126 CALALANG v.

WILLIAMS AUTHOR: Yayie Lanting

G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940. NOTES: In this case the Court defined social justice in this wise: “Social justice is "neither
TOPIC: Social Justice defined communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
PONENTE: Laurel, J: equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex.”

FACTS:
1. The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.;
and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from
a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic;
 the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted

2. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a
writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante,
as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
 Contends that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
 Contends that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of
the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
ISSUE(S): whether or not the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice?
HELD: NO
RATIO:
Commonwealth Act No. 548 is constitutional. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, "The rule
has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: ’The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.’ Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case."

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may
contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may
be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications."

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination
of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to
be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was
said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or
act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The
Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state
of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-
making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña,, , and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, this
Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in
the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the
rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of
greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in
the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise
of the paramount police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion
of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of
said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely
the very means of insuring its preservation.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles "the
right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to
the public good." And in People v. Pomar, it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the
state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly
increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to
look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for
regulation which formerly were not so considered."

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice,
however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units
of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
127 Oposa v Factoran Concept of Intergenerational responsibility
Topic: Natural Resources
1. The petitioners, all minors (44 children) duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition
against DENR to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
2. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae.
3. This case is filed not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding
generations based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.
4. The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."
5. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity
to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect”.
6. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and
film evidence in the course of the trial.
7. Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage
and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs.
8. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office regarding the plea to cancel the
said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.
9. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary
to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation."
10. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy
11. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
12. In 1990,the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.
13. MTD granted: the complaint states no cause of action and that it raises a political question — sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts
which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUES:
1. Whether they have legal standing
2. Whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth."
3. Whether or not the court can exercise judicial power over political question
HELD: Yes
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged
order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE #1:

Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the
concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve
that environment for the succeeding generations.
In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on
non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public
welfare.

ISSUE #2:

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.

As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-
founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
— to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint,
the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

ISSUE 3:

It must be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. Second
paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the
Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
128 MMDA, Petitioners, vs. CONCERNED AUTHOR: DJEE
RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, Respondents. NOTES: Issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus to ensure the
TOPIC: Natural Resources quality of water in Manila in compliance with the constitutional mandate
G.R. Nos. 171947-48; February 15, 2011 under Section 16, Article II of the Constitution.

FACTS:
2008 and 2011 Case has the same facts as follows:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners,
for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay, and to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete
plan of action for the purpose.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, which was confirmed by DENR’s Water Quality Management Chief, Renato T. Cruz that
water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal
coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard
200 MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90.

The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants]
resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine
life of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]

Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover
cleaning in general. They also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be
compelled by mandamus.

The CA sustained RTC’s decision stressing that petitioners were not required to do tasks outside of their
basic functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents;
(2) Can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
NO. Yes.
RATIO:
Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a ministerial in nature and can
be compelled by mandamus.

Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law creating MMDA) states that the MMDA is mandated to put up an
adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not
only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in
nature and can be compelled by mandamus.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform
certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the clean up, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the
Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. So, their functions being
ministerial in nature can be compelled by mandamus.
 Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned
shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove
and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations
and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup Operations,
amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152
continues, however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26

hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable
and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution
incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit
for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are
necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination
with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup
operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to
have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of
the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds
where said disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since
the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead
agency in the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves
only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. Th ey aver
that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the
terms “cleanup operations” and “accidental spills,” as follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants

discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that
result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion
or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to
“water pollution incidents,” which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution
events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further,
they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires “cleanup operations” to restore the body of water to pre-
spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental
spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
 As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary
to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec.
20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution
accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of
pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being
a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as
among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading
of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming,
respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is
constricted by the definition of the phrase “cleanup operations” embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled
by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases “cleanup operations” and “accidental spills” do not
appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage.” This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate,
“to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards.” In fine, the
underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they
left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the
polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in
the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the
containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec.
17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if
there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec.
20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a
specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of
PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: “PD 1152 aims to introduce a
comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs.
17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.”[35]

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is
correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and
scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And
such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20
of PD 1152 mentions “water pollution incidents” which may be caused by polluters in the waters of
the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay.
Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to “any person who causes pollution in or pollutes
water bodies,” which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near
the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the
water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be
categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned
that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not
be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between.
Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution
incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus,
Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup
situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term
solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the
cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and
other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a
futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the
ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put
the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice
about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and
preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing
mandamus,”[36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of
the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do
not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR)
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and
other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the
accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor
responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures
would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with
sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for
naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38]

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the
Water Code, which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other
waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout
their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters
in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any
kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or
near the banks of thePasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be
treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of
the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it
that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water
treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from
flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying
establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with
their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in
Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage
crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon
and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
 2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human
waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households
that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an
understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly
strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into
the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as
prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the
blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps
shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person,
including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years
following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended
on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the
prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of
waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of
solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply
discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are
violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of
infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid
waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of
substances to the aquatic environment including “dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge
of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive,
noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-
made structure.”

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their
respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set
timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the
nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot
be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring
back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the t asks ahead, daunting as they may be,
could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals,
would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has
to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable.
Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their
mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are
disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution
incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State
shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision
specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot
escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as
humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of
RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal
Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is
ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure
the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion
schedules.

Pursuant to Title XII Local Government of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local
Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its
duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks
of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River,
the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Mani la Bay;
and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic
septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these
LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic
tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into
these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other
sanctions.

As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the
necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the
earliest possible time.

Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is
ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.

Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine
life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in
the Manila Bay.

The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of
RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing
laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid
and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports
and apprehend the violators.

The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and
drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and
remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and
other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro
Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest
of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the
DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove
and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA
9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction
and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings,
it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the
respective penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws
on pollution.

The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this
Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and
disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to
be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of
its environmental sanitation clearance.

Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall
integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the
school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents
and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem
in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and
succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water
quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain economic growth in a
manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.

The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group,
DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of “continuing mandamus,” shall, from
finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in
accordance with this Decision.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

129 Miriam College v. CA AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000 NOTES: Right of a school to prescribe rules governing discipline
TOPIC: Right to quality education of students.
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
"Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young readers," and devoid of all moral values."
This was now some members of the Miriam College community allegedly described the contents of the September-
October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing
Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho). The articles in the Chi-Rho included: a story, clearly fiction, entitled 'Kaskas' written by one
Gerald Garry Renacido . . . Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the experience of a group of young, male, combo players
who, one evening, after their performance went to see a bold show in a place called "Flirtation". This was the way the
author described the group's exposure during that stage show:

 "Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos . . . he! he! he! sambit ng kanilang bokalistang kanina pa di maitago
ang pagkahayok sa karneng babae na kanyang pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa, susog naman ang tropa.
 ". . . Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si 'Red Raven' ayon sa emcee. Nakasuot lamang ng bikining pula na may
palamuting dilaw sa gilid-gilid at sa bandang utong. Nagsimula siya sa kanyang pag-giling nang tumugtog na ang
unang tono ng "Goodbye" ng Air Supply. Dahan-dahan ang kanyang mga malalantik at mapang-akit na galaw sa
una. Mistulang sawa na nililingkis ang hangin, paru-parong padapo-dapo sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang
umamoy o kumuha ng nektar, ngunit para ipaglantaran ang sariling bulaklak at ang angkin nitong malansang
nektar.
 "Kaskas mo babe, sige . . . kaskas."
 Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay Mike. Mistulang natipuhan, dahil sa harap niya'y nagtagal. Nag-
akmang mag-aalis ng pangitaas na kapirasong tela. Hindi nakahinga si Mike, nanigas sa kanyang kinauupuan,
nanigas pati ang nasa gitna ng kanyang hita. Ang mga mata niya'y namagnet sa kayamanang ngayo'y halos isang
pulgada lamang mula sa kanyang naglalaway na bunganga. Naputol-putol ang kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni
'Red Raven' ang kanyang kanang hita. Lalo naghingalo siya nang kabayuhin ito ng dahan dahan . . . Pabilis ng
pabilis.'

The author further described Mike's responses to the dancer as follows (quoted in part):

 . . . Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si Mike sa dancer. Hindi nagpatalo ang ibong walang pakpak, inipit ng
husto ang hita ni Mike at pinag-udyukan ang kanyang dibdib sa mukha nito.
 "Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!"
 Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang tumambad sa kanya ng biglang halikan siya nito sa labi at iniwang bigla,
upang kanyang muniin ang naudlot niyang pagtikim ng karnal na nektar. Hindi niya maanto kung siya ay nanalo o
natalo sa nangyaring sagupaan ng libog. Ang alam lang niya ay nanlata na siya."

After the show the group went home in a car with the bokalista driving. A pedestrian happened to cross the street and the
driver deliberately hit him with these words:

 "Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na ito. He! He! He! He! Sabad ng sabog nilang drayber/bokalista."
 The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck) in these words: . . . "Pare . . . trak!!! Put . . .!!!!
 Ang Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994 issue, was in turn, given the cover title of "Libog at iba pang tula."

In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled "Foreplay", Jerome wrote: "Alam ko, nakakagulat ang aming pamagat."
Jerome then proceeded to write about previous reactions of readers to women-writers writing about matters erotic and to
gay literature. He justified the Magazine's erotic theme on the ground that many of the poems passed on to the editors were
about "sekswalidad at iba't ibang karanasan nito." Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga manunulat . . . tungkol sa maselang
usaping ito . . . at sa isang institusyon pang katulad ng Miriam!"

Mr. Gomez quoted from a poem entitled "Linggo" written by himself:

 may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang -
 mga putang biyak na sa gitna,
 'di na puwedeng paglabhan,
 'di na maaaring pagbabaran . . ."
Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not "garapal" and "sa mga tulang ito namin maipagtatanggol ang
katapangan (o pagka-sensasyonal) ng pamagat na "Libog at iba pang Tula." He finished "Foreplay" with these words:
"Dahil para saan pa ang libog kung hindi ilalabas?"

The cover title in question appears to have been taken from a poem written by Relly Carpio of the same title. The poem
dealt on a woman and a man who met each other, gazed at each other, went up close and "Naghalikan, Shockproof." The
poem contained a background drawing of a woman with her two mammary and nipples exposed and with a man behind
embracing her with the woman in a pose of passion-filled mien.

Another poem entitled 'Virgin Writes Erotic' was about a man having fantasies in his sleep. The last verse said: "At zenith I
pull it out and find myself alone in this fantasy." Opposite the page where this poem appeared was a drawing of a man
asleep and dreaming of a naked woman (apparently of his dreams) lying in bed on her buttocks with her head up (as in a
hospital bed with one end rolled up). The woman's right nipple can be seen clearly. Her thighs were stretched up with her
knees akimbo on the bed.

In the next page (page 29) one finds a poem entitled "Naisip ko Lang" by Belle Campanario. It was about a young student
who has a love-selection problem: ". . . Kung sinong pipiliin: ang teacher kong praning, o ang boyfriend kong bading." The
word "praning" as the court understands it, refers to a paranoid person; while the word "bading" refers to a sward or
"bakla" or "badidang". This poem also had an illustration behind it: of a young girl with large eyes and sloping hair
cascading down her curves and holding a peeled banana whose top the illustrator shaded up with downward-slanting
strokes. In the poem, the girl wanted to eat banana topped by peanut butter. In line with Jerome's "Foreplay" and by the
way it was drawn that banana with peanut butter top was meant more likely than not, to evoke a spiritedly mundane,
mental reaction from a young audience.

Another poem entitled "Malas ang Tatlo" by an unknown author went like this:

 'Na picture mo na ba
 no'ng magkatabi tayong dalawa
 sa pantatluhang sofa -
 ikaw, the legitimate asawa
 at ako, biro mo, ang kerida?
 tapos, tumabi siya, shit!
 kumpleto na:
 ikaw, ako at siya
 kulang na lang, kamera."

A poem "Sa Gilid ng Itim" by Gerald Renacido in the Chi-Rho broadsheet spoke of a fox (lobo) yearning for "karneng
sariwa, karneng bata, karneng may kalambutan . . . isang bahid ng dugong dalaga, maamo't malasa, ipahid sa mga labing
sakim sa romansa' and ended with 'hinog na para himukin bungang bibiyakin."

Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the editorial board,3 and Relly Carpio, author of
Libog, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline
Committee. The Letter dated 4 November 1994 stated:

This is to inform you that the letters of complain filed against you by members of the Miriam Community and a concerned
Ateneo grade five student have been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please find
enclosed complaints. As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in the student handbook
specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j, page 36 letters m, n, and
p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses) letter a, page 37.

You are required to submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the initial date of hearing to be held
on November 15, 1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at the DSA Conference Room.

None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the
Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order No.
94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the case.
In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers.

In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter6to the Discipline Committee reiterating his
clients' position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. According to Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was
"trying to impose discipline on his clients on account of their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus
journalists." Hence, he argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and its
implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the members of said Committee who allegedly
"had already articulated their position" against his clients.

The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the
Discipline Committee's report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students, thus:

1. Jasper Briones Expulsion. Briones is the Editor-in-Chief of Chi-Rho and a 4th year student;
2. Daphne Cowper suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;
3. Imelda Hilario suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 1995;
4. Deborah Ligon suspension up to May, 1995. Miss Ligon is a 4th year student and could graduate as summa cum
laude;
5. Elizabeth Valdezco suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;
6. Camille Portugal graduation privileges withheld, including diploma. She is an Octoberian;
7. Joel Tan suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 1995;
8. Gerald Gary Renacido Expelled and given transfer credentials. He is a 2nd year student. He wrote the fiction
story "Kaskas";
9. Relly Carpio Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd year and wrote the poem "Libog";
10. Jerome Gomez Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd year. He wrote the foreword "Foreplay" to
the questioned Anthology of Poems; and
11. Jose Mari Ramos Expelled and given transfer papers. He is a 2nd year student and art editor of Chi-Rho.

The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction/restraining order before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them.

On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., issued an order
denying the plaintiffs' prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. It held: There is nothing in the DECS Order No. 94, S.
1992 dated August 19, 1992 that excludes school Administrators from exercising jurisdiction over cases of the nature
involved in the instant petition. R.A. 7079 also does not state anything on the matter of jurisdiction. The DECS
undoubtedly cannot determine the extent of the nature of jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases. Moreover, as this
Court reads that DECS Order No. 94, S. of 1992, it merely prescribes for purposes of internal administration which DECS
officer or body shall hear cases arising from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for resolution. The said order never
mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases falling under R.A. 707.8

The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration." The College followed with its
Answer.

Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

ACCORDINGLY, so as not to render the issues raised moot and academic, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue
enjoining the defendants, including the officers and members of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary B oard, or
any similar body and their agents, and the officers and members of the Security Department, Division, or Security Agency
securing the premises and campus of Miriam College Foundation, Inc.

Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated 22 February 1995, the RTC dismissed the
petition, thus: On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which has jurisdiction, inasmuch as both parties do
not want this court to assume jurisdiction here then this court will not be more popish than the Pope and in fact is glad that
it will have one more case out of its docket.

The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and Daphne Cowper, sought relief in this Court through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining order questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and
24 February 1995.
On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for disposition. On 19 May 1995, the
CA issued a resolution stating: The respondents are hereby required to file comment on the instant petition and to show
cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, and the petitioners
may file reply thereto within five (5) days from receipt of former's comment.

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining the public
respondents from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995.

In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, respondent court granted the students' petition. The CA declared the RTC Order
dated 22 February 1995, as well as the students' suspension and dismissal, void.

Hence, this petition by Miriam College.

We limit our decision to the resolution of the following issues:

(1) The alleged moot character of the case.

(2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by the students.
(3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students.
(4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students.

We do not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, the propriety of the penalty imposed or the manner of the
imposition thereof. These issues, though touched upon by the parties in the proceedings below, were not fully ventilated
therein.
ISSUE(S): WHETHER OR NOT THE SCHOOL CAN PUNISH THE STUDENTS FOR THE ARTICLE?
HELD: (1) The right of the students to free speech in school premises is not absolute. The right to free speech must always
be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the court upheld the right of the
students to free expression in these cases, disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others were not ruled out. (2) The school cannot suspend or expel
a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class work or
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
RATIO:
1. Case is not Moot. As Miriam never readmitted the students, the CA's ruling that the case is moot has no basis. How
then can Miriam argue in good faith that the case had become moot when it knew all along that the facts on which the
purported moot character of the case were based did not exist? Obviously, Miriam is clutching to the CA's wrongful
assumption that the TRO it issued was enforced to justify the reversal of the CA's decision.

JURISDICTION:
"To uphold and protect the freedom of the press even at the campus level and to promote the development and growth of
campus journalism as a means of strengthening ethical values, encouraging critical and creative thinking, and developing
moral character and personal discipline of the Filipino youth," Congress enacted in 1991 Republic Act No. 7079. Entitled
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF CAMPUS JOURNALISM AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," the law contains provisions for the selection of the editorial board and publication adviser, the
funding of the school publication, and the grant of exemption to donations used actually, directly and exclusively for the
promotion of campus journalism from donor's or gift tax.

Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to the editorial board and its members. Thus, the second
paragraph of Section 4 states that "(o)nce the publication is established, its editorial board shall freely determine its
editorial policies and-manage the publication's funds."

The DECS regional office shall have the original jurisdiction over cases as a result of the decisions, actions and
policies of the editorial board of a school within its area of administrative responsibility. It shall conduct
investigations and hearings on the these cases within fifteen (15) days after the completion of the resolution of each
case.

The issues were thus limited to the question of jurisdiction - a question purely legal in nature and well within the
competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is an exception to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. As the Court held in Phil. Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova. Absent such clarity as to the
scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an
administrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence
to act on the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is to beg the question. There is
merit, therefore, to the approach taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy as to whether or not the legislative
franchise could be so interpreted as to enable the National Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A
jurisdictional question thus arises and calls for an answer.

However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsideration contended that the DECS Regional Office, not the RTC,
had jurisdiction, the trial court, refusing to "be more popish than the Pope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court could
hardly contain its glee over the fact that "it will have one more case out of its docket." We remind the trial court that a
court having jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and the power or authority, but also the duty, to exercise that
jurisdiction and to render a decision in a case properly submitted to it.38 Accordingly, the trial court should not have
dismissed the petition without settling the issues presented before it.

MAIN ISSUE: ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Recall, for purposes of this discussion, that Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act prohibits the expulsion or suspension
of a student solely on the basis of articles he or she has written.

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and
how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint.39 The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,
(3) How it shall be taught, and
(4) Who may be admitted to study.

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A
school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for
the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning.
Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field
of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise
finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."

Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less
imposes such duty.

All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights,
appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help its
students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If
a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude
or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation
privileges.
Thus, in Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong,44 the Court upheld the expulsion of students found guilty of hazing by petitioner
therein, holding that: No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who
have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules
and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to
do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935,
1973 and the present 1987 Constitution. Tracing the development of academic freedom, the Court continued: Since Garcia
vs. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of
higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right.
While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline a nd promotion
of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college.
The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of the rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students
demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the
rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, In Hohfeldian terms, they have the concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to
learn under the rules laid down by the school.

. . . It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry,
but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; may, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution
are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead said, is 'an education which inculcates duty and reverence.' It appears that the particular brand of religious
education offered by the Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a
minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those
who come after them.

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a
morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperilled, if, under the circumstances of this
case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." Thus, the
decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds.

Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State's power to regulate educational institution:

The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall
exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.

As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness.
Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of
their rights.

In several cases, this Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in school premises. In the landmark case of
Malabanan vs. Ramento,47 students of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, believing that the merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture would result in the increase in their tuition, held a
demonstration to protest the proposed merger. The rally however was held at a place other than that specified in the school
permit and continued longer than the time allowed. The protest, moreover, disturbed the classes and caused the stoppage of
the work of non-academic personnel. For the illegal assembly, the university suspended the students for one year. In
affirming the students' rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, the Court through Mr. Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, echoed the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District.48

Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of
the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings
such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines
Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'
While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go s o
far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to this Fortas opinion.
"The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose
of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only
inevitable part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When
he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions,
even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfering
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of
others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.

The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to free speech must always
be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while we upheld the right of the students
to free expression in these cases, we did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class
or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Thus, in Malabanan, we held: Objection is
made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That there would be a vigorous
presentation of view opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture
was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they were against such a move as it confronted them with a
serious problem ("isang malaking suliranin.") They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees,
an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.") If in the course of such
demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances extremely critical at times, even vitriolic, were
let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, different types. They are likely to be assertive
and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the
academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They
take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They
may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the
daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of
disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act. Provisions of law should be
construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in a
manner that would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental law.56 A statute should not be given a broad construction
if its validity can be saved by a narrower one. Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the
school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, we should not construe said provision as to unduly
restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism
Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written,
except when such article materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others .
From the foregoing, the answer to the question of who has jurisdiction over the cases filed against res pondent students
becomes self-evident. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. We therefore rule that Miriam College has the
authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.
130 UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN AUTHOR: Krystelle
vs. COURT OF APPEALS NOTES: The students are governed by the rules set forth in the student handbook.
G.R. No. 100588 March 7, 1994
TOPIC: Right to Quality Education
PONENTE: Nocon, J.
FACTS:
1. Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy
were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in the
summer classes of 1989 and last two semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain
grades of not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II with Related Learning Experience). Its persistent
refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and finish a college degree and worse,
no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and
school residency requirement. Thus, they filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to
command petitioner USA to re-admit them. Aside from the prayer for re-admission, they also prayed for actual and
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of them.
2. Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean Concepcion Cajilig and
Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa and Cosette
Monteblanco admitted having barred private respondents from finishing their Nursing course but justified the decision
not to re-admit them as being in pursuance of the school's policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any
major Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year.
Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80% performance rating. To buttress petitioner's
stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of
students to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation,
except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in
institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted to study, who may
teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and research.
3. Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the premises
because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated neither do the former have a
corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not performing
public functions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to
academic freedom.
4. TC: private respondents are entitled to the relief sought
When petitioning students enrolled at respondent university, they and their parents/guardians signed agreements
of admission wherein they bound themselves to abide by the policies of the school, otherwise to discontinue.
This is also provided for in the Nursing Catalog of respondent university.
5. CA: did not agree with the ruling of the trial court
Prior to the decision of respondent court, or on April 4, 1991, petitioners already filed a motion for dismissal of
appeal 4 averring, inter alia, that the appeal has become moot and academic because private respondents have
enrolled in and graduated from the Lanting College of Nursing, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. In the resolution
dated April 25, 1991, respondent court merely noted said motion, considering that the appeal has been decided
and the importance of the issues involved. 5 Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration ad cautelam of
the April 23, 1991 decision, reiterating their previous averments. The motion was denied in the resolution dated
June 10, 1991 because the importance of the issues involved and jurisprudential relevance and significance of
the ponencia sought to be vacated militate against petitioners' posture.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not erred in: 1) not dismissing the case although moot and academic; and 2) ordering them to re-admit
private respondents.
HELD:

RATIO:
We rule that the special civil action of mandamus is not available in this instance.

The petition which was filed by private respondents before the trial court sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to
command petitioners to admit them for enrollment. Taking into account the admission of private respondents that they have
finished their Nursing course at the Lanting College of Nursing even before the promulgation of the questioned decision, this
case has clearly been overtaken by events and should therefore be dismissed. However, the case of Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans, etc., et al. is the authority for the view that even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of
the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly
situated. We shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition.

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station;
and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

The nature of mandamus has been the subject of discussions in several cases. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill
contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the
petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and
it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not
be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by
law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.

In the present case, private respondents have failed to satisfy the prime and indispensable requisites of a mandamus proceeding.
There is no showing that they possess a clear legal right to be enrolled in petitioner USA. Moreover, assuming that petitioner
USA has an imperative duty to enroll them, it does not appear to this Court that the duty is merely ministerial; rather, it is a duty
involving the exercise of discretion. This was likewise our ruling in the case of Tangonan v. Paño et al., which involves a
factual setting similar to the present petition. We adopted as our own the rationalization of the trial court therein:
. . . . Every school has a right to determine who are the students it should accept for enrolment. It has the right to
judge the fitness of students. This is particularly true in the case of nursing students who perform essential health
services. Over and above its responsibility to petitioner is the responsibility of the school to the general public and
the community. This Court take (sic) judicial notice that nursing has become a popular course because of the great
demand for Filipino Nurses abroad, especially in the United States. It is essential therefore that Nursing graduates
who go abroad and become in a sense our own ambassador (sic) should be highly qualified to perform their tasks.
This is the responsibility of our school and in the discharge of this responsibility, they certainly should be given
the greatest latitude in formulating their admission policies.
While petitioner questions the findings of respondent school as to her academic competence, the Court cannot
find any legal jurisdiction to interfere in the exercise of judgment of the school on this matter. . . .

The late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee supplied the rationale underlying our attitude towards academic decisions or policies
in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, et al., 17 to wit:
Only . . . when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment of the school
faculty and the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an applicant for enrollment. . . . The courts
simply do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute themselves as Admission Committees of the
universities and institutions of higher learning and to substitute their judgment for that of the regularly constituted
Admission Committees of such educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivably be
swamped with petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands
who flunked and were dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their grades.

Section IV, paragraph 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private School states:
Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific requirement and
reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire period he is expected to complete
his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.

The meaning of this provision is that the school, after having accepted a student for enrollment in a given course may not expel
him or refuse to re-enroll him until he completes his course, except when he is academically deficient or has violated the rules of
discipline. He is presumed to be qualified to study there for the entire period it will take to complete his course.

This presumption has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982."
20
Section 9(2) of this Act provides:
SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by
 law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. (emphasis
supplied)

Article XIV, Section 5(3) of the 1987 Constitution affords a similar right, although limited to citizens:
Sec. 5 (3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements. (emphasis supplied).

At the same time, educational institutions are entitled to pursue their academic freedom and in the process have the concomitant
right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.

Section 13(2) of B.P. Blg. 232 provides:

Sec. 13. Rights of Schools. — In addition to their rights provided for by law, school shall enjoy the following:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The right for institutions of higher learning to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted to study,
who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of the study and research. (emphasis supplied)

Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987 Constitution is that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning. Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them — free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending
to the choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
That would be to frustrate its purposes and nullify its intent.

While it is true that an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue, since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the obligation of the school to educate a
student would imply a corresponding obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and regulations of the
school. When a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his
contractual right. In this connection, this Court recognizes the expertise of educational institutions in the various fields of
learning. Thus, they are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and regulations in the admission of students,
including setting of academic standards. Within the parameters thereof, they are competent to determine who are entitled to
admission and re-admission.

We find the challenged regulation of petitioner USA reasonable and relevant to its objective, namely: . . . to produce graduates of
proven competence and aptitude in a demanding profession, for which it is responsible to society-at-large, not only nationally
but also internationally, considering the good fame and reputation of Filipino nurses abroad. Although private respondents did
not flunk in Nursing 104 but on the contrary earned credits therefor, nevertheless, their performances are still academically
deficient for failure to meet the standards set by petitioner USA. Besides, it is worthy to note that they were apprised fully
beforehand about the rules and regulations of petitioner USA.

Our conclusion is, as sure to follow as night follows the day, that the dismissal of private respondents' petition by the trial court
is proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 23, 1991 and its resolutions dated April 25, 1991
and June 10, 1991 are SET ASIDE. The order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City dated September 15, 1989 is REINSTATED.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
131 Ateneo v. Capulong AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993 NOTES: It is the national government shall provide the overall
TOPIC: Right to Quality Education policy on education to meet national goals.
PONENTE:
FACTS:
1. As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation
rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks.
2. As a result, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical
injuries at Chinese General Hospital. Another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized
at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him
on the same occasion.
3. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding
the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they
failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension.
4. Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing
the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of
the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
5. Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or before February 18,
1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses.
6. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board.
7. Respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in the
Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from initiations held on
February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your participation in
acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written answers to
the above charge on or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their defenses.
8. Respondent students, through counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending
action on their request for copies of the evidence against them.
9. Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing to clarify their answer with
regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, counsel for
respondent students moved to postpone the hearing.
10. Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory questions. They
were also informed that: a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down in
the case of Guzman vs. National University; b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the proposed bill of
Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815; d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the
petitioners in the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty; e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable
to the President of the University, i. e., Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.
11. On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not
prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the
Administration so that this case be decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level."
12. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline
which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
12.1The Board found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of
Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical hazing.
12.2Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the neophytes,
actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was
heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the
neophytes under their care.
12.3The Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the
Board pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the
Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived
her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President of the University the decision of
whether to expel respondents or not.
13. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board ,
 thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming they did not lay hands on
the neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in accordance with the principle that "where two or more
persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for
the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the
"offense of the respondents can be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian
education and contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent
students.
14. On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction alleging that
they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary
restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally
centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.
15. On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing
respondent students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident.
16. A temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of
the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro,
Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereñeta to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and
Mendoza.
17. Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamuswith prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid
members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the original petition.
18. Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the Special Board was totally
unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the
Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same
being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in
effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime. Acting on the urgent motion to
admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of
respondents Judge Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991.
19. On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court
ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students
were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and
Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent
students to file a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
20. Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of
students.
21. The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by
respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.Hence, this special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement
of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge.
ISSUE(S):
1. whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its disciplinary
rules and moral standards
2. whether or not the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances.
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating
respondents students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J.,
then President of Ateneo de Manila University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board
DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.
RATIO:

Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang Tibay case and not theGuzman case
which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process,
the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be
satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: (1)
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them ; (2) that they shall have
the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa,
petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February
11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing
a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. While of the students mentioned in the
February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an
extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements.

Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14
and 20, 1991. It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as
contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners'
notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity
to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration
Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed
pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportun ity to see and examine the
written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due
process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due
process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An
administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the
investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals
that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz.

Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth
because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written statements and
hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was
preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.

With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and
allege that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits
hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be
overemphasized that the charge filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the
Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the
specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision
of a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not
defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the subject
of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation
under scrutiny.

Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the
increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes
the test of reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship
and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in our
country.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that
they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of
Appeals.

It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a
question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due
process prior to their dismissal from petitioner university.

Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to
suffer irreperable damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to
doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found by the Disciplinary
Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the
administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935,
1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions.

At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term
"academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, thus: (1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3)
how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.

Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State" has deservedly earned for
himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this grea t
teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he
willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens.

Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority,
whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the
insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities,
renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.

In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of
freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of
the new German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1554), Hel mstatdt (1574)
and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental
human rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights
related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press;
in other words, with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators,
to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free
from internal and external interference or pressure.

But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into
unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have been stressed the need for assuring to
such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components
of this aspect of academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.

It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu with its
institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the
right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In
theFrankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who
may be admitted to study.

In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American
government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights
now subsumed under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the institutional
aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal
protection.

The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities
established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State University at that time, being the University of the
Philippines, the Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the
rest.

In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its Section 8(2): "All institutions of
higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G.
Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of
academic freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university
professor."

Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an
expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of the 1986 came up with this formulation:
"Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing
speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2)
Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein,
ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand
the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters
of academic freedom."

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the
institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought, — "the
faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an
institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather
than a right. While under the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion
of students. This . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college.
The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students
demanded and plucked for themselves from the ponoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the
rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to
learn under the rules laid down by the school.

Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of
its curriculum and assidously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the
founder of the order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and
ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop
the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or
flowering if you will, of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the
institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred
North Whitehead said, is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." It appears that the particular brand of
religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been lost on the respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a
minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those
who come after them.

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a
morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this
case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." Thus, the
decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such
a congruence between the offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento.

Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its
decision founded on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity
conducted hazing activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of the
hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the
vicious acts of respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites,
how can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore, affirm
petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in
Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
132 JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and *Consolidated 16 petitions!!
in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and Note: RH LAW CASE!! Long case! Many issues
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD raised!!!   
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. Note: Just read the held part to know which
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, provisions were declared consti and unconsti
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of The Ratio part explains why the said provisions
are consti / unconsti 
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents. In ruling that the RH bill is constitutional, the
Court reiterated that the family is the basic unit
TOPIC: The Family of society.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law) was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after, fourteen (14) petitions (either certiorari and/or
prohibition) and two (2) petitions- in-intervention were filed before the Court. Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality
of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of
the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access
to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for
indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target
of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any
violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound
only his own preferred way of family planning.
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory
reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of
the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List.
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution. 52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is
contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to
LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.

The respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or
controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo: The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be
declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the
very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law -
must be maintained." It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic
Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the
Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencie s - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet
secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception
program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning
methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family
 planning methods, devices and supplies.

ISSUES: After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined
them to the following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. –Yes

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional [for violating]: **Generally, NO

1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech – **As to some provisions, yes
4] The Family --- **As to some provisions, yes
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

HELD: In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods,
devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled
upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each
other. Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. The principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion"
in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of
family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
 8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution

RATIO:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the
courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in
striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great la ndmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken w ith grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it
may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its
unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes
no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure
that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution . If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review. This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

"Judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority
and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.”

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH
Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of t he
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court
has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish
this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them, and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. The petitioners, for their part,
invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the
requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness, which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. With these said, even if the
constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again
acted liberally on the locuss tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance
is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to
sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act.

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions
on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights . Mindful of all these
and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which
is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are bein g
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the
full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. It cannot
be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however,
covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It
is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and
the RH Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1. The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners: the RH Law violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers
of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non -abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.

Position of the Respondents: the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They
contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and
respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive.

The Court's Position / Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from Fertilization

(Note: Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter. In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.)

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that
the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.
According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are
not identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can
be medically detected."

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by
those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also
to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position. If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly
legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would
be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness. It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes
- abortion and abortifacients.

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it
finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As
pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the
fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. Moreover, the RH Law recognizes
that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it .
The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first
kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized
ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb (third kind).

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When
a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point
of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,
is an abortifacient.

2. The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. Citing various
studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in
women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under
Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that
women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement
of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute
the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.

The Court's Position: A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution
is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH
Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is
still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since
the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed
physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that
are safe are made available to the public.

3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech:

The Court's Position: In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious
standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that
matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent
with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion. Consequently, the petitioners
are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law
simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded
to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot
refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.

WON the RH Law *violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals,
and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their conscientious
objections?

*YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause,
whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do
so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain
of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of re ligion. While
penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the
effective implementation of the law.n

Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal
protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In
addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is
employed in the government.

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious
objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted
provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objecti ve.
The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA
6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to
enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view
that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to
act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition

NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police
power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

** On this part, RH Law is unconstitutional because:

Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in
the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii)
which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to
accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-
and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it. Any
attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education. Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing
their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant)
the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children. By incorporating parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be
said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. Due process clause

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care
institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.” The terms
“service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures.
Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures .

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and
“knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.

7. Equal protection clause

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does
not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teach ing
of reproductive health education.

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render
RH service, pro bono or otherwise.

9. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product
is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid

The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in
the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover
health services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).

10. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to
provide RH services. Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare.
133 Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the AUTHOR:
President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit NOTES:
v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al. The Court said that the Ombudsman is vested with broad investigative and
[G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232; January disciplinary powers. These powers include the scrutiny of all acts of malfeasance,
28, 2014] misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the
TOPIC: Ombudsman; Office of the Special Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. Under Section 12, Article
Prosecutor XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the
PONENTE: BRION, J “protector of the people” against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the government,
to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision
of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an
authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses, and excesses of the
bureaucracy. As the Ombudsman is expected to be an ”activist watchman”, the
Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers
granted it by the Constitution and by R.A. No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably
in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.

In recognition of the importance of the office of the Special Prosecutor as a

necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, Congress
made the Office of the Special Prosecutor as an organic component of the Office of
the Ombudsman. It also granted the Ombudsman control and supervision over that
office. This power of control and supervision includes vesting the Office of the
Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he or she
may deem fit. Even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part
of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an
organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment between
the Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the
other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her
Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents
of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.

FACTS:
A. Gonzales’ petition (G.R. No. 196231)

A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR
against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M.
Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and
evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a
case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by
the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged."
Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the
administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite
due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza et. al. guilty
of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza et. al. filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to
Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval.

On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the
21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board as hostages, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on
board the hijacked bus.

In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and
Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident. The two departments issued Joint Department
Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).

In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their "gross negligence
and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza." The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to
promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated
the desperate resort to hostage-taking." The IIRC recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for further determination
of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.

Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency
in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.

The OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the service. According to the OP, "the inordinate and
unjustified delay in the resolution of [Mendoza’s] Motion for Reconsideration [‘that spanned for nine (9) long months’] xxx
amounted to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the Ombudsman’s own Rules of
Procedure."

Gonzales now argues in this petition before the court that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction
over the Deputy Ombudsman.

On the merits, Gonzales argued that since the draft order on Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration had to undergo different levels of
preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft
order only within nine (9) calendars days from his receipt of the order.

B. Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232)

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and
money laundering.

The Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea bargaining agreement with Garcia. Garcia
thereby agreed to: (i) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of indirect
bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of money laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of
facilitating money laundering. In exchange, he would convey to the government his ownership, rights and other interests over the real
and personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in the information.

The Sandiganbayan approved the agreement.

The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and assistants
committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust – grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770. The Committee recommended to the President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and the filing of appropriate
charges against her deputies and assistants before the appropriate government office.

The OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit. Sulit questioned the OP’s jurisdiction. 30 The question
of jurisdiction notwithstanding, the OP set the case for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011, prompting Sulit to seek
relief from this Court.

In both cases, the OP’s exercise of disciplinary authority finds basis in Section 8, Paragraph (2) of Republic Act No. 6770 or the
Ombudsman’s Act, which provides that:

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

xxxx
(2) A Deputy, or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the
removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President.
2. Whether a Special Prosecutor may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President.

HELD:
1. NO. The Court declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a
Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
2. YES. The Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not
consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to
the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.
RATIO:
A. Gonzales’ petition (G.R. No. 196231)

The Deputy Ombudsman: Constitutional Issue

The Philippine Ombudsman

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the
1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state
policy in Section 27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the
people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.36
This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly
check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. The Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to
further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary. [emphasis ours, italics supplied]

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling
under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its
official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.

The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.
To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures
and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent"
office. Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A
separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. [emphasis ours]

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government
constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers,
both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public
officers.40

"Independence" of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsman’s independence

Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as "independent."41 The extent of the
independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted with two significant
considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any
allowable interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances.

Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares
certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution
itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
"independent" bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would
result in the impairment of their core functions.

Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
 vesting disciplinary authority
 in the President over the
 Deputy Ombudsman violates 
 the
independence of the Office
 of the Ombudsman and is thus 
 unconstitutionalx

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust
in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
 controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young
democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be
declared void.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence of the Ombudsman fully support this position. The
statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power to remove and
discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd
situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the
very persons who can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given to the
public if the rule were otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking official of the Executive, who
appears to enjoy the President’s favor, would be discouraged from approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint;
the complainant’s impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be susceptible to political pressure,
cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of the
Ombudsman as champion of the people against corruption and bureaucracy.

d. The mutual-protection argument for 
 crafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6770

In crafting Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, Congress apparently addressed the concern that a lack of an external check against
the Deputy Ombudsman would result in mutual protection between the Ombudsman and her Deputies.

This concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the existing checks and balances already in place. On the one
hand, the Ombudsman’s Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is subject to the impeachment power of
Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s attempt to cover up the misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned
before the Court on appeal or certiorari. The same attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.

B. Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232)

The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue (Got this from the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen since J.
Brion’s decision provides that “the prevailing ruling on this latter point is embodied in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J.
Marvic Mario Victor Leonen”)

The Office of the Special Prosecutor may by law be removed by the President. This is what Section 8, Paragraph (2) of the
Ombudsman Act provides.

The Office of the Ombudsman’s powers are more proactive than the prosecutorial powers of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.

By clear constitutional design, the Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special Prosecutor is separate from the Office of
the Ombudsman. Section 7 is explicit on this point, in that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is allowed to exercise its
powers, except for those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman. While the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not
automatically a part of the Office of the Ombudsman, there is, however, no reason that Congress and the President may, by
law and in their political wisdom, attach the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of the Ombudsman. There is also
no constitutional prohibition for the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be functionally separate from the Office of the
Ombudsman. This is a matter to be addressed by the political departments. This may also be viewed as a check of both
Congress and the President on the powers of the Ombudsman.

By clear provision of the Constitution, it is only the Office of the Ombudsman, which includes her Deputies, that is
endowed with constitutional independence. The inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of the
Ombudsman in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6770 does not ipso facto mean that the Office of the Special Prosecutor
must be afforded the same levels of constitutional independence as that of the Ombudsman and the Deputy
Ombudsman. The law simply defines how the Office of the Special Prosecutor is attached and, therefore, coordinated
with the Office of the Ombudsman.

Thus, the provision of Section 8, Paragraph (2) of Republic Act No. 6770 which provides for the power of the President to
remove the Special Prosecutor is valid and constitutional.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

134 People v. Luis J. Morales AUTHOR: JANNA | NCC created ExpoCorp, to handle the Phil. Centennial
[G.R. No. 166355; May 30, 2011] Project. This was however, marred by numerous allegations of anomalies
TOPIC: Sandiganbayan (Art. XI, Sec. 4) (such as lack of public biddings). Morales is the President of Expocorp. He
PONENTE: BRION, J. was charged before the Sandiganbayan. Morales moved for dismissal,
alleging that Expocorp is not a GOCC, and he is not a public officer, thus he
is not within Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Court held that since BCDA was
only a minority shareholder of Expocorp, the latter cannot be held as a
GOCC. Since Expocorp is not a GOCC, Morales cannot be charged as a
public officer at the Sandiganbayan.

A private corporation is beyond the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

FACTS:
1. June 13, 1991: President Corazon Aquino issued A.O. No. 223 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the
declaration of Philippine Independence and thereby created the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in
1998 (Committee).
2. 1993: President Ramos issued E.O. 128, entitled "Reconstituting the Committee for the Preparation of the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998." EO 128 renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial Commission" (NCC).
3. NCC mandate: "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial
of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."2 The late Vice-President
Salvador Laurel was appointed as NCC Chairman.
4. March 10, 1996: the NCC and the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) 3 organized the Philippine
Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation or Expocorp whose primary purpose was to operate, administer, manage and develop
the Philippine Centennial International Exposition 1998 (Expo ‘98).4
5. The Philippine Centennial project was marred by numerous allegations of anomalies, among them, the lack of
public biddings.
 In 1998, Senator Nikki Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing these anomalies.
Because of this speech, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an investigation on the Philippine
Centennial project. In 1999, President Estrada created the Ad Hoc and Independent Citizen’s Committee
(AHICC), also for the purpose of investigating these alleged anomalies. Both the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee and the AHICC recommended to the Office of the Ombudsman that a more exhaustive
investigation of the Philippine Centennial project be conducted.
6. In 2001: The investigation that followed resulted in the filing of an Information 5 by the Ombudsman’s Fact-Finding
and Investigation Bureau against respondent Luis J. Morales (Morales), the acting president of Expocorp at the time
relevant to the case. This Information served as basis for Criminal Case No. 27431 that we now consider.
7. The Information against Morales for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 6 reads:
That on or about September 6, 1997 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in Pasig City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Pres. of Expo Corporation, Pasig City, a government corporation,
and as such was issued one (1) Mercede[s] Benz, Model 1997-C230, bearing Serial No. WDB202023-1F-602122, and Engine No. 111974-12-
027093 for his official use, and while in the performance of his official functions, acting thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefits to one Rodolfo M. Lejano by selling to him said Mercede[s] Benz
through Newton Motors, Inc. represented by its President Exequiel V. Mariano in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P2,250,000.00), without the requisite public bidding nor approval of the Board of Directors of Expo Corporation and thereafter failed to
deposit the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned vehicle to the account of Expo Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of the
Corporation and the public interest as well. 7
8. In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Morales: (a) moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged; (b) alleged that Expocorp is a private corporation and that he
is not a public employee or official; (c) alleged that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over his person or the
offense charged as he is a private individual who has not been charged jointly with other public officials or employees ;
(d) added that Expocorp is not a government-owned or controlled corporation because it was not created by a special
law, it did not have an original charter, and a majority of Expocorp’s capital stock is owned by private individuals;
(e) claimed that he did not receive any compensation from the government as defined in Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 3019,
and the compensation he received as Expocorp’s acting president was paid from Expocorp’s funds.
9. Office of Special Prosecutor’s Comment to Expocorp’s motion: (a) insisted that Expocorp is a government-owned
corporation since its articles of incorporation showed that of its ten listed subscribers, BCDA held stocks valued
at P99,999,100.00, while the stocks held by the rest of the subscribers had a total value of P900.00; (b) further argued,
based on the Court’s ruling in Salvador H. Laurel v. Aniano A. Desierto, 9 that NCC Chairman Laurel was a public
officer; thus, Morales was likewise a public officer since his appointment flowed from the former’s exercise of his
authority as chairman of both NCC and Expocorp.
10. Morales’ Reply: (a) upon Expocorp’s incorporation, BCDA owned essentially all of Expocorp’s stocks; (b) Two
months after its incorporation, however, the Board of Directors of Expocorp issued a resolution declaring all its
unissued and unsubscribed shares open for subscription; (c) Global Clark Assets Corporation (Global) subscribed to
essentially all of these unissued and unsubscribed shares; thus, Global became the majority owner with 55.16% of
Expocorp’s stocks, while BCDA was left as minority stockholder with 44.84% of Expocorp’s stocks; (d) the ruling in
Laurel10 applied exclusively to Chairman Laurel. Morales concluded that since Expocorp is a private corporation and
an entity distinct from NCC, he, as its president, is not a public officer.
11. Sandiganbayan Resolution: (a) ruled that the position of a president of a GOCC clearly falls within its jurisdiction;
(b) To hold Morales could be held accountable as Expocorp’s president, it must first be established that GOCC.
 In Laurel, the Court only held that Laurel is a public officer without ruling on whether Expocorp is a private or
a government-owned corporation.
 Court also held that NCC performed executive functions, hence, it was a public office; consequently, its
chairman, Laurel, was a public officer.
 Morales, in the case at bar, is being charged as president of Expocorp only and not as an NCC official.
12. In ruling that Expocorp is a private corporation, the Sandiganbayan stated: (a) it was not created by a special law
nor did it have an original charter. It was organized under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission; (b) Expocorp could not derive its public character from the fact that it was organized by
the NCC; (c) ruled that applying the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Expocorp is a private
corporation because Global owns 55.16% of its stocks; hence, its officers and employees are private individuals who
are outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On this basis, information against Morales was dismissed.
13. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion the People subsequently filed; 12 hence, the present petition.
ISSUE(S): (1) Whether EXPOCORP should be considered as a public office; (2)Whether Morales, as Expocorp President
should be rightfully considered as a public officer, falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:

RATIO:
The nature of Expocorp
1. Expocorp is a private corporation as found by the Sandiganbayan. It was not created by a special law but was
incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.16 It is
also not a GOCC.
2. Although BCDA, which owned 999,991 shares 17 of its shares, was one of Expocorp’s original incorporators, the
Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed Global to buy 1,229,998 of its unused and unsubscribed shares two
months after its incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
3. In Dante V. Liban, et al. v. Richard J. Gordon, 18 we pointedly said:A government-owned or controlled corporation
must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock
must be owned by the government.

The Sandiganbayan’s Jurisdiction

1. Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:

Sec. 5. The [Batasang Pambansa] shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction
over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined
by law.

2. R.A. No. 8249,20 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, 21 delineated the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as follows:

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
 of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27'
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the Sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang Panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other city department heads;
(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.1avvphi1
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986. (Underlining supplied.)

3. Since Expocorp is a private corporation, not a government-owned or controlled corporation, Morales, as

Expocorp’s president who now stands charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in this capacity, is
beyond the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Sandiganbayan’s June 15, 2004 Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27431, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Luis J.
Morales," is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
135 BANAT v. COMELEC AUTHOR: RC Alfafara
Topic: Powers and Functions of the COMELEC NOTE/S: The Constitution provides that Congress shall not have
G.R. No. 179271; July 8, 2009 more than 250 members unless Congress provides otherwise and
PONENTE: CARPIO, J out of the total number of incumbent members not more than 20%
shall come from the party list. Of the party list members, each
party list shall be entitled to a maximum of three seats.

FACTS:
1. The House of Representatives (HOR), represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to
intervene in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295. The HOR filed a motion for clarification in intervention and enumerated the
issues for clarification as follows:
A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list representation should only be 54
and not 55. The HOR seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of Members
considering that the Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.
B. The HOR wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named party-list representatives or only
such number of representatives that would complete the 250 member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32, will this act not violate the Constitutional provision considering that the
total members would now rise to 270.
C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain the minimum
number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term additional seats refer to 2nd
and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the HOR wishes to be clarified whether there is no more
minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
D. For the guidance of the HOR, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in Veterans that the filling up of the
allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory, has been abandoned.
2. Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), 3RD nominee of Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion for leave
for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that: The SC, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has
deprived without due process and in violation of the equal protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies,
such as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties who did not even meet the 2% threshold.
3. In the Court’s Decision (21 April 2009), the COMELEC submitted the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution
which updated the data used by the Court in its 21 April 2009 Decision. The total votes for party-list is now 15,723,764
following the cancellation of the registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement
(FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of legislative districts is now 219 following the annulment of Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the percentage and ranking of the actual
winning party-list groups are different from the Decision in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
ISSUE:
(1) The Number of Members of the HOR in the 2007 Elections.
(2) The Number of Party-List Seats in the 2007 Elections.
HELD:
(1) In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty (20) legislative districts were added by piecemeal legislation
after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district
representatives. Navotas City became a separate district on 24 June 2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007
elections.
(2) In the 2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for distribution should be reduced from 55 to 54.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.
RATIO:
1. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. The Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the HOR at 250. However, the Constitution expressly
allows for an increase in the number of members of the HOR provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This is clear from
the phrase unless otherwise provided by law in Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Legislature has the
option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the HOR is done by piecemeal legislation or by
enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. Legislation that makes piecemeal increases of the number of district
representatives is no less valid than legislation that makes a general increase.
3. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. x x x
4. The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio automatically
applies whenever the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical formula for determining the
number of seats available to party-list representatives is

5. As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, [t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of
seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Thus, for every four district
representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for
legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section
5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat.
6. Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats.
However, the increase in the number of members of the HOR went unnoticed as the available seats for party-list
representatives have never been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, there were
220 legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were thus allocated. However, the number of legislative districts was
subsequently reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008 declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif
Kabunsuan. Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly
reduced from 55 to 54.
7. The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the
number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite
the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the
three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.
8. Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2%
threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Court
upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.
9. In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat
because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically,
the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes can no longer be given any effect.
Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
10. However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat
allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the
number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats
received in the first round of seat allocation. (Eg. if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election and each party
received only one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are
further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat allocation.)
11. The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives in the 2007 Elections:
The NBC issued NBC Report No. 33 on 11 June 2008, updating the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not furnish this
Court with a copy of NBC Report No. 33. In any case, we stated in the dispositive portion of our Decision that [t]he
allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure. Party-List Canvass
Report No. 32 is not part of the procedure.
(The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid down in our Decision requires correction for
purposes of accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for party-list by 36, the COMELEC
multiplied the percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the number of available party-list
seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed seats. Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of seats to the winning party-
list organizations, however, remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001.)
12. Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino
(ALIF) both have pending cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation of both
BATAS and ALIF as the outcome of their cases may affect the final composition of party-list representatives.
> The computation and allocation of seats may still be modified in the event that the COMELEC decides against BATAS and/or ALIF.
13. To address Roa-Borjes motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the results in
future party-list elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the preference in the
distribution of seats should be in accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting the distribution
to parties receiving two-percent of the votes. To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would mathematically
prevent the filling up of all the available party-list seats.
14. CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party allocated with a seat. CIBAC's
2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a lower fractional seat value after the
allocation of its second seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03
compared to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the additional seats for distribution in the
second round, gives 1.03 seat, leaving 0.03 fractional seat. Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38,
higher than CIBAC's fractional seat of 0.03. The fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second
round of seat allocation to determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for purposes of the second step in the second round of
seat allocation, TUCP has a higher rank than CIBAC.
15. The 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, a nd the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties and organizations.
>> The phrase legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio in Section
5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to proportional representation. However ,
this principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation
of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list
representatives shall be those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system, giving the Legislature
wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats.
16. Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the HOR through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x. However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is
qualified by Section 11(b) of the same law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list
organization from dominating the party-list system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by
imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because
they do not violate the Constitution, which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.

Four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:

1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of
seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing
legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat.
The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the
total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the
party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this
threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall
be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the
Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require
absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the
Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.

These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list
representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time, these
four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that
could not be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.
136 ANG LADLAD LGBT AUTHOR:
PARTY represented Accreditation is done solely by COMELEC. The Court said that under the country’s system of
herein by its Chair, laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
DANTON REMOTO vs. validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply
held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.The OSG argues
COMMISSION ON
that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang
ELECTIONS Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there
[G.R. No. 190582; April 8, has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The Court said that the
2010] moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. Thus it held:
Topic: Powers and “To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action,
Functions of COMELEC from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J. political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed,
been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.”
FACTS:
1. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
2. Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on
the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.
3. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
4. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector
that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
5. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds, stating that petitioner’s definition of the “LGBT Community” makes it clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
6. On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions
and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation.
ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation should be granted
HELD: Yes, it should be.
RATIO:
1. The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
2. Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had
nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification
by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
almost all provinces in the country.
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence is a
new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to
the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the
Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence
were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular
procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioners
right to procedural due process.
3. Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition
shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
 community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented
itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of [several]
LGBT networks[.]
4. Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they
found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed,
petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
5. Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-
existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register
as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

 Re: Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration - Our Constitution provides
in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious
matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
 Re: Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration - Respondent has failed
to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-
list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not
suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and
sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior
considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with
the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go
through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value.
Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
 Re: Equal Protection - From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other
political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
 Re: Freedom of Expression and Association - Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received
but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly
not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.
 Re: Non-Discrimination and International Law - The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws
of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual orientation. Additionally, a variety of
United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.
137 CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, vs. AUTHOR: Ernest
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO NOTE/S: This case overturned the jurisprudence that a second placer in an election
y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.. contest is always a second placer. The Court held that the ballot cannot override the
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013 constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
TOPIC: Powers and Functions of COMELEC candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
PONENTE: SERENO,C. J.: certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective
public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a
candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the
highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

2. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship

3. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte

4. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further
bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The
said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving
back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION (GRANTED THE DISQUALIFICATION)

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship
and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and
nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would
not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.

The order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is held to take effect.

MOTION FOR INTERVENTION

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of
votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he
claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate
who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all
motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer,
Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for
disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer,
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
 However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on
the following premises:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never
became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law
saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First
Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the
said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portu guese passport. Strict
policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original
citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is
not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly
help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with
the case at bar.

HENCE PETITION. Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued
use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

HELD: YES. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to
run for an elective position.
RATIO:
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citize nship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise
possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the
laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US
passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is
whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for
public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his
US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of
both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and po litical rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents exe cuted abroad
 that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces
his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also
a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that
he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenshi p, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an Amer ican citizen by
using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed
on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is
distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of
the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other
hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship
in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of
Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which
date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to
attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated
his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact
did. It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective
public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.(RULE ON SUCCESSION
WOULD NOT APPLY )

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the q ualified
candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of
an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as
players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not
possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his
disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as
provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he
filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar
against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not
have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he
filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN
MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
139. Ramon R. Yap vs. COA AUTHOR:
GR. No. 158562; April 23, 2010 NOTES: COA is the guardian of public funds. COA is not
TOPIC: COA with public accountability in so far as public merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its
funds are concerned own assessment of the merits of the disallowed
PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro, J. disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the
validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the
government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would
render COA’s vital constitutional power unduly limited and
thereby useless and ineffective.

FACTS:
1. Ramon R. Yap is a holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the National Development Company
(NDC), a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter.
2. He was appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC as Vice-
President for Finance effective June 14, 1991 while remaining as regular employee of NDC.
3. The additional employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to 50% of his basic salary at NDC and various
allowances attached to the office.
4. In the course of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued the following notices of disallowances
against Mr. Ramon R. Yap:

Notice of Disallowance Date Amount Nature

ND 99- 03(98)MGC 03/26/99 P3,330.00 Subscription to National Geographic

and Readers Digest
ND 99-10(98)MGC 04/12/99 2,848.00 Car maintenance allowance
1,500.00 Annual fee of VISA card

ND 99-12(98)MGC 04/12/99 789.00 Representation expense on a Sunday

ND 99-16(98)MGC 09/09/99 4,180.56 Fellowship with other PCA club

Members on Sunday
ND 99-07(98)IIGSI 08/28/99 11,500.00 Car maintenance allowance
ND 99-14(98)IIGSI 08/31/99 7,000.00 Executive check-up
ND 99-09(99)MGC 05/26/00 119,508.90 Monthly allowance
ND 2000-01(99)MGC 03/31/00 2,304.32 Car maintenance allowance
ND 2000-08(99)MGC 03/31/00 21,523.00 Monthly allowance
ND 2000-07(99)MGC 03/31/00 445.00 Car maintenance allowance
1,862.00 Car maintenance allowance
ND 2000-01(99)MGC 5/11/00 35,433.70 Gasoline allowance and drivers subsidy

which were predicated on the ground that appellants appointment to MGC in addition to his regular position as Department
Manager III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former directly
contravened the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution to wit:

Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Section 8. x x x No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, x x x

Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the questioned benefits were all approved by the
MGC Board of Directors. x x x x.
 5. Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II, which affirmed the MGC Corporate Auditors findings that the
allowances and reimbursements at issue were given in violations of Sections 7(2) and 8, Article IX-b of the 1987
Constitution.
6. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent COA via a Letter addressed to the COA
Chairman wherein he argued that his assignment to MGC was required by the primary functions of his office and
was also authorized by law, namely Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25, 1987.
7. Respondent COA denied petitioners appeal. It upheld the CAO IIs ruling that characterized the disallowed
allowances and reimbursements as prohibited by the Constitution. It also ruled that the said allowances and
disbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose requirement of the law and further
emphasized that it is not enough that payments made to petitioner be authorized by the Board of Directors of the
MGC but it is likewise necessary that said payments do not contravene the principles provide for under Section 4
of Presidential Decree 1445 on the use of government funds.

ISSUE(S): WON the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
affirmed the questioned disallowances.
HELD: NO. In light of express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we have previously
ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with
enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds.

RATIO:
In resolving this issue, it is imperative that we examine the powers vested in respondent COA by the pertinent laws of the
land. The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA, to wit:

Section 11. General Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional
bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state
colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the
internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including
temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit
and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.

Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule
that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds
relied upon by a government agencys auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In
consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make
its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of
the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COAs vital
constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective.

Petitioner also contends that assuming, without conceding, that the other allowances and benefits do not pass the public
purpose test, the rest of the allowances, such as the basic monthly allowances, executive check-up and the gasoline
allowances should not be disallowed, as they are normally given to officers of corporations, whether private or
government-owned and controlled.

We cannot uphold petitioners plausible but unsubstantiated argument on this point since, as previously discussed,
respondent COA is in the best position to determine which allowances and benefits may be properly allowed under the
circumstances, as it is the sole constitutional body mandated to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations such as the MGC and the NDC in the case at bar.
Even if we assume the truth of petitioners assertion that the said allowances are normally given, this fact alone does not
operate to preclude respondent COA from performing its constitutional mandate.

That certain allowances are enjoyed by corporate officers in the private sector does not justify the grant of the same
benefits to similarly designated public officers, even if they are officers of government -owned and controlled corporations
(GOCCs), which perform purely proprietary functions. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the funds of GOCCs
are still public funds and that is precisely the reason such funds are subject to audit by the COA. Thus, there is a valid
distinction between the officers of public corporations and those of private corporations.

To reiterate, the public purpose requirement for the disbursement of public funds is a valid limitation on the types of
allowances and benefits that may be granted to public officers. It was incumbent upon petitioner to show that his
allowances and benefits were authorized by law and that there was a direct and substantial relationship between the
performance of his public functions and the grant of the disputed allowances to him.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
140 G.R. No. 191424 August 7, 2013 AUTHOR: Bea Mationg
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE NOTES:
SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY
BANK, PETITIONER,
vs.
THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
TOPIC: Central Monetary Authority
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Record shows that the corporate life of RBFI (Rural Bank Faire, Inc) expired on May 31, 2005. Petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas)
and his principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new
management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof highlighted the dismal operation of the rural
bank. In view of those findings, certain measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced. On December 8,
2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) extended the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years . The BSP also
approved the change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated, as well as the increase in the number
of the members of its BOD, from five (5) to eleven (11).

The Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of
December 31, 2007. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an exit conference was held at the BSP during
which the BSP officials and examiners apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as the other bank officers
and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted during the said examination. The ECBI submitted its comments on BSP’s
consolidated findings and risk asset classification through a letter, dated April 8, 2008.

The examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the BSP arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of
the bank. Vivas appealed the cancellation to BSP. Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255, dated
September 25, 2008, placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of the following serious findings
and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination: 1] negative capital of ?14.674 million and capital adequacy
ratio of negative 18.42%; 2] CAMEL (Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity) composite rating of "2" with a Management
component rating of "1"; and 3] serious supervisory concerns particularly on activities deemed unsafe or unsound. Vivas
claimed that the BSP took the above courses of action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a
former BSP examiner.

CONTENTION OF VIVAS: Vivas moved for a reconsideration on the grounds of non-observance of due process and
arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the
bank under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the MB.

MONETARY BOARD: ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its books and records,
in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653. I

RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE MONETARY BOARD: Eurocredit Bank) (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in
the ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities; (c) cannot continue in business without
involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors; and (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order of the Monetary
Board for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking practices and other acts or transactions
constituting fraud or dissipation of the assets of the institution, and considering the failure of the Board of
Directors/management of Eurocredit Bank to restore the bank’s financial health and viability despite considerable time given
to address the bank’s financial problems, and that the bank had been accorded due process, the Board, in accordance with
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act), approved the recommendation of ISD II as follows: To
prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership; a nd
To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver of the bank.
ISSUE(S): W/N the power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural banks under receiverships is
unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of the powers of the Supreme Court, in violation of Section 2, Article VIII of
the Philippine Constitution.

CONTENTIONS OF VIVAS: Vivas submits that the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when they erroneously
applied Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, instead of Sections 11 and 14 of the Rural Bank Act of 1992 or R.A. No. 7353. He argues that
despite the deficiencies, inadequacies and oversights in the conduct of the affairs of ECBI, it has not committed any financial
fraud and, hence, its placement under receivership was unwarranted and improper. He posits that, instead, the BSP should
have taken over the management of ECBI and extended loans to the financially distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and 14
of R.A. No. 7353 because the BSP’s power is limited only to supervision and management take-over of banks.

He contends that the implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that
ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing in violation of his and the bank’s right to due process. He
adds that respondent PDIC actually closed ECBI even in the absence of any directive to this effect. Lastly, Vivas assails the
constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 claiming that said provision vested upon the BSP the unbridled power to close
and place under receivership a hapless rural bank instead of aiding its financial needs. He is of the view that such power goes
way beyond its constitutional limitation and has transformed the BSP to a sovereign in its own "kingdom of banks."

HELD: Petition is without merit.

(1) RATIO: As to the absence of due process

The thrust of Vivas’ argument is that ECBI did not commit any financial fraud and, hence, its placement under receivership was
unwarranted and improper. He asserts that, instead, the BSP should have taken over the management of ECBI and extended
loans to the financially distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and 14 of R.A. No. 7353 because the BSP’s power is limited o nly
to supervision and management take-over of banks, and not receivership.

Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI
was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing, invoking Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states that the BSP
may take over the management of a rural bank after due hearing. 33 He adds that because R.A. No. 7353 is a special law, the
same should prevail over R.A. No. 7653 which is a general law.

The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI was given every opportunity to be
heard and improve on its financial standing. The records disclose that BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives
of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings. There were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit report s for
the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a written explanation of such omission shall result in
the imposition of a monetary penalty. More importantly, ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI
to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having
been heard on its motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right under the Rural Bank Act.

At any rate, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under receivership without
prior notice and hearing. Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 provides, viz:

Sec. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. – Whenever, upon report of the head of the supervising or examining department, the
Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not include
inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community;
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or
(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or
(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or transactions which
amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without
need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.

Accordingly, there is no conflict which would call for the application of the doctrine that a special law should prevail over a
general law. It must be emphasized that R.A .No. 7653 is a later law and under said act, the power of the MB over banks,
including rural banks, was increased and expanded. The Court, in several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over banks
without need for prior hearing. It is not necessary inasmuch as the law entrusts to the MB the appreciation and determination
of whether any or all of the statutory grounds for the closure and receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under
R.A. No. 7653, has been invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under receivership for insolvency or
illiquidity, or because the bank’s continuance in business would probably result in the loss to depositors or creditors.

The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Swift
action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are
taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate
to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and
stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.

Accordingly, the MB can immediately implement its resolution prohibiting a banking institution to do business in the
Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the PDIC as receiver. The procedure for the involuntary closure of a bank is summary and
expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be final and executory, but may be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a
petition for certiorari to be filed by the stockholders of record of the bank representing a majority of the capital stock.
Obviously, this procedure is designed to protect the interest of all concerned, that is, the depositors, creditors and stockholders,
the bank itself and the general public. The protection afforded public interest warrants the exercise of a summary closure.

In the case at bench, the ISD II submitted its memorandum, dated February 17, 2010, containing the findings noted during the
general examination conducted on ECBI with the cut-off date of September 30, 2009. The memorandum underscored the
inability of ECBI to pay its liabilities as they would fall due in the usual course of its business, its liabilities being in excess of the
assets held. Also, it was noted that ECBI’s continued banking operation would most probably result in the incurrence of
additional losses to the prejudice of its depositors and creditors. On top of these, it was found that ECBI had willfully violated
the cease-and-desist order of the MB issued in its June 24, 2009 Resolution, and had disregarded the BSP rules and directives.
For said reasons, the MB was forced to issue the assailed Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership. In addition, the
MB stressed that it accorded ECBI ample time and opportunity to address its monetary problem and to restore and improve its
financial health and viability but it failed to do so.

(2) No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

Vivas’ attempt to assail the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 constitutes collateral attack on the said provi sion of
law. Nothing is more settled than the rule that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally attacked as
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally. A collateral attack on a presumably valid law is not
permissible. Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity stands.

Be that as it may, there is no violation of the non-delegation of legislative power. The rationale for the constitutional
proscription is that "legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated
is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is
a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate."

"There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power esse ntially
legislative."

In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative authority in the issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To
address the growing concerns in the banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively monitor
and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their
management or to place them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the reasonable parameters of the
power entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the manner of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a
wide discretion and latitude only as to how the law should be implemented in order to attain its objective of protecting the
interest of the public, the banking industry and the economy.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
141 AUTHOR: Yayie Lanting
G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002 NOTES: (if applicable)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD petitioner, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,respondent.

G.R. No. 141369. November 15, 2002

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) consisting of CEFERINO
PADUA, Chairman, G. FULTON ACOSTA,GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA
BUENAVENTURA, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ,
FERNANDO GAITE, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MA. LUZ
ARZAGA-MENDOZA, ANSBERTO PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO
REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, members, and ROLANDO
ARZAGA, Secretary-General, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SENATOR
AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR. and COMMISSIONER BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.,
Board of Consultants, and Lawyer GENARO LUALHATI, petitioners, vs. MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent.
Topic: Regulation of economic activity
PONENTE: Puno, J:
FACTS:
1. MERALCO filed with the ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of
21 centavos per kilowatthour (kwh) in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the
increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172.

2. the ERB issued an Order:

 granting a provisional increase of P0.184 per kwh, subject to the following condition:
In the event, however, that the Board finds, after hearing and submission by the Commission on Audit of an audit report on the books and
records of the applicant that the latter is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicants customers as a result of
this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills cove ring future consumptions
 ERB requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an audit and examination of the books and other records of
account of the applicant for such period of time, which in no case shall be less than 12 consecutive months, as it may deem
appropriate and to submit a copy thereof to the ERB immediately upon completion.

3. the COA submitted its Audit Report (the COA Report) which contained, among others, the recommendation not to include income
taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate determination and the use of the net average investment
method for the computation of the proportionate value of the properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the determination
of the rate base.

4. ERB rendered its decision adopting the above recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the
average amount of P0.017 per kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994.
 ordered that the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184 per kilowatthour granted under the Boards Order dated January 28,
1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167 per kilowatthour starting with
[MERALCOs] billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to
[MERALCOs] customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption.
 held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients
of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence, should not be passed on to the consumers.
 in applying the net average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate
base, only the proportionate value of the property should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months
the same was actually used in service during the test year.

5. CA: set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167 per kwh and the
refund of such amount to MERALCOs customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February
1998.Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners seek a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals by arguing primarily that the Court of Appeals erred:
a) in ruling that income tax paid by MERALCO should be treated as part of its operating expenses and thus considered in deter mining
the amount of increase in rates imposed by MERALCO and
b) in rejecting the net average investment method used by the COA and the ERB and instead adopted the average investment method
used by MERALCO.
ISSUE(S): whether or not income tax paid by MERALCO should be treated as part of its operating expenses and thus considered in
determining the amount of increase in rates imposed by MERALCO?
HELD: NO
RATIO:
We grant the petition.
The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing
rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public
purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to
promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the
property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while
maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to
prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the
State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service and one
that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered. The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor
and the consumer interests.

In his famous dissenting opinion in the 1923 case of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission:
The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific property, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked i n an
enterprise. Upon the capital so invested, the Federal Constitution guarantees to the utility the opportunity to earn a fair return The
Constitution does not guarantee to the utility the opportunity to earn a return on the value of all items of property used by the utility, or
of any of them.

The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that its charges to the public shall be reasonable. His company is the substitute
for the State in the performance of the public service, thus becoming a public servant. The compensation which the Constitution
guarantees an opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting the business.

While the power to fix rates is a legislative function, whether exercised by the legislature itself or delegated through an
administrative agency, a determination of whether the rates so fixed are reasonable and just is a purely judicial question and is
subject to the review of the courts.

The ERB was created under Executive Order No. 172 to regulate, among others, the distribution of energy resources and to fix rates to
be charged by public utilities involved in the distribution of electricity. In the fixing of rates, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. It has been held that even
in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. What is a just and reasonable rate is a
question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. The
requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be
oppressive. In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and
opportunities of the utility.

Settled jurisprudence holds that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be
accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant. In
one case, we cautioned that courts should "refrain from substituting their discretion on the weight of the evidence for the discretion of
the Public Service Commission on questions of fact and will only reverse or modify such orders of the Public Service Commission
when it really appears that the evidence is insufficient to support their conclusions."

In the cases at bar, findings and conclusions of the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO to the public should be
respected. The function of the court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is to determine whether under the facts and
circumstances, the final order entered by the administrative agency is unlawful or unreasonable. Thus, to the extent that the
administrative agency has not been arbitrary or capricious in the exercise of its power, the time-honored principle is that courts should
not interfere. The principle of separation of powers dictates that courts should hesitate to review the acts of administrative officers
except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.

In determining the just and reasonable rates to be charged by a public utility, three major factors are considered by the
regulating agency: a) rate of return; b) rate base and c) the return itself or the computed revenue to be earned by the public
utility based on the rate of return and rate base. The rate of return is a judgment percentage which, if multiplied with the rate base,
provides a fair return on the public utility for the use of its property for service to the public. The rate of return of a public utility is not
prescribed by statute but by administrative and judicial pronouncements. This Court has consistently adopted a 12% rate of return for
public utilities. The rate base, on the other hand, is an evaluation of the property devoted by the utility to the public service or the value
of invested capital or property which the utility is entitled to a return.

In the cases at bar, the resolution of the issues involved hinges on the determination of the kind and the amount of operating expenses
that should be allowed to a public utility to generate a fair return and the proper valuation of the rate base or the value o f the property
entitled to a return.
I. Income Tax as Operating Expense Cannot be Allowed For Rate-Determination Purposes
In determining whether or not a rate yields a fair return to the utility, the operating expenses of the utility must be considered. The
return allowed to a public utility in accordance with the prescribed rate must be sufficient to provide for the payment of such
reasonable operating expenses incurred by the public utility in the provision of its services to the public. Thus, the public utility is
allowed a return on capital over and above operating expenses. However, only such expenses and in such amounts as are reasonable for
the efficient operation of the utility should be allowed for determination of the rates to be charged by a public utility.

The ERB correctly ruled that income tax should not be included in the computation of operating expenses of a public
utility. Income tax paid by a public utility is inconsistent with the nature of operating expenses. In general, operating expenses are
those which are reasonably incurred in connection with business operations to yield revenue or income. They are items of expenses
which contribute or are attributable to the production of income or revenue. As correctly put by the ERB, operating expenses should be
a requisite of or necessary in the operation of a utility, recurring, and that it redounds to the service or benefit of customers.

Income tax, it should be stressed, is imposed on an individual or entity as a form of excise tax or a tax on the privilege of earning
income. In exchange for the protection extended by the State to the taxpayer, the government collects taxes as a source of revenue to
finance its activities. Clearly, by its nature, income tax payments of a public utility are not expenses which contribute to or are incurred
in connection with the production of profit of a public utility. Income tax should be borne by the taxpayer alone as they are payments
made in exchange for benefits received by the taxpayer from the State. No benefit is derived by the customers of a public utility for the
taxes paid by such entity and no direct contribution is made by the payment of income tax to the operation of a public utilit y for
purposes of generating revenue or profit. Accordingly, the burden of paying income tax should be Meralcos alone and should not
be shifted to the consumers by including the same in the computation of its operating expenses.

The principle behind the inclusion of operating expenses in the determination of a just and reasonable rate is to allow the public utility
to recoup the reasonable amount of expenses it has incurred in connection with the services it provides. It does not give the public
utility the license to indiscriminately charge any and all types of expenses incurred without regard to the nature thereof, i.e., whether or
not the expense is attributable to the production of services by the public utility. To charge consumers for expenses incurred by a public
utility which are not related to the service or benefit derived by the customers from the public utility is unjustified and inequitable.

While the public utility is entitled to a reasonable return on the fair value of the property being used for the service of t he public, no
less than the Federal Supreme Court of the United States emphasized: [t]he public cannot properly be subjected to unreasonable rates in
order simply that stockholders may earn dividends If a corporation cannot maintain such a [facility] and earn dividends for
stockholders, it is a misfortune for it and them which the Constitution does not require to be remedied by imposing unjust burdens on
the public.

We are not impressed by the reliance by MERALCO on some American case law allowing the treatment of income tax paid by a
public utility as operating expense for rate-making purposes. Suffice to state that with regard to rate-determination, the government is
not hidebound to apply any particular method or formula. The question of what constitutes a reasonable return for the public utility is
necessarily determined and controlled by its peculiar environmental milieu. Aside from the financial condition of the public utility,
there are other critical factors to consider for purposes of rate regulation. Among others, they are: particular reasons involved for the
request of the rate increase, the quality of services rendered by the public utility, the existence of competition, the eleme nt of risk or
hazard involved in the investment, the capacity of consumers, etc. Rate regulation is the art of reaching a result that is good for the
public utility and is best for the public.

For these reasons, the Court cannot give in to the importunings of MERALCO that we blindly apply the rulings of American courts on
the treatment of income tax as operating expenses in rate regulation cases. An approach allowing the indiscriminate inclusion of
income tax payments as operating expenses may create an undesirable precedent and serve as a blanket authority for public utilities to
charge their income tax payments to operating expenses and unjustly shift the tax burden to the customer. To be sure, public utility
taxation in the United States is going through the eye of criticism. Some commentators are of the view that by allowing the p ublic
utility to collect its income tax payment from its customers, a form of sales tax is, in effect, imposed on the public for consumption of
public utility services. By charging their income tax payments to their customers, public utilities virtually become tax collectors rather
than taxpayers. In the cases at bar, MERALCO has not justified why its income tax should be treated as an operating expense to enable
it to derive a fair return for its services.

It is also noteworthy that under American laws, public utilities are taxed differently from other types of corporations and thus carry a
heavier tax burden. Moreover, different types of taxes, charges, tolls or fees are assessed on a public utility depending on the state or
locality where it operates. At a federal level, public utilities are subject to corporate income taxes and Social Security taxes in the same
manner as other business corporations. At the state and local levels, public utilities are subject to a wide variety of taxes, not all of
which are imposed on each state. Thus, it is not unusual to find different taxes or combinations of taxes applicable to respective utility
industries within a particular state. A significant aspect of state and local taxation of public utilities in the United Stat es is that they
have been singled out for special taxation, i.e., they are required to pay one or more taxes that are not levied upon other industries. In
contrast, in this jurisdiction, public utilities are subject to the same tax treatment as any other corporation and local taxes paid by it to
various local government units are substantially the same. The reason for this is that the power to tax resides in our legisl ature which
may prescribe the limits of both national and local taxation, unlike in the federal system of the United States where state legislature
may prescribe taxes to be levied in their respective jurisdictions.

MERALCO likewise cites decisions of the ERB allowing the application of a tax recovery clause for the imposition of an additional
charge on consumers for taxes paid by the public utility. A close look at these decisions will show they are inappropos. In the said
cases, the ERB approved the adoption of a formula which will allow the public utility to recover from its customers taxes already paid
by it. However, in the cases at bar, the income tax component added to the operating expenses of a public utility is based on an estimate
or approximate figure of income tax to be paid by the public utility. It is this estimated amount of income tax to be paid by MERALCO
which is included in the amount of operating expenses and used as basis in determining the reasonable rate to be charged to t he
customers. Accordingly, the varying factual circumstances in the said cases prohibit a square application of the rule under the previous
ERB decisions.

II. Use of Net Average Investment Method is Not Unreasonable

In the determination of the rate base, property used in the operation of the public utility must be subject to appraisal and evaluation to
determine the fair value thereof entitled to a fair return. With respect to those properties which have not been used by the public utility
for the entire duration of the test year, i.e., the year subject to audit examination for rate-making purposes, a valuation method must be
adopted to determine the proportionate value of the property. Petitioners maintain that the net average investment method (al so known
as actual number of months use method) recommended by COA and adopted by the ERB should be used, while MERALCO argues
that the average investment method (also known as the trending method) to determine the proportionate value of properties should be
applied.

Under the net average investment method, properties and equipment used in the operation of a public utility are entitled to a return only
on the actual number of months they are in service during the period. In contrast, the average investment method computes the
proportionate value of the property by adding the value of the property at the beginning and at the end of the test year with the resulting
sum divided by two

The ERB did not abuse its discretion when it applied the net average investment method. The reasonableness of net average investment
method is borne by the records of the case. In its report, the COA explained that the computation of the proportionate value of the
property and equipment in accordance with the actual number of months such property or equipment is in service for purposes of
determining the rate base is favored, as against the trending method employed by MERALCO, to reflect the real status of the
property. By using the net average investment method, the ERB and the COA considered for determination of the rate base the value of
properties and equipment used by MERALCO in proportion to the period that the same were actually used during the period in
question. This treatment is consistent with the settled rule in rate regulation that the determination of the rate base of a public utility
entitled to a return must be based on properties and equipment actually being used or are useful to the operations of the public utility.

MERALCO does not seriously contest this treatment of actual usage of property but opposes the method of computation or valuation
thereof adopted by the ERB and the COA on the ground that the net average investment method assumes an ideal situation where a
utility, like MERALCO, is able to record in its books within any given month the value of all the properties actually placed in service
during that month. MERALCO contends that immediate recordal in its books of the property or equipment is not possible as
MERALCOs franchise covers a wide area and that due to the volume of properties and equipment put into service and the amount of
paper work required to be accomplished for recording in the books of the company, it takes three to six months (often longer) before an
asset placed in service is recorded in the books of MERALCO. Hence, MERALCO adopted the average investment method or the
trending method which computes the average value of the property at the beginning and at the end of the test year to compensate for
the irregular recording in its books.

Further, computing the proportionate value of assets used in service in accordance with the actual number of months the same is used
during the test year is a more accurate method of determining the value of the properties of a public utility entitled to a return. If, as
determined by COA, the date of recordal in the books of MERALCO reflects the actual date the equipment or property is used in
service, there is no reason for the ERB to adopt the trending method applied by MERALCO if a more precise method is available for
determining the proportionate value of the assets placed in service.

If we were to sustain the application of the trending method, the public utility may easily manipulate the valuation of its property
entitled to a return (rate base) by simply including a highly capitalized asset in the computation of the rate base even if the same was
used for a limited period of time during the test year. With the inexactness of the trending method and the possibility that the valuation
of certain properties may be subject to the control of and abuse by the public utility, the Court finds no reasonable basis to overturn the
recommendation of COA and the decision of the ERB.

MERALCO further insists that the Court should sustain the trending method in view of previous decisions by the Public Service
Commission and of this Court which upheld the use of this method. By refusing to adopt the trending method, MERALCO argues that
the ERB violated the rule on stare decisis.

Again, we are not impressed. It is a settled rule that the goal of rate-making is to arrive at a just and reasonable rate for both the
public utility and the public which avails of the formers products and services. However, what is a just and reasonable rate cannot
be fixed by any immutable method or formula. Hence, it has been held that no public utility has a vested right to any particular
method of valuation. Accordingly, with respect to a determination of the proper method to be used in the valuation of property and
equipment used by a public utility for rate-making purposes, the administrative agency is not bound to apply any one particular formula
or method simply because the same method has been previously used and applied. In fact, nowhere in the previous decisions cited by
MERALCO which applied the trending method did the Court rule that the same should be the only method to be applied in all
instances.

At any rate, MERALCO has not adequately shown that the rates prescribed by the ERB are unjust or confiscatory as to deprive its
stockholders a reasonable return on investment. In the early case of Ynchausti S.S. Co. v. Public Utility Commissioner, this Court
held: [t]here is a legal presumption that the rates fixed by an administrative agency are reasonable, and it must be conceded that the
fixing of rates by the Government, through its authorized agents, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and, unless there is an
abuse of that discretion, the courts will not interfere. Thus, the burden is upon the oppositor, MERALCO, to prove that the rates fixed
by the ERB are unreasonable or otherwise confiscatory as to merit the reversal of the ERB. In the instant cases, MERALCO was
unable to discharge this burden.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.
SP No. 46888 is REVERSED. RespondentMERALCO is authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017 per
kilowatthour, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision
of the ERB dated February 16, 1998, the excess average amount of P0.167 per kilwatthour starting with the applicants billing cycles
beginning February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCOs customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future
consumption.