EN BANC

[Adm. Case No. 4758. April 30, 1999.]

VICTOR NUNGA, Complainant, v. ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In his complaint, Victor Nunga seeks the disbarment of respondent Venancio Viray on the
ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents without a commission to do so. After
issues were joined, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted an investigation.

The Investigating Commissioner was Atty. Lydia A. Navarro. Her Report dated 4 August 1998
reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Victor D. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Venancio M. Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing
documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were
executed.

Complainant alleged that in May 1996, he was appointed by the board of directors of Masantol
Rural Bank after his father’s resignation as its president.

A few month[] thereafter, he allegedly discovered that one of the bank’s assets consisting of 250
square meters house and lot in Kalookan City was sold without proper bidding by its manager
Jesus B. Manansala to Jesus Carlo Gerard M. Viray, a minor born February 2, 1969 during the
transaction on May 22, 1987. The deed of absolute sale was notarized by the respondent who is
not only the father of the buyer minor but also a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor
bank and was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that date.

Complainant further alleged that the said minor vendee wasn’t capable to buy the said property
at its value of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) but his parents Atty. and
Mrs. Venancio Viray, respondent herein [sic]. Being a minor he must [have been] represented by
a guardian in the said transaction. After the title was allegedly issued in the name of the minor
vendee Jesus Carlo [M.] Viray, the same title was allegedly used by Respondent and his wife in
mortgaging the property to Crown Savings and Loan Association for THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) on July 15, 1991 both by virtue of Special Powers of
Attorney annotated at the back of the TCT No. 362813 PR 9907. The annotation of the
cancellation of the THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) loan in . . . favor of
Crown Savings and Loan Association under entry number 1226 was allegedly entered in the
notarial registry of the Respondent for 1991 when he wasn’t commissioned as notary public.

The aforesaid acts of Respondent allegedly constitute not only unprofessional and unethical
misconduct unbecoming of a lawyer but also gross and serious malpractice which justifies
disbarment.

Respondent for his part alleged in his comment that complainant holds no position at the
Masantol Rural Bank Inc. [i]n 1987 and 1997, but is facing criminal charges for having
plundered the said bank of millions of pesos and [for] trespass to dwelling; while his father is
facing a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The sale of the lot by the
Masantol Rural Bank Inc. to his son was allegedly done in good faith all the formalities required
by law [were] properly complied with and the complaint from all indications is a leverage in
persuading him into a possible compromise.

From 1965 to date Respondent alleged that he was always commissioned as notary public and
the fact that Pampanga is under several feet of floodwaters, he could not annex all the needed
documents to support the allegations. According to Respondent, there was no year in his practice
of law that he was not commissioned as notary public. In fact, in the alleged documents he had
PTR for that purpose [, and] he would not [have obtained] a commission without the PTR.

After going over the records of this case, the Undersigned noted that although both parties were
required to submit their respective memorand[a], only complainant complied with the order.

Complainant submitted certification and the respective orders of the Clerk of Court and presiding
judges . . .in support of his contention, and previous certification issued by the Clerk of Court of
Pampanga to the effect that Respondent Atty. Venancio Viray had been commissioned to act as
notary public for the said province on January 2, 1981 to December 31, 1982; January 10, 1983
to December 31, 1984; and January 8, 1995 to December 31, 1996 and had no record of any
notarial reports. These therefore negate respondent’s allegation that he [has been] commissioned
as notary public since 1965 to the present.

Complainant likewise submitted a copy of the Resolution which dismissed the cases filed against
the Complainant and his father and the xerox copy of the TCT No. 362813 PR 9907 where the
special power of attorney and the annotations for the cancellation of mortgage showed
inscription of the same in the notarial register of Venancio Viray on June 4, 1991. Nowhere from
the records and evidence[] submitted was there any proof that Respondent was commissioned as
notary public in 1987 and 1991, the years the Absolute Deed of Sale was notarized by
Respondent as appearing to be May 22, 1987 and the inscription for cancellation of mortgage on
the dorsal side of TCT 362813 as June 4, 1991 [sic].
The respondent’s contention that he had a PTR for all the documents he prepared is only an
indication that the Professional Tax Receipt is a license for him to engage in the practice of his
profession as a lawyer but not a commission for him to act as notary public.

Inasmuch as Respondent was not able to counteract the averments of Complainant which were
duly supported with evidence[], it is apparent that Respondent violated the provisions of the
notarial law by having affixed his official signatures to the aforesaid documents with the intent to
impart the appearance of notarial authenticity thereto when . . . in fact as of those dates 1987 and
1991 he was not commissioned as notary public.

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that if Respondent is presently

commissioned as notary public, the same should be revoked, and [he should] not be granted any
commission as notary public up to December 31, 2002.

On 5 November 1998, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar promulgated Resolution No.
XIII-98-196 adopting the Report of the Investigating Commissioner and recommending that
respondent’s commission as a notary public be revoked and that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for three months.

We concur with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Venancio
Viray did not have a commission as notary public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the
assailed documents. Respondent knew that he could not exercise the powers or perform the
duties of a notary public unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law
(Chapter 11, Title IV, Book I, Revised Administrative Code). He tried to impress upon the
investigating commissioner that since "1965 to date" he has always been commissioned as a
notary public. Yet, he was unable to rebut complainant’s evidence that he was not so
commissioned for the years in question.

We have emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and
the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA
408, 413 [1997]; Arrieta v. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248, 252-253 [1997]).

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when
he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s
oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he
is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."cralaw virtua1aw library

By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code,
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting (supra):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain
from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. (Citing Marcelo v. Javier, 214
SCRA 1 [1992]).

What aggravated respondent’s unlawful notarization in 1987 was the fact that the transaction
involved was in favor of his son, who was then only eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.
Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, which was the governing law as of 22 May 1987 when the
said transaction was made, the age of majority was twenty-one years. Republic Act No. 6809,
which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years was approved only on 13 December 1989
and became effective two weeks after publication in two newspapers of general circulation.

Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary
public and as a member of the Philippine Bar.

However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is too light. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public
for three (3) years, and suspended from the practice of law for also three (3)
years.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board
of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from
being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission, if any, is
revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing and
Purisima, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case
where the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an
incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary.
In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the
Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct.1
After an answer2 and a reply3 were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court,
in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate
Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following
recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid
Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent,
former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation
of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and
therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing
from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or any
other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent
facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his
disposition of this case may be duly appreciated:
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while
respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime
Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.
Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special
Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares
presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years.
Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their
marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when
respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying
a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a
close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they
received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s)
resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,
respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the
condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the
other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated,
complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked
"it would have been just a call at the wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of
harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent called complainant a "nagger",
saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko".
Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left
complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then,
the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized,
contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to
apologize for what happened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996.
Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the
complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group,
that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and
a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no
time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant
Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").
On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent,
the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for
Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").
Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was
offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a
marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as
SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and
indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also
presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B");
Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and
Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant)
and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").
Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on
January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he
voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in
the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph
Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with
complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Peña, his
first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not
yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as
required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Peña having been made by
publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by
Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Exh. "4").
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of
demanding respect and dignity.4 He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein
complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Peña, had
not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married
another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for
marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled.
Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not
justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense
which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense
of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor
even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a
Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a
marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites.5
On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating
Justice Purisima which we quote with approval:
That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a
Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a
civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he could not be
forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).
That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and
the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles
2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male
and a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the
solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were
satisfied and complied with.
The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a
"sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he
entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality
against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with
complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His
consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize
the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage.
Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the
criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument
that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between
respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due to non publication of said
judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made subject
marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and
respondent void.
Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with
Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia
Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of
estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by a second marriage,
his first marriage with Librada Peña was subsisting and unannulled.
But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not
respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a
crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the
Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with
complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion
is — that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the
Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge
against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph
Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage
to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is
surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he
never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he
felt duty bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent
could have testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what
Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any
factual and legal basis.
In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of
marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery
thereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the
sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense
of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was
nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross
misconduct, nay sacrilege.
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral
fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney
at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law.6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers.7
However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive
conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior
probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of
commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a
penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice
as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.
WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of
immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof,
with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the
same or a similar offense hereafter.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., J.J., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, 1-2.
2 Ibid., 15-16.
3 Ibid., 19-20.
4 Pangan v. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 1.
5 See Pomperada vs. Jochico, Bar Matter No. 68, November 21, 1984, 133 SCRA 309.
6 People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 682.
7 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO
CASTILLO, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty.
Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).1 Respondent courted complainant and promised to
marry her while representing himself to be single.2 Soon they had an intimate relationship that
started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997.3 During their affair, respondent was preparing
for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar.4 It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that
respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her
relationship with respondent.5 On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer,
executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the
unborn child she was carrying as his.6 On December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby
girl, Aletha Jessa.7 By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child
and giving her any form of support.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was
nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was known in
the NBI that he was already married and with children;9 complainant is almost 10 years older
than him and knew beforehand that he is already married;10 the child borne by complainant is not
his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having an affair.11 He
admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to
save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was
seeing other men.12cräläwvirtualibräry
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of
gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.13cräläwvirtualibräry
In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he
declared explicitly:
1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;
2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;
3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my own;
4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal and medical
needs, education, housing, food, clothing and other necessities for living, which I will give
through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal age and capable to live
on his/her own;
5.  That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my child;
however, my failure to sign does not negate the recognition and acknowledgement already done
herein;
6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I have
full knowledge of the consequence of such acknowledgment and
recognition.14cräläwvirtualibräry
More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:
Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and
others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your daughter.
Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix amount
for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not more than
P1,000.15cräläwvirtualibräry
In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that:
...even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct
demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than his
lawful wife fails to meet these standards.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality
required of every lawyer.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and
undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his
part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-
stultification.18cräläwvirtualibräry
This Court has repeatedly held:
as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards.19cräläwvirtualibräry
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks
understanding from the Court, pointing out that men by nature are polygamous,20 and that what
happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire.21 The Court is not convinced. In
fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo that
complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it does
not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondents
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party
knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held
in Mortel vs. Aspiras:
In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is
not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of
unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts.22cräläwvirtualibräry
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar
examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to
membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.23 This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is
essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession;24 it is a continuing requirement to the
practice of law25 and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness before
he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.
The Court held:
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be
deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
giving him the opportunity to be heard.26cräläwvirtualibräry
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.27cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to
recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly
therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and
should be disciplined accordingly.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment
could be given.28 Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his
ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court
does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondents effort to mend his ways or that he
recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court
deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should be meted
out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to
the full satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining
moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.29cräläwvirtualibräry
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross
Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillos personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND
ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.
Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.
Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.
Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.

PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20, 1991
by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's
Medical Center (hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical
practitioners. The respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection
with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit
filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.
Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re
Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public interests is
the primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577,
588), or to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs.
Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).
Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for
his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and
Chinese business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank
vs. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).
Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his
promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession. Only eight (8) months later, on
August 20, 1991, he was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical
practice. Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not
effectively reform him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy Court
of Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. The following
are Judge Bernad's findings:
The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St.
Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and
abdominal pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St.
Luke's, Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves
and diagnosed her problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on
Christmas day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate
Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December
27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child.
Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with
his three (3) minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the attending
physicians of his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint
entitled: "Attorney Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto
Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to Branch
172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as
requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
Avelina Robles.
On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another
hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the
medical records of Mrs. Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical
records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk.
They saw Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He
immediately returned the folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by
his audacious act) and left the office.
Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered
Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the building,
calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's
car). When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his
coatpocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what she had seen to Mrs. Robles. The
latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of
them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs. Ms. Sandico
pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched
from medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her
chamber. On the way back to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso
Aves, and St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her
office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge
Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed
on to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when
Sandico declared that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them
from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages "72" and
"73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them as the same papers that
she saw Grecia hand over to the man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed in
a dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where she later regained consciousness.
In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of
ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly
realized this, so she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered
Sandico to submit a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.
A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver who
was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was not
allowed to enter the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin
of "SID" and asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to his
province by Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor
confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".
The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court, so
much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the
incident, Judge Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.
At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse
of the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu
Castro, counsel of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the
medical folder which lay among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court
Robles. When he allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to arrive, he
noticed Attorney Castro come out of the building and walk toward a man in the parking lot to
whom he handed a piece of paper. Afterward, Attorney Castro reentered the courthouse.
Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He
alleged that the person who was caught in possession of the detached pages of the medical record
was actually "planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.
He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so he
was fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the
courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second floor
of the building. He did not leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly
a very warm day, he wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He branded the
testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute falsehood. He alleged that he would not have done the
act imputed to him, because the medical chart was the very foundation of the civil case which he
filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He wondered why the man, alleged to be his driver, to
whom he supposedly gave the detached pages of the medical chart, was neither held nor arrested.
His identity was not even established.
He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had
never seen him before.
He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court
personnel, accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical record and he alleged that the
unidentified man remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.
In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee, Maria
Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and "without
any noticeable guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross
examination" (p. 11, Judge Bernad's Report).
That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly
clerk, Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages of
the medical record, was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature.
Nevertheless, they had the presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who
forthwith took appropriate steps to recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro had
absolutely no motive to testify falsely against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney Grecia's
"driver," her swift action in summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of the stolen
pages of the medical chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the
man was fruitless for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who stole
the pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an incredible
fabrication. Not only is it directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but,
significantly, Attorney Aves failed to mention it during the confrontation with the man inside
Judge Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present.
His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for he
would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for the man
to ascertain his identity.
In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the
investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge
Bernad noted that while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court
(9:15 A.M.) on July 16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue
barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not sharp when he was cross-
examined regarding more recent events. For instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent
on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that a hearing was held on that date as shown by the
transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the absence
of a court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was he who asked
that the chart be left with the clerk of court.
His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical chart
for the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact, the
entries show that after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the
doctors were able to stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the
charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves'
medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An
incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of
"an instrument to advance the ends of justice."
The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the
practice of his profession has been stressed by this Court repeatedly.
. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing
should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree
the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs.
Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)
. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the
exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although
not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the bar, which puts his moral
character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. (Melendrez vs.
Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)
. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted
only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the
ethics of the profession, a s well as being subject for judicial disciplinary control for the
protection of court, clients and the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.)
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced
the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the
honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or
unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an
attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the
favorable opinion of the public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, p.
15.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second
offense against the canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more
the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby
CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Padilla, J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

[ADM. CASE No. 3319. June 8, 2000.]

LESLIE UI, Complainant, v. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, Respondent.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disablement against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie
Ui.

The relevant facts are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City 1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children,
namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987,
however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village
in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.chanrobles.com.ph:red

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the Respondent. Complainant then

visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal
wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui
and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant
believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on
and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos
Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989
and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail.
The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had
been employed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11,
1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, 2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in
1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui
had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She
stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and
they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985. 3 Upon their return to Manila, respondent did
not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and
accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together. 4chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her
trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a
woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her
discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20,
1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm 5 she was connected with, the
woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding
to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil
status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in
Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L.
Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents’ funds. 6 By way of
counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and
groundless disbarment case against Respondent.

In her Reply 7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the
start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give
birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.chanrobles.com : law library

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her
husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Complainant’s evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same
evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the
latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and
was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still
living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they,
admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or
later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant’s evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent’s cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The
statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of
cohabitation does not make the complainant’s evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. v.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).chanrobles.com : virtual law library

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for
want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 8

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of
Justice, but the same was dismissed 9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to
Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with
making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was
altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated
Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985
and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the
Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General
in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was
within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of
Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission;
and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which
make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she
did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession
of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared
on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995, and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on
two (2) grounds, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral
manner. 17

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this
case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that
upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated
that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of
a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.
18chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible
for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that
the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make
it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact
remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent
and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent
stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for
changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present
evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant’s evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a
child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light
colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and
ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house
and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary
value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency
and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution
of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by
Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice 21 to bolster her
argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with
Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good
faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it
suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and,
that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.chanrobles.com.ph : red

In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by
having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children.
Complainant testified that respondent’s mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew
complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where
Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who
was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that
Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed
disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant’s Memorandum, 24 respondent stated that complainant miserably

failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the
allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of
marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a
married man does not prove that such information was made known to Respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report
and Recommendation, finding that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to
believe in the light of contemporary human experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui,
she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro
Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom
he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of
having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

x       x       x"

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of
Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for
Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of
Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe
penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked,
subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal
ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in
court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held: —

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession
of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and
as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only
far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from
what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps
respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised
prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui’s personal background
prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent’s suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions.
For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from
Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui
and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never
lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible
considering respondent’s allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. 28

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent’s act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just
that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we
find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of
the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a
marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is
difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when
she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of
good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.
The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard
the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted
positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that
a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4680. August 29, 2000
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and
LIGAYA P. SALAYON, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P.
Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in
connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers
in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City
Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.1 Complainant,
now a senator, was also a candidate for the Senate in that election. chanrobles virtual law library
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),2respondents tampered with the
votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and
Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial
candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan,
Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were above the number of
votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101
precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein;
and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that,
by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge that some of the entries therein
were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers
oath. chanrobles virtual law library
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs
was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the
canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to
honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue. chanrobles virtual law library
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for
the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact
that the canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and
supervision. chanrobles virtual law library
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been
referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.3 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated
April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c). chanrobles
virtual law library
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the
COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution
dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency of
evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,4 this Court set aside the
resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against respondents.
Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000. chanrobles virtual law library
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct. chanrobles
virtual law library
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was
filed late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-
B, 12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll
the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can
be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999
resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained
whether his petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c). chanrobles
virtual law library
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,6 in
which this Court held: chanrobles virtual law library
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its
text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15
days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort
is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency
rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[7 chanrobles virtual law library
On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided
under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent
has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on
time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this
Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties
by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18,
1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his
receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to
show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it. chanrobles
virtual law library
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on
the same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay
would only be two days.8 The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case.
Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for
determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.9 For this reason, laws dealing with
double jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with procedure like verification of pleadings12 and
prejudicial questions13 have no application to disbarment proceedings. chanrobles virtual law
library
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of
justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due
course to appeals even though filed six,14 four,15 and three16 days late. In this case, the petition is
clearly meritorious. chanrobles virtual law library
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the
following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because
when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished
and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of
watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general public so that
respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with
in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish
criminal intent on the part of respondents.17 chanrobles virtual law library
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar,
only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.18 As long as the evidence
presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court19 is more convincing and
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto,20 the imposition of disciplinary
sanction is justified. chanrobles virtual law library
In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the
canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such
irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the
part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. chanrobles virtual
law library
This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.21 In rejecting this
allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court
said: chanrobles virtual law library
There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to
fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the
total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the
SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number
of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who
actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest
mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.[22 chanrobles virtual
law library
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes
per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures
in one or two SoVs23 but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at
the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory
look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101
precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the
said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the
Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial
candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the
SoVs.24Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns
from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC,
were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number
of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute
misconduct. chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of
the SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads: chanrobles virtual
law library
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and
correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of
___________ Province of ____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis
added) chanrobles virtual law library
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous
individuals preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that
only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and
detect the discrepancies therein. chanrobles virtual law library
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.25 However, if the
misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers
oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency
on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct.26 chanrobles virtual law library
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to
lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as
lawyers to do no falsehood. chanrobles virtual law library
Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public
dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said: chanrobles virtual
law library
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers
by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a
common reality. . . .[28 chanrobles virtual law library
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater
obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public
trust. chanrobles virtual law library
Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in
general, and on lawyers in government, in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their
official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through
the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first
administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service.29 Under the
circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should
be sufficient. chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with
a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. chanrobles
virtual law library
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtual law library
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 2797             October 4, 2002
ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant,
vs.
JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for
disbarment, docketed as Administrative Case No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus Balicanta. After
respondent’s comment to the complaint and complainant’s reply thereto, this Court, on March
29, 1995 referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for brevity) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. Commissioner George
Briones of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was initially tasked to investigate the case.
Commissioner Briones was later on replaced by Commissioner Renato Cunanan. Complainant
filed a supplemental complaint which was duly admitted and, as agreed upon, the parties filed
their respective position papers.
Based on her complaint, supplemental complaint, reply and position paper, the complainant
alleged the following facts:
When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and her
daughter Rosemarie inherited the properties left by the said decedent. All in all, complainant and
her daughter inherited 21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The lawyer who helped her
settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Jesus Balicanta.
Sometime in the early part of 1981, respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize
a corporation that would develop the said real properties into a high-scale commercial complex
with a beautiful penthouse for complainant. Relying on these apparently sincere proposals,
complainant and her daughter assigned 19 parcels of land to Rosaura Enterprises, Incorporated, a
newly-formed and duly registered corporation in which they assumed majority ownership. The
subject parcels of land were then registered in the name of the corporation.
Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity as
Chairman of the Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer. The respondent also made
complainant sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust agreement. Respondent
likewise succeeded in making complainant sign a special power of attorney to sell and mortgage
some of the parcels of land she inherited from her deceased husband. She later discovered that
respondent transferred the titles of the properties to a certain Tion Suy Ong who became the new
registered owner thereof. Respondent never accounted for the proceeds of said transfers.
In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos
(P2,220,000) using as collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her daughter
contributed to the corporation. The respondent ostensibly intended to use the money to construct
the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for brevity). Complainant later on found out that the
structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco lumber and bamboo which could not
have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan secured.
For four years from the time the debt was contracted, respondent failed to pay even a single
installment. As a result, the LBP, in a letter dated May 22, 1985, informed respondent that the
past due amortizations and interest had already accumulated to Seven Hundred Twenty-nine
Thousand Five Hundred Three Pesos and Twenty-five Centavos (P729,503.25). The LBP made a
demand on respondent for payment for the tenth time. Meanwhile, when the BCC commenced its
operations, respondent started to earn revenues from the rentals of BCC’s tenants. On October
28, 1987, the LBP foreclosed on the 9 mortgaged properties due to non-payment of the loan.
Respondent did not exert any effort to redeem the foreclosed properties. Worse, he sold the
corporation’s right to redeem the mortgaged properties to a certain Hadji Mahmud Jammang
through a fake board resolution dated January 14, 1989 which clothed himself with the authority
to do so. Complainant and her daughter, the majority stockholders, were never informed of the
alleged meeting held on that date. Again, respondent never accounted for the proceeds of the sale
of the right to redeem. Respondent also sold to Jammang a parcel of land belonging to
complainant and her daughter which was contiguous to the foreclosed properties and evidenced
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62807. He never accounted for the proceeds of the sale.
Sometime in 1983, complainant’s daughter, Rosemarie, discovered that their ancestral home had
been demolished and that her mother, herein complainant, was being detained in a small nipa
shack in a place called Culianan. Through the help of Atty. Linda Lim, Rosemarie was able to
locate her mother. Rosemarie later learned that respondent took complainant away from her
house on the pretext that said ancestral home was going to be remodeled and painted. But
respondent demolished the ancestral home and sold the lot to Tion Suy Ong, using another
spurious board resolution designated as Board Resolution No. 1, series of 1992. The resolution
contained the minutes of an alleged organizational meeting of the directors of the corporation
and was signed by Alexander Wee, Angel Fernando, Erwin Fernando and Gabriel Solivar.
Complainant and her daughter did not know how these persons became stockholders and
directors of the corporation. Respondent again did not account for the proceeds of the sale.
Complainant and her daughter made several demands on respondent for the delivery of the real
properties they allegedly assigned to the corporation, for an accounting of the proceeds of the
LBP loan and as well as the properties sold, and for the rentals earned by BCC. But the demands
remained unheeded. Hence, complainant and her daughter, in a letter dated June 4, 1985,
terminated the services of respondent as their lawyer and repeated their demands for accounting
and turn-over of the corporate funds, and the return of the 19 titles that respondent transferred to
the corporation. They also threatened him with legal action in a letter dated August 3, 1985.
Soon after, complainant found out from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for
brevity) that Rosaura Enterprises, Inc., due to respondent’s refusal and neglect, failed to submit
the corporation’s annual financial statements for 1981, 1982 and 1983; SEC General Information
Sheets for 1982, 1983 and 1984; Minutes of Annual Meetings for 1982, 1983 and 1984; and
Minutes of Annual Meetings of Directors for 1982, 1983 and 1984.
Complainant also discovered that respondent collected rental payments from the tenants of BCC
and issued handwritten receipts which he signed, not as an officer of the corporation but as the
attorney-at-law of complainant. Respondent also used the tennis court of BCC to dry his palay
and did not keep the buildings in a satisfactory state, so much so that the divisions were losing
plywood and other materials to thieves.
Complainant likewise accused respondent of circulating rumors among her friends and relatives
that she had become insane to prevent them from believing whatever complainant said.
According to complainant, respondent proposed that she legally separate from her present
husband so that the latter would not inherit from her and that respondent be adopted as her son.
For his defense, respondent, in his comment and position paper, denied employing deceit and
machination in convincing complainant and her daughter to assign their real properties to the
corporation; that they freely and voluntary executed the deeds of assignment and the voting trust
agreement that they signed; that he did not single-handedly manage the corporation as evidenced
by certifications of the officers and directors of the corporation; that he did not use spurious
board resolutions authorizing him to contract a loan or sell the properties assigned by the
complainant and her daughter; that complainant and her daughter should be the ones who should
render an accounting of the records and revenues inasmuch as, since 1984 up to the present, the
part-time corporate book-keeper, with the connivance of the complainant and her daughter, had
custody of the corporate records; that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the operation of
BCC when they illegally took control of it in 1986; that he never pocketed any of the proceeds of
the properties contributed by the complainant and her daughter; that the demolition of the
ancestral home followed legal procedures; that complainant was never detained in Culianan but
she freely and voluntarily lived with the family of P03 Joel Constantino as evidenced by
complainant’s own letter denying she was kidnapped; and that the instant disbarment case should
be dismissed for being premature, considering the pendency of cases before the SEC and the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga involving him and complainant.
Based on the pleadings and position papers submitted by the parties, Commissioner Renato
Cunanan, in his report1 dated July 1, 1999, recommended respondent’s disbarment based on the
following findings:
"A. The complainant, Rosaura Jaldon-Cordon and her daughter, Rosemarie were stockholders of
a corporation, together with respondent, named Rosaura Enterprises, Inc.
"Per the Articles of Incorporation marked as Annex ‘A’ of Complainant’s Position Paper,
complainant’s subscription consists of 55% of the outstanding capital stock while her daughter’s
consists of 18%, giving them a total of 73%. Respondent’s holdings consist of 24% while three
other incorporators, Rosauro L. Alvarez, Vicente T. Mañalac and Darhan S. Graciano each held
1% of the capital stock of the corporation.
"B. On April 5, 1981, complainant and her daughter Rosemarie Jaldon executed two Deeds of
Transfer and Assignment conveying and transferring to the corporation 19 parcels of land in
exchange for shares of stock in the corporation.
"x x x           x x x           x x x
"C. Both Deeds of Assignment particularly page 3 thereof indicate that respondent accepted said
assignment of properties and titles in behalf of the corporation as Treasurer. The deeds were
signed on April 5, 1981.
"x x x           x x x           x x x
"Together, therefore, complainant and her daughter owned 1,711 shares of the 1,750 shares
comprising the authorized capital stock of the corporation of 97% thereof.
"No increase in capitalization was applied for by the corporation.
"F. Respondent claims in his Comment, his Answer and his Position Paper that on April 4, 1981
he was elected as Chairman and Director and on April 5, 1981 he was elected President of the
corporation. Respondent’s own Annexes marked as ‘G’ and ‘G-1’ of his Comment show that on
April 4, 1981 he was not only elected as Chairman and Director as he claims but as ‘Director,
Board Chairman and President.’ The purported minutes was only signed by respondent and an
acting Secretary by the name of Vicente Mañalac.
"Said Annex does not show who was elected Treasurer.
"Respondent’s Annex ‘H’ and ‘H-1’ shows that in the alleged organizational meeting of the
directors on April 5, 1981 a certain Farnacio Bucoy was elected Treasurer. Bucoy’s name does
not appear as an incorporator nor a stockholder anywhere in the documents submitted.
"The purported minutes of the organizational meeting of the directors was signed only by
respondent Balicanta and a Secretary named Verisimo Martin.
"G. Since respondent was elected as Director, Chairman and President on April 4, 1981 as
respondent’s own Annexes ‘G’ to ‘G-1’ would show, then complainant’s claim that respondent
was likewise acting as Treasurer of two corporations bear truth and credence as respondent
signed and accepted the titles to 19 parcels of land ceded by the complainant and her daughter, as
Treasurer on April 5, 1981 after he was already purportedly elected as Chairman, President and
Director.
"H. Respondent misleads the Commission into believing that all the directors signed the minutes
marked as Exhibit ‘H’ to ‘H-1’ by stating that the same was ‘duly signed by all the Board of
Directors’ when the document itself shows that only he and one Verisimo Martin signed the
same.
"He also claims that ‘all the stockholders signed’ the minutes of organizational meeting marked
as Annexes ‘G’ and ‘G-1’ of his Comment yet the same shows that only the acting Chairman and
acting Secretary signed.
"I. Respondent claims that the Board or its representative was authorized by the stockholders
comprising 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock, as required by law, to mortgage the parcels of
land belonging to the corporation, which were all assigned to the corporation by complainant and
her daughter, by virtue of Annex ‘I’ and ‘I-1’: attached to his Comment.
"The subject attachment however reveals that only the following persons signed their conformity
to the said resolution: respondent Balicanta who owned 109 shares, Vicente Mañalac (1 share),
Daihan Graciano (1 share).
"Complainants who collectively held a total of 1,711 shares out of the 1,750 outstanding capital
stock of the corporation were not represented in the purported stockholders’ meeting authorizing
the mortgage of the subject properties.
"The 2/3 vote required by law was therefore not complied with yet respondent proceeded to
mortgage the subject 9 parcels of land by the corporation.
"J. Respondent further relies on Annex ‘J’ of his Comment, purportedly the minutes of a special
meeting of the Board of Directors authorizing him to obtain a loan and mortgage the properties
of the corporation dated August 29, 1981. This claim is baseless. The required ratification of 2/3
by the stockholders of records was not met. Again, respondent attempts to mislead the
Commission and Court.
"K. Further, the constitution of the Board is dubious. The alleged minutes of the organizational
meeting of the stockholders electing the members of the Board, have not been duly signed by the
stockholders as shown in respondent’s annex ‘G’ which was purportedly the organizational
meeting of the stockholders.
"L. Also, Annex ‘J’ of respondent’s Comment which purportedly authorized him to obtain a loan
and to mortgage the 9 parcels of land was only signed by himself and a secretary.
"M. In said Annex 'J' of respondent’s Comment he stated that complainant Rosaura Cordon was
on leave by virtue of a voting trust agreement allegedly executed by complainant ‘in his favor
covering all her shares of stock.’ The claim is baseless. The voting trust referred to by respondent
(annex ‘D’ of his Comment), even if it were assumed to be valid, covered only 266 shares of
complainants yet she owned a total of 1,039 shares after she and her daughter ceded in favor of
the corporation 19 parcels of land.
"Being a former lawyer to complainant, respondent should have ensured that her interest was
safeguarded. Yet, complainant was apparently and deliberately left our (sic) on the pretext that,
she had executed a voting trust agreement in favor of respondent.
"It is suspicious that complainant was made to sign a voting trust agreement on 21 August 1981
and immediately thereafter, the resolutions authorizing respondent to obtain a loan and to
mortgage the 9 parcels of land were passed and approved.
"N. It is also highly irregular for respondent who is a lawyer, to allow a situation to happen
where, with the exclusion of complainant as director the result was that there remained only 4
members of the Board,.
"O. Respondent’s own pleadings submitted to the Commission contradict each other.
"1. For instance, while in his Comment respondent DENIES that he employed deceit and
machination in convincing the complainant and her daughter to sign the articles of incorporation
of Rosaura Enterprises and in ceding to the corporation 19 parcels of land in Zamboanga City,
because ‘they freely, intelligently and voluntarily signed’ the same, yet, in his Position Paper,
respondent took another stance.
"In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of his Position Paper which was submitted 12 years later, respondent
claimed that ‘it was actually the idea of Atty. Rosaura L. Alvarez’ that a corporation be put up to
incorporate the estate of the late Felixberto D. Jaldon.
"2. Likewise, respondent claimed that complainant and her daughter were not directors, hence
they were not notified of meetings, in paragraph 2-6 (c) of his Comment he blamed the other
stockholders and directors for the corporation’s inability to comply with the Land Bank’s
demands saying that they ‘have consistently failed since 1982 to convene (1.) for the annual
stockholders’ meetings and (i.i) for the monthly board meeting’.
"His own pleadings claim that he had been the Chairman/President since 1981 to the present. If
(sic) so, it was his duty to convene the stockholders and the directors for meetings.
"Respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when he needed to make a
loan of p2.2 million; when he sold the corporation’s right of redemption over the foreclosed
properties of the corporation to Jammang, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT
62,807 to Jammang in addition to the 9 parcels of land which were foreclosed, and when he sold
the complainant’s ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72,004.
"It is thus strange why respondent claims that the corporation could not do anything to save the
corporation’s properties from being foreclosed because the stockholders and directors did not
convene.
"This assertion of respondent is clearly evident of dishonest, deceitful and immoral conduct
especially because, in all his acts constituting conveyances of corporate property, respondent
used minutes of stockholders’ and directors’ meetings signed only by him and a secretary or
signed by him and persons who were not incorporators much less stockholders.
"It is worthy of note that in respondent’s Exhibits 15, 16, 17 and 18 of his position paper, there
were 7 new stockholders and complainant appeared to have only 266 shares to her name while
her daughter Rosemarie had no shares at all. Respondent did not present any proof of
conveyance of shares by complainant and her daughter.
"It is further worth noting that complainant’s voting trust (annex ‘D’ of respondent’s Comment)
where she allegedly entrusted 266 shares to respondent on August 21, 1981 had only a validity of
5 years. Thus, she should have had her entire holdings of 1,283 shares back in her name in
August 1986.
"Respondent’s purported minutes of stockholders’ meeting (Exhs. ‘15’ and ‘17’) do not reflect
this.
"There was no explanation whatsoever from respondent on how complainant and her daughter
lost their 97% control holding in the corporation.
"3. As a further contradiction in respondent’s pleadings, we note that in paragraph 2.7.C of his
Comment he said that ‘only recently, this year, 1985, the complainant and her aforenamed
daughter examined said voluminous supporting receipts/documents which had previously been
examined by the Land Bank for loan releases, during which occasion respondent suggested to
them that the corporation will have to hire a full-time book-keeper to put in order said
voluminous supporting receipts/documents, to which they adversely reacted due to lack of
corporate money to pay for said book-keeper.’ But in respondent’s Position Paper par. 6.3 he
stated that:
‘Anyway, it is not the respondent but rather the complainant who should render a detailed
accounting to the corporation of the corporate records as well as corporate revenues/income
precisely because since 1994 to the present:
‘(a). The corporate part-time book-keeper Edilberto Benedicto, with the indispensable
connivance and instigation of the complainant and her daughter, among others, has custody of
the corporate records, xxx’
"4. In other contradictory stance, respondent claims in par. 7.3 of his position paper that
‘complainant and her daughter sabotaged the BCC operations of the corporation by illegally
taking over actual control and supervision thereof sometime in 1986, xxx’
"Yet respondent’s own exhibits in his position paper particularly Exhibit 15 and 16 where the
subject of the foreclosed properties of the corporation comprising the Baliwasan Commercial
Center (BCC) was taken up, complainant and her daughter were not even present nor were they
the subject of the discussion, belying respondent’s claim that the complainant and her daughter
illegally took actual control of BCC.
"5. On the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by
lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes ‘H’ to ‘H-17’, respondent claims
that the receipts are temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were
issued. On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and
numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing his printed name.
"It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent’ stature would issue official receipts to
lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones.
"6. With regard to respondent’s claim that the complainant consented to the sale of her ancestral
home, covered by TCT No. T-72,004 to one Tion Suy Ong for which he attached as Exhibit 22
to his Position Paper the minutes of an annual meeting of the stockholders, it behooves this
Commission why complainant’s signature had to be accompanied by her thumb mark.
Furthermore, complainant’s signature appears unstable and shaky. This Office is thus persuaded
to believe complainant’s allegation in paragraph 3b of her position paper that since September
1992 up to March 1993 she was being detained by one PO# (sic) Joel Constantino and his wife
under instructions from respondent Balicanta.
"This conclusion is supported by a letter from respondent dated March 1993, Annex ‘H’ of
complainant’s position paper, where respondent ordered Police Officer Constantino ‘to allow
Atty. Linda Lim and Rosemarie Jaldon to talk to Tita Rosing.’
"The complainant’s thumb mark together with her visibly unstable shaky signature lends
credence to her claim that she was detained in the far flung barrio of Culianan under instructions
of respondent while her ancestral home was demolished and the lot sold to one Tion Suy Ong.
"It appears that respondent felt compelled to over-ensure complainant’s consent by getting her to
affix her thumb mark in addition to her signature.
"7. Respondent likewise denies that he also acted as Corporate Secretary in addition to being the
Chairman, President and Treasurer of the corporation. Yet, respondent submitted to this
commission documents which are supported to be in the possession of the Corporate Secretary
such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.
"The foregoing findings of this Commission are virtual smoking guns that prove on no uncertain
terms that respondent, who was the legal counsel of complainant in the latter part of the
settlement of the estate of her deceased husband, committed unlawful, immoral and deceitful
conduct proscribed by Rule 1.01 of the code of professional responsibility.
"Likewise, respondent clearly committed a violation of Canon 15 of the same code which
provides that ‘A lawyer should observe candor fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.’
"Respondent’s acts gravely diminish the public’s respect for the integrity of the profession of law
for which this Commission recommends that he be meted the penalty of disbarment.
"The pendency of the cases at the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga filed by
complainant against respondent does not preclude a determination of respondent’s culpability as
a lawyer.
"This Commission cannot further delay the resolution of this complaint filed in 1985 by
complainant, and old widow who deserves to find hope and recover her confidence in the judicial
system.
"The findings of this office, predominantly based on documents adduced by both parties lead to
only one rather unpalatable conclusion. That respondent Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, in his
professional relations with herein complainant did in fact employ unlawful, dishonest, and
immoral conduct proscribed in no uncertain terms by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In addition, respondent’s actions clearly violated Canon 15 to 16 of the same
Code.
"It is therefore our unpleasant duty to recommend that respondent, having committed acts in
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, thereby causing a great disservice to the
profession, be meted the ultimate sanction of disbarment."2
On September 30, 1999, while Commissioner Cunanan’s recommendation for respondent’s
disbarment was pending review before Executive Vice-President and Northern Luzon Governor
Teofilo Pilando, respondent filed a motion requesting "for a full-blown investigation and for
invalidation of the entire proceedings and/or remedial action under Section 11, Rule 139-B,
Revised Rules of Court," alleging that he had evidence that Commissioner Cunanan’s report was
drafted by the lawyers of complainant, Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno. He
presented two unsigned anonymous letters allegedly coming from a disgruntled employee of
Attys. Cope and Jimeno. He claimed to have received these letters in his mailbox.3
Respondent’s motion alleging that Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno drafted
Commissioner Cunanan’s report was accompanied by a complaint praying for the disbarment of
said lawyers including Commissioner Cunanan. The complaint was docketed as CBD Case No.
99-658. After Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan filed their answers, a hearing
was conducted by the Investigating Committee of the IBP Board of Governors.
On May 26, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution4 dismissing for lack of merit
the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan. And
in Adm. Case No. 2797, the Board adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Cunanan, and meted against herein respondent Balicanta the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for 5 years "for commission of acts of misconduct and
disloyalty by taking undue and unfair advantage of his legal knowledge as a lawyer to gain
material benefit for himself at the expense of complainant Rosaura P. Jaldon-Cordon and caused
serious damage to the complainant."5
To support its decision, the Board uncovered respondent’s fraudulent acts in the very same
documents he presented to exonerate himself. It also took note of respondent’s contradictory and
irreconcilable statements in the pleadings and position papers he submitted. However, it regarded
the penalty of disbarment as too severe for respondent’s misdeeds, considering that the same
were his first offense.6
Pursuant to Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,7 the said resolution in
Administrative Case No. 2797 imposing the penalty of suspension for 5 years on respondent was
automatically elevated to this Court for final action. On the other hand, the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan, docketed
as CBD Case No. 99-658, became final in the absence of any petition for review.
This Court confirms the duly supported findings of the IBP Board that respondent committed
condemnable acts of deceit against his client. The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client
followed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to
him. At the very outset, he embarked on his devious scheme by making himself the President,
Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was
prohibited from assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time.8 As
Treasurer, he accepted in behalf of the corporation the 19 titles that complainant and her
daughter co-owned. The other treasurer appointed, Farnacio Bucoy, did not appear to be a
stockholder or director in the corporate records. The minutes of the meetings supposedly electing
him and Bucoy as officers of the corporation actually bore the signatures of respondent and the
secretary only, contrary to his claim that they were signed by the directors and stockholders.
He likewise misled the IBP investigating commission in claiming that the mortgage of 9 of the
properties of the corporation previously belonging to complainant and her daughter was ratified
by the stockholders owning two-thirds or 67% of the outstanding capital stock when in fact only
three stockholders owning 111 out of 1,750 outstanding shares or 6.3% assented thereto. The
alleged authorization granting him the power to contract the LBP loan for Two Million Two
Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) was also not approved by the required minimum of two-
thirds of the outstanding capital stock despite respondent’s claim to the contrary. In all these
transactions, complainant and her daughter who both owned 1,711 out of the 1,750 outstanding
shares of the corporation or 97.7% never had any participation. Neither were they informed
thereof.
Clearly, there was no quorum for a valid meeting for the discussion and approval of these
transactions.
Respondent cannot take refuge in the contested voting trust agreement supposedly executed by
complainant and her daughter for the reason that it authorized respondent to represent
complainant for only 266 shares.
Aside from the dishonest transactions he entered into under the cloak of sham resolutions, he
failed to explain several discrepancies in his version of the facts. We hereby reiterate some of
these statements noted by Commissioner Cunanan in his findings.
First, respondent blamed the directors and the stockholders who failed to convene for the
required annual meetings since 1982. However, respondent appeared able to convene the
stockholders and directors when he contracted the LBP debt, when he sold to Jammang the
corporation’s right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the corporation, when he sold
one parcel of land covered by TCT No. 62807 to Jammang, when he mortgaged the 9 parcels of
land to LBP which later foreclosed on said mortgage, and when he sold the complainant’s
ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72004.
Second, the factual findings of the investigating commission, affirmed by the IBP Board,
disclosed that complainant and her daughter own 1,711 out of 1,750 shares of the outstanding
capital stock of the corporation, based on the Articles of Incorporation and deeds of transfer of
the properties. But respondent’s evidence showed that complainant had only 266 shares of stock
in the corporation while her daughter had none, notwithstanding the fact that there was nothing
to indicate that complainant and her daughter ever conveyed their shares to others.
Respondent likewise did not explain why he did not return the certificates representing the 266
shares after the lapse of 5 years from the time the voting trust certificate was executed in 1981.9
The records show that up to now, the complainant and her daughter own 97% of the outstanding
shares but respondent never bothered to explain why they were never asked to participate in or
why they were never informed of important corporate decisions.
Third, respondent, in his comment, alleged that due to the objection of complainant and her
daughter to his proposal to hire an accountant, the corporation had no formal accounting of its
revenues and income. However, respondent’s position paper maintained that there was no
accounting because the part-time bookkeeper of the corporation connived with complainant and
her daughter in keeping the corporate records.
Fourth, respondent’s claim that complainant and her daughter took control of the operations of
the corporation in 1986 is belied by the fact that complainant and her daughter were not even
present in the alleged meeting of the board (which took place after 1986) to discuss the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The truth is that he never informed them of such
meeting and he never gave control of the corporation to them.
Fifth, Commissioner Cunanan found that:
"5. on the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by
lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes ‘H’ to ‘H-17’, respondent claims
that the receipts are temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were
issued. On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and
numbered duly signed by the respondent bearing his printed name.
"It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent’s stature would issue official receipts to
lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones."10
Sixth, respondent denies that he acted as Corporate Secretary aside from being the Chairman,
President and Treasurer of the corporation. Yet respondent submitted to the investigating
commission documents which were supposed to be in the official possession of the Corporate
Secretary alone such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.
Seventh, he alleged in his comment that he was the one who proposed the establishment of the
corporation that would invest the properties of the complainant but, in his position paper, he said
that it was a certain Atty. Rosauro Alvarez who made the proposal to put up the corporation.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondent committed grave and serious
misconduct that casts dishonor on the legal profession. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful
scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left
to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The documents he
thought could exculpate him were the very same documents that revealed his immoral and
shameless ways. These documents were extremely revealing in that they unmasked a man who
knew the law and abused it for his personal gain without any qualms of conscience. They painted
an intricate web of lies, deceit and opportunism beneath a carefully crafted smokescreen of
corporate maneuvers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the
obligation to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Specifically, he is forbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.11 If
the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled
in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them.12 Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.13 Lawyers
are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity.14 Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to
do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.15 This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his
care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property,
reputation, his life, his all."16
Indeed, the words of former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Pompeyo Diaz cannot find
a more relevant application than in this case:
"There are men in any society who are so self-serving that they try to make law serve their
selfish ends. In this group of men, the most dangerous is the man of the law who has no
conscience. He has, in the arsenal of his knowledge, the very tools by which he can poison and
disrupt society and bring it to an ignoble end."17
Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer "to hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession."18 He is bound "to account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client."19 The relation between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly account
for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.20
This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to
absolve him from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by complainant.
He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the
complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the creation of said
corporate fiction.
The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice but to set
aside the veil of corporate entity. For purposes of this action therefore, the properties registered
in the name of the corporation should still be considered as properties of complainant and her
daughter. The respondent merely held them in trust for complainant (now an ailing 83-year-old)
and her daughter. The properties conveyed fraudulently and/or without the requisite authority
should be deemed as never to have been transferred, sold or mortgaged at all. Respondent shall
be liable, in his personal capacity, to third parties who may have contracted with him in good
faith.
Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of respondent’s
offenses cannot be adequately matched by mere suspension as recommended by the IBP. Instead,
his wrongdoings deserve the severe penalty of disbarment, without prejudice to his criminal and
civil liabilities for his dishonest acts.
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Jesus T. Balicanta is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova,
with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded
by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline
("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified
complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the
Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed
complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of
the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for
failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order
required complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December
1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988
hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled
for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second,
for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear.
Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the
hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and
her husband had already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required
the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of
the telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint
within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either
party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP
Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts,
admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two
(2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year,
respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with
one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and
children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in
Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife,
and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds
with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time
failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation.
Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate
family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come home from
beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family. In
February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her
(complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with
another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along
with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial
Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes
as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that
complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree
that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be
real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent
carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and
upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to
show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement
persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued
possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral
character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being
already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently
cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly
morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter
cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent
was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by
reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in
sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained
for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the
humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or
refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with another
woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with
them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and
its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this
Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has
given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5141. September 29, 1999]
PRISCILA L. TOLEDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERLINDA ABALOS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back.
On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo,
payable within six months from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the payment of
said obligation, respondent executed a Promissory Note (Exhibit B). After the lapse of six
months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her obligation. Afraid that she
will not recover her money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline.
On February 1, 1995, the Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer
to the letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not answer
the complaint.
On August 17, 1995, Investigating Commissioner Benjamin B. Bernardino, issued an order
setting the case for hearing on September 29, 1995 at 2 p.m. Despite due notice, respondent
failed to appear. Accordingly, complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte after
which, the case was considered submitted for resolution. Respondent received this order as
shown by the registry return. However, she again did not do anything about it.
On June 19, 1999, the Commission passed a resolution recommending the suspension from the
practice of law of respondent for a period of six months for her flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the Court and illustrating her despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer. The
Commission, however, declined to discipline her for failing to meet her financial obligation, the
same having been incurred in her private capacity.
We agree with the Commission that respondent may not be disciplined either by the IBP or by
this Court for failing to pay her obligation to complainant. Complainants remedy is to file a
collection case before a regular court of justice against respondent. The general rule is that a
lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction
to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 569 [1923]; Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]).
We, however, find the recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six
months to be grossly disproportionate to the act complained of , i.e., her failure to appear before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. With her legal knowledge and expertise,
respondent may have known all along that the Commission has no jurisdiction over a complaint
for collection of a sum of money which she borrowed in her private capacity. Hence, her
adamant refusal to appear before said body.
We do not, of course, ignore the fact that by virtue of ones membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus
submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization. However, as the complaint
lodged against the respondent in the case at hand did not pertain to an act that she committed in
the exercise of her profession, the IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline respondent. As
the Commission on Bar Discipline correctly suggested, complainants remedy is to file the
necessary collection case in court for her to recover the amount respondent owed her.
It was, however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in
deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful
orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law for one
month is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution. Copies of this
Resolution shall be furnished all courts of the land and the Office of the Bar Confidant. This
Resolution shall likewise be spread on the personal record of respondent attorney.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6408 : August 31, 2004]
ISIDRA BARRIENTOS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ELERIZZA A. LIBIRAN-
METEORO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro
for deceit and non-payment of debts.
A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C. Mercado, which was signed, however, by
Isidra only. It states that: sometime in September of 2000, respondent issued several Equitable
PCIBank Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia, amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of
Olivia, totaling P234,000.00, for the payment of a pre-existing debt; the checks bounced due to
insufficient funds thus charges for violation of B.P. 22 were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the
City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan; respondent sent text messages to complainants asking for the
deferment of the criminal charges with the promise that she will pay her debt; respondent
however failed to fulfill said promise; on May 16, 2001, respondent, through her sister-in-law,
tried to give complainants a title for a parcel of land in exchange for the bounced checks which
were in the possession of complainants; the title covered an area of 5,000 square meters located
at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of Victoria Villamar which
was allegedly paid to respondent by a client; complainants checked the property and discovered
that the land belonged to a certain Dra. Helen Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria Villamar, who
merely entrusted said title to respondent pursuant to a transaction with the Quedancor;
complainants tried to get in touch with respondent over the phone but the latter was always
unavailable, thus the present complaint.1
On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order2 of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), respondent filed her Answer alleging that: she issued several Equitable PCIBank checks
amounting to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but not to Isidra; said checks were issued in
payment of a pre-existing obligation but said amount had already been paid and replaced with
new checks; Isidra signed a document attesting to the fact that the subject of her letter-complaint
no longer exists;3 she also issued in favor of Olivia several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting
to P67,000.00 for the payment of a pre-existing obligation; the checks which were the subject of
the complaint filed at the City Prosecutor's Office in Cabanatuan City are already in the
possession of respondent and the criminal case filed by complainants before the Municipal Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City Branch 3 was already dismissed; the Informations for Violation of
B.P. 22 under I.S. Nos. 01-14090-034 were never filed in court; Olivia already signed an affidavit
of desistance; respondent did not send text messages to Isidra and Olivia asking for deferment of
the criminal complaints neither did she present any title in exchange for her bounced checks; she
never transacted with Isidra since all dealings were made with Olivia; and the present complaint
was initiated by Isidra only because she had a misunderstanding with Olivia and she wants to
extract money from respondent.5
Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by Olivia C. Mercado which states as follows:
1. That I am one of the complainants for the Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Office in Pasig City, Philippines docketed
as CBD case no. 01-840;
2. That the filing of the said complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was brought
about by some misunderstanding and error in the accounting of the records of the account of
Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro;
3. That I was the one who transacted with Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my co-complainant
Isidra Barrientos;
4. That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and the
corresponding checks were given to Isidra Barrientos through me;
5. That my name was indicated as co-complainant in a letter-complaint filed by Ms. Isidra
Barrientos against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro but I am not interested in pursuing the complaint
against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro since the complaint was brought about by a case of some
mistakes in the records;
6. That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had already signed an affidavit of desistance and
submitted the same before the Municipal Trial Court Branch III of Cabanatuan City w(h)ere
Criminal Case Nos. 77851 to 56 for violation of BP 22 were filed against Atty. Meteoro;
7. That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to 1361 the case was not filed in court and I have
also executed an affidavit of desistance for said complaint;
8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and to prove that I
have no cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro.6
On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both parties to appear
before it on September 6, 2001. On said date, both parties appeared and agreed to settle their
misunderstanding.7
On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 which respondent
acknowledged as her indebtedness to complainant will be settled on a staggered basis. Another
hearing was then set for February 5, 2002. Respondent failed to appear in said hearing despite
due notice. It was then reset to February 28, 2002 with the order that should respondent fail to
appear, the case shall already be submitted for resolution.8
Respondent appeared in the next two hearings. However, this time, it was complainant who was
unavailable. In the hearing of July 31, 2002, respondent was absent and was warned again that
should she fail to appear in the next hearing, the Commissioner shall resolve the case. On said
date, respondent did not appear despite due notice.9
On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for reconsideration of the
July 31 order stating that: she got sick a few days before the scheduled hearing; she had already
paid complainant the amount of P64,000.00; in March of 2002, respondent's father was admitted
to the Intensive Care Unit of the University of Santo Tomas Hospital thus she was not able to
settle her remaining balance as planned; and because of said emergency, respondent was not able
to fully settle the balance of her debt up to this date. Respondent prayed that she be given another
60 days from August 1,2002 to finally settle her debt with complainant.10
On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondent's motion and setting aside
the order dated July 31, 2002. It noted that while respondent claims that she already paid
complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts she submitted evidencing payment
amount only to P45,000.00.11 A hearing was then set for May 28, 2003 at which time respondent
was directed to present proof of her payments to the complainant. The hearing was however reset
several times until August 20, 2003 at which time, only complainant appeared. Respondent sent
somebody to ask for a postponement which the commission denied. The commission gave
respondent a last opportunity to settle her accounts with complainant. The hearing was set for
October 7, 2003 which the commission said was "intransferrable."12
On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared. The commission noted that respondent was
duly notified and even personally received the notice for that day's hearing. The case was
thereafter submitted for resolution.13
On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted his
report pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has committed a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Office holds that she has. More
particularly, the respondent, by initially and vehemently denying her indebtedness to herein
complainant and then subsequently admitting liability by proposing a staggered settlement has
displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity. She has shown herself to possess poor moral characters.
In her motion for reconsideration, seeking the reopening of this case, the respondent made a false
assertion that she had settled up to P64,000.00 of her indebtedness but the receipts she submitted
total only P50,000.00. What is more disconcerting is that while she is aware and duly notified of
the settings of this Office respondent has seemingly ignored the same deliberately. Finally, the
respondent has not offered any satisfactory explanation for, nor has she controverted the
complainant's charge that she (respondent) had tried to negotiate a transfer certificate of title
(TCT) which had been entrusted by a certain Dra. Helen Garcia to her relative to a transaction
which the former had with the Quedancor where respondent was formerly employed. Based on
all the foregoing findings and the deliberate failure of the respondent to come forward and settle
her accountabilities, inspite of several warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to
attend the scheduled hearings despite due notice, this Office is convinced that Atty. Elerizza
Libiran-Meteoro has committed a glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but also the
dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which mandates that a worthy member of the Bar must constantly
be of good moral character and unsullied honesty.14
He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the practice of
law for two years and meted a fine of twenty thousand pesos.15
On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration stating that: she was
not able to receive the notice for the October 7 hearing because she was in Bicol attending to
pressing personal problems; she only arrived from the province on October 25, 2003 and it was
only then that she got hold of the Order dated October 7; from the very beginning, respondent
never intended to ignore the Commission's hearings; as much as she wanted to pay complainant
in full, the financial crisis which hit her family since 2001 has gravely affected her ability to pay;
until that day, the expenses incurred by respondent due to the hospitalization of her father has not
been paid in full by her family; the family home of respondent in Cabanatuan has already been
foreclosed by the bank; respondent's husband has been confined recently due to thyroid problems
and respondent herself had sought medical help on several occasions due to her inability to
conceive despite being married for more than five years; if not for said reasons, respondent could
have already paid the complainant despite respondent's knowledge that the amount complainant
wanted to collect from her is merely the interest of her debt since she already returned most of
the pieces of jewelry she purchased and she already paid for those that she was not able to return.
Respondent prays that the resolution of the case be deferred and that she be given another 90
days from said date or until January 19, 2003 to settle whatever balance remains after proper
accounting and presentation of receipts.16
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67
CBD Case No. 01-840
Isidra Barrientos v. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and
considering respondent's glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and Restitution of P84,000.00
to complainant.17
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the alleged matter of
respondent offering a transfer certificate of title to complainants in exchange for the bounced
checks that were in their possession.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.18 Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured.19 They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.20 Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
explicitly states that:
CANON 1 - - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligation towards Isidra
Barrientos. Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD, however, respondent eventually acknowledged
her indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00, promising only to pay in a staggered
basis. Her attempt to evade her financial obligation runs counter to the precepts of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, above quoted, and violates the lawyer's oath which imposes upon
every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.21
After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself to the payment
thereof. Yet she failed many times to fulfill said promise. She did not appear in most of the
hearings and merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2002 after the IBP-
CBD Commissioner had already submitted the case for resolution. She claimed that she got sick
days before the hearing and asked for sixty days to finally settle her account. Again, she failed to
fulfill her promise and did not appear before the Commission in the succeeding hearings despite
due notice. After the case was submitted anew for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent
filed another motion for reconsideration, this time saying that she was in the province attending
to personal matters. Again she asked for another ninety days to settle her entire debt. This
repeated failure on her part to fulfill her promise puts in question her integrity and moral
character. Her failure to attend most of the hearings called by the commission and her belated
pleas for reconsideration also manifest her propensity to delay the resolution of the case and to
make full use of the mechanisms of administrative proceedings to her benefit.
She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which prompted
Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the prosecutor's office in Cabanatuan City. Her only
excuse is that she was able to replace said checks and make arrangements for the payment of her
debt, which led to the dismissal of the criminal complaints against her.
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence.22 The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and
public order.23 It also manifests a lawyer's low regard to her commitment to the oath she has
taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession
she should hold in high esteem.24
Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were
issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures. As we
explained in Co v. Bernardino : 25
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity. Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so
gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which
his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him
from the office of attorney.
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross
misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts
his moral character in serious doubt'26 (Citations omitted).
She also claims that her father was hospitalized in March 2002 and that she and her husband also
had to seek medical help which greatly affected her ability to pay. She however did not present
any proof to substantiate such claims. She also did not appear personally before the complainant
and the commission, in spite of the many opportunities given her, to make arrangements for the
payment of her debt considering the circumstances that befell her family. Instead, she waited
until the case was submitted for resolution to allege such facts, without presenting any proof
therefor.
We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since respondent has not offered any explanation for,
nor has she controverted the complainants' charge that she tried to negotiate with them a transfer
certificate of title that had been entrusted to her by a client, she should be held liable therefor.
Basic is the principle that if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving her cause
of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove her exception or defense.27 Simply put, the burden is
not on the respondent to prove her innocence but on the complainants to prove her guilt. In this
case, complainants submitted a photocopy of a TCT in the name of Victoria Villamar together
with their letter-complaint, which according to complainants was the title respondent tried,
through her sister-in-law, to negotiate with them in exchange for the bounced checks in their
possession.28 No other evidence or sworn statement was submitted in support of such allegation.
Respondent in her answer, meanwhile, denied having any knowledge regarding such matter and
no further discussion was made on the matter, not even in the hearings before the
commission.29 For this reason, we hold that respondent should not be held liable for the alleged
negotiation of a TCT to complainants for lack of sufficient evidence, but only for the non-
payment of debts and the issuance of worthless checks which were sufficiently proved and which
respondent herself admitted.
We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.30
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent's misconduct. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
In Lao v. Medel,31 which also involved non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks,
the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for one year was appropriate. Unlike in
the Lao case however, respondent is this case paid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts
amounting to P50,000.00. Thus we deem that six months suspension from the practice of law and
the restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this
Decision, and is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount of P84,000.00, as
balance of her debt to the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality of herein decision.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP as
well as the court administrator who shall circulate herein Resolution to all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Callejo, Sr., TINGA, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), on official leave.
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 4256             February 13, 2004
JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO, complainant
vs.
ATTYS. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS A.
VILLARIN, respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed in 1994 by Jovita Bustamante-Alejandro charging
respondents Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro and Atty. Maricris A. Villarin with bigamy and
concubinage.
Complainant alleged that respondent, Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro, is her husband; that they
were married on March 3, 1971 at Alicia, Isabela, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract;1 that
she bore him three (3) sons, namely, Dino, Eric, and Carlo, born in 1971, 1973, and 1978,
respectively, as evidenced by their respective Certificates of Live Birth;2 that respondent
abandoned her and their children in 1990 to live with his mistress, respondent Atty. Ma. Cristina
Arrieta Villarin,3 at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that respondents have since then been
publicly representing themselves as husband and wife; that respondent Atty. Villarin gave birth
to Paolo Villarin Alejandro on January 17, 1992 as a result of her immoral and scandalous
relationship with complainant’s husband whom she named as the father of her son in the latter’s
Certificate of Live Birth;4 and, that in said Certificate of Live Birth, respondent Atty. Villarin
identified herself as "Ma. Cristina V. Alejandro" having been married to Atty. Alejandro on May
1, 1990 at Isabela Province. Complainant alleged that she filed this administrative complaint
when she learned that her husband has been nominated as a regional trial court judge. She insists
that he is not fit to be a judge considering that he, and co-respondent Atty. Villarin, do not even
possess the basic integrity to remain as members of the Philippine Bar.
We required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint in our Resolution dated
July 4, 1994. When copies of our resolution and of the complaint and its annexes addressed to
respondent Atty. Alejandro at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City were returned unserved with
notation "moved," we required complainant to submit the correct and present address of her
husband.5 No similar return of service with respect to respondent Atty. Villarin appears on the
record.
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated December 5, 1994, complainant insisted that her
husband’s correct address remains to be 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that it was him who told
the postman that he had already moved; and, that any subsequent service by mail will result in
the same failure as respondent will either refuse service or misrepresent a change of address
again. Complainant therefore asked that copies of the complaint and Court resolution requiring
comment be served personally upon her husband by the Court’s process servers. We noted and
granted the prayer.6 However, when the Court’s process server attempted to effect personal
service on February 16, 1995, respondent Atty. Alejandro was allegedly out of the house and his
house helper refused to accept service. Consequently we considered the copies as having been
served upon respondent Atty. Alejandro in our Resolution of July 31, 1996,7 and required him to
show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for his continued
failure to file comment, and to file such comment, considering the considerable length of time
that has lapsed since he has been first required to do so. Respondent Atty. Alejandro failed to
comply. Hence, we fined him ₱1,000.00 and directed that he file the required explanation and
comment on the administrative complaint.8
When copies of both resolutions were again returned unserved with postal notations "moved,"
we required complainant anew to submit the correct and present address of respondents, within
ten (10) days from notice, under pain of dismissal of her administrative complaint.9 In a
handwritten letter dated September 10, 1998, complainant disclosed respondents’ present address
as "12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas."10
We referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation, within ninety (90) days from notice, in our Resolution of March 17, 2003.
In a Report dated August 26, 2003, IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan recommended that
both respondents be disbarred on the following rationalization:
In its Resolution dated 31 July 1996, the Supreme Court (Second Division) ruled that respondent
Atty. Alejandro was deemed served a copy of the instant administrative complaint and of the
Court’s Resolution dated 4 July 1994, by substituted service pursuant to Rule 1, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court.
In the earlier Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 4 July 1994, respondents Atty. Alejandro
and Atty. Villarin were directed to file their Comment on the instant Complaint within ten (10)
days from notice of said Resolution. To date, no Comment has been filed by either respondent
Atty. Alejandro or Atty. Villarin. x x x
Complainant submitted a photocopy of the Marriage Contract (Annex A of the letter-complaint)
between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro executed on 3 March 1971. Complainant also
submitted photocopies of the Birth Certificates (Annexes B to D of the letter-complaint) of the
children born out of her marriage to respondent Atty. Alejandro. These documentary evidence
submitted by complainant clearly show that there was and is a valid and subsisting marriage
between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro at the time she filed the instant administrative
complaint against said respondent, her husband.
In support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against respondents Alejandro and Villarin,
complainant submitted a photocopy of the Birth Certificate (Annex E of the letter-complaint) of
one Paolo Villarin Alejandro. The said Birth Certificates states that the mother of said Paolo
Villarin Alejandro is "Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin", while his father is one "Warfredo Tomas
Alejandro". Said Birth Certificate also states that the parents of Paolo Villarin Alejandro were
married on May 1, 1990 in Isabela Province.
Given the Birth Certificate of Paolo Villarin Alejandro (Annex E of the letter-complaint), and
considering the failure of respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin to deny the charges of
complainant, it is submitted that there is sufficient evidence on record which establishes the
immoral/illicit relationship between respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin. However,
there is no evidence on record which would establish beyond doubt that respondent Atty.
Alejandro indeed contracted a second marriage with Atty. Villarin while his marriage to herein
complainant was subsisting. Thus, it is recommended that as prayed for by complainant,
respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin be disbarred for willful violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the above report and
recommendation in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-169 dated September 27, 2003.
We agree with the IBP recommendation with respect to respondent Atty. Alejandro.
Indeed Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides –
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Thus we have in a number of cases11 disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as
a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed
in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not
divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.12 He is
expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and
abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional
dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.13 The administration of justice, in
which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of
intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose
confidence in him.14
In the instant case, sufficient evidence was presented to show that respondent Atty. Alejandro,
while being lawfully married to complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with another
woman, co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence presented was not sufficient to
prove that he contracted a subsequent bigamous marriage with her, the fact remains that
respondent Atty. Alejandro exhibited by his conduct a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the Bar. We have already held that disbarment proceedings is
warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship
with another woman15 who had borne him a child.16 We can do no less in the instant case where
respondent Atty. Alejandro made himself unavailable to this Court and even fled to another
country to escape the consequences of his misconduct.
The same penalty however cannot be imposed on respondent Atty. Villarin. I is noted that our
Resolution dated July 4, 1994 requiring comment on the administrative complaint was never
"deemed served" upon her, in the same way that it was upon Atty. Alejandro. In fact, it does not
appear that copies of the administrative complaint, its annexes, and of our resolution requiring
comment were even sent to her. Although sent at the address she allegedly shared with co-
respondent Atty. Alejandro, the envelope bearing the copies was addressed to the latter
only.17 That was why when both service by registered mail and personal service failed, the copies
were deemed served solely upon Atty. Alejandro.18
The IBP for its part attempted to serve copy of the complaint upon Atty. Villarin with directive
for her to file answer. It is noted however that the same was sent to respondent’s old address at
27-C Masbate St., Quezon City, not "12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas," which was
respondents’ new address on record supplied by the complainant. The return of service therefore
showed the postal notation "moved." Considering the serious consequences of disbarment
proceedings, full opportunity upon reasonable notice must have been given respondent to answer
the charge and present evidence in her behalf. It is only in clear cases of waiver that an
administrative case be resolved sans respondent’s answer.
WHEREFORE, for Gross Immorality, respondent Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro is
DISBARRED from the practice of law, to take effect immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision. Let copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Alejandro’s personal record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The complaint against respondent Atty. Maricris A. Villarin is REFERRED BACK to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136             August 1, 2007
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje
(Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes
spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of
which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about
her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was
busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions.
On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw
her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal
house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the
household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love
You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7,
2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the
time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will
love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS
ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY
TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B
11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was
already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January
18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-
quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP
as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September
2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines,
held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported
in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli
Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families , and
that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally
married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit
to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling
it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride
on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together
again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making
him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with
Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own
family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary
Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-
quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of
paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the
family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason
being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and
low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl
and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant
attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's
signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who
was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January
10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of
Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint
due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to
Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to
Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not
cross-examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against
respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
 CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c),
Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as
its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other
pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel
made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted
an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of
the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members
of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents
with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a
"special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together
with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1")
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene
which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by
any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the
man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be
subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such
relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members
of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which
are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's
daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named
respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED"
is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison
of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as
the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in
the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was
38 years old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently
proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which
is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight
than the other32 – which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant
evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was
not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the
phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse
under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or,
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a
woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit
disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage
is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that
indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly
immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which
goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution
reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the
IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by
Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for
adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in
the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition
of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to
Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for
review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70
dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied
by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio  is
immaterial.  The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and
void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed
his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his
Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of
complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of
the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of
both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going
out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about
Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed
Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact
that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to
another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and
that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said
address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in
that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed
smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house,
for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both
respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few
months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth
of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too
eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents.
Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the
point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that
Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus
leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review.
But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for
adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative
complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume
in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January
28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies
of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, JJ., concur.