PART I

Skepticism
 Introduction

Like Rene Descartes, we have all asked ourselves at one time or another "Couldn't
everything I seem to see, hear, etc. be illusory? Might I in fact be dreaming all this? If so,
what do I really know of the outside world?" The skeptic's answers are pessimistic: yes,
you could be dreaming, and so you know nothing of the outside world. The conclusion
is outlandish, and yet the reasoning behind it hardly seems strained at all. We feel the
pressure towards skepticism in the movement from the question about the trust-
worthiness of our senses to the question of our ability to know. Given that the bulk of
our knowledge of the outside world derives from the senses, how can we know any-
thing about the world unless we first show that our senses can be trusted? The core of
the skeptical strategy is more general: how can one gain knowledge using a source of
belief unless one first shows that the source is trustworthy?
In his selection, Barry Stroud presents the skeptic's argument in its most favorable
light. The skeptic does not hold us up to an uncommonly high standard of knowledge
only to make the obvious point that we fail to meet it. The skeptic invokes only
the standards presupposed in everyday knowledge attributions. To use an example of
Stroud's, if no goldfinch could possibly be a canary, then if one is to know that the bird
one sees is a goldfinch, one must be able to rule out its being a canary. More generally,
to know that p, one must be able to rule out every possibility one knows to be incom-
patible with one's knowing that p. The skeptic then has her wedge: to know that you're
sitting beside a warm fire, you must be able to rule out any possibility which excludes
this knowledge, including innumerable "skeptical possibilities:' such as that you're
dreaming, that you're being deceived by a malicious demon, and that you're a brain in
a vat stimulated to have the experiences and apparent memories you now have. But it's
hard to see how you can rule these out.
In each of the selections from the work of G. E. Moore, the tables are turned on the
skeptic. Moore provides a counter-argument in "Proof of an External World." A good
proof, he explains, proceeds from known premises to a distinct conclusion to which
they can be seen to lead. He then produces an example: raising his hands, one after the
other, he exclaims "Here is a hand. Here is another hand," and he concludes "There are
4 INTRODUCTION

hands:' If asked to prove his premises, he would reject the demand, for not everything
that is known can be proved.
Moore nevertheless takes the skeptic seriously. In "Certainty;' he grants that if he
doesn't know he is not dreaming, he doesn't know he is standing up giving a lecture.
Still he asks why there is any more plausibility in using this premise as part of a modus
ponens argument to conclude that he doesn't know he is standing up than in using it as
a part of the corresponding modus tollens argument to conclude that he does know
after all that he is not dreaming.
In "Four Forms of Scepticism;' Moore fully admits that skeptical scenarios are
logically possible, but he finds it more certain that something has gone afoul in the
skeptical argument than that he lacks knowledge that he has hands (or is holding a
pencil). Moreover, he concludes that since the only way he could know this is through
some inductive or analogical argument from the character of his experience, such an
argument must exist.
The selections from Stroud and Moore concern our knowledge of the external
world. One might hope that, even if it is hard to answer the skeptical challenge for
knowledge, at least it could be satisfactorily answered for justification. Peter Klein calls
the view that we cannot be justified in our beliefs about how things are (as opposed to
how they seem) "Academic skepticism" and contrasts it with an older form of skepti-
cism: Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonism, in Klein's view, is a more moderate skepticism than its
Academic cousin, for Pyrrhonism allows that our beliefs can be conditionally or pro-
visionally justified. But it is still a form of skepticism, because it denies that our beliefs
can be completely justified. Only if reasoning could settle the matter of whether a
belief is true could that belief be completely justified. But how can reasoning settle
anything? If it were legitimate to end reasoning with a proposition for which we could
not provide a further reason, then it seems reasoning could settle some matter. But this
is not legitimate. Nor is it legitimate to reason in a circle. Therefore, the only way for
reasoning to settle matters would be to complete an infinite regress of non-repeating
reasons (a view Klein refers to as "infinitism," discussed in more detail in his contribu-
tion to Part 11). While this would be a legitimate way to settle some matter, it cannot,
in fact, be done.
The lesson for Academic skepticism is that the arguments invoked in favor of
Academic skepticism are themselves fallacious in that they either rely on arbitrary
premises or beg the question in favor of their conclusion. Thus, consider the Academic
skeptic's claim that we cannot know whether we are dreaming or deceived by a mali-
cious demon. This claim is central to the argument for Academic skepticism. If it is
unsupported, it is arbitrary. To support the claim, the Academic skeptic must first dem-
onstrate that we cannot know, say, that there is a table in front of us. But "I cannot know
there is a table in front of me" is the ostensible conclusion of the skeptical argument.
Therefore, Academic skepticism, like the inadequate models of reasoning, must either
rely on arbitrary premises or beg the question.
Michael Williams argues that if there is such a thing as knowledge of the external
world, the kind of knowledge the Cartesian skeptic questions, it seems impossible for us
to see ourselves as having it. That is, the skeptic would carry the day. But he asks: is there
such a thing as knowledge of the world? His answer is no. The concept of knowledge of
the external world is a theoretical concept, and so, unlike practical concepts such as the
concept of a chair, it lacks application entirely unless there is an appropriate unified
 PART I 5

domain of reality whose contours are there for it to match. But there is no such epi-
stemic domain. There could be only if (empirical) beliefs divided into two classes: those
that could only be known on the basis of beliefs about immediate experience, i.e.,
beliefs about the external world, and those that could be known directly from immedi-
ate experience. Yet an examination of our practices in attributing knowledge and justi-
fication suggests that beliefs do not divide into these epistemic categories nor into any
objective epistemic categories.
Williams describes his view as a form of contextualism. But it is a version of context-
ualism quite different from those appearing in Part VIII of this volume. The contextual-
ist theories of DeRose and Cohen, and to a lesser extent Lewis, presuppose the existence
of a unified range of objective characteristics which, given a speech context, comprise the
truth-conditions for knowledge attributions in that context. For DeRose, there are the
objective (context-invariant) notions of sensitivity and strength of epistemic position,
and for Cohen objective notions of strength of evidence or justification. For Lewis,
there are the objective factors of one's evidence and which possibilities it rules out. For
all three of these epistemologists, the function of context is to set the bar on which (or
what degree) of a relatively unified range of objective factors count. Thus, for them,
there is an independent place for epistemological inquiry into the nature of these objec-
tive factors as well as into how they feed into the semantics of knowledge attribution.
According to Williams, by contrast, there is no range of objective factors, with
the result that there is nothing at all to serve as an object of theoretical investigation for
the epistemologist.
Part and parcel of repudiating skepticism, then, is repudiating traditional epistemol-
ogy. Both rely for their livelihood on the assumption that Williams calls "epistemological
realism:' viz. that there are objective relations of epistemic priority waiting to be
described.

Further Reading

Annas, Julia and Jonathan Barnes, The Modes of Landesman, Charles and Roblin Meeks (eds),
Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Philosophical Skepticism: From Plato to Rorty
Press, 1985). (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
Burnyeat, M. F. (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition Klein, P., Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
Clarke, Thompson, "The Legacy of Skepticism;' 1991).
Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972), pp. 754-69. Nozick, Robert, Philosophical Explanations
DeRose, K. and T. Warfield (eds), Skepticism: A (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Contemporary Reader (Oxford: Oxford Popkin, Richard, Scepticism from Erasmus to
University Press, 1999). Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California
Fumerton, R., Metaepistemology and Skepticism Press, 1979).
(Langham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995). Roth, Michael D. and Glenn Ross (eds),Doubting:
Hadot, Pierre, Philosophy as a Way ofLife (Oxford: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism
Blackwell, 1995). (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Hankinson, R. J., The Sceptics (London: Routledge, 1990).
1995). Sosa, Ernest, "The Skeptic's Appeal;' in Marjorie
Huemer, Michael, Skepticism and the Veil of Clay and Keith Lehrer (eds), Knowledge and
Perception (Langham, MD: Rowman and Skepticism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
Littlefield, 2001). 1989), pp. 51-68.
6 INTRODUCTION

Strawson, P. F., Skepticism and Naturalism: Some - - , The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism
Varieties (London: Methuen, 1985). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Stroud, Barry, "Understanding Human Knowledge Unger, Peter, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism
in General;' in Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
(eds), Knowledge and Skepticism (Boulder, CO: Williams, Michael, Unnatural Doubts (Princeton:
Westview Press, 1989), pp. 31-50. Princeton University Press, 1996).
 CHAPTER 1
The Problem of the
External World

Barry Stroud

Since at least the time of Descartes in the seven- the philosophical problem of our knowledge of
teenth century there has been a philosophical the external world.
problem about our knowledge of the world The problem arose for Descartes in the course
around us. 1 Put most simply, the problem is to of reflecting on everything he knows. He reached a
show how we can have any knowledge of the point in his life at which he tried to sit back and
world at all. The conclusion that we cannot, that reflect on everything he had ever been taught or
no one knows anything about the world around told, everything he had learned or discovered
us, is what I call "scepticism about the external or believed since he was old enough to know or
world", so we could also say that the problem is to believe anything. 2 We might say that he was reflect-
show how or why scepticism about the external ing on his knowledge, but putting it that way could
world is not correct. My aim is not to solve the suggest that what he was directing his attention to
problem but to understand it. I believe the prob- was indeed knowledge, and whether it was knowl-
lem has no solution; or rather that the only answer edge or not is precisely what he wanted to deter-
to the question as it is meant to be understood is mine. "Among all the things I believe or take to be
that we can know nothing about the world around true, what amounts to knowledge and what does
us. But how is the question meant to be under- not?"; that is the question Descartes asks himself.
stood? It can be expressed in a few English words It is obviously a very general question, since it asks
familiar to all of us, but I hope to show that an about everything he believes or takes to be true,
understanding of the special philosophical char- but in other respects it sounds just like the sort of
acter of the question, and of the inevitability of question we are perfectly familiar with in everyday
an unsatisfactory answer to it, cannot be guaran- life and often know how to answer.
teed by our understanding of those words alone. For example, I have come to accept over the
To see how the problem is meant to be under- years a great many things about the common
stood we must therefore examine what is per- cold. I have always been told that one can catch
haps best described as its source - how the cold by getting wet feet, or from sitting in a
problem arises and how it acquires that special draught, or from not drying one's hair before
character that makes an unsatisfactory negative going outdoors in cold weather. I have also learned
answer inevitable. We must try to understand that the common cold is the effect of a virus
transmitted by an already infected person. And
Originally published in B. Stroud, The Significance of I also believe that one is more vulnerable to colds
Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, when over-tired, under stress, or otherwise in less
1984), ch. 1. than the best of health. Some of these beliefs seem
8 BARRY STROUD

to me on reflection to be inconsistent with some In pointing out that we are perfectly familiar
others; I see that it is very unlikely that all of them with the idea of investigating or reviewing our
could be true. Perhaps they could be, but I knowledge on some particular matter or in some
acknowledge that there is much I do not under- general area I do not mean to suggest that it is
stand. If I sit back and try to think about all my always easy to settle the question. Depending on
"knowledge" of the common cold, then, I might the nature of the case, it might be very difficult,
easily come to wonder how much of it really perhaps even impossible at the time, to reach a
amounts to knowledge and how much does not. firm conclusion. For example, it would probably
What do I really know about the common cold? If be very difficult if not impossible for me to trace
I were sufficiently interested in pursuing the and assess the origins of many of those things I
matter it would be natural to look into the source believe about the common cold. But it is equally
of my beliefs. Has there ever been any good reason true that sometimes it is not impossible or even
for thinking that colds are even correlated with especially difficult to answer the question. We do
wet hair in cold weather, for example, or with sit- sometimes discover that we do not really know
ting in a draught? Are the people from whom I what we previously thought we knew. I might
learned such things likely to have believed them find that what I had previously believed is not
for good reasons? Are those beliefs just old wives' even true - that sitting in draughts is not even
tales, or are they really true, and perhaps even correlated with catching a cold, for example. Or I
known to be true by some people? These are ques- might find that there is not or perhaps never was
tions I might ask myself, and I have at least a any good reason to believe what I believed - that
general idea of how to go about answering them. the man's alibi was concocted and then falsely tes-
Apart from my impression of the implausibil- tified to by his friends. I could reasonably con-
ity of all my beliefs about the common cold being clude in each case that I, and everyone else for
true together, I have not mentioned any other that matter, never did know what I had previously
reason for being interested in investigating the thought I knew. We are all familiar with the ordi-
state of my knowledge on that subject. But for the nary activity of reviewing our knowledge, and
moment that does not seem to affect the intelligi- with the experience of reaching a positive verdict
bility or the feasibility of the reflective project. in some cases and a negative verdict in others.
There is nothing mysterious about it. It is the sort Descartes's own interest in what he knows and
of task we can be led to undertake for a number how he knows it is part of his search for what he
of reasons, and often very good reasons, in so far calls a general method for "rightly conducting
as we have very good reasons for preferring knowl- reason and seeking truth in the sciences".3 He
edge and firm belief to guesswork or wishful wants a method of inquiry that he can be assured
thinking or simply taking things for granted. in advance will lead only to the truth if properly
Reflection on or investigation of our putative followed. I think we do not need to endorse the
knowledge need not always extend to a wide area of wisdom of that search or the feasibility of that
interest. It might be important to ask whether some programme in order to try to go along with
quite specific and particular thing I believe or have Descartes in his general assessment of the posi-
been taking for granted is really something I know. tion he is in with respect to the things he believes.
As a member of a jury I might find that I have been He comes to find his putative knowledge wanting
ruling out one suspect in my mind because he was a in certain general respects, and it is in the course
thousand miles away, in Cleveland, at the time of the of that original negative assessment that the prob-
crime. But I might then begin to ask myself whether lem I am interested in arises. I call the assessment
that is really something that I know. I would reflect "negative" because by the end of his First
on the source of my belief, but reflection in this case Meditation Descartes finds that he has no good
need not involve a general scrutiny of everything I reason to believe anything about the world
take myself to know about the case. Re-examining around him and therefore that he can know noth-
the man's alibi and the credentials of its supporting ing of the external world.
witnesses might be enough to satisfy me. Indeed How is that assessment conducted, and how
I might find that its reliability on those counts is closely does it parallel the familiar kind of review
precisely what I had been going on all along. of our knowledge that we all know how to conduct
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 9

in everyday life? The question in one form or the addition of the number one to a given number;
another will be with us for the rest of this book. It I would still have to do the same for the addition
is the question of what exactly the problem of our of two, and then the addition of three, and so on.
knowledge of the external world amounts to, and And even that would exhaust only my beliefs
how it arises with its special philosophical charac- about addition; all my other mathematical beliefs,
ter. The source of the problem is to be found not to mention all the rest of my knowledge,
somewhere within or behind the kind of thinking would remain so far unexamined. Obviously the
Descartes engages in. job cannot be done piecemeal, one by one. Some
One way Descartes's question about his knowl- method must be found for assessing large classes
edge differs from the everyday examples I consid- of beliefs all at once.
ered is in being concerned with everything he One way to do this would be to look for
believes or takes to be true. How does one go common sources or channels or bases of our
about assessing all of one's knowledge all at once? beliefs, and then to examine the reliability of
I was able to list a few of the things I believe about those sources or bases, just as I examined the
the common cold and then to ask about each of source or basis of my belief that the suspect was
them whether I really know it, and if so how. But in Cleveland. Descartes describes such a search as
although I can certainly list a number of the a search for "principles" of human knowledge,
things I believe, and I would assent to many more "principles" whose general credentials he can
of them as soon as they were put to me, there then investigate (HR, 145). If some "principles"
obviously is no hope of assessing everything I are found to be involved in all or even most of our
believe in this piecemeal way. For one thing, it knowledge, an assessment of the reliability of
probably makes no sense, strictly speaking, to talk those "principles" could be an assessment of all or
of the number of things one believes. If I am most of our knowledge. If I found good reason to
asked whether it is one of my beliefs that I went to doubt the reliability of the suspect's alibi, for
see a film last night I can truly answer "Yes". If I example, and that was all I had to go on in my
were asked whether it is one of my beliefs that belief that he was in Cleveland, then what I earlier
I went to the movies last night I would give the took to be my knowledge that he was in Cleveland
same answer. Have I thereby identified two, or would have been found wanting or called into
only one, of my beliefs? How is that question ever question. Its source or basis would have been
to be settled? If we say that I identified only one of undermined. Similarly, if one of the "principles"
my beliefs, it would seem that I must also be said or bases on which all my knowledge of the world
to hold the further belief that going to see a film depends were found to be unreliable, my knowl-
and going to the movies are one and the same edge of the world would to that extent have been
thing. So we would have more than one belief found wanting or called into question as well.
after all. The prospects of arriving even at a prin- Are there any important "principles" of human
ciple for counting beliefs, let alone at an actual knowledge in Descartes's sense? It takes very little
number of them, seem dim. reflection on the human organism to convince us
Even if it did make sense to count the things of the importance of the senses - sight, hearing,
we believe it is pretty clear that the number would touch, taste, and smell. Descartes puts the point
be indefinitely large and so an assessment of our most strongly when he says that "all that up to the
beliefs one by one could never be completed present time I have accepted as most true and
anyway. This is easily seen by considering only certain I have learned either from the senses or
some of the simplest things one knows, for through the senses" (HR, 145). Exactly what he
example in arithmetic. One thing I know is that would include under "the senses" here is perhaps
one plus one equals two. Another thing I know is somewhat indeterminate, but even if it is left
that one plus two is three, and another, that one vague many philosophers would deny what
plus three is four. Obviously there could be no Descartes appears to be saying. They would hold
end to the task of assessing my knowledge if I had that, for example, the mathematical knowledge I
to investigate separately the source of each one of mentioned earlier is not and could not be acquired
my beliefs in that series. And even if I succeeded I from the senses or through the senses, so not every-
would only have assessed the things I know about thing I know is known in that way. Whether
10 BARRY STROUD

Descartes is really denying the views of those who really are a certain way, I might still be wrong.
believe in the non-sensory character of mathe- We have all found at one time or another that we
matical knowledge, and whether, if he were, he have been misled by appearances; we know that
would be right, are issues we can set aside for the the senses are not always reliable. Should we not
moment. It is clear that the senses are at least very conclude, then, that as a general source of know1-
important for human knowledge. Even restrict- edge the senses are not to be trusted? As Descartes
ing ourselves to the traditional five senses we can puts it, is it not wiser never "to trust entirely to
begin to appreciate their importance by reflect- any thing by which we have once been deceived"
ing on how little someone would ever come to (HR, 145)? Don't we have here a quite general
know without them. A person blind and deaf way of condemning as not fully reliable all of our
from birth who also lacked taste buds and a sense beliefs acquired by means of the senses?
of smell would know very little about anything, I think the answer to that question is "No, we
no matter how long he lived. To imagine him also do not", and I think Descartes would agree with
anaesthetized or without a sense of touch is per- that answer. It is true that he does talk of the
haps to stretch altogether too far one's conception senses "deceiving" us on particular occasions, and
of a human organism, or at least a human organ- he does ask whether that is not enough to con-
ism from whom we can hope to learn something demn the senses in general as a source of knowl-
about human knowledge. The importance of the edge, but he immediately reminds us of the
senses as a source or channel of knowledge seems obvious fact that the circumstances in which the
undeniable. It seems possible, then, to acknowl- senses "deceive" us might be special in certain
edge their importance and to assess the reliability ascertainable ways, and so their occasional fail-
of that source, quite independently of the difficult ures would not support a blanket condemnation
question of whether all our knowledge comes to of their reliability.
us in that way. We would then be assessing the Sometimes, to give an ancient example, a
credentials of what is often called our "sensory" or tower looks round from a distance when it is
"experiential" or "expirical" knowledge, and that, actually square. If we relied only on the appear-
as we shall see, is quite enough to be going on with. ances of the moment we might say that the dis-
Having found an extremely important "prin- tant tower is round, and we would be wrong. We
ciple" or source of our knowledge, how can we also know that there are many small organisms
investigate or assess all the knowledge we get from invisible to the naked eye. If the table before me is
that source? As before, we are faced with the prob- covered with such organisms at the moment but
lem of the inexhaustibility of the things we believe I look at it and say there is nothing on the table at
on that basis, so no piecemeal, one-by-one proce- all, once again I will be wrong. But all that follows
dure will do. But perhaps we can make a sweeping from these familiar facts, as Descartes points out,
negative assessment. It might seem that as soon as is that there are things about which we can be
we have found that the senses are one of the wrong, or there are situations in which we can get
sources of our beliefs we are immediately in a false beliefs, if we rely entirely on our senses at
position to condemn all putative knowledge that moment. So sometimes we should be careful
derived from them. Some philosophers appear to about what we believe on the basis of the senses,
have reasoned in this way, and many have even or sometimes perhaps we should withhold our
supposed that Descartes is among them. The idea assent from any statement about how things are -
is that if I am assessing the reliability of my beliefs when things are too far away to be seen properly,
and asking whether I really know what I take for example, or too small to be seen at all. But that
myself to know, and I come across a large class of obviously is not enough to support the policy of
beliefs which have come to me through the senses, never trusting one's senses, or never believing
I can immediately dismiss all those beliefs as anything based on them. Nor does it show that I
unreliable or as not amounting to knowledge can never know anything by means of the senses.
because of the obvious fact that I can sometimes If my car starts promptly every morning for two
be wrong in my beliefs based on the senses. Things years in temperate weather at sea level but then
are not always as they appear, so if on the basis of fails to start one morning in freezing weather at
the way they appear to me I believe that they the top of a high mountain, that does not support
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 11

the policy of never trusting my car to start again position any of us can ever be in for knowing
once I return to the temperate lower altitude from things about the world around us on the basis of
which I so foolishly took it. Nor does it show that the senses. What is true of a representative case, if
I can never know whether my car will ever start it is truly representative and does not depend on
again. It shows only that there are certain circum- special peculiarities of its own, can legitimately
stances in which my otherwise fully reliable car support a general conclusion. A demonstration
might not start. So the fact that we are sometimes that a particular isosceles triangle has a certain
wrong or "deceived" in our judgements based on property, for example, can be taken as a demon-
the senses is not enough in itself to show that the stration that all isosceles triangles have that prop-
senses are never to be trusted and are therefore erty, as long as the original instance was typical or
never reliable as a source of knowledge. representative of the whole class. Whether
Descartes's negative assessment of all of his Descartes's investigation of the general reliability
sensory knowledge does not depend on any such of the senses really does follow that familiar pat-
reasoning. He starts his investigation, rather, in tern is a difficult question. Whether, or in pre-
what would seem to be the most favourable con- cisely what sense, the example he considers can be
ditions for the reliable operation of the senses as a treated as representative of our relation to the
source of knowledge. While engaging in the very world around us is, I believe, the key to under-
philosophical reflections he is writing about in standing the problem of our knowledge of the
his First Meditation Descartes is sitting in a warm external world. But if it turns out that there is
room, by the fire, in a dressing gown, with a piece nothing illegitimate about the way his negative
of paper in his hand. He finds that although he conclusion is reached, the problem will be prop-
might be able to doubt that a distant tower that erlyposed.
looks round really is round, it seems impossible For the moment I think at least this much can
to doubt that he really is sitting there by the fire in be said about Descartes's reasoning. He chooses
his dressing gown with a piece of paper in his the situation in which he finds himself as repre-
hand. The fire and the piece of paper are not too sentative of the best position we can be in for
small or too far away to be seen properly, they are knowing things about the world in the sense that,
right there before his eyes; it seems to be the best if it is impossible for him in that position to know
kind of position someone could be in for getting that he is sitting by the fire with a piece of paper in
reliable beliefs or knowledge by means of the his hand then it is also impossible for him in other
senses about what is going on around him. That situations to know anything about the world
is just how Descartes regards it. Its being a best- around him on the basis of his senses. A negative
possible case of that kind is precisely what he verdict in the chosen case would support a nega-
thinks enables him to investigate or assess at one tiveverdict everywhere else. The example Descartes
fell swoop all our sensory knowledge of the world considers is in that sense meant to be the best kind
around us. The verdict he arrives at about his of case there could be of sensory knowledge about
putative knowledge that he is sitting by the fire the world around us. I think we must admit that it
with a piece of paper in his hand in that particu- is very difficult to see how Descartes or anyone
lar situation serves as the basis for a completely else could be any better off with respect to know-
general assessment of the senses as a source of ing something about the world around him on the
knowledge about the world around us. basis of the senses than he is in the case he consid-
How can that be so? How can he so easily reach ers. But if no one could be in any better position
a general verdict about all his sensory knowledge for knowing, it seems natural to conclude that any
on the basis of a single example? Obviously not negative verdict arrived at about this example, any
simply by generalizing from one particular exam- discovery that Descartes's beliefs in this case are
ple to all cases of sensory knowledge, as one might not reliable or do not amount to knowledge, could
wildly leap to a conclusion about all red-haired safely be generalized into a negative conclusion
men on the basis of one or two individuals. about all of our sensory "knowledge" of the world.
Rather, he takes the particular example of his If candidates with the best possible credentials
conviction that he is sitting by the fire with a piece are found wanting, all those with less impressive
of paper in his hand as representative of the best credentials must fall short as well.
12 BARRY STROUD

It will seem at first sight that in conceding that With this thought, if he is right, Descartes has
the whole question turns on whether Descartes lost the whole world. He knows what he is experi-
knows in this particular case we are conceding encing, he knows how things appear to him, but
very little; it seems obvious that Descartes on that he does not know whether he is in fact sitting by
occasion does know what he thinks he knows the fire with a piece of paper in his hand. It is, for
about the world around him. But in fact Descartes him, exactly as if he were sitting by the fire with a
finds that he cannot know in this case that he is piece of paper in his hand, but he does not know
sitting by the fire with a piece of paper in his whether there really is a fire or a piece of paper
hand. If the case is truly representative of our sen- there or not; he does not know what is really hap-
sory knowledge in general, that will show that no pening in the world around him. He realizes that
one can know anything about the world around if everything he can ever learn about what is hap-
us. But how could he ever arrive at that negative pening in the world around him comes to him
verdict in the particular case he considers? How through the senses, but he cannot tell by means of
could anyone possibly doubt in such a case that the senses whether or not he is dreaming, then all the
the fire and the piece of paper are there? The sensory experiences he is having are compatible
paper is in Descartes's hand, the fire is right there with his merely dreaming of a world around him
before his open eyes, and he feels its warmth. while in fact that world is very different from the
Wouldn't anyone have to be mad to deny that he way he takes it to be. That is why he thinks he
can know something about what is going on must find some way to tell that he is not dream-
around him in those circumstances? Descartes ing. Far from its being mad to deny that he knows
first answers "Yes". He says that if he were to in this case, he thinks his recognition of the pos-
doubt or deny on that occasion that he is sitting sibility that he might be dreaming gives him "very
by the fire with a piece of paper in his hand he powerful and maturely considered" (HR, 148)
would be no less mad than those paupers who reasons for withholding his judgement about how
say they are kings or those madmen who think things are in the world around him. He thinks it is
they are pumpkins or are made of glass. But his eminently reasonable to insist that ifhe is to know
reflections continue: that he is sitting by the fire he must know that he
is not dreaming that he is sitting by the fire. That
At the same time I must remember that I am a is seen as a necessary condition of knowing some-
man, and that consequently I am in the habit of thing about the world around him. And he finds
sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself that that condition cannot be fulfilled. On careful
the same things or sometimes even less probable reflection he discovers that "there are no certain
things, than do those who are insane in their indications by which we may clearly distinguish
waking moments. How often has it happened to wakefulness from sleep': He concludes that he
me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself knows nothing about the world around him
in this particular place, that I was dressed and because he cannot tell that he is not dreaming; he
seated near the fire, whilst in reality I was lying cannot fulfil one of the conditions necessary for
undressed in bed! At this moment it does indeed
knowing something about the world.
seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am
The Cartesian problem of our knowledge of the
looking at this paper; that this head which I move
external world therefore becomes: how can we know
is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set pur-
anything about the world around us on the basis of
pose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what
the senses if the senses give us only what Descartes
happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so
distinct as does all this. But in thinking over this I says they give us? What we gain through the senses
remind myself that on many occasions I have in is on Descartes's view only information that is com-
sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in patible with our dreaming things about the world
dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so mani- around us and not knowing anything about the
festly that there are no certain indications by world. How then can we know anything about the
which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness world by means of the senses? The Cartesian argu-
from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my ment presents a challenge to our knowledge, and
astonishment is such that it is almost capable of the problem of our knowledge of the external world
persuading me that I now dream. (HR, 145-6) is to show how that challenge can be met.
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 13

When I speak here of the Cartesian argument they accept it. There seems to me no doubt about
or of Descartes's sceptical conclusion or of his the force and the fascination - I would say the
negative verdict about his knowledge I refer of almost overwhelming persuasiveness - of his
course only to the position he finds himself in by reflections. That alone is something that needs
the end of his First Meditation. Having at that accounting for. I cannot possibly do justice to all
point discovered and stated the problem of the reasonable reactions to them here. In the rest of
external world, Descartes goes on in the rest of his this chapter I want to concentrate on deepening
Meditations to try to solve it, and by the end of the and strengthening the problem and trying to
Sixth Meditation he thinks he has explained how locate more precisely the source of its power.
he knows almost all those familiar things he began There are at least three distinct questions that
by putting in question. So when I ascribe to could be pressed. Is the possibility that Descartes
Descartes the view that we can know nothing might be dreaming really a threat to his knowl-
about the world around us I do not mean to sug- edge of the world around him? Is he right in
gest that that is his final and considered view; it is thinking that he must know that he is not dream-
nothing more than a conclusion he feels almost ing if he is to know something about the world
inevitably driven to at the early stages of his around him? And is he right in his "discovery"
reflections. But those are the only stages of his that he can never know that he is not dreaming? If
thinking I am interested in here. That is where the Descartes were wrong on any of these points it
philosophical problem of our knowledge of the might be possible to avoid the problem and per-
external world gets posed, and before we can con- haps even to explain without difficulty how we
sider possible solutions we must be sure we know things about the world around us.
understand exactly what the problem is. On the first question, it certainly seems right
I have described it as that of showing or to say that if Descartes were dreaming that he is
explaining how knowledge of the world around sitting by the fire with a piece of paper in his hand
us is possible by means of the senses. It is impor- he would not then know that he is sitting by the
tant to keep in mind that that demand for an fire with a piece of paper in his hand. When you
explanation arises in the face of a challenge or dream that something is going on in the world
apparent obstacle to our knowledge of the world. around you you do not thereby know that it is.
The possibility that he is dreaming is seen as an Most often, of course, what we dream is not even
obstacle to Descartes's knowing that he is sitting true; no one is actually chasing us when we are
by the fire, and it must be explained how that lying asleep in bed dreaming, nor are we actually
obstacle can either be avoided or overcome. It climbing stairs. But although usually what we
must be shown or explained how it is possible for dream is not really so, that is not the real reason
us to know things about the world, given that the for our lack of knowledge. Even if Descartes were
sense-experiences we get are compatible with our in fact sitting by the fire and actually had a piece
merely dreaming. Explaining how something is of paper in his hand at the very time he was
nevertheless possible, despite what looks like an dreaming that he is sitting by the fire with a piece
obstacle to it, requires more than showing merely of paper in his hand, he would not thereby know
that there is no impossibility involved in the he was sitting there with that paper. He would be
thing - that it is consistent with the principles of like a certain Duke of Devonshire who, according
logic and the laws of nature and so in that sense to G. E. Moore, once dreamt he was speaking in
could exist. The mere possibility of the state of the House of Lords and woke up to find that he
affairs is not enough to settle the question of how was speaking in the House of Lords. 4 What he
our knowledge of the world is possible; we must was dreaming was in fact so. But even if what you
understand how the apparent obstacle is to be are dreaming is in fact so you do not thereby
got round. know that it is. Even if we allow that when you are
Descartes's reasoning can be examined and dreaming that something is so you can be said, at
criticized at many different points, and has been least for the time being, to think or to believe that
closely scrutinized by many philosophers for cen- it is so, there is still no real connection between
turies. It has also been accepted by many, perhaps your thinking or believing what you do and its
by more than would admit or even realize that being so. At best you have a thought or a belief
14 BARRY STROUD

which just happens to be true, but that is no might be a physicist who knows a great deal about
more than coincidence and not knowledge. So the way things are which the child does not know.
Descartes's first step relies on what seems to be an If the man also dreams that things are that way he
undeniable fact about dreams: if you are dream- can once again be said to be dreaming that some-
ing that something is so you do not thereby know thing is so and also to know that it is so. There is
that it is so. therefore no incompatibility between dreaming
This bald claim needs to be qualified and more and knowing. That is true, but I do not think it
carefully explained, but I do not think that will affects Descartes's argument. He is led to consider
diminish the force of the point for Descartes's how he knows he is not dreaming at the moment
purposes. Sometimes what is going on in the by reflecting on how he knows at that moment
world around us has an effect on what we dream; that he is sitting by the fire with a piece of paper
for example, a banging shutter might actually in his hand. If he knows that at all, he thinks, he
cause me to dream, among other things, that a knows it on the basis of the senses. But he real-
shutter is banging. If my environment affects me izes that his having the sensory experiences he is
in that way, and if in dreams I can be said to think now having is compatible with his merely dream-
or believe that something is so, would I not in that ing that he is sitting by the fire with a piece of
case know that a shutter is banging? It seems to paper in his hand. So he does not know on the
me that I would not, but I confess it is difficult to basis of the sensory experiences he is having at
say exactly why I think so. That is probably the moment that he is sitting by the fire. Nor, of
because it is difficult to say exactly what is required course, did the man in my examples know the
for knowledge. We use the term "know" confi- things he was said to know on the basis of the sen-
dently, we quite easily distinguish cases of knowl- sory experiences he was having at that moment.
edge from cases of its absence, but we are not He knew certain things to be so, and he was
always in a position to state what we are going on dreaming those things to be so, but in dreaming
in applying or withholding the term in the ways them he did not thereby know them to be so.
we do. I think that in the case of the banging shut- But as long as we allow that the sleeping man
ter it would not be knowledge because I would be does know certain things about the world around
dreaming, I would not even be awake. At least it him, even if he does not know them on the basis
can be said, I think, that even if Descartes's sitting of the very dreams he is having at the moment,
by the fire with a piece of paper in his hand (like isn't that enough to show that Descartes must
the banging shutter) is what in fact causes him to nevertheless be wrong in his conclusion that no
dream that he is sitting by the fire with a piece of one can know anything about the world around
paper in his hand, that is still no help to him in him? No. It shows at most that we were hasty or
coming to know what is going on in the world were ignoring Descartes's conclusion in conced-
around him. He realizes that he could be dream- ing that someone could know something about
ing that he is sitting by the fire even if he is in fact the world around him. If Descartes's reasoning is
sitting there, and that is the possibility he finds he correct the dreaming physicist, even when he is
has to rule out. awake, does not really know any of the things we
I have said that if you are dreaming that some- were uncritically crediting him with knowing
thing is so you do not thereby know that it is so, about the way things are - or at least he does not
and it might seem as if that is not always true. know them on the basis of the senses. In order to
Suppose a man and a child are both sleeping. I say know them on the basis of the senses there would
of the child that it is so young it does not know have to have been at least some time at which he
what seven times nine is, whereas the grown man knew something about what was going on around
does know that. If the man happens at that very him at that time. But if Descartes is right he could
moment to be dreaming that seven times nine is not have known any such thing unless he had
sixty-three (perhaps he is dreaming that he is established that he was not dreaming at that time;
computing his income tax), then he is a man who and according to Descartes he could never estab-
is dreaming that something is so and also knows lish that. So the fact about dreams that Descartes
that it is so. The same kind of thing is possible relies on - that one who dreams that something is
for knowledge about the world around him. He so does not thereby know that it is so - is enough
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 15

to yield his conclusion if the other steps of his it is very plausible to say that there is nothing we
reasoning are correct. could not dream about, nothing that could be the
When he first introduces the possibility that case that we could not dream to be the case. I say
he might be dreaming Descartes seems to be rely- it is very plausible; of course I cannot prove it to
ing on some knowledge about how things are or be true. But even if it is not true with complete
were in the world around him. He says "I remind generality, we must surely grant that it is possible
myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been to dream that one is sitting by a fire with a piece
deceived by similar illusions", so he seems to be of paper in one's hand, and possible to dream of
relying on some knowledge to the effect that he countless other equally obvious and equally mun-
has actually dreamt in the past and that he remem- dane states of affairs as well, and those possibili-
bers having been "deceived" by those dreams. That ties are what Descartes sees as threatening to his
is more than he actually needs for his reflections knowledge of the world around him.
about knowledge to have the force he thinks they There seems little hope, then, of objecting that
have. He does not need to support his judgement it is simply not possible for Descartes to dream
that he has actually dreamt in the past. The only that he is sitting by the fire with a piece of paper
thought he needs is that it is now possible for him in his hand. Nor is it any more promising to say
to be dreaming that he is sitting by the fire, and that even if he were dreaming it would not follow
that if that possibility were realized he would not that he did not know that he was sitting there.
know that he is sitting by the fire. Of course it was I think both those steps or assumptions of
no doubt true that Descartes had dreamt in the Descartes's reasoning are perfectly correct, and
past and that his knowledge that he had done so further defence of them at this stage is unneces-
was partly what he was going on in acknowledg- sary. If his argument and the problem to which it
ing the possibility of his dreaming on this partic- gives rise are to be avoided, it might seem that the
ular occasion. But neither the fact of past dreams best hope is therefore to accept his challenge and
nor knowledge of their actual occurrence would show that it can be met. That would be in effect to
seem to be strictly required in order to grant what argue that Descartes's alleged "discovery" is no
Descartes relies on - the possibility of dreaming, discovery at all: we can sometimes know that we
and the absence of knowledge if that possibility are not dreaming.
were realized. The thought that he might be This can easily seem to be the most straight-
dreaming that he is sitting by the fire with a piece forward and most promising strategy. It allows
of paper in his hand, and the fact that if he were that Descartes is right in thinking that knowing
he wouldn't know he was sitting there, is what that one is not dreaming is a condition of know-
gives Descartes pause. That would worry him in ing something about the world around us, but
the way it does even if he had never actually had wrong in thinking that that condition can never
any dreams exactly like it in the past - if he had be met. And that certainly seems plausible. Surely
never dreamt about fires and pieces of paper at it is not impossible for me to know that I am not
all. In fact, I think he need never have actually dreaming? Isn't that something I often know, and
dreamt of anything before, and certainly needn't isn't it something I can sometimes find out if the
know that he ever has, in order to be worried in question arises? If it is, then the fact that I must
the way he is by the thought that he might be know that I am not dreaming if I am to know
dreaming now. anything about the world around me will be no
The fact that the possibility of dreaming is all threat to my knowledge of the world.
Descartes needs to appeal to brings out another However obvious and undeniable it might be
truth about dreams that his argument depends that we often do know that we are not dreaming,
on - that anything that can be going on or that I think this straightforward response to Descartes's
one can experience in one's waking life can also challenge is a total failure. In calling it straightfor-
be dreamt about. This again is only a statement of ward I mean that it accepts Descartes's conditions
possibility - no sensible person would suggest for knowledge of the world and tries to show that
that we do at some time dream of everything that they can be fulfilled. That is what I think cannot
actually happens to us, or that everything we be done. To put the same point in another way:
dream about does in fact happen sometime. But I think Descartes would be perfectly correct in
16 BARRY STROUD

saying "there are no certain indications by which of knowing something about the world around us
we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from on the basis of the senses. Since he thinks the pos-
sleep", and so we could never tell we are not sibility of his dreaming must be ruled out in the
dreaming, ifhe were also right that knowing that case he considers, and the case he considers is
one is not dreaming is a condition of knowing regarded as typical and without special character-
something about the world around us. That is istics of its own, he thinks that the possibility that
why I think one cannot accept that condition and he is dreaming must be ruled out in every case of
then go on to establish that one is not dreaming. knowing something about the world by means of
I do not mean to be saying simply that Descartes the senses.
is right - that we can never know that we are not If that really is a condition of knowing some-
dreaming. But I do want to argue that either we thing about the world, I think it can be shown
can never know that we are not dreaming or else that Descartes is right in holding that it can
what Descartes says is a condition of knowing never be fulfilled. That is what the straightfor-
things about the world is not really a condition in ward response denies, and that is why I think
general of knowing things about the world. The that response must be wrong. We cannot accept
straightforward strategy denies both alternatives. the terms of Descartes's challenge and then hope
I will try to explain why I think we must accept to meet it.
one alternative or the other. Suppose Descartes tries to determine that he is
When Descartes asks himself how he knows not dreaming in order to fulfil what he sees as a
that he is sitting by the fire with a piece of paper necessary condition of knowing that he is sitting
in his hand why does he immediately go on to ask by the fire with a piece of paper in his hand. How
himself how he knows he is not dreaming that he is he to proceed? He realizes that his seeing his
is sitting by the fire with a piece of paper in his hand and seeing and feeling a piece of paper
hand? I have suggested that it is because he recog- before him and feeling the warmth of the fire - in
nizes that ifhe were dreaming he would not know fact his getting all the sensory experiences or all
on the basis of his senses at the moment that he is the sensory information he is then getting - is
sitting there, and so he thinks he must know that something that could be happening even if he
that possibility does not obtain if he is to know were dreaming. To establish that he is not dream-
that he is in fact sitting there. But this particular ing he would therefore need something more
example was chosen, not for any peculiarities it than just those experiences or that information
might be thought to possess, but because it could alone. He would also need to know whether those
be taken as typical of the best position we can experiences and that information are reliable, not
ever be in for coming to know things about the merely dreamt. If he could find some operation
world around us on the basis of the senses. What or test, or if he could find some circumstance or
is true of this case that is relevant to Descartes's state of affairs, that indicated to him that he was
investigation of knowledge is supposed to be true not dreaming, perhaps he could then fulfil the
of all cases of knowledge of the world by means condition - he could know that he was not dream-
of the senses; that is why the verdict arrived at ing. But how could a test or a circumstance or a
here can be taken to be true of our sensory state of affairs indicate to him that he is not dream-
knowledge generally. But what Descartes thinks ing if a condition of knowing anything about the
is true of this particular case of sensory knowl- world is that he know he is not dreaming? It could
edge of the world is that he must know he is not not. He could never fulfil the condition.
dreaming if he is to know that he is sitting by the Let us suppose that there is in fact some test
fire with a piece of paper in his hand. That is which a person can perform successfully only if
required, not because of any peculiarities of this he is not dreaming, or some circumstance or state
particular case, but presumably because, accord- of affairs which obtains only if that person is not
ing to Descartes, it is a necessary condition of any dreaming. Of course for that test or state of affairs
case - even a best possible case - of knowledge of to be of any use to him Descartes would have to
the world by means of the senses. That is why I know of it. He would have to know that there is
ascribed to Descartes the quite general thesis that such a test or that there is a state of affairs that
knowing that one is not dreaming is a condition shows that he is not dreaming; without such
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 17

information he would be no better off for telling successfully or that he established that the state of
that he is not dreaming than he would be if there affairs obtains. How could that in turn be known?
were no such test or state of affairs at all. To have Obviously the particular test or state of affairs
acquired that information he would at some already in question cannot serve as a guarantee of
time have to have known more than just some- its own authenticity, since it might have been
thing about the course of his sensory experience, merely dreamt, so some further test or state of
since the connection between the performance of affairs would be needed to indicate that the origi-
a certain test, or between a certain state of affairs, nal test was actually performed and not merely
and someone's not dreaming is not itself just a dreamt, or that the state of affairs in question was
fact about the course of that person's sensory actually ascertained to obtain and not just dreamt
experience; it is a fact about the world beyond his to obtain. But this further test or state of affairs is
sensory experiences. Now strictly speaking if it is subject to the same general condition in turn.
a condition of knowing anything about the world Every piece of knowledge that goes beyond one's
beyond one's sensory experiences that one know sensory experiences requires that one know one is
that one is not dreaming, there is an obvious not dreaming. This second test or state of affairs
obstacle to Descartes's ever having got the infor- will therefore be of use only if Descartes knows
mation he needs about that test or state of affairs. that he is not merely dreaming that he is perform-
He would have to have known at some time that ing or ascertaining it, since merely to dream that
he was not dreaming in order to get the informa- he had established the authenticity of the first test
tion he needs to tell at any time that he is not is not to have established it. And so on. At no
dreaming - and that cannot be done. point can he find a test for not dreaming which he
But suppose we forget about this difficulty can know has been successfully performed or a
and concede that Descartes does indeed know state of affairs correlated with not dreaming
(somehow) that there is a test or circumstance or which he can know obtains. He can therefore
state of affairs that unfailingly indicates that he is never fulfil what Descartes says is a necessary
not dreaming. Still, there is an obstacle to his ever condition of knowing something about the world
using that test or state of affairs to tell that he is around him. He can never know that he is not
not dreaming and thereby fulfilling the condition dreaming.
for knowledge of the world. The test would have I must emphasize that this conclusion is
to be something he could know he had performed reached only on the assumption that it is a condi-
successfully, the state of affairs would have to be tion of knowing anything about the world around
something he could know obtains. If he com- us on the basis of the senses that we know we are
pletely unwittingly happened to perform the test, not dreaming that the thing is so. I think it is his
or if the state of affairs happened to obtain but he acceptance of that condition that leads Descartes
didn't know that it did, he would be in no better to "see so manifestly that there are no certain
position for telling whether he was dreaming than indications by which we may clearly distinguish
he would be if he had done nothing or did not wakefulness from sleep". And I think Descartes is
even know that there was such a test. But how is absolutely right to draw that conclusion, given
he to know that the test has been performed suc- what he thinks is a condition of knowledge of the
cessfully or that the state of affairs in question world. But all I have argued on Descartes's behalf
does in fact obtain? Anything one can experience (he never spells out his reasoning) is that we
in one's walking life can also be dreamt about; it is cannot both accept that condition of knowledge
possible to dream that one has performed a cer- and hope to fulfil it, as the straightforward
tain test or dream that one has established that a response hopes to do. And of course if one of the
certain state of affairs obtains. And, as we have necessary conditions of knowledge of the world
seen, to dream that something about the world can never be fulfilled, knowledge of the world
around you is so is not thereby to know that it is so. around us will be impossible.
In order to know that his test has been performed I think we have now located Descartes's reason
or that the state of affairs in question obtains for his negative verdict about sensory knowledge
Descartes would therefore have to establish that he in general. If we agree that he must know that he
is not merely dreaming that he performed the test is not dreaming if he is to know in his particular
18 BARRY STROUD

case that he is sitting by the fire with a piece of circumstances when nothing very important turns
paper in his hand, we must also agree that we can on the outcome, we cannot know a particular thing
know nothing about the world around us. unless we have ruled out certain possibilities that
Once we recognize that the condition Descartes we recognize are incompatible with our knowing
takes as necessary can never be fulfilled if he is that thing.
right in thinking it is indeed necessary, we are Suppose that on looking out the window I
naturally led to the question whether Descartes is announce casually that there is a goldfinch in the
right. Is it really a condition of knowing some- garden. If I am asked how I know it is a goldfinch
thing about the world that one know one is not and I reply that it is yellow, we all recognize that
dreaming? That is the second of the three ques- in the normal case that is not enough for knowl-
tions I distinguished. It is the one that has received edge. "For all you've said so far," it might be
the least attention. In asking it now I do not mean replied, "the thing could be a canary, so how do
to be going back on something I said earlier was you know it's a goldfinch?" A certain possibility
undeniably true, viz., that if one is dreaming that compatible with everything I have said so far has
something about the world is so one does not been raised, and if what I have said so far is all I
thereby know that it is so. That still seems to me have got to go on and I don't know that the thing
undeniable, but it is not the same as Descartes's in the garden is not a canary, then I do not know
assumption that one must know that one is not that there is a goldfinch in the garden. I must be
dreaming if one is to know something about the able to rule out the possibility that it is a canary if
world. The undeniable truth says only that you I am to know that it is a goldfinch. Anyone who
lack knowledge if you are dreaming; Descartes speaks about knowledge and understands what
says that you lack knowledge if you don't know others say about it will recognize this fact or con-
that you are not dreaming. Only with the stronger dition in particular cases.
assumption can his sceptical conclusion be In this example what is said to be possible is
reached. something incompatible with the truth of what I
Is that assumption true? In so far as we find claim to know - if that bird were a canary it would
Descartes's reasoning convincing, or even plausi- not be a goldfinch in the garden, but a canary.
ble, I think it is because we too on reflection find What I believe in believing it is a goldfinch would
that it is true. I said that not much attention had be false. But that is not the only way a possibility
been paid to that particular part of Descartes's can work against my knowledge. If I come to sus-
reasoning, and I think that too is because, as he pect that all the witnesses have conspired and
presents it, the step seems perfectly convincing made up a story about the man's being in
and so only other parts of the argument appear Cleveland that night, for example, and their testi-
vulnerable. Why is that so? Is it because Descartes's mony is all I have got to go on in believing that he
assumption is indeed true? Is there anything we was in Cleveland, I might find that I no longer
can do that would help us determine whether it is know whether he was there or not until I have
true or not? The question is important because I some reason to rule out my suspicion. If their tes-
have argued so far that if it is true we can never timony were all invented I would not know that
know anything about the world around us on the the man was in Cleveland. But strictly speaking
basis of the senses, and philosophical scepticism his being in Cleveland is not incompatible with
about the external world is correct. We would their making up a story saying he was. They might
have to find that conclusion as convincing or as have invented a story to protect him, whereas in
plausible as we find the assumption from which it fact, unknown to them, he was there all the time.
is derived. Such a complicated plot is not necessary to bring
Given our original favourable response to out the point; Moore's Duke of Devonshire is
Descartes's reasoning, then, it can scarcely be enough. From the fact that he was dreaming that he
denied that what I have called his assumption or was speaking in the House ofLords it did not follow
condition seems perfectly natural to insist on. that he was not speaking in the House of Lords. In
Perhaps it seems like nothing more than an instance fact he was. The possibility of dreaming - which
of a familiar commonplace about knowledge. We was actual in that case - did not imply the falsity
are all aware that, even in the most ordinary of what was believed. A possible deficiency in the
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 19

basis of my belief can interfere with my knowl- conditions? I have already said that it seems unde-
edge without itself rendering false the very thing I niable that it fulfils the first. If he were dreaming
believe. A hallucinogenic drug might cause me to Descartes would not know what he claims to
see my bed covered with a huge pile of leaves, for know. Someone who is dreaming does not thereby
example. s Having taken that drug, I will know the know anything about the world around him even
actual state of my bed only if I know that what I if the world around him happens to be just the
see is not just the effect of the drug; I must be able way he dreams or believes it to be. So his dream-
to rule out the possibility that I am hallucinating ing is incompatible with his knowing. But does it
the bed and the leaves. But however improbable it fulfil the second condition? Is it a possibility
might be that my bed is actually covered with which must be known not to obtain if Descartes
leaves, its not being covered with leaves does not is to know that he is sitting by the fire with a piece
follow from the fact that I am hallucinating that it of paper in his hand? I think it is difficult simply
is. What I am hallucinating could nevertheless be to deny that it is. The evident force of Descartes's
(unknown to me) true. But a goldfinch simply reasoning when we first encounter it is enough to
could not be a canary. So although there are two show that it certainly strikes us as a relevant pos-
different ways in which a certain possibility can sibility, as something that he should know not to
threaten my knowledge, it remains true that there obtain if he is to know where he is and what is
are always certain possibilities which must be happening around him.
known not to obtain if I am to know what I claim When that possibility strikes us as obviously
to know. relevant in Descartes's investigation we might
I think these are just familiar facts about come to think that it is because of a simple and
human knowledge, something we all recognize obvious fact about knowledge. In the case of the
and abide by in our thought and talk about know- goldfinch we immediately recognize that I must
ing things. We know what would be a valid chal- know that it is not a canary if I am to know it is a
lenge to a claim to know something, and we can goldfinch. And it is very natural to think that that
recognize the relevance and force of objections is simply because its being a canary is incompat-
made to our claims to know. The question before ible with its being a goldfinch. If it were a canary
us is to what extent Descartes's investigation of it would not be a goldfinch, and I would there-
his knowledge that he is sitting by the fire with a fore be wrong in saying that it is; so if I am to
piece of paper in his hand follows these recog- know it is a goldfinch I must rule out the possi-
nized everyday procedures for assessing claims to bility that it is a canary. The idea is that the two
know. If it does follow them faithfully, and yet conditions I distinguished in the previous para-
leads to the conclusion that he cannot know graph are not really separate after all. As soon as
where he is or what is happening around him, we we see that a certain possibility is incompatible
seem forced to accept his negative conclusion with our knowing such-and-such, it is suggested,
about knowledge in general just as we are forced we immediately recognize that it is a possibility
to accept the conclusion that I do not know it is a that must be known not to obtain if we are to
goldfinch or do not know the witness was in know the such-and-such in question. We see that
Cleveland because I cannot rule out the possibili- the dream-possibility satisfies that first condition
ties which must be ruled out if! am to know such in Descartes's case (if he were dreaming, he
things. Is Descartes's introduction of the possibil- wouldn't know), and that is why, according to
ity that he might be dreaming just like the intro- this suggestion, we immediately see that it is rel-
duction of the possibility that it might be a canary evant and must be ruled out. Something we all
in the garden or that the alibi might be contrived recognize about knowledge is what is said to
or that it might be a hallucination of my bed cov- make that obvious to us.
ered with leaves? But is the "simple and obvious fact about
Those possibilities were all such that if they knowledge" appealed to in this explanation really
obtained I did not know what I claimed to know, something that is true of human knowledge even
and they had to be known not to obtain in order in the most ordinary circumstances? What exactly
for the original knowledge-claim to be true. Does is the "fact" in question supposed to be? I have
Descartes's dream-possibility fulfil both of those described it so far, as applied to the case of the
20 BARRY STROUD

goldfinch, as the fact that if I know something p all those things that I know to be incompatible
(it's a goldfinch) I must know the falsity of all with p. Since I claim to know that the bird is a
those things incompatible with p (e.g., it's a goldfinch, and I know that its being a goldfinch
canary). If there were one of those things that I implies that it is not a canary, I must for that
did not know to be false, and it were in fact true, I reason know that it is not a canary if my original
would not know that p, since in that case some- claim is true. In claiming to know it is a goldfinch
thing incompatible with p would be true and so p I was, so to speak, committing myself to knowing
would not be true. But to say that I must know that it is not a canary, and I must honour my
that all those things incompatible with p are false commitments.
is the same as saying that I must know that truth This requirement as it stands, even if it does
of all those things that must be true if p is true. explain why I must know that the bird is not a
And it is extremely implausible to say that that is canary, does not account for the relevance of the
a "simple and obvious fact" we all recognize about other sorts of possibilities I have mentioned. The
human knowledge. reason in the goldfinch case was said to be that I
The difficulty is that there are no determinate know that its being a canary is incompatible with
limits to the number of things that follow from its being a goldfinch. But that will not explain
the things I already know. But it cannot be said why I must rule out the possibility that the wit-
that I now know all those indeterminately many nesses have invented a story about the man's
things, although they all must be true if the things being in Cleveland, or the possibility that I am
that I already know are true. Even granting that I hallucinating my bed covered with a pile ofleaves.
now know a great deal about a lot of different Nor will it explain why Descartes must rule out
things, my knowledge obviously does not extend the possibility that he is dreaming. What I claimed
to everything that follows from what I now know. to know in the first case is that the man was in
If it did, mathematics, to take only one example, Cleveland that night. But, as we saw earlier, it is
would be a great deal easier than it is - or else not a consequence of his being in Cleveland that
impossibly difficult. In knowing the truth of the no one will invent a story to the effect that he was
simple axioms of number theory, for example, I in Cleveland; they might mistakenly believe he
would thereby know the truth of everything that was not there and then tell what they think is a lie.
follows from them; every theorem of number Nor is it a consequence of my bed's being covered
theory would already be known. Or, taking the with leaves that I am not hallucinating that it is.
pessimistic side, since obviously no one does But we recognize that in order to know in those
know all the theorems of number theory, it would cases I nevertheless had to rule out those possi-
follow that no one even knows that those simple bilities. Similarly, as the Duke of Devonshire
axioms are true. reminds us, it is not a consequence of Descartes's
It is absurd to say that we enjoy or require such sitting by the fire with a piece of paper in his hand
virtual omniscience, so it is more plausible to that he is not dreaming that he is. So if it is obvi-
hold that the "simple and obvious fact" we all rec- ous to us that Descartes must know that he is not
ognize about knowledge is the weaker require- dreaming if he is to know that he is sitting by the
ment that we must know the falsity of all those fire, it cannot be simply because the possibility in
things that we know to be incompatible with the question is known to be incompatible with what
things we know. I know that a bird's being a he claims to know. It is not.
canary is incompatible with its being a goldfinch; If there is some "simple and obvious fact about
that is not some farflung, unknown consequence knowledge" that we recognize and rely on in
of its being a goldfinch, but something that responding to Descartes's reasoning it must there-
anyone would know who knew anything about fore be more complicated than what has been
goldfinches at all. And the idea is that that is why suggested so far. Reflecting even on the uncontro-
I must know that it is not a canary if I am to know versial everyday examples alone can easily lead us
that it is a goldfinch. Perhaps, in order to know to suppose that it is something like this: if some-
something, p, I do not need to know the falsity of body knows something, p, he must know the fal-
all those things that are incompatible with p, but sity of all those things incompatible with his
it can seem that at least I must know the falsity of knowing that p (or perhaps all those things he
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 21

knows to be incompatible with his knowing that day and scientific life. We have no notion of
pl. I will not speculate further on the qualifica- knowledge other than what is embodied in those
tions or emendations needed to make the princi- procedures and practices. So if that requirement
ple less implausible. The question now is whether is a "fact" of our ordinary conception of knowl-
it is our adherence to any such principle or edge we will have to accept the conclusion that no
requirement that is responsible for our recogni- one knows anything about the world around us.
tion that the possibility that the bird is a canary or
the possibility that the witnesses made up a story I now want to say a few more words about the
must be known not to obtain if I am to know the position we would all be in if Descartes's conclu-
things I said I knew in those cases. What exactly sion as he understands it were correct. I described
are the procedures or standards we follow in the him earlier as having lost the whole world, as
most ordinary, humdrum cases of putative knowing at most what he is experiencing or how
knowledge? Reflection on the source of Descartes's things appear to him, but knowing nothing about
sceptical reasoning has led to difficulties in how things really are in the world around him. To
describing and therefore in understanding even show how anyone in that position could come to
the most familiar procedures we follow in every- know anything about the world around him is
day life. That is one of the rewards of a study of what I am calling the problem of our knowledge
philosophical scepticism. of the external world, and it is worth dwelling for
The main difficulty in understanding our a moment on just how difficult a problem that
ordinary procedures is that no principle like those turns out to be if it has been properly raised.
I have mentioned could possibly describe the way If we are in the predicament Descartes finds
we proceed in everyday life. Or, to put it less dog- himself in at the end of his First Meditation we
matically, if our adherence to some such require- cannot tell by means of the senses whether we are
ment were responsible for our reactions in those dreaming or not; all the sensory experiences we
ordinary cases, Descartes would be perfectly cor- are having are compatible with our merely dream-
rect, and philosophical scepticism about the ing of a world around us while that world is in
external world would be true. Nobody would fact very different from the way we take it to be.
know anything about the world around us. If, in Our knowledge is in that way confined to our
order to know something, we must rule out a sensory experiences. There seems to be no way of
possibility which is known to be incompatible going beyond them to know that the world
with our knowing it, Descartes is perfectly right around us really is this way rather than that. Of
to insist that he must know that he is not dream- course we might have very strongly held beliefs
ing if he is to know that he is sitting by the fire about the way things are. We might even be unable
with a piece of paper in his hand. He knows his to get rid of the conviction that we are sitting by
dreaming is incompatible with his knowing. the fire holding a piece of paper, for example. But
I have already argued that if he is right in insisting if we acknowledge that our sensory experiences
that that condition must be fulfilled for knowl- are all we ever have to go on in gaining knowledge
edge of the world around us he is also right in about the world, and we acknowledge, as we must,
concluding that it can never be fulfilled; fulfilling that given our experiences as they are we could
it would require knowledge which itself would be nevertheless be simply dreaming of sitting by the
possible only if the condition were fulfilled. So fire, we must concede that we do not know that
both steps of Descartes's reasoning would be valid we are sitting by the fire. Of course, we are in no
and his conclusion would be true. position to claim the opposite either. We cannot
That conclusion can be avoided, it seems to conclude that we are not sitting by the fire; we
me, only if we can find some way to avoid the simply cannot tell which is the case. Our sensory
requirement that we must know we are not experience gives us no basis for believing one
dreaming if we are to know anything about the thing about the world around us rather than its
world around us. But that requirement cannot be opposite, but our sensory experience is all we
avoided if it is nothing more than an instance of a have got to go on. So whatever unshakeable con-
general procedure we recognize and insist on in viction we might nevertheless retain, that convic-
making and assessing knowledge-claims in every- tion cannot be knowledge. Even if we are in fact
22 BARRY STROUD

holding a piece of paper by the fire, so that what on in the world outside. For all he can know, what-
we are convinced of is in fact true, that true con- ever is producing the patterns he can see on the
viction is still not knowledge. The world around screens in front of him might be something other
us, whatever it might be like, is in that way beyond than well-function cameras directed on to the
our grasp. We can know nothing of how it is, no passing show outside the room. The victim might
matter what convictions, beliefs, or opinions we switch on more of the sets in the room to try to get
continue, perhaps inevitably, to hold about it. more information, and he might find that some of
What can we know in such a predicament? We the sets show events exactly similar or coherently
can perhaps know what sensory experiences we related to those already visible on the screens he
are having, or how things seem to us to be. At can see. But all those pictures will be no help to
least that much of our knowledge will not be him without some independent information,
threatened by the kind of attack Descartes makes some knowledge which does not come to him
on our knowledge of the world beyond our expe- from the pictures themselves, about how the pic-
riences. What we can know turns out to be a great tures he does see before him are connected with
deal less than we thought we knew before engag- what is going on outside the room. The problem
ing in that assessment of our knowledge. Our of the external world is the problem of finding
position is much more restricted, much poorer, out, or knowing how we could find out, about the
than we had originally supposed. We are confined world around us if we were in that sort of predica-
at best to what Descartes calls "ideas" of things ment. It is perhaps enough simply to put the
around us, representations of things or states of problem this way to convince us that it can never
affairs which, for all we can know, might or might be given a satisfactory solution.
not have something corresponding to them in But putting the problem this way, or only this
reality. We are in a sense imprisoned within those way, has its drawbacks. For one thing, it encour-
representations, at least with respect to our ages a facile dismissive response; not a solution to
knowledge. Any attempt to go beyond them to try the problem as posed, but a rejection of it. I do
and tell whether the world really is as they repre- not mean that we should not find a way to reject
sent it to be can yield only more representations, the problem - I think that is our only hope - but
more deliverances of sense experience which this particular response, I believe, is wrong, or
themselves are compatible with reality's being at the very least premature. It is derived almost
very different from the way we take it to be on the entirely from the perhaps overly dramatic descrip-
basis of our sensory experiences. There is a gap, tion of the predicament I have just given.
then, between the most that we can ever find out I have described Descartes's sceptical conclu-
on the basis of our sensory experience and the sion as implying that we are permanently sealed
way things really are. In knowing the one we do off from a world we can never reach. We are
not thereby know the other. restricted to the passing show on the veil of per-
This can seem to leave us in the position of ception, with no possibility of extending our
finding a barrier between ourselves and the world knowledge to the world beyond. We are confined
around us. There would then be a veil of sensory to appearances we can never know to match or to
experiences or sensory objects which we could not deviate from the imperceptible reality that is for-
penetrate but which would be no reliable guide to ever denied us. This way of putting it naturally
the world beyond the veil. If we were in such a encourages us to minimize the seriousness of the
position, I think it is quite clear that we could not predicament, to try to settle for what is undenia-
know what is going on beyond the veil. There bly available to us, or perhaps even to argue that
would be no possibility of our getting reliable sen- nothing that concerns us or makes human life
sory information about the world beyond the veil; worthwhile has been left out.
all such reports would simply be more representa- If an imperceptible "reality", as it is called on
tions, further ingredients of the evermore-com- this picture, is forever inaccessible to us, what
plicated veil. We would know nothing but the veil concern can it be of ours? How can something we
itself. We would be in the position of someone can have no contact with, something from which
waking up to find himselflocked in a room full of we are permanently sealed off, even make sense to
television sets and trying to find out what is going us at all? Why should we be distressed by an
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 23

alleged limitation of our knowledge if it is not reason. On the contrary; so far we have every
even possible for the "limitation" to be overcome? reason to think that Descartes has revealed the
If it makes no sense to aspire to anything beyond impossibility of the very knowledge of the world
what is possible for us, it will seem that we should that we are most interested in and which we began
give no further thought to this allegedly imper- by thinking we possess or can easily acquire. In
ceptible "reality': Our sensory experiences, past, any case, that would be the only conclusion to
present, and future, will then be thought to be all draw if Descartes's investigation does indeed par-
we are or should be concerned with, and the idea allel the ordinary kinds of assessments we make
of a "reality" lying beyond them necessarily out of of our knowledge in everyday life.
our reach will seem like nothing more than a phi- We saw that I can ask what I really know about
losopher's invention. What a sceptical philoso- the common cold, or whether I really know that
pher would be denying us would then be nothing the witness was in Cleveland on the night in ques-
we could have ordinary commerce with or inter- tion, and that I can go on to discover that I do not
est in anyway. Nothing distressing about our really know what I thought I knew. In such ordi-
ordinary position in the familiar world would nary cases there is no suggestion that what I have
have been revealed by a philosopher who simply discovered is that I lack some special, esoteric
invents or constructs something he calls "reality" thing called "real knowledge", or that I lack knowl-
or "the external world" and then demonstrates edge of some exotic, hitherto-unheard-of domain
that we can have no access to it. That would show called "reality". If I ask what I know about the
nothing wrong with the everyday sensory knowl- common cold, and I come to realize that I do not
edge we seek and think we find in ordinary life really know whether it can be caused by sitting in
and in scientific laboratories, nor would it show a draught or not, the kind of knowledge I discover
that our relation to the ordinary reality that con- I lack is precisely what I was asking about or
cerns us is different from what we originally taking it for granted I had at the outset. I do not
thought it to be. conclude with a shrug that it no longer matters
I think this reaction to the picture of our being because what I now find I lack is only knowledge
somehow imprisoned behind the veil of our own about a special domain called "reality" that was
sensory experiences is very natural and immedi- somehow invented only to serve as the inaccessi-
ately appealing. It is natural and perhaps always ble realm of something called "real knowledge".
advisable for a prisoner to try to make the best of I simply conclude that I don't really know whether
the restricted life behind bars. But however much colds are caused by sitting in draughts or not. If I
more bearable it makes the prospect of life- say in a jury-room on Monday that we can elimi-
imprisonment, it should not lead him to deny the nate the suspect because we know he was in
greater desirability, let alone the existence, of life Cleveland that night, and I then discover by
outside. In so far as the comfort of this response reflection on Tuesday that I don't really know he
to philosophical scepticism depends on such a was in Cleveland that night, what I am denying I
denial it is at the very least premature and is prob- have on Tuesday is the very thing I said on Monday
ably based on misunderstanding. It depends on a that I had.
particular diagnosis or account of how and why There is no suggestion in these and countless
the philosophical argument succeeds in reaching similar everyday cases that somehow in the course
its conclusion. The idea is that the "conclusion" is of our reflections on whether and how we know
reached only by contrivance. The inaccessible something we are inevitably led to change or ele-
"reality" denied to us is said to be simply an arte- vate our conception of knowledge into something
fact of the philosopher's investigation and not else called "real knowledge" which we showed no
something that otherwise should concern us. signs of being interested in at the beginning. Nor
That is partly a claim about how the philosophi- is it plausible to suggest that our ordinary assess-
cal investigation of knowledge works; as such, it ments of knowledge somehow lead us to postu-
needs to be explained and argued for. We can late a "reality" that is simply an artefact of our
draw no consolation from it until we have some inquiries about our knowledge. When we ask
reason to think it might be an accurate account of whether we really know something we are simply
what the philosopher does. So far we have no such asking whether we know that thing. The "really"
24 BARRY STROUD

signifies that we have had second thoughts on the Descartes is right, we know nothing of such
matter, or that we are subjecting it to more careful things. What we perceive and are in direct sensory
scrutiny, or that knowledge is being contrasted contact with is never a physical object or state of
with something else, but not that we believe in affairs, but only a representation - something that
something called "real knowledge" which is dif- could be just the way it is even if there were no
ferent from or more elevated than the ordinary objects at all of the sort it represents. So if we were
knowledge we are interested in. Knowing some- to settle for the realm of things we could have
thing differs from merely believing it or assuming knowledge about even if Descartes's conclusion
it or taking it for granted or simply being under were correct, we would not be settling for the
the impression that it is true, and so forth, so comfortable world with which we began. We
asking whether we really know something is would have lost all of that, at least as something
asking whether we know it as opposed to, for we can know anything about, and we would be
example, merely believing it or assuming it or restricted to facts about how things seem to us at
taking it for granted or simply being under the the moment rather than how they are.
impression that it is true. It might still be felt that after all nothing is cer-
If that is true of our ordinary assessments of tain in this changing world, so we should not
knowledge, and if Descartes's investigation of his aspire to firm truths about how things are. As
knowledge that he is sitting by the fire with a piece long as we know that all or most of us agree about
of paper in his hand is just like those ordinary how things seem to us, or have seemed to us up
cases, his discovery that he doesn't know in the till now, we might feel we have enough to give our
case he considers will have the same significance social, cultural, and intellectual life as much sta-
as it has in those ordinary cases. And if that exam- bility as we can reasonably expect or need. But
pIe is indeed representative of our knowledge of again this reaction does not really acknowledge
the world around us, the kind of knowledge we the poverty or restrictedness of the position
are shown to lack will be the very kind of knowl- Descartes's sceptical conclusion would leave each
edge we originally thought we had of things like of us in. Strictly speaking, there is no community
our sitting by the fire holding a piece of paper. of acting, experiencing and thinking persons I
Without a demonstration that Descartes's philo- can know anything about if Descartes is correct.
sophical investigation differs from our ordinary Other people, as I understand them, are not
assessments in some way that prevents its nega- simply sensory experiences of mine; they too, if
tive conclusion from having the kind of signifi- they exist, will therefore inhabit the unreachable
cance similar conclusions are rightly taken to world beyond my sensory experiences, along with
have in everyday life, we can derive no consola- the tables and chairs and other things about
tion from the ungrounded idea that the reality which I can know nothing. So at least with respect
from which he shows our knowledge is excluded to what I can know I could not console myself
does not or should not concern us anyway. It is with thoughts of a like-minded community of
the investigation of his everyday knowledge, and perceivers all working together and cheerfully
not merely the fanciful picture of a veil of percep- making do with what a communal veil of percep-
tion, that generates Descartes's negative verdict. tion provides. I would have no more reason to
But even if we did try to console ourselves believe that there are any other people than I have
with the thought that we can settle for what we to believe that I am now sitting in a chair writing.
can know on Descartes's account, how much con- The representations or sensory experiences to
solation could it give us? The position Descartes's which Descartes's conclusion would restrict my
argument says we are in is much worse than what knowledge could be no other than my own sen-
is contemplated in the optimistic response of sory experiences; there could be no communal
merely shrugging off any concern with an imper- knowledge even of the veil of perception itself. If
ceptible "reality". my own sensory experiences do not make it pos-
For one thing, we would not in fact be left with sible for me to know things about the world
what we have always taken to be the familiar around me they do not make it possible for me to
objects of our everyday experience - tables and know even whether there are any other sensory
chairs, trees and flowers, bread and wine. If experiences or any other perceiving beings at all.
 THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 25

The consequences of accepting Descartes's and that there can be no question of "accepting"
conclusion as it is meant to be understood are Descartes's conclusion at all. I have no wish to
truly disastrous. There is no easy way of accom- discourage such a reaction. I would only insist
modating oneself to its profound negative impli- that the alleged absurdity or unintelligibility must
cations. But perhaps by now we have come far be identified and made out. I think that is the
enough to feel that the whole idea is simply only way we can hope to learn whatever there is to
absurd, that ultimately it is not even intelligible, be learned from Descartes's investigation.

Notes

It has been argued that the problem in the E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (2 vols,
completely general form in which I discuss it New York, 1955), vol. I, p. 145. (Hereafter cited
here is new in Descartes, and that nothing as HR.)
exactly similar appears in philosophy before 3 See his Discourse on the Method of Rightly
that time. See M. F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Conducting Reason and Seeking Truth in the
Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Sciences in HR, pp. 81 ff.
Berkely Missed", The Philosophical Review 4 See G. E. Moore, "Certainty", this vol., ch. 4.
(1982). 5 A memorable example H. H. Price gave in
2 See the beginning of the first of his Meditations a lecture in 1962. It is my impression that
on First Philosophy in The Philosophical Price was reporting on an actual hallucination
Works of Descartes, edited and translated by of his.