MINDA S. GAERLAN v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192717, March 12, 2014
Facts:
On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application for original registration of title over a parcel of land
Cagayan de Oro City. In her application, petitioner alleged that she acquired the above–mentioned
property in November 1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of unregistered land. She had the
property declared for taxation purposes under her name. After finding petitioner’s application sufficient
in form and substance, the trial court set the case for initial hearing. On August 25, 1992, the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Opposition to petitioner’s
application. His grounds are:
(1) Neither petitioner nor her predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier;
(2) The muniments of title and tax declarations attached to the petition do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the subject land;
(3) The claim of ownership based on Spanish title is no longer available for purposes of registration;
and
(4) the subject land is a portion of the public domain, hence, not registrable.
During the hearing, petitioner testified and also presented several witnesses, including the city
assessor to show her tax declaration over the property. On November 20, 2001, the trial court granted
petitioner’s application for registration of title. Thereafter, the Republic, through the OSG, appealed
from the aforementioned decision asserting that the trial court erred in ruling that the subject parcel of
land is available for private appropriation. In 2010, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and
dismissed the application for registration by petitioner.
In its ruling, the CA found that petitioner failed to present any proof to establish that the subject land
is alienable and disposable.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s application for registration of title.
Ruling:
SC held that Petitioner is not entitled to the title and thus, reversed the Court of Appeals.
P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, provides who may apply for registration.
Based on the above–quoted provisions, applicants for registration of title must establish and prove:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that
the applicant and his predecessors–in–interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that his possession has been under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Each element must necessarily be proven by
no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence; otherwise the application for registration should
be denied.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or statute. The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for
are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as
proclaimed by the President.
In the present case, petitioner did not offer any explanation why the CENRO certification was not
presented and submitted during the proceedings before the trial court to justify its belated submission
to this Court. Furthermore, what is strictly required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by the applicant and her predecessors–in–interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable
and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) she and her predecessors–in–interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, her application for registration of title of the subject
property under P.D. No. 1529 should be denied.
