Educational Philosophy and Theory
ISSN: 0013-1857 (Print) 1469-5812 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rept20
An exploration of Naquib al-Attas’ theory of
Islamic education as ta’dīb as an ‘indigenous’
educational philosophy
Farah Ahmed
To cite this article: Farah Ahmed (2018) An exploration of Naquib al-Attas’ theory of Islamic
education as ta’dīb as an ‘indigenous’ educational philosophy, Educational Philosophy and Theory,
50:8, 786-794, DOI: 10.1080/00131857.2016.1247685
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2016.1247685
Published online: 02 Dec 2016.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 515
View related articles
View Crossmark data
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rept20
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2018
VOL. 50, NO. 8, 786–794
https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2016.1247685
An exploration of Naquib al-Attas’ theory of Islamic education as
ta’dīb as an ‘indigenous’ educational philosophy
Farah Ahmed
Centre for Research and Evaluation in Muslim Education, UCL Institute of Education, London, UK
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This paper explores the ‘indigenous’ philosophy of education of Syed Islam; Islamization of
Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, a Malay-Muslim scholar who’s theoretical work knowledge; Islamic
culminated in the establishment of a counter-colonial higher education education; indigenous
institution. Through presenting al-Attas’ life and philosophy and by philosophy; indigenous
education; Naquib al-Attas
exploring the arguments of his critics, I aim to shed light on the challenges
and paradoxes faced by indigenous academics working at the interface of
philosophy and education.
Introduction
In her ambitious survey of non-Western social science, ‘Southern Theory’, the Australian scholar Raewyn
Connell (2007, pp. 111–137) includes a chapter on three Iranian intellectuals who challenged ‘western’
dominance of Muslim intellectual thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In doing so,
Connell explores a number of issues that arise whenever Islamic intellectual resistance is considered
as a form of ‘indigenous’ thought. Central to these issues is the question of whether Islam deserves to
be included in an overview of sociological theories originating in what Connell calls the ‘Global South’.
Similarly, Reagan (2005) qualifies his decision to include a chapter on Islam in his book on indigenous
educational traditions, with a lengthy discussion of perceived non-liberal Islamic teachings. Despite
their misgivings, both writers nevertheless see it as important to include Islamic thought within the
scope of the indigenous field because ultimately it is ‘non-western’ and is engaged in the kind of cultural
and intellectual resistance that is characteristic of ‘indigenous’ research. Connell recognizes the long
historical roots of Islamic sociological thinking; nevertheless, she argues that it is misguided to turn to
so-called ‘founding fathers’, i.e. classical Muslim scholars such as Ibn Khaldun (d.1406), regarded as a
forerunner of sociology (Alatas, 2006)1; and Al-Biruni (d.1048) regarded as a forerunner of anthropology
(Ahmed, 1986). Connell argues that this approach fails to produce social thought about the modern
world and that further work, regarding the connections and the contrasts between this kind of work and
that of the mainstream ‘western’ discourse, is required. There is additional irony here, in that, possibly
because her focus is sociology, which is a relatively new discipline in the Western academy; Connell does
not identify Ibn Khaldun and Al-Biruni as polymaths who have influenced the development of ‘western’
thought in other ways. Even better known in Europe were scholars such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna d.1037)
and Ibn Rushd (Averroes d.1198), through whose writings renaissance scholars revived Greek medicine
and philosophy. There is little doubt that Islamic intellectual advances influenced the Western academy
and educational thought to some degree (Makdisi, 1981). It has even been argued that the work of Ibn
al-Haytham (d.1040) was the forerunner of the ‘western’ scientific method. Where does this interwoven
© 2016 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 787
intellectual history leave the claim of current Muslims who decry ‘western’ intellectual hegemony and
call for ‘Islamization’ of knowledge and education? Advocates of Islamization would argue that far from
being recognized, the very suppression of this intellectual history in the current educational systems
is essential to Western intellectual and cultural hegemony. Furthermore, from their perspective, secu-
larization of the Western academy and education systems means that they are now far removed from
the principles of Islamic thought. These systems are corrupting the minds of the Muslims, who have
little knowledge of their own intellectual history; this is precisely why there is a need for Islamization.
However, is a call for Islamization really a call for indigenization, as claimed by Dangor (2005)? This
paper aims to explore this claim through analysis of the work of one of the original scholars behind the
Islamization of knowledge movement, namely: the Malay-Muslim philosopher, Syed Muhammad Naquib
al-Attas. This paper is not concerned with the wider Islamization of Knowledge project, for example
the theory of the Palestinian-American philosopher Ismail al Faruqi. Although al-Faruqi collaborated
with al-Attas in conferences during the late 1970s and 1980s, al-Attas sought to distinguish his thought
from that of al-Faruqi and other scholars who were involved in the wider movement, such as Ali Ashraf
(Abaza, 2002; Ahmed, 2014). Al-Attas saw his project as quite distinct. He sought to devise an ‘Islamic
educational philosophy’ and establish an alternative university, as efforts toward a counter-colonial
movement. This paper focuses on the internal and external challenges he faced in realizing this project.
Interestingly, al-Attas rejects the term indigenization, arguing that localizing Islam through the use of
terms such as Indigenization (pribumisasi in Malay) is a form of sophism, which fails to recognize the right
of non-Western scholars to claim that their thought can be universal. Al-Attas in the tradition of classical
Muslim thought sees Islam as a universal truth that can be applied to all local situations without taking
away from their ‘localness’ and particularity (Wan Daud, 1998). This has been an important principle in
Islamic tradition, which has enabled the flourishing of diverse, yet unified Muslim cultures and socie-
ties. This principle bears a similarity to the ongoing layers of identity discourse in indigenous research
expressed in relation to being and embodiment, as explored in the work of Kovach and colleagues
(2010, 2013). Al-Attas’ personal embodiment of the complexities of being and identity is a particularly
interesting case study of an indigenous philosopher. This is because his personal history is so closely tied
to the anti-colonial struggle and the post-colonial reality that frames the Islamization/indigenization
projects. Al-Attas was born in Bogor, Java, Dutch East Indies (pre-independence Indonesia) in 1931.
His genealogical tree is complex but he traces his roots over a thousand years to the Ba’Alawi sayyids2
of Hadramaut, Yemen, as well as claiming descent from Turkish, Sundanese, and Johore (Indo-Malay)
aristocracies (Wan Daud, 1998). As in many indigenous communities, genealogy is an important science
in the Arab-Islamic world and al-Attas’ standing as a representative of the Islamic cause is elevated by his
links to Arab, Turkish, and ‘indigenous’ Indo-Malay families. However, his standing is more importantly
heightened by the claim of having had a traditional Islamic and ‘indigenous’ education that he draws
on in his academic career.
From the family in Bogor he obtained his education in Islamic sciences, while from his family in Johore he developed
the foundations for Malay language, literature, and culture. (Wan Daud, 1998, p. 2)
Al-Attas has written extensively in Malay and one strand of his philosophical work is deeply con-
cerned with philology; he traces the cultural, literary roots of the Malay language and the Islamic history
of the Indo-Malay archipelago. An example is his work on the dating of the Terengganu inscription.
Al-Attas argued extensively for the importance of the Malay language in nation building in the early
years of Malaysian independence. During his tenure as Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur (1968–1970), he initiated and led the establishment of Malay as an intellectual and aca-
demic language. Paradoxically, despite al-Attas’ emphasis on the Malay language in his later academic
career, his academic writing on important Muslim-Malay scholars such as Fansuri and al-Raniri was
completed using the English language. This took place during his time as a student in the orientalist
heart of the Western academy, the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK and
McGill University, Canada (1959–1964). This was not al-Attas’ only exposure to ‘western’ education; in the
colonial period prior to Malaysian independence (1951–1955), he was a Cadet Officer in the Royal Malay
788 F. AHMED
regiment and received training at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England. Ironically, during this
time, having been attracted to the metaphysics of the Sufis while in the library at Sandhurst, al-Attas,
traveled through Europe, Spain, and North Africa seeking out Sufi Mystics and meeting Moroccan and
other North African independence leaders. Drawing on both the Malay and English intellectual tradi-
tions, al-Attas has published over 20 books in Malay and English. Interestingly, he has not written in
Arabic, the language of classical Islamic learning. However, al-Attas’ educational philosophy centers on
the importance of Qur’anic Arabic to Islamic education because it is the language that gives access to
Islam’s core texts. His most enduring influence has been in the field of reviving an Islamic educational
and intellectual movement in Malaysia to counter Western hegemony in the Malay education system.
Following the above preliminary comments, I now intend to examine the interface between philos-
ophy and education for indigenous people by exploring al-Attas’ educational philosophy. In so doing,
I firstly give a brief and basic outline of al-Attas’ epistemology, ontology, and pedagogical philosophy.
I then explore the critique of his work by a range of scholars. I identify both the potential ‘western’ bias
in the arguments of his critics and the complexity of the layers of identity embodied in al-Attas as an
‘indigenous’ scholar, who is grappling with the challenges of generating indigenous education in the
modern world.
Al-Attas’ educational philosophy
Al-Attas is deeply concerned with re-examining the philosophical foundations of the Muslim educational
endeavor in the post-colonial world. He seeks to reclaim education and learning through a non-Western,
i.e. Islamic, way of being in and knowing the world, a way of being that differs fundamentally from
the secular and ‘technological’3 educational systems that he is critiquing. Although al-Attas uses the
words ‘system of education’ in his writings (al-Attas, 1980, p. 1), I feel the term indicates a practical
manifestation and thus does not properly elucidate his intended meaning. Al-Attas is firstly concerned
with a conceptual reframing of our understanding of education and gives much more importance to a
proposed conceptual ‘system’ than a practical ‘system’ that may emerge from his philosophy. Al-Attas’
philosophy is concerned with a spiritual ontology and epistemology. He takes great care in developing
his philosophical position on being and knowing, particularly because he identifies a post-colonial loss
of understanding of these fundamentals in Islamic societies. Al-Attas identifies the weakness in Muslim
understanding as what he calls the loss of adab, an Arabic word that he uses both ontologically and
pedagogically. Al-Attas’ exacting use of the word adab is true to his insistence that there has been a
loss of meaning of Islamic concepts, in that he is seeking to revive an original use of the word adab, a
use that differs from the common contemporary use of the term, which is usually literature or urbane
social etiquette (Wan Daud, 1998, p. 134). For al-Attas, attaining adab is authentically becoming through
knowing and recognizing the ‘proper place of things’. Muslims have become entrenched within a sec-
ular Western worldview and are looking to understand their problems through this inauthentic lens.
For al-Attas, only through a regeneration of adab through ta’dīb (authentic education) will Muslims be
able to faithfully address the needs of their societies. He further argues that this loss of adab is due to
a loss of understanding of the ma’na (meanings) of Qur’anic terms and concepts, which in turn leads
to inauthenticity and injustice to the self and society (al-Attas, 1980, p. 13). Al-Attas begins with a thor-
ough exposition of the dangers of secularism for Muslim society per se and the separation of religious
and secular scholarship in Muslim higher education in particular. For al-Attas, this separation leads to
a loss of ma’na (meaning) and thus impacts the being of the Muslim scholar or academic. He goes on
to discuss the mistake that the newly independent Muslim nation states made; in imitating the secular
colonial powers, they conceived education as educating the citizen as opposed to holistically educat-
ing the human being (Wan Daud, 1998, pp. 128–133). Al-Attas’ solution is to devise a neo-Ghazalian
approach to ontology and epistemology in order to establish a metaphysics of Islam which recognizes
non-empirical and non-rational being and knowing. According to Daiber (2011), he is further influenced
by al-Farabi and Ibn Qutayba and is thus drawing in a diverse and rich tradition of classical Islamic
scholarship. Al-Attas draws on the widely accepted Islamic definition of the human being as having a
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 789
range of interdependent faculties incorporating the ‘aql (intellect), nutq (speech/reason), nafs (self ),
qalb (heart), and ruh (spirit). For al-Attas, these are interdependent strands of a holistic understanding
of the human being. However, he argues that the spiritual dimension of human self-awareness and
knowledge was lost in the Greek separation of the terms ratio and intellectus. The Qur’anic term ‘aql,
which is linked indelibly to nutq (speech/reason), incorporates both meanings.
Man is possessed of an inner faculty that formulates meaning (i.e. dhu’nutq) and this formulation of meaning,
which involves judgement and discrimination and clarification, is what constitutes his ‘rationality’. The terms natiq
and nutq are derived from a root that conveys the basic meaning of ‘speech’, in the sense of human speech, so that
they both signify a certain power and capacity in man to articulate words in meaningful pattern. He is, as it were, a
‘language animal’, and the articulation of linguistic symbols into meaningful patterns is no other than the outward,
visible and audible expression of the inner, unseen reality, which we call ‘aql. The term ‘aql itself basically signifies
a kind of ‘binding’ or ‘withholding’, so that in this respect ‘aql signifies an innate property that binds and withholds
objects of knowledge by means of words. ‘Aql is synonymous with qalb in the same way as qalb, which is a spiritual
organ of cognition called the ‘heart’, is synonymous with ‘aql. (al-Attas, 1980, p. 2)
Al-Attas thus frames his metaphysics in opposition to secularism and in accordance with the clas-
sical Sufism of al-Ghazali who sees the human being as having the capacity of a spiritual recognition
that scaffolds both his understanding of meanings, and his self-awareness as a being whose purpose
is to turn to God. Ultimately, for al-Attas, all knowledge comes from God and the human being is the
active receptor and interpreter of this knowledge; but this interpretation is about understanding the
true meaning as given by God.
Knowledge, with reference to God as being its origin, is the arrival (husul) in the soul of the meaning of a thing or
an object of knowledge; and that with reference to the soul as being its interpreter, knowledge is the arrival (wusul)
of the soul at the meaning of a thing or an object of knowledge. (al-Attas, 1980, p. 5)
Further, this knowledge gives an understanding of being that involves re-cognition of the ‘proper place
of things within a certain order’, which is attained through ta’dīb, i.e. the drawing out of self-awareness
and the inculcation of adab. This sense of hierarchy comes from the Islamic mystical tradition of Sufism.
The Sufi seeks to know the ultimate reality, that is God, and to achieve this knowledge, s/he needs to
attain a state of being by passing through various hierarchical cycles of submission to God, which involves
the movement of the nafs (self) toward meaning. The Sufi engages in theological, moral, and spiritual
training at the hands of a Sufi master/teacher to attain an understanding of his nafs (self) and the relation
of his self to God. Ultimately, this leads to a state of being that attains knowledge of a transcendental
level of existence. This is attained through being at one with God.
The classical Islamic theological and mystical position on ‘worldly’ or scientific knowledge is complex;
this so-called secular knowledge was part and parcel of the scholarly life of the classical Muslim civili-
zation (Lettinck, 2011, p. 151). As he draws on al-Ghazali, al-Attas is within an epistemological tradition
that recognizes empirical and rational knowledge as well as imaginary and analogous knowledge.
(Wan Daud, 1998, p. 107)
By ‘proper place’ al-Attas means not the man-made and generally unjust socio-economic place, but the various
real levels of human existence encompassing ontological, cosmological and psychological domains. (Wan Daud,
1998, p. 107)
According to al-Attas, this approach, which draws on one distinctly Islamic intellectual tradition,
will restore order and justice not only to the human self but also to society and environment. It is a
holistic approach that recognizes man’s spiritual nature and relationship with others, his environment,
and most importantly God. The above is a very simplistic rendition of al-Attas’ basic ideas, which
are extensively developed in his many writings, particularly in the Prolegomena to the Metaphysics
of Islam (al-Attas, 1995) and Islam and Secularism (al-Attas, 1978). He writes persistently about how
the implementation of his approach would transform the Muslim understanding of research meth-
odology and ‘development’, writing both about de-Westernization and Islamization of knowledge
(al-Attas, 1980, p. 5; al-Attas, 1978, pp. 133–169). His writings provide the theory concerning the
integration of classical Islamic education with contemporary higher education in the Muslim world
and devising an Islamic university for the contemporary era (Wan Daud, 1998, pp. 169–224). In 1987,
790 F. AHMED
al-Attas implemented his theory through the establishment of the International Institute of Islamic
Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), based within the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM).
For over two decades, the institute flourished under his personal directorship. The experiment was,
however, to be short-lived; in 2015, all courses run by ISTAC and the institute itself were amalgamated
into IIUM. Although the institute’s work remains within the ‘Islamization of knowledge’ paradigm,
because IIUM also broadly subscribes to this theory, it could be argued that al-Attas’ personal vision
and contribution have been diminished by this merger, in that IIUM has not sought to sustain the
very specific project that he had begun. Nevertheless, this translation of theory into a fully func-
tioning counter-colonial higher education institution has rare parallels and therefore provides a rich
opportunity for critical evaluation and analysis from both sociological and philosophical perspectives.
Al-Attas’ critics
Al-Attas’ ability to translate his ideas into an educational institute raises questions about power and the
Islamization project. First, for some, al-Attas has allowed his thought to be appropriated by the Malaysian
state for it’s own purposes (Noor, 2009, p. 214). Secondly, can Muslim intellectuals who have access to
state power in Muslim nation states equate their project with indigenous peoples who have no such
power? The answer to this important question is complex and multilayered in that although Muslim
nation states have the potential of challenging Western intellectual hegemony, they are, according to
al-Attas and other Muslim thinkers, mesmerized by supposed Western progress and technology, a condi-
tion that Aal-e-Ahmed calls ‘westoxication’, cited in (Connell, 2007). It is this very condition that al-Attas
identifies as the loss of adab and that he is working to redress. In working with the government, al-Attas
was seeking to reform society through education. Furthermore, the Islamization project is not unique
in working to set up institutions, supported by state actors. There are other proposals and attempts
to establish indigenous higher education institutions, some of which have government support, for
example a National Maori university in Aotearoa (Hook, 2010) and the International Research Institute
For Maori And Indigenous Education at The University of Auckland, New Zealand. Other examples are
the First Nations University in Canada, which opened in 2003, and the Melbourne Institute for Indigenous
Development at the University of Melbourne. These indigenous movements and institutions all face
challenges; it can be argued that al-Attas faced very similar challenges and these are discussed below.
Some Western and/or indigenous scholars argue that indigenous movements are futile attempts to
demonstrate that ‘western’ thought is not universal. For these scholars, rational and scientific thought
is the pinnacle of human achievement and indigenous scholarship is a reversal of hard-fought efforts
to remove subjectivity from scholarship. From this basis, indigenous scholarship is sometimes seen as
not worthy or capable of generating thought equivalent to the Western academy or in a more sophisti-
cated alternative, as falsely claiming to generate original thought. Thus, these critics claim that so-called
‘indigenous’ research is actually dependent on the norms and models of the Western academy.
Farid Panjwani, for example, has heavily critiqued the Islamization of Knowledge project with these
sorts of arguments. Panjwani (2004, p. 2) argues that the critique of Western education, drawn on by
scholars advocating an Islamization project, is almost exclusively drawn from Western sources. This he
sees as a weakness, presumably because it demonstrates an inability to develop ‘Islamic’ arguments.
Panjwani does not recognize this approach as a strategy by Muslims to critique ‘western’ education, by
arguing that on its own terms ‘western’ education is wanting. Panjwani does not acknowledge that for
indigenous scholars to enter the discourse in the Western academy, it is often necessary to cite Western
sources because established academics are unlikely to recognize arguments that do not sit within a
Western methodology. Simultaneously, Panjwani argues that despite using Western sources, Muslim
scholars fail to demonstrate a shared concern with Western educators, presumably because they do not
ally their project with these other educational critiques. Panjwani does not accept that identification
of the aims of the Islamization project as distinct from internal critiques within the Western academy
is necessary. That without illustrating this distinction, there is little point in arguing for the need for an
alternative approach to education that draws on non-Western epistemologies and ontologies.
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 791
Conversely, in critiquing ‘western’ science and presenting an ‘Islamic’ alternative, Panjwani goes on to
argue that Muslim scholars are essentializing Islam and failing to present the diversity of Muslim inter-
pretations of ‘Islamic’ thought. In Panjwani’s eyes, this is creating two problems: firstly, a false dichotomy
between Islam and the West and secondly, the proclamation of a divinely ordained education system
with no room for human interpretation. In relation to the first problem, any non-Western scholar will
naturally identify the difference of the worldview from which they are presenting their argument in
order to demonstrate its uniqueness in relation to the dominant paradigm; it seems to me strange
to point this out as a criticism. Upholding this distinctness does not preclude openness to acknowl-
edgement of shared values and concerns. Certainly in my reading of al-Attas, I sense such openness to
engaging with ‘western’ ideas, and recognition that ‘classical’ Islamic thought was itself influenced by
Greek philosophy and other cultures. It stands to reason that a scholar like al-Attas, who is educated in
the Western academy, who liberally refers to English translations of Greek philosophers in his works,
clearly recognizes that Muslim intellectuals need to engage with Western thought. Panjwani’s main
concern is the claims of Muslims that Islamic thought originates from a divine source. In his view, this
is no more than an idealized apologetic due to the dominance of Western thought and the inability of
Muslim scholars to confront it (Panjwani, 2004, pp. 4, 5). From Panjwani’s perspective, claiming a divine
origin of any particular belief system is asserting the superiority of this particular worldview and he is
uncomfortable with this approach.
Other Muslim scholars have expressed a similar unease at al-Attas’ emphasis on adab, which can be
read as an insistence on hierarchies and the ‘proper place of things’. Sahin (2013, p. 178) for example sees
this as ‘a set of coercive moral practices and training’, arguing that al-Attas is overly concerned with the
esoteric nature of Islamic education. Considering that Sahin is arguing for a holistic view of education
from an Islamic perspective, it is striking that Sahin does not give importance to al-Attas’ centering of
spiritual awareness within a holistic Islamic epistemology. Al-Attas, in drawing on the Ghazalian hier-
archy of knowledge, fully recognizes empirical and rational knowledge; however, he subsumes these
into an approach to knowledge that also recognizes intuition and spiritual awareness which is as much
tied up with being, as with knowing (al-Attas, 1995, p. 148; Wan Daud, 1998, pp. 107, 108).
Noaparast (2012, p. 153) argues that al-Attas is casting the concept of adab too widely. He argues that
al-Attas’ insistence that all knowledge is essentially an ayah (sign) toward knowledge of the existence
of God reduces all disciplines to theology. According to Noaparast, al-Attas’ insistence on the role of
the divine undermines the methodologies of a range of disciplines, especially those of the sciences.
Noaparast does not accuse al-Attas of being dogmatic; he recognizes the hermeneutic dimension
of al-Attas’ philosophy. However, his concern is that subsuming all other disciplines within such an
epistemology brings the sciences under the realm of hermeneutics, which to him is not desirable. It
could be argued that Noaparast is failing to see beyond the dominant rational-scientific paradigm in
this critique. Elsewhere in the same paper (2012, pp. 164–170), Noaparast applies a different critique,
focusing on al-Attas’ definition of education as ta’dīb by drawing on Islamic sources that use the term
tarbiyah for education. Noaparast is attempting to broaden the Islamic concept of education to resolve
the weaknesses he identifies in al-Attas’ approach. Sahin also presents a similar argument. Both scholars
draw upon Western and Islamic theory to present a way forward for Islamic education that recognizes
al-Attas’ contribution, although addressing what they perceive as weaknesses. This internal discourse,
it could be argued, addresses Panjwani’s concern that Islam is somehow seen as monolithic by those
who call for a de-Westernization of knowledge. Panjwani however has a further criticism, namely that
alternatives to Western education presented by Islamic scholars are either no different to Western
models, or that they are lacking in creativity (Panjwani, 2004, pp. 5, 6)—they have not presented a real
alternative, only a critique of the West which is taken from the West itself.
Abaza (1999, 2002) concurs with Panjwani’s argument and also brings forward a further criticism
on the ethos of ISTAC and al-Attas’ insistence on religious ceremony, symbols and performance, and
architecture that conveyed the spirit of his project. Rather than seeing this as an embodiment of Islamic
being and a revival of spiritual ceremony, she perceives it as empty inflated gestures without meaning
and intellectual substance. For Abaza, these are the outward manifestations of al-Attas’ vainglorious
792 F. AHMED
obsession with hierarchy which she argues is influenced by his British military training and a neo-Sufi
reading of Islam leading to a ‘refeudalization and institutionalization of an Islam of power’ (2002, pp.
92–95), which, according to her, served the interests of Malaysia’s ruling elites some of whom were
students of al-Attas. Instead of seeing substance in al-Attas’ extensive theoretical work, which is realized
in a flourishing educational institution that has become home to respected scholars with innovative
output such as Mohammad Hashim Kemali, Abaza sees only failure. Instead of seeing the cross-cultural
position of ISTAC scholars as straddling the Islamic educational tradition and Western disciplines as a
strength, Abaza argues that this led to a lack of grassroots following as most Muslim-Malays still hold
on to traditional Islamic scholars. Instead of al-Attas influencing Malay policy and successfully infusing
his intellectual work into the structures and work of government, according to Abaza, al-Attas’ elite
background and Western education made him a hostage to political interests who used him to gain
‘Islamic’ credibility with the masses. Abaza fails to recognize that this argument itself demonstrates a
desire among Malay-Muslims to see Islam as part of their public life and to build their society on an
Islamic intellectual tradition. It can be argued that this applies both to the grassroots who according
to her are not represented by al-Attas and the elites who she claims use al-Attas.
Like Panjwani, ultimately, Abaza is wary of the entire project and completely skeptical of the capacity
of Islam to generate knowledge appropriate for contemporary society. Panjwani argues that the only
way for this to happen is for Islamic scholars to drop the term ‘Islamic’. Further, scholars must recognize
weaknesses and discord in what they, according to Panjwani, assume is a purely successful intellec-
tual heritage. According to Panjwani, Muslims must read ‘Islamic’ sources through a modern lens, as
only this approach will allow them to understand the subjectivity of their worldview. While Panjwani’s
and Abaza’s critiques are not as damning as Tibi who outright refers to al-Attas as a fundamentalist
(1995), nevertheless, Panjwani and Abaza betray a strong attachment to the ‘western’ academy and its
worldview. Through this lens, the efforts of Islamic scholars to draw on their own tradition to generate
educational projects will be seen as futile and lacking in intellectuality or creativity. Any intellectuality
and creativity Islamic scholars may generate is unlikely to be recognized or accepted by the Western
paradigm. Al-Attas’ focus on spirituality and being is too alien to be given credence in an academy
steeped in the rational and scientific.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to explore al-Attas’ life and work, and the arguments deployed by his
critics to shed light on the numerous challenges faced by indigenous scholars. I have also sought to
contextualize al-Attas’ work as a post-colonial indigenous philosophy of education. I close with an apt
quotation from al-Attas, where he highlights the preoccupation with doubt in the ‘western’ academic
paradigm.
It is like the thirsty traveller who at first sincerely sought the water of knowledge, but who later, having found it
plain perhaps, proceeded to temper his cup with the salt of doubt so that his thirst now becomes insatiable though
he drinks incessantly, and that in thus drinking the water that cannot slake his thirst, he has forgotten the original
and true purpose for which the water was sought (al-Attas, 2013).
According to al-Attas, the preoccupation with doubt and lack of emphasis on purpose has led to
the current crises in the Western academy and in post-colonial non-Western societies, which are also
now plagued with doubt. The need for critique and questioning that characterizes Western higher edu-
cation has paralyzed a true search for knowledge and self-awareness. For al-Attas, critique and doubt
have become the purpose of Western academia and the purpose of knowledge and education of the
pre-colonial period has been lost in Western disciplines and academic structures.
However, in my reading of this quotation, it also applies to those who are seeking to quell that
doubt by regaining a sense of purpose that draws on previous ways of being and knowing. Al-Attas
also manages to identify the indigenous scholar’s inherent problem in attempting to reinvigorate
non-Western or indigenous knowledge and education. What is it that we as indigenous scholars
actually seek to do? What is our purpose in being? These are not an expression of doubt, but questions
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 793
of ontology and epistemology. They illustrate the importance of philosophy in indigenous education
and scholarship.
For al-Attas, purpose itself has been lost; and in losing a sense of purpose, we have thrown ourselves
into a purposeless, yet insatiable quest for knowledge and understanding. The Muslim, in al-Attas’ view,
in response to the insatiable doubt of the Western academy must locate purpose at the core of his being.
This awareness of purpose and one’s proper relation to all other beings and things, especially God, is
the true goal of education. The purpose of education is achieving a sense of adab in our being, knowing
intuitively through our tradition how to be—how to be authentic in the modern world.
Notes
1.
Syed Farid Alatas is the nephew of Syed Naquib al-Attas, who is the subject of this paper.
Sayyid (also spelt syed) is a term denoting descent from Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him).
2.
3.
I use the word ‘technological’ here in the Heideggerean sense, see for example (Peters, 2002, p. 9).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Farah Ahmed is an honorary research associate at Centre for Research and Evaluation in Muslim Education, UCL Institute of
Education and director of Education and Research at Islamic Shakhsiyah Foundation. The author has 18 years experience
of teaching in and leading Islamic schools in the UK and has developed CPD courses on Islamic philosophies and practices
of education. The author is interested in models of holistic Islamic education that attempt to appropriate contemporary
pedagogy into traditional Islamic educational paradigms, for example sociocultural theory and the Islamic oral pedagogy
known as Halaqah. As a practitioner-researcher, the author’s research looks at how UK Muslim educators are addressing
issues of cultural relevance in two ways: the relevance of traditional Islamic education to the modern context and the
relevance of mainstream education to the needs of Muslim pupils.
References
Abaza, M. (1999). Intellectuals, power and Islam in Malaysia: S.N. al-Attas or the beacon on the crest of a hill. Archipel, 58,
189–227.
Abaza, M. (2002). Debates on Islam and knowledge in Malaysia and Egypt: Shifting worlds (1st edn.). London: Routledge.
Ahmed, A. S. (1986). Toward Islamic anthropology: Definition, dogma, and directions. Herndon, VA: IIIT.
Ahmed, F. (2014). Exploring halaqah as research method: A tentative approach to developing Islamic research principles
within a critical “indigenous” framework. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 27, 561–583. doi:10.1
080/09518398.2013.805852
Alatas, S. F. (2006). A Khaldunian exemplar for a historical sociology for the south. Current Sociology, 54, 397–411.
doi:10.1177/0011392106063189
al-Attas, S. M. N. (1978). Islam and secularism. Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC.
al-Attas, S. M. N. (1980). The concept of education in Islam: A framework for an Islamic philosophy of education. Presented
at the First World Conference on Islamic Education, Makkah: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia.
al-Attas, S. M. N. (1995). Prolegomena to the metaphysics of Islam: An exposition of the fundamental elements of the world
view. Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC.
al-Attas, S. M. N. (2013). Islam: The concept of religion and the foundation of ethics and morality. Kuala Lumpur: IBFIM.
Connell, R. (2007). Southern theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in social science. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Daiber, H. (2011). The Malaysian scholar Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (born 1931) on Islamic education: An evaluation
in view of classical Islamic sources. Presented at the Knowledge and Education in Classical Islam: Historical foundations
– Contemporary impact, University of Gottingen, Germany.
Dangor, S. (2005). Islamization of disciplines: Towards an indigenous educational system. Educational Philosophy and Theory,
37, 519–531. doi:10.1111/j.1469-5812.2005.00138.x
Hook, G. R. (2010). A national Maori University. MAI Review, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.review.mai.ac.nz/index.php/
MR/article/view/296/481
794 F. AHMED
Kovach, M. E. (2010). Indigenous methodologies: Characteristics, conversations, and contexts. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Kovach, M., Carriere, J., Barrett, M. J., Montgomery, H., & Gillies, C. (2013). Stories of diverse identity locations in indigenous
research. International Review of Qualitative Research, 6, 487–509. doi:10.1525/irqr.2013.6.4.487
Lettinck, P. (2011). Science in adab literature. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 21, 149–163. doi:10.1017/S0957423910000159
Makdisi, G. (1981). The rise of colleges: Institutions of learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Noaparast, K. B. (2012). Al-Attas revisited on the Islamic understanding of education. Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies, 5,
149–172.
Noor, F. (2009). Reformist Muslim thinkers in Malaysia. In S. Hunter (Ed.), Reformist voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and
modernity (pp. 208–226). London: Routledge.
Panjwani, F. (2004). The Islamic in Islamic education – Assessing the discourse. Current Issues in Comparative Education, 7,
19–29.
Peters, M. A. (2002). Heidegger, education, and modernity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Reagan, T. G. (2005). Non-western educational traditions: Indigenous approaches to educational thought and practice. Mahwah,
NJ: Routledge.
Sahin, A. (2013). New directions in Islamic education: Pedagogy and identity formation. Markfield: Kube Publishing Ltd.
Tibi, B. (1995). Culture and knowledge: The politics of Islamization of knowledge as a postmodern project? The fundamentalist
claim to de-westernization. Theory, Culture & Society, 12, 1–24. doi:10.1177/026327695012001001
Wan Daud, M. (1998). The educational philosophy and practice of Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas: An exposition of the
original concept of Islamization. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization.
