Leonida C. Quinto vs.
People of the Philippines
GR No. 126712 || April 14, 1999 || Ponente: Vitug, J. || Topic: Novation
Facts:
Petitioner Leonida Quinto received in trust three (3) pieces of jewelry from Aurelia Cariaga with a
total value of P36,000 with the purpose of selling the same on a commission basis and with the express
obligation to turn over the proceeds of sale thereof or to return the jewelry within 5 days if not sold. Cariaga
claimed that Quinto asked for more time to sell the items but failed to conclude any sale. After 6 months,
Aurelia sent a demand letter for the return of the items which petitioner ignored. Quinto argued that she had
sold several pieces of jewelry for Aurelia, and it happened on some occasions that the buyers (Mrs. Camacho
and Mrs. Ramos) were unable to pay in full. When this happened, Quinto brought the two buyers to meet
Aurelia who agreed to accept payment in installments. Quinto claims that the contract between herself and
Aurelia was effectively novated when the latter agreed to accept payment in installments directly from the
buyers.
Cariaga thus proceeded to the RTC to file a complaint of estafa against Quinto. The same court
found her guilty and sentenced her to imprisonment (prision mayor) and indemnification of the P36,000. The
Court of Appeals also affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue(s):
i. WON there was novation of the contract?
Ruling:
SC:
The SC ruled that the acceptance of Cariaga of payments from Quinto’s buyer was not tantamount
to novation which extinguished the latter’s relationship with the former.
i. With regard Quinto’s defense of novation having occured:
a. Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi (the intent of the parties to extinguish or
modify an obligation), whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the
parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.
b. There are two ways which could indicate the presence of novation and thereby produce the
effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same.
i. The first is when novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal
terms. (explicit)
ii. The second is when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point.
(implied) The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand
together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are
incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first.
c. Also, changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental.
The incompatibility must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as
its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely
modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
i. The changes alluded to by petitioner consists only in the manner of payment.
ii. There was really no substitution of debtors since Cariaga merely acquiesced to the
payment but did not give her consent to enter into a new contract. The fact alone that
the creditor receives guaranty or accepts payments from a third party who has agreed
to assume the obligation does not constitute an extinctive novation absent an
agreement that the first debtor shall be released from responsibility.
1. There are two forms of novation by substituting the person of the debtor:
a. Expromision: The initiative for the change does not come from the
debtor and may even be made without his knowledge; however,
since a third person would substitute for the original debtor and
assume the obligation, the debtor and creditor’s consent would be
required.
b. Delegacion: The debtor offers, and the creditor accepts, a third
person who consents to the substitution and assumes the obligation,
thereby releasing the original debtor from the obligation.
