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6. AUTHOR(S)
This paper examines the causes and effects of mobile number portability WMNP) and provides a survey of its implementation in Europe. We
first examine the competitive effects and the costs of introducing MNP. Next, we discuss how to clarge for MNP. We argue that a price cap
regime starting from the average cost of porting is likely to provide appropriate incentives. Finally, we review the recent experience with
implementing MNP in Europe. Differences in the speed of porting and porting charges appear to explain part of the differences in the use of
MNP across countries.
ISL, German, Mobile number portability (MNP), Mobile communications, Switching costs
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT
July 2005***
University of Zurich and University of St. Gallen; Socioeconomic Institute, Bliimlisalpstr. 10, CH-8006
Zurich. Fax: +41-1-634 49 07, email: [email protected].
Helmut-Schmidt-University, Department of Economics, Holstenhofweg 85, D-22043 Hamburg. Fax:
+4940 6541 2042, email: [email protected].
Ruhr-University of Bochum, Department of Economics, Universitiitsstr. 150, GC3/62, D-44780 Bochum.
Fax: +49 234 32 14311, email: [email protected].
We thank two anonymous referees, Bernhard Albrecht, Oliver Kaliski, J6m Kruse, Scott Minehane;
Alexander Zuser and participants at the 15th Biennial Conference of the International Tele-
communications Society (ITS) at Berlin 2004 for most helpful comments and suggestions. We are also
grateful to the numerous individuals and regulatory authorities who have responded to our survey on
mobile number portability. Sandra Grunewald and Jutta Kehrer provided valuable research assistance.
44Q O5-33
1 Introduction
Traditionally, consumers of mobile telecommunications services were required to give up
their number when switching providers. Consumers were thus hesitant to switch from the
incumbent to competing operators, thereby inhibiting more effective competition in mobile
telecommunications. Lately, the picture has changed dramatically, as mobile number
portability (MNP) has been implemented in the European Union (EU) and many other
countries around the world.
According to the EU's Universal Service Directive of 7 March 2002, which became effective
on 25 July 2003, MNP means that customers are given the right to keep their mobile
telephone number when switching between service providers. Under Article 30 of this
Directive ,,Member States shall ensure that all subscribers of publicly available telephone
services, including mobile services, who so request can retain their number(s) independently
of the undertaking providing the service". 1 Similar approaches towards introducing MNP
have been adopted elsewhere.
From a property rights perspective, the introduction of MNP reallocates the property rights in
mobile telephone numbers from operators to consumers. The main rationale for this re-
allocation is the enhancement of competition in mobile telecommunications. As the EU
argues, "number portability is a key facilitator of consumer choice and effective competition
in a competitive telecommunications environment" (see EU, 2002, p. 57). Accordingly,
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) shall ensure that (a) charges for mobile number
portability are cost-oriented and "that direct charges to subscribers, if any, do not act as a
disincentive for the use of these facilities" (Art. 30 (2) Universal Service Directive), and (b)
retail charges for MNP do not distort competition (Art. 30 (3) Universal Service Directive).
In this paper, we present a non-technical analysis of the causes and effects of MNP, and we
review the recent experience gained with MNP in European countries. We start with a
discussion of the competitive effects and the costs of introducing MNP (sections 2 and 3).
Section 4 provides an analysis of appropriate charges for MNP, an aspect that has largely
been ignored in previous literature. We then proceed to evaluate the recent experience with
MNP in Europe (section 5). We offer concluding remarks in section 6.
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal
service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service
Directive), Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 April 2002, L108/51-77.
I B). 2 WhileMNP thus benefits consumers that actually switch, there are also benefits to non-
switching consumers resulting from more intense competition among providers of mobile
telecommunications services (benefit 2).3 Furthermore, introducing MNP benefits consumers
who place calls to ported numbers (benefit 3). Without MNP, these consumers have to update
their address books, may be unable to call a particular user, etc. 4 Finally, introducing MNP
benefits mobile customers because of the reallocation of property rights (benefit 4). The fact
that MNP reallocates property rights in telephone number is especially important for so-called
vanity numbers. If customers advertise their telephone number, this increases the number's
value and may be seen as a specific investment into the number's value. Hence, a telephone
number's value is to some extent endogenous. 5 The incomplete contracts literature suggests
that underinvestment results if the customer making the investment does not hold the property
right in the number. 6 Hence, the reallocation of property rights strengthens the customers'
investment incentive. This thickening of consumers' property rights benefits all consumers -
whether they actually port their number or not. The option to port one's number is decisive
here, and this option is given to every telephone user with MNP.
We now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the competitive effects of MVNP, focusing on
the elimination of switching costs associated with MNP.
2 In a model with differentiated products, this means that consumers can switch more easily to their pre-
ferred provider, so that an increase in allocative efficiency results (see, e.g., Buehler and Haucap, 2004).
3 See, e.g., Aoki and Small (1999); Galbi (2001), and Gans and King, (2001).
4 However, most cost benefit analyses have estimated this effect to be relatively small or almost negligible
(see, e.g. Oftel, 1997, Schwarz-Schilling and Stumpf, 1999).
5 Some numbers that are easy to remember already have a high exogenous value. This is illustrated by the
fact that in the Chinese province of Sichuan the telephone number 8888 8888 obtained a price of 2.33m
yuan ($282,000) in an auction in August 2003. The reason is that many Chinese people consider the
number eight to be lucky because it sounds similar to the Mandarin and Cantonese word for getting rich.
So an eight-digit number containing only the number eight is considered especially auspicious (see BBC,
2003).
6 The classic reference is Grossman and Hart (1986). Haucap (2003) provides an application to telephone
numbers.
2
2.2 The Effects of Eliminating Switching Costs
Consumers of mobile telecommunications services typically face switching costs which
derive from the real and psychological costs that consumers confront when changing suppliers
(see, e.g., Klemperer 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1995). These switching costs are endogenous if
they emanate from customer loyalty programs (such as Deutsche Telekom's so-called Happy
Digits program) or contractual clauses that make the change of suppliers more costly (such as
contract termination penalties). There are also exogenous switching costs resulting from the
transaction costs associated with switching providers (e.g. for changing the network assign-
ment of a given number). Introducing MNP eliminates at least part of these switching costs. In
the following, we describe some important static and dynamic effects of introducing MNP.
Retail Prices
It is well known that, in the presence of switching costs, firms may exploit their market power
over captured customers. For instance, with linear retail prices, an incumbent firm benefits
from a wedge driven between its price and the prices of new entrants, allowing the incumbent
to charge a higher price than would otherwise be possible. To see this, suppose that the
customers of an established provider A face switching costs S > 0. Firm A is thus able to
charge a higher retail price than its competitor B without inducing its customers to switch.
That is, the customers of provider A will switch only if PA > PB + S. Introducing MNP
should thus be expected to reduce retail prices, benefiting mobile customers.
With nonlinear retail prices, introducing MNP is still likely to benefit mobile customers
(provided they do not suffer from the so-called "customer ignorance problem" 7 ). However,
the argument is slightly more complex. Using a simple model with differentiated networks,
Buehler and Haucap (2004) show that the incumbent's customers benefit from lower fixed
fees with MNP, whereas competitors' customers suffer from higher fixed fees. Since the
beneficial effects on the incumbent's customers dominate the adverse effects on the
8
competitors' customers, the overall effect of MNP on mobile customers is positive.
PriceElasticities
The above arguments suggest that it is more difficult to gain market share in the presence of
switching costs, as undercutting needs to be more severe. Technically speaking, the firms'
perceived price elasticity of demand is smaller, and equilibrium prices should thus be
expected to be higher than with MINP. Moreover, the smaller price elasticity of demand helps
to stabilize collusive arrangements (see Schwarz-Schilling and Stumpf, 1999), as the extra
profits from deviating from collusive behavior will be relatively small.
7 We discuss the customer ignorance problem in more detail below (see section 3.2).
8 A referee correctly pointed out, though, that the overall effects on prices in a more general model are less
clear, as MNP reduces the firms' possibilities to discriminate between on-net and off-net tariffs.
3
Termination Charges
The effects of introducing MNP on termination charges crucially depend on the occurrence of
the "customer ignorance problem" (Gans and King, 2000). If customers can identify the
network assignment of each individual number even after introducing MNP, termination
charges should remain unaffected. However, if customers are no longer able to determine
which mobile network they are calling when placing a call, termination charges are likely to
increase. Intuitively, this follows from the firms' incentives to increase their charges when
customers only take notice of average charges (see Buehler and Haucap, 2004).
Market Shares
In the presence of switching costs, the market shares of the incumbent and its competitor will
typically be asymmetric. More specifically, the incumbent will have a large market share,
whereas its competitor will have a smaller market share. In standard network competition
models, introducing MNP will eliminate this asymmetry, as the competitor is no longer forced
to offer a discount relative to the incumbent to attract customers, and market shares will thus
be aligned. If the providers' profits are convex in own market share (as, e.g., in Buehler and
Haucap 2004), introducing MNP will reduce aggregate profits. That is, the incumbent's loss is
larger than the extra profit awarded to the competitor.
Entry
We have noted above that, with switching costs, entrants have to price aggressively to steal
business from the incumbent. Introducing MNP will alleviate the need to price aggressively,
thereby facilitating entry. However, there may be countervailing effects. For instance, if
incumbent mobile operators have a large captured customer base thanks to switching costs,
they are less likely to fight entry by aggressively cutting prices due to the so-called fat-cat
effect (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984). The net effect of introducing MNP on entry is thus
ambiguous.
Investment
Introducing MNP is likely to affect the investment incentives of both incumbents and
potential competitors. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic analysis
of the effects of MNP on the service providers' investment incentives. Standard arguments
suggest that introducing MNP will reduce the incumbent's incentive to make cost-reducing
investment, as the cost-reduction applies to a reduced customer base. Conversely, the
competitor's incentives to make cost-reducing investment should be expected to increase,
with ambiguous net effect. The aggregate effects on demand-enhancing investment, such as
infrastructure quality or product innovation, are even less clear.
4
2.2.3 Summary
Overall, the competitive effects of introducing MNP are fairly complex. MNP is likely to
affect retail prices, termination charges, price elasticities, market shares, as well as entry and
investment decisions. So far, it is fair to say that most analyses on MNP have supported the
notion that, on the whole, MNP intensifies competition in mobile telecommunications.
Available empirical evidence on the portability of premium rate numbers appears to support
this conclusion (Viard, 2004). Yet, it is unlikely that introducing MNP reduces all prices. In
fact, standard models suggest that handset prices will increase as the value of a captured
customer decreases, whereas prices for mobile services will decrease as competition
intensifies (Buehler and Haucap, 2004). Furthermore, the pro-competitive effects of MNP are
likely to vary across countries, depending on the degree of competition achieved before
introducing MNP. 9
9 For example, a NERA/Smith study of the costs and benefits of introducing MNP in Hong Kong estimated
the additional benefit from increase competition to amount to I Euro per customer over a period of 10
years, as competition was already quite intense even before MNP was introduced (see NERA/Smith,
1998). In contrast, Oftel (1997) estimated the additional benefits of increased competition resulting from
MNP to lie around 69 Euros per customer over a 10 year period - quite a significant difference which is
due to Oftel's assumption that competition would be significantly more intense with MNP than without
M7NP (see Oftel, 1997).
5
the number switch, and so on. These costs are essentially personnel costs, and they depend on
the specific administrative and technical procedures put in place.
Finally, there may be conveyance costs, which also depend on the technical solution chosen to
implement MNP. Since simple technical solutions (on switch) lead to an inefficient use of
network resources, these costs are much lower with more advanced IN solutions (off-switch).
With simple solutions, it becomes difficult to determine the exact costs of a connection, and
the problem is exacerbated when the number of portings and networks involved is high. As a
result, simple solutions for the implementation of MNP are usually regarded as inefficient
temporary solutions at best (see Smith/Arcome/NERA, 1997, p. 67).
Comparing the direct costs of the various technical solutions, we note that on-switch solutions
are characterized by comparatively low fixed set-up costs and high variable costs. In contrast,
IN solutions have relatively high fixed set-up costs, whereas their variable costs are low.
Hence, IN solutions are cost-efficient if the expected number of portings is relatively high,
whereas less advanced solutions (such as call forwarding) are efficient as long as the number
of portings is low. The stylized average cost function for these two technologies, on-switch
(ONS) and off-switch (IN), are depicted below, as is the threshold number of portings after
which an IN solution becomes more efficient than an on-switch solution.
SA ACONs
ACIN
•Number of
Portings X
6
Full tariff transparency is therefore lost and, unless prices change, callers end up paying a lot
more than expected for certain calls. [...But] it is difficult to quantify these effects and we
have excluded them from our cost benefit analysis."
In the academic literature, the "customer ignorance problem" has been explored by Gans and
King (2000) and Wright (2002). These authors show that mobile operators may have
incentives to increase their termination charges if consumers only take notice of average
prices. Dewenter and Haucap (2005) provide empirical support for this finding, and Buehler
and Haucap (2004) analyze the tradeoffs related to the introduction of MNP.
However, the loss of tariff transparency may be overcome. In Finland and Germany, for
example, consumers can call a toll-free number to identify a particular number's network
assignment. In Portugal, an acoustic signal alerts consumers when placing off-net calls. Yet,
such mechanisms generate costs on their own, and they are often considered a nuisance by
many consumers.
An alternative method to avoid the customer ignorance problem would be the introduction of
the so called receiving partypays regime (RPP), as in the United States, in Canada and some
Asian countries. Since under RPP the calling party is charged for the origination but not for
the termination of off-net calls, tariff transparency becomes irrelevant. That is, under RPP, the
customer ignorance problem vanishes.
7
number. In particular, it is not possible to exclude any user from the competitive benefits that
arise from the introduction of MNP. Moreover, type 2 and 4 benefits do not actually arise
from porting a number, but from the option to do so. The possibility to port one's number
strengthens users' positions vis-At-vis their provider, and this possibility is decisive for
competition.10
Existing cost-benefit-analyses suggest that type IA and lB benefits are at least as large as
type 2 benefits. Furthermore, type 2 benefits are expected to be the smaller the more
competitive a particular market was before introducing MNP. Hence, at least in highly
competitive markets the benefits of MNP will be largely private, while in less competitive
markets the benefits are more likely to be contain public benefits.
While private benefits and positive incremental costs per porting call for positive charges,
there are also positive externalities to be considered. These are the benefits to potential
callers, i.e. type 3 benefits. On the other hand, there are negative externalities, as MNP can
reduce tariff transparency. We think that neither the positive nor the negative externalities
should be overemphasized, as their magnitude has not been estimated to be significant. From
this, we conclude that making MNP available free of charge will be inefficient: Free porting
will induce users to port their number even if their number's valuation is smaller than the
incremental cost of porting. Therefore, an avoidable deadweight loss will result.
Furthermore, MNP can be viewed as a new service offered to consumers. In a perfectly
competitive market, new services will be offered if providers expect the total revenues from
these services to cover the costs. Hence, even in a perfectly competitive environment, MNP
would not be offered free of charge, but at a positive price. Accordingly, donor and/or
recipient networks should be allowed to charge for porting.
I0 Also note that users can not be excluded from the option to port their number, even if users who do not
wish to pay can be excluded from actually porting the number.
l This argument is related to Farrell and Gallini (1988) who show that producers may voluntarily commit to
keep markets competitive (by opening up second sources) in order to convince consumers that they will
not be exploited at a later stage.
8
received their current mobile telephone number.12 This suggests that regulating the charges
for MNP is desirable (at least for a transition period after introducing MNP).
For determining the efficient charge for porting a number, it is important to note that MNP
has both fixed and variable costs. In particular, IN solutions are characterized by decreasing
average costs. This means that determining efficient charges for MNP gives rise to similar
problems as the determination of efficient charges in natural monopoly settings. It is well
known from standard economic theory that the efficient price for natural monopoly services is
at the marginal or incremental cost level (see, e.g. Viscusi, Vernon, Harrington, 2000). The
resulting deficit should ideally be compensated through government subsidies. Hence, one
could argue that porting charges should be set at incremental or variable cost and the
government should cover the fixed cost associated with the development and implementation
3
of mandatory MNP.1
One might be tempted to argue that the operators should bear the fixed cost and set prices at
incremental costs in order to guarantee allocative efficiency if the government is not willing
to cover the fixed cost. However, this solution distorts the operators' choice of technology: If
operators are forced to cover the fixed cost and the technology is not predetermined, operators
are likely to choose a technology with relatively low fixed and high variable costs (such as an
on-switch solution), which may lead to productive inefficiencies. That is, providers may
deliberately install an inefficient technology with relatively high variable costs, attempting to
recover a larger part of the total cost from MNP. In addition, higher MNP charges imply
higher consumer switching costs. This again allows incumbent providers to charge less
aggressively without losing their current customers. Hence, incumbent providers are likely to
set rather high MNP charges in order to avoid losing customers.
To avoid this problem, regulatory authorities could prescribe the technology to be used.
However, this approach is unlikely to give rise to an efficient outcome, as operators typically
have better information about the efficient use of technologies than regulators. It is well
known from principal-agent analysis that the regulator (the principal) has to reward the
operators (the agents) to induce an efficient technology choice in the presence of asymmetric
information. If operators anticipate that they will have to lower their porting charges if they
use an efficient instead of an inefficient technology, an inefficient technology will result. An
obvious way to provide incentives is a price cap regulation for porting charges. As a starting
point, one may use current average cost, but also some other figure exceeding incremental
cost (to avoid the over-use problem). To avoid potential "gold plating" by operators, one may
use a ceiling for the average cost, based on the most efficient technology in use today.
There are essentially two arguments in favor of a price cap regime starting from current
average costs. First, such a regime leads to efficient "make or buy" decisions: If operators are
allowed to recover variable costs only, they may strategically outsource parts of their business
in order to substitute variable for fixed costs. Since an external provider of MNP-related
services will charge a price for its services that at least covers average cost, mobile operators
12 It should thus not come as a surprise that the German regulatory authority (RegTP) felt it had to step in
and to regulate charges for MNP ex post after two small service providers decided to charge their
customers a price of 116.00 E for porting their number (see
http://www.rectp.de/aktuelles/pin/03140/index.htinl). Most other European countries have regulated MNP
charges ex ante.
13 Introducing two-part tariffs for MNP is not very useful, as most consumers have only one mobile number
to port (i.e., one unit of consumption). Alternatively, one might consider a tariff involving a (fixed) fee
for buying an option to port one's number and another charge when exercising this option (the
incremental cost of porting). Note, however, that it is virtually impossible to install different technologies
for different customers on the same network. Hence, in practice, the MNP option can only be installed
jointly for all customers and it is not possible to exclude consumers from this option.
9
will outsource excessively in order to reduce their fixed cost (if they cannot recover them
through MNP fees). In contrast, under a price cap regime starting from current average costs,
operators will only outsource if an external provider of MNP services can offer these services
at lower prices than the corresponding costs of in-house production. Second, starting from
current average costs allows operators to implement MNP without incurring losses. If,
instead, operators are forced to offer MNP at prices below average cost, this will be regarded
as a government hold-up or expropriation. Since license fees, network investments and
customer acquisition costs are all specific investments, operators are vulnerable to
expropriation through renegotiation of the regulatory contract (see Goldberg, 1976; Sidak and
Spulber, 1997). In dynamic and innovative industries such as mobile communications,
dynamic efficiency aspects are highly relevant. Therefore, regulators should be hesitant to
introduce regulations adversely affecting investment and innovation incentives.
Summing up, we argue that the market is unlikely to generate efficient charges for MNP, as
service providers have monopoly power over their captured customers, as MNP became
available after most consumers had been allocated a mobile number. Regulating the charges
for MNP thus seems desirable (at least in a transition period after introducing MNP), provided
that the regulated charges cover not only the variable costs, but also parts of the fixed costs (a)
in order to avoid an ex post hold-up which adversely affects investment incentives and (b) to
provide incentives to implement an efficient MNP technology. We argue that a price cap
regime starting from the current average cost of the most efficient technology in use should be
expected to provide appropriate incentives.
14 We have surveyed European regulatory authorities in fall 2003 with respect to regulatory frameworks and
their first experiences with MNP. In the following, we present some of this survey's results.
15 Even though implemented in 1997, MNP has been limited to voice telephony without the ability to
support data services such as SMS and MMS.
10
Table 2: Introduction of MNP in Europe
Year Countries
1997
1999 UK, Netherlands,
2000 Spain, Switzerland
2001 Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
2002 Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal
2003 Finland, Luxembourg, Ireland, France
2004 Greece, Austria, Slovenia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary,
The widespread implementation of MNP in Europe thus took about six years. A number of
countries postponed the implementation of MNP for various reasons. For instance, Germany
delayed the introduction of MNP due to the lack of an adequate technical solution. Also,
Austria postponed the introduction of MNP several times (see Table 3): While smaller
Austrian operators such as tele.ring and Tele2 supported MNP, the larger operators mobilkom
and T-Mobile had reservations about MNP.16 Similar delays occurred in Non-European
12
countries such as Australia, where MNP started with a delay of no less than 50 months (see
Ovum, 2005).
Since many European countries have introduced MNP only recently, it is difficult to predict
future adoption processes.. Furthermore, because of different introductory dates and
considerable heterogeneity among the countries, it is no trivial task to compare the number of
portings. Many variables such as contract periods, competitive environments, and switching
costs affect the decision to use MNP services. A crucial factor, however, should be the price
17 Note, however, that there may also be an overuse of MNP if porting charges are too low as argued above.
13
for porting numbers. As charges for porting mobile numbers strongly vary across countries,
price differentials might be an adequate explanation.
14
not exceed administrative
costs.
Norway YES - Only recipient NO Charge between networks
network is allowed to should cover costs of donor
charge fees. network.
Portugal YES NO
Sweden YES - Only donor NO (to customer) Cost oriented
network is allowed to YES (donor to recipient) (administrative and porting
charge fees. costs)
Switzerland YES NO
Spain YES Charges shall not be an
disincentive for users to
port their number.
UK YES "adequate fees" Marginal costs
Source: Own inquiries.
As can be seen from Table 6, there are a number of countries where networks do not charge
customers for porting numbers. For instance, in addition to Finland, MNP is typically free in
the UK and in Ireland. In Belgium, only pre-paid subscribers pay for porting their mobile
number. German operators charge between C22.50 and C29.95, whereas networks charge
between C9 and €24 in other countries.
Table 6: Charges for Porting Mobile Numbers
Country Fee
Austria Recipient network charges E4-15.
Belgium Only pre-paid but not post-paid customers are charged for porting mobile
numbers.
Denmark Operators committed to charge C9.60 per ported number to customers.
The donor operator charges the same amount to the' new operator.
Germany 02 charges C22.50 and T-Mobile, Vodafone and E-Plus charge C24.95 to
their customers. Some small service providers charge C29.95.
Finland The donor network charges about C5-10 to the recipient operator. No fees
for customers.
Ireland No fees for Customers.
Italy The donor operator charges £10.02 to the recipient operator.
No fees for Customers.
Netherlands The recipient operator is allowed to charge the customer E9. Charges
consist of administrative fees.
Sweden Only donor operators charge E4-24 fees to the recipient operator.
Spain No fees.
UK Typically no fees. Some operators charge £25.
Source: Own inquiries.
Relating the actual use of MNP (measured by the percentage of ported numbers) to the
relevant charges yields ambiguous results: In some countries with free porting (Ireland, Spain
and UK) only a moderate number of portings occurs, whereas Finland shows a high number
(see Figure 2). Moreover, German operators seem to have set nearly prohibitively high
charges. Overall, there appears to be a negative relation between porting fees and the number
15
of portings (in percent of all numbers). Higher charges tend to lead to higher consumer
switching costs and therefore to a lower use of MNP.
30-
25- A Germany
20
015-
L.
5
Ireand Spain
Ireland UK Finland
0 A 'A A
0 5 10 15 20 25
Percentage of Ported Numbers
18 In particular, the donor network has little to gain from speeding up the process.
19 In Germany, for example, subscribers have to inform the donor network about their intention to port a
mobile number about 2 weeks before the contract expires.
16
port their numbers when the contract has not yet expired. In the Netherlands, roughly 60% of
porting requests are not successful because of invalid customer information (see Ovum,
2005).
Table 7: Speed of Porting
Country Speed of porting Porting process
20 Recall that this problem arises only when the so called calling-party-pays regime applies as in most
European countries.
17
Table 8: Methods of Carrier Identification
Country Method
Austria Verbal announcement
Belgium Acoustic signal when placing off-net calls
Finland Toll-free enquiry numbers
Germany Toll-free enquiry numbers and toll-free SMS Service
Ireland Acoustic signal when placing off-net calls
Portugal Acoustic signal when placing off-net calls
Sources: Own inquiries
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Bisher ersehienen:
"* Bifihler, Stefan, Ralf Dewenter & Justus Haucap, Mobile Number Portability in Europe, No. 41
(August 2005).
"* Meyer, Dirk, Manuskriptstaus behindern den Wissenschaftsbetrieb: Zur M6glichkeit von
Einreichungsgeb-ihren, Autorenhonoraren und Gutachterentgelten, Nr. 40 (Juni 2005).
"* Carlberg, Michael, International Monetary Policy Coordination, No. 39 (March 2005).
"* Zimmermann, Klaus W. & Reto Schemm-Gregory, Eine Welt voller Clubs, Nr. 38 (Mdirz 2005),
erscheint in: Zeitschriftfiir Wirtschafispolitik.
"* Hackmann, Johannes, Die Bestimmung der optimalen Bev6lkernngsgr6Be als (wirtschafts-)
ethisches Problem, Nr. 37 (M~irz 2005).
"* Josten, Stefan Dietrich, Middle-Class Consensus, Social Capital and the Mechanics of Economic
Development, No. 36 (January 2005).
"* Dewenter, Ralf & Ulrich Kaiser, Anmerkungen zur bkonomischen Bewertung von Fusionen auf
dem Printmedienmarkt, Nr. 35 (Januar 2005).
"* G6bel, Markus & Tobias Thomas, Informal Institutions and the "Weaknesses" of Human Behavior,
No. 34 (January 2005).
"* Dewenter, Ralf & Justus Haucap, Estimating Demand Elasticities for Mobile Telecommunications
in Austria, No. 33 (Dezember 2004).
"* Meyer, Dirk, Die Entmachtung der Politik: Zur Frage der Oberlebensfdhigkeit demokratischer
Nationalstaaten in einer globalisierten Weltwirtschaft, Nr. 32 (Dezember 2004).
"* Josten, Stefan Dietrich & Klaus W. Zimmermann, Unanimous Constitutional Consent and the
Immigration Problem, No. 31 (Dezember 2004), erscheint in: Public Choice.
"* Bleich, Torsten, Importzoll, Beschiftigung und Leistungsbilanz: ein mikrofundierter Ansatz,
Nr. 30 (September 2004).
"* Dewenter, Ralf, Justus Haucap, Ricardo Luther & Peter R6tzel, Hedonic Prices in the German
Market for Mobile Phones, No. 29 (August 2004).
"* Carlberg, Michael, Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in the Euro Area, No. 28 (Mdrz 2004).
"* Dewenter, Ralf & Justus Haucap, Die Liberalisierung der Telekommunikationsbranche in Deutsch-
land, Nr. 27 (Mdirz 2004), erschienen in: Zeitschrififlir Wirtschaftspolitik 53, 2004, 374-393.
"* Kruse, J6m, Okonomische Konsequenzen des Spitzensports im 6ffentlich-rechtlichen und im
privaten Fernsehen, Nr. 26 (Januar 2004).
"* Haucap, Justus & J6rn Kruse, Ex-Ante-Regulierung oder Ex-Post-Aufsicht fuir netzgebundene
Industrien?, Nr. 25 (November 2003), erschienen in Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 54, 2004, 266-275.
"* Haucap, Justus & Tobias Just, Der Preis ist heiB. Aber warum? Zum Einfluss des Okonomie-
studiums auf die Einschdtzung der Fairness des Preissystems, Nr. 24 (November 2003), erschienen
in WirtschaftswissenschafilichesStudium (WiSt) 33 (9), 2004, 520-524.
"* Dewenter, Ralf & Justus Haucap, Mobile Termination with Asymmetric Networks, No. 23
(October 2003), erscheint in: EuropeanJournalof Law and Economics 20, 2005.
"* Dewenter, Ralf, Raising the Scores? Empirical Evidence on the Introduction of the Three-Point
Rule in Portugese Football, No. 22 (September 2003).
"* Haucap, Justus & Christian Wey, Unionisation Structures and Innovation Incentives, No. 21
(September 2003), erschienen in: The Economic Journal 114, 2004, C 145-C 165.
"* Quitzau, J6nm, Erfolgsfaktor Zufall im Profiful3ball: Quantifizierung mit Hilfe informations-
effizienter Wettmarkte, Nr. 20 (September 2003).
"* Reither, Franco, Grundztige der Neuen Keynesianischen Makro6konomik, Nr. 19 (August 2003),
erschienen in: JahrbuchfiirWirtschaftswissenschaften 54, 2003, 131-143.
"• Kruse, J6rm & J6rn Quitzau, FuBball-Fernsehrechte: Aspekte der Zentralvermarktung, Nr. 18
(August 2003).
"• Bfihler, Stefan & Justus Haucap, Mobile Number Portability, No. 17 (August 2003), erschienen in:
Journalof Industry, Competition and Trade 4, 2004, 223-238.
"* Zimmermann, Klaus W. & Tobias Just, On the Relative Efficiency of Democratic Institutions,
No. 16 (July 2003).
"* Biihler, Stefan & Justus Haucap, Strategic Outsourcing Revisited, No. 15 (July 2003), erscheint in
Journalof Economic Behavior and Organization,2005.
"* Meyer, Dirk, Die Energieeinsparverordnung (EnEV) - eine ordnungspolitische Analyse, Nr. 14
(Juli 2003).
"* Zimmermann, Klaus W. & Tobias Thomas, Patek Philippe, or the Art to Tax Luxuries, No. 13
(June 2003).
"* Dewenter, Ralf, Estimating the Valuation of Advertising, No. 12 (June 2003).
"* Otto, Alkis, Foreign Direct Investment, Production, and Welfare, No. 11 (June 2003).
* Dewenter, Ralf, The Economics of Media Markets, No. 10 (June 2003).
* Josten, Stefan Dietrich, Dynamic Fiscal Policies, Unemployment, and Economic Growth, No. 9
(June 2003).
"* Haucap, Justus & Tobias Just, Not Guilty? Another Look at the Nature and Nurture of Economics
Students, No. 8 (June 2003).
"* Dewenter, Ralf, Quality Provision in Interrelated Markets, No. 7 (June 2003).
"* Brauninger, Michael, A Note on Health Insurance and Growth, No. 6 (June 2003).
"* Dewenter, Ralf, Media Markets with Habit Formation, No. 5 (June 2003).
"* Haucap, Justus, The Economics of Mobile Telephone Regulation, No. 4 (June 2003).
* Josten, Stefan Dietrich & Achim Truger, Inequality, Politics, and Economic Growth. Three Critical
Questions on Politico-Economic Models of Growth and Distribution, No. 3 (June 2003).
* Dewenter, Ralf, Rational Addiction to News?, No. 2 (June 2003).
* Kruse, J6rn, Regulierung der Terminierungsentgelte der deutschen Mobilfunknetze?, Nr. 1 (Juni
2003).