a female analyst. He also left aside the relations
between (penis) envy and other concepts, such as narcissism and the destructive impulse, and considered it from
a very concrete, static, anatomical point of view, disregarding the 'equivalents' for penis in the human mind:
creativity, potency, capacity, power and knowledge. He also seemed to be reducing the woman's capacity to
procreate to a mere substitute for the envied penis.
These aspects, which could be attributed to Freud's masculine-phallocentric vantage-point (Whitehead,
1975), do not do justice to later, well-established clinical data.
We could say that, at that time, Freud considered that, in a psychoanalytic treatment with a male analyst, the
two most important and insurmountable obstacles to success were penis envy and masculine protest, the first
being a very concrete and anatomical statement, and the second a specific version of a particular form of
resistance against the psychoanalytic treatment.
Later developments of these theoretical points of view progressed along these two main tracks, namely, that
some psychoanalysts worked out the problems related to envy according to the concepts of penis envy and the
'castration complex', while others worked on the line of envy 'lato sensu'.
In this paper, we shall be concerned mainly with the broader concept of envy (sensu lato), since from our
standpoint, penis envy, though important and having many clinical and psychopathological implications, is but
one of the various expressions of this phenomenon.
Abraham (1919) related envy to a very subtle but stubborn resistance, accurately describing a special kind of
patient who refused to accept psychoanalytic treatment, though apparently eager to co-operate. He described the
patient's defiance, his worthless communication during the sessions, his 'sensitiveness to anything that injures his
self-love', and his inclination to feel 'humiliated', analysis being felt as an attack on his self-esteem. He
considered all these features to be expressions of the patient's narcissism, and also of the presence of an element
of envy. He related such attitudes of superiority towards the analyst, onanistic or masturbatory activities as well
as anal-sadistic personality traits, to a hostility and negative attitude towards the physician, pointing out that
these patients often make use of their speech as an activity comparable to emptying their bowels.
To summarise, the main factors described by Abraham in this form of resistance against psychoanalysis were
narcissism, envy and hostility, with anal-sadistic character traits as a background.
Having been influenced by Abraham's ideas, in the 1920s Melanie Klein developed her work, mainly with
children, through which she confirmed and enlarged some conclusions concerning the important problem of
envy,

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bringing to the scene the observations of a female analyst.
In 1925, Klein suggested that the feeling of envy was oral in nature, related to the primal scene, and based on
the infantile theory that coitus is a gratifying process where mother incorporates orally the father's penis, and
stated that: 'This envy proved to be the central point of Erna's neurosis' (1925p. 56, our italics).
It is of the utmost importance that, in 1932, she completed these views and defined more accurately what she
had described before, namely, that the [child's] feeling of envy is a reaction to the phantasy that its parents
enjoy mutual sexual pleasures [of an oral sort], while he/she gets nothing but frustration. Consequently,
what the little girl 'primarily wants is not to possess a penis of her own as an attribute of masculinity, but to
incorporate her father's penis as an object of roal satisfaction' (1932p. 196, our italics), as is the case in her
phantasies about her parents' sexual intercourse.
Conversely, the boy compensates for his feelings of hate, anxiety, envy and inferiority, by reinforcing his
pride in the possession of a penis, and displacing this pride on to intellectual activities, which helps him to face
his feminine phase:
This displacement forms the basis of a very hostile attitude of rivalry towards women and affects his
character-formation in the same way as envy of the penis affects the girls (Klein, 1932p. 250).
She also pointed out (1932) the reverse situation: the boy's envy and hatred of the mother related to his
feelings of inferiority and disadvantage on account of his wish for a child.
Summarising Klein's views on envy, as published before 1932, we can say that for a long time she saw envy
as a (reaction) feeling associated with hatred and hostility, which stemmed from early frustrations (oral, anal,
urethral and genital) related to the mother or the primal scene, and to the child's theories and phantasies that
father and mother exchange all sorts of gratifications while leaving the child unconditionally frustrated; the penis
being a magical all-goodness-giving instrument which the girls lacks, and the capacity to have a child being
lacked by the boys. Both girls and boys feel inferior as a result of their particular specific lack.
Thus, the notion of penis envy was no longer static or anatomical in its essence; the woman's procreative
capacity was not a mere substitute for the girl's penis envy, but could be the source of this feeling both to boys
and girls; the primal scene was the origin of intense oral frustrations that eventually triggered (the reaction
feeling) oral envy of something abstract and intangible, namely 'pleasure … gratification … goodness'.
In 1957, Klein published 'Envy and gratitude', a comprehensive and final personal view on the subject of
envy. In this paper, she made a broad review of envy in the light of her more recent experience, and proposed an
important shift in the concept, which was endorsed by many of her followers and disputed by her opponents and
some former collaborators.
This new approach was based on her earlier findings about the newborn's mental functioning, especially her
description of the 'positions' (paranoid-schizoid and depressive), the early defences, foremost among which was
projective identification.
KLEIN'S VIEW OF THE NEWBORN'S PSYCHIC CONDITIONS
Based largely on her clinical work, and making tentative reconstructions about the newborn's feelings
towards the mother's breast, Klein concluded that, from the very beginning of extra-uterine life, the newborn has
an incipient ego, rudimentary and largely lacking coherence, but capable of performing some important
functions, mainly defensive, such as: deflection of the death instinct, splitting, integration, projective and
introjective identification, idealisation, omnipotent denial, and so on.
The capacities to deal with anxiety and to discriminate self from non-self at the dawn of life are related by
Klein to a constitutional factor. The latter is a main point of controversy with authors who think that at the
beginning there is a state of fusion or undifferentiation (see Gaddini, 1987); (Mahler, 1967); (Ogden, 1986),
(1989b); (Pacheco, 1983), related to a lack of

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anatomo-physiological and functional capacities (lack of coherence), which maintains the infant in a situation of
poor cognitive abilities, particularly in conceptualising time and space. These still-undeveloped capacities also
combine to prevent the infant from 'knowing' himself as opposed to non-self (Gaddini, 1987); (Joffe, 1969),
thus making him unable at this stage to perceive and experience as his own some of the attributed feelings to him
by Klein.
Klein thought that 'the capacity both for love and for destructive impulses is, to some extent, constitutional,
though varying individually in strength and interacting from the beginning with external conditions' (1957p.
180).
In her opinion,
An element of frustration [by the breast] is bound to enter into the infant's earliest relation [to it] …
because even a happy feeding situation cannot altogether replace the pre-natal unity with the mother.
Also, the infant's longing for an inexhaustible and ever-present breast (p. 179, our italics)
is not only food-determined, but is fundamentally rooted in anxiety, for 'he also wants to be freed from
destructive impulses and persecutory anxiety' (p. 185).
The mother, on the other hand, is felt to be omnipotent, and it is up to her to prevent all pain and evils from
any source, be it internal or external (which at that time are still not sufficiently differentiated).
Klein describes many instances of the infant–mother relationship and the inevitable frustrations that
accompany it because the mother is not what the infant needs her to be. Many internal and external
circumstances influence this primitive relationship, leading to grievances on the part of the infant. The mother's
inevitable failure is barely tolerated by the infant, which makes it easy to understand the universal character of
lack, and the breach in the infant's desire to be safe and above any pain or evil, internal or external.
Stein (1990) pointed out that Klein's ideas should be understood not as a set of descriptive instinctivistic
concepts, but rather as the dynamics of affective and emotional states of mind. Not a conflict among the life and
death instincts in themselves, but among their emotional, affective expressions (derivatives), the complex
feelings of love and hate. In this context Klein introduced her new ideas about envy.
KLEIN'S CONCEPT OF ENVY AND ITS PSYCHIC CATEGORY
The main shift in the Kleinian theory of envy was based on two ideas already present in her earlier work: the
existence of a death instinct that shares the same status as life instinct; and her ideas that the ego exists from birth
and is capable of performing many functions.
Klein, unlike Freud, sees the death instinct as the origin of all aggression and consequently of all anxiety,
mainly the threat of annihilation (operation of the death instinct within). This early anxiety triggers primitive ego
defences in order to maintain the integrity of the self.
In her 1957 paper, Klein presents the concept of envy as an oral-sadistic and anal-sadistic expression of
destructive impulses, operative from the beginning of life, having a constitutional basis (meaning that though
envy might be active from the beginning of life, it is not the destructive impulse in itself, but one of its
expressions or derivatives). Nevertheless, in spite of proposing a very neat concept of envy, Klein did not
maintain a consistent approach to the problem of its category.
Speaking of envy alternately as a feeling or as an impulse (Klein, 1957p. 188), it is difficult to determine
which in Klein's mind was its psychic category. This looseness of approach leads to some problems, for while
one may easily consider an impulse to be constitutionally determined, the same is not true if one speaks of a
feeling. One can say that the sexual impulse is constitutionally determined; the same, however cannot be said
about sadness, happiness, or resentment. If we decide that envy is located in the 'feeling category', it makes us
think that, although it has a constitutional basis (the destructive impulse, which has no ethical or moral values
attached to it), its effective appearance will depend greatly on the interaction of this disposition with the
environment, as in so many other instances of human development, be they normal or pathological. Klein herself
seems to underline this

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when she says that the capacity both for love and for destruction is to some extent constitutional.
Of gratitude, Klein says that, 'One major derivative of the capacity for love is the feeling of gratitude'
(1957p. 187, our italics). Conversely, we can say that one major derivative of the capacity for hate is the
feeling of envy, if one considers the two mental phenomena as belonging to the same category.
But, if the capacity (potential) to hate is constitutional, it does not follow that a particular baby will hate
using all its (potential) capacity. And that still does not imply that in a particular situation a particular baby will
have, as a consequence of his potential to hate, the feeling of envy. It will depend on the complex interactions
that will occur between baby and environment. And if this envy comes to happen, say some of Klein's critics, it
must occur later on in the infant's life, when the 'finesse' of self–object discrimination is already underway.
Klein, on the other hand, tries (ambivalently?) to convey that envy is innate and can barely be affected or
reduced by experience.
Paula Heimann criticised this point of view, saying that
complex emotions … are antedated and allocated to the most immature phase of life … by assuming
that envy and gratitude are inborn and operative with effective energy from the beginning of life …
these emotions are placed in the category of instinctual drives and replace Freud's concept of
instinctual drives … (1962pp. 166-7).
While Klein dealt with envy as an impulse (instinct) or as a 'simple affect', Joffe conceptualises it as a
response to mental pain: 'a complex object-related attitude or tendency, made up of different component parts,
and a certain level of ego development is necessary for its existence' (1969p. 540). Spielman (1971) and Stein
(1990) consider envy a compound affect or emotion; Segal (1964) speaks of envy as 'a most important emotion'
(p. 39), and refers to Klein as considering envy as 'one of the most primitive and fundamental emotions' (p. 40);
Joseph (1986) and Spillius (1993) seem to consider it a feeling.
Spielman (1971), in particular, concluded that envy is not to be considered as a simple affect but as a
compound or fused affect, which can be reduced to its elements only under special circumstances.
Joffe (1969) considers that 'envy is always a manifestation of an essentially ambivalent relationship'
associated with 'complex social responses rooted in the development of ego functions and reality object
relations, and should never be reduced to instinctual sources alone' (p. 542). His idea is that envy can be
considered as one of the responses to mental pain that occurs as a consequence of a discrepancy between the
state of actual representation of the self (as consciously or unconsciously perceived by the individual) and the
ideal state of the self-representation. The ideal self-representation can be defined as the shape of the self that is
most desired at any particular time. It is 'the self I want to be' and is related to the greatest degree of well-
being and gratification of the individual at a particular time. Painful discrepancies between self and ideal self
may lead to a variety of reactions, among them depression and envy.
Greenberg & Mitchell (1983) think that envy can be more economically derived from other factors than from
constitutional aggression, and see it as a response to early (inevitable) frustration, due to extreme dependency
(greedy needfulness), intense anxiety and/or inconsistency of mothering figures, and the primitive nature of the
child's cognitive capabilities.
In 1987, Etchegoyen et al. published a paper in which envy is seen as an inborn (built-in) destructive force
(impulse) that antedates and is not related necessarily to any post-natal experience. In their view, it is a faulty
(albeit simple and convincing) way of thinking to relate the feeling of envy to the existence of a previous
moment, when what the other has and one lacks was painfully recognised, and this first recording of the existing
difference involving a frustration sets in the envious attack (Racker, 1957), (1960).
According to these authors, it is faulty because it makes envy depend on an original frustration in such a way
as to include envy along with it. They argue that such a point of view leads to a conclusion that a libidinal

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tie per se triggers an envious reaction (which does not seem to be suggested in Racker's proposition): 'With an
explanation like this, a view of development may be offered in which envy plays no part nor has any reason to
do so' (Etchegoyen et al., 1987p. 50); if it did, it would be the result of an original frustration (narcissistic
wound, trauma). These authors assert that those who flatly reject the theory of primary envy will never see it
emerge in the patient's material, and imply that if one does not take envy as constitutional one is doing
'supportive psychotherapy' (p. 50).
These arguments seem to contradict the findings of Klein herself, at a time when she was certainly not doing
'supportive psychotherapy', but was working with the concept of envy (not yet the 'constitutional' one) as an
outcome of the well-known complementary series, Constitution + Experience, and concluding, as early as 1924
(Klein, 1925), that envy could be considered the core of the neurosis of a little girl. On the other hand, the
conceptualisation of what psychoanalysis is, as opposed to supportive psychotherapy, cannot lie exclusively in
the interpretation of a single mental phenomenon.
Etchegoyen et al. also claim that the autonomous (innate) origin of envy is fundamental, because 'the
analysand should take the charge of the hostile impulses … [he] must accept more forcefully that his conflicts do
not depend solely on the other's behaviour but also on his own' (1987p. 50, our italics).
It is one of the tasks of analysis to enable the analysand to take charge of his impulses, both loving and
hostile, with which he will have to deal all through his life, willingly or not. And that is based on the capacity to
differentiate what depends on the 'amount' of frustration from the intensity or inadequacy of his own impulses
and judgement. We agree that he should know that his conflicts do not depend solely on the other's behaviour but
also (not solely) on his own.
Betty Joseph has suggested that 'we all are born with a potentiality for envy', and that dealing with it implies
the releasing of 'split-off or stifled love and gratitude', thus relieving the 'awful grip of the envious feelings'
(1986p. 22, our italics). For Joseph, then, envy is not considered as a built-in impulse that has no connection
with life experiences, but rather is viewed as a (potential) feeling, which is dependent on many factors present
in the early infant–mother relationship, as well as in the infant's instincts (complementary series).
More recently, Spillius (1993) begins her paper by stating that 'Envy is disturbing—both as a feeling and as
a concept in psychoanalysis' (1993p. 1199, our italics), and that Klein herself did not assert 'as is sometimes
thought, that envy is entirely constitutional' (p. 1200). In Spillius's view,
the experience and expression of envy, and indeed of love and hate in general, occur and develop in
relationships with objects, so that one can never meet the constitutional component unmodified by
experience (pp. 1200-1).
It is her opinion that one can only speak about the patient's envy in the framework of its expression in the
transference. Although Kleinian analysts continued to deal with the concept of envy as a cornerstone of their
theory, there has been a shift towards a 'focus more on the expression of envy in the clinical situation', and 'a
gradual assimilation of some criticisms of Kleinian usage so that there is now a greater acceptance of the
inevitable ubiquity of envy … that it is not usually helpful to interpret envy directly to patients …' (p. 1202), in
such a way that most of the Kleinian analysts have been less prone to find a confirmation of primitive
(constitutional?) envy in all clinical material.
ORIGINS, ONSET AND THE PRIMITIVE OBJECT OF ENVY
According to Klein, and coherent with her view that envy is an innate (feeling/impulse) phenomenon, envy is
present and active from birth as a direct expression of the death instinct, and is independent of any post-natal
occurrence.
She points to two different kinds of envy: the primary, directed to the breast itself, and the later forms, in
which envy is no longer

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focused on the breast, but on the mother receiving the father's penis and having babies inside her, giving birth to
them and being able to feed them.
Greenberg & Mitchell (1983) describe Klein's view of primary envy as a particularly malignant and
disastrous form of innate aggression inasmuch as it is directed toward good objects, in contrast to other kinds of
aggression. The child experiences the goodness and nurturing which the mother provides, but feels it to be
insufficient and resents the mother's control over it. The breast releases the milk in limited amounts and then
goes away. In the child's phantasy, Klein suggests, the breast is felt to be hoarding the milk for its own purposes.
Envy contributes to the infant's difficulties in building up his good object, for he feels that the gratification of
which he was deprived has been kept for itself by the breast that frustrated him. 'This feeling [envy] adds to his
sense of grievance and hate, resulting in a disturbed relation to his mother' (Klein, 1957p. 183, our italics),
meaning perhaps that there might be some primeval non-envious grievance and hate.
Envy spoils the primal good object and gives particular impetus to the sadistic attacks on the mother's breast,
which becomes bad by being bitten up and poisoned by urine and faeces, and loses its value. It also spoils the
capacity for enjoyment and becomes persistent, because gratitude cannot then mitigate the destructive impulses:
envy and greed.
A good account of the clinical consequences of envy is given by Zanin (1989), in a comprehensive paper.
From a Kleinian standpoint, the author presents case material in which envy towards the analyst is displayed,
leading to stalemates and impasses. Envy, in the author's view, is responsible for the feelings of humiliation and
smallness on the part of the patient as well as the infant.
Excessive envy (implying there is envy which is not excessive, or 'normal') indicates that there are
abnormally strong paranoid and schizoid features (and the infant can be regarded as ill), and increases the
intensity and duration of the attacks, making it more difficult for the infant to regain the lost good object. The
envious attacks on the breast pass less quickly than the sadistic attacks and destroy the goodness of the object in
the infant's mind more strongly and lastingly.
Greed, envy and persecutory anxiety inevitably augment each other, for the feeling of harm done by envy, the
great anxiety that stems from this, and the resulting uncertainty about the goodness of the object, have the effect
of increasing greed and destructive impulses.
Common daily experiences can activate the earliest envy and, in every individual, frustration and unhappy
circumstances rouse some envy and hate throughout life, though the strength of these emotions and the way the
individual copes with them varies considerably.
Doubts connected with the good object easily arise even in a secure child–mother relation, owing to the
infant's dependency on the mother as well as to the recurrent anxiety that his greed and destructive impulses will
get the better of him—very important in depressive states. In any stage of life, under the stress of anxiety, the
belief and trust in a good object can be shaken, varying its intensity and duration, which determine the ego's fate.
Hope and trust help people through great adversity, and effectively counteract persecution.
In contrast to this difficulty of building up a good internal object, a child with a strong capacity for love and
gratitude has a deep-rooted relationship with a good object and can, without being fundamentally damaged,
withstand temporary states of envy, hatred and grievance, which arise even in children who are loved and well
mothered (but who can decide if a child is loved sufficiently and well mothered?). Thus, if these states are
transient, the good object will be regained time and time again, which is an essential factor in establishing the
foundations of a strong ego.
According to Klein, the very envious person is insatiable, because his envy stems from within and therefore
always finds an object to focus on. The envious person thus 'can never be satisfied, and therefore his envy is
reinforced' (1957p. 204).
Nevertheless, other authors (Joffe, 1969); (Spielman, 1971) think that envy, as we define it, can only appear
when the infant's cognitive and discriminative as well as integrative capacities

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are present, later on in development (depressive position), and not from birth.
Furthermore, even considering that there is a functioning ego from the beginning of extrauterine (maybe
before?) life, and that there might be a kind of phylogenetic 'knowledge' about the existence of a 'good object',
and that there is some 'unconscious knowledge' about 'inside' and 'outside', the psychical operations necessary to
trigger the envious reaction would be far too complex to be achieved at this stage of development.
Klein herself seemed to consider that these discriminatory capacities could only be fully achieved after the
establishment of the depressive position, at around 3-6 months, thus making clear that her concept of envy has no
backing in these mental operations.
For Klein, the prototypical envied object is the breast, as soon as the infant is born and comes into contact
with it:
The first object to be envied is the feeding breast, for the infant feels that it possesses everything he
desires and that it has an unlimited flow of milk, and love which the breast keeps for its own
gratification(1957p. 183, our italics).
And also: 'We find … that the breast in its good aspect is the prototype of maternal goodness, inexhaustible
patience and generosity, as well as of creativeness' (p. 180, our italics).
We think that this is not an adequate description of the 'good' object of the paranoidschizoid position, but
rather of the 'perfect' (idealised) breast, as is suggested by Simões (1962). According to this author, it is
possible to understand why envy arrives even if the infant is well fed, because 'for the baby this is not a good
breast, but, from the very first moment it was an idealised breast' (1962pp. 127, our translation).
Though the concept of primary envy involves the hatred and destructive wishes towards the 'good object', we
think that this distinction of which object is being envied is very important, for it determines different
understandings of the clinical situation.
If, as most Kleinians see it, the envied object is the 'good object', then it becomes quite understandable why
sometimes envious patients seem to be looked upon with such surprise and perhaps even indignation.
If, however, we consider that the envied object is not the 'good', but the 'idealised object', which actually fits
well with Klein's description, we can more easily and with less surprise understand why this object is so
admired and hated. For the idealised object knows everything, and has all the power, all the 'well-being'
experience, all the love, goodness and richness of the world, and deprives (even if it lasted but one of 'our'
seconds) the baby of this omnipotent and omniscient state of mind, which the baby so desperately needs at the
very beginning of his life as the means to assure that he will survive, both physically and psychically. The
envious feeling includes this bitter aspect: on the one hand, this exceedingly powerful object shares with the
baby its 'god-like' qualities; on the other, it 'makes' the baby experience that it does not belong to him. The infant
is neither the proprietor nor the subject of such omnipotent greatness and omniscience, but he has been robbed of
it (by this very same object?) without even knowing how it came to happen, for, according to Klein herself, the
object is felt to be keeping all the milk and love for its own gratification.
Such loss, related to a non-definable and non-identifiable cause, for which no understanding is viable at that
period, possibly has to do with the so-called 'nameless dread' felt by the newborn, who experiences the terror of
dismantling, or melting, its fragile ego when the illusion of total security is lost. So, in our view, the envied
object must be the one that is capable of being above all the uncertainties and pains, all the lack of well-being
and peace of mind, the owner of all the good in the world. It is not, as it might seem, a mere 'good' object to
whom all that is devoted is sheer hate and destruction, but it is the owner of all the desired goods, certainties,
richness, well-being and peace. This means that it has to be recognised as the separate owner, and perhaps the
thief of all the desired bliss, item by item. It fits the description of the idealised object, at the same time so
admired and so hated.
Joffe (1969), addressing the subject of the object of envy from another point of view,

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considers that the incipient capacities of the ego of the newborn make it unable to elaborate the complex
fantasies attributed to it by Klein, even though an adult patient can understand such interpretations.
Spillius, describing the classical Kleinian point of view says that,
When the individual approaches the depressive position … [t]he stage is set for greater awareness of
envy and jealousy … when they approach the depressive-position mode of thinking … envy is likely
to be experienced most acutely, sometimes consciously, and retreat to the defences of the
paranoidschizoid position may ensue (1993p. 1202).
It is thus at this very moment (when approaching the depressive position), when the object is more clearly
recognised as being external to the self, that the envy process, as we generally understand it, really sets in, and
that prior to it there is something which, for the sake of scientific accuracy, shouldn't be called envy.
SOME RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS ON ENVY
More recently there has been a progressive modification of the (classical) Kleinian point of view concerning
the envy problem, which can be seen in Rosenfeld (1987):
It is inevitable that envy arises in human development and that the child, or the patient in analysis, is
going to feel small or inferior at some times … the child, or patient, feels put down and may actually
have been put down by the parents or … by the analyst (pp. 266-7, our italics).
Spillius (1993), though claiming adherence to the Kleinian concept of envy, departs from the classical
Kleinian point of view by proposing definitively the inclusion of the 'external object' in the circuit of envy, as
well as by proposing the existence of different varieties of envy: ego or consciousness-dystonic and impenitent
—virtually conscious.
In the first case, envy is defined by both analyst and patient in the same way (destructive attack on a good
object), the individual directs defences against becoming aware that his behaviour might be based on it, and
intense guilt is aroused if the individual becomes fully aware of it. This allows a direct approach of the subject
within a common ground of understanding. In the second case, however, there is no such common ground of
understanding, because while the analyst 'thinks the patient is doing a destructive attack on a good object; the
patient thinks he is making a legitimate attack on an object who deserves to be hated', and 'does not suffer from
conscious guilt and a sense of responsibility for his envy; he thinks it is the envied person's fault that he, the
envier, feels so wretched' (1993p. 1203).
Spillius links this second variety of envy to a character perversion, where sadism, masochism and
preoccupation with power are present. She considers that the severity and destructiveness of envy are not
directly linked to its variety, and that there might be other ways of experiencing envy. She also tries to avoid
characterisation of the two varieties of envy in terms of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, and
goes on to construct a model that may add to the understanding of factors that can mitigate or exacerbate envy,
centring her attention on the 'giver–receiver' relationship, for it can be clearly seen in analysis as well as in
infancy, and also because it is the relation in which it is especially probable that envy will be triggered. She
describes as crucial to the process both the giver's feelings (conscious or unconscious) as far as giving is
concerned, and how these feelings are consciously or unconsciously (well or badly) perceived by the receiver,
acknowledging the extremely complicated situation which thereby arises, because both the giver's and receiver's
conscious and unconscious feelings are involved in the establishment of the final outcome at either extremity of
the process. She examines some of the possibilities in this process, in which she attributes the same weight to
both giver and receiver. Spillius makes a point of how complex and complicated these processes that happen
between mother and baby are, and stresses that she uses her model 'in order to achieve more accurate
descriptions

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of envious reactions', becoming very cautious as far as giving a causal explanation for this complex feeling.
These ideas represent an important shift in the Kleinian point of view on this issue: for both Rosenfeld and
Spillius, envy is no longer a straight result of a genetically-imprinted impulse (constitutional envy), but rather an
outcome of a very complex process—the give-and-take of life, in all its extent. They consider equally
fundamental the 'contribution' both of giver (parent) and receiver (baby) for the development of envy, in contrast
to previous Kleinian authors.
Spillius's paper also points to the richness of possibilities in the mother–baby (giver–receiver) relationship,
in which there might be a feeling of greater 'consonance' or 'dissonance', and where the parameters are both the
conscious and unconscious purposes and feelings of both participants. The envious feelings seem to stem from
what could be called a 'dissonance' in this emotional 'chord'.
It might thus be thought that the greater the 'dissonance', not only of conscious or unconscious purposes or
feelings but also of the practical capacities to perform the giving or receieving among mother-giver and baby-
receiver, the greater the possibility of development of 'malignant envious circles'.
If envy is admittedly a compound affect, a reaction or an outcome of many trends, then its final shape will
also be related to differences that might occur as a result of its triggering at a particular stage of development, as
Klein herself observed, distinguishing between a primary (related to the primitive breast) and later forms of
envy (related to the parents as total objects).
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF ENVY
This discussion leads us to the most primitive stages of development, to the inchoation of mental processes.
Direct observation of infants is available, but there is not sufficient data to produce a 'provable' theory about
when and what happens in the inner experience of a newborn. Besides, it is possible that some of the mental
processes begin before birth, and then we have to rely on instrumental methods of observation (Piontelli, 1992).
In order to bridge gaps in knowledge, theories about those primitive stages are formulated. Theories are
considered 'good-enough' as long as they explain a certain set of phenomena, do not contradict observation, are
not self-contradictory, and allow further progress of knowledge.
Envy seems to be related to the question of when and how the human subject develops a knowledge of
himself as separated from other subjects, that is, if there is a departure from a situation of partial or total
undifferentiation towards one of subject–object differentiation, and when and how it occurs from the infant's (or
foetus's?) point of view.
Many authors have approached the problem, either from a clinical or a direct-observational standpoint. The
classical psychoanalytic (clinical) approach to the early stages of development has, since Freud (primary
narcissism), dealt with the possible existence of an 'undifferentiated' stage (from a cognitive and/or affective
point of view). The relations of envy with this 'undifferentiated' state are hinted at through allusions to its
connections with narcissism (Abraham, 1919); (Etchegoyen et al., 1985); (Freud, 1937); (Riviere, 1936);
(Rosenfeld, 1987).
Gaddini (1987), Joffe (1969), Mahler (1967), Ogden (1986), (1989b), Pacheco (1983) and Winnicott (1958)
are some of the numerous authors who have dealt with and theorised about some sort of undifferentiated mental
state at the dawn of life.
Stern (1985), departing from his experience both as a developmentalist and a psychoanalyst, concluded that
infants
never experience a period of total self/other undifferentiation. There is no confusion between self and
other in the beginning or at any point during infancy … and never experience an autistic-like phase
(1985p. 10).
He dismisses any symbiotic-like phase and any experience of 'non-organisation' on the part of the infant.
According to Stern, this notion would be the result of a reification made by

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clinical theorists who 'have taken the observer's knowledge of infants—that is relative undifferentiation
compared with the differentiated view of other children' (p. 46, our italics) as a departure for their theory. By
admitting this relative undifferentiation, Stern keeps the discussion open, because one cannot really assess how
relative is this 'relative undifferentiation'. It may well be that this is the conceptual space that the clinical
theorists have been using as their departure point to 'invent' a state of 'undifferentiation' (more or less relative).
Tustin (1992) revised her previous ideas about the existence of a 'normal primary autism' vis-à-vis the recent
observational studies of babies. In her opinion, psychogenic autism can be seen as a means of coping with a
state of terror, 'a massive "not-knowing" and "not-hearing" provoked by traumatic awareness of bodily
separateness … from a mother with whose body they [autistic children] had previously felt fused and equated'
(1992p. 11), implying that some sort of undifferentiation was present prior to the development of the autistic
phenomenon. In our view, a model that takes into account this kind of partial or total undifferentiation at some
primitive stage of development is still useful as a theoretical 'invention'.
What follows is a set of hypotheses, some of a speculative character, for which we cannot claim more than
do other theories which deal with facts that lie beyond our immediate or sensuous capacity to grasp. In order to
clarity our ideas, we think it might be useful to synthesise some thoughts about the conditions that surround the
psychological birth of the human infant, who has to cope with a massive invasion of stimuli as soon as he is
born.
Let us consider the prenatal state. Intrauterine conditions are maintained at an optimum and stable level as far
as nourishment, thermal variations, pressure and sensuous damping are concerned, in order to allow proper
foetal development. The foetus has no 'reflexive capacities' in the sense of conscious thought, nor does it
discriminate itself from elements of the intrauterine environment, even if under observation it gives hints of
having an emotional life and interest for its bodily and environmental circumstances (Tractenberg, 1992).
We may suppose that, at the moment that some mental activity begins in the foetus, there is a situation of
psychic fusion (undifferentiation) between foetus and mother, from the foetus's point of view. This stage, in our
view, is not to be considered only as an objectless state, but it might also be, from the foetus's point of view, a
subjectless state, as far as any knowledge or discrimination of the subject is concerned. Though to an 'external
observer' this is a situation of complete dependence, and in certain moments it might become apparently painful,
we are limited in evaluating the foetus's point of view.
It is possible that there is no 'knowledge' of dependence, and suffering can only be estimated on an indirect
basis (heart rate, muscular activity, grimaces). This situation seems to correspond to what Freud called primary
narcissism: a situation in which the foetus has no knowledge whatsoever of 'himself' or of anything that is 'non-
himself'; he is identified with his own creator, an omnipotent-omniscient object. At the beginning of its existence
the foetus would be in a state of identification with the 'Almighty God', who created him and assures him of
every need in his path of development and growth.
We may suppose that, at a particular time, some kind of self–object separation develops, characterised by a
search for an 'external' object. This search might be present in the foetus's development as early as the eighth
week, as is described by authors such as Piontelli (1992). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that,
from the foetus's point of view, there exists any sense of such separation or that these objects are external to him.
Gaddini presents an interesting view on these nebulous times; before acknowledging the existence of anything
external to itself, the foetus is concerned with the functioning of its own body: 'Physiological learning
necessarily precedes mental learning' (1987p. 317). After birth, the physiological functions are exposed to an
environment that 'no longer acts as the stable and precise boundary of their operation' (p. 317). For a certain
period of time, the newborn's mind is alert in order to provide the needs of the organism, 'the mental experience

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of something which has been physically lost' (p. 317, our italics).
Tustin (1992), referring to these sensations of loss, cites some authors who have dealt with this concept, for
example, Balint (1968—'basic fault'), Bibring (1953—'primal depression'), Mahler (1961—'loss of the
symbiotic love object'), and Winnicott (1958—'psychotic depression').
Tustin suggests 'an integrative hypothesis in relation to the origins of primal envy and penis envy. At these
levels, loss of physical presence of the mother seems like an amputation. The child feels that he has lost an all-
powerful, magical bodily part …', which leads to the 'feelings of helplessness which Edward Bibring (1953)
described as being at the root of primal depression' (p. 92). In Tustin's opinion, 'it provokes the savage,
predatory envy of "sticking out bits"' that plug in 'the holes resulting from separation experiences, which lead to
sensations of helplessness, hopelessness and extreme vulnerability. At this level, "sticking out bits" means all-
powerful and in control, and this is felt to ensure survival' (p. 92).
Tustin describes the following possible course of events with autistic children:
For the young baby, the mother is experienced mainly in a sensuous way as a relief-giving agency. In
moments of bodily discomfort such as hunger, coldness, skin irritation or bodily pain, the infant
encounters the fact that he is helplessly at the mercy of bodily discomfort … the mother, who has been
taken for granted as a relief-giving part of his body, with little or no differentiation being made
between his body and hers, seems to be 'gone' … a relief-giving and exciting part of his body seems to
be missing. He is exposed to terrible 'not-me' discomfort … Dealing with this disillusionment, at a
sensation level, prepares him for the depressive position described by Klein (1937) (1992pp. 93-4).
Our focus then is the moment when this incipient 'knowledge' (though it might be called 'unconscious' from
our standpoint) about his differentiation from the 'omnipotent idealised god-like' object begins. It is probably at
this moment that there occurs a breach of the fusion, possibly triggered by some sort of discomfort, suffering or
pain, which characterises the lack referred to above. From the foetus/newborn's point of view, what has
happened to him may be seen as a loss of something undefinable, limitless, that could represent his survival or
death: a 'nameless loss'.
We wonder if this situation can be regarded as pertaining to the realm of frustration, as it is usually
described by an external observer. If we think about the infant, who desperately needs his mother's love, care,
feeding, without even knowing yet what a mother is, we can assess the situation differently. From the infant's
point of view, either he is the owner of all the desired goods, the master of his own existence (omnipotence and
omniscience), nothing can hurt him, and above all pain and suffering (safe), the 'Almighty-God' himself; or he is
in such an unstable situation that dealing with his feebleness becomes a cyclopean task. Time and space have no
meaning for him yet; a one-second delay can be an eternity. Absence can mean nothingness (black hole) or a bad
concrete object inside. Postponement has no possible representation, and might lead to psychic pain, disruption
or death.
If we take into account the fact that the most important thing for the baby's survival (this being not only a
fantasy, but also an objective fact) is not part of himself (breast-mother-care-taker), and, for that matter, can be
denied (as probably he has already experienced) at any moment, the infant might feel that every lack (pain) leads
to death. If we avoid ethical or religious values, we can suppose that the irruption of aggressive feelings against
this object is one of the possibilities to be expected, not only as a means of destruction but also of survival.
If the baby is not capable of maintaining, with the help of its loving-caring mother, the illusion that he is safe,
as far as his physical and psychical security are concerned, he may feel that he is nothing, can do nothing, which
is in part true. In this period, the infant's fears may be related to an unknown feeling coming from nowhere (or
everywhere) that threatens his greatest (and, at that time, perhaps only) value—his own life.
Winnicott pointed to the importance of the illusion-disillusionment process in the mental development of the
newborn, stressing that,

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 The mother's eventual task is gradually to disillusion the infant, but she has no hope of success unless
at first she has been able to give sufficient opportunity for illusion (1953p. 92).
Our point of view is that the maintenance of illusion is the main task of the mother at this stage, in order to
allow the newborn to acquire, through the projective-introjective processes, the necessary psychic resilience to
be able to cope with the inevitable ongoing disillusionment (loss). It is this continuum of illusion-
disillusionment (related to its caretaker) in the first weeks of life that at the same time grants the infant the
feeling that he either has not lost anything, or that he has lost something that is retrievable, thanks to his
omnipotence-omniscience.
This more or less smooth process of recognition of loss, and of the object's capacities, is only fully
accomplished when the depressive position is achieved, which implies the instant and backward understanding
of everything he has suffered until then. We think that the loss is not only experienced at the bodily level, as
Tustin (1992) seems to imply, but is also felt in all strata of the infant's incipient mental apparatus as the loss of
an identification with an omnipotent object.
We propose, avoiding moral, religious or cultural biases, that instead of considering envy the result of
frustration or the direct expression of instinct, we consider it as a complex feeling, fully developed only around
the establishment of the depressive position. This feeling would stem from the loss of an identification (total?,
partial?) with an omnipotent-idealised object (breast/mother), which we call a 'nameless loss'. It would occur
at a time when, we suggest, there would be a (relative) self–object undifferentiation and no real feeling of
frustration. Rather, the infant's feeling would be in the nature of a lack of something, meaning that the self was
'robbed', forcefully torn up by the object. This would lead to a breach of self-idealisation, security, well-being,
goodness and the blissful state of mind.
We suggest that the development of envy is related to this loss that occurs so early in life that there is no
possibility of working it through (mourning). This loss of the 'fusion' with the idealised omnipotent object is
dealt with through a precarious process, due to the incompetence of the psychic apparatus.
This process that we call precocious mourning leads to the establishment of some kind of (melancholic)
depression. This ineffective mourning for the lost (idealised) self foreshadows the situation of the envious adult:
a bitter loser, robbed of his omnipotent safety, revengeful and turned to destroy the 'thief' that is deemed
responsible for the acute pain of not being the idealised object himself. Thus, immersed in this universal envious
experience, the baby tries to 'steal' back from the 'thief'-object and bring back to himself what he believes to be
his possession.
Our point of view thus is that envy belongs to the feeling category (compound affect). It cannot be reduced to
a single impulse or even be considered a derivative of a single impulse, but is a complex and multidetermined
psychic phenomenon, an outcome of the interaction of many processes: constitutional trends (for example,
impulses and their strength, particular dispositional arrangements, and so on), interaction with the environment
(giver–receiver relation), cultural factors, defence mechanisms, etc.
The role played by the death instinct in providing the aggressive aspects of envy is undeniable. However, as
far as constitutional factors are concerned, the life instinct plays an equally fundamental role. Thus, hate,
destructiveness and malignancy are surely expressions of the death instinct, and admiration, awe, need and love
are expressions of Eros.
The constitutional (instinctual) trends operate at the origin of the feeling of envy, determining what could be
called 'precursors' of envy: by this we mean the primitive sensations and phantasies (not yet feelings) derived
from the subject's primitive interactions with its caretaker(s).
We cannot but agree with Klein when she points to the great importance of gratifying experiences with the
real breast to the development of enjoyment and gratitude (1957), because, in our opinion, these experiences
allow the baby to feel and fantasise that he has not been 'robbed' of his omnipotent idealised self. This is
possible through the maintenance of a

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fantasised 'fusion' while his ego capacities mature. When speaking about the transference, Klein showed that the
analysis is likely to take full effect if the working through of envy reaches its deeper sources (Klein, 1957).
In our opinion, these 'deeper sources' are the inevitable conditions which all mankind is likely to face: to go
through a 'narrow passage' from the almost complete identification with the idealised omnipotent object to a
situation in which we are forced to abandon this omnipotent state without the adequate mental apparatus to
understand what is going on. This may have catastrophic effects, because of internal or external factors.
We do not want to convey the impression that we attribute all the responsibility to the so-called 'birth
trauma'. Rather, it depends on the interaction of the constitutional trends with the environment: the possibility of
meeting the object again and again in the mothering/feeding situation in due time (although it is impossible to
measure what 'due time' means for each individual) helps to sustain the illusion that nothing was really lost.
These successive encounters allow the newborn to develop his psychic capacities. At the same time, inevitable
frustration-like moments will tend to confirm the sense of having been 'robbed'.
We think that at these periods there is a mixture of strong feelings: some terrible, such as smallness,
impotence, complete dependency, humiliation; others awesome, such as admiration, passion, craving. All these
feelings are stirred up by the infant's situation, and point towards the unbridgeable gap between the real
capacities of the baby and those of the mother, which turns the mother's (breast's) capacities into an
unattainable gift.
Segal states it very clearly when explaining that,
Envy aims at being as good as the object but, when this is felt as impossible, it aims at spoiling the
goodness of the object, to remove the source of envious feelings (1964p. 40, our italics).
It is this unattainability that seems to be the original constituent of a feeling that in due course will become
known as envy.
At the moment that the infant 'discovers' his lack, the loss of his state of well-being, that the omnipotence and
omniscience that would grant him all good and peace of mind is opposed by a being that 'possesses' everything,
owns all that he has lost at the painful moments; he has his response to what has happened to him, namely, that
he was robbed by this admirable, lovable and desirable being that is omnipotent and omniscient as far as she is
compared with the infant.
Here we might come back to our 'modelvillain', Richard III: Freud saw this character as an example of a
handicapped person, a 'special case' who feels that he is granted the right to commit all sorts of crimes because
he has so many deformities, 'I may do wrong myself, since wrong has been done to me' (Freud, 1916, p. 315).
On the other hand, we think that the main problem this persona brings to the fore is a universal one, namely,
the feeling he has of no capacity to become a lover. This is not because he is 'ugly, or unfinished', but because
this represents a stage of development, the infancy of every human being. At this stage, when compared with
his mother/caretaker, he is nothing, he cannot give anything, unless in this interchange with his mother/caretaker
something is 'inculcated' into him. This 'inculcation' by no means indicates that it is only dependent on an active
effort of his mother/caretaker, but rather equally on his cognitive and emotional capacities to internalise
appropriately external signs (reintrojection of projective identifications). Therefore, since he has no capacity to
prove that he has love to give (he feels that he has nothing good in himself) because (in his mind) his caretaker
cannot see it, he will prove a villain, trying to destroy every sign of his meanness and ugliness vis-à-vis the
loved one (robber).
The unattainability of the ideal qualities of the object becomes an unbearable feeling for the ego. Gratitude
for the life-giving aspects of the object can be expected only later on, when sufficient separation and recognition
of the object's separateness can be achieved, but never before psychical and physical maturation allows this
painful developmental process to take place. Narcissistic defences are mobilised against this recognition, which
makes it more

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difficult, particularly if we are correct in saying that the magical qualities attributed to the object (the
inexhaustibility of the breast) are in reality impossible to obtain.
CONCLUSIONS
Envy is a universal and inevitable phenomenon of human development. It belongs to the category of feeling,
and is to be considered as a complex or compound feeling. Although derived from instinctual forces, we do not
see it as a 'constitutional' (impulse, instinct) phenomenon, but rather as a feeling that is fully developed only at
the establishment of the depressive position, when the ego achieves its cognitive, discriminative, evaluative and
synthetic capacities.
The most crucial aspects of envy seem to be the feelings of loss, lack (incompleteness), and the
unattainability of the qualities of the idealised-omnipotent object. We propose that they are dealt with through a
process that we call 'precocious mourning'—which is incomplete and a relative failure, owing to the inadequacy
of the infant's mental apparatus: the search to recover the fusion with the idealised-omnipotent object (Klein's
description of the phantasy of an inexhaustible breast), and destructive measures that are meant to eliminate the
source of feelings of anger and persecution (the sense of being robbed) triggered by the perception of the
unattainability of the desired ideal-omnipotent qualities of the object, which simultaneously mirrors the 'extreme
poverty' of the infant's ego, unless otherwise conveyed and appropriately perceived by the infant.
In our opinion, it does not seem necessary to adopt the controversial hypothesis of 'constitutional envy',
which implies that one is born with such a complex emotion 'imprinted genetically', or that one is born already
functioning on such a high level of abstraction as to be capable of considering self-object separation,
recognition of one's lack, of the other's qualities, comparison and emulation, etc.
In fact, the old 'repertoire' of Kleinian theories seems quite useful and comprehensive on this subject, with no
need to explain clinical data within the concept of 'constitutional envy', provided that one adds to the Kleinian
theory the existence of a primitive initial state of self-object psychic undifferentiation, as is proposed by many
authors, such as Mahler (1967), Ogden (1989a), (1989b), Pacheco (1983) and others.
The changes in Kleinian thought concerning envy must reflect a change in the theoretical grounds of the
concept, which it is to be hoped will lead to further advances in the clinical management of the difficult envious
patient. Envy is one of the most important human feelings, and inevitably has to be dealt with in every analysis.
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Article Citation [Who Cited This?]

Feldman, E. and De Paola, H. (1994). An Investigation Into the Psychoanalytic Concept of Envy. Int. J.
Psycho-Anal., 75:217-234

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