US–Pakistan Relations

US foreign policy approaches from the end of the Cold War to 2001 is crucial to
understanding the years of strong US engagement with Pakistan that would
follow 9/11. This book explains Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s by
examining the role of the US in the shaping of Islamabad’s security goals.
Drawing upon a diverse range of oral history interviews as well as available
primary documents, the book explains the American contribution to Pakistani
security objectives during the presidency of Bill Clinton (1993–2001). The
author investigates and explains the dynamics that drove Islamabad’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons, its support for the Taliban and its approach towards the indi-
genous uprising in Indian-held Kashmir. She argues that Clinton’s foreign policy
contributed to the hardening of Islamabad’s security perspectives, creating space
for the Pakistani military establishment to pursue its regional security goals. The
book also discusses the argument that US–Pakistan relations during this period
were driven by a Cold War mindset, causing a fissure between US global and
Pakistan’s regional security goals. The Pakistani military and civilian leadership
utilized these divergent and convergent trends to protect Islamabad’s India-
centric strategic interests.
The book addresses a gap in the relevant literature and moves beyond the
available mono-causal explanations often distorted by a mixture of intellectual
obfuscation and political rhetoric. It adds a Pakistani perspective and is a valu-
able contribution to the study of US–Pakistan relations.

Talat Farooq is a Research Associate in the Institute of Conflict, Cooperation

and Security in the School of Government and Society at the University of
Birmingham, UK.
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US–Pakistan Relations
Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s

Talat Farooq
First published 2016
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Names: Farooq, Nasra Talat, author.
Title: US-Pakistan relations : Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s /
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Other titles: United States-Pakistan relations
Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge studies
in South Asian politics ; 6 | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016002124| ISBN 9781138952676 (hardback) |
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relations–1989-1993. | United States–Foreign relations–1993-2001.
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Contents

Interviewees vii

Introduction 1
Positioning and contribution 5
Book structure 5

1 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance: a historical

perspective 8
The key driver 10
Becoming the ‘most allied ally’ 11
Alliance contradictions and implications for PFP 14
PFP and the dynamics of convergence and divergence 20
Summary 28

2 Out in the cold: immediate post-Cold War catalysts

(1989–1993) 40
Replacing containment 41
Pakistan and Bush after the Soviet–Afghan conflict 45
Drifting apart 56
Summary 66

3 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan: reinforcing catalysts 83

Clinton and the triangular relationship 85
Clinton and Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions 92
The Clinton–Pakistan–Taliban connection 100
Summary 113

4 Coping mechanisms: Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s

foreign policy 132
The making of a policy 133
vi Contents
Survival of the ‘unwilling’ 144
Diplomatic efforts 155
Summary 160

Conclusion 172

Index 177
Interviewees

Sardar Assef Ahmad Ali, Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan in Benazir Bhut-
to’s Cabinet, 1993–1996 (Islamabad, 19 September 2011).
Dr Tahir Amin, Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, former Head of
the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University,
Islamabad and author (Islamabad, 12 July 2011).
Lt General Ali Jan Aurakzai (Retired), Commander XI Corps Western
Military Command 2001–2004 and former Governor of North West Fron-
tier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhawa), 2006–2008 (Rawalpindi, 4 August
2011).
Admiral Fasih Bokhari (Retired) Former Chief of Naval Staff, 1997–1999
(Islamabad, 15 July 2011).
General Mirza Aslam Beg (Retired) Former Chief of Army Staff, 1988–1991
(Rawalpindi, 2 July 2011).
Lt General Asad Durrani (Retired) Former Director General Inter-Services Intel-
ligence (ISI), 1990–1992 (Islamabad, 24 April 2012).
Lt General Hamid Gul (Retired) Former Director General Inter-Services Intelli-
gence (ISI) 1987–1989 (Rawalpindi, 13 July 2011).
Lt General Mumtaz Gul (Retired) Inspector General Frontier Corps, 1992–1994
and Commander XI Corps Western Military Command 1994–1996 (Pesha-
war, 19 October 2011).
General Ehsan-ul Haq (Retired) Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004–2007 and
Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 2001–2004 (Islamabad, 7
July 2011).
Siraj-ul-Haq Right-wing politician and chief of Jamaat-i-Islami (Peshawar, 19
October 2011).
Dr Riffat Hussain Head of the Defense and Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-
i-Azam University and former Press Counsellor, Pakistan Embassy Wash-
ington, DC 1933–1997 (Islamabad, 7 August 2011).
Zahid Hussain, Journalist and author (Islamabad, 21 July 2011).
Karl Inderfurth Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia in the Clinton Admin-
istration 1997–2001 (Telephonic Interview, 2 February 2012).
Dr Mohammad Islam Director Iqra University, Islamabad and Former Director
Area Study Centre, Quaid-i-Azam University (Islamabad, 12 July 2011).
viii Interviewees
Lt General Shahid Iqbal (Retired), Former Commander V Corps Karachi, Sec-
retary Defense Production and Former President National Defense Univer-
sity (Rawalpindi, 6 August 2011).
Seth G. Jones, Political scientist at the RAND Corporation and author (Tele-
phonic Interview, 15 February 2012).
Senator Afrasyab Khattak, Left-wing politician and former President of the
secular, nationalist Awami National Party (Peshawar, 18 October 2011).
Riaz Khokhar, Former ambassador to New Delhi 1992–1997 and to Washington
1997–1999, and Foreign Secretary 2002–2005 (Islamabad, 28 July 2011).
Michael Krepon, Arms Control official in the Clinton administration and Co-
founder of the Stimson Centre (Skype Interview, 3 February 2012).
Dennis Kux, Former US ambassador to Pakistan and author (Telephonic Inter-
view, 18 March 2012).
Dr Maleeha Lodhi, Former ambassador to Washington 1993–1996 and
1999–2002, journalist (Islamabad, 25 October 2011).
Lt General Talat Masood (Retired), Former Chairman Pakistan Ordnance
Factories, Wah and Taxila Heavy Industries, Taxila and defence analyst
(Islamabad, 6 September 2011).
Professor Ashfaq Saleem Mirza Director South Asia Free Media Association,
(Islamabad, 24 October 2011).
Iftikhar Murshed, Career diplomat and special envoy to Afghanistan 1996–2000
and author (Islamabad, 12 August 2011).
General Pervez Musharraf (Retired), Former President of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff, 1998–2007 (London, Interview, 16
July 2012).
Sarwar Naqvi, Career diplomat and Deputy Chief of Mission, Washington DC,
1991–1995 (Islamabad, 12 October 2011).
Shuja Nawaz, Director South Asia Centre of the Atlantic Council and author
(Telephonic Interview, 19 January 2012).
Professor Joseph Nye, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Clinton
Administration, 1993–1994 and political scientist/author (Telephonic Inter-
view, 7 March 2012).
Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi (Retired), Former Director General Inter-Services
Intelligence 1993–1995 (Rawalpindi, 17 August 2011).
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of
Management Sciences and author (Islamabad, 12 August 2011).
Bruce Riedel, Former Director National Security Council (1997–2001), Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (1995–1997) and National Intelligence
Officer for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Intelligence
Council (1993–1995) in the Clinton administration; author and senior fellow
at the Brookings Institution (Telephonic Interview, 2 February 2012).
Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, Author and defence analyst (Islamabad, 19 July 2011).
Professor Marvin Weinbaum, Former analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan, US
Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Clinton
 Interviewees ix
and George W. Bush administrations 1999–2003 (Telephonic Interview, 2
February 2012).
Rahimullah Yusufzai, Journalist and former BBC Correspondent with access to
the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden (Peshawar, 19 October 2011).

Note: Some high-ranking military and civilian officials have been quoted
anonymously.
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction

Clinton’s presidency constitutes the era from which political analysts, journalists
and political scientists have retired, and to which professional, document-oriented
historians have yet to direct their attention.
John Dumbrell1

As Dumbrell implies, the 1990s have been overshadowed by the dramatic events
that occurred in the wake of 9/11 and it will be some time before official docu-
ments from this time period are declassified. Nevertheless, academic inquiry
must continue. This book is an effort to understand the complexities of US–
Pakistan foreign relations during the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton
(1993–2001), whose eight years in office crucially span the period between the
end of the Cold War and 11 September 2001.
The 1990s serve as a critical link between US strategic disengagement from
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and its post-9/11 re-engagement
with Pakistan in 2001. Although aspects of US–Pakistan relations are covered in
a number of other works, none offer a complete and balanced explanation of
Pakistan’s security paradigm or examine the role of the United States in shaping
its thinking. The available discourse on this period – mostly from American and
western sources – either ignores Pakistan’s internal and external security com-
pulsions in the aftermath of the Soviet–Afghan War or dismisses the subject
altogether.
The explanatory power of post-9/11 literature is limited by a tendency
towards mono-causality in that it primarily holds the Pakistani military establish-
ment – especially Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) – responsible for
mismanaging the fallout from the Soviet–Afghan War. Pakistan’s strategic pri-
orities are assumed to stem from its military’s paranoid obsession with India or
the ISI’s rogue behaviour without an in-depth examination of the American role
in shaping these strategic objectives.
This book is motivated by a desire to comprehend how and why Pakistan –
the weaker of the two states – demonstrated what one critic has correctly referred
to as ‘an ability to resist America in the case of its nuclear program, its Kashmir
policy [and] its support for the Taliban’.2 What motivated Pakistani military and
2 Introduction
civilian policy-makers to opt for certain strategic choices? How did their percep-
tions of the post-Cold War world shape Pakistan’s security goals? What drove
them to defy the sole superpower? Drawing upon a number of oral history inter-
views with Pakistani and American actors and available primary documents, this
book offers a more complex explanation for Clinton’s failure to modify Islama-
bad’s strategic behaviour in the 1990s.
Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan was driven by a desire to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, to curtail terrorism and, at least rhetorically,
promote democracy. By the end of Clinton’s term, it was abundantly clear that
his foreign policy approach towards Pakistan had failed to achieve any of his
goals – Pakistan became an overt nuclear state in 1998; it continued supporting
both the Taliban regime in Kabul and proxies in Indian-occupied Kashmir; and
it returned to military rule in 1999.
This book argues that the lack of consistency in Clinton’s approach towards
Pakistan gave its policy-makers space to pursue their own goals. It also argues
that US–Pakistan relations during this period were influenced by thinking rooted
in the Cold War, causing a pattern of convergence and divergence between US
global objectives and Pakistan’s regional security goals. This was a pattern that
Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership exploited to protect Islamabad’s
India-centric strategic interests.
During the Cold War, Pakistan became relevant to the US policy of Soviet con-
tainment because its policy-makers viewed the defence of the subcontinent as
crucial in blocking Soviet access to oil rich Middle East. On the other hand, Paki-
stan allied with the US primarily to counter the regional power of its neighbour
and arch rival, India. The development of Pakistan foreign policy (PFP) since the
creation of Pakistan in 1947 has been tightly focused on its hostility with India
over the accession of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir – a dispute
that erupted during the partition of India. This has led to an ongoing arms race in
the region and the issue remains unresolved more than six decades later.
The two states have fought three wars over Kashmir in 1948, 1965 and 1999,
separated by decades of skirmishing and low-intensity conflict. Tensions
between the two wings of Pakistan resulted in the creation of Bangladesh in
December 1971, after a bitter war in which India militarily supported the insur-
rection in the eastern wing. To Pakistan, this was a confirmation that its fear of
losing territory to India was justified. Thus, when India conducted its first suc-
cessful nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan saw no alternative to pursuing nuclear
weapons of its own.
Pakistan’s strategists have always been concerned about the possibility that
India could encircle Pakistan by taking all of Kashmir or gaining influence over
Pakistan’s western neighbour, Afghanistan. The possibility of Indian aggression
from the east has thus shaped Pakistan’s military strategy in the west. Pakistan
sought to defend itself from this threat by, among other things, seeking an alli-
ance with the US. Accordingly, from 1954 to 1962 and again in the 1980s, there
emerged a close bilateral linkage in which Pakistan offered itself as a strategic
asset for the larger US policy of Soviet containment.
 Introduction 3
In return, Pakistan received significant US military aid that enhanced its
military capacity, enabling it to compete with India. This also contributed to the
empowerment of the military as a political actor in Pakistan. The convergence of
American and Pakistani interests in supporting the Afghan resistance against the
Soviet Union in the 1980s also led to the growth of Pakistan’s ISI.
The alliance, however, suffered from a fundamental flaw in that Pakistan’s
security objectives were regional whereas the key US goal of Soviet containment
was, by definition, global in nature. From Pakistan’s perspective, the alliance
was never entirely satisfactory because it had an Indian dimension from the very
outset, as relations with Pakistan did not diminish America’s strategic interest in
India. It is this structural incongruity that resulted in a pattern of convergence
and divergence in the relationship between Pakistan and the US throughout the
Cold War. Pakistan’s policy-makers used both trends to further their regional
security goals.
Convergence of interests during the 1950s and early 1960s, for instance,
created space for Pakistan to build-up its military capacity and then use it against
India during the 1965 and 1971 wars. When the US imposed an arms embargo
on Islamabad after 1965, it moved closer to China in response. Similarly,
responding to the 1971 arms embargo, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto made sustained efforts to forge closer ties with Muslim countries that
included non-aligned states such as Libya and Indonesia. His government also
initiated Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons – turning to China once again for
support.
The 1980s saw yet another swing in the relationship, as it was in both coun-
tries’ interests to roll back Soviet influence in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the
relationship between the Soviet Union and India meant that a Soviet take-over in
Afghanistan would also increase India’s strategic influence there. As for the US,
its containment policy compelled it to oppose Soviet efforts to gain access to the
warm waters of the Persian Gulf. This convergence of interests allowed Pakistan
to gain influence in Afghanistan and secure its western border with the
cooperation of the US. The Americans also tolerated Pakistan’s quest for nuclear
capability.
Consequently, by 1990 an important context had evolved within which PFP’s
vision and practice of security was driven by three key security goals: territorial
integrity based on gaining security against India through asymmetric, low-
intensity conflict in Indian-administered Kashmir; territorial integrity based on
the prevention of Indian encirclement by influencing developments in Afghani-
stan, and the uninterrupted pursuit of nuclear weapons capability to balance
India’s power.
Farzana Shaikh argues that US–Pakistan Cold War cooperation flowed from
a ‘fundamentally flawed bilateral relationship’ in which Pakistan sought to
‘validate geo-political parity with India through great power endorsement of
its desire to assume regional status disproportional to its real capacities’.3
Shaikh’s argument is only partially correct; the fundamental flaw stemmed not
so much from Pakistan’s aforementioned desire but from the triangular nature
4 Introduction
of the Pakistan–US–India relationship itself. This book will demonstrate that
the securitized pattern of the relationship during the Cold War was reinforced
by the administration of Bill Clinton.
It is important to understand that, unlike the US and the Soviet Union, the end
of the Cold War did not usher in an era of cooperation between India and Paki-
stan. In fact, the regional security competition intensified as the two states made
efforts to enhance their conventional military power with nuclear weapons.
Islamabad’s nuclear program was a source of concern for the US even during the
Cold War, but it had looked the other way to secure Pakistan’s help in contain-
ing the Soviets. After the end of the Cold War, preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons became a more important priority for US policy-makers; it was
viewed as vital for preventing the rise of new challengers to US hegemony. This
goal was closely entangled with the issue of transnational terrorism. The possib-
ility that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) could fall into the hands of ter-
rorists was viewed as a serious concern. Consequently, in the post-Cold War
environment the US saw no further benefit in tolerating Pakistan’s efforts to
achieve its regional security goals.
Between 1989 and 2000, Pakistan’s nuclear program became the subject of
intense scrutiny by the US Congress. Cracks in the bilateral relationship had begun
to emerge during the George H.W. Bush administration (1988–1992) when – its
nuclear program aside – Pakistan had ceased to be of strategic concern to the US.
However, it was Clinton’s foreign policy that reinforced the policies of the Bush
administration and subsequently hardened Islamabad’s strategic posture.
As Pakistan’s utility to America’s global security goals decreased, the US had
little to gain by continuing to attempt to balance its relationships with India and
Pakistan. Accordingly, even as the US applied an unprecedented amount of pres-
sure on Pakistan to stop pursuing nuclear weapons, it moved closer to India and
the economic opportunities it offered. Clinton’s administration opted for coer-
cive diplomacy and a securitized approach and became the first US administra-
tion to de-hyphenate India and Pakistan. This loss of US support and the weight
of its sanctions had an impact on Pakistan’s own policies as well.
The Clinton administration’s shift from geo-strategic to geo-economic goals
– and the increased US interest in a close relationship with India – inflamed
Islamabad’s already severe mistrust of US intentions. This, combined with the
inconsistency of Clinton’s approach towards the Taliban–Pakistan connection
resulted in a failure to modify Islamabad’s strategic behaviour.
Throughout the 1990s, the army and the ISI exercised control over Pakistan’s
Afghan, Kashmir and nuclear policies. This led to the rise of a new governance
structure: the ‘Troika’. This comprised the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) – the
most powerful member – the President and the Prime Minister. Ironically, Clin-
ton’s approach towards Islamabad helped make this possible as between 1989
and 1999 it displayed little interest in actively supporting Pakistan’s democracy.
Instead, his approach – security-oriented as it was – continued to empower the
military at the cost of elected civilian governments, which had come into power
after eleven years of military rule (1977–1988).
 Introduction 5
This book aims to shed light on Pakistan’s strategic choices during the 1990s
by examining the interplay between Islamabad’s regional security compulsions
and US global objectives within the parameters of the securitized relationship
that existed between the two states.

Positioning and contribution

This book draws on both the best available open sources and extensive inter-
views with individuals who were either directly involved in the process of
making policy, or were close observers; thirty-five semi-structured interviews
were carried out from a cross-section of Pakistani and American actors.
By highlighting the hitherto neglected Pakistani perspectives and the Ameri-
can contribution to Pakistan’s security choices, the book addresses a gap in
available discourse thereby adding value to the existing literature on Clinton’s
foreign policy and Pakistan’s security paradigm in the 1990s. By doing this it
provides the missing link between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of
the US-led War on Terror in 2001, thus broadening the scope of analysis of post-
9/11 US–Pakistan relations.
The narrative is broadly situated within the international relations concept of
the security dilemma. This is a condition in which measures taken by one state
to maximize its security motivates another state to respond with similar meas-
ures, thus perpetuating a chain of action and reaction. It is an important concept
and in the narrative of this book it helps us understand Pakistan’s India-centric
existential fears and the contributory role of US global security compulsions in
aggravating the regional security competition. By doing this the book adds to the
existing literature on the security dilemma.
In order to avoid disappointing readers it is important to state clearly at the very
outset the things that this book does not do. This book is not an effort to test theor-
etical concepts such as the security dilemma. The aim is not to view US–Pakistan
relations and policy processes through this conceptual lens but to use it broadly as
a means to analyse the interplay between various variables. Second, the book does
not consider the ethical or moral dimensions of either Clinton’s foreign policy
towards Pakistan or Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s. It is not a blanket
endorsement of Islamabad’s security outlook in the 1990s, but rather an effort to
untangle the narrative surrounding it so as to provide a more inclusive picture.
Finally, while developments in the 1990s can shed light on the nature of the post-
9/11 US–Pakistan re-engagement, an analysis of post-9/11 US–Pakistan relations
is beyond the scope of this book. This is primarily due to space constraints, but
also because this book can be considered the reference point from which the still
unfolding events of the post-9/11 era can be analysed in another book.

Book structure
The introduction outlines the central argument of the book, the rationale for
writing it and the key questions it seeks to address. It aims to show why a study
6 Introduction
such as this is both timely and necessary. Finally, it highlights the book’s contri-
bution to existing knowledge on the subject.
Chapter 1 examines the motivations behind Pakistan’s decision to enter into a
collective security arrangement with the US, the inherent contradictions in the
alliance and their implications for Pakistan’s regional goals. This chapter
emphasizes major variations in the relationship between 1954 and 1989 and how
Pakistan’s leadership used convergent and divergent trends in the US–Pakistan
partnership to protect its national security interests.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Pakistan’s weak political institutions facilitated
the emergence of strong military structures. Pakistan’s territorial integrity was
shaken by its dismemberment in 1971; however, Islamabad’s close cooperation
with Washington in the 1980s enabled it to protect its regional security interests.
Close cooperation with the CIA substantially increased the financial and opera-
tional resources of the ISI and taught it the art of conducting effective asymmet-
rical warfare. Indeed, contrary to the accepted American and western version of
the story, the ISI is part of PFP and not a rogue agency.
Chapter 2 focuses on the administration of George H.W. Bush and the imme-
diate catalysts for the bilateral relationship. It begins with an investigation of the
evolving US role in the post-Cold War world. During this period, American
foreign policy was mainly interested in consolidating its status as a superpower.
By 1989 Washington’s security policy shifted from supporting Islamabad to dis-
engagement except for a re-energized scrutiny of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
Focusing on the initial cracks in the Pakistan–US relationship between 1989 and
1993, this chapter examines Islamabad’s relevance to the US in light of these
new policies. Highlighting the rationale underlying PFP in the immediate after-
math of the Soviet–Afghan conflict, it examines Pakistani perspectives on the
Bush administration’s approach towards Islamabad’s nuclear program and the
process of US strategic disengagement from Pakistan. It also demonstrates that
US–Pakistan relations during the Bush presidency were a continuation of the
securitized relationship of the Cold War era.
Chapter 3 explains Clinton’s foreign policy choices and the tools he employed
to deal with Pakistan. In so doing, it examines the reinforcement and entrenching
of trends initiated during the Bush presidency. As with any social phenomenon,
Clinton’s foreign policy conduct was influenced by a number of variables. Clin-
ton’s approach towards external security issues, public opinion, the intellectual
inclinations of his foreign policy team and a Republican Congress greatly shaped
the way he approached Pakistan.
This chapter examines and explains the extent to which post-Cold War US
global interests interacted with Pakistan’s India-specific regional objectives and
in the process impacted the latter’s Afghan, Kashmir and nuclear policies. It
explores the degree to which variations in the relationship impeded Clinton’s
foreign policy goals. Continued imposition of nuclear sanctions by the US
encouraged Pakistan to develop an indigenous armament industry and in the
process move closer to China – in opposition to the US desire to contain China’s
power. An intense scrutiny of Islamabad’s nuclear program in the absence of an
 Introduction 7
effort to understand its India-centric security dilemma reinforced immediate
catalysts that emerged during the Bush presidency.
This chapter further examines the contradictions in Clinton’s inconsistent
approach towards Pakistan’s Afghan policy even as the US opposed its nuclear
program. Clinton’s administration did not avail opportunities to wean Pakistan
away from its strategy in Afghanistan or to constructively engage the Afghan
Taliban. Despite Clinton’s adoption of a policy of democracy enlargement as the
bedrock of US foreign policy, US–Pakistan relations remained enmeshed in
Cold War patterns that strengthened the political role of the Pakistani military
establishment.
Chapter 4 examines Pakistan’s responses to the Clinton administration’s pol-
icies and the coping mechanisms it adopted to offset them. It discusses Islama-
bad’s foreign policy-making process and the perceptions of its civilian and
military actors in order to understand the rationale behind Pakistan’s Afghan and
Kashmir policies and its quest for nuclear parity with India.
Pakistan’s decision-making elite viewed providing support for proxy forces in
Afghanistan and Kashmir as a strategically viable and economically cost-
effective option which could potentially deny India the space it needed to influ-
ence developments in Kabul and to possibly foment trouble in Pakistan’s tribal
region that borders Afghanistan. By keeping both borders relatively secure, the
military leadership could concentrate on accelerating Pakistan’s nuclear
program.
Diplomatic efforts were also undertaken by civilian governments as part of
PFP, giving the process of policy-making a veneer of democracy. However, in
practice such efforts were largely aimed at furthering the military’s security
objectives. On the whole, the military establishment retained control of Paki-
stan’s foreign policy. In keeping with the Cold War mindset, the Pakistani
decision-making elite viewed American policy through both pragmatic and
romantic lenses. However, this chapter argues that Pakistan based its policies on
a foundation of pragmatism. It made its decisions rationally on the basis of the
security dilemma in South Asia and reduced American leverage over Pakistan in
this time period.
The conclusion sums up the main arguments of the book. It highlights the
effects that the failure of Clinton’s foreign policy had on Pakistan’s strategic
choices in the 1990s and reflects upon other key themes and arguments
developed over the course of this study.

Notes
1 John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992–2000 (Oxon:
Routledge, 2009): 1.
2 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt), 2005): 328.
3 Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2009): 195–196.
1 The US–Pakistan Cold War
alliance
A historical perspective

With Pakistan the Middle East could be defended; without Pakistan I don‘t see
any way to defend the Middle East.
US Ambassador in Turkey George C. McGhee (2 April 1951)

At present we can‘t get a (Kashmir) settlement mainly because India has greater
military strength.
Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra (15 January 1954)

US–Pakistan relations during the Cold War era were based on periodic conver-
gence of strategic interests. The alignment and subsequent variations are explain-
able in the backdrop of an evolving US global policy of Soviet containment and
Pakistan‘s India-centric regional security goals. The above-quoted statements
reflect this reality.
In 1946 the US Deputy Chief of Mission to the Soviet Union George F.
Kennan proposed an American counterbalancing of the Soviet military, eco-
nomic and political expansionism through US counterforce wherever the Soviets
encroached.1 In 1950, the US National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68), a
policy document, called for an increased US defence budget and the expansion
of the Soviet containment strategy to cover the entire globe through strengthen-
ing of alliances. In this regard US military and economic aid could serve as a
key incentive. The concept of containment juxtaposed with NSC 68 presaged
subsequent Pakistan–US partnership.
Pakistan’s near-contiguous border with the Soviet Union and direct land con-
nection with China made it a suitable site for US bases. Its western wing’s prox-
imity to the Persian Gulf allowed it to act as the potential defender of Middle
Eastern oil resources and the Indian Ocean area. Its eastern wing could act as a
link between South East Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan’s British-trained
military commanders were perceived by US foreign policy experts as being sus-
ceptible to American rather than Soviet influence; its armed forces – if properly
equipped – were seen as being capable of securing the region.2 US policy-makers
understood that local forces under indigenous command would be acceptable to
the Islamic Middle East. Pakistan’s Muslim identity thus added to its utility.
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 9
Successive US administrations recognized India’s strategic importance for
US foreign affairs but the Indian policy of non-alignment and its close relations
with the Soviet Union obviated warmer bilateral ties. Pakistani leadership’s will-
ingness to cooperate with the west provided a viable alternative to American
policy-makers who considered Pakistani territory feasible for airfields and bases
‘to defend trade routes from the west to the east as well as northern frontiers of
the region against the Soviet Union’.3
The nuclear aspect of the Cold War was obviously a matter of great concern
to US strategists who had concluded in the mid-1940s that military bases ‘farther
from our own vital areas’ could enhance ‘our chances of surviving successfully
an attack by atomic weapons and of destroying the enemy which employs them
against us’.4 In 1949, the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the US. This
enhanced the importance of intelligence gathering as a way to pre-empt Soviet
moves. A 1949 Joint Chiefs of Staff study sees the Karachi–Lahore areas suit-
able for US air operations against the Soviet Union and recommends the use of
Pakistani territory as ‘a staging area for forces engaged in the defence or recap-
ture of Middle East oil areas’. The report also speculates about a strategic base
for covert surveillance operations.5
Subsequently, Pakistan became relevant to Eisenhower’s Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles’s Northern Tier strategy comprising Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq
and Iran while separating the issues of regional defence from Arab–Israeli and
inter-Arab politics. Moreover, Dulles understood that a blueprint from abroad
will be less acceptable than local forces under indigenous command in defend-
ing the overwhelmingly Islamic Middle East.
Truman’s concept of Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) had focused
on Egypt; Dulles refined the concept; his proposal was predicated on an idea of
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs, Henry
Byroade. Advocating protection of Persian Gulf oil resources with the help of
Northern Tier countries, Byroade had argued that US military support to ‘a geo-
graphical arc of Muslim countries’ in the south of the Soviet Union could make
the region less vulnerable to Soviet expansion.6 By the end of November 1953,
the Defense Department added its formal support to military assistance agree-
ment with Pakistan. In January 1954 Dulles sent his final recommendations to
President Eisenhower who subsequently authorized the US aid program for
Pakistan.7
To secure the Asian region from communism and to prevent Soviet access to
the oil rich Middle East, a regional collective security system was thus con-
structed in 1954. Pakistan was the first South Asian country to join it in return
for American military and economic aid. The alliance partnership was based on
security agreements, military aid, training and intelligence cooperation. Between
1954 and 1989, convergent and divergent security interests translated into a
pattern of closeness and estrangement between Pakistan and the US, symbolized
by the rise and fall of the frequency and volume of American military aid.
Academic and author Ayesha Siddiqa described Pakistan’s entry into the US
military alliance as ‘a patron-client relationship in which we agreed to become a
10 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
rent-seeking state because we were providing services’.8 Siddiqa’s words merely
describe one aspect of the partnership; in order to fully understand the nature of
US–Pakistan alliance a more balanced approach is in order that must begin by
asking what drove Pakistan to join the alliance system?

The key driver

Muslim Pakistan was carved out of a predominantly Hindu India in 1947 once
British colonial rule in the subcontinent ended. The political, religious and cul-
tural divide between the two communities widened in the wake of the massacres
and mass migrations that accompanied the partition.
According to the partition plan formulated by the British, Pakistan was to
comprise of the Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent while the 562 auto-
nomous princely states were to independently decide which country to join. The
final outcome was less than perfect since the status of the Muslim majority states
of Jammu and Kashmir, Junagarh and the Hindu majority state of Hyderabad
remained undecided. Competing claims over the fate of Jammu and Kashmir
remains at the core of the rivalry between Pakistan and India. The two states
have since fought three wars over the disputed territory in 1948, 1965 and 1999.
When the Indian military annexed the princely states of Junagarh (1947) and
Hyderabad (1948), it increased Pakistani fears of an Indian annexation of
Kashmir and the retaking of Pakistani territory. Such concerns were shared by
external observers, including American diplomats, who saw Pakistan’s reabsorp-
tion into India as only a matter of time.9 Following the exodus of Hindus from
East Pakistan in 1950 Nehru was ready to go to war with Pakistan.10 The Nehru–
Liaquat Agreement defused the crisis but it shook Pakistani leadership and it
looked towards US assistance with increasing urgency.
At partition, Pakistan was clearly at a disadvantage with regard to the division
of physical and financial assets. The original agreement called for the armed forces
and other assets’ division at 64–36, with India getting the larger share. Eventually
Pakistan would only receive one-third share of the assets. Pakistan’s failure to
challenge India when it annexed Junagarh – that had opted to join Pakistan – and
its performance in the first Indo-Pakistan armed conflict over Kashmir in 1948
clearly underlined the inadequacies of its under-equipped military.
Pakistan’s geographical vulnerability to India was also a major source of exis-
tential fear. At the time of partition the new state comprised East and West Paki-
stan. These two wings were separated by 1000 miles of Indian territory. The
western wing (now Pakistan) – 1000 miles in length but at various strategic
points only 300 miles in width – was, and remains, vulnerable to Indian flanking
movements in the north and south and a central assault can split it into two. By
comparison, Indian troops can fall back many miles before critical positions are
compromised. Lahore, the capital of Pakistan’s most prosperous Punjab province
is only fifteen miles from the Indian frontier. There are no high mountains or
rivers separating the two countries; the desert in the Sind province, the Punjab
plains and the coastline are easily penetrable.
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 11
This rivalry was exacerbated in the west by an unfriendly Afghanistan, the
only country to oppose Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations (UN) in 1947.
Successive Afghan leaders refused to recognize the British-drawn border with
Pakistan – the Durand Line – which cuts through Pashtun tribal areas in the
North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, politically dividing Pashtun,
Baluch and other ethnic groups. Until the late 1970s, successive governments in
Kabul had reservations about the Durand Line, claiming that ‘Pashtunistan’– the
land of the Pashtun – was on both sides of that border in the west.11
Kabul has historically had close economic and political ties with New Delhi.
During the Cold War the two states were recipients of Soviet military and eco-
nomic aid and resented the Pakistan–US alliance. India’s ability to exploit this
situation by fuelling irredentism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) bordering Afghanistan added to Pakistan’s security concerns. Pakistan’s
security dilemma vis-à-vis territorial integrity was thus already in existence at
the time of independence. Jervis argues that security dilemma creates mutual
distrust and suspicion, leading to a self-sustaining cycle of action and reaction.12
Hence, India’s stronger military capacity motivated Pakistan to fortify its
defence by integrating its regional goals with US global interests.
Through its alliance Pakistan sought security guarantees from a great power
to secure its territorial integrity, and also hoped to win diplomatic support for the
resolution of the Kashmir dispute. With the European powers and the Soviet
Union devastated by two world wars the US had emerged as the wealthiest
nation; it accounted for over 40 per cent of global production and was thus the
best choice as an ally.

Becoming the ‘most allied ally’

Pakistan and the US formally initiated a securitized relationship following the
signing of a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on 2 May 1954. Later that
year, Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Using
its eastern wing’s proximity to South East Asia, Pakistan justified SEATO mem-
bership in return for substantial military aid, and also used the forum to raise the
Kashmir issue even though its eastern wing was never in danger of any Soviet
expansionist design. In 1955 Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq, along with Great
Britain, entered the Baghdad Pact (renamed to Central Treaty Organization or
CENTO after Iraq withdrew in 1959). The US did not itself opt for membership
as Congress was wary of the implications of the Pact in the event of an Arab–
Israel conflict. In view of the American stance Pakistan was initially reluctant to
join the Baghdad Pact. The British however convinced it to do so.
Arguably, the British were able to persuade Pakistan because PFP’s goal of
territorial integrity could be realized through an alliance with the US. Pakistan
clearly signed the two Pacts to protect its regional interests. Consequently, Paki-
stan, in the words of Ayub Khan, emerged as ‘America’s most allied ally in
Asia’. For the US the Pacts were a ‘coordinated force’ that connected ‘NATO in
the west and SEATO in the east, thus completing the strategic perimeter’.13
12 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security
Act of 1951, Eisenhower committed to a major US economic and military aid
program for Pakistan in February 1954. In 1957, following the consent of Paki-
stan’s Prime Minister Suhrawardy and the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C)
General Ayub Khan, a secret US base at Badaber in Pakistan’s North West Fron-
tier Province was established and extra-territorial rights were granted to the US.
It was subsequently used for intelligence operations against the Soviet Union
and China while the Peshawar airport was used for U2 flight operations for aerial
spying.
The agreement for the establishment of this base – termed Communications
Centre – was formalized later in 1959.14 The base helped promote US economic
and military aid to Pakistan and restrained US arms sales to India. Ironically,
Pakistan was willing to grant territorial rights to one country in order to protect
its sovereignty from another thus reflecting the insecurity and desperation eman-
ating from its India-centric regional security goals.
Between 1954 and 1965 Pakistan received over $630 million in grant military
assistance for weapons, $619 million for defence support assistance, and some
$55 million worth of equipment purchased on a cash or concessional basis.15 US
military and economic assistance not only helped secure the PFP goal of territo-
rial integrity but also provided a psychological advantage as Pakistan’s leader-
ship saw it as driving a wedge between the United States and India.
Robert McMahon argues that Pakistan used a clever combination of public
diplomacy and newspaper leaks to ‘virtually force’ the Eisenhower administra-
tion to respond to its agenda.16 Ridgway B. Knight, Deputy Chief of Mission in
Karachi in 1955, recalls: ‘I happened to feel that the Pakistanis were taking us to
the cleaners’, and that US aid was being used to develop military formations
against India. Similarly, US diplomat Christopher Van Hollen remembers that
some Pakistanis admitted in private that the aid was being used against India but
‘we went through the charade of highlighting the Soviet threat’.17
As a rational actor, Pakistan did make efforts to take advantage of American
security compulsions. As early as September 1947 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the
founder of Pakistan, told a cabinet meeting: ‘Pakistan [is] a democracy and com-
munism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. . . . Our interests [lie] more with
. . . the UK and the USA rather than Russia’.18 In one concise statement, Jinnah
established a link between Islam, democracy and Pakistan and demonstrated
Pakistan’s willingness to ally with the US and its allies against the Soviet Union.
After Jinnah’s death in 1948, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan persevered in the
mission of supporting US positions on international issues and emphasizing
Pakistan’s democratic system of government.19
Interestingly, Liaquat promptly accepted Stalin’s invitation to visit Moscow
in the wake of an American invitation to Nehru in 1949. Subsequently, Liaquat
never visited the Soviet Union but was welcomed in Washington in 1950. His
move was hailed by Pakistan’s Ambassador in Washington, Mirza Abol Hasan
Ispahani, as a ‘master strategic stroke’. When Dulles visited Pakistan in 1953,
Pakistan’s army chief Ayub Khan offered convincing assessment that the Soviet
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 13
Union’s strategy was to drive to the Persian Gulf through the mountain passes of
Central Asia. His proposed response was a strong Pakistan military for contain-
ing communist expansionism,20 a proposal that clearly resonated with Dulles.21
Thus, Pakistan was able to cope with its regional security concerns by manipu-
lating America’s Soviet-specific security dilemma.
Having said this, no state, least of all a weak one, can ‘force the hand’ of a
great power in the formulation of its policy decisions. Pakistan’s regional angle
was never a secret; Prime Minister Suhrawardy asserted in February 1958 that
Pakistan’s motivation behind alliance membership was US military aid for
defence purposes against India.22 For PFP the larger Soviet threat was secondary
while its primary threat emerged from India. This was is in keeping with what
Stephen Walt sees as the pragmatic logic of smaller states balancing against a
threatening state and not necessarily against a powerful one.23 Pakistan allied
with a great power to mitigate its regional security dilemma.
That Pakistan accorded priority to its regional security objectives was clear
throughout the relationship. For example, Pakistan did not shift its primary
concern from India and Kashmir to China in the late 1950s and 1960s when the
rise of China as a Soviet surrogate was one of the key US foreign policy themes.
Instead it established a partnership with China despite being a member of anti-
communist pacts. In view of the perceived Indian threat, it did not free its troops
from its eastern border and Kashmir to focus on the Northern Tier as the US
desired.24 This clearly demonstrated that Pakistan had nothing against com-
munism per se.25
Since the United States was strategically required to balance its relations with
India and Pakistan it gave the latter certain leverage where it could exercise
some independence in foreign policy. Robert O. Keohane thus correctly argues
that a small state can influence US decision-makers when ‘common interests in
bases, military strength, aid programs or intelligence information’ can leave
American agencies dependent on the smaller ally’s consent for presence on its
territory.26
Coming back to McMahon’s argument then, Pakistani historian Hamza Alavi
contends: ‘the old imperial option of direct military intervention using troops
based in India was no longer available’ following the independence of India and
Pakistan. Hence, ‘in truth, it was the US that took the initiative and went to great
lengths to manoeuvre support for it in Pakistan’.27 Following his May 1953 visit
to India and Pakistan, Dulles found Pakistan to be a ‘dependable bulwark against
Communism’.28 Vice President Richard Nixon, who was another increasingly
vocal proponent of this policy, told Congress, ‘Pakistan is a country I would like
to do everything for’.29
Chester Bowles, the American Ambassador to New Delhi, criticized US
strategy as based on the twisted geopolitical reasoning contained in Sir Olaf
Caroe’s book Wells of Power.30 Caroe argued that the stability of the Middle
East and South East Asia had formerly rested largely with the Indian army but in
view of Nehru’s non-alignment, stability should now be maintained by develop-
ing Pakistan’s military. Despite Bowles’s reservations, in 1951 the US Air Force
14 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg told him in 1951, ‘We are going to give you
some trouble out there in India because we have our eyes set on bases in
Pakistan’.31
McMahon himself concedes that US interest in the Middle East accentuated
Pakistan’s significance in view of Egyptian and Iranian unreliability. Moreover,
considering Pakistan’s dire need for military assistance, American foreign policy
experts feared its possible strategic engagement with China or the Soviet Union
in case of western disinterest. It is therefore fair to argue that even as Pakistan
manipulated the US to protect its regional security objectives, American officials
disregarded Pakistan’s regional motives precisely because of its relevance to
containment.
While the alliance made sense for both parties, these disparities in goals
would result in clashes between US global interests and Pakistan’s regional
security concerns.

Alliance contradictions and implications for PFP

The Mutual Defense Agreement explicitly stated that US military hardware
was for deterring communist attack and was not to be used against a non-
communist nation; Eisenhower confirmed that Pakistan had given assurances
that this would be respected.32 This begs the question whether Pakistan know-
ingly breached these terms during its wars with India or whether there was
inherent ambiguity in the terms of the agreement that emerged from US ambiv-
alence in its relations with India and Pakistan. Pakistani diplomat Abdul Sattar
argues that following Pakistan’s earlier reluctance to sign the Baghdad Pact
the US signed a Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement with Pakistan on 5
March 1959 wherein the US made concrete commitments to support Pakistan’s
defence.33 Article 1 stated:

In case of aggression against Pakistan the United States of America will

take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be
mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote
Peace and Stability in the Middle East.34

The caveat of the Joint Resolution was the key point as – in keeping with the
Eisenhower Doctrine – it authorized US military and economic assistance to
Middle Eastern countries seeking protection from communist aggression. Thus,
when Pakistan tried to use SEATO and CENTO platforms to raise the Kashmir
issue the US did not support Pakistan ensuring that the dispute remained bilat-
eral or confined to the UN.
The 1959 agreement further stated that preservation of the independence and
integrity of Pakistan was vital to US national interest and to world peace.35 The
agreement was supplemented by a formal note presented by Ambassador James
Langley to Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir on 15 April 1959 that stated: ‘the US
would promptly come to the assistance of Pakistan if it were subjected to armed
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 15
aggression’. Such written promises were not legally binding and were carefully
36

watered down by the Americans in press statements.

Nevertheless, the Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (henceforth the
bilateral agreement) was ‘taken by Pakistan as virtually tantamount to guarantee-
ing an effective US role in the preservation of Pakistan’s independence and
security’.37 According to Stephen P. Cohen, ‘American officials now admit that
such pledges were made but contend that they were not binding’.38 As late as
1973 US and Pakistani positions regarding CENTO’s role in intra-regional dis-
putes remained at variance.39
Pakistan’s expectations were not entirely wishful thinking; they were
strengthened by verbal reassurances from senior US officials. For example, in
1962 when Kennedy provided military assistance to India in the Indo-China War
of 1962, Ambassador McConaughy handed Ayub Khan an aide-memoire prom-
ising US assistance in the event of Indian aggression40 and ‘formally reiterated’
America’s ‘past pledge’ in this regard.41 Later, during a one-on-one Khan–
Johnson meeting on 15 December 1965 the American President promised Khan
that the US would come to Pakistan’s assistance if, in Khan’s words, India tried
‘to knock us [Pakistan] off ’.42 In any case Pakistani decision-makers believed
there was a ‘moral commitment’ based on the bilateral agreement.43
Pakistani expectations are also explainable by US arms transfers, which sym-
bolized military and diplomatic support. For Pakistan this was a confirmation of
the US commitment to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty although the US had no
doubts about the nature of its own commitment.44 The transfer of arms also sig-
nified trust; one may argue that the US trusted Pakistan not to use the weapons
against India. Pakistan was – and is – a rational actor however, and, like the
United States, follows a realistic foreign policy emerging from national interests.
In the event of war with a large and powerful opponent such as India, it was pre-
pared to use every weapon available.
Another inherent flaw in the alliance pertained to America’s balancing act in
its relations with Pakistan and India. President Eisenhower – and all subsequent
US administrations – was wary that arming Pakistan might ensnare the United
States in India–Pakistan disputes. Before sending arms to Pakistan, Eisenhower
promised Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that these would not be used
against India, pledging appropriate UN action against Pakistan in case they were
and offered a similar package to India.45 Interestingly, however no ‘appropriate
UN action’ against Pakistan was ever initiated by the US when Pakistan did use
American arms against India during the 1965 and 1971 wars. India never joined
the US military alliance but remained the largest recipient of US economic aid
from 1951 to 1992.
According to McMahon, American misgivings about Indian foreign policy of
neutralism from all sides of the ‘political spectrum’ increased during the Eisen-
hower presidency; as did the State Department’s indignation at Indian ‘noisy
public protests against the proposed arms deal’. Senator William F. Knowland
contrasted Indian neutralism ‘when the chips were down (in the Korean War)’
with Pakistani support for the UN resolution authorizing military action. Similarly,
16 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
Dulles perceived Indian neutralism as undermining the ‘moral weight’ of the Cold
War issues.46
Conversely, there had been initial reluctance in certain American quarters
‘lest arming Pakistan ensnare the United States in India–Pakistan disputes’. The
possibility did not stop the US from arming Pakistan anyway. Wanting to
appease India, American experts simultaneously feared possible PFP reorienta-
tion towards China or the Soviet Union in case of western disinterest. The US
therefore did not openly acknowledge that India was not a threat for fear of
losing Pakistan. At the end of the day, the Americans left the nature of US com-
mitment deliberately vague.
This inherent ambiguity served the purposes of both allies. It allowed the US
to balance its relations with India and Pakistan without alienating either state.
Pakistan used the ambiguity in its relationship with the US to express ‘moral
outrage’ against the US while using US weapons to fight non-communist India.
It enabled Pakistan to adopt certain regional policies regarding its security com-
petition with non-communist India even as these were at variance with the global
goals of the US. Similarly, from 1970s onwards Pakistan was able to continue its
nuclear program despite US reservations.
That said, while the alliance helped secure Pakistan’s territorial integrity it
provided neither a security guarantee against India, nor did it exert political pres-
sure for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The US approach to the Kashmir
dispute was primarily concerned with crisis management and not peace-building.
The Kashmir issue was taken to the UN by Nehru with India as the aggrieved
party in the wake of the 1948 war. The subsequent Security Council resolution
sought a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir; Nehru initially agreed but later
backtracked.47
The US supported the 1948 UN resolution calling for plebiscite to settle
Kashmir’s accession and also made some early efforts towards conflict resolu-
tion after the 1948 India–Pakistan war.48 Between 1948 and 1951, during the
Truman presidency, American officials Frank Graham and Chester Nimitz were
involved in facilitating plebiscite as part of UN efforts to resolve the dispute but
were unsuccessful when Nehru spurned a series of proposals so as to ‘make per-
manent the status-quo rather than settle the dispute’.49 US Ambassador to India
(1948–1951), Loy Henderson’s report explains Nehru’s attitude. It said:
‘Military observers and other foreigners in Kashmir with whom I talked seemed
unanimous in their belief that if Vale (Kashmir) should be given an opportunity
to vote freely, it would prefer Pakistan to India’.50
Truman’s efforts encouraged Pakistani leadership to expect political support
from the US – the champion of democracy and freedom. As a new state desper-
ately in need of infrastructure and a running economy, Pakistani leadership was
averse to diverting indigenous insufficient resources to defence spending. Con-
flict resolution over Kashmir could minimize such expenditures.
Pakistan’s strategic importance to containment started to decline in the 1960s
and after 1971 the US began to treat the Kashmir dispute as an issue that had to
be resolved between the countries concerned. Later, a pledge to solve all issues
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 17
bilaterally was made part of the Simla Agreement between Pakistan and India in
1972. This agreement was neither legally binding, nor could it override UNSC
resolutions regarding plebiscite however.
The alliance was flawed on several counts. Pakistani academic Tahir Amin
argues: ‘There was hardly a sense of common purpose or common threat percep-
tion’.51 Amin’s premise is endorsed by McMahon who argues that the US
approach was ‘curiously inchoate and inconsistent’. He confirms that his quest
through the ‘voluminous American planning documents’ failed to clarify how
Pakistani troops were expected to foil a Soviet military invasion or intervene in
the Middle East in conjunction with other Northern Tier states.52 According to
primary US documents CENTO never actually provided its members with a
mechanism for collective defence.53
Kux maintains that one of the reasons for the lack of a clear policy was the
involvement of the US bureaucracy. The Northern Tier concept was promoted
by Dulles and Byroade with scant Department of Defense involvement. As
Eisenhower was looking to reduce defence expenditure, the military was not
keen on new missions.54 As for Dulles, he was more interested in getting the idea
going rather than worrying about the finer details. The following conversation
between Dulles and Lippmann is enlightening in this regard:

‘Look Walter’, said Dulles ‘I have got to get some real fighting men into the
south of Asia. The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis.
That’s why we need them in the Alliance. We could never get along without
the Gurkas [sic].’ ‘But Foster’, Lippmann reminded him, ‘the Gurkas aren’t
Pakistanis, they are Indian.’ ‘Well’, responded Dulles, unperturbed by such
nit-picking, ‘they may be Indians but they are Moslems.’ ‘No, I am afraid
they are not Moslems either; they are Hindus’, Lippmann stated.55

Clearly, the policy remained vague in military terms due to a lack of rigorous
planning and policy review. Byroade himself later termed the concept as more
political and psychological than military.56 This leads to the conclusion that the
primary US interest in Pakistan pertained to the establishment of military bases
and use of airfields.
Jinnah and Liaquat’s themes of Pakistan’s compatibility with American
values and its vulnerability to Russia were adopted by all subsequent arms
procurement advocates between 1951 and 1953. Liaquat Ali Khan said at a press
conference in the US on 4 May 1950: ‘If your country will guarantee our territo-
rial integrity, I will not keep any army at all.’ In 1951 when the US approached
Pakistan about sending forces to Korea to augment US war effort, Liaquat
responded that his country was ready to commit a full division, but only if Paki-
stan was given a US security guarantee.57 Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and
Khawaja Nazimuddin had been unwilling to commit fully to the American camp
without concrete security guarantees against India. By 1953, according to a Paki-
stani academic, Pakistan dropped its demand for guarantee once the US agreed
to give military aid.58
18 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
The general feeling among the middle and lower echelons of political leader-
ship – a category that did not include prominent leaders such as Ghulam Muham-
mad, Iskander Mirza and Hussain Suhrawardy – was that the slow delivery of
aid was not commensurate with the commitments the US had undertaken. Due to
interagency rivalry the Americans dragged their feet mainly because Secretary
of State Dulles had pushed through the arms deal without significant input from
the Department of Defense. Political leaders from East Pakistan like Khawaja
Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali Bogra were wary of a strong and largely non-
Bengali Pakistani military; others were sceptical of the whole arrangement.
Veteran diplomat Abdul Sattar notes that PFP from 1950s onward suffered
from a flaw in that domestic public sentiment was overwhelmingly with the
Muslim world.59 The Baghdad Pact was criticized by Arab countries; Egypt per-
ceived it as part of American imperialism in support of Israel and Saudi Arabia
termed it ‘a stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim States’.60 Arguably, Muslim
Pakistan’s India-centric security dilemma motivated it to ally with a great power
for strategic reasons at the cost of ignoring its population’s ideological values.
This domestic dissent was highlighted when Prime Minister Suhrawardy’s
cabinet supported the west’s position during the Suez Crisis. It was decided that
Pakistan’s economic and trade interests would be better served if the Suez Canal
was not nationalized by Egypt.
Veteran leaders of the Pakistan Movement, like Jinnah’s sister, Fatima Jinnah,
and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, along with Khawaja Nazimuddin however
demanded unqualified support for Muslim Egypt. Pakistan’s foreign minister
Feroz Khan Noon would later assert at an international conference convened by
eighteen nations that the scope of the negotiations on the Suez Crisis be widened
and that Egypt be included in the deliberations.61 The C-in-C and Defense
Minister General Ayub Khan, however, saw the US as the only source of
massive military aid to Pakistan.
In 1958 Ayub Khan, supported by senior military commanders, executed a
military coup, deposing President Iskander Mirza to become the second Pres-
ident of Pakistan while relinquishing the office of C-in-C to General Mohammad
Musa. In 1959 he promoted himself to the rank of Field Marshal. The military–
bureaucracy nexus that had developed after independence flourished in the Ayub
era (1958–1969) and senior military commanders in collaboration with chosen
bureaucrats shaped PFP. The nationalization of a large part of the press ensured
that dissenting political opinions were kept at bay. Over the course of the Cold
War, military dictatorships of Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq
would influence PFP processes with implications for US–Pakistan alliance.
After Khan’s military coup in 1958 the US did not oppose Pakistan’s move
‘from an unstable pro-Western democracy to a more stable pro-Western military
dictatorship’.62 According to a US State Department assessment, a prolonged
period of military rule would increase Pakistan’s underlying political problems –
especially between the east and west wings of the country.63 Nevertheless, Eisen-
hower was happy to have ‘a strongman in Pakistan to ensure the alliance lasted’
and visited Pakistan in December 1959 on the first ever US presidential visit to
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 19
the subcontinent. This attitude would also manifest in the 1980s when the
64

Reagan administration entered into a tight cooperative linkage with General Zia-
ul-Haq’s military regime against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Clearly, America’s
interest was limited to Pakistan’s security cooperation; the alliance thus strength-
ened the ability of the Pakistan military to take on a political role.
Immediately after independence Pakistan lacked strong political institutions.
British-trained civil servants and military commanders were the key decision-
makers during the first decade and were traditionally susceptible to western and
not Soviet influence. The observation that US arms supply increased during
periods of military rule in Pakistan65 suggests that the US was willing to deal
with military rulers and uncomfortable with civilian leaders such as Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto. US arms empowered Pakistan’s army, which staged the first coup in
1958; this would pave the way for latter military regimes. US arms also embold-
ened the Ayub regime to launch a war with India in 1965. These developments
had disastrous political consequences for Pakistan. Former Foreign Minister
Assef Ali argued:

They preferred to deal with the military . . . every time there was a military
ruler there was [American] cooperation and every time there was a civilian
set-up we were subjected to [US] sanctions.66

American analyst Michael Krepon agreed that:

Supporting the military rule has been a repetitive mistake on the part of US
policy-makers who believe the civilians cannot deliver. . . . This construct
was doubly flawed – it undermined civil society and the military never
delivered.67

US military aid played a central role in the growth of the Pakistani military and
in creating close institutional relations between the two militaries. Pakistan could
not have competed with India without the US arms supply and military training
which reduced the burden of maintaining a large army. Military to military rela-
tions between the two states remained strong throughout the Cold War; this
facilitated the development of a personalized approach to PFP. For example,
even before he took over the country, Khan’s demands for US aid were often
directed through his Washington contacts rather than the Pakistan-based office
of the US Military Advisory Group (USMAG). There were close military to
military contacts but ‘no compatible link with professional staff in the State
Department or Congress’ which kept Pakistan ‘at the mercy of changing US
presidencies’.68
The provision of US arms to Pakistan had regional implications that played a
role in the formulation of PFP. What began as a small amount of arms aid in
1954 ‘ballooned into a $500 million (supply)’ by 1957, forcing Eisenhower to
declare it ‘a terrible error but now we seem hopelessly involved in it’.69 This
suggests that the decision-making process in the US on this issue was rather
20 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
hasty. For example, Director for Mutual Security Averell Harriman expressed
concerns over aid to Pakistan as it had the potential to exacerbate regional dis-
putes.70 Bowles warned that the Soviets could enhance their position in South
Asia by befriending India in response to American aid to Pakistan.71
His words proved prophetic as following the alliance the Soviet Union, which
had hitherto been largely neutral, repeatedly used its veto in the UN Security
Council to support Indian positions and remained its main arms supplier through-
out the Cold War. On a visit to India in 1955, Russian leaders, Premier Nicolai
Bulganin and President Nikita Khrushchev denounced the partition of India in
1947 and un-divided Kashmir was referred to as part of India. Similarly, Soviet
leaders announced support for ‘Pashtunistan’.72 Thus, while the alliance con-
tributed substantially to an improvement in Pakistan’s military capabilities, it
negatively impacted its relations with the great power in its neighbourhood.
Political scientist Norman Palmer states that Eisenhower’s military assistance
fuelled a regional arms race.73 Citing declassified archival material, Indian
scholar A.G. Noorani argues that Nehru was not pro-Soviet right from the start
and was in fact wary of Soviet expansionist potential.74 This suggests that India
moved closer to the Soviet Union after Eisenhower administration’s tilt towards
Pakistan raising Indian fears of American backing for Pakistani position on
Kashmir.
Cohen points to Indian purchases of equivalent weapons from the US, the
Soviet Union and Europe.75 Palmer and Cohen make a convincing argument;
Cohen argues that in the wake of the alliance ‘the central concern of the Indian
military’ was that the growth of Pakistan’s military capacity to deter communist
aggression would also allow it to take a more offensive posture against India.76
Reflecting the inherent contradictions in the alliance the US thus tried to per-
suade India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute peacefully77 while
simultaneously feeding the regional security dilemma through the supply of
weapons.78 Henry Kissinger argues that containment came to be equated with
constructing military alliances and undermining diplomacy.79
This assessment suggests that US interference in regional disputes resulted in
unintended consequences. The provision of US military aid to Pakistan in the
1950s and to India during the Sino-India conflict in 1962 encouraged military
solutions to political problems such as the accession of Kashmir or border adjust-
ments between China and India. Similarly, the security-based partnership
between the US and Pakistan in the Afghan–Soviet War in the 1980s has had
long-term outcomes for both nations in the 1990s.

PFP and the dynamics of convergence and divergence

The pendulum of the US–Pakistan alliance reached its zenith and nadir during
four wars in 1962, 1965, 1971 and the 1980s. During the Sino-India War in
October 1962 the Kennedy administration and their western allies supported
India with massive military assistance. This conflict coincided with the Cuban
Missile Crisis, which played out from 15 to 25 October. As a result, the wider
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 21
image that emerged was that of a democratic world under attack by communism
on all fronts.
Kennedy wrote to Ayub to refrain from taking advantage of Indian problems
with China. Ayub reminded Kennedy of his promise to inform Pakistan before
deciding to arm India and requested him to use US leverage to force Nehru to
resolve the Kashmir issue.80 Instead Kennedy convinced Ayub Khan to sign a
joint statement with Nehru assuring Pakistan’s non-aggression during the Indo-
China War. Simultaneously stepping up his rhetoric in favour of China,81 Khan
pointed out the blurring line between an ally and a neutral.82
Security advisers – McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow – warned against
allowing Ayub to push the US into a position ‘contrary to our larger strategic
interests’. It was recommended that a tougher policy be adopted by delaying the
impending $500 million aid to Pakistan.83 However, it was not in the US interest
to alienate Pakistan therefore Kennedy opted for reassurances and the pledge of
$143 million under a proposed Military Assistance Program (MAP), stating that
‘in providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with
Pakistan’.84
Khan’s disquiet was not entirely misplaced; according to a 1961 US intelli-
gence estimate, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and its support of India on
Kashmir and Pashtunistan increased after the Soviet downing of the American
U2 plane over Moscow in 1962. The American plane had taken off from the
Pakistani city of Peshawar.85 Nevertheless, having acquiesced to Kennedy’s
wishes in 1962, Khan’s later gripe that ‘the great opportunity which history had
offered of the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute was thus lost’86 does not
sound convincing. It is likely that Khan’s acquiescence had a regional angle.
Pakistan’s military was close to achieving its target of military equipment and
trained manpower by early 1960s and it was not in Pakistan’s interest to antago-
nize the US at that point in time.
Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Aisa Centre Shuja Nawaz explained
that China’s swift victory created an image of communist invasion of India
spawning anxiety in the western camp hence the massive military aid to non-
aligned India.87 Moreover, because of the concurrent Cuban Missile Crisis,
Soviet solidarity seemed more likely with China than with India; Kennedy could
thus take advantage of the Soviet position.
Kennedy and the British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan assured Ayub
Khan that if India attacked Pakistan ‘there would be an American response’.
This was cold comfort considering that the US and its allies continued to siphon
a flood of military assistance to India, even after the war had ended.88 Accord-
ingly, President Johnson approved a long-term military aid program for India in
May 1964. In accordance with the regional security dilemma, Pakistan viewed
the growth in Indian military capability as directed against Pakistan and not
China. In response to US policy of arming India, PFP looked to China as an
alternative source of military supplies. In March 1963 the two states signed an
agreement to settle a border issue amicably and the Chinese leadership publicly
supported the Pakistani position on Kashmir in 1964.
22 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
The US was not happy with this PFP diversion. Ayub Khan further annoyed
Johnson by refusing to commit to a token Pakistani military participation in
Vietnam so as not to antagonize Beijing. Pakistan also publicly questioned the
value of SEATO.89 This was of course rhetoric since Pakistan remained a
member of SEATO till 1972. This growing estrangement was reflected in
Ayub’s 1965 visit to the Soviet Union to request economic and military aid.
Unable to distinguish between the offensive and defensive nature of the
Indian forces, Pakistan expected a worst-case scenario in keeping with the
dynamics of the security dilemma. It was clear that despite informal commit-
ments and verbal reassurances the US would not directly intervene on behalf
of Pakistan’s regional concerns. According to former Foreign Minister Assef
Ali, Ayub miscalculated the US reaction; instead of the US offering military
support his move was seen as an attempt at ‘bluffing the Americans. It was
then that they decided to have Pakistan as a tactical partner rather than a
strategic one’.90
Nawaz argued from another perspective:

Once the US changed the status quo in 1962, Pakistan was free to choose
alternatives . . . Ayub Khan visited Moscow and Beijing to hold economic
and security negotiations and also reacted positively to Moscow’s mediation
for India–Pakistan ceasefire (in 1965).91

Thus one may infer that the main implication of this variation was not only that
the US decided about the future nature of its relations with Pakistan but also that
China replaced the US as Pakistan’s main arms supplier. According to Keohane,
the alliance stood revoked when Pakistan established close relations with com-
munist China.92 Keohane’s argument can be replicated and extended to the 1962
US weapons aid to non-aligned India, a close friend of the Soviet Union. Paki-
stan cemented bilateral security relations with Beijing after the Sino-India con-
flict of 1962 that marked a clear divergence in interests.
The alliance was tested again in 1965 when Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto proposed the infiltration of trained politico-military proxies into Indian-
held Kashmir to assist the local population in an uprising against the Indian Gov-
ernment. Subsequently, Ayub Khan authorized Operation Gibraltar. India
responded by attacking Lahore on 6 September 1965. Rejecting Khan’s invoking
of the Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1959 President Johnson –
whose administration was deeply involved in Vietnam – denounced Pakistan’s
use of US weapons against a non-communist country and imposed arms embargo
on arms shipment to Pakistan and India. The embargo (1965–1975) impacted
Pakistan but did not translate into a comparable pressure on India because it con-
tinued receiving arms from the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Pakistan reacted posi-
tively to Moscow’s offer of mediation to negotiate a ceasefire.
The two wars of 1962 and 1965 clearly highlighted the divergent dimensions
of Pakistan and US foreign policy. A third war would exacerbate the widening
gulf between the two allies.
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 23
Bengali grievances in East Pakistan against the central government in West
Pakistan led to a civil war in 1970 and an insurrection in early 1971. Exploiting
the indigenous uprising, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Government act-
ively provided political and military support to Bengali guerrilla fighters. The
ensuing Indo-Pakistan War culminated in the surrender of Pakistani forces to the
Indian military on 16 December 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh.
Earlier, in April 1971, American Consul General in Dacca, Archer K. Blood,
sent his famous Blood telegram93 to the State Department. It urged condemnation of
the Pakistan military’s atrocities against the Bengalis. However, in a brief re-
emergence of convergent security interests Ayub’s successor General Yahya Khan
used his access to Zhou En Lai to arrange a secret visit to Beijing for Nixon’s
National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in July
1971. This would lead to a thawing of relations between the US and China in 1972.
Pakistan’s initiative was based on its need for both US arms supplies and American
pressure on India to retract its support of the separatists in East Pakistan while the
US wanted to engage China to counter the Soviet Union. Accordingly, despite State
Department and Congressional pressure following the Blood telegrams, the White
House was reluctant to apply diplomatic pressure on Yahya Khan.
Nixon’s handwritten note on a memorandum emphasizes a ‘hands-off ’
approach saying, ‘Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time’.94 In fact when tensions in
East Pakistan escalated into an India–Pakistan War in West Pakistan, Nixon
allowed a one-time waiver on military supplies despite Indian protest. However,
Yahya’s invoking of the 1959 bilateral defence agreement did not oblige the US
to come to Pakistan’s rescue.95 Kissinger argues in his book that ‘the plain
import’ of the bilateral defence agreement was that the US would come to Paki-
stan’s assistance in case of Indian aggression.96 Keeping in mind that Kissinger
is criticized for offering modified explanations of events retrospectively, it is
unlikely that he upheld this interpretation of the bilateral agreement behind
closed doors at the time.
Congressman Christopher Van Hollen argues that the Pakistan military’s atro-
cities eroded the goodwill for Yahya Khan in the US State Department bureau-
cracy and media hence making it increasingly difficult for Nixon to help
Pakistan.97 Van Hollen’s argument does not account for systemic changes. As
Thornton explains, Pakistan’s geographic location by now was of dwindling
interest to the United States since Iran had become the key US listening post
and, along with Saudi Arabia, the principal supporter of US interests in West
Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, now that Washington had direct access to
China another source of Pakistani leverage had evaporated.98
Nixon did not lift the arms embargo despite US intelligence reports that India
was contemplating the seizure of Pakistani Azad Kashmir,99 which would have
deprived Pakistan of its common boundary with China. In a clear manifestation
of the balancing act however, Nixon ordered a US Navy task force, headed by
USS Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal. It was a symbolic action meant to pressu-
rize India into a ceasefire but also to send a message to the Soviet Union to not
take advantage of the conflict.
24 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
Kissinger justifies Nixon’s ‘tilt’ as prudent at a time when ‘America’s weight
as a factor in the world was already being undercut’ in Vietnam. The ‘tilt’ con-
fined the conflict to the subcontinent without allowing the Soviets to intervene
and harm ‘our China initiative’ or give China cause to doubt American cred-
ibility as an ally.100 Academic Tahir Amin agreed that it was because of US pres-
sure that the Indians did not continue the war at their western border.101
However, despite the ‘tilt’ which supported Pakistan’s defence, there was a sharp
contrast between the absence of US military assistance to Pakistan and the
massive flow of Soviet aid to India during and prior to the 1971 war. In the end,
Nixon’s ‘tilt’ did little to prevent the tilt in regional power distribution in India’s
favour.102
The emergence of Bangladesh was a traumatic event in terms of Pakistan’s
territorial integrity. It was a watershed in PFP’s approach to Indian military
power. After Indian nuclear tests in 1974 it would drive Pakistan’s quest for
nuclear weapons as a force equalizer with its arch-enemy. The 1970s saw a frac-
turing of the alliance, which manifested as a reduction in US aid. After 1971
Pakistan requested – unsuccessfully – for immediate weapons supply in view of
India’s increased military budget, the Soviet efforts at ‘fomenting trouble’ on
Pakistan’s western border, Indian nuclear tests in 1974 and the continued Soviet
arms supply to India.103 The combined effect of these developments had implica-
tions for PFP.
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto followed Ayub Khan’s strategy and nur-
tured Pakistan’s military and economic ties with China. Reflecting an overt
divergence with the US goals he also sought to improve ties with non-aligned
Muslim nations and adopted pro-Arab positions on Arab–Israeli issues. Promis-
ing to ‘eat grass’ if necessary, Bhutto publicly resolved to achieve nuclear parity
with India. Kissinger’s offer of A-7 aircraft at this juncture was not sufficient to
dissuade Pakistan, as it considered the development of nuclear weapons to be a
matter of national survival. This new PFP objective would have far-reaching
impacts on Pakistan’s relations with the US in the 1990s.
Reacting to reports of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, the Carter administration
suspended aid in August 1978 and then resumed it in October 1978 when France
tacitly dropped a nuclear processing plant deal with Pakistan. Later, aid was
again halted in 1979 after Pakistan’s Kahuta plant was reported as being capable
of producing weapons grade material. This downward spiral in relations can be
traced by observing diminishing US aid between 1963 and 1979. Carter’s visit to
India in 1978 without stopping in Pakistan was a clear message that relations
had reached the breaking point and that the US wanted to strengthen ties with
the country it appeared to perceive as the regional boss.
India had introduced nuclear weapons in South Asia but it was Pakistan that
saw itself as being punished. This resentment was reflected in the storming of
the US embassy in Islamabad by a group of students in November 1979. The
students belonged to the religious political party Jamaat-i-Islami, a staunch sup-
porter of General Zia-ul Haq’s military regime (1977–1988).104 With the Soviet
military move into Afghanistan in December 1979, however, Carter declared the
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 25
Persian Gulf to be of vital interest to the US and to be defended militarily if
necessary. Seeking Pakistan’s help he offered $200 million in economic aid and
$200 million worth of military hardware. Carter’s offer was famously rejected
by Zia-ul-Haq as ‘peanuts’.
Under the Reagan administration, a March 1985 national security directive
authorized significant escalation in US engagement in Afghanistan with Paki-
stan’s help in return for substantial military aid.105 Pakistan’s deep-seated insecu-
rities were again revealed in a renewed desire for US security guarantee.
Pakistan asked America to replace the 1959 bilateral agreement with a formal
treaty along with military and economic aid. However, as no treaty was forth-
coming substantial US aid sufficed.106 There thus emerged a convergence of
security interests which effectively meant US tolerance of Pakistan’s undeclared
India-centric nuclear program and regional objectives in Afghanistan since, as
Weinbaum correctly argues, without Pakistan there could have been ‘no effective
Afghan resistance movement’ or any ‘prospects for its success against the
Soviets’.107 During this period, Soviet aircraft periodically violated Pakistani air-
space, aggravating Pakistan’s security fears on its western border even as India
and Pakistan locked horns at 20,000 feet above sea-level in Siachen.108
A permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan could have translated into
increased Indian strategic influence on Pakistan’s western border. Convergence
of interests obviated any Soviet ambitions of reaching the warm waters of the
Persian Gulf via Pakistan. Moreover, the partnership was based on covert
strategy and contributed to the strengthening of institutional linkages between
US and Pakistani intelligence agencies. Accordingly, the CIA and ISI remained
close partners until the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989.
The CIA, with Saudi financial contribution, funnelled $3.5 billion and
weapons, including Stingers, into Afghanistan between 1980 and 1992. Besides
having economic interests in the region Saudi Arabia – a Sunni state – was inter-
ested in preventing Iranian Shia influence in Afghanistan following the Islamic
revolution in Iran in 1979.
Using the ISI as a conduit the CIA provided technical and strategic advice on
training, intelligence and sophisticated technology. Pakistan’s tribal areas bor-
dering Afghanistan were subsequently used for the Afghan resistance to regroup
among a sympathetic tribal population. Together the CIA–ISI nexus executed
the largest covert operation in history.109 These developments contributed to the
empowerment of the ISI, whose jurisdiction under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had
already expanded to institutionalize domestic political spying. Former ISI chief,
Lt General Asad Durrani pointed out that the partnership worked because ‘the
CIA did not interfere in how we distributed resources and organized the resist-
ance, and we did not question how they spent their [and Saudi] money to procure
weaponry and other support material’.110
The $3.2 billion US military and economic aid program to Pakistan in 1982
was followed by another $4 billion for 1988–1993, mostly earmarked for
defence expenditure allowing Pakistan to purchase military hardware and anti-
submarine weapons that were more suitable for countering India than the Soviet
26 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
Union. Massive arms supplies and large weapons depots were located in Paki-
stan but Americans also tolerated ISI’s regular siphoning of aid into Afghanistan
to favourite Islamic groups.111 More importantly, the Zia regime used US aid to
bolster and further the PFP goal of achieving nuclear capability.112
According to Ahmed Rashid, CIA Director William Casey supported the ISI
plan to recruit radical Muslims around the world in 1986 to demonstrate that ‘the
entire Muslim world was fighting Communism’.113 However, former Director
General ISI Lt General Hamid Gul (1987–1989) posited:

It was not an ISI plan; it was Reagan and the CIA who had come up with
the plan in the 1980s, spending billions to produce an army of Muslim
fighters for the Soviet–Afghan conflict. They are the ones who international-
ized the Afghan resistance.114

Former army chief General Aslam Beg endorsed Gul:

In keeping with Reagan’s policy even American Muslim leaders like Farah
Khan were allowed to preach ‘jihad’ in the US . . . it gained global reach and
in the process made ISI strong and independent . . . the CIA trained thou-
sands of Muslim fighters. It [the CIA] established forward bases in Pesha-
war and Quetta with support bases in Karachi and Lahore and the controlling
head quarter in Islamabad. They almost took over Pakistan!115

Former naval chief Admiral Fasih Bokhari added:

The use of religion was encouraged by America, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
and they invested heavily in the building and mushrooming of orthodox
[Wahabi] religious seminaries . . . and religious economy started gathering
pace.116

This line of argument was supported by the left-wing politician Afrasyab

Khattak who was in Kabul throughout the Soviet–Afghan War. He stated:

It was Reagan’s idea. The US invested billions of dollars to raise Jihadists

[Muslim fighters] with no plan to disarm them . . . the children in religious
seminaries studied pro-Jihad syllabus prepared in the University of
Nebraska.117

Gul is known for his orthodox religious views and Bokhari for his liberal cre-
dentials; Khattak is a senior leader of the secular, nationalist Awami National
Party and a close friend of the Soviet-backed Afghan President Mohammad
Najibullah. The fact that all held the same view shows that the idea could only
have been executed with active US participation as the ISI lacked the required
resources. Clearly, the ISI was as much a tool of PFP as the CIA was of the
American foreign policy.
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 27
Religious ideology was used in this joint covert operation to protect respec-
tive security interests. Pakistan used this convergence of security interests to
secure its western border, strengthen its security interests in Afghanistan to
counter Indian influence and to gain operational advantage. More importantly,
this convergence of US–Pakistan security interests enabled Islamabad to con-
tinue its nuclear program despite US reservations.118 From the American per-
spective this policy was in keeping with the containment strategy. However, it
was also used as a tool to ‘demolish [Shia] Iran with [orthodox Sunni] counter-
religion in the Soviet–Afghan war’.119
The Geneva Accords120 were signed in April 1988 during the Reagan presid-
ency by the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan and were guaranteed by
the Soviet Union and the US. These Accords – to which the Afghan Mujahedeen
were not a party – facilitated Soviet withdrawal and US disengagement but did not
provide for the dissolution of the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime in Kabul or the
formulation of an interim Afghan Government.121 Hamid Gul reminisced:

As ISI chief I was summoned to the joint session of the Parliament in 1988
to give my views on the process . . . I begged Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister
Junejo not to sign the Accords because it would be a betrayal of the Mujah-
edeen . . . but the civilian leadership was under American pressure . . . . some
of them had been on the ISI pay-roll . . . so I knew they were purchasable . . .
Zia looked very perturbed after my passionate speech but in the end he gave
in to American pressure.122

Gul’s premise is supported by UN special representative for Afghanistan, Diego

Cordovez, who confirms ‘strenuous efforts’ by the US State Department to pres-
surize Pakistan to sign the Accords. He also refers to the Soviet pressure on Paki-
stan including ‘a scarcely veiled threat to reactivate Afghan irredentist claims’ in
Pakistan’s tribal areas.123 Clearly, after achieving the objective of Soviet with-
drawal, neither Reagan nor the Bush administration were interested in insisting
on an interim Afghan Government, miscalculating that in the absence of full
Soviet military assistance the Najibullah regime would not endure for long.
By the end of the 1980s PFP goals included not only securing territorial integ-
rity through conventional and nuclear capabilities but also through the use of
CIA–ISI trained proxies. This was not peculiar to PFP – proxies had been
employed before as in 1948 and 1965 – but with US cooperation the ISI had
grown powerful both financially and operationally and US-trained manpower
and weapons were available. According to a former ISI chief there were hardly
any US efforts to dismantle weapon dumps in Afghanistan or to rehabilitate
trained fighters.124 Clearly, both proxy warfare and nuclear weapons were prag-
matic choices since this prevented the depletion of conventional military
resources. Thus, Fasih Bokhari argued:

The Americans helped us in developing an asymmetrical force in Afghanistan

that destroyed an industrial force . . . we learnt the art and used it in Kashmir
. . . if the US could do it in the 1980s then so could we in the 1990s.125
28 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
Summary
Pakistan–US relations during the Cold War era emerged from an episodic con-
vergence of security interests. This securitized relationship suffered from inher-
ent contradictions stemming from Pakistan’s India-centric regional goals that
were often at variance with US Soviet-centered global aims. At the time of inde-
pendence in 1947 security concerns with a hostile India in the east and a dis-
gruntled Afghanistan in the west aggravated Pakistan’s security dilemma. PFP
sought to ameliorate this predicament by allying with the US in 1954 and subse-
quently received substantial economic and military aid that was primarily used
to build and use its military capacity against a much stronger India. The key PFP
concern thus revolved around maintaining territorial integrity. In return Pakistan
offered the use of its territory for a US base for surveillance against the Soviet
Union.
In keeping with the goals of containment, while the US bolstered the Pakistan
military through aid and training it remained mindful of the strategic importance of
India and adopted a crisis management mindset in relation to the Kashmir dispute;
despite non-binding commitments it did not give any formal security guarantee
against a non-communist India. As the US foreign policy approach aimed at per-
forming a balancing act between India and Pakistan this regularly highlighted the
inherent contradictions stemming from a disparity in respective security goals.
In this asymmetric, predominantly patron–client relationship PFP was period-
ically able to demonstrate some independence in view of Pakistan’s occasional
possession of leverage over the US. On the other hand there were domestic and
regional implications for PFP as US weapons aid initiated and perpetuated a
regional arms race. American willingness to deal with military dictators and the
development of military to military relations strengthened the political role of
the Pakistani military establishment. Military and intelligence structures thus
gained in strength over a period of nearly three decades of US economic and
military aid which varied in degree but was never terminated between 1958
and 1990. Variations in the relationship could be measured against the frequency
and volume of military aid. PFP aimed to exploit both convergent and divergent
trends to secure its security goals.
Convergence of interests during the 1950s and early 1960s was used by Paki-
stan to bolster its military capacity and deploy US weapons against India during
the 1965 and 1971 wars. Kennedy’s military aid to India in 1962 and the Paki-
stan–India War of 1965 demonstrated the inherently contradictory and ambiva-
lent underpinnings of the alliance. During the period of estrangement in the
1960s – symbolized by US military aid to India and arms embargoes – PFP sub-
stantially shifted focus to building relations with communist China thus clearly
demonstrating that it had nothing against communism as such and that its alli-
ance with the US emerged from its India-centric regional concerns.
The brief convergence of interests in 1971 – when Islamabad facilitated a thaw
in US–China relations – allowed Pakistan to elicit some favourable responses from
the Nixon administration. That said, PFP failed to prevent the loss of East Pakistan
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 29
in 1971 in which India played an active political and military role. Nixon’s
selective ‘tilt’ did not prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan. Following this and
the Indian nuclear tests in 1974, PFP expanded to include the goal of an active
pursuit of nuclear weapons as a force equalizer against India. Evincing independ-
ence and demonstrating the priority of its regional security compulsions, PFP
pursued this goal despite US concerns and sanctions.
Congruent security goals in the 1980s translated into a tight CIA–ISI linkage
in which the ISI was used as a conduit for US weapons and funding to the
Afghan resistance minus accountability or oversight. This extensively con-
tributed to the strengthening of Pakistan’s military and intelligence structures.
Consequently, the ISI, which served as a PFP instrument in the 1980s, emerged
as a powerful entity with substantial financial and operational resources.
Notably, Pakistan–US cooperation in the 1980s provided Pakistan the oppor-
tunity to secure its western border by enlarging its footprint in Afghanistan and
thereby lessening the threat of a two-front war.
Subsequently, by 1990 an important context had evolved and PFP was driven
by three core security principles: first, territorial integrity based around security
against India in the east through asymmetrical warfare; second, territorial integ-
rity on the western border by influencing internal developments in Afghanistan;
and third, continued pursuit of nuclear capability as a force equalizer against
India. As Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 the disparity in PFP
regional interests and US foreign policy’s global objectives began to cause the
alliance to unfold. These events would play out throughout the 1990s.

Notes
1 George F. Kennan, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs 25:4 (July
1947): 566–582.
2 Department of State Policy Statement with respect to Pakistan, 3 April 1950, in K.
Arif, (ed.), America-Pakistan Relations: Documents (Lahore: Vanguard Books,
1984): 27–28.
3 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Sword: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 2008): 94.
4 JCS, ‘Statement of Effect of Atomic Weapons on National Security and Military
Organization’, 29 March 1946, RG 1, 65, ser. ABC 471.6 Atom (8–17–45), JCS
477/10; JCS, ‘Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States
Armed Forces’, 19 September 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 (5–13–45); JCS 1518 in
Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘The American Conception of National Security and the Begin-
nings of the Cold War, 1945–48’, American Historical Review 89:2 (1984):
346–348, 350, 356.
5 Joint Strategic Plans Committee, JSPC 684/52, ‘Military Requirements for Base
Rights’, 23 March 1949, in K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 15–16.
6 Byroade’s interview with Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000:
Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2001): 47.
7 Memo of Discussion at National Security Council Meetings, 16 and 23 December
1953, NSC Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers, in Robert J. McMahon, ‘United
States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan,
1947–1954’, The Journal of American History 75:3 (December 1988): 812–840, 837.
30 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
8 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
9 Charles W. Lewis to Department of State, 27 October 1947, file 845F.00/10–2747,
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, in Robert
J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994): 66.
10 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 2 (Harvard University
Press, 1980): 84.
11 See Tariq Mahmood, ‘The Durand Line: South Asia’s Next Trouble Spot’, Master’s
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, June 2005, www.ccc.nps.
navy.mil/research/theses/Mahmood05.pdf, accessed March 2011.
12 Robert Jervis ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30:2
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16 Robert J. McMahon, ‘United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a
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17 Knight’s Interview, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign
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tion Centre, Islamabad.
19 K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 33, 35.
20 ‘Assessment of the Soviet Threat to Pakistan and the Armed Forces Needed to Meet
this Threat’, memo dated December 1952, presented to Dulles by Ayub Khan, 23
May 1953, Pakistan, 1953 Folder, SOA Files, DSR, (National Archives) in Dennis
Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 55.
21 Telegram from Dulles to State Department, sent by Consulate General in Istanbul,
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Part 1, in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 56.
22 ‘Area Handbook for Pakistan, American Foreign Areas Studies Division of the
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23 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’, Inter-
national Security 9:4 (Spring 1985): 3–43.
24 Stephen P. Cohen, ‘Security Decision-making in Pakistan’, Report for the Office of
External Research, Department of State (September 1980): 5–24.
25 Statement by Foreign Minister Bhutto on the USIS Press Release, 20 February 1966,
in K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 245–246.
26 Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Big Influence of Small Allies’, Foreign Policy 2 (Spring
1971): 161–182.
27 Hamza Alavi, ‘Pakistan–US Military Alliance’, Economic and Political Weekly
33:25 (August 1998): 1551–1557, 1551.
28 ‘Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on His Visit to India and Pakistan,
1 June 1953 (Extract)’, in K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 77.
29 Memoranda of Discussion at National Security Council Meetings, 16 and 23 Decem-
ber 1953, NSC Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers, in Fredrik Logevall and
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 31
Andrew Preston, Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations: Documents
1969–1977 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 251.
30 Olaf Caroe, The Wells of Power (London: Macmillan, 1951).
31 Memorandum from Bowles to Acheson, 6 December 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. VI,
Part 2, pp. 2191–2202, in Michael J. Lacey, (ed.), The Truman Presidency (New
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‘Case History of a Mistake’, New Republic 10 August 1959: 13.
32 Statement by Eisenhower on the Defence Potential of Pakistan, 25 February 1954, in
K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 90–91.
33 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Concise History, 1947–2009, Second
Edition. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010): 56–58.
34 ‘The Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East Joint Res-
olution 117, The Eisenhower Doctrine’, 9 March 1957, United States Legislation on
Foreign Relations 3: 641–642, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-71/pdf/
STATUTE-71-Pg5–2.pdf, accessed April 2013.
35 ‘US–Pakistan Agreement of Co-operation’, 5 March 1959, in K. Arif, (ed.), Docu-
ments, 156–158.
36 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 56–57.
37 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan The Evolution of an Influence
Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982): 6–8.
38 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984): 138.
39 ‘CENTO: Conversation between Assistant Secretary SISCO and Pakistan Ambas-
sador’, US State Department Communication No. 122987, June 1973, https://history.
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969–76ve08/d58, accessed July 2011.
40 Karachi Embassy Telegram to State Department, 5 November 1962, FRUS,
1961–1963, Vol. 19, p. 370, in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 132.
41 Aide-memoire Transmitted to State Department as an Enclosure to Karachi’s Air-
gram 883, 23 February 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 19, p. 372, https://history.
state.gov, accessed July 2011.
42 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 132.
43 President Ayub’s TV Interview with Michael Maclear of the Canadian Broadcasting
corporation in Rawalpindi (8 May 1964), in K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 230–232.
44 NSC 5409, ‘United States Policy toward South Asia’, 19 February 1954 (Extracts),
in K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 89; ‘Statement of President Eisenhower on the Defence
Potential of Pakistan’, ibid., 90–91; Document 101, Telegram 249640, State Depart-
ment to US Embassy in Turkey, 7 October 1976, 1704Z, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. 8,
Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1969–76, accessed January 2012.
45 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 50–51.
46 Robert J. McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 175–180, 155.
47 The Hindu Maharaja of the predominantly Muslim State of Jammu and Kashmir had
signed a ‘standstill agreement’ with Pakistan until he decided whether to join India
or Pakistan after partition. In October 1947, in the wake of communal violence
against Muslims in Kashmir, Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan’s Frontier Province,
supported by the Pakistan Government, invaded Kashmir. The Maharaja hurriedly
signed the Instrument of Accession in favour of India in return for Indian armed
assistance. The then Governor-General Lord Mountbatten favoured Kashmir’s tem-
porary accession to India prior to a referendum or plebiscite. Pakistan immediately
contested the accession, suggesting that it was deceitful, that the Maharaja had acted
under duress and that he had violated the standstill agreement. India, on the basis of
this accession, however has since claimed ownership of the entire state including
the one-third that Pakistan managed to acquire during the war. The conflict turned
into a regular India-Pakistan war in May 1948 that lasted until ceasefire in
January 1949. In the 1950s, the Indian Government distanced itself from its
32 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
commitment to hold a plebiscite. This was firstly because Pakistani armed forces,
in view of distrust of Indian intentions, had not been withdrawn from Kashmir
and secondly because elections affirming the state’s status as part of India had
been held. Both Pakistan and the United Nations said that a referendum be held
to judge the fairness of the election. For an analysis of the conflict see Victoria
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2010).
48 Documents number 631 to 822 Contain Details of US Efforts to Resolve Kashmir
Dispute from January 1951 to November 1954 in FRUS, 1952–1954, Africa and
South Asia, Vol. XI, Part 2, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus
1952–54v11p2/ch2, accessed November 2012.
49 UN Affairs Officer Howard Meyers and Assistant Secretary McGhee Interviews in
Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 31.
50 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1435. http://digicoll.
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ze=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=1435, accessed 19 December 2015
51 Interview with Dr Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
52 Robert J. McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, 175, 338.
53 ‘Milestones: 1953–1960: The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organ-
ization (CENTO)’, www.history.state.gov/milestones/1953–1960/cento, accessed
August 2011; ‘CENTO Command Structure’, Memorandum from the Assistant Sec-
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history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958–60v12/d93, accessed August 2011.
54 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 62.
55 Lippmann’s Interview with Ronald Steel, quoted in Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann
and the American Century (London: The Bodley Head, 1980): 504.
56 Henry Byroade’s Interview with Kux in Disenchanted Allies, 62.
57 A.G. Noorani, ‘The Enduring Triangle’, www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1822/
18220760.htm, accessed 25 September 2011.
58 Interview with Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
59 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 61.
60 Dawn, Karachi, 26 September 1955.
61 Pakistan Times, 20 September 1956.
62 ‘Pakistan: The New Dictatorship’, Time, 8 November 1954, http://content.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,857631,00.html, accessed 4 February 2011.
63 Tariq Ali, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power (Toronto:
Scribner, 2008): 59.
64 Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace; Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global
Jihad (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011): 14.
65 For details see Murad Ali, ‘US Foreign Aid to Pakistan and Democracy: An Over-
view’, Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, 29:2 (December 2009): 247–258.
66 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
67 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
68 Tahir Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 5–6, 24–26.
69 Report of the 3 January 1957 NSC Meeting, in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted
Allies, 84.
70 W. Averell Harriman Statement before the Senate CFR hearings on Mutual Security
Act of 1959, 8 May 1959, in K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 163–164.
71 Bowles to Kennedy (29 January 1953), Folder 268, Box 95, Bowles Papers, in
McMahon, ‘United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia’, 830.
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 33
72 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 64.
73 Norman D. Palmer, The United States and India: The Dimensions of Influence (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1984): 119–125.
74 A.G. Noorani, ‘The Enduring Triangle’.
75 Stephen P. Cohen, ‘US Weapons and South Asia’, 50–52.
76 Stephen P. Cohen, ‘Security Decision-making in Pakistan’ Report, 5–24.
77 Dawn, Karachi, 10 April 1963.
78 Robert G. Wirsing, ‘The Arms Race in South Asia: Implications for the United
States’, Asian Survey 25:3 (March 1985): 265–291.
79 Henry Kissinger, Book Review, John Lewis Gaddis, George F Kennan: An
American Life, www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/books/review/george-f-kennan-
an-american-life-by-john-lewis-gaddis-book-review.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all,
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80 Letter from Kennedy to Ayub Khan in a Telegram from the Department of State to
the Embassy in Pakistan, 28 October 1962, 2:42 p.m., FRUS, Vol. XIX, pp. 358–359,
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accessed June 2012.
81 Statement by USAID Administrator before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 22 March 1965, in K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 233.
82 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967):
150–153; Mohammed Ayub Khan, ‘The Pakistan–American Alliance: Stresses and
Strains’, Foreign Affairs 42:2 (1964): 195–209.
83 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff to the President’s Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, 6 January 1962,
USFR, Vol. XIX, pp. 179–181, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1961–63v19/comp1, accessed 4 December 2011.
84 Quoted in Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, 150.
85 ‘Prospects for Pakistan’, Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, 5 July
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gove/historicaldocuments/frus1961–63v19/d29, accessed December 2012.
86 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, 153.
87 Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
88 Joint Communiqué of President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Mac-
Millan on their talks in Sussex, 30 June 1963, in K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 222.
89 K. Arif, (ed.), Documents, 236.
90 Interview with Sardar Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
91 Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
92 Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Big Influence of Small Allies’, Foreign Policy 2 (Spring
1971): 161–182.
93 Document ID 01138: 0640082, from American Consul Dacca, 4 April 1971; Docu-
ment ID 00959, from American Consul Dacca, 28 March 1971, www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB8.pdf, accessed January 2012.
94 ‘Policy Options toward Pakistan’, Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard
Nixon, 28 April 1971, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB9.pdf,
accessed 7 January 2012.
95 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 131.
96 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1979): 895.
97 Christopher Van Hollen, ‘The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics
and South Asia’, Asian Survey 20:4 (April 1980): 339–361.
34 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
98 Thomas Perry Thornton, ‘Between the Stools: US Policy towards Pakistan during
the Carter Administration’, Asian Survey 22:10 (October 1982): 959–977.
99 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from
Nixon to Reagan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985): 268.
100 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, 913–915; Transcript of Telephone Con-
versation between Secretary of the Treasury Connally and Kissinger, Washington,
DC 5 December 1971, http://2001–2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7txt/49196.
htm, accessed 4 January 2012.
101 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
102 Stephen P. Cohen, ‘Security Decision-making in Pakistan’, 5–24.
103 No2908, Memorandum of Conversation, Brent Scowcroft to Henry Kissinger,
‘Nixon and Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed’, 23 May 1974, http://cdn.geraldford
foundation.org/memcons/1552709.pdf, accessed 16 July 2011.
104 See for details Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004): 21–37.
105 Steve Coll, ‘Anatomy of a Victory: CIA’s Covert Afghan War’, Washington Post,
20 July 1992, A12.
106 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 248.
107 Marvin Weinbaum, ‘War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role’, Middle
East Journal 45:1 (1991): 71–85, 71.
108 For Siachen Dispute see Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security Under Zia,
1977–1988: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State (New York: St Mar-
tin’s Press, 1991): 143–194; also, Talat Farooq, ‘Bring the Boys Home’, The News, 11
April 2011, www.thenews.com.pk/writer/talat-farooq, accessed 5 December 2015.
109 See Muhammad Yusuf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold
Story, 5th Ed. (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 2003).
110 Interview with Asad Durrani, Islamabad (24 April 2012).
111 Steve Coll, ‘Anatomy of a Victory’, Washington Post, 20 July 1992, A12.
112 Larry Pressler, ‘The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program’,
Senate, 31 July 1992, Congressional Record 102nd Congress, (1991–1992), http://
rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S__Archives; http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=102 accessed December 2011; Declas-
sified Documents, ‘The United States and Pakistan’s Quest for the Bomb’, www2.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/, accessed 17 June 2011.
113 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords (London: Pan Macmil-
lan, 2001): 129–130.
114 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
115 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
116 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
117 Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October 2011).
118 See Declassified US Documents Showing Reagan Era Tensions over Pakistan’s
Nuclear Program, www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb377/, accessed 9
February 2013.
119 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
120 Cordovez Diego and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the
Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002): 389–390.
121 Rosanne Klass, ‘Afghanistan: The Accords’, Foreign Affairs 66:5 (Summer 1988):
922–945.
122 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
123 Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 935–936.
124 Interview with Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi, Rawalpindi (17 August 2011).
125 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 35
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38 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance
1976, 1704Z, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. 8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976.
Accessed 8 January 2012. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76.
Documents number 631 to 822 on Kashmir – Foreign Relations of the United States,
1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Vol. XI, part 2. Accessed 14 November 2012.
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/ch2.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 5, p. 1435. Accessed 19 Decem-
ber 2015. http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.
FRUS1950v05&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=1435.
Extract, ‘Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on His Visit to India and Paki-
stan’. 1 June 1953.
JCS, ‘Statement of Effect of Atomic Weapons on National Security and Military Organ-
ization’. 29 March 1946, RG 1, 65, ser. ABC 471.6 Atom (8–17–45), JCS 477/10.
JCS, ‘Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States Armed Forces’.
19 September 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 (5–13–45), JCS 1518.
Joint Communiqué of President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan
on their talks in Sussex, 30 June 1963.
Joint Strategic Plans Committee, JSPC 684/52, ‘Military Requirements for Base Rights’.
23 March 1949.
Karachi Embassy Telegram to State Department, 5 November 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963,
Vol. 19, p. 370.
Knight’s Interview. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs
Oral History Project, 23 October 1990, p. 6. Accessed 4 November 2011. www.adst.
org/OH%20TOCs/Knight,%20Ridgway%20B%20.toc.pdf.
Larry Pressler. ‘The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program’.
Senate, 31 July 1992, Congressional Record 102nd Congress (1991–1992). Accessed 15
December 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=102.
Letter from Kennedy to Ayub Khan in a Telegram from the Department of State to the
Embassy in Pakistan, 28 October 1962, 2:42 p.m., FRUS, Vol. XIX, pp. 358–359.
Accessed 18 June 2012. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/
d186.
Memorandum from Bowles to Acheson, 6 December 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 2,
pp. 2191–2202.
Memo of Discussion at National Security Council Meetings, 16 and 23 December 1953,
NSC Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers.
Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff to the President’s Special Assist-
ant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, 6 January 1962, USFR,
Vol. XIX, pp. 179–181. Accessed 15 December 2011. http://history.state.gov/historical-
documents/frus1961-63v19/comp1.
Milestones: 1953–1960: The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO). Accessed 9 August 2011. www.history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/cento.
Minutes of Cabinet Discussion, 9 September 1947, 67/CF/47, National Documentation
Centre, Islamabad.
NSC 5409, ‘United States Policy Towards South Asia’. 19 February 1954.
‘Policy Options toward Pakistan’. Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon,
28 April 1971. Accessed 5 January 2012. www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB79/BEBB9.pdf.
‘Prospects for Pakistan’. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, 5 July 1961,
FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. XIX, South Asia, Document 29. Accessed 7 December 2012.
http://history.state.gove/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d29.
 The US–Pakistan Cold War alliance 39
Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for NEA George Allen before the House CFA
on the Mutual Security Act of 1956, 24 April 1956 in K. Arif, (ed.), American-Pakistan
Relations: Documents (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984): 122.
Statement by Eisenhower on the Defense Potential of Pakistan, 25 February 1954, in K.
Arif, (ed.), American-Pakistan Relations: Documents (Lahore: Vanguard Books,
1984): 90–91.
Statement by Foreign Minister Bhutto on the USIS Press Release, 20 February 1966, in
K. Arif, (ed.), American-Pakistan Relations: Documents (Lahore: Vanguard Books,
1984): 245–246.
Statement by USAID Administrator before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
22 March 1965, in K. Arif, (ed.), American-Pakistan Relations: Documents (Lahore:
Vanguard Books, 1984): 233.
Telegram from Dulles to State Department, sent by Consulate General in Istanbul, 26
May 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. 9, Part 1.
The Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East Joint Resolution
117, The ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’. 9 March 1957, United States Legislation on Foreign
Relations, Vol. 3, pp. 641–642. Accessed 2 April 2013. www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
STATUTE-71/pdf/STATUTE-71-Pg5-2.pdf.
Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of the Treasury Connally and
Kissinger, Washington, 5 December 1971. Accessed 5 January 2012. http://2001-2009.
state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7txt/49196.htm.
US Documents Showing Reagan Era Tensions over Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.
Accessed 17 February 2013. www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb377/.
W. Averell Harriman, Statement before the Senate CFR hearings on Mutual Security Act
of 1959, 8 May 1959.

Interviews
Ali, Sardar Assef Ahmad. Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan in Benazir Bhutto’s
Cabinet, 1993–1996 (Islamabad, 19 September 2011).
Amin, Dr Tahir. Director, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, former Head of the
Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and author
(Islamabad, 12 July 2011).
Beg, General Mirza Aslam (Retired). Former Chief of Army Staff, 1988–1991
(Rawalpindi, 2 July 2011).
Bokhari, Admiral Fasih (Retired). Former Chief of Naval Staff, 1997–1999 (Islamabad,
15 July 2011).
Durrani, Lt General Asad (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence,
1990–1992 (Islamabad, 24 April 2012).
Gul, Lt General Hamid (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence,
1987–1989 (Rawalpindi, 13 July 2011).
Khattak, Afrasyab. Senator, left-wing, pro-Soviet politician and former President Awami
National Party (Peshawar, 18 October 2011).
Krepon, Michael. Arms Control Official in the Clinton administration and Co-founder of
the Stimson Center and political/defence analyst (Skype Interview, 3 February 2012).
Nawaz, Shuja. Director South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council and author (Telephonic
Interview, 19 January 2012).
Qazi, Javed Ashraf Lt General (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelli-
gence, 1993–1995 (Rawalpindi, 17 August 2011).
2 Out in the cold
Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
(1989–1993)

We were in a terrible military state in the aftermath of the Afghan–Soviet war

and Bush era [nuclear]sanctions added to our problems considerably . . . our
economy in the 1990s was plunging down . . . the military was very hard-pressed.
India was spending on conventional and nuclear weapons and Afghanistan was in
turmoil . . . the Americans left us in the lurch.
General Pervez Musharraf 1

Musharraf ’s words sum up Islamabad’s security concerns at the beginning of the

new decade. In February 1989, the Soviet Union evacuated the last of its forces
from Afghanistan, signalling the end of the Soviet–Afghan War and a general
thawing of the Cold War. In the wake of these events, the US lost interest in
both further involvement in Afghanistan and cooperation with Pakistan. Islama-
bad was left facing sanctions over its nuclear program imposed by the George
H.W. Bush administration, a slowing economy and the strain of a continuing
arms race with India.
Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, Pakistan did not experience
any relief from its regional security competition with India. PFP’s security and
economic stakes in Afghanistan and the post-conflict fallout ensured the con-
tinuation of Islamabad’s role in political and strategic developments in Afghani-
stan. The Geneva Accords that paved the way for Soviet withdrawal had not
provided for an interim Afghan Government and instead left the Soviet-backed
Najibullah regime intact in Kabul. The weakness of this regime, combined with
a lack of Soviet support inevitably led to an armed power struggle with anti-
Soviet–Afghan fighters.
As a result, Pakistan was faced with continued instability on its western
border and fears of increased Indian involvement in Afghanistan. On one hand,
the Bush administration did not actively and adequately support the UN to help
form a broad-based Afghan Government; on the other, the CIA’s efforts to
manipulate rival Afghan factions struggling for control of Kabul aggravated
Islamabad’s regional security concerns. Bush’s approach, moreover, suggests an
agenda to curb the ISI so as to undermine Pakistan’s strategic ambitions in
Afghanistan. An empowered ISI had, by 1989, begun to apply CIA-taught skills
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 41
in asymmetric warfare to Indian-administered Kashmir. The policy of the US
administration was aimed at preventing the installation of a Pakistan-friendly,
Mujahedeen-led broad-based government in Kabul so as to discourage potential
security and economic cooperation between Muslim Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan,
Central Asia and communist China.
Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons emerged as issue of serious concern
during the Bush presidency. Reports of Chinese assistance in Pakistan’s missile
program and an alleged Pakistan–Iran understanding on the transfer of nuclear
technology added to Congressional concerns, which influenced Bush’s approach
towards Islamabad. Punitive sanctions aimed at forcing Islamabad to roll back
its nuclear program mandated the suspension of all military and economic aid to
a country that had been largely dependent on US military assistance throughout
the Cold War years. This development benefitted India as it was able to enhance
its conventional capability while pressing on with its nuclear build-up, unfettered
by US restrictions.
This combination of US disapproval of Pakistan’s nuclear program and a
diminished interest in a strategic partnership had an impact on the formulation of
PFP. Amid sweeping changes in the international environment, Pakistan’s
regional security interests and US global security objectives clashed once more
and served as immediate catalysts for the bilateral relationship.
After the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, the United States emerged as
the sole superpower in the world. The United States led the world in military
power, higher education, scientific research and technology.2 American dis-
course during this period focused on the future role of the US in the international
system and spawned a number of competing and over-lapping policy prescrip-
tions. Before moving on to examine the dynamics of the changing bilateral rela-
tionship let us contextualize the American approach towards Pakistan’s regional
goals by discussing broad aspects of the American discourse.

Replacing containment

A sure sign that experts are encountering difficulty with figuring something
out is their use of ‘post’ as a prefix [before ‘Cold War’]. Such a label reveals
that people know only where they have been, not where they are now, much
less where they are heading.
Richard Haass3

Haass’s words reflect an accurate description of the post-Cold War US quest to

adopt sensible new guiding principles for its foreign policy. The collapse of the
Soviet Union in December 1991 heralded an era of fundamental systemic and
structural changes in the world order. The Bush administration’s single term in
office straddled this collapse and it was left with the task of replacing the now
obsolete strategy of Soviet containment. As Clinton moved into the White
House, his first post-Cold war administration felt that ‘. . . absent a reversal in
42 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Russia, there is no-near term threat [that] holds the same immediate dangers for
us’.4 This liberating sentiment helped drive the quest for a post-containment
foreign policy onwards.
These two administrations sought new guiding principles amid a backdrop of
an enthusiastic academic and journalistic discourse on the post-Cold War role of
the US in the world. The collapse of the Soviet threat was greeted with tri-
umphant proclamations of the ‘end of history’5 and the ‘unipolar moment’.6 New
cultural fault lines were identified along with potential sources of future ‘civili-
zational clashes’7 even as America the ‘benevolent hegemon’8 was hailed as the
harbinger of global stability.9 Some policy prescriptions favoured retrenchment10
– a reduction in overseas commitments, a reallocation of funds to domestic con-
cerns, others supported an activist foreign policy and deep global engagement.
The United States, according to Melvyn Leffler and Michel Cox, has long
desired a US-led political, military and economic world order.11 Accordingly
when realists, neo-conservatives and internationalists debated the structural
issues of unipolarity12 and multipolarity,13 or prescribed the strategies of multilat-
eralism/unilateralism,14 selective engagement15 and the use of soft power,16 the
shared aim was to maintain the post-Cold War global dominance of the US.
A policy of deep engagement makes two key assumptions: the supremacy of
American political and economic values; and the benevolence of an American
world order. This benevolence will not necessarily be readily apparent to weaker
states subjected to unilateral US actions however. An overwhelmingly unequal
distribution of relative power is more likely to spawn fear rather than reverence
in weaker states. It is thus a case of perceiving the international system through
the lens of an American self-image as a power for good. Hence, the US dis-
course largely expresses a desire for the preservation of raw military and eco-
nomic prowess in idealistic terms. As Seymour Lipset points out, ‘Americans
must define their role in a conflict as being on God’s side against Satan, for
morality against evil, not, in its self-perception, to defend national interests’.17
Given this context, isolationism i.e. a withdrawal from major global military
entanglements – a recurring pattern in the history of US foreign relations – did
not appear to be an option in view of the economic interdependence of the world
and advancements in military technology,18 despite efforts to promote the
‘America First’ approach.19 Thus, the first Gulf War against Iraq (1990–1991)
signalled an end to the Cold War-era politics as the Soviets did not object to
Bush’s multilateral campaign against their erstwhile client, Iraq. It also signalled
that the end of the Cold War did not mean an end to American global activism.
Addressing the Congress in the fall of 1990, Bush argued that a new inter-
national order was emerging: ‘a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of
the jungle’.20 Later, during his State of the Union address he warned that the
world’s oil resources were at risk of falling into the hands of aggressive states
‘to finance further aggression’ and advocated building peace based on ‘shared
principles and the rule of law’ under American global leadership.21 It was clearly
a case of linking US military power with economic interests and the desire for
collective security. He appeared to reject the concept of American ‘overstretch’
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 43
and his emphasis on multilateralism demonstrated an understanding of the limits
of American power.22 Bush, a foreign policy pragmatist who confessed to being
deficient in ‘that vision thing’, perceived his New World Order as a means of
furthering democracy, prosperity and the rule of international law.23
The message that the US projected to the world was somewhat uncertain and
meant many things to many people. The US attempted to simultaneously balance
somewhat contradictory postures – it wished to position itself as the pre-eminent
nation on one hand while making efforts to strengthen international institutions
on the other. During the Gulf War for example, Bush worked to build a UN-
sanctioned coalition to fight the war, but also placed the US firmly in
command.24
According to Brzezinski ‘order’ suggested stability to the traditionalist
conservatives who believe in status quo and slow change; to the ‘reformers’ the
adjective ‘new’ suggested a rearrangement of priorities; while the international-
ists understood the word ‘world’ as implying universality of American values.25
This vagueness provided the US with considerable freedom of action – it could
choose between multilateralist and unilateralist responses without being con-
strained by international institutions. It was obvious that as a believer in power
politics, Bush did not want to place restraints on American power by making
foreign policy decisions subservient to international institutions. It is against the
nature of the powerful to willingly surrender their interests; such a course of
action would need to be motivated by ideology and according to Hyland, ‘. . . [The
Bush] administration’s main theme [was] not ideology but pragmatism; prudent
approaches carried out by skilled practitioners’.26
Accordingly, Bush’s team – Secretary of State James Baker, National
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, second
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Colin Powell – were more concerned with practical operational efficiency
rather than the ‘vision thing’.27
In spite of this focus on pragmatism, there were two competing visions within
the Bush administration. The Defense Policy Guidance 1992 (DPG) – drafted by
Undersecretary Wolfowitz’s aide Zalmay Khalilzad and leaked to Pat Tyler of
the New York Times in March 1992 – demonstrates Secretary of Defense
Cheney’s preference for unilateral use of American military might to obviate the
rise of rival powers.28 Conversely, Secretary of State Eagleburger’s twenty-two-
page memo to his successor Warren Christopher offers a more complex assess-
ment of post-Cold War challenges – nuclear proliferation, ethnic conflicts and
economic interdependence – and asserts that the US should lead by example, not
fear.29
One might argue that Cheney’s guiding principles emerge from the dynamics
of the ‘unipolar moment’ while Eagleburger’s memo appears to favour the
concept of the US as a ‘benevolent hegemon’, capable of humanitarian interven-
tion and the formation of coalitions to resolve conflicts. Bush’s New World
Order borrowed elements from both of these opposing visions; he was willing to
act unilaterally, but was pragmatic about embracing multilateralism where is
44 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
seemed prudent.30 Given that at this point the US was burdened by a massive
budget deficit in a world where the resurgence of a weakened but intact Soviet
Union remained a source of concern, Bush had reason to act pragmatically.31
Unlike the Bush administration, Clinton’s team entered the White House well
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and was not preoccupied with Cold War
dynamics.
A study group under Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake com-
prising NSC members Jeremy Rosner, Leon Fuerth and Donald Steinberg
embarked upon the task of finding a suitable doctrine to replace containment. In
keeping with the prescriptions of internationalist policy their strategy document
recommended ‘democracy enlargement’,32 a concept that made the promotion of
democracy and free markets the principal aim of the Clinton administration.33 It
was thought that the ‘character of the foreign regimes’ could impact US
security34 and that in response the US should aim to contain reactionary regimes
and pursue select humanitarian goals.35
Concurrently, Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspin conducted a Bottom-up
Review (BUR) that assumed that the future of military operations would emerge
from the strategy of engagement, partnership and prevention. This perspective
envisioned US internationalism as being committed to not only multilateralism
but also ‘assertive multilateralism’, which involved the use of US military
power.36
Flowing from a belief in the ‘unipolar moment’, the concept signalled that
while many states and cultures perceived themselves as unique the US had the
military power to back up its self-image. In the context of US domestic politics
it suggested a desire to ameliorate the image of the Democrats as being averse to
using military force and being ‘temperamentally scarred by Vietnam’.37
Clearly, much like the neo-conservatives, Anthony Lake and Les Aspen saw
democracy and the free market economy as ethical and desirable systems, which
should be spread through the application of American power. Subsequently,
Clinton integrated the ideas of Lake and Aspin in his successive National
Security Strategy (NSS) statements,38 emphasizing domestic prosperity as the
linchpin of his foreign policy strategy.39 Clinton’s approach evidently assumed
that in an increasingly economically interdependent world US engagement with
non-democratic states would eventually serve as a catalyst for their regimes.40
Clinton’s aide Sidney Blumenthal along with historian James Chace coined the
term, ‘the indispensable nation’ in 1996 which envisioned American power as
the primary guarantor of global peace and prosperity, thus legitimizing its efforts
to promote democracy and the free market economy.41
Separating moral from hard security issues, however, was not easy and the
effort to do so had its supporters and detractors.42 On one hand, it was reminis-
cent of the ideological and universal dimensions of the Cold War era where the
periphery had been deemed vital to US interests; on the other, it was an attempt
to inject an idealistic approach into an otherwise pragmatic American foreign
policy based on power politics, a combination that had consistently marked the
history of US foreign relations.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 45
Clinton’s failure in Somalia – where eighteen US marines on a humanitarian
mission, were killed by a mob in Mogadishu and Haiti where a US ship carrying
military trainers was turned back by local demonstrators, as well as his economic
interests in undemocratic China, reduced the emphasis on democracy enlarge-
ment in the overarching strategic framework.43 Subsequently, critics viewed his
foreign policy contradictions44 as being a reflection of Clinton’s lack of interest
in foreign affairs, especially during his first term when he leaned heavily on his
advisers – Christopher, Lake, Aspin, Berger and Albright.45 Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell dismissed White House foreign
policy sessions as ‘coffee-house meetings’ and although his second term saw a
more engaged Bill Clinton, ‘neither the president, nor vice president Al Gore or
Secretary of State Albright took charge’.46
That said, the goal of nuclear non-proliferation, a key factor in US–Pakistan
relations, remained a consistent foreign policy priority for both Bush and Clinton47
against the backdrop of academic discourse on nuclear deterrence and its regional
and nationalistic dimensions.48 The break-up of the Soviet Union had resulted in
four independent nuclear weapons states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and
Belarus. The danger of nuclear weapons or technology falling into the wrong
hands gained importance following post-Cold War ethnic, nationalist and religious
tensions and the rise of transnational militant groups. It was deemed important by
the US to ensure that the nuclear arsenal was located only in Russia.
Thus, the control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons emerged,
according to Clinton, as ‘one of our nation’s highest priorities’ in an increasingly
globalizing world.49 Indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and his proposal for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) reflected Clin-
ton’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. So did his signing of the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) despite its later rejection by the senate.
While the Bush-era DPG and the Eagleburger memo offered competing
visions of the future of US foreign policy, there was nevertheless a consensus on
the importance of preventing the rise of new nuclear powers. Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program therefore re-emerged as an important foreign policy issue
before Clinton entered the White House. Post-Cold War American budgetary
problems, diminishing public interest in foreign affairs and renewed Congres-
sional focus on nuclear non-proliferation influenced Bush’s approach towards
Islamabad as early as 1989.

Pakistan and Bush after the Soviet–Afghan conflict

As Soviet forces began to withdraw from Afghanistan, the US interest in the
region began to decline. Unlike the US, however, Pakistan could not disentangle
itself from its western neighbour because of its strategic stakes; these are
explainable on three levels:
First, Pakistan was hosting nearly three million Afghan refugees50 and a
heavily armed and mobile Pashtun Afghan resistance with easy access to Paki-
stan’s semi-autonomous FATAs following the softening of borders during the
46 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Soviet–Afghan War. This stoked Islamabad’s historical fears of Pashtun nation-
alism within the tribes living on both sides of the border. Irredentist elements
within the refugee community and an Afghan resistance acting in concert with
domestic Pashtun ‘could conceivably secure a domestic political voice, creating
a de facto Pashtunistan’.51
The former governor of Pakistan’s frontier province Ali Jan Aurakzai, who
hails from FATA, argued that there has never been a real threat of a ‘Greater
Pashtunistan’ because traditionally ‘the tribal people on the Pakistan–Afghani-
stan border have looked eastwards and not westwards [towards Afghanistan] for
prosperity’.52 However it should not be discounted that the end of the Cold War
meant that there would be a decline in great power supervision to keep a lid on
indigenous rivalries. Given the opportunity India could foment trouble to
destabilize Pakistan’s FATA in response to Islamabad’s ongoing support for the
indigenous uprising in Indian-held Kashmir.
Secondly, Pakistan’s former president and Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
Pervez Musharraf explained during the interview that prior to the 1980s Pakistan
had always followed a ‘strategy of military deterrence on our eastern border;
never in the west’ but the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ‘changed our stra-
tegic thinking. . . . [and thereafter] ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul became
our strategic priority.’53
Musharraf ’s words reflect the security fear that the former ISI chief Asad
Durrani termed the ‘nutcracker-dilemma’ that stemmed from ‘India-friendly
Afghanistan on our western border and a hostile India in the east’.54 Since ‘Paki-
stan’s territory lacks depth’, argues defence analyst Hasan Askari, it creates
‘serious handicaps’ for the military. The main railroad link from south to north
runs parallel to the India–Pakistan border and no Pakistani military airfield
except Quetta is more than 150 miles from the Indian border. There are hardly
any natural barriers especially in the Punjab area.55 Securing a friendly govern-
ment in Afghanistan, which could provide Pakistan with operational as well as
psychological advantages was thus necessary to counterbalance India’s funda-
mental geographic advantage.
Third, dissolution of the Soviet Union had resulted in the emergence of five
predominantly Muslim states in Central Asia i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Pakistan could thus access Central
Asian markets and energy resources via Afghanistan – a possibility which
offered security and economic benefits. Former ISI chief Hamid Gul, who was
heading the agency in 1989, saw this as ‘a historic window of opportunity . . .
[thus] friendly-government in Kabul was strategically very important for us’.
Instability in Afghanistan – exacerbated by the strategic disengagement of the
US – directly affected Pakistan’s security. But the Bush administration, accord-
ing to Gul, failed to appreciate ‘Pakistan’s long-term interest in post-conflict
political arrangements to ensure that Kabul will not conspire with New Delhi
against Islamabad’s security interests’.56
The Geneva Accords of April 1988 – which ended the Afghan–Soviet conflict
– explicitly demanded non-interference by external actors, to allow Afghans to
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 47
resolve their disputes in keeping with their cultural and tribal traditions.
However, the Accords left the Soviet-backed Najibullah Government in power
without any provision for the formation of an interim government, forcing anti-
Soviet Afghan fighters to continue their armed opposition to the puppet regime.
Aslam Beg, COAS between 1988 and 1991 argued that ‘it was Reagan who had
planned disengagement before he left office . . . Bush merely implemented his
plan.’57 Beg’s premise is substantiated by the fact that Reagan’s post-Accords
policy of aiding anti-Najibullah forces – a response to the flow of Soviet aid to
Najibullah – was continued by the Bush administration.58 This continued inter-
ference by both powers prolonged the civil war in Afghanistan and also provided
Pakistan’s ISI the space it needed to continue with its intervention in Afghani-
stan. In September 1991, the Soviet Union and the US, working towards ending
the Cold War, agreed to cut off aid to both sides.59 Unsurprisingly, by April 1992
the Najibullah regime collapsed.
The Peshawar-based Mujahedeen leadership of the resistance was highly
factionalized. Accordingly, a feasible political alternative was missing post-
Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and later in 1992 when the Najibullah Government
collapsed.60 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s administration – guided by the
military establishment61 – stepped in to guide the formation of an interim gov-
ernment. Consequently, the Peshawar Accord was signed at the Governor’s
House in April 1992, followed by the Islamabad Accord in March 1993. Afghan
Interim Government (AIG) was formed with a rotational head of government
drawn from different ethnic groups until the final settlement. However, Pres-
ident Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, who became the first president, refused to
transfer power to the Pashtun Gulbadin Hekmatyar, leading to long drawn
battles.62 Critics point out that the Pakistan-sponsored Afghan council was
unrepresentative of all Afghan groups and comprised only ISI-backed religious
parties.63
‘Pakistan has always had a stake in Afghanistan because of its security
interests’, agreed Karl Inderfurth, ‘if its legitimate interests are not addressed
there can be no peace in Afghanistan . . . it is as true now [after 9/11] as it was
then’.64 Inderfurth shared these thoughts in the 2012 interview conducted for
this book; however there is no available evidence that he aired this perspective
publicly as Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton administration
(1997–2001).
Similarly, writing in 2008, Brzezinski points out that the United States ‘made
little effort to galvanize the international community to help Afghanistan sta-
bilize politically and recover economically’.65 Yet, in 1988 Brzezinski, along
with Kissinger, advised the Bush administration against getting involved in
Afghan affairs or the formation of the interim government.66 Expecting the UN
to stabilize the situation without active support from the US was unrealistic. The
UN tried with scant success to promote the peace settlement, according to Ift-
ikhar Murshed, who was Pakistan’s special envoy to Afghanistan (1996–2000):
‘The US provided some humanitarian aid and verbal support to the UN in some
areas. This was not enough’.67
48 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Karl Inderfurth, who witnessed the Soviet withdrawal as a journalist in 1989,
agreed that the UN ‘cannot by itself exert strong influence unless supported by
the five permanent members of the Security Council’. During the Afghanistan
crises the UN had ‘little institutional autonomy from its member-states [and] was
dependent on their material and political capital; it could never have acted effect-
ively in the absence of American support’.68
That full-fledged US support was not forthcoming was not unexpected. The
US behaved like a realist power, according to Durrani: ‘we always knew they
were going to withdraw once their Soviet-specific goal was achieved and we
were not shocked’.69 Gul endorsed Durrani’s pragmatic explanation with an
emotional one. ‘Bush was merely behaving in keeping with how the US has
always behaved with Pakistan . . . using us for their strategic interests and then
discarding us in favor of India’.70
From these two perspectives, it is apparent that Pakistan was fully aware of
the pattern of convergence and divergence in its partnership with the US. The
DPG recommended ‘rebuilding’ a ‘constructive relationship’ with Pakistani
military for stability in Southwest and Central Asia.71 That the Pentagon still per-
ceived Pakistan as a useful ally in the Middle East is confirmed by US media
reports highlighting the Pentagon’s discomfort with Congressional efforts to
penalize Islamabad for its nuclear ambitions.72
There is evidence that between 1990 and 1994 there were some useful con-
tacts between the two militaries. In 1994, joint high altitude combat military
exercises were conducted by Pakistan and the US, causing concern in India that
such ‘growing US Pakistan military ties’ could be a threat.73 Given that India
and Pakistan are locked in a confrontation on the Siachen glacier – the highest
battlefield in the world – it is not surprising that India interpreted the exercises as
a show of support by the US. Similarly, joint naval exercises were conducted in
1993–1994. That US–Pakistan links did not fracture suddenly is also borne out
by the approach of some State Department officials such as Howard Schaffer,
who favoured close ties with Pakistan.74
Academic Thornton saw Pakistan ‘as the key’ to the US role in ‘the evolving
situation in Afghanistan’ and the Gulf.75 Confirming this stance Beg argued that
‘the Pentagon still needed Pakistan; they wanted our support for American
efforts in the First Gulf War; they wanted us to send troops to defend Saudi
Arabia’.76 To this journalist and author Zahid Hussain added that, ‘[it was] 1993
onwards [that] there was a complete cut-off between Pakistan military and the
Pentagon . . . old traditional links reduced; training programs cancelled . . . there
was massive resentment and anti-American feeling within the military’.77
In a 1994 column, Pakistani journalist Syed Mushahid Hussain maintains that
the US still perceived Pakistan as a potential observation post for the surveil-
lance of China, Iran and Central Asia. Nevertheless, he correctly sees this
intimacy to be inadequate from the Pakistani perspective as it did not involve the
provision of US military aid,78 an inadequacy that stemmed from the re-
emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program as an important Congressional issue
by 1989. Thus it may be surmised that although institutional links between the
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 49
two militaries did not rupture suddenly, these began to come under strain during
the Bush presidency.
American disinterest was not entirely to the detriment of Pakistan. US disen-
gagement allowed the ISI to continue influencing developments in Kabul. It also
allowed them to take advantage of an indigenous uprising in Indian-controlled
Kashmir – which arose out of local grievances against the Indian Government –
by conducting proxy warfare using many of the same tools and methods that had
previously been applied against the Soviets in Afghanistan. This was seen as a
way to tie up Indian troops while simultaneously diverting Afghan fighters away
from stirring up trouble in FATA. Furthermore, it could offset the Indian role in
the post-Afghan War regional security dilemma.
Growing Indian conventional military power, its unimpeded quest for nuclear
weapons and active support for India-friendly non-Pashtun groups in Afghani-
stan were matters of serious concern for Islamabad. The imposition of nuclear
sanctions at this juncture was therefore the key catalyst for the bilateral
relationship.

Pakistan’s nuclear program and Bush

On 30 July 1992 Senator Glenn testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations that:

On March 28, 1984, this Committee adopted an amendment offered by Sen-

ators Cranston and Glenn providing that no assistance shall be furnished and
‘no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Paki-
stan’ unless The president could first certify that Pakistan does not possess a
nuclear explosive device, is not developing a nuclear device, and is not
acquiring goods to make such a device. On April 3, 1984, the Committee
narrowly voted to reconsider this amendment and adopted instead a substi-
tute offered by Senator Pressler, Mathias and Percy, which tied the con-
tinuation of aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that
Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid will
reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess such a device.79

The latter legislation came to be known as the Pressler Amendment to US

Foreign Assistance Act. Initially, it was supported by Pakistan because it diluted
the more stringent Symington (1976) and Glenn (1977) Amendments with no
caveats.80 During the Soviet–Afghan conflict, Presidents Reagan and Bush had
continued to issue an annual certification that Pakistan did not possess nuclear
weapons capability. Congress accepted this because the Afghan conflict was at a
crucial stage ‘rather than with any assurance that Pakistan had really down-
graded its nuclear program’.81
In 1989, CIA Director William H. Webster informed the Senate that India
was developing nuclear weapons and Pakistan was seeking an equalizer.82
During Aslam Beg’s 1989 visit to Washington, outgoing National Security
50 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Advisor Colin Powell and his nominated successor Brent Scowcroft warned him
of impending sanctions and emphasized that Bush will not lie to Congress.83
Durrani was unimpressed with this bout of American contriteness, ‘presidents
Reagan and Bush had already issued false certifications to the Congress on
behalf of Pakistan’s nuclear program during the Afghan War. They had already
lied and cheated Congress and they knew it’.84
‘The certification process became farcical in the last years of the Reagan
Administration’, wrote journalist Seymour Hersh in 1993; this ‘yearly certifica-
tion – despite explicit American intelligence about Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons
program –was seen as little more than a payoff to the Pakistani leadership for its
support in Afghanistan’.85
In the aforementioned testimony Glenn pointed out ‘twenty official adminis-
tration statements’ since 1981 which claim that military assistance would address
Pakistan’s security concerns and thereby keep Pakistan from acquiring the
bomb’ but this has not been the case.86 Clearly, by excluding the Glenn–Cranston
caveat that US aid be conditional upon Pakistan’s avoidance of developing a
nuclear device or acquiring goods to make one, the Pressler Amendment created
space for Islamabad to pursue its undeclared nuclear program.
Reagan and Bush, however, were not the only ones resorting to ‘dou-
blespeak’. Addressing the joint session of the Congress during an official visit to
Washington in June 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto denied possessing or
building nuclear weapons.87 During this visit Benazir was briefed by Webster on
Pakistan’s nuclear program. The purpose was to encourage her to freeze uranium
enrichment;88 a feat impossible to accomplish given the military’s powerful posi-
tion in Pakistani politics and its control over the nuclear program.
Kux quotes Benazir confessing that she had been ‘carefully scripted’ by the
military elite and their hand-picked President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on how to
handle the nuclear issue during her US visit.89 A senior Pakistani official con-
firmed such briefings before her official visits to Washington:

One of us played the role of the US president and asked questions and she
practiced answering them . . . she herself wanted the military to brief her
because she did not want to make any wrong commitments [to the
Americans].90

Evidently, some in the military saw Benazir as cooperative and well-meaning!

On the other hand military actors like Hamid Gul had no such misgivings
about her loyalty and accused her of allying with the Americans to consolidate
her own political position.91
The political truth is somewhere in the middle, given the army’s security
agenda and Benazir’s political ambition to stay in power by appeasing the
military establishment. Either way, she played her part well as following her
visit Bush issued the required certification in 1989 to allow the sale of sixty
F-16s and $600 million in aid to Pakistan. However, Benazir’s ‘scripted per-
formance’ was not the only reason for this. Bush had received intelligence
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 51
reports that, following Beg’s visit, Pakistan had stopped the production of
weapons grade uranium. That said, Bush did not issue the required annual certi-
fication in 1990 since by then, according to the US Ambassador to Islamabad
Robert Oakley, US intelligence had ‘definitive information’ that Pakistan was
crossing the line.92
According to a US Congressional document, those privy to Pakistan’s nuclear
program, including nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, maintain that they had
achieved the capability to build a bomb by 1988 and that no new threshold had
been crossed in 1990.93 Beg confirmed that, ‘we put a freeze on it [sic] . . . no
further enrichment . . . no hot tests only deterrence . . . we had achieved nuclear
explosive capability by 1989 . . . we retained the option of the first strike’.94
Lending credibility to the Pakistani position, Kux quotes unnamed US ‘know-
ledgeable sources’ conceding that Pakistan may not have added to existing capa-
bility after 1989.95
Two former army chiefs argued during their interviews that the US had
moved the goal-posts, replacing a desire to ‘freeze’ the program with one to
‘roll-back’ the progress Pakistan had made by destroying bomb cores.96 Post-
Cold War bipartisan support for non-proliferation apparently drove the Bush
administration’s recourse to the Pressler Amendment, ‘whose raison d’être in
1985’, said Musharraf, ‘was to facilitate uninterrupted flow of aid to Pakistan’.97
Bush came under greater Congressional pressure to not issue the annual certi-
fication in 1990 following reports on Pakistan’s alleged sale of nuclear techno-
logy to Iran.98 A US company, the Consarc Corporation, refused to sell Pakistan
dual-purpose high-temperature furnaces in 1990.99 Beg rejected the Iranian con-
nection and countered that ‘before the post-Cold War stringent nuclear safe-
guards, any country could buy technology from the underground nuclear
bazaar’.100
The bazaar presumably was a product of the Cold War era. Unlike India that
possesses indigenous resources, Pakistan undertook extensive clandestine
procurement to obtain nuclear technology. It was in this connection that some
Pakistani procurement agents in Europe and America were apprehended in the
1980s.101 Subsequently, the Solarz Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
was passed by the US Congress in 1985. The legislation prohibits military and
economic assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state that illegally exports or
attempts to export nuclear-related items from the United States. The Amendment
included a presidential waiver.
During the Soviet–Afghan conflict, Reagan imposed the penalty when a Paki-
stani agent was caught violating the Solarz Amendment in the US, and then
immediately issued the waiver to remove it.102 Journalist Seymour Hersh argues,
‘The president was telling Pakistan that it could have its money and its bomb’.103
‘Yet we were sanctioned in 1990’, argued Beg, ‘as if our nuclear program had
emerged out of nowhere!’104
‘US intelligence reports regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program became
public’, argued Hamid Gul, ‘when Bush was due to certify Pakistan’s nuclear
status after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The American leaders
52 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
behaved as if our nuclear ambitions were a revelation!’105 Gul’s premise cannot
be discounted; after all, as a Pakistani journalist pointed out, Pakistan’s nuclear
program ‘like Rome, was not built in a day’.106 From the Pakistani perspective, it
seemed clear that once the US had achieved its strategic goals in Afghanistan, it
had no further reason to turn a blind eye to Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions; it jus-
tified this pressure and its previous silence by claiming that Pakistan was cross-
ing the threshold just then.
There is evidence that the US was well aware of the status of Pakistan’s
nuclear program before the Bush era. Confirming prior US knowledge of Paki-
stan’s nuclear weapons status, a post-9/11 Congressional report cites official US
assessments in the mid-1980s of Pakistan being a couple of years short of
becoming a nuclear power. A 1985 National Intelligence Council report states
that Pakistan ‘probably has a workable design for a nuclear explosive device’
and was ‘probably a year or two away from a capacity to produce enough’ highly
enriched uranium for such a device. A 1987 NSC memorandum describes Paki-
stan’s ‘continued pursuit . . . of its nuclear weapons option’.
A 1993 report to Congress states that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons efforts
‘culminated with the capability to rapidly assemble a nuclear device if necessary
by the end of the 1980s’.107 According to official US documents, although it was
unclear as to when Pakistan had produced a workable nuclear explosive device,
the United States had information ‘during the 1970s and early 1980s that Paki-
stan was pursuing nuclear weapons designs’.108
That Islamabad was a rational actor resorting to self-help was clear to US
policy-makers even though their rhetoric painted Pakistan as deceptive. Recom-
mending aid cut-off to Pakistan in October 1990, Congressman Fortney Stark
shared a lead Washington Post editorial in the House. It argued:

The strategic equation in the South Asian subcontinent now turns not on the
reliability of the United States as a guarantor but on mutual Indian–Pakistani
deterrence. The United States got service from Pakistan in Afghanistan.
Pakistan got from the United States the extended patronage that allowed it
to built [sic] its bomb without Indian interference. It build [sic] its bomb
precisely to stand alone in case the American umbrella someday folded.109

A former army chief asserted that the Americans had prevailed upon Zia-ul-Haq in
mid-1986 to cap the nuclear program.110 Newly declassified US documents after
9/11 however substantiate that Zia-ul-Haq did not oblige Reagan.111 That said, it is
clear that the Reagan administration, which needed Zia’s cooperation against the
Soviets in Afghanistan, risked his resentment by pressurizing him on this issue
demonstrating that the program had reached the red line. This is also substantiated
by Beg’s confirmation that, ‘We carried out cold tests in 1986 and trials of the
delivery systems in 1987. The US knew this yet Reagan issued the certifications’.112
During the 1980s the CIA was conducting joint covert operations with the ISI
in Afghanistan and it is difficult to believe that as a close ally the US intelligence
was unmindful of Pakistan’s progress towards nuclear weapons. Thus, Glenn
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 53
contended that Bush’s 1989 certification, ‘conflicts with widely available
information indicating that Pakistan was [already] a de facto nuclear weapons
state’.113 The official rationale for the 1989 certification was that the Soviet-
backed regime in Kabul had still been in place at the time and that continued
engagement with Pakistan was crucial. Sales of spare parts and equipment to
Pakistan had thus followed.114
US intelligence reports that Beg was in favour of aiding the crash 5-year
nuclear program of Iran after the Gulf War added to Congressional concerns.115
Given that Pakistanis themselves had achieved nuclear technology through clan-
destine means, the Americans clearly feared the possibility of anti-US states
such as Iran attaining nuclear capability in a similar manner. Countering Ameri-
can claims Beg averred during the interview that, ‘Iranians did approach me as
well as Benazir [but] the civil–military leadership was able to deflect such
requests without seriously jeopardizing bilateral relations’.116
Endorsing Beg’s premise Ehsan-ul-Haq, former ISI chief and Chairman Joint
Services, emphasized that ‘there was no clear evidence against the state or gov-
ernment of Pakistan despite a lot of finger-pointing in 1990 regarding the sale of
nuclear technology to third parties’.117
Nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan – the so-called ‘father of Pakistan’s
bomb’ – maintains that the final information and components provided to the
Iranians were ‘not sufficiently detailed to enable mastery of this difficult techno-
logy’.118 Stephen Cohen notes that evidence regarding the Iran–Beg connection
was ambiguous.119 However, apprehensions of such connections continued to
echo in Congress.120
Shia Iran’s growing geo-political compulsions stemmed from growing Sunni
Saudi influence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These are likely to have added to
the US anxiety emanating from what Fasih Bokhari, called, ‘the fear of the rise
of an Islamic threat [that was] very real for the US’. He saw the Iranian Islamic
revolution as ‘the game-changer’, and supported his perspective by pointing out
that, ‘I know [from first-hand experience] that US military officers were giving
presentations on the subject by mid-1980s’.121 It was therefore not surprising that
Congressmen called upon the State Department to ‘redouble its efforts’ to curb
Pakistan’s nuclear program.122
Bipartisan advocacy of non-proliferation in the Congress, notably cham-
pioned by Senators Pressler and Glenn, was strengthened when in October 1991
Abdul Qadeer Khan publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s ability to build a bomb.
Pakistani official Shahryar Khan also gave a similar statement in 1992.123 Such
statements were likely aimed at political mileage with India and the US.
Pressler argued that Pakistan had deceived the US by spending aid designated
for progress on nuclear capability instead.124 The Pressler Amendment had actu-
ally facilitated US aid to Pakistan in keeping with Reagan’s wishes and Ameri-
can interests; it is not beyond belief that Pressler was privy to the deception
carried out by Reagan and Bush when issuing false certification. Later, his
finger-pointing at Pakistan is most likely a ploy to cover his tracks. In this regard
Senator Glenn’s aforementioned testimony in July 1992 is revealing.
54 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Pressler also pointed out in Congress that in contrast to Pakistan, India had
used mostly indigenous resources in its own program.125 One might argue that
having indigenous sources could not be treated as a justification for nuclear pro-
liferation or as an excuse to absolve India of continuing to develop its nuclear
program while Pakistan was being penalized for doing the same. Clearly, the
American approach was discriminatory and grounded in realist interests and both
states were well aware of mutual deception.
As Bush sanctions kicked in, Pakistan turned to China for missile technology.
In early 1991, US intelligence reported that Beijing was selling M-11 missile
equipment and launchers to Islamabad besides assisting in the construction of a
manufacturing plant.126 That relations were deteriorating was also reflected in
Beg’s shifting stance on the Gulf crisis. In August 1990 when Iraq attacked
Kuwait, Beg supported the American position. Later in 1991, Beg contradicted
the Nawaz Sharif Government’s stated position and accused the anti-Saddam
coalition of ‘strategic military intimidation’, in keeping with the ‘Western-
Zionist game plan to neutralize the Muslim world’.127
Although Beg’s words draw more upon political rhetoric than keen military
assessment, this provides an insight into the Pakistani counter-narrative to the
American ‘unipolar moment’. In this narrative, the US is accused of supplanting
the communist threat with the Islamic one. Such accusations gained popularity
in response to Pressler’s anti-Pakistan statement while in New Delhi. Pressler
was on a nuclear weapons related fact-finding mission to India and Pakistan.
Terming Indian nuclear capability as ‘peaceful’, Pressler expressed strong fears
about the emergence of a fundamentalist Islamic bloc. Comprising nuclear Paki-
stan, Afghanistan, Iran and the former Soviet Muslim states, the bloc, he argued,
was a potential threat to India and the rest of the world.128
The American silence on Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability129 was – and
remains – a valid argument. Since no country could match ‘unipolar’ America’s
military might, argues Pakistani journalist Omer Kureishi, ‘the introduction of
the nuclear element was exactly the sort of alarm-mongering that will make the
enemy credible’. Kureishi credits this line of thinking to old colonialist ideas
about the inability of the ‘natives’ to handle their own ‘burdens’ and notes that
apparently, compared to the ‘Islamic Bomb’, the ‘Hindu Bomb’ seems to be as
safe as the ‘Jewish Bomb’ as in those countries ‘no nut will ever press the
button’.130
Endorsing such sentiments, Gul linked the nuclear and Afghan issues:

They [the US] are loath to let us remain Islamic and nuclear . . . there was no
provision in the Geneva Accords for an Afghan interim government [com-
prising Mujahedeen] because they did not want to empower Pakistan [but]
India as a supporter of Israel.131

Gul’s argument clearly demonstrates that Pakistan’s security anxieties stemmed

from fears that the US would support Indian regional hegemony by discouraging
Islamabad’s efforts towards nuclear parity; this could, in Gul’s perception,
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 55
threaten Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Gul’s position is supported by academic
Tahir Amin:

Post-Cold War there is a rapprochement between western liberal world

order and Hindu India . . . Islam is the potential enemy therefore India is
being promoted . . . while Pakistan [when needed] will only be a tactical
partner.132

Interestingly, former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel largely endorsed the Pakistani
perspective during the interview:

After the Bush era sanctions almost every high level conversation [in the
1990s] was dominated by Pakistan’s complaint against US double standards
vis-à-vis India and Israel. There was much about the Pakistani stance that
was correct and true. There has long been an American double standard vis-
à-vis Israel and other nuclear programs.133

Riedel’s views appear to be a case of post-9/11 hindsight because there is no

available evidence of his endorsement of the Pakistani position during the 1990s.
Thus Riaz Khokhar, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Washington in the late 1990s
posited:

They (the US and its allies) never wanted a Muslim Pakistan to go nuclear.
They pressurized the weak Pakistani leadership by offering inducements. They
were not happy about the growing Pakistan China strategic friendship. The US
suspected that China had a role in Pakistan’s nuclear program.134

US policies towards the Indian nuclear program were motivated by US fears of a

China–Iran–Pakistan nexus, causing Pakistan’s policy-makers to feel that the US
was being soft on India. In the 1990s, the Indians developed their nuclear
weapons unhindered, argues former Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub, primarily
because ‘the US looked the other way’.135
Clearly, Pakistan’s counter-narrative had not only nationalist and regional
undertones but was also concerned with Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Some in
Pakistan’s press thought that the US was applying pressure on China to stop the
transfer of M-11 missile technology ‘because of American fears of a Muslim
nuclear power capable of helping the Middle East neutralize the Israeli threat’.136
However, Pressler’s statement on the so-called ‘Islamic bloc’ is simplistic. The
Muslim world is not a homogenous body; there are internal conflicts and dis-
agreements.137 The Pakistani perception of a US–India–Israel nexus is similarly
flawed. Conflict in the Middle East is driven by a variety of factors including
indigenous Arab and Muslim sources of conflict, it is not exclusively the work
of the US and Israel. Moreover, the treatment of the US as a monolith by Paki-
stani interviewees also demonstrates a subconscious bias towards all things
American rather than particular US policies.
56 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Noticeably, however, what the Pakistani press resented more than Pressler’s
reference to the Islamic bloc was his rejection of Pakistan’s ‘Islamic Bomb’ in
contrast to – what Pressler termed – the Indian ‘peaceful bomb’. This under-
scored the importance Pakistan accorded to its regional, India-specific security
competition. It must also be noted that during the 1990s Pakistan’s print and
electronic media was not entirely independent and the points of view expressed
in the leading newspapers or on the state-controlled Pakistan Television (PTV)
channel were likely influenced by the military establishment – a powerful
stakeholder.

Drifting apart
Interestingly, before the nuclear sanctions were imposed in 1990, Pakistani
security managers, in keeping with the Cold War mindset, assumed that Paki-
stan’s ‘true friends’ in the CIA and the Pentagon would rescue them.138 This was
not to be.

PFP and US nuclear sanctions

In September 1990, Ghulam Ishaq Khan received a presidential letter
delivered by Ambassador Oakley apprising him of US sanctions. Con-
sequently, after October 1990, $700 million in aid pledged for 1988–1994
was suspended. The US declined to transfer twenty-eight F-16 aircraft and
other military equipment for which Pakistan had already paid a billion dollars
and imposed an embargo on Pakistan-owned military equipment sent to the
US for repairs; US military training programs for Pakistani officers were also
stopped.139 In the short term, this meant the suspension of the $564 million in
military and economic aid approved for 1991.140 Until then, Pakistan had been
the third-largest recipient of US economic and military aid after Israel and
Egypt, receiving nearly $300 million worth of military equipment and sup-
plies annually. Subsequently, US assistance to Pakistan in the 1990s was the
lowest since the 1950s.141
The sanctions, according to diplomat Sarwar Naqvi, ‘brought about a major
low point in our relations’.142 ‘There was no doubt’, argued Amin, that ‘the Bush
administration was keen on rolling back Pakistan’s nuclear program . . . this was
no conspiracy theory’.143 Bush’s response to PFP’s regional goals thus sparked
the process of estrangement. Riedel explained that the Pressler Amendment
‘undermined the possibility of any kind of military to military relationship and
actually restricted American ability to influence Pakistani strategic thinking’.144
Describing Pakistan’s predicament Ehsan-ul-Haq affirmed:

Nuclear sanctions were a serious disadvantage for the military . . . it blocked

a large amount of equipment in the pipeline. In fact Beg’s reaction to Gulf
War was in reaction to US sanctions . . . I wouldn’t say it was the army’s
thinking but sanctions were a turning point in Beg’s thinking.145
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 57
The sanctions however were also ‘a blessing in disguise’, argued Beg, ‘now we
could concentrate on indigenization of weapons industry with help from our
friends in the east, especially China’.146 This line of argument was supported by
Musharraf:

Bush’s approach reinforced the lesson that the Americans were unreliable . . .
so we leaned towards the east – China, Russia, Korea . . . his approach was the
beginning of Pakistan’s focus on indigenization of its weapons industry.147

Indigenous efforts meant an acceleration of the nuclear program because as

former Foreign Minister Assef Ali argued, ‘The US should have realized that an
insecure state is a dangerous state’.148 Zahid Hussain concluded that Bush-era
sanctions had a negative impact on PFP ‘and [subsequently] Pakistan would pro-
gressively become more stubborn [in the pursuit of its security goals] in the
1990s’.149 Oakley would later reminisce, ‘The Pakistan military accused us of
betraying them and leaving them defenseless against the Indians’150 as the erst-
while allies began to drift apart.
A November 1991 meeting between Ghulam Ishaq Khan and US Under Sec-
retary of State Reginald Bartholomew reflected this growing estrangement. The
latter lost his temper and walked out on the President when Khan stuck to Islam-
abad’s position on nuclear weapons. Bartholomew was later told by Pakistani
Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan that the US was bullying Pakistan.151 That Bar-
tholomew, a junior US official, was authorized to hold discussions with the Pres-
ident of Pakistan was a reflection of the low priority the US now accorded
Islamabad even if the nuclear issue itself was important. That the President
received a junior US official to discuss Pakistan’s program reflects the import-
ance Pakistan accorded to US military aid and PFP’s regional security goals.
Bartholomew’s conduct symbolized both US ‘unipolar’ arrogance and its frus-
tration with a weaker state’s reluctance to fall in line.
Pakistan viewed most US nuclear legislation as discriminatory and tilted
towards India and predictably rejected Washington’s request for an inspection of
Pakistan’s nuclear facilities without comparable Indian inspections.152 Beg and
Gul emphasized that the US itself was a nuclear proliferator since it had pro-
vided technology to Israel. It is then hardly surprising that military decision-
makers perceived the American approach as favouring non-Muslim India, a
country with friendly ties to Israel.153
This perception of discrimination goes back to 1974 when India did not face
any US economic sanctions after it tested a ‘peaceful’ nuclear device. In fact
India was never sanctioned prior to 1998 although restrictions were imposed on
the export of dual-purpose technology. The Symington Amendment penalized
states pursuing nuclear weapons after 1974 thus effectively letting India off the
hook. Subsequently, Symington and Glenn Amendments were invoked to justify
an arms embargo and sanctions against Pakistan in 1978 and 1979.
The Indian stance that its nuclear weapons were China-specific was not con-
vincing for Pakistani decision-makers.154 Prior experiences with opposing
58 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
nations have a way of perpetuating the dynamics of action and reaction inherent
in the security dilemma.155 For Pakistan, India’s role in the creation of Bangla-
desh in 1971 – where it had actively supported Bengali insurgents – combined
with its growing military strength had created such suspicion towards India that
it had become difficult to distinguish between Indian offensive and defensive
actions.
The Pressler Amendment was Pakistan-specific and did not affect the Indian
nuclear program or impact its military capability. India was not dependent on
American weapons and spare parts; consequently, it did not experience a great
deal of pressure. Pakistan’s position was, and remains ‘that India was the prolif-
erator in South Asia but it was Pakistan that paid the price’.156 A 2001 official
US report states, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs are part of Islama-
bad’s effort to preserve its territorial integrity against its principal external threat
and rival, India . . . Pakistan is driven by its perceived need to counter India’s
conventional superiority and nuclear capability [and] remains fearful of India’s
regional and global power aspirations . . .’.157
Confirming Scott Sagan’s hypothesis of domestic politics and national pres-
tige as motivators of nuclear ambitions,158 Siraj-ul-Haq of the Jamaat-i-Islami
maintained:

The Bush administration and the US Congress chose not to concede that
Pakistan’s hostility with India primarily shaped Islamabad’s security pol-
icies . . . the civil–military leadership was conscious of domestic political
costs of failing to keep up with New Delhi.159

Bush did try to delay sanctions in 1990 to allow the new Pakistani Government
under Nawaz Sharif to conduct a policy review. But Democratic Senators Glenn
and Cranston as well as Republican Senator William Cohen were adamant that
standards should not be lowered.160 In 1991, the Bush administration made
efforts to repeal the Pressler Amendment as part of a broader legislation aimed
at restricting the ability of Congress to impose conditions on the disbursement of
US foreign aid.161
Opponents of sanctions in Congress contended that ‘the Pressler aid ban has
reduced US influence in Pakistan at a time when that country is making fateful
decisions about its military and political future’.162 Supporters argued that by
sanctioning Pakistan the US will be sending a strong message to all future
nuclear aspirants. This argument had particular resonance for those who viewed
the foreign aid program as a target for budget reduction.163
Foreign aid has never been popular in America and ‘[T]he only way it could
be legitimized’ and justified to the public and Congress ‘was in terms of its
value as a weapon in the Cold War’.164 Hence, Representative Jim Kolbe failed
to win substantial support when he advocated ‘an even-handed treatment’ for
Islamabad.165
One incident related to the embargo affected relations particularly strongly.
Pakistan had finalized a deal with the US to acquire F-16, and had already made
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 59
the payment for the batch when the deal was frozen. The planes ended up in
storage at Davis–Monthan air force base near Tuscan, Arizona. Moreover, Paki-
stan was not reimbursed the funds it had paid; it was in fact urged to continue
payments for services such as parking charges because non-payment of dues
meant a breach of contract. At the end of the day, this did not help Pakistan but
did help the cash-strapped General Dynamics Corporation. Pakistan continued to
pay before it suspended disbursements in 1993.166 It is noticeable that the
Pressler Amendment did not stop Washington from reimbursing Islamabad for
the payments that it had made, which leads to the conclusion that the F-16s were
used as a bargaining chip to leverage Pakistan on its nuclear program. Despite
this serious disagreement, Pakistan’s civil–military leadership made efforts at
damage control because Pakistan needed American aid.
Before Bush invoked the Pressler legislation, Benazir’s Foreign Minister
Yaqub Ali Khan flew to Washington in October 1990 and suggested that Paki-
stan might consider a freeze of its nuclear program in place of a roll-back, but
Secretary of State Baker ‘was cold and lacking in sympathy for Pakistan’.167 This
was not unexpected; Bush’s reliance on a small group of trusted advisers such as
Baker, Cheney, Scowcroft and Sununu encouraged groupthink where consensus
is seldom challenged.168
In early 1991, senior diplomat Akram Zaki was dispatched by Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif to reiterate Pakistan’s position in Washington. In return, Washing-
ton asked Islamabad to join the NPT; Pakistan showed willingness to do so if
India signed it.169 Sharif then called a five power conference comprising the US,
the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan and India, to consider banning nuclear
weapons in South Asia. America showed interest but India rejected the pro-
posal.170 The Indian position was that nuclear proliferation was global and not a
regional issue and that its nuclear weapons were to deter China.
In a more favourable development in 1991, largely driven by US military–
industrial interests, the State Department approved licences for $120 million,
allowing Pakistan to purchase military equipment commercially. This drew criti-
cism from Senators Pressler, Pell and Representative Solarz171 who argued that
sanctions did not exclude commercial arms sales.172 However, the legislation
does not specifically mention this; a loophole which Secretary Baker manipu-
lated in the Senate.173 Despite this favourable development for Islamabad, rela-
tions continued to deteriorate against the backdrop of Pakistan’s quest for
nuclear weapons.
The US fear that passions in Pakistan and India could escalate into a nuclear
conflict derived from the historical fact that the two states had already gone to
war during the Cold War and had indulged in brinkmanship in 1987 and again in
1990. Indian forces carried out a massive multi-phased exercise Operation Brass-
tacks in 1986–1987 which raised bilateral tensions. The 1990 crisis was trig-
gered by a major Pakistani military exercise and a relentless surge of separatist
violence in the Indian-held Kashmir. India moved offensive units on Pakistan’s
border prompting the Pakistani military to respond. Indian and Pakistani air
forces were put on high alert.174
60 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Given Pakistani officials’ periodic allusions to Pakistan’s advanced stage of
nuclear capability,175 India–Pakistan tensions in 1990 brought into focus the
possibility of an escalation of the conflict. Bush dispatched CIA and NSC Dir-
ectors Robert Gates and Richard Haass to Islamabad to defuse the situation.
Richard Kerr, a Deputy Director at the CIA, later commented on the possib-
ility of a nuclear exchange: ‘It was the most dangerous nuclear situation we
have ever faced since I’ve been in the US government’.176 Cognizant of the
Indo-Pakistani historical baggage, American fears were grounded not only in
Pakistan’s affiliation with an ‘Islamic bloc’ but also in the possibility of a
nuclear conflict between the two neighbours. This regional context was closer
to reality.
That said, Bush’s approach was perceived by Islamabad, and particularly the
military establishment, as primarily a bid to enhance India’s regional position.
Ehsan reflected this stance by postulating:

[The] Indian nuclear position was understood and accepted by the US and
the West but not Pakistan’s problem of a nuclearized India . . . an adversary
that had already played an active military role in the creation of Bangladesh
in 1971.177

From the Pakistani perspective, for a military dependent on US weapons termi-

nation of aid had serious implications. Against the backdrop of its security com-
pulsions it was not surprising that Islamabad increased its dependence on
Beijing. Beg minced no words:

Yes, China provided all kinds of military assistance to Pakistan, after US

sanctioned Pakistan. I, as Chief of General Staff went to China and gave
their leadership a list of all the equipment we needed . . . they gave us every-
thing we wanted worth about a billion and a half dollars, payable in the next
twenty five years at a nominal mark-up.178

Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons had been a PFP strategic goal since the
1970s and there was substantial progress in the program during the 1980s as
confirmed by former COAS Aslam Beg. It is however pertinent to point out that
reduction of US strategic interest in the area during the Bush era coupled with
continued instability in Afghanistan impacted Pakistan’s quest for nuclear
weapons and missiles. In accordance with the regional security dilemma
‘growing Indian military power was bound to add to our existential concerns
especially with continued instability in Afghanistan’.179 To this Gul added:

The Geneva Accords did not provide a formula for transfer of power . . . the
Bush administration did not want the Mujahedeen to form a government in
Kabul because this would have been an Islamic government sympathetic to
Pakistan instead of India . . . their primary target was to prevent Pakistan not
India from becoming a powerful, nuclear state.180
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 61
Reflecting Pakistani perspectives on the issue, academic Mohammad Islam
argued that the American approach to nuclear non-proliferation stemmed from
the American perception of themselves as the ‘benevolent hegemon’ while
simultaneously ‘lacking sensitivity towards the Pakistani strategic and cultural
mindset’.181 Having said that, the conduct of US foreign policy is primarily
determined by its relative power182 and it was in the US interest to prevent the
rise of nuclear Pakistan with close ties to China. Thus, Bush’s approach towards
Pakistan’s nuclear program stemmed from the securitized dimension that had
marked the Cold War alliance and which had failed to consider sustainable non-
security dimensions of cooperation. Riedel therefore affirmed that Pakistan mili-
tary’s view of the US was ‘poisoned by the sanctions’.183
Once again, a clash between the regional security interests of Pakistan and the
global security goals of the US was causing a split in the alliance between the
two countries. The issue of US strategic disengagement from Pakistan and
Afghanistan during the Bush era served as another catalyst.

PFP and US disengagement

Bush’s approach reminded me of Zia-ul-Haq’s words to Cyrus Vance that
Pakistan’s relationship with the US is like living on a great river that
changes course every five years; friends find themselves stuck in the sand.184
Tahir Amin

Amin’s words reflect Pakistani perspective of the quality of US–Pakistan rela-

tions. Bush’s approach therefore was not entirely unexpected, as academic Islam
pointed out: ‘When the chips are down Pakistan’s strategic objectives are poles
apart from the US’.185 Thus, in a 1989 article, CIA official Charles Cogan recom-
mends that the US policy towards Afghanistan must ‘maintain a prudent distance
. . . [from] the “internal purification problems” of others’. In the same article he
argues that the ISI ‘gave most of the weaponry to the fundamentalists . . . to
install a [post-Cold War] fundamentalist and anti-American regime in Kabul’
and also siphoned it off for later use ‘most notably in Kashmir’. Cogan’s
approach characterizes an implicit understanding of the limits of the future US
role after the Cold War; it also shows awareness of Pakistan’s intertwined stra-
tegic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Cogan’s argument that Washington
made sustained efforts to formulate a post-war government in Afghanistan,186
however, is not supported by empirical proof.
Partly spurred by concern for the safety of US diplomats, Secretary of State
James Baker closed down the American embassy in Kabul in 1989, depriving
the US of a possible point of contact with the Najibullah Government. Accord-
ing to Kux, in keeping with the policy of avoiding contact with communist
Najibullah, and in the absence of diplomatic presence in Kabul, State Depart-
ment officials, such as Robert Kimitt, refused to talk to representatives of the
Soviet-installed Najibullah regime.187 According to US media reports, Pakistan’s
civilian government under Benazir Bhutto grew frustrated with the Bush-era
62 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
policy of aiding the resistance forces, without demanding that they stop feuding
among themselves, participate in efforts for a broad-based government and
deliver a military victory by capturing Kabul. The Bush administration was
‘reluctant to make’ such a move.188 Pakistan’s frustration with the Bush adminis-
tration’s approach was highlighted in Congress.189
According to Steve Coll, the CIA continued its, now diminished, support to
the anti-communist Pashtun Islamists, such as the Afghan commander Gulbadin
Hekmatyar, through the ISI.190 Confirming that the two militaries to some extent
‘kept the link alive’, Durrani downplayed any sustained perpetuation of CIA–ISI
links saying, ‘there was an American compulsion . . . they wanted their Stingers
back and the ISI could have helped them since it had distributed CIA weapons
during the Afghan conflict’.191
Durrani’s argument while credible is nonetheless inadequate. The Stingers
did not represent an existential threat to the US and therefore could not have
been the primary reason for continued support of anti-Soviet elements in
Afghanistan. According to Scowcroft, Bush saw no need to contest continued
aid to Afghan militias as the supporters of the Mujahedeen in the Congress
backed this position, urging ‘no truck with the communists’.192 Moreover, the
staying power of Najibullah was assessed as being not longer than a few weeks.
Later, Bush and Scowcroft would concede that ‘the conventional wisdom on the
staying power of Najibullah had proven wrong’.193
According to Aurakzai, as the US lost interest:

UN funds for refugees were curtailed . . . instead of helping us rehabilitate

the refugees and the Afghan Mujahedeen the Bush administration said our
interests have been achieved now it is your problem only . . . the chaos in
Afghanistan impacted us.194

‘Like any other country we too did not seek a two-front war with India’, argued
Ehsan, ‘if you look at force differential we face a very real existential threat . . .
we needed to minimize our inferiority with India by seeking security on our
border with Afghanistan’.195
Adding to Ehsan’s argument, Musharraf contended:

After 1989 US changed its strategic policy . . . no assistance to Pakistan . . .

worst of all no rehabilitation of the fighters . . . these people had been trained
and raised as fighters only . . . all they knew was how to make war . . . they
were armed to the teeth . . . this meant continued ‘warlordism’ in Afghani-
stan and instability in FATA which could benefit India.196

That the Pakistani security elite saw a connection between US disengagement,

instability in Afghanistan and a potentially explosive situation in FATA is quite
clear. This was bound to add to Islamabad’s security dilemma vis-à-vis India.
One explanation for Bush’s misreading of the Afghan situation, according to
Kux, was the lack of clarity in US policy. The State Department wanted to shift
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 63
covert funds to Afghan rehabilitation; the CIA would have washed its hands of
Afghanistan if there had not been Congressional support for the Mujahedeen.197
The absence of a great power adversary diminished the role of US intelligence
operations in the region, contributing to this interagency tension.198 Moreover,
the CIA also made efforts – independent of the ISI – to co-opt non-Pashtun
leaders like Ahmed Shah Masood.199 Clearly, the complexity of the Afghan scen-
ario did not lessen Pakistan’s security dilemma and its leadership was wary of
the Bush administration’s ambivalent approach towards the issue. Thus, former
Inspector General Frontier Corps Lt General Mumtaz Gul maintained that:

After the Soviet withdrawal members of the Bush administration began sup-
porting the non-Pashtun, pro-India elements thus creating a wedge between
us and the Afghans to weaken Pakistan and undermine our strategic gains.200

Mumtaz Gul perceived Bush administration’s dual approach from another per-
spective. ‘It was not only the nukes, they were averse to a Mujahedeen-led gov-
ernment but they did not have leverage anymore so they tried instead to defang
the ISI’. Hamid Gul endorsed Mumtaz Gul and recalled a White House meeting
called by George H.W. Bush in 1989. This was attended by – among others –
officiating CIA Director Richard Kerr who ‘told me that Bush wanted ISI wings
clipped to contain Pakistan’.201
Hamid Gul’s assessments may be biased by his service as ISI chief. However,
a reading of the messages sent by the US representative in Peshawar, Peter
Tomsen, lends credibility to this premise. Advocating for the weakening of ‘the
CIA–ISI nexus’, Tomsen warned that ISI-backed Hekmatyar’s victory ‘will
enable Pakistan’s direct control of Afghanistan, destabilizing strategic balance in
Central Asia’.202 The potential instability in Central Asia quite clearly emerged
from US fears of a strong Islamic bloc in the region. In his 1991 RAND paper,
Zalmay Khalilzad – who served as Special Advisor on Afghanistan in the
Reagan administration – also warned that the ISI’s leverage over key Afghan
commanders allowed ‘Pakistan to increase its direct control over military opera-
tions’.203 Beg’s version of events was that:

The Pakistan military wanted the US to reward the anti-Soviet Mujahedeen

but the US betrayed them . . . the CIA wanted to play a double game by sup-
porting both the Pashtun and non-Pashtun groups . . . the latter with Indian
help. They wanted the Afghan factions to destroy each other because they
never wanted a Mujahedeen dominated government in Kabul . . . the Ameri-
cans having seen what the ISI could accomplish were wary . . . frightened.204

Bokhari concluded:

They [the US] taught the ISI how an asymmetric force could destroy an
industrial power [like the Soviet Union] . . . this was the American strategy
in Afghanistan . . . they did not realize it then . . . now they may demonize
64 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
ISI [use of proxies] because they have no answer to what they have
created.205

Thus Beg and Bokhari’s versions lend support to Hamid Gul and Mumtaz Gul’s
point. It is evident that the Pakistani military elite viewed Bush’s approach with
a great deal of scepticism, contributing to the growing gap between the US and
Pakistan.
Confirming interagency dissention however, Steve Coll argues that Bush was
not fully in the picture about the CIA’s continued covert supply. Thus, when in
1991 Milt Bearden, the former Islamabad CIA station chief, broached the issue
of the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan, Bush asked, ‘Is that thing still going
on?’206 Besides a lack of interagency coordination, this also shows that Pakistan
was no longer a priority at the highest levels of the US Government. A low-level
covert engagement was however allowed until the end of the Najibullah regime.
This leads to the conclusion that while US strategic interest in Pakistan was
declining there was a continuation of the original containment policy in the
region.
Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, a former ISI officer closely involved with the
Afghan War in the 1980s, while explaining the inadequacy of the Geneva
Accords, argues that the Bush administration did not want Kabul to fall.207 This
premise may be considered against Bush’s traditional status quo-oriented think-
ing which originated from a belief in the stability of the Cold War bipolar order
and thus, as Baker put it, ‘doing what we can to strengthen [the Soviet] centre’.
This attitude reflected the period of flux where fears of a resurgence of the Soviet
Union resided side by side with concerns over the consequences of Soviet
collapse.208
Against the backdrop of such complexities and Pakistani scepticism regarding
the Bush administration, another development added to the murkiness of the
situation. From 1989 onwards, Pakistan’s Afghan and Kashmir policies became
increasingly entwined.

Bush and Pakistan’s Kashmir policy

Islamabad began supporting Kashmiri dissidents and their Pakistani supporters
to ‘continue bleeding India’209 as a means to balance any advantage that India
may gain on the western border. Gul did not deny it outrightly: ‘as for the
Kashmir insurgency . . . well, any state – whether Pakistan, India or the US –
would manipulate a favorable situation for strategic advantage’.210
The Mujahedeen fighters had not been rehabilitated and so trained manpower
and facilities to supply and train more were available to be used in Kashmir.
These Afghan fighters were well supplied, armed with a combination of US
weapons and abandoned Soviet supplies. These weapons had allowed the power
struggle in Afghanistan to escalate into a full-scale civil war. According to Lt
General Javed Ashraf Qazi, Director General ISI from 1993 to 1995, ‘just one
storage site, the Pasha Dump near Kandahar, had seventeen tunnels filled with
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 65
arms and ammunition. . . . This was enough to equip an entire Corps!’211 Clearly,
while US disengagement from Afghanistan was seen as ‘abandonment’ by Paki-
stani actors, from a pragmatic angle it also provided the PFP the space to con-
tinue its Kashmir policy.
Presenting the Indian version, Raman states that in 1991 the Government of
India gave to the Bush administration a detailed dossier outlining Islamabad’s
sponsorship of terrorism in Indian-administered Kashmir. Rejecting the informa-
tion, the Bush administration argued that much of the evidence was based on
interrogation reports which, according to US law, were suspect due to the pos-
sible use of torture by the Indian police.212 One explanation for this US response
stems from continued albeit diminished CIA–ISI cooperation between 1989 and
1992 until the unravelling of the Najibullah regime. Moreover, there appears to
be a lack of coordination between the State Department and the CIA.
Marvin Weinbaum, who served in State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence
and Research from 1999 to 2003, confirmed during the interview that ‘US intel-
ligence had reports of the ISI’s interference in Kashmir from the early 1990s’.213
However judging from the available US diplomatic communication from Islama-
bad at the time, there was no definitive report of the ISI’s support for the
Kashmir insurgency.214 On the other hand, Coll quotes anonymous senior US
officials confirming interagency rivalry and a lack of coordination as a result of
which CIA’s definitive reports on the subject ‘gathered dust in the middle level
of the bureaucracy’.215 Clearly, US interagency problems also flowed from a
diminishing strategic interest in Islamabad.
Indian academic Sharma maintains that after an attack in 1992 on a group of
Israeli tourists in Srinagar, Kashmir, George Bush, then in the midst of his cam-
paign for re-election, came under pressure from Jewish voters to act against
Pakistan. Subsequently, the 1991 dossier was re-examined by the State Depart-
ment, ‘which now felt there were, after all, strong grounds for action against
Pakistan’. Bush, however, lost the election before any action could be contem-
plated.216 Sharma’s perspective is supported by a statement by Pakistan’s
Ambassador to Washington in 1992, Syeda Abida Hussain, that the Under Sec-
retary for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter had conveyed to her informally that
Pakistan could be declared a terrorist state.217
Had the Bush administration classified Pakistan as a terrorist state Pakistan
would have been ineligible for any kind of US aid and banned from importing
goods and services to the United States; Congress would have been required to
vote on any loans from multilateral lending agencies, something the Pressler
Amendment did not restrict.218 Academic Tahir Amin correctly points out that
‘the US wanted Pakistan to pursue a special kind of policy but failed to see the
link between Afghanistan and Kashmir’.219
The Bush administration’s ambivalence on the issue was driven by changing
US priorities in Europe and a relative disinterest in Pakistan. Resolving the
Kashmir issue for India by extension meant involvement in Afghanistan and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union had removed incentives for the Bush administra-
tion to concern itself with the Afghan–Pakistan affairs.
66 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Summary
As the Cold War came to an end with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghani-
stan, the US emerged as the most powerful country in the world. American discourse
focused on the future role of the US in the international arena as the Bush adminis-
tration largely directed its attention to fast-moving events in Europe and the Middle
East. Islamabad meanwhile was trying to cope with the post-conflict fallout of the
Afghan–Soviet War. The end of the Cold War did not end the Pakistan–India con-
flict, and was not perceived by Pakistan as the beginning of an era of reduced
security concerns. PFP’s security stakes and economic objectives ensured the con-
tinuation of Pakistan’s role in political and strategic developments in Afghanistan.
Renewed US concern over Pakistan’s nuclear program and subsequent sanctions
suspending economic and military aid had serious implications for PFP’s security
objectives. With an unstable Afghanistan on its western border and a powerful India
in the east a decline in American strategic interest meant that Pakistan was left on its
own to face the fallout of the Soviet–Afghan War while simultaneously competing
with growing Indian military power and its unhindered quest for nuclear weapons.
Conversely, PFP’s focus on nuclear weapons contributed to American con-
cerns about nuclear proliferation as well as fears of the emergence of a strong
regional bloc comprising Islamic countries and China. Bush’s approach also sug-
gests an effort to curb Pakistan military’s strategic ambitions in Afghanistan.
The Bush-era response to PFP was thus clearly aimed at reducing the operational
advantages that Pakistan had gained on its western border with US help during
the 1980s and which it then also diverted to Kashmir as part of its strategy to
counter India. Despite efforts from Pakistani officials to find a way out, the Bush
administration was unwilling to oppose Congress over the nuclear program of a
country that was no longer strategically important. Moreover, reports of Islama-
bad’s alleged sale of nuclear technology to developing countries, especially Iran,
and the Chinese transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan reinforced the posi-
tion of those opposing Pakistan’s nuclear program. Punitive sanctions hurt Paki-
stan’s military capability while benefitting India as it continued with the pursuit
of nuclear weapons while also enhancing its conventional capability.
Thus, the American response to Islamabad’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and
the process of US disengagement emerged as the two immediate catalysts for the
Pakistan–US partnership in the early 1990s. Pakistan perceived the Bush admin-
istration’s approach to be discriminatory and unmindful of PFP’s security com-
pulsions. Reinforcing the foreign policy trends of the Bush administration, the
Clinton presidency solidified the effects of those policies. This had implications
for PFP’s regional objectives and US global interests in the 1990s. Clinton’s
approach towards Pakistan will be examined in the next chapter.

Notes
1 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
2 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs 79:2
(2000): 63–79, 63.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 67
3 Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
1997): 21.
4 ‘From Containment to Enlargement’, Remarks of Anthony Lake, Washington DC:
Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, 21 September
1993, www.fas.org/news/usa/1993/usa-930921.htm, accessed 17 February 2012.
5 Francis Fukuyama ‘The End of History?’ The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989):
3–18. For competing perspectives see Fareed Zakaria, ‘The End of the End of
History’, US Edition Newsweek, 24 September 2001: 70; Benjamin Barber, ‘Can
History Have an End?’ in Harriet Swain, (ed.), Big Questions in History (London:
Jonathan Cape, 2005); George F. Will, ‘The End of Our Holiday from History’,
Washington Post, 12 September 2001, A31.
6 Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, Foreign Affairs 70: 1 (March
1990–1991): 23–33.
7 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs 72:3 (Summer
1992–1993): 22–49.
8 Robert Kagan ‘The Benevolent Empire’, Foreign Policy 111 (Summer 1998):
24–36, 26; William Kristol and Robert Kagan, ‘The Present Danger’, National
Interest 59 (Spring 2000): 57–69, 67; Robert Kagan and William Kristol, ‘Toward a
Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs 75:4 (July–August 1996): 18–32;
Robert Kagan, ‘The Case for Global Activism’, Commentary, 98 (September 1994):
40–44; Robert Kagan, ‘A Retreat from Power?’ Commentary 100 (July 1995):
19–25; Joshua Muravichik, ‘At Last, Pax Americana’, New York Times, 24 January
1991: A19; Stuart Gottlieb, ‘What if US Stops Policing the World?’, CNN Opinion,
18 September 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-
retrenchment, accessed March 2013; Robert Kagan, ‘Not Fade Away’, New
Republic, 11 January 2012, www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/
america-world-power-declinism#, accessed 17 May 2013.
9 William Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security, 24:1
(Summer 1999): 5–41; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘American Primacy
in Perspective’, Foreign Affairs 81:4 (July–August 2002): 20–33; John J. Mearshe-
imer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International
Security 15:1 (Summer 1990): 5–56; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001): 360–402; John J. Mearsheimer,
‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security 19:3 (Winter
1994–1995): 5–49; Richard Perle, ‘Next Stop Iraq’, Speech at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute, Philadelphia, 30 November 2001, www.fpri.org/america-
war.20011130.perle.nextstopiraq.html, accessed 12 September 2011.
10 Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press and Harvey Sapolsky, ‘Come Home, America: The
Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation’, International Security 21:4 (Spring
1997): 5–48; Stephen Van Evera, ‘Why Europe Matters and the Third World
Doesn’t: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War’, Journal of Strategic Studies
13:2 (1990): 1–51; Robert J. Art, ‘A Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy
after the Cold War’, International Security 15:4 (Spring 1991): 5–53; Barry R.
Posen, ‘The Case for Restraint’, The American Interest 3:2 (November–December
2007): 7–17; Christopher Layne, ‘From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing:
America’s Future Grand Strategy’, International Security 22:1 (Summer 1997):
86–124; Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will
Rise’, International Security 17:4 (Spring 1993): 5–51; Richard Hass, ‘The Squan-
dered Presidency: Demanding More From the Commander-in-Chief ’, Foreign
Affairs 79:3 (May–June 2000): 31–49; A.C. Goldberg, ‘Selective Engagement: US
National Security Policy in the 1990s’, The Washington Quarterly 15:3 (Summer
1992): 15–24; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 234–333.
11 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman
Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992):
68 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
17; Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superman without a
Mission? (London: Pinter, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995): 5.
12 Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’, 5; Charles Krauthammer, ‘What’s
Wrong with the Pentagon Paper?’, The Washington Post, 13 March 1992, A25.
13 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs 78:2 (March–
April 1999): 35–49, 35.
14 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’, International
Journal 45 (Fall 1990): 731–764; John G. Ikenberry, ‘Is American Multilateralism
in Decline?’, Perspectives on Politics 1:3 (September 2003): 533–550; John G. Iken-
berry, ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American Postwar
Order’, International Security 23:3 (Winter 1998–1999): 43–78; John G. Ikenberry,
Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Tony Smith, The Crisis of American
Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Robert Keohane
and Lisa Martin, ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, International Security
20:1 (1995): 39–51. Conversely unilateralism pertains to a nation acting alone. In
the context of the US see for example Jesse Helms, ‘Saving the UN: A Challenge to
the Next Secretary-General’, Foreign Affairs 75:5 (September–October 1996): 2–7;
Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs 79:1 (January–
February 2000): 45–62; Richard Perle, ‘Next Stop Iraq’.
15 Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion’; Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism
after the Cold War’, International Security 25:1 (Summer 2000): 5–41.
16 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy 80 (Autumn 1990): 153–171.
17 Seymour Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-edged Sword (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1997): 20.
18 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Toward a Post-Cold War World’, Foreign Affairs 70:2 (Spring
1991): 102–122, 102.
19 Patrick J. Buchanan, ‘America First and Second, and Third’, The National Interest
19 (Spring 1990): 77–82.
20 George H.W. Bush, Address before the Joint Session of the United States Congress,
Washington DC, 11 September 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_
papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9, accessed 12 January 2013.
21 George H.W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 1991, www2.hn.
psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/uspressu/SUaddressGHWBush.pdf, accessed 12
January 2013.
22 John Dumbrell, ‘Evaluating the Foreign Policy of President Clinton, or Bill Clinton:
Between the Bushes’, Lecture, British Association for American Studies Annual
Conference, 2005, Cambridge University, 14–17 April 2005.
23 George H.W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 1991.
24 George W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage
Books, 1999): 361–364.
25 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American
Superpower (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 30.
26 William G. Hyland, ‘Bush’s Foreign Policy: Pragmatism or Indecision?’ New York
Times, 26 April 1989, A.27.
27 John Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy from Carter to Clinton (London: Macmil-
lan Press, 1997): 131.
28 Draft Defense Planning Guidance Excerpt, Department of Defense Declassified
Document, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_extract_nytedit.pdf,
accessed 2 April 2013; Patrick Tyler, ‘US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals
Develop in a One-Superpower World’, New York Times, 8 March 1992, http://work.
colum.edu/~amiller/wolfowitz1992.htm, accessed 5 April 2013.
29 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America between the Wars; From 11/9 to 9/11
(New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 43–52.
30 John Dumbrell, ‘Evaluating the Foreign Policy of President Clinton’.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 69
31 Charles William Maynes, ‘The New Decade’ Foreign Policy 80 (Autumn
1990): 3–13.
32 ‘From Containment to Enlargement’, Remarks of Anthony Lake, Washington, DC,
Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, 21 September
1993, US Department of State Dispatch 4, 27 September 1993.
33 Linda Miller, ‘The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign Policy’, International
Affairs 70:4 (October 1994): 621–634, 626.
34 Anthony Lake, ‘From Containment to Enlargement’; Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Clin-
ton’s Foreign Policy’, New York Times, 31 October 1993, A8.
35 Douglas Brinkley ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, Foreign Policy,
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36 Charles Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, ‘Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal
Internationalism in the United States’, International Security 32:2 (Fall,
2007): 7–44.
37 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America between the Wars, 103, 59–62.
38 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 1994; National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995; National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement, 1996, http://nssarchive.us/, accessed 3 March 2012.
39 Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 121–122.
40 Douglas Brinkley ‘Democratic Enlargement’.
41 William Clinton, ‘American Security in a Changing World’, Remarks at George
Washington University, Washington, DC, 5 August 1996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/
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Madeleine Albright, Interview on NBC-TV ‘The Today Show’ with Matt Lauer
Columbus, Ohio, 19 February 1998, http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/
1998/980219a.html, accessed 3 March 2012.
42 See for example Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’, Foreign
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Foreign Policy Revisited’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 13:2 (June 2002): 43–56.
43 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars, 80–83.
44 William G. Hyland ‘A Mediocre Record’.
45 Thomas Friedman, ‘Clinton’s New Foreign-Policy Thinkers’, New York Times, 23
December 1992.
46 Brzezinski, Second Chance, 86–87.
47 George Bush, ‘Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of
the Persian Gulf Conflict’, 6 March 1991, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/
public_papers.php?id=2767&year=1991&month=3, accessed 11 November 2012;
William Clinton, ‘Speech before the UN General Assembly’, 27 September 1993,
www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm, accessed 10 September 2010.
48 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better’, Adelphi
Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); Scott D.
Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security 18:4 (Spring 1994): 66–107;
Steven R. David, ‘Why the Third World Still Matters’, International Security 17:3
(Winter 1992–1993): 127–159; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker,
‘An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation’, Journal of Con-
flict Resolution 26:2 (June 1982): 283–306; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’; John M. Deutsch, ‘The New
70 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Nuclear Threat’, Foreign Affairs 71:41 (Fall 1992): 124–125; Bradley A. Thayer,
‘The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime’, Security
Studies 4:3 (Spring 1995): 463–519; Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear
Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security 21:3 (Winter
1996–1997): 54–86.
49 William J. Clinton, ‘Speech before the UN General Assembly’.
50 Rhoda Margesson, ‘Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects’, CRS
Report for Congress, 26 January 2007, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33851.pdf,
accessed 19 December 2010.
51 Marvin G. Weinbaum, ‘The Politics of Afghan Resettlement and Rehabilitation’,
Asian Survey 29:3 (March 1989): 287–307.
52 Interview with Ali Jan Aurakzai (4 August 2011).
53 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
54 Interview with Assad Durrani (24 April 2012).
55 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’ in Michael R. Chambers, (ed.),
South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, Strategic Studies Insti-
tute of US Army War College Report, (November 2002), http://scholar.google.
co.uk/, accessed 4 August 2012.
56 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
57 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
58 Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of Soviet
Withdrawal (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002): 924.
59 Charles G. Cogan, ‘Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979’, World
Policy Journal 10:2 (1993): 73–82.
60 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond
(London: IB Tauris, 2010): 96–97.
61 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
62 For details see S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years (London:
Bennett & Bloom, 2006): 33–41.
63 Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Prospects for the Afghan Interim Government’, RAND Paper,
1991, http://130.154.3.14/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3949.pdf, accessed
14 August 2010.
64 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
65 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance, 66.
66 Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 285, 338; Washington Post,
19 February 1988; Editorial, Washington Post, 10 April 1988.
67 Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (12 August 2011); US Embassy Islamabad cable,
‘Afghanistan [Excised] Briefs Ambassador on His Activities; Pleads for Greater
Activism by UN’, 27 August 1997, released by NSA, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/, accessed 3 December 2011.
68 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
69 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
70 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
71 Draft Defense Planning Guidance Excerpt.
72 R. Jeffery Smith, ‘Administration Unable to Win Hill Support for Continued Aid to
Pakistan’, The Washington Post, 10 October 1990, A14.
73 ‘US–Pakistani Military Exercises Cause Concern’, The Hindustan Times, Delhi,
19 January 1994, http://docs.newsbank.com.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/s/HistArchive/
fbisdoc/FBISX/11CA3BE508A67A40/5D782E02AB8E45F3B049767AD4AEE203,
accessed 3 December 2011.
74 Report on the Testimony of Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
to the House Appropriations Committee, reported in Frontier Post, 14 April 1989;
also, Daily Jang, London, 15 September 1989.
75 Thomas P. Thornton, ‘The New Phase in US–Pakistani Relations’.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 71
76 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
77 Interview with Zahid Hussain (21 July 2011).
78 Mushahid Hussain, ‘US Policy in South Asia Outlined, Examined’, The Nation,
Islamabad, 14 February 1994, http://docs.newsbank.com.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/s/
HistArchive/fbisdoc/FBISX/11E58DC574F2A060/5D782E02AB8E45F3B049767A
D4AEE203, accessed 3 December 2011.
79 Testimony of Senator John Glenn, ‘US/Pakistan Nuclear Issues’, Committee on
Foreign Relations, US Senate, 30 July 1992, http://fas.org/news/pakistan/1992/
920731.htm, accessed 3 May 2011.
80 Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, ‘The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions
on India and Pakistan’, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1999): 1–16, http://cns.
miis.edu/npr/pdfs/morrow64.pdf, accessed 27 February 2011.
81 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Pakistan after Reagan’, Middle East Report, 155 (November–
December 1988).
82 William Webster, ‘Nuclear and Missile Proliferation’, Hearing before the Commit-
tee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 18 May 1989 (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1990): 12, www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/
fpb010.pdf, accessed 3 October 2013.
83 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 299.
84 Interview with Assad Durrani (24 April 2012).
85 Seymour Hersh, ‘On the Nuclear Edge’, The New Yorker, 29 March 1993.
86 Testimony of Senator John Glenn, ‘US/Pakistan Nuclear Issues’.
87 David Ottaway, ‘Addressing Congress, Bhutto Formally Renounces Nuclear Arms’,
Washington Post, 8 June 1989.
88 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
89 Benazir Bhutto’s interview with Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 302.
90 Interview with a senior Pakistani military official.
91 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
92 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 300, 310.
93 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and
Security Issues’, Report, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 19 March 2013,
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf, accessed 4 May 2013.
94 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
95 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, Note 58, 442.
96 Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011) and another former army chief.
97 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012); Senator Pressler, ‘Holding the Line
against Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia’, 9 May 1991, Congressional Record,
102nd Congress, 1991–1992, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=
Record&c=102, accessed 2 June 2010.
98 Representative McCollum, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Effort’ House of Representatives, 31
October 1991, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress, 1991–1992, http://thomas.
loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=102, accessed 13 May 2012.
99 Associated Press Report, 10 October 1990, www.apnewsarchive.com/1990/
Company-Pakistan-Sought-Furnaces-Useful-in-Making-Nuclear-Weapons/id-d27650
f5188cf7af0cffd041c7200fa5, accessed 29 April 2013.
100 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
101 ‘The AQ Khan Report by Pakistan ISI’, available at www.foxnews.com/
world/2011/09/16/aq-khan-report-isi/#ixzz1Y9ZIgsQV, accessed 4 May 2013.
102 Leonard Weiss, ‘Turning a Blind Eye Again?: The Khan Network’s History and
Lessons for US Policy’, www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/Weiss, accessed 6
May 2013.
103 Seymour Hersh, ‘On the Nuclear Edge’, www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/03/29/
on-the-nuclear-edge, accessed 15 October 2011.
104 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
72 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
105 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
106 Shameem Akhtar, ‘Selective Nuclear Non-Proliferation’, Dawn, Karachi, 24 January
1992, 11.
107 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons’.
108 1978 Central Intelligence Agency report, www.faqs.org/cia/docs/44/0000107983/
(UNTITLED)-RE.html; 1983 State Department document, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-11.pdf, accessed 14 July 2012.
109 Representative Fortney Pete Stark, Washington Post, Editorial, 5 October 1990,
Extension of Remarks, 10 October 1990, Congressional Record, 101st Congress,
1989–1990, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas2, accessed 2 November 2011.
110 Interview with former army chief.
111 Documents available at www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb377/, accessed 12
October 2013.
112 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
113 Senator John Glenn, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
30 July 1992, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress, 1991–1992, http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=Record&c=102, accessed 18 September 2011.
114 Washington Post, 7 June 1989, A4.
115 Jim Hoagland, ‘How Pakistan Helped Iran and Clinton Alerted Yeltsin’, Inter-
national Herald Tribune, 18 May 1995.
116 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
117 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
118 Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, Thirteen Page Confession, www.foxnews.com/
world/2011/09/15/aq-khans-thirteen-page-confession/#ixzz1otdGOSoS, accessed 6
March 2012.
119 Stephen Cohen quoted in ‘Pakistan Threatened to Give Nukes to Iran, Ex-officials
Say’, Associated Press Report, www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004–02–27-us-
pakistan_x.htm, accessed 6 January 2012.
120 See Hon. Bill McCollum, House of Representatives, Extension of Remarks, 12 Sep-
tember 1994, 103rd Congress, www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_cr/h940912-pak.htm,
accessed 23 May 2010.
121 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
122 ‘Origins of the Pressler Amendment’, Senate, 31 July 1992; Senator John Glenn,
‘On Proliferation Law: A Disgraceful Failure’, Congressional Record 102nd Con-
gress, Senate, 31 July 1992, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=
Record&c=102, accessed 21 June 2011.
123 R. Jeffery Smith, ‘Pakistani Official Affirms Capacity for Nuclear Device’, Wash-
ington Post, 7 February 1992.
124 Larry Pressler, ‘The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons
Program’, Senate, 31 July 1992, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress, 1991–1992,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=Record&c=102, accessed 21
June 2011.
125 Ibid.
126 Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, ‘China’s Missile Sales-Few Changes for the
Future’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 1992, 560; Douglas Jehl, ‘China
Breaking Missile Pledge, US Aides Say’, New York Times, 6 May 1993.
127 Mariana Babar, ‘Iraq to Prove Afghanistan: Beg Sees Game Plan in Allied Action’,
The Nation, Lahore, 29 January 1991, 1; ‘Defense Forces Should be Able to Act as
Deterrent – Beg’, The Nation, Lahore, 5 December 1990.
128 ‘Senator Pressler’s Logic’, Dawn, Karachi, 15 January 1992, 11, available in JPRS-
NEA-92–015 Report on Near East and South Asia, 21 February 1992, www.dtic.
mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA334252, accessed 3 August 2012.
129 Mushtaq Ahmed, ‘Pressler’s Indiscretion’, Dawn, Karachi, 21 January 1992, www.
dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA334252, accessed 3 August 2012.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 73
130 Omar Kureishi, ‘The “Islamic Bomb” Syndrome’, Dawn, Karachi, 21 January
1992,11, Ibid.
131 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
132 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
133 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
134 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
135 Gohar Ayub Khan, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power (Karachi: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007): 299.
136 Mushtaq Ahmed, ‘Pressler’s Indiscretion’.
137 ‘Pressler’s Alarmist Views’, Editorial, The Frontier Post, Peshawar, 13 January 1992, 10.
138 Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the
United States (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2011): 68–69.
139 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 251.
140 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 308.
141 ‘Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the US Approach to Development in Pakistan’,
Report of the Study Group on US Development Strategy in Pakistan, Centre for
Global Development, June 2011, 18.
142 Interview with Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).
143 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
144 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
145 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
146 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
147 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
148 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
149 Interview with Zahid Hussain (21 July 2011).
150 Quoted in Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan
(London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010): 48.
151 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 314.
152 Interview with a former army chief (20 July 2011).
153 Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011) and Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
154 Interview with a former army chief.
155 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’; Ken Booth and Nicholas
Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 51–58.
156 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
157 Report issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Proliferation: Threat and
Response’, January 2001, www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf, 25–27, accessed 7
July 2012.
158 Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’.
159 Interview with Siraj-ul-Haq (19 October 2011).
160 R. Jeffery Smith, ‘Administration Unable to Win Support for Continued Aid to Paki-
stan’, Washington Post, 10 October 1990.
161 Larry Q. Nowels, ‘Foreign Aid Budget and Policy Issues for the 104th Congress’,
CRS Issue Brief, updated 15 February 1995, www.pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
Pcaaa648.pdf , accessed 19 October 2012.
162 Steve Coll, ‘Hill Pressed to Lift Curb on Pakistan’, Extension of Remarks, 9 May
1991, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress, 1991–1992, accessed 3 December
2011, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r102:1:./temp/~r102ACEuGp:e14039,
accessed 3 December 2011.
163 Thomas P. Thornton, ‘The New Phase in US–Pakistani Relations’.
164 Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 104, 116.
165 Hon. Jim Kolbe, Remarks in the House of Representatives, 11 August 1992,
Congressional Record, 102nd Congress, 1991–1992, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=102, accessed 3 December 2011.
74 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
166 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 313.
167 Yaqub Ali Khan, Bob Oakley and Teresita Schaffer interviews with Dennis
Kux, 310.
168 T.L Diebel, ‘Bush’s Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction’, Foreign Policy 84 (Fall
1991): 3–23.
169 Interview with Sardar Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
170 Steve Coll, ‘India Rejects Pakistani bid for talks on nuclear ban’, Washington Post,
8 June 1991.
171 ‘Senators Seek Full Cutoff of Arms to Pakistan’, New York Times, 8 March 1992.
172 ‘Origins of the Pressler Amendment’ and ‘The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s
Nuclear Weapons Program’ Congressional Record, 102nd Congress, Senate, 30 and
31 July 1992, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=Record&c=102,
accessed 12 May 2013.
173 James Baker, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 102nd
Congress, 1991–1992, 5 February 1992, Ibid.
174 See Appendix 1 in Michael Krepon and Nate Cohn, (eds.), Report, ‘Crises in South
Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences’ (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2011):
29–40, www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Crises_Complete.pdf, accessed
17 January 2013; Report ‘The Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare’,
House Republican Research Committee, House of Representatives, 24 August 1994,
www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_cr/h940912-pak.htm, accessed 30 May 2011.
175 Larry Pressler, Remarks Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 30
July 1992, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress, 1991–1992, http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=102, accessed 11 June 2011.
176 New Yorker, 29 March 1993.
177 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
178 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
179 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
180 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
181 Interview with Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
182 Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Myth of American Exceptionalism’, Foreign Policy,
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism,
accessed 6 June 2012.
183 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
184 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
185 Interview with Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
186 See Charles. G. Cogan, ‘Partners in Time’, quotes from p. 82.
187 Interview with Dennis Kux (18 March 2012).
188 John F. Burns, ‘Pakistan Wearies of Afghan Burden’, The New York Times, 15
December 1989, www.nytimes.com/1989/12/15/world/pakistan-wearies-of-afghan-
burden.html, accessed December 2012.
189 ‘Pakistan is Growing Impatient with US over Afghanistan Policy’, Senate (Exten-
sion of Remarks), 8 February 1990, Congressional Record, 101st Congress,
1989–1990, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=Record&c=101,
accessed 28 June 2011.
190 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 226–228.
191 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
192 Brent Scowcroft quoted in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 297.
193 George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 134–135.
194 Interview with Ali Jan Aurakzai (4 August 2011).
195 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
196 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
197 Anonymous US intelligence officer quoted in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted
Allies, 299.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 75
198 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 240–245.
199 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
200 Interview with Mumtaz Gul (19 October 2011).
201 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
202 Peter Tomsen’s interview with Roy Gutman in How We Missed the Story: Osama
Bin Laden, the Taliban & the Hijacking of Afghanistan (Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books, 2008): 31.
203 Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Prospects for the Afghan Interim Government’, RAND Paper
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991), www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3949.html, 2,
accessed 14 August 2010.
204 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
205 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
206 Milt Bearden’s interview with Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 228.
207 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap, 217.
208 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance, 61–62.
209 Interviews with Pakistani officials B and C.
210 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
211 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17August 2011).
212 B. Raman, Terrorist State as a Frontline Ally (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers,
2002): 5–11.
213 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
214 Document ID19ISLAMABAD27305, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, December 17
1989, http://wikileaks.org, accessed 12 April 2012.
215 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 228.
216 D.P. Sharma, The New Terrorism: Islamist International (New Delhi: APH Publish-
ing Corporation, 2005): 402.
217 Syeda Abida Hussain’s interview with Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 316.
218 ‘United States and Pakistan Relations’, 25 May 1994, Congressional Record, 103rd
Congress, 1993–1994, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas2, accessed July 2011.
219 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).

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Superpower. New York: Basic Books. 2007.

Books (edited)
Barber, Benjamin. ‘Can History Have an End?’ in Harriet Swain, ed., Big Questions in
History. London: Jonathan Cape, 2005.
Rizvi, Hasan Askari. ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’ in Michael R. Chambers, ed., South
Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances. Strategic Studies Institute of
US Army War College Report, (November 2002), http://scholar.google.co.uk/,
accessed 4 August 2012.

Journal articles
Art, Robert J. ‘A Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy after the Cold War’.
International Security 15:4 (1991): 5–53.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 77
Brinkley, Douglas. ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’. Foreign Policy 106
(Spring 1997): 110–127.
Brooks, Stephen and William Wohlforth. ‘American Primacy in Perspective’. Foreign
Affairs 81:4 (2002): 20–33.
Carpenter, Ted Galen. ‘Delusions of Indispensability’. National Interest 124 (March–
April 2013): 47–55.
Cogan, Charles. G. ‘Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan Since 1979’. World
Policy 10:2 (1993): 73–82.
David, Steven R. ‘Why the Third World Still Matters’. International Security 17:3
(1992–1993): 127–159.
Deutsch, John M. ‘The New Nuclear Threat’. Foreign Affairs 71:41 (Fall 1992): 124–125.
Diebel, T.L. ‘Bush’s Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction’. Foreign Policy 84 (Fall
1991): 3–23.
Dumbrell, John. ‘Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton’s Foreign Policy
Revisited’. Diplomacy and Statecraft 13:2 (2002): 43–56.
Evera, Stephen Van. ‘Why Europe Matters and the Third World Doesn’t: American
Grand Strategy After the Cold War’. Journal of Strategic Studies 13:2 (1990): 1–51.
Gaddis, John Lewis. ‘Toward a Post-Cold War World’. Foreign Affairs 70:2 (1991):
102–122.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl Press and Harvey Sapolsky. ‘Come Home, America: The Strategy
of Restraint in the Face of Temptation’. International Security 21:4 (1997): 5–48.
Goldberg, A.C. ‘Selective Engagement: US National Security Policy in the 1990s’. The
Washington Quarterly 15:3 (1992): 15–24.
Haass, Richard. ‘The Squandered Presidency: Demanding More From the Commander-
in-Chief ’. Foreign Affairs 79:3 (2000): 31–49.
Helms, Jesse. ‘Saving the UN: A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General’. Foreign
Affairs 75:5 (1996): 2–7.
Hoffmann, Stanley. ‘In Defense of Mother Teresa: Morality in Foreign Policy’. Foreign
Affairs 75:2 (1996): 172–175.
Huntington, Samuel P. ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72:3 (1992–1993):
22–49.
Huntington, Samuel P. ‘The Lonely Superpower’. Foreign Affairs 78:2 (1999): 35–49.
Hyland, William G. ‘A Mediocre Record’. Foreign Policy 101 (Winter 1995–1996):
69–74.
Ikenberry, John G. ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American
Postwar Order’. International Security 23:3 (1998–1999): 43–78.
Ikenberry, John G. ‘Is American Multilateralism in Decline?’ Perspectives on Politics 1:3
(2003): 533–550.
Kagan, Robert. ‘The Benevolent Empire’. Foreign Policy 111 (Summer 1998): 24–36.
Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’. Foreign
Affairs 75:4 (1996): 18–32.
Keohane, Robert O. ‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’. International Journal
45:4 (1990): 731–764.
Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa Martin. ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’. Inter-
national Security 20:1 (1995): 39–51.
Krauthammer, Charles. ‘The Unipolar Moment’. Foreign Affairs 70:1 (1990–1991):
23–33.
Kupchan, Charles and Peter L. Trubowitz, ‘Dead Center: the Demise of Liberal Interna-
tionalism in the United States’. International Security 32:2 (2007): 7–44.
78 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Lake, Anthony. ‘Confronting Backlash States’. Foreign Affairs 73:2 (1994): 44–55.
Layne, Christopher. ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’. Inter-
national Security 17:4 (1993): 5–51.
Layne, Christopher. ‘From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future
Grand Strategy’. International Security 22:1 (1997): 86–124.
Malik, Iftikhar H. ‘Pakistan’s National Security and Regional Issues: Politics of Mutuali-
ties with the Muslim World’. Asian Survey 34:12 (1994): 1077–1092.
Mandelbaum, Michael. ‘Foreign Policy as Social Work’. Foreign Affairs 75:1 (1996):
16–32.
Maynes, Charles William. ‘The New Decade’ Foreign Policy 80 (Autumn 1990): 3–13.
Mearsheimer, John J. ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’.
International Security 15:1 (1990): 5–56.
Mearsheimer, John J. ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’. International
Security 19:3 (1994–1995): 5–49.
Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de and William H. Riker. ‘An Assessment of the Merits of
Selective Nuclear Proliferation’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 26:2 (1982): 283–306.
Miller, L. ‘The Clinton Years: Reinventing US Foreign Policy’. International Affairs 70:4
(1994): 621–634.
Nye Jr., Joseph S. ‘Soft Power’. Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 153–171.
Posen, Barry R. ‘The Case for Restraint’. The American Interest 3:2 (2007): 7–17.
Rais, Rasul Bakhsh. ‘Afghanistan and the Regional Powers’. Asian Survey 33:9 (1993):
905–922.
Rashid, Ahmed. ‘Pakistan after Reagan’. Middle East Report 155 (1988): 30–33.
Rice, Condoleezza. ‘Promoting the National Interest’. Foreign Affairs 79:1 (2000):
45–62.
Rubin, Barnett R. ‘Post-Cold War State Disintegration: The Failure of International Con-
flict Resolution in Afghanistan’. Journal of International Affairs 46:2 (1993): 469–492.
Sagan, Scott D. ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory,
and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’. International Security 18:4 (1994): 66–107.
Sagan, Scott D. ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a
Bomb’. International Security 21:3 (1996–1997): 54–86.
Thayer, Bradley A. ‘The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Non-proliferation
Regime’. Security Studies 4:3 (1995): 463–519.
Thornton, Thomas P. ‘The New Phase in US–Pakistani Relations’. Foreign Affairs 68:3
(1989): 142–159.
Walt, Stephen M. ‘Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy’. Foreign Affairs 79:2
(2000): 63–79.
Walt, Stephen M. ‘The Myth of American Exceptionalism’. Foreign Policy. Accessed 6
June 2012. www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_
exceptionalism.
Waltz, Kenneth N. ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better’. Adelphi
Paper No. 171. International Institute for Strategic Studies (1981).
Waltz, Kenneth N. ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’. International Security 25:1
(2000): 5–41.
Weinbaum, Marvin G. ‘The Politics of Afghan Resettlement and Rehabilitation’. Asian
Survey 29:3 (1989): 287–307.
Wohlforth, William. ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’. International Security 24:1
(1999): 5–41.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 79
Newspapers/periodicals
Akhtar, Shameem. ‘Selective Nuclear Non-Proliferation’. Dawn, 24 January 1992.
Buchanan, Patrick J. ‘America First and Second, and Third’. The National Interest 19
(1990): 77–82.
Burns, John F. ‘Pakistan Wearies of Afghan Burden’. New York Times, 15 December 1989.
Coll, Steve. ‘India Rejects Pakistani Bid for Talks on Nuclear Ban’. Washington Post, 8
June 1991.
‘Company: Pakistan Sought Furnaces Useful in Making Nuclear Weapons’. Associated
Press, 10 October 1990.
‘Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: “Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival” ’. New
York Times, 8 March 1992.
Friedman, Thomas L. ‘Clinton’s New Foreign-Policy Thinkers’. New York Times, 23
December 1992.
Friedman, Thomas L. ‘Clinton’s Foreign Policy’. New York Times, 31 October 1993.
Fukuyama, Francis. ‘The End of History?’ The National Interest 16 (1989): 3–18.
Hersh, Seymour. ‘On the Nuclear Edge’. The New Yorker, 29 March 1993.
Hussain, Mushahid. ‘US Policy in South Asia Outlined, Examined’. The Nation, Islama-
bad. 14 February 1994.
Hyland, William G. ‘Bush’s Foreign Policy: Pragmatism or Indecision?’ New York Times,
26 April 1989.
Kagan, Robert. ‘The Case for Global Activism’. Commentary 98 (1994): 40–44.
Kagan, Robert. ‘A Retreat from Power?’ Commentary 100 (1995): 19–25.
Kagan, Robert. ‘Not Fade Away’. The New Republic, 11 January 2012.
Krauthammer, Charles. ‘What’s Wrong with the Pentagon Paper?’ Washington Post, 13
March 1992.
Kristol, William and Robert Kagan. ‘The Present Danger’. The National Interest 59
(2000): 57–69.
Muravichik, Joshua. ‘At Last, Pax Americana’. New York Times, 24 January 1991.
Ottaway, David. ‘Addressing Congress, Bhutto Formally Renounces Nuclear Arms’.
Washington Post, 8 June 1989.
Report on the Testimony of Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, to the
House Appropriations Committee. Frontier Post, 14 April 1989.
‘Senators Seek Full Cutoff of Arms to Pakistan’. New York Times, 8 March 1992.
Smith, R. Jeffery. ‘Administration Unable to Win Support for Continued Aid to Paki-
stan’. Washington Post, 10 October 1990.
Tyler, Patrick. ‘US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop a One-Superpower
World’. New York Times, 8 March 1992.
‘US–Pakistani Military Exercises Cause Concern’. The Hindustan Times, 19
January 1994.
Will, George F. ‘The End of Our Holiday from History’. Washington Post, 12 Septem-
ber 2001.
Zakaria, Fareed. ‘The End of the End of History’. Newsweek US Edition, 24 Septem-
ber 2001.

Online newspapers/periodicals
Gottlieb, Stuart. ‘What if US Stops Policing the World?’ CNN Opinion, 18 September
2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-retrenchment. Accessed
March 2013.
80 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Morrow, Daniel and Michael Carriere. ‘The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on
India and Pakistan’. The Nonproliferation Review (1999). Accessed 27 February 2011.
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/morrow64.pdf.
Rydell, Randy J. ‘Giving Non-Proliferation Norms Teeth: Sanctions and the NPPA’. The
Non-proliferation Review (1999). Accessed 12 May 2013.http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/
rydel62.pdf.
Weiss, Leonard. ‘Turning a Blind Eye Again?: The Khan Network’s History and Lessons
for US Policy’. Accessed 6 May 2011. www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/Weiss.

Speeches/lectures
Bush, H.W. George. Address before the Joint Session of the United States Congress. 11
September 1990.
Bush, H.W. George. State of the Union Address. 29 January 1991.
Bush, George. Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the
Persian Gulf Conflict. 6 March 1991.
Clinton, Bill. Speech before the UN General Assembly. 27 September 1993.
Clinton, Bill. American Security in a Changing World, Remarks at George Washington
University. 5 August 1996.
Dumbrell, John. ‘Evaluating the Foreign Policy of President Clinton, or Bill Clinton
Between the Bushes’. Lecture, British Association for American Studies Annual Con-
ference, Cambridge University. 14–17 April 2005.
Evans, Alexander. ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture & US–Pakistan Relations’. Lecture,
Kluge Centre, Washington DC. 11 November 2011.
‘From Containment to Enlargement’. Remarks of Anthony Lake, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity. 21 September 1993.
Perle, Richard. ‘Next Stop Iraq’. Speech at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Phila-
delphia. 30 November 2001.

Primary documents
Draft Defense Planning Guidance Excerpt, Department of Defense Declassified Docu-
ment. Accessed 2 April 2013. www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_
extract_nytedit.pdf.
No. Islama007343, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Afghanistan [Excised] Briefs
Ambassador on his Activities; Pleads for Greater Activism by UN’. Document 24. 27
August 1997. Accessed 3 December 2011. www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB227/.
Madeleine Albright, Interview on NBC-TV ‘The Today Show’ with Matt Lauer Colum-
bus, Ohio, 19 February 1998. Accessed 3 March 2012. http://secretary.state.gov/www/
statements/1998/980219a.html.
Michael Krepon and Nate Cohn, (eds.). Report, ‘Crises in South Asia: Trends and Poten-
tial Consequences’. Appendix-1 (2011), 29–40. Accessed 17 January 2013. www.
stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Crises_Complete.pdf.
National Security Strategy 1994, 1995 and 1996. Accessed 14 November 2012. http://
nssarchive.us/.
Report issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense. ‘Proliferation: Threat and Response’.
January 2001. Accessed 7 July 2012. https://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf.
 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts 81
Stephen P. Cohen. ‘India and America: an Emerging Relationship’. Paper at the Kyoto
Conference, Japan, 8–10 December 2000. Accessed 18 September 2012. www.
brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2001/12/08india%20cohen/kyoto.pdf.
‘The A.Q. Khan Report by Pakistan ISI’. Accessed 4 May 2013. www.foxnews.com/
world/2011/09/16/aq-khan-report-isi/#ixzz1Y9ZIgsQV.
Zalmay Khalilzad. ‘Prospects for the Afghan Interim Government’. RAND Paper (1991).

Congressional record
Source: http://thomas.loc.gov/home. Accessed May 2011–April 2012.
Hon. Jim Kolbe. Remarks in the House of Representatives, Congressional Record 102nd
Congress (1991–1992), 11 August 1992.
James Baker. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 102nd Congress
(1991–1992), 5 February 1992.
‘Pakistan is Growing Impatient with US over Afghanistan Policy’. Senate (Extension of
Remarks), Congressional Record, 101st Congress (1989–1990), 8 February 1990.
Representative Collins. ‘United States and Pakistan Relations’. Congressional Record,
103rd Congress (1993–1994), 25 May 1994.
Representative Fortney Pete Stark. Extension of Remarks, Congressional Record, 101st
Congress (1989–1990), 10 October 1990.
Representative McCollum. ‘Iran’s Nuclear Effort’. House of Representatives, Congres-
sional Record, 102nd Congress (1991–1992), 31 October 1991.
Senator John Glenn. ‘On Proliferation Law: A Disgraceful Failure’. The Herald Tribune,
26 June 1992, Congressional Record 102nd Congress, 31 July 1992.
Senator Larry Pressler. ‘Origins of the Pressler Amendment’. Congressional Record
102nd Congress (1991–1992), 31 July 1992.
Senator Larry Pressler. ‘Holding the Line against Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia’.
Congressional Record 102nd Congress (1991–1992), 9 May 1991.
Steve Coll. ‘Hill Pressed to Lift Curb on Pakistan’. Extension of Remarks Congressional
Record 102nd Congress (1991–1992), 9 May 1991.

Congressional record – other sources

Testimony of Senator John Glenn. ‘US/Pakistan Nuclear Issues’. Committee on Foreign
Relations, US Senate, 30 July 1992. Accessed 3 May 2011. http://fas.org/news/
pakistan/1992/920731.htm
US Raphael F. Perl. ‘Taliban and the Drug Trade’. Congress Research Service (CRS)
Report. 5 October 2001.
William Webster. ‘Nuclear and Missile Proliferation’. Hearing before the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 18 May 1989. Accessed 3 October 2013.
www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/fpb010.pdf.
Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin. ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and
Security Issues’. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, 19 March 2013.
Report ‘The Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare’, House Republican
Research Committee, House of Representatives, 24 August 1994. Accessed 30 May
2011. www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_cr/h940912-pak.htm.
Rhoda Margesson. ‘Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects’. Congres-
sional Research Service (CRS), 26 January 2007.
82 Immediate post-Cold War catalysts
Larry Q. Nowels. ‘Foreign Aid Budget and Policy Issues for the 104th Congress’. CRS
Issue Brief, updated 15 February 1995. Accessed 19 October 2012. www.pdf.usaid.
gov/pdf_docs/Pcaaa648.pdf.

Interviews
Aurakzai, Lt General Ali Jan (Retired). Commander XI Corps Western Military
Command, 2001–2004 and former Governor of North West Frontier Province (Khyber
Pakhtunkhawa), 2006–2008 (Rawalpindi, 4 August 2011).
Beg, General Mirza Aslam (Retired). Former Chief of Army Staff, 1988–1991
(Rawalpindi, 2 July 2011).
Bokhari, Admiral Fasih (Retired). Former Chief of Naval Staff, 1997–1999 (Islamabad,
15 July 2011).
Durrani, Lt General Asad (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence,
1990–1992 (Islamabad, 24 April 2012).
Gul, Lt General Hamid (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence,
1987–1989 (Rawalpindi, 13 July 2011).
Haq, Siraj-ul, Right-wing politician and Vice President Jamaat-i-Islami (Peshawar, 19
October 2011).
Hussain, Zahid. Journalist, political analyst and author (Islamabad, 21 July 2011).
Inderfurth, Karl F. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia in the Clinton Administra-
tion, 1997–2001 (Telephonic Interview: 2 February 2012).
Islam, Mohammad. Doctor, Director Iqra University, Islamabad and Former Director
Area Study Center, Quaid-i-Azam University (Islamabad, 12 July 2011, 28 July 2011).
Kux, Dennis H. Former US Ambassador to Pakistan and author (Telephonic Interview,
18 March 2012).
Lodhi, Maleeha. Doctor, Former Ambassador to Washington, 1993–1996 and 1999–2002,
journalist (Islamabad, 25 October 2011).
Murshed, Iftikhar. Career diplomat and special envoy to Afghanistan, 1996–2000, author
(Islamabad, 12 August 2011).
Musharraf, Pervez General (Retired). Former President of the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan and Chief of Army Staff, 1998–2007 (Telephonic Interview, 16 July 2012).
Qazi, Javed Ashraf. Lt General (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelli-
gence, 1993–1995 (Rawalpindi, 17 August 2011).
Rais, Rasul Bakhsh. Doctor, Professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of
Management Sciences and author (Islamabad, 12 August 2011).
Riedel, Bruce O. Former Director National Security Council, 1997–2001, Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense, 1995–1997 and National Intelligence Officer for Near East
and South Asian Affairs at the National Intelligence Council, 1993–1995 in the Clinton
administration, author and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (Telephonic Inter-
view, 2 February 2012).
Weinbaum, Marvin G. Professor, Former analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan, US
Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Clinton and George
W. Bush administrations, 1999–2003 (Telephonic Interview, 2 February 2012).
3 Clinton’s foreign policy and
Pakistan
Reinforcing catalysts

But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places
are, or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we
must ask is what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester
and spread? And we must remember that the real challenge of foreign policy is to
deal with problems before they harm our national interests.1

Thus spoke President Clinton in San Francisco on 26 February 1999. His words
foreshadowed the US decision to bomb Kosovo during the Balkans crisis. Less
than 3000 miles from the Balkans, Afghanistan’s civil war had been raging since
1991. This was a brutal power struggle between local warlords, exacerbated by
regional actors who continued to support rival groups in service of their own
national security goals. Chief among these actors was Pakistan, as it continued
its involvement in Afghanistan even though the Afghan–Soviet conflict had
ended and the Soviet Union had withdrawn. There would be no US intervention
here however, for the US had lost interest in this region for the duration of the
1990s.
Leslie Gelb argues that the main strategic challenge for the United States was
to cope with civil wars and the post-conflict problems of state collapse.2
However, given Clinton’s criteria for selective engagement – a real threat to
international peace, clear objectives, anticipatable costs and a clear exit strategy
– intervention in the complex and messy Afghan civil war was clearly not an
option.3
Clinton continued the Bush-era policy of strategic disengagement from the
area which, by extension, meant diminished interest in Pakistan. That Pakistan,
in the words of author and RAND researcher Seth Jones, was ‘no longer visible
on the US radar screen’,4 was reflected in official attitudes. In his statement
before the Senate in 1993, Clinton’s Secretary of State Warren Christopher had
the temerity to emphasize US interest in the promotion of ‘human rights and free
elections in Pakistan, Burma and elsewhere’.5 Considering that Pakistan had held
a free election in 1989 and had a democratic government in place at the time, the
incumbent administration clearly lacked interest in the country.
South Asia expert Stephen Cohen points out that Pakistan ‘had begun to
liberalize its economy before India’ and in 1989 ‘the country appeared to be
84 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
entering an era of democracy, was free of major conflicts with its neighbours,
and was well situated to take advantage of changes in the global economy’.6 Yet
the Clinton administration remained uninterested in engaging with the popula-
tion of Pakistan, despite evidence that it was shunning religious extremism as
manifested in electoral results. Between 1989 and 1997 the combined vote of the
religious political parties was reduced from 21.5 per cent in 1970 to 6.7 per cent
in 1993.
US support for democracy during this period was linked to the economic use-
fulness of the country concerned. Clinton emphasized the need for a ‘concen-
trated American effort’ to support Nigeria and Indonesia – both lucrative markets
– as they were ‘two aspiring democracies due to hold elections in 1999 after
years of repression and military rule’. Pakistan, which had held its first election
ten years earlier after eleven years of military rule, apparently warranted no such
effort.7
Pakistan, struggling with more than three million Afghan refugees, a weak
economy and ongoing security problems was not among those countries with
‘free-spending middle classes’, thought by the US to be a necessary precondition
for becoming a functioning democracy and a bulwark against terrorism.8 Clin-
ton’s lack of interest in Pakistan’s return to democracy in the 1990s was in
keeping with the Cold War era US approach towards Pakistan and which,
according to Michael Krepon, had ‘undermined civil society’.9 On the other
hand, Clinton’s securitized approach failed to coerce the military to either cap its
nuclear program or review its Afghan policy. Instead this strengthened the hold
of the military at the cost of Pakistan’s civilian institutions.
That said, in the post-Cold War world of the 1990s, WMDs, nuclear prolifer-
ation and terrorism became the principal security concerns of the United States.10
Accordingly, the PFP goals of attaining nuclear weapons capability, ensuring a
Pakistan-friendly regime in Kabul and supporting proxy warfare in Indian-
administered Kashmir made Islamabad relevant to Clinton’s foreign policy.
Clinton’s approach was primarily based on coercive diplomacy; it was ambiva-
lent and largely a repeat of the Cold War mindset that created conflict over the
issue of nuclear non-proliferation while also briefly driving Pakistan–US conver-
gence of interests in Afghanistan. There was, however, a fundamental differ-
ence; in the post-Cold War world the US was no longer constrained by its Soviet
containment strategy and the subsequent balancing of its relations with Pakistan
and India.
It is clear that Clinton’s concept of geo-economics was driven by the desire to
build US economic prosperity and democratic India, with its large markets and
huge population, offered a lucrative opportunity. Combined with continued
efforts by Congress to stifle Pakistan’s nuclear program, Clinton’s reaching out
to India inflamed Pakistan’s regional security dilemma. These developments
reinforced the trends in the US–Pakistan relationship set in motion by the pol-
icies of the Bush administration.
The Clinton presidency raises two interesting questions. Why did Clinton fail
to achieve his foreign policy objectives in Pakistan? To what extent did the
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 85
regional security goals of PFP facilitate or impede American post-Cold War
global objectives? To address these broad questions, we must examine the trian-
gular relationship between the US, India and Pakistan.

Clinton and the triangular relationship

During the Cold War, US foreign policy towards South Asia was managed by
the South Asia and Near Eastern desk in the State Department. On 24 August
1992, a separate Bureau of South Asian Affairs was created by Congress. When
Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel took charge of the Bureau in 1993, it
seemed to indicate that South Asia would now be paid sustained attention.
However Sarwar Naqvi, who served as the Deputy Chief of Mission to Wash-
ington (1991–1995), argued that despite a separate South Asia desk, Pakistan
was not on the State Department’s list of priorities given that only Assistant Sec-
retary level officials were dealing with it.11
Pakistan’s Ambassadors to Washington, Maleeha Lodhi (1995–1997) and
Riaz Khokhar (1997–1999) confirmed Naqvi’s perspective. Khokhar recalled
that the Secretary of State hardly ever engaged with him. Mostly, she left it to
Under Secretary of State Tom Pickering to deal with Pakistan on critical matters,
such as the nuclear issue and the pending F-16 problem.12 Although Albright
visited Pakistan in 1997, the visit was primarily driven by US domestic politics
concerning women’s rights under the Taliban. According to co-founder of the
Henry L. Stimson Centre, Michael Krepon, who served as an arms control offi-
cial in the Clinton administration, Clinton did not begin his tenure with any pre-
conceived notions of alienating Pakistan as opposed to India.13 Clinton’s first
term record supports his point.
In contrast to its Cold War policy, India liberalized its economy in the early
1990s, facilitating US investment and improving bilateral ties despite disagree-
ments over human rights abuses in Kashmir and Indian Punjab. According to
Indian analysts, Indian reports on Pakistan’s efforts to infiltrate militants into
Indian Kashmir were not adequately addressed between 1993 and 1994;14 reports
that the ISI was supporting Sikh separatists in Indian Punjab were also ignored.15
In fact, Clinton initially expressed support for Sikh rights and promised to take
up the issue with India16 while Assistant Secretary Raphel, much to India’s dis-
pleasure, described Kashmir as ‘disputed territory’ and described the insurgency
in Kashmir as ‘self-sustaining’.17 Raphel, along with Defense Secretary William
Perry, ‘supported closer Pakistan–US ties’ perceiving Pakistan as a ‘potentially
useful friend’ in western Asia and the Middle East18 and an important source of
troops for UN peacekeeping missions.19
In April 1995, Bhutto visited Washington and Clinton responded positively to
her request to either release the pre-ordered F-16s or reimburse Pakistan. He
promised to urge Congress to reconsider the Pressler Amendment and supported
Republican Senator Hank Brown’s efforts towards this end,20 which culminated
in the Brown Amendment in 1995. It was aimed at one-time waiver on Pressler
Amendment to release embargoed military equipment in the pipeline.
86 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
Furthermore, he helped Nawaz Sharif in defusing the Kargil conflict with
India in 1999. Despite such gestures however, the US did not renew its aid,
release the F-16s or support Islamabad in resolving the Kashmir issue – demon-
strating the limits of Clinton’s desire to maintain a relationship with Pakistan.
Conversely, the administration’s interest in India rose steadily.21
Clinton was the first US president who de-hyphenated the India–Pakistan
construct. This, as a RAND report explains, meant that ‘each state would be gov-
erned by an objective assessment of the intrinsic value of each country to US
interests rather than by fears about how US relations with one would affect rela-
tions with the other’.22 The assumption was that the utility of the two countries
to the US was shifting due to the changes in its grand strategic interests.23 This
was confirmed by Lodhi who argued:

The US had to de-hyphenate the two countries for they did not want to
alienate India. They never helped in [the resolution of] Indo-Pakistan dis-
putes. They only wanted to manage relations to keep Pakistan engaged in a
nuclear dialogue.24

The US was India’s largest trade partner and a major source of investment and
technology throughout the 1990s. Moreover, New Delhi became the largest
South Asian recipient of US development and food aid, with US assistance
reaching a total of $170 million in the fiscal year 2000, more than forty-five
times that of Pakistan’s $3.78 million.25 In contrast, Pakistan offered far fewer
economic opportunities and its close relations with China were not to its
advantage. Conversely, India, with its significant military capability, was seen as
a potential geopolitical balance against China.26 Thus, Clinton’s effort to build a
new partnership with India had a security angle in addition to the economic one.
Clinton’s economic priorities are illustrated by Strobe Talbott’s assertion that
the India and Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1998 provided Clinton with a
powerful incentive to engage India and ‘give the US a degree of traction with
India that it never had during the Cold War’.27 Although sanctions under the
Glenn Amendment were imposed on both Islamabad and New Delhi after the
May 1998 nuclear tests, their effect on India – which was not dependent on US
military aid – was marginal as compared to the impact on Pakistan.28 After the
US Senate rejected the CTBT in October 1998, Clinton’s pressure on India to
sign the treaty weakened. Interestingly – and perhaps predictably – Clinton’s
economic interest in the huge Indian market and US domestic politics ensured
that even the sanctions regime is not followed strictly by his own administration
and Congress.29 The Brownback legislation, which did not authorize the waiving
of military sanctions, removed obstacles to trade and economic relations between
the US and India while failing to improve Pakistan’s predicament since it was
under the Pressler and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sanctions
that were imposed in 1993 for importing Chinese missile technology.30 Such
punitive measures against Pakistan by the US contributed to India’s comfort
level in its post-Cold War relations with America.31
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 87
In January 1995, Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Perry signed a
security agreement in New Delhi to establish a Defense Policy Forum for
reviewing post-Cold War strategies and to enhance military to military contacts
through improved training, exchange programs and joint exercises. This agree-
ment was a breakthrough for US–India relations, marking a move away from the
estrangement that dominated the Cold War era. Immediately after Perry’s visit
Ron Brown, the Secretary of Commerce, visited India and signed an agreement
establishing a ‘Commerce Forum’ to promote bilateral economic relations.32 No
comparable commercial agreement was signed with Pakistan although Perry also
visited Islamabad in January 1995 to find ways to improve security relations.33
Subsequently, the Pakistan–US Defense Consultative Group on security
issues, which had not met since 1990, was revived in September 1996. It is note-
worthy that a military cooperation forum was reactivated just as the Taliban was
strengthening their hold on Kabul. Given that no financial or material benefits
were offered to Pakistan, it is likely that this was a mostly symbolic attempt to
maintain at least some relations with a country that held leverage over the
Taliban – a group still considered to be potentially useful to US interests in
Central Asia. Raphel’s shuttle diplomacy during this period – aimed at winning
a stake in the proposed Turkmenistan gas pipeline – lends credibility to this
argument.34
US–India bilateral relations became considerably warmer after the Indian
Prime Minister, Narsimah Rao, officially visited Washington in May 1994; he
was the first head of government to deliver a speech to the US Congress during
the Clinton presidency. Conversely, in late May 1994, US officials virtually
ignored Pakistan’s President Farooq Leghari’s private visit to Washington.35
Writing in his political memoirs, Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Gohar
Ayub Khan recalls how the US media ignored Nawaz Sharif ’s address to the UN
General Assembly and later neglected to highlight his press conference in Sep-
tember 1997.36 The mixed signals of Clinton’s first term were replaced with
positive gestures towards India – signified by the August 1997 replacement of
Robin Raphel with Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth
who – as Krepon confirmed – was ‘very strongly inclined towards India’; he was
particularly interested in the commercial opportunities of the relationship.37 The
fact that a pro-India official was chosen to replace the pro-Pakistan Raphel
reflects Clinton’s shift towards India – especially given the Indian Government
and media’s public displeasure with Raphel’s stance on Kashmir.38 After replac-
ing Raphel, Inderfurth first visited India, then Pakistan, and then New Delhi
again before flying home.
Executing the then army chief General Musharraf ’s plan, on May 1999 Paki-
stani troops occupied 500 square miles of Indian-held Kashmir, including a
border post near Kargil. The Indians retaliated and there were US fears of con-
flict escalation into a nuclear exchange. Nawaz Sharif sought Clinton’s help in
resolving the issue without upsetting the fragile civil–military relations. Accord-
ing to Fasih Bokhari who attended the meeting between Musharraf and Nawaz
Sharif prior to the Kargil debacle:
88 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
There were clear lines of disagreement between Musharraf and Nawaz
Sharif [on Kargil] . . . it started as a loose politico-military adventure. . . .
That could not be justified politically by Sharif as it unfolded.39

On 4 July 1999 and at the Blair House meeting in Washington the US President
persuaded him to order a pullback40 after Clinton secured Vajpayee’s consent on
the phone. In exchange Clinton promised to help resolve the Kashmir issue. But
before any progress could be made General Pervez Musharraf took over the
country in the wake of an army coup in October 1999.
Nawaz Sharif was in fact clearly told before leaving for Washington that he
would not be received by Clinton unless he intended to withdraw from Kargil.41
Musharraf argued during the interview:

We were in a very, very strong position; Sharif accepted to withdraw

because of US pressure . . . Kargil was undertaken to bring Kashmir back
into international focus . . . after Americans started supporting the Indian
position on Kashmir you could not even talk about it in the UN.

Musharraf ’s political objective – if there was one – remained unfulfilled. As for

his military aim, according to Bokhari, it was only later that cutting a crucial
Indian supply line was claimed by Musharraf as the military objective.42 Khokhar
correctly saw the Kargil conflict as ‘a watershed event because after this India
was able to build the case against trusting Pakistan’.43 His perspective was
endorsed by Krepon. According to him, Pakistan’s nuclear testing and its initi-
ation of an armed conflict with India in the Kargil significantly shifted US policy
towards New Delhi. This could be gauged from Clinton’s carefully crafted ‘lan-
guage on Kashmir as a bilateral dispute in July 4 communiqué’ following the
Kargil Summit at Blair House. India was the primary beneficiary, as this
endorsed the Indian position.44
Clinton’s handling of the Kargil crisis, which increased Indian trust in Clin-
ton’s efforts to cultivate India, was impacted by Pakistan’s unconvincing expla-
nation of the Kargil conflict as being ‘indigenous’. The potential for nuclear
escalation played an important role although, according to Inderfurth, ‘there was
no real risk of a nuclear confrontation at that time’.45 Khokhar recalled:

Tom Pickering called me and made a strong demarche. He said ‘Kargil has
tarnished Pakistan’s image, and the US saw it as an example of a nuclear
country behaving in an irresponsible manner.’46

The Kargil episode thus allowed Clinton to make a clean break with Pakistan,
without the need for diplomatic niceties. In 2000, he spent five days in India and
barely five hours in Islamabad, where he refused to shake hands or be photo-
graphed with Pakistan’s new military leader, Pervez Musharraf. Yet, he found it
important to explain himself to the Pakistani nation in a televised speech during
which he made an unsubtle allusion to the Kashmir dispute saying: ‘this era does
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 89
not reward people who struggle in vain to redraw borders with blood’.47 His
words were little more than rhetoric, since the post-Cold War era was no dif-
ferent from the Cold War years in that US foreign policy was driven by self-
interest in both periods. This unusual television performance can perhaps be
explained as an unconscious effort to clarify the reasons for the American ‘aban-
donment’ of Pakistan in favour of India; it can also be viewed as a manifestation
of Clinton’s personal desire for approval. More importantly, Clinton’s visit to
Islamabad followed his visit to New Delhi and his public statements about Kargil
and Kashmir in Pakistan were meant to reinforce the improvement in US–India
relations.
It is important to note that two years prior to the Kargil conflict there were
efforts by the Nawaz Sharif Government to resolve the Kashmir dispute through
dialogue. In support of this effort, Sharif had requested American support during
his meeting with Bill Clinton in New York in 1997. In response, says former
Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan – who was present at the meeting – Clinton
emphasized the Indian position which advocated a bilateral solution – saying,
‘We have not developed leverage with India as yet’ after the Cold War.48 The
Indian media’s response was triumphant, perceiving ‘Sharif ’s attempts to wear
down his hosts’ as futile.49 Interestingly, while no two international situations
are identical, it is worth noting that Clinton played a role in brokering peace in
Ireland despite a lack of enthusiasm from the British.50 According to Khokhar,
even though the US stance on Kashmir became more overt in the Clinton era, it
had begun to form during the Cold War. ‘They do not have enough clout with
India’, argued Khokhar ‘so they can only pressurize us’.51
Clinton’s approach might have been a continuation of the American position
during the Cold War; however, there was a distinct post-Cold war angle to it in
that there was no strategic compulsion to balance the triangular relationship. The
loss of US strategic interest deprived Pakistan of any reverse influence. More-
over, even during the Cold War the US was not without influence. India had
been the largest recipient of US economic aid and had received massive US
military aid during its conflict with China in 1962. The US approach was there-
fore shaped by its Soviet containment policy rather than by an absence of influ-
ence. After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, New Delhi was
even more conducive to American assistance.
Inderfurth argued that ‘Kashmir is a manifestation’ of Indo-Pakistan hostility
and ‘not its sole cause’.52 This perspective diminishes the centrality of the issue
to India–Pakistan hostility. The fact is that Clinton perceived the Kashmir con-
flict as an issue of little relevance to the primarily economic global interests of
the US; as a result he had no interest in participating in conflict resolution. As
Brinkley perceptively notices, the guiding principle of democracy enlargement
did not commit the United States to concern itself with the ‘bloody, unprofitable
civil and religious wars that raged from Angola to the Caucasus to Kashmir.
Only when anarchy reigned in a major trade pact region – Bosnia or Northern
Ireland, for example would Clinton play global peacemaker’.53 The Clinton
administration, sensitive to public opinion, was uninterested in ruining its media
90 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
image, given the lack of public support – or even pressure from an interest group
– for an intervention in Kashmir.54 More importantly, Indian liberalization of
economic policies and US fears of the rise of China are likely to have impacted
Clinton’s approach.
Before going any further let us examine the key strategic and domestic drivers
behind Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan.

Key strategic drivers

The first key strategic objective was nuclear non-proliferation. Clinton inherited
the sanctions under the Pressler Amendment and the issue of the purchase of
F-16s by Pakistan. Clinton supported the Brown Amendment passed by Con-
gress on 24 October 1995; authorizing the supply of military equipment that
Islamabad had ordered and paid for prior to 1 October 1990 but excluding the
F-16s. The Brown Amendment did not temper the Pressler Amendment nor
permit new arms sales to Pakistan.
Following the 1998 nuclear explosions by India the Clinton administration
embarked on a diplomatic effort to dissuade Pakistan from responding. Paki-
stan’s refusal to comply brought about more sanctions. The United States, along
with fourteen other states, suspended aid programs to both countries. They also
suspended all loans to Pakistan, which totalled $231 million in 1997–1998, and
cancelled grant aid totalling approximately $55 million while opposing any
future non-humanitarian lending by international monetary institutions like the
World Bank.55
The second key strategic goal that drove Clinton’s Pakistan policy pertained
to Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The struggle against the Soviet-backed Najibullah
regime continued even after the collapse of his government, transforming into a
full-fledged civil war among local groups and warlords. The UN had little
support from major states and was unsuccessful in brokering a negotiated settle-
ment.56 Inderfurth correctly pointed out that ‘the UN has little institutional auto-
nomy from its member-states . . . it is dependent on their material and political
capital . . . it could never have acted effectively in the absence of American
support’.57 The breakup of the Soviet Union also reduced great power leverage
in the conflict. Regional powers like Pakistan, India and Iran, with their own
strategic goals, were thus able to attain greater latitude to intervene. However,
despite losing interest in Pakistan the region remained important to US interests.
Containing China and preventing the anti-US Islamic regime in Iran from
expanding its religious and political influence into Afghanistan and the neigh-
bouring Central Asian Republics (CARs) were important strategic goals.58 That
said, the Clinton administration’s interest in the region was primarily economic
with a focus on the proposed oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghani-
stan to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port for onward supply to Europe and America.
Unocal, an American oil company, was competing with the Argentinean firm
Bridas for the contract. However Clinton’s foreign policy team that was focused
on the Balkans, Russia and East Asia, did not want to get directly entangled.59
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 91
Riffat Hussain – who served as Press Secretary in Pakistan’s embassy in Wash-
ington during the 1990s – stated that, ‘the Clinton administration chose to
depend on anti-Iran Saudi Arabian monarchy and Pakistan’s ISI to protect its
economic interests in Afghanistan’.60
According to Rashid, President Niyazov of Turkmenistan was influenced by
the Clinton administration into signing a contract with US oil giant Unocal and
its Saudi Arabian partner Delta Oil. Pakistan supported Unocal for economic
reasons and also to help legitimize the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime. The US
rationale was that by supporting the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan pipe-
line, Unocal’s commercial interest would be protected and the pipeline would
exclude Iran even though it provided the shortest and most economical route.61
The third key strategic goal that drove Clinton’s Pakistan policy related to
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. The issue had already been highlighted by the
Indians during the Bush presidency. There were media reports that training
camps established by the ISI in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the 1980s were
being used for training anti-India fighters to fuel an ongoing indigenous insur-
gency in Indian-administered Kashmir.62 Eleven days before Clinton took over,
outgoing Secretary of State James Baker’s letter dated 9 January 1993 informed
Prime Minister Sharif that Pakistan was under review for possible inclusion in
the State Department’s terror watch list. The letter mentioned Pakistan’s ‘spon-
sorship of terrorism’ in Indian-held Kashmir and Indian Punjab. In the wake of
the March 1993 bomb blasts in the Indian commercial city of Bombay
(Mumbai), India again pointed a finger at Pakistan’s ISI, urging the US to
declare Pakistan a terrorist state.63 According to Lodhi, ‘relations sunk to an all-
time low when Washington threatened to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of
terrorism’.64
Pakistan’s name was, however, dropped from consideration for the terror
watch list in July 1993 because, according to the new Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, ‘Pakistan’s policy of ending official support for terrorists in India is
apparently now being implemented on the ground’.65 Although Pakistan was
never declared a terrorist state, the question of ISI interference in Kashmir and
the use of Afghan territory for training camps remained an important issue given
its relevance to the US goal of containing transnational terrorism.
The fourth key strategic objective that shaped Clinton’s policy towards Paki-
stan was linked to US–India relations. As we have seen, Clinton’s approach
favoured a stronger relationship with India at the expense of the one with Paki-
stan. According to Riedel, Clinton’s Pakistan policy was heavily influenced by
the non-proliferation interest groups within Congress. His argument underlines
the key domestic factors that influenced Clinton’s foreign policy towards
Islamabad.

Key domestic drivers

Clinton was elected with less than half of the popular vote and the 1994 Repub-
lican midterm electoral victory tilted the political balance of power in their
92 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
favour. Clinton was therefore more vulnerable to Congressional infringement
than his predecessor. The 1994 Congress wanted mostly to concentrate on
domestic economic issues and questioned the rationale for foreign aid in the
post-Cold War era when there was no credible adversary to challenge the US. In
the aftermath of the Gulf War, there was a loss of public interest in foreign
affairs; polls in the 1990s rarely found more than 5 per cent of Americans who
could name the most important foreign policy issue – a steep fall from the more
than 50 per cent who could name a foreign policy issue during the Cold War.
Similarly, public support for the protection of weaker nations against foreign
aggression fell from 57 to 24 per cent in the 1990s. Thus, members of Congress
who challenged the White House on foreign policy ran negligible electoral risks
during the 1990s. The main reason for this state of affairs was that in the post-
Cold War environment, ethnic, business and single-issue interest groups had
gained importance.66
Congressional assertion could clearly be seen in the different approaches
taken towards the Afghan and Balkans conflicts. Congress viewed the Balkans
issue largely within the context of US–Europe relations and vital US economic
and military interests in Europe. The President and Congress both saw a stable
Balkans as being important for US interests.67 Afghanistan, on the other hand,
was not viewed as a key strategic issue, nor did it motivate Congressional or
public support for a humanitarian intervention.68 In Pakistan’s case, the Congres-
sional non-proliferation group led by Senators Glenn and Pressler and the Amer-
ican Indian lobby were especially important influences on an image-conscious
Clinton. Notably, through concerted efforts by pro-India Congressmen by 1999,
the India caucus claimed 115 members – more than one-quarter of the entire
House.69
In conclusion then, the above-narrated strategic and domestic factors drove
Clinton’s foreign policy approach towards Islamabad. In the post-Cold War
world, PFP pursued three primary goals: improved nuclear weapons capability;
bolster a pro-Pakistan faction in Afghanistan as a regional ally; support insur-
gency in Indian-controlled Kashmir.70 The first option was in direct opposition to
the US post-Cold War global objectives of nuclear non-proliferation; the second
and third options had implications for Clinton’s goal of containment of ter-
rorism. Interestingly, the Clinton administration’s initial perception of the second
option was ambivalent and resulted in a brief period of convergence. Let us
examine each option and its relevance to Clinton’s foreign policy.

Clinton and Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions

During Clinton’s first term, efforts were made to resolve the F-16 dispute by
proposing a one-time waiver in exchange for certain non-proliferation related
agreements. This move was easily defeated by strong opponents such as Sena-
tors Pressler, Glenn, Feinstein and Patrick Moynihan who made any revision or
legislative relief in a Republican-dominated Congress an uphill task.71 Despite
Riedel’s claim that Clinton wanted to address unfairness to Pakistan vis-à-vis the
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 93
F-16s, the primary record shows that the waiver had not been proposed out of a
72

sense of fair play. Rather, it was the first step towards a new diplomatic strategy
aimed at circumventing the Indo-Pakistan nuclear stalemate.73
While it aimed to ease the Pakistan military’s anxiety, the real target was to
persuade Pakistan to accept international inspections of its key nuclear facilities
to ascertain levels of uranium enrichment.74 Robert Einhorn, a key policy-maker
on nuclear issues during the Clinton era, confirms that the US sought a freeze on
the development of nuclear, missile and fissile material technology in exchange
for the F-16s.75
This is also evident from the Pakistani reaction to these moves, where the
incumbent COAS General Abdul Waheed refused any such trade-off in a
meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Talbott writes: ‘Mimick-
ing the face of a man on the gallows he said, “We will choke on your carrots” ’.76
Confirming the interaction a former army chief argued: ‘Why should we have
agreed when India was hell-bent on producing as much fissile material as pos-
sible for its own nuclear bomb?’77 F-16s were certainly important for strengthen-
ing the air force, but in the cost–benefit calculus the attainment of nuclear
weapons capability – as a deterrent and force multiplier – was non-negotiable.
Moreover, given the ongoing sanctions and the suspension of all military and
economic aid, it was difficult for the Clinton administration to influence Paki-
stani military and civilian decision-makers.
Clearly, in order to secure its long-term vital security objective, Clinton was
willing to make a short-term bargain by proposing changes in the Pressler
Amendment. But, as a press report argues: ‘if the proposal . . . touched off a
storm of criticism in Congress, the [Pressler] amendment probably would be
retained’.78 Senator Pressler – who was determined to ensure the existence of
just such a storm – argued that the relevant legislation did not provide for a one-
time waiver. ‘Encouraged by the Indian embassy’, Senator Pressler ‘publicly
vowed to keep sanctions in place even if the Pakistanis agreed to the US plan’.79
Talbott’s premise is strengthened by Huntington’s assertion that ‘Indian-
Americans contributed about $150,000 to Senator Larry Pressler’s re-election
campaign because he supported limits on US arms exports to Pakistan’.80 Such
allegations were also levelled against Senators Pressler and Brown during the
run up to the passing of the Brown Amendment in 1995 when Pakistanis won
the goodwill of Senator Brown.
Pressler argued that Clinton’s team was supporting Pakistan in ‘lobbying
Congress to pass the Brown Amendment’ despite the ongoing ‘illegal sale of
[Chinese] nuclear technology’.81 Brown alluded to Pakistan’s steadfastness as an
ally insisting that ‘we owe them the return of their money or the delivery of their
equipment’ and in response, Pressler complained, ‘We don’t have a non-
proliferation policy any more . . . we have an arms bazaar’.82
Pressler’s assertion suggests the existence of a hidden agenda of certain Ameri-
can politicians to appease Pakistan, but as South Asia specialist Robert Wirsing
points out, ‘in the face of the remarkable recent upgrading by Washington official-
dom of India’s global importance’ such a suggestion ‘strains credulity’.83 It is
94 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
evident that besides discrediting Pakistan’s ‘Islamic Bomb’, Pressler’s response
aims to address the American security dilemma vis-à-vis China as a potential rival.
Pakistan’s closeness to China and its hostility towards India were enough to create
mistrust of Chinese intentions. Interestingly, Pressler agreed to support a Clinton
administration proposal to sell the F-16s to a third party to raise the money to
repay Pakistan with.84 This was most likely meant to undermine Senator Brown’s
efforts to make changes to the Pressler legislation.
Despite this struggle between Senators Pressler and Brown, it should be noted
that neither ‘had significant numbers of Indian or Pakistani constituents to
motivate their interest in the subcontinent’.85 This could perhaps be better
explained as a case of intra-party rivalry between the two Republican senators.
For instance, Kux recalled how Brown was ‘disgusted’ with Pressler’s com-
ments pertaining to Pakistan’s ‘Islamic Bomb’ in New Delhi. More importantly,
Senator Brown’s fact-finding mission to the subcontinent ‘convinced him that
sanctions against Pakistan were damaging US interests’.86
That the Indian lobby was actively supporting efforts to undermine the release
of military equipment, or any renewal of military aid, to Pakistan was confirmed
by Washington-based diplomats Maleeha Lodhi and Sarwar Naqvi.87 Indian
efforts were in line with the increased importance of interest groups during the
Clinton era. In comparison, Lindsay notes Pakistan’s disadvantage in the com-
petition to court lawmakers because the Pakistani community was one-tenth the
size of the Indian community; Pakistan’s close ties with China did not help
either.88 The largely inter-personal style of dealing with the US during Pakistan’s
military regimes in the Cold War era contributed to this weakness. Although, in
the words of Assef Ali, there did

. . . emerge a caucus for Pakistan when Benazir visited Washington in 1995.

Senators Kennedy and O’Leary were very receptive . . . and we cultivated the
White House . . . Sandy Berger and William Perry . . . were wonderful. . .89

That said, while authorizing a one-time waiver, the Brown Amendment did not
facilitate the release of the twenty-eight nuclear capable F-16s; nor did it reverse
Washington’s earlier decision to ask for the return of eight leased US frigates
and destroyers, whose replacement was extremely costly for the Pakistan Navy.90
Clearly, the Pakistanis failed to muster strong support inside and outside Con-
gress. The Indian lobby was able to garner support primarily because of the pres-
ence of a strong non-proliferation lobby in Congress. The Indian effort also
ensured, albeit inadvertently, that Congressional focus remained on Pakistan.
Thus when India became the first of the two states to test nuclear weapons in
May 1998, US agencies were caught on the wrong foot.
Cox posits that the Benazir Government, under US pressure, halted all nuclear
cooperation with the Iranians in early 1994, which in turn paved the way for the
Brown Amendment.91 Cox, however, does not present any credible evidence.
Pakistani Ambassador to Washington at the time, Maleeha Lodhi, shared her
acerbic observation:
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 95
When it is in the US interest it can bypass, overrule and modify its own laws
[as in the case of the Brown Amendment] and when expedient it invokes
that law or brings a new one on the statute books.92

Lodhi’s argument makes sense. Clinton’s support for the legislation aligned with
the US tactic of using the F-16s as a bargaining chip. Since Islamabad did not
agree to nuclear concessions it diluted possibilities for gaining support for the
proposed legislation. The watered-down version of the Brown Amendment
failed to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of either party. Clinton might not
have been averse to a rejection of Pakistan’s position by Congress because it
allayed Indian concerns over the delivery of F-16s, which furthered his adminis-
tration’s economic interests in India. Given that India and Pakistan had a com-
bined annual defence expenditure of $12 billion, no one could ‘reasonably
contend’ that the one-time waiver tilted the arms balance in Pakistan’s favour.93
At the same time, Clinton could be seen as a president who tried to be fair to
Pakistan but was constrained by Congressional opposition.
The non-delivery of the F-16s remained a major bone of contention for the
better part of Clinton’s second term. Finally, ‘we informed the US government
that we would seek legal recourse’, recalled Khokhar. ‘That prompted Secretary
Albright to summon me and caution me about the serious implications of taking
the US to court and the negative impact on bilateral relations’. Khokhar told the
Secretary that Pakistan had no choice and had faith in the US judicial system.
However, ‘President Clinton being a lawyer took a wiser approach. He con-
vinced the visiting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to accept an out of court settle-
ment. Nawaz agreed and the problem was resolved’.
Formal letters were exchanged between Khokhar and Assistant Secretary of
State Inderfurth. Pakistan was given a cheque of $364 million and the balance of
approximately $80 million was settled against commodities. The deal on com-
modities was later settled with Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi.94 It is obvious that
the Clinton administration had been capable of resolving the repayment issue
without Congressional approval but had chosen not to in order to pressure
Pakistan.
Hopes that the Brown Amendment could lead to an improved relationship ran
aground following Congressional concerns over US media reports of Beijing’s
transfer of technology to Islamabad; the reports also alleged Pakistan’s transfer
of nuclear technology to Libya and Iran in return for finances and to North Korea
for technical expertise.95 The perceived linkages between a nuclear Pakistan and
anti-Israel, Islamic Iran96 caused anguish in the US as demonstrated by Congres-
sional speeches and reports from 1993 onwards. The assumption was that a
nuclear Pakistan – in collaboration with China and Iran – could serve to enhance
Islamic strategic influence in the region including the Middle East. Nuclear
Islamabad was variously seen as the linchpin of the China-dominated ‘Trans
Asian Axis’ – stretching from the eastern border of China, and including
Afghanistan, CARs and the oil rich regions of the Caspian Sea – and a member
of the ‘Tehran-led Islamic Bloc’.97 This was a weak argument, not least because
96 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
of the intra-Islamic sectarian differences and political differences. Nevertheless,
the perception of a threat to Israel and American interests in the Middle East
caused members of Congress to demand that the Clinton administration take
stringent action against Pakistan.98
Pakistan’s refusal to sign the NPT unless India did so was another source of
strain in US–Pakistan relations. India had strong export controls to prevent the
spread of nuclear technology abroad and therefore, argues Talbott, it was con-
sidered less of a concern than Pakistan.99 India’s superior record, however, did
not justify nuclear proliferation; nevertheless, India continued with its nuclear
weapons program unhindered. Primary evidence shows that Pakistan had
expressed concerns over the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – the Indian nation-
alist government – due to its history of radical and anti-Muslim activities.
Islamabad warned that the BJP was more inclined to go nuclear than the
previous Indian Government. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sent a letter to
President Clinton in April 1998 to warn the US of impending Indian nuclear
tests. Pakistan’s warnings were ignored by the Clinton administration as a case
of ‘jitters’.100
Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament,
Munir Akram – while discussing the discriminatory approach of the US – con-
firms that the US had received a warning of the possibility of Indian tests.101 In
his memoirs, former Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan argues, ‘I had written
to fifteen of my counterparts around the world and so had the Prime Minister to
ask them to stop Indian tests’.102 Both Akram and Khan imply the US turned a
blind eye.103 However, as argued by Talbott, it was more a case of inadequate
interagency coordination and analysis104 since it was not in the US interest to
allow the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Engaging Pakistan after Indian nuclear tests

In the wake of five Indian nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 Clinton’s team –
Talbott, Inderfurth, Riedel and General Anthony Zinni – embarked on an ‘emer-
gency dose of face-to-face diplomacy’ to stop Pakistan from conducting its own
set of tests.105 Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership was not receptive to these
efforts however. Islamabad was simply unwilling to trust either India or the US.
To the incumbent COAS, General Jahangir Karamat, Indian nuclear tests
were meant to intimidate Pakistan into giving up its claim on Kashmir. Foreign
Minister Gauhar Ayub and Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad were equally
dismissive, telling Talbott that India would get away with the tests and would
end up benefitting politically and militarily as international outrage dissipated.
‘India will then force itself into permanent membership of the UN Security
Council’. Pakistan wanted an iron-clad security guarantee from the US – a move
described by Karamat as the product of ‘politicians’ panic’. He asserted that
Pakistan can look after its own defence; what it really needed was a solid rela-
tionship with the US in which there was no ‘arm twisting’ or ‘forcing us into
corners’.106
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 97
In any case, the provision of any security guarantee was a major US strategic
decision involving Congress. Considering that Pakistan received no such guar-
antee against India as a US ally during the Cold War, it was hardly a possibility
now that it was no longer strategically important to the US. Riedel stated that
Pakistan went ahead with the tests despite lucrative incentives,107 including the
release of F-16s. Khokhar termed them as ‘vague lucrative incentives’ which
along with ‘offer to resolve the F-16 problem’ were not enough to restrain
Islamabad.108 American appeals to moral traits of maturity and restraint and sug-
gestions that Pakistan could improve its international image by restraining its
response were not sufficiently strong arguments given Pakistan’s security
dilemma.
According to Talbott, Clinton called Nawaz Sharif and offered to release the
F-16s and considerable softening of the Pressler Amendment as the mood in
Congress had shifted after the Indian tests. However, Sharif was not swayed as
‘the lure of money, praise and gratitude from around the world along with F-16s
was less powerful than the Pakistanis’ fear of what had happened just across
their border’.109 Once again the US used the F-16s as a bargaining tool while
overlooking Pakistan’s security dilemma, which generated mistrust of both India
and the United States. This is reflected in the words of a former COAS:

The Clinton administration was not very hard on India . . . [they] wanted to
prop them up against China. It was in the US interest to have a nuclear
India. On the other hand they were wary of nuclear proliferation in the
Islamic world.110

The argument has some weight despite the fact that a great power’s foreign
policy cannot be described in binary terms. That said, fears of an ‘Islamic bloc’
as discussed by American legislators were mirrored by Pakistani perceptions of
Clinton’s ‘pro-India tilt’ as a sign of the future trajectory of US–India relations.
From the Pakistani perspective, this signalled that in a unipolar and anarchic
international system, the greatest power on earth was now on the Indian side.
Mistrust and uncertainty of others’ intentions thus added a powerful psychologi-
cal aspect to the structural mechanism of anarchy. It is therefore not surprising
that Islamabad continued its efforts to enhance nuclear weapons capability. By
moving closer to India’s enemy and America’s potential competitor, China,
Islamabad not only sought an alternative source of weapons but also attempted
to obviate Indian efforts at regional hegemony.
US diplomatic communication paints Pakistan’s response to the Indian
nuclear tests as the product of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s buckling under the
public and political pressure.111 This assessment is reductionist. Karamat main-
tains that the decision to test was taken jointly by the civil–military leadership
after much deliberation. Academic Rasul Bakhsh Rais agreed, positing that ‘on
the nuclear issue there was complete consensus between the military and civilian
leadership’.112 Given the military’s control of nuclear policy and its assessment
of the threat that Pakistan was facing, it was a foregone conclusion that once
98 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
India had ‘gone nuclear’ Pakistan would follow. Moreover, as academic Feroz
Hassan argues, it was unthinkable for the Pakistani strategic mindset to acqui-
esce to Indian hegemony.113
Nawaz Sharif was invited to the National Defence College on the morning of
28 May 1998 for discussion of the issue. During this event, when more than
sixty senior military officers were asked to vote for or against the testing, only
one Pakistani naval officer dissented. There was evidence of groupthink in the
decision as even those who privately opposed the tests publically supported the
move. ‘It was the army that had the final say’, stated the naval officer during a
conversation, ‘and without their concurrence, Nawaz Sharif was in no position
to oblige the Americans’.114 It can be argued that as Pakistan’s establishment had
grown accustomed to coping with sanctions for nearly a decade, the US leverage
had diminished. Ironically, the sanctions inadvertently contributed to Islama-
bad’s acceleration of its nuclear program instead of curbing its behaviour.

Sanctioning blues
By imposing nuclear sanctions on Pakistan, the United States sought to modify
Pakistan’s behaviour. However, these sanctions were not effective due to Paki-
stan’s India-centric existential anxiety and mistrust of American intentions.
Moreover, Chinese support provided the resources and the motivation to con-
tinue. Thus, although the Clinton administration intensified sanctions in compar-
ison to previous governments, it had little effect on Pakistan’s behaviour.
Stephen Cohen argues that throughout the 1990s Pakistan was expected to ‘uni-
laterally strip itself of its key policy instruments without positive US induce-
ments’ in the form of military aid or active support for the resolution of the
Kashmir issue.115 Albright conceded during a television interview that ‘the very
tough sanctions [that have] no waiver authority and no flexibility [are] just blunt
instruments [while] diplomacy requires us to have some finesse’.116
By the late 1990s, voices in Congress argued that broad sanctions had left
little choice for countries such as Pakistan other than going for nuclear equaliza-
tion by finding alternative sources of capital and technology; it was suggested
that the termination of military education, training and aid had reduced US influ-
ence with Pakistan’s politically powerful military.117 Hence, Haass posits that
broad sanctions appeared to jeopardize ‘an entire bilateral relationship’.118 Chris-
tine Fair, a RAND expert on US–Pakistan relations, observes that ‘broad sanc-
tions levied between 1990 and 2001 harmed US interests more than they curbed
Pakistani behaviour’.119 Tahir-Kheli and Hyland criticize US sanctions as being
the product of thinking that refused to acknowledge nationalism as the force
behind nuclear proliferation.120 In his interview Inderfurth, endorsed their
argument:

No political leader could have taken any other decision in view of India-
Pakistan hostility . . . the US was largely attempting to build a relationship
based on punitive measures.121
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 99
Talbott justifies sanctions on the grounds that they created a disincentive for
other states.122 Talbott’s argument is challenged by academic T.V. Paul who
insightfully argues that ‘sanctions against a potential proliferator in a protracted
conflict zone without a nuclear ally are unlikely to succeed particularly if the
proliferator is an isolated state’.123
According to Shaikh, ‘Pakistan’s defiance of the non-proliferation regime has
been shaped by deep resentment against the United States’.124 However, rational
states do not base their strategic choices on sentiments and nor does Pakistan.
Fair argues that Pakistan’s fears were unfounded as India’s May 1971 nuclear
test led to the introduction of non-proliferation legislations in the 1970s.125
However, Fair’s argument omits Islamabad’s reservations about the Symington
law – under which Pakistan and not India was sanctioned in the 1970s. In fact as
Senator Glenn noted, the United States did ‘nothing, absolutely nothing’ after
India violated its assurances that nuclear fuel shipped by the United States would
be used for peaceful purposes by using it in its 1974 nuclear test.126
An explanation for the failure of US leverage was highlighted by Prime
Minister Sharif. In a confidential communication with Clinton, Sharif pointed
out that selective sanctions ‘had produced a totally untenable security equation
between Pakistan and India’ and that this ‘evident selectivity in the pursuit of
global non-proliferation goals’ had left Pakistan more insecure.127 By doing this,
the US overlooked ‘India’s much older, more advanced, and larger nuclear
program [and more importantly] Pakistan’s natural dread of an Indian nuclear
monopoly’.128 Thus Lodhi argued:

The irony about US non-proliferation policy in South Asia was that while
the impetus for proliferation at every step came from India, it was Pakistan,
and not India, that was subjected to penalties, embargoes and sanctions.129

Even when Clinton sanctioned India along with Pakistan following the May
1998 nuclear tests, the Pakistani perspective was that sanctions should have been
imposed only on India, which had started the nuclear race and jeopardized
regional stability.130 The implication was that had India kept its capability unde-
clared, Pakistan could have met its deterrence requirement through a policy of
nuclear ambiguity.
Pakistan’s reaction to Clinton’s efforts to stop nuclear proliferation appeared
to endorse Waltz’s conclusion that when faced with the security dilemma, states
assume the worst.131 The anarchical international system motivated Pakistan’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons and was in keeping with the realist concept of self-
help as a rational choice made to blunt an external threat through the acquisition
of coercive power. The Clinton administration overlooked the idea that ‘weapons
have meanings in relation to the context and the beliefs of the relevant actors’.132
His team failed to correctly gauge the impact of their actions on Pakistani policy-
makers partly due to their inability to grasp that their self-image as a benevolent
power was not shared by other nations. Moreover, Clinton’s efforts to issue a
one-time waiver in Pakistan’s favour after imposing sanctions and – as Riedel
100 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
argues – neglecting to undertake sustained efforts to change and repeal the
Pressler Amendment sent mixed messages.133 Clinton’s approach to sanctions
and his drive to improve US–India relations encouraged the evolution of Paki-
stan’s nuclear program and contributed significantly to Islamabad’s resolve.
Scrutiny of Pakistan’s nuclear program was accompanied by a lack of sus-
tained high-level interest in Pakistan’s Afghan policy, thereby creating space for
Islamabad to continue to intervene in that conflict. Subsequently, Clinton’s
foreign policy had implications for PFP’s objectives of bolstering the Taliban in
Afghanistan and its support for insurgents in Indian-controlled Kashmir.

The Clinton–Pakistan–Taliban connection

As noted in previous chapters, the ISI’s institutional power increased during the
Afghan War in the 1980s when it collaborated with the CIA and acted as a
conduit for the provision of US funds and weapons to the Mujahedeen. Although
the agency was not a king-maker per se during the 1990s, it continued to influ-
ence political developments in Afghanistan with the blessing of the military
establishment and the civilian leadership. Evidence shows that the Clinton
administration did not pay sustained attention to the ISI’s ongoing role in
Afghanistan. ‘By 1995 Hekmatyar, [ISI’s] fair headed boy was not delivering
[and] the Taliban [became] the best regional option’,134 argued Marvin Wein-
baum during his interview. He was an analyst with the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research during Clinton’s second term.
In his memoir, the Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Zaeef, argues
that the Taliban movement was initially indigenous and that Pakistan’s ISI later
hijacked it for its own interest.135 Many Pakistani and American interviewees136
also described the rise of the Taliban as an indigenous movement supported only
by the frustration of the Afghan people with local mafias. This was confirmed by
Pakistani journalist and former BBC correspondent, Rahimullah Yusufzai, who
had access to the leadership of the Taliban. Rahimullah Yusufzai was present in
Kandahar when the city fell to the Taliban in 1994. Upon his return to Pakistan
from Kandahar, Yusufzai received several calls from ISI officials wanting to find
out about the Taliban leadership and their mission as they did not seem to know
much about them. That Benazir’s Interior Minister Major General (retired) Nase-
erullah Babar tried to take undue credit for the rise of the Taliban was also high-
lighted by Yusufzai who said ‘he never called them “my boys” when he talked
to me; he knew I had access to the Taliban leadership and knew the truth’.137 The
breakdown of law and order in Afghanistan as a result of the civil war created
much of the ambiguity around these events. That said, US diplomatic communi-
cation clearly identified the ISI as the key supporter of the Taliban; a premise
with which Siraj-ul-Haq of Jamaat-i-Islami candidly agreed while being
interviewed:

The Taliban did not emerge suddenly; Pakistan played a major role in
organizing it. The Taliban tsunami that rose from Kandahar and reached
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 101
Kabul could not have done so without the help of military intelligence agen-
cies. The Taliban stopped when and where the [intelligence] agencies
wanted it to stop!138

Yet, primary source material from the US does not show sustained US effort to
prevent Pakistan from bolstering the Taliban between 1993 and 1996. Observing
that the US ‘gave tacit support by encouraging Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to
support the Taliban’,139 academic Tahir Amin agreed with Ahmed Rashid’s
assertion that ‘between 1994 and 1996 the US supported the Taliban politically
through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Washington viewed the
Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and pro-Western’.140 Weinbaum confirmed that
some members of Clinton’s team were very hospitable to the notion of an Amer-
ican connection with the Taliban.141 US diplomatic communication shows that
the Clinton administration was cognizant of ‘Pakistan’s contacts with all of the
major opponents of Rabbani and Masood and [was encouraging] cooperation
among them’.142 Inderfurth however asserted:

The US government had no formal understanding of the movement and

there was a gradual evolution in the US understanding of the situation. Ini-
tially it was seen as a local movement to establish law and order but by 1997
it became clear that it was a political movement that wanted to impose its
own interpretation of Islam on the society.143

To this Weinbaum added:

Afghanistan or Pakistan was not on our list of priorities. The Clinton admin-
istration came alive with the embassy bombings in 1998 and we woke up to
the fact that there was an organized element that had managed to locate
itself in Afghanistan.144

Inderfurth and Weinbaum are only partially correct as the administration – accord-
ing to US declassified documents – had been aware of the rising political power of
the Taliban since 1995 and US intelligence sources had confirmed the movement’s
political motives well before 1997. Between 1994 and 1997, there were several US
intelligence reports on the Taliban–Pakistan nexus. In 1995, the Taliban took over
Herat, a city outside of the Taliban’s putative sphere of influence i.e. Kandahar.
This was a demonstration of their expanding political ambition that – according to
US sources – was supported by military and financial assistance from Pakistan. An
excised US fax dated 5 December 1994, for instance, informs the State Depart-
ment of the ISI’s heavy involvement in Taliban operations in Kandahar and efforts
by Pakistan’s Air Force officials to enable Kandahar airport for a large Taliban
military operation in the Farah and Helmand provinces and Spin Boldak on the
Pakistan–Afghanistan border.145 One of the unnamed sources confirming the
Pakistan military’s assistance was granted a detailed audience with US Assistant
Secretary Raphel, demonstrating the source’s credibility and stature.146
102 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
Senior US official Richard Armitage’s argument that the US had drifted for
too long and had ‘failed to understand the independent role that the ISI was
playing’147 is tenable. Bruce Riedel, who served with Clinton on the National
Security Council and National Intelligence Council, said:

We knew about the ISI support for the Taliban movement from the very
beginning . . . the Clinton administration had credible intelligence reports
early on and the Northern Alliance was pretty quick to bring Pakistan’s
involvement with the Taliban to our notice.148

However, this information did not elicit any opposition from the Clinton admin-
istration between 1994 and 1996.149 Early reports of the Taliban’s religious
orthodoxy and its treatment of women also did not motivate the Clinton admin-
istration to denounce the movement’s human rights abuses.150 Moreover, the
summary execution of former President Najibullah on 26 September 1996,
ordered by Taliban leader Mullah Raziq,151 drew no serious condemnation by the
US beyond a statement that it was a ‘regrettable development’.152 This suggests a
lack of interest in the region as well as tolerance of the emerging Taliban
phenomenon.
Robin Raphel argues that there were two competing policies within the State
Department; one in favour of giving the Taliban a chance and the other inclined
towards supporting opposing factions such as the Northern Alliance. A State
Department communication to the US embassy in Islamabad after the Taliban
victory in Kabul shows US desire to ‘engage the new Taliban interim govern-
ment at an early stage’.153 Throughout the Taliban rule ‘both approaches existed
in a kind of foreign policy schizophrenia’.154 On one hand, US officials like
Albright – under pressure from US women rights groups – issued anti-Taliban
statements denouncing its misogynistic policies155 and on the other there was no
serious US effort to dissuade Pakistan from supporting the repressive regime.
According to Amnesty International, human rights abuses by the Taliban Gov-
ernment between 1996 and 1999 did not sufficiently pressure Clinton to take any
punitive action.156
The Taliban that emerged during Clinton’s first term was not a homogenous
group of orthodox extremists. It comprised many moderate elements and –
according to US diplomatic sources – on the whole it did not harbour deep-
seated hatred for the United States.157 This was substantiated by Yusufzai who
had personally visited girls’ schools in Laghman, Naghman and Nangarhar prov-
inces and disputed the American claim that all members of the Taliban were
opposed to women’s education.158
It is evident from US diplomatic sources that the Clinton administration did
not exploit divisions in the Taliban or its goodwill for the US. A 1995 cable
reveals that the Taliban leadership looked up to both the US and the UN, while it
disliked the ISI for – in its view – treating Afghanistan as a Pakistani province.159
Clinton’s lack of focus on external security issues during his first term –which
coincided with the rise of the Taliban – stemmed from reduced US interest in the
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 103
region. The process of formulating US foreign policy was, at this time, more
concerned with press strategy and the domestic political implications of events;
it was further undermined by Clinton’s aversion to daily intelligence briefings by
the CIA Director, James Woolsey.160 Thus, even though diplomatic communica-
tions warned of a worsening regional security dilemma, the Clinton administra-
tion failed to respond consistently.
This inaction gave the impression that the Taliban was an American proxy
being assisted through Pakistan against Iranian regional interests.161 Thus, a
diplomatic communication shows that Iran’s financial and material support to
anti-Taliban factions was much more than ISI’s to the Taliban militia that was
actually receiving substantial support from Afghan traders.162 A daily CIA intel-
ligence brief describes meetings between Taliban officials and unnamed US
diplomats outside Afghanistan and reports that the Taliban viewed Islamabad as
a conduit for US support.163 In contrast, the anti-Taliban Rabbani Government in
Kabul felt alienated from the US – a sentiment that was conveyed to Robin
Raphel in October 1995.164 This leads us to the conclusion that by choosing to
remain disengaged without fully deliberating the associated side effects, the
Clinton administration was essentially tolerating the Taliban.
US Government documents suggest that there was a small window of oppor-
tunity in which to undermine the Taliban–Pakistan connection in 1996 before
the former took over Kabul. The Taliban had been pushed back from Kabul
twice by Rabbani forces and was willing to consider a broad-based government
with proportionate ethnic representation. Skilful management, such as an arms
embargo on all parties and the creation of an All Party Afghan Conference, may
have helped start a dialogue between these factions. The US Ambassador to
Pakistan, Thomas Simons, argued regarding the Taliban militia that there was a:

Growing awareness, previously absent, of their [sic] own limitations, which

may be the modality through which they [sic] can be coaxed, over time, to
the negotiating table . . . the bottom line is that there still appears to be
reason for limited optimism.165

This was an important moment since it coincided with an apparent change in

Pakistan’s stance. An April 1996 US cable indicated that Pakistani civilian and
military decision-makers were not united in their support for the Taliban. As
leadership of the Taliban was becoming increasingly independent in its decision-
making, Islamabad was considering alternatives.166 This assessment found
endorsement in a former army chief ’s assertion that:

The Taliban has its own peculiar ways to settle problems. As army chief in
the mid-1990s Waheed advised Benazir not to listen to [her pro-Taliban
interior minister] Babar and refrain from supporting the Taliban.167

Prime Minister Bhutto, her Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ali and Foreign Sec-
retary Najmuddin Sheikh, indicated that Pakistan needed to broaden its policy
104 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
and pursue serious dialogue with Rabbani’s Government in Kabul. Waheed’s
successor General Jahangir Karamat called the Taliban ‘a millstone around our
necks’. It was understood by American diplomats in Pakistan that ‘fearing
regional isolation on (its) Afghanistan policy, (Pakistan) is reaching out and
wants to engage with the US’ and cooperate with Iran by holding an Afghan
Conference and support the UN mission.168 This development was confirmed by
Assef Ali who argued that Pakistani efforts – reaching out to Tehran and con-
vincing the former Afghan King, Zahir Shah to act as peace-maker – were not
solely aimed at supporting the Taliban at this stage. According to him, the ISI
and the Taliban leadership were receptive to these efforts and were not opposed
to the formulation of an ethnically representative Afghan Government.169
Assef Ali’s argument is supported by US diplomatic records that show that
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto told visiting Senator Hank Brown and Congress-
man Charlie Wilson that her government supported the UN and not the Taliban.
Conveying interest in the Turkmenistan gas pipeline, she recommended US diplo-
matic presence in Afghanistan and a more active US role in the region.170 This was
a sensible suggestion but fell on deaf ears. Iftikhar Murshed, who was Pakistan’s
special envoy to Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, argued during his interview that
his mandate was to bring the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to a negotiated
settlement; he recounted his intense shuttle missions between Kandahar, the
Taliban headquarters and Afghan provinces controlled by various ethnicities. His
diplomatic efforts to win support for the UN peace mission under the UN special
envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, he asserted, clearly demonstrated that ‘the Pakistani
leadership was not averse to a broad based, multi-ethnic Afghan government’.171
Echoing Waheed and Karamat’s scepticism about alleged ISI and govern-
mental interference in Afghanistan, Lt General Mumtaz Gul asserted that ‘Paki-
stan imposed the Afghan interim government on Kabul’, even though the
Afghans should have been allowed to ‘sort things out for themselves’.172 That
such views can be found within the military suggests that even it was not mono-
lithic in its stance. Available primary and secondary sources indicate that the
Clinton administration did not take advantage of such differences in opinion. As
Assef Ali argued:

Every time we approached them [the State Department] their attitude was
‘we don’t want to take Pakistani chestnuts out of the fire . . . it is your busi-
ness’ . . . they had this hands-off approach. They threw the baby with the
bathtub at our door.173

Still, there is evidence some US interest in the movement. Testifying before a

Congressional hearing in 1995, Raphel stated that the Taliban supported a peace-
ful political process.174 After the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, Raphel
asserted that it was a ‘completely indigenous movement’ and ‘the best way to
moderate (its leadership) is to engage them’.175 Regarding the Taliban’s imposi-
tion of strict Islamic law, State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said, ‘On
the face of it, there is nothing objectionable at this stage’.176
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 105
Weinbaum argues that some in the State Department initially saw the Taliban
as harbingers of stability in Afghanistan in view of their ability to curtail the
drug trade and their announcement to support the UN peace mission.177 A State
Department cable shows that there was some opposition to supporting the
Taliban in 1995.178 Nevertheless, the US approach towards the Taliban take-over
of Kabul in 1996 was – according to Agence France-Press correspondent in
Kabul, Stefan Smith – ‘largely sympathetic’. Smith maintains, ‘We had the very
general impression, including from US diplomats in Islamabad that the Taliban
were [sic] not such a bad bunch after all’.179 Diplomat Sarwar Naqvi noted that
‘the Americans let the Taliban come to power . . . during our discussions with
State Department officials we could see their total frustration with Afghan
warlords’.180
There was no consistent approach towards the issue in the Clinton administra-
tion. Raphel complains, ‘I did everything except dance naked (on Secretary of
State’s staff ’s) table (to draw attention to the problem)’. Unfortunately, the lack
of serious commitment on the issue frustrated her efforts. Confirming that intra-
agency differences also contributed to this apathy, Raphel asserts that within
hours of the Taliban take-over, the State Department announced the opening of
diplomatic relations with the regime, but then retracted the announcement.181
This also demonstrates that US intelligence services were not playing their role
in guiding the formulation of policy in Washington.182
According to Durrani, ‘Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the US – all three tried to
hobnob with the Taliban’.183 A former army chief asserted during his interview
that the US pressurized Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to
recognize the Taliban regime, citing its potential to play a stabilizing role in
Afghanistan.184
At the same time, the US was reluctant to recognize the Taliban regime itself
even when it controlled over 90 per cent of Afghanistan. Moreover, it procrasti-
nated in allowing Rabbani, who no longer ruled the country, to continue holding
the Afghan seat in the UN. It is thus evident that the Clinton administration was
willing to give the Taliban some latitude but was wary of domestic public
opinion vis-à-vis the regime’s religious orthodoxy and women’s rights issues.
Moreover, in view of scant strategic interest in the region, it was reluctant to
engage the Taliban through economic incentives that, argued Musharraf, ‘could
have translated into a convergence of security interests’.185 Clearly, since the
Afghan issue was not a strategic priority for the US, the Clinton administration’s
policy-makers were content with regional countries stabilizing the situation in
Kabul; in other words this signalled a tolerance of the ISI’s actions.
Subsequently, argues Rashid, Pakistan was not restrained from supporting the
movement between 1994 and 1996. By 1997, he asserts, there was a ‘change of
heart’ as ‘US officials began to voice fears that the threat of terrorism and funda-
mentalism posed by the Taliban could overwhelm its old and now decidedly
[economically and politically] fragile ally Pakistan’.186 Riffat Hussain however
perceived the ‘change of heart’ as an outcome of the Taliban’s growing disen-
chantment with Unocal as it became apparent that American financial aid to
106 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
Kabul was not forthcoming.187 Economic interests can thus largely explain the
Clinton administration’s later approach. Riedel stated:

The US was ambivalent [towards the Taliban] as it saw the civil war end
through a popular movement . . . [therefore] in the mid 90s there was some
convergence of US–Pakistan security interests . . . to try the Taliban out as
an instrument of peace in Afghanistan.188

Confirming Riedel’s point, Weinbaum argued that ‘they had brought peace to
Kandahar and the adjoining areas and this in itself was a great achievement’.189
Clearly, the Clinton team was content with the ISI’s involvement in tackling the
Afghan imbroglio.
Available primary evidence leads to the conclusion that Clinton’s approach to
Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban was shaped by a temporary conver-
gence of Washington and Islamabad’s security interests. This was a continuation
of a familiar Cold War pattern, where Pakistan’s regional interests could be
tolerated while it served America’s global objectives. However, the ISI’s use of
Taliban territory to prepare militants for infiltration into Indian Kashmir was in
opposition to Clinton’s stated anti-terrorism stance. Some important militant
groups included the Kashmiri group Hezb-ul Mujahedeen with links to Gulbadin
Hekmatyar; the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, and Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA),
later called Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HUM).190

Clinton and Pakistan’s Kashmir policy

Former Director General ISI, and Chairman Joint Services General Ehsan-ul-
Haq and former President of National Defence University Lt General Shahid
Iqbal argued that private organizations were a key variable in these events.191
Arguing that Pakistan was ‘drawn into it [and did not] organize [infiltration into
Indian Kashmir]’, Ehsan asserted that the civilian government was trying to
‘regulate the inflow and outflow’ of Azad Kashmiri and Pakistani volunteers
through ‘humanitarian and some material support . . . but not weapons or train-
ing’.192 Musharraf endorsed Ehsan’s view:

Beyond 1989, the civilian government policy was to support the Kashmiri
fighters to bring India to the negotiating table . . . Pakistan based organiza-
tions like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba drew support from
Pakistan . . . there may have been some ISI help or turning the blind eye but
basically it was the government policy . . . there was open recruitment. But
there was no nexus between the Kashmiri freedom fighters and the Taliban;
it happened only after 9/11.193

This argument is credible in that the civilian leadership in the 1990s was vocal
about Kashmir as the ‘unfinished agenda of partition’ that had been over-
shadowed throughout the 1980s by Pakistan’s focus on the Afghan–Soviet War.
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 107
Pakistan’s involvement also stemmed from the concern that Kashmiris may opt
for a state independent of both India and Pakistan, especially during the period
of reduced attention on the issue during the 1980s. But was the civilian consen-
sus independent of the military’s influence? Some interviewees were willing to
confirm the ISI’s involvement in training anti-India elements in the 1990s.194 A
Pakistani official saw the situation as follows:

In the 1990s the military was totally in control of policies . . . the military
shifted its focus from the western to the eastern border after 1989 . . . we had
trained people available – local Kashmiris, Pakistani volunteers raised by
Jamaat-i-Islami and the Afghans . . . some areas in Indian Kashmir such as
Doda, were allocated to our people . . . there was some talk of shifting
Stingers. . . .195

Journalist and author Zahid Hussain – who has researched and written exten-
sively on terrorism – argued that in 1990–1991 ‘the ISI under General Javed
Nasir – an orthodox Islamist – was definitely involved . . . and during the Nawaz
Sharif administration there was strong evidence of ISI involvement’ in
Kashmir.196 Endorsing Hussain, another senior decision-maker of the early 1990s
agreed that ‘Military Intelligence and the ISI supported the insurgency in
Kashmir . . . when Clinton came in 1992, the direction was set’.197 Durrani – who
headed the ISI between 1991 and 1992 – avoided talking about the issue, indi-
cating that it was not so straightforward.
In 1995, linking the nuclear question and Kashmir, Prime Minister Benazir
argued that Kashmir had changed the nature of the security competition in the
region; the focus of the arms race had shifted to the development of nuclear arse-
nals rather than conventional weapons. This is not to say that the Americans did
not realize the relevance of Kashmir to the nuclear issue. Before the tests,
Talbott had suggested manipulating the issue to ‘hold the Pakistanis back from
testing’198 and afterwards, in a bid to influence Pakistan into signing the CTBT,
he spoke of the centrality of the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan’s strategic inter-
ests.199 At the same time, the Clinton administration attempted to deal separately
with the two issues by supporting the Indian position that Kashmir was a bilat-
eral problem.200 Thus, Talbott’s recognition of the significance of the Kashmir
problem can be seen as little more than rhetoric.
What cannot however be disregarded are US records that highlight Pakistani
interference in Indian Kashmir. By 1995, US intelligence reports had confirmed
ISI’s support to HUA, a militant Kashmir group with links to Pakistan’s religious
political party, the JUI and its efforts to train and infiltrate anti-Indian elements –
including former Afghan fighters – into Kashmir. The HUA was running training
camps in Afghanistan in the Taliban-controlled areas of Khost and Jalalabad near
the Pakistan border.201 In a July 1996 message, Benazir confirms receiving ‘dis-
turbing’ intelligence reports of HUA camps. Her account is confirmed by an
unnamed British journalist.202 It thus became increasingly clear to the US embassy
in Islamabad that the ISI’s support for the Taliban had a Kashmir angle to it.203
108 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
During the Clinton presidency there were a number of terrorist attacks against
American assets: Killing of three CIA officials in Langley, Virginia in 1993;
World Trade Centre bombing in 1993; US embassy bombings in Kenya and
Nairobi in 1998; attack on USS Cole in Yemen in 2000; the Khobar Towers
attack in 1996. This demanded a US foreign policy focus on the Pakistan–
Taliban connection.
US intelligence reports pointed a finger at the Saudi billionaire and former
anti-Soviet fighter, Osama Bin Laden, who was allowed by the Rabbani Govern-
ment to live in Afghanistan. From 1997 to 2000, the expulsion of Osama Bin
Laden to the US for legal proceedings remained the ‘the paramount issue
between the US and the Taliban’.204 To further complicate matters, there were
reports that HUA was in contact with Bin Laden who was said to be financing its
activities. US intelligence quotes Yusufzai confirming that Bin Laden was
indeed in Taliban-controlled Jalalabad.205
In a 1996 State Department memo, Strobe Talbott drew an analogy
between Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and militants in Indian-controlled
Kashmir, warning of unintended regional consequences.206 Thus, a link
between Bin Laden, the ISI and HUA camps was established by the US.207
Yusufzai confirmed that when he visited Bin Laden in Afghanistan for an
interview in 1998, his visit was facilitated by members of HUA who took him
across the Pakistan border to Afghanistan after eluding Frontier Corps border
patrols. He also confirmed that HUA members were present with Bin Laden
when he issued his 1998 ‘Fatwa’ or religious edict, declaring war on the
US.208 This leads to the conclusion that the HUA leader did indeed sign the
edict, as alleged by the US.209
The US expected Pakistan to use its leverage with the Taliban to have Bin
Laden expelled. Assistant Secretary of State Inderfurth suggested that relevant
Security Council resolutions should be invoked210 and that India should be
offered a greater role in UN peace efforts in Afghanistan to pressurize Pakistan
on this issue.211 Available documentary evidence shows that such steps were not
taken to curb Pakistan’s behaviour; nor was it considered for placement on the
terror watch list again.
Clinton, however, did order a cruise missile attack on Bin Laden’s training
camps in Khost on 20 August 1998, using Pakistan’s airspace without prior per-
mission. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston –
according to the US plan – was having dinner with the COAS, Jahangir Karamat,
at the time of the attack to assure him that the incoming missiles were American
and not Indian. Bin Laden escaped unhurt, but some of the missiles landed in
Pakistani territory. This event did nothing to boost Pakistan’s faith in the Clinton
administration.212
One explanation for Pakistan’s behaviour is that it did not have as much
leverage on the Taliban as was thought by the US. Riffat Hussain argues that the
Taliban grew more independent over time.213 Murshed argues that US Under-
Secretary of State Thomas Pickering was aware of ‘Pakistan’s limitations’ and
agreed that Pakistan was not in a position to ‘deliver all that [the US] wanted’
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 109
even though he maintained that ‘Pakistan was not doing enough’.214 Moreover, it
is probable that such steps were not taken because following the downward
spiral in bilateral relations after 1989 the US did not have much leverage over
Islamabad. Following the sanctions, Islamabad did not have any significant
incentives to comply with US demands. However, another, more plausible expla-
nation is possible.
By 1996, for the first time since independence, there was a pro-Pakistan
Afghan Government that was not averse to helping the ISI in sustaining its proxy
warfare in Indian-held Kashmir to secure its border in the east. Clearly, using
proxies to secure borders in the west while tying down Indian forces in Kashmir
provided space for the Pakistani military to focus on and accelerate its nuclear
weapons program. From the civil–military policy-makers’ perspective, Paki-
stan’s strategic choices regarding the Taliban, nuclear weapons and Kashmir
were interlinked. Clinton, however, viewed Kashmir as a separate problem that
could be managed and perhaps even resolved bilaterally between India and Paki-
stan – preferably without US involvement.

Explaining Clinton’s approach

Arguing that from 1995 to 1997, US support for the Taliban regime was driven
by the Turkmenistan oil and gas pipeline project, Rashid points out that the
project predated the Taliban.215 This is confirmed by a US diplomatic cable out-
lining Raphel’s discussion with President Rabbani.216 A 2001 newspaper report
quotes Afghan and US officials confirming Raphel’s ‘intense round of shuttle
diplomacy’ between potential stakeholders prior to the Taliban take-over of
Kabul.217 According to author Gutman, Raphel tried to use the pipeline as
‘leverage in dealing with the parties’ but the White House showed little
interest.218 This implies that Raphel’s efforts were more or less personal or
represented the minority view in the Clinton administration. However, contrary
to Gutman’s argument, meetings were held between US and Taliban officials
after Raphel’s departure in 1997. For instance, Raphel’s successor, Inderfurth,
received in Washington ‘three senior members of the Taliban delegation’ visit-
ing the US under the ‘auspices of Unocal’.219 This indicates that the project did
not become irrelevant after Raphel’s departure.
Aslam Beg however advances another possible explanation for US tolerance
of the Taliban:

It was neither the pipeline nor any security reason . . . by betraying the
Afghans in 1989 [the US] had lost leverage in Afghanistan . . . they could
not have controlled the Taliban even if they wanted to.220

The Saudi and UAE Governments closed down their missions in Kabul after dif-
ferences with the Taliban regime developed and the Clinton administration never
tried to renew American diplomatic relations. The reduction in US intelligence
operations in the region was further influenced by Clinton’s lukewarm relations
110 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
with the US intelligence community.221 Moreover this borderless, transnational
threat was by definition diffuse and murky. Therefore, America sought Paki-
stan’s assistance and the Pakistani foreign ministry facilitated the visits of Amer-
ican State Department officials to meet the Taliban leadership in Kabul.
Benazir’s Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ali (1993–1996) recalled during his
interview:

Even though the Americans did not recognize the Taliban, they were very
keen to do business with them. Raphel came to Islamabad and wanted to
meet Mullah Omar who never met women. I arranged her meeting with the
Taliban council. And she invited them to the US.222

Various news reports during this period show Taliban–US interaction. Taliban
leaders visited the US to discuss the pipeline project in December 1997223 and
Bill Richardson, Energy Secretary in the Clinton administration, travelled to
Afghanistan in April 1998 to hold talks with them in turn.224 Clearly, while Clin-
ton’s approach was lethargic, the economy-driven foreign policy-makers were
well aware of the strategic value of the pipeline in a region with half of the
world’s significant oil and gas reserves. Thus, Ahmed Rashid maintains that
Clinton’s NSC Adviser Sandy Berger set up an interagency government commit-
tee to formulate policy towards Central Asia as trade between the US and
Uzbekistan suddenly increased eight-fold between 1995 and 1997.225
Musharraf – recalling his 2000 meeting with Clinton – argued:

I told Clinton you have committed a big blunder by failing to engage the
Taliban . . . by failing to understand its tribal culture and psychology . . . its
leadership is uneducated and has no international exposure . . . isolating it
was not the answer . . . had you invested in Afghanistan you could have
moderated the Taliban.226

In 1996 Khalilzad, as adviser to Unocal, had also urged the Clinton administra-
tion to treat the Taliban regime as a positive entity since the construction of oil
and gas pipelines could go forward only ‘if Afghanistan has a single author-
itative government’.227 Murshed maintained that the US was willing to do busi-
ness but was not prepared to understand the Taliban phenomenon.228 This
suggests a lack of access to first-hand intelligence – perhaps due to a lack of
American diplomatic presence in Kabul; this dearth of intelligence was exacer-
bated by a view that economic prosperity was the sole method of achieving
political stability. Notably, there was no Afghan expert in Clinton’s foreign
policy team229 – demonstrating a disinterest in comprehending cultural influences
on the Taliban’s mindset.
There was also a security dimension to the US approach, albeit a less
important one. A State Department memo from Christopher refers to a US intel-
ligence report that describes Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism against Israel
and suggests that it aims to undermine Clinton’s efforts to negotiate a peaceful
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 111
settlement of the Israel–Palestine issue. Warning that Iran was promoting an
anti-Taliban coalition, the report points to Iranian efforts to develop nuclear
weapons and to expand ‘politicized Islamic influence’230 in Afghanistan and
Central Asia. Thus, an anti-Shia Taliban was clearly an antidote to Iran, as
implied by Khalilzad.231
According to Pakistani military interviewees, such as Beg, Durrani and
Bokhari, Iran continued to figure as a security threat to US interests in the
1990s.232 Riedel, however, downplayed the importance of Iran in the equation,
arguing that ‘most US governments have been obsessed with Iran trying to
block energy outlets and pipelines that may benefit Iran’. Seth Jones also
offered a competing perspective, arguing that neither Iranian influence nor the
pipeline drove initial US support for the Taliban. Jones, along with Riedel,
Inderfurth and Weinbaum maintained that the primary reason for Clinton’s
approach to the Taliban–Pakistan connection was US lack of interest in the
region and its focus on the Balkans, Somalia and Haiti. Joseph Nye, who
served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council during Clinton’s first
term, chose not to comment on whether the US had any convergence of interest
with Pakistan.233
Most of these analysts were formerly part of the Clinton administration, with
access to information that gives them an aura of credibility. However, it is not
unreasonable to ask whether their answers – or the lack thereof – are aimed at
justifying the decisions taken during their tenures in office.
Clinton’s administration has been criticized not only for its apathetic
approach, but for the security lapses that allowed 9/11 to occur; it was suggested
that the lack of interagency coordination lead to a misreading of the threat from
Al-Qaeda. It would be understandable if interviewees associated with the Clinton
administration would like to provide a counter-narrative.
What is noticeable is that most of them agree there was initial US acceptance
of the Taliban. Maleeha Lodhi also confirmed: ‘Yes, there was US interest in the
pipeline – but then they took their eye off the ball’.234 Available primary data
shows that the potential economic benefits, coupled with inconsistent foreign
policy dynamics, primarily drove the US approach towards the Taliban–Pakistan
connection; the issue of Bin Laden was a later addition to the agenda. Thus,
Murshed asserts that the US approach shifted from human rights, gender issues
and narcotic trafficking to terrorist camps and finally ‘gravitated to the single
issue of Osama Bin Laden’.235
In 1999, Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher accused the State
Department of withholding documents that would provide evidence of US
support to the Taliban in the 1990s, saying:

I am making the claim that there is and has been a covert policy by this
administration to support the Taliban movement’s control of Afghanistan . . .
and [has] kept the Congress in the dark . . . [and it is] currently engaged in a
major effort to obstruct Congress from determining the details behind this
policy.236
112 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
Rohrabacher’s remarks may be best understood in the context of forthcoming
general elections and thus Democrat Tom Lantos was quick to dismiss them as,
‘absurd and delusional’.237 Having said this, the US assessment that the Taliban
will not be ‘systematically unfriendly to US interests’,238 US economic interests
in Central Asia and a general US inattentiveness provided the Pakistani military
establishment with the opportunity to continue its support of the movement.
Similarly, there was a lack of interest in the ISI’s role in Indian-controlled
Kashmir.
An explanation for Clinton’s decision to remove Pakistan from consideration
for inclusion on the terror watch list is reflective of the complexity of US–Pakistan
relations during this era. Cohen argues that Pakistan was not declared a terrorist
state despite evidence of its support of militant groups for fear of strengthening
extremists at the cost of the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif.239 However, his
view does not present the whole picture. While Pakistan’s military continued its
support of the Kashmir insurgency, the Benazir and Nawaz Sharif Governments
also facilitated high-profile extraditions such as Aimal Kansi in 1997 for the 1993
killings of three CIA officials. Ramzi Yousaf, wanted for the 1993 World Trade
Centre bombing was extradited to the US in February 1995 – a time period that
coincided with Pakistan’s efforts to promote the Brown Amendment. Moreover,
the religiously orthodox ISI chief, Javed Nasir, accused of supporting militants in
Indian Kashmir and Punjab, was removed by the Prime Minister and replaced with
Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi, who was tasked with purging the ISI of the Islam-
ists who had been promoted by Nasir.
During his interview Qazi argued that, ‘Pakistan was removed from the list
because I purged the ISI . . . changed the rules of the game . . . no extremist links
– only professional work’.240 From this one can infer that prior to his taking over
in May 1993, the ‘rules of the game’ included ‘links with extremists’. Another
source implied the shifting of training camps from Azad Kashmir to the far-flung
FATA near the Pakistan–Afghan border as a ploy to show that Pakistan had
closed all training camps in the mid-1990s. This then is another reason for not
declaring Pakistan a terrorist state.
Moreover, early US embassy reports show that ‘hard evidence’ of Islama-
bad’s support ‘was lacking’ although private anti-Indian groups were ‘free to
raise funds and find recruits in Pakistan’.241 Thus, as late as May 1993, some
voices in the US Congress were opposing Pakistan’s placement on the terror
watch list242 despite – as Weinbaum confirmed – US intelligence reports of the
ISI’s interference in Kashmir from the early 1990s onwards.243
According to Shuja Nawaz, the visit to Washington by Beg’s successor
General Asif Nawaz (1991–1993) played a part in allaying American fears.244
According to Hamid Gul, Asif Nawaz was inclined towards capping Pakistan’s
nuclear program,245 which could be the primary reason why the Bush administra-
tion was receptive. However, James Baker’s above-mentioned letter to Prime
Minister Sharif is dated a day after Asif Nawaz’s untimely demise, and shows
that the Bush administration continued to air its concerns about Pakistan even
after Asif Nawaz’s visit.
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 113
Summary
The strategic vision of the Clinton era, such as it was, perceived threats to US
interests from nuclear proliferation and terrorism. At the beginning of his first
term in 1993, Clinton’s foreign policy towards South Asia was seen by the Paki-
stani intelligentsia as not tilted in India’s favour following Robin Raphel’s state-
ment on Kashmir and Clinton’s support for Sikhs’ rights in Indian Punjab.
However, by 1994, US–India ties began to improve due to Clinton’s emphasis
on economics as the bedrock of his foreign policy.
In contrast, Pakistan was largely perceived through the prism of security,
despite the fact that a civilian government was in power at the time in Pakistan.
In some ways, this was a continuation of the approach that the US had followed
during the Cold War; characterized by a focus on security issues above all else.
This helped to strengthen the political role of the Pakistan military.
Instead of curtailing PFP’s nuclear ambitions, US sanctions inadvertently
contributed to the acceleration of the process while diminishing Washington’s
leverage. Bilateral relations were further fractured by perpetuation of the F-16s
issue, nuclear testing, Islamabad’s support for the Kashmir insurgency and, what
the US perceived as, its reluctance to help modify the Taliban’s behaviour. The
final nail in the coffin was Pakistan’s aggression in Kargil.
Clinton’s coercive sanctions against Pakistan, while effectively ignoring
India’s nuclear ambitions; the administration’s tolerance of Islamabad’s support
for the Taliban and the Kashmir insurgency – all this created space for the Paki-
stan military establishment to pursue its regional security goals.
The Clinton administration expected Pakistan to recognize US actions as
aimed to save Pakistan from itself, as it were, while interpreting Islamabad’s
clandestine sale and purchase of nuclear technology as evidence of support for
what Tony Lake called the ‘backlash states’246 rather than rational self-interest.
A combination of disinterest and inconsistency in Clinton’s approach towards
Pakistan against the backdrop of improving India–US ties thus reinforced trends
in the US’s relations with Pakistan set in motion during the Bush era.
The Clinton administration could not grasp that, from the Pakistani per-
spective, PFP’s goals were interlinked; and that Kashmir, Afghanistan and
nuclear weapons had an interconnected logic. In view of its security competition
with India, Pakistan was obliged to respond to Indian nuclear tests. Moreover,
for the first time since the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the loss of East Paki-
stan in 1971, the achievement of a psychological and strategic victory over India
appeared possible on the western border – a way to address Islamabad’s peren-
nial fear of geographic vulnerability and Indian encirclement. The opportunity to
access Central Asian markets further sweetened the pot for Pakistan.
By tying down Indian forces in Kashmir through proxy warfare, Islamabad
could, from a position of strength, pressurize India into resolving outstanding
issues. Not only did the Clinton administration fail to take Islamabad’s genuine
security concerns into consideration, it’s inconsistent and largely disinterested
foreign policy approach hardened Islamabad’s strategic stance. In congruence
114 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
with the Cold War pattern, Islamabad utilized convergence and divergence to
promote PFP’s security objectives.

Notes
1 William J. Clinton, Remarks on Foreign Policy, San Francisco, 26 February 1999,
Video at www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ndShX16mIw, accessed 3 July 2012.
2 Leslie H. Gelb, ‘Quelling the Teacup Wars: The New World’s Constant Challenge’,
Foreign Affairs 73:6 (November–December 1994): 2–6.
3 William J. Clinton, Address to UN General Assembly, 27 September 1993, www.
state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207375.htm, accessed 3 July 2012.
4 Interview with Seth Jones (15 February 2012).
5 Statement by Warren Christopher, Confirmation Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, January 1993, www.archive.org/stream/nominationofwarr00unit/
nominationofwarr00unit_djvu.txt, accessed 5 February 2012.
6 Stephen Philip Cohen, ‘America and Pakistan: Is the Worst Case Avoidable?’
Current History (March 2005), http://library.perdana.org.my/Digital_Content/
Journal&Papers/000001/4/Current_History/pdf, accessed 31 December 2010.
7 William J. Clinton, ‘Remarks on Foreign Policy’.
8 Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement’
9 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
10 Leslie Aspin, Report on the Bottom-up Review, October 1993, 1, www.fas.org/man/
docs/bur/index.html, accessed 10 February 2012.
11 Interview with Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).
12 Interviews with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011) and Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
13 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
14 Anandabazar Patrika, Calcutta, ‘US Urged to Ask Islamabad to Stop Meddling in
Kashmir’, 28 January 1994, http://docs.newsbank.com.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/s/
HistArchive/fbisdoc/FBISX/11D969036E914B90/5D782E02AB8E45F3B049767A
D4AEE203, accessed 12 July 2011.
15 See B. Raman, Terrorist State as a Frontline Ally, 8–11.
16 ‘Clinton Remarks on Punjab’, Editorial, Patriot, Delhi, 2 February 1994; ‘US
Administration Blamed for Fomenting Terrorism’, The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 14
February 1994, http://docs.newsbank.com.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/s/HistArchive/
fbisdoc/FBISX/11CAC1CE7A4121B8/5D782E02AB8E45F3B049767AD4AEE203,
accessed 12 July 2011.
17 The Hindu, 30 October 1993.
18 Interview with Dennis Kux (18 March 2012).
19 Interview with Aslam Beg (July 2011).
20 Interviews with Dennis Kux (18 March 2012) and Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
21 Remarks by Senator Helms, ‘Genocide in Kashmir’, Congressional Record, 103rd
Congress, 7 June 1993, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r103:45:./temp/
~r1039HtkNv, accessed 12 June 2011.
22 Frank Carlucci, Robert E. Hunter and Zalmay Khalilzad, (eds.), ‘Taking Charge: A
Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security’
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2001): 45–47, www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/
MR1306.pdf, accessed 29 July 2012.
23 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining US Success in Engaging
India and Pakistan’, The Washington Quarterly 31:4 (Autumn 2008): 21–42.
24 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
25 Thomas Lum, US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients,
Congressional Research Service (CRS), Report for Congress, April 2002, www.
iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/9661.pdf, accessed 3 August 2011.
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 115
26 Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the National Interest’.
27 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (New Delhi:
Viking-Penguin Group, 2004): 78.
28 See Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, ‘The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanc-
tions on India and Pakistan’.
29 ‘Confrontation and Retreat: The US Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests’,
Arms Control Today, www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/rhjf00#back9 , accessed
12 June 2015.
30 ‘Pakistan–US Relationship’, Defense Journal (1998) www.defencejournal.com/
april98/pakistanus.htm, accessed 4 March 2011.
31 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
32 David S. Chou, ‘US Policy towards India and Pakistan in the Post Cold War Era’,
Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, www2.tku.edu.tw/~ti/Journal/8–3/832.
pdf, accessed 31 December 2011.
33 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 328.
34 US Embassy Moscow cable, No. 774357, ‘A/S Raphel Consultations with Deputy
FM Chernychev’, 13 May 1996, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/
tal16.pdf, accessed 23 December 2011.
35 David S. Chou, ‘US Policy Towards India and Pakistan in the Post-Cold War Era’.
36 Gohar Ayub Khan, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power (Karachi: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007): 279–280.
37 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
38 ‘US Remarks Angers Indians’, New York Times, 10 March 1994, www.nytimes.
com/1994/03/10/world/us-remarks-over-kashmir-anger-indians.html?pagewanted=2&
src=pm, accessed 15 September 2011.
39 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
40 See Bruce Riedel, ‘American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair
House’, Occasional Papers, Centre for the Advanced Study of India, University of
Pennsylvania, 2002, www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/685898/posts, accessed 17
March 2011.
41 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
42 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
43 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
44 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
45 Interview with Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
46 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
47 ‘Clinton Addresses Pakistani People’, CNN.com, 25 March 2000, http://transcripts.
cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/25/bn.01.html, accessed 25 August 2010.
48 Gohar Ayub Khan, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, 279.
49 ‘Nawaz Sharif in Washington’, Frontline, 15 (1998–1999) www.frontline.in/static/
html/fl1420/14200040.htm, accessed 17 December 2012.
50 Joseph O’Grady, ‘An Irish Policy Born in the USA: Clinton’s Break with the Past’,
Foreign Affairs 75:3 (1996): 2–7.
51 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
52 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
53 Douglas Brinkley ‘Democratic Enlargement’.
54 Chollet and Goldgeier, America Between the Wars, 57–59.
55 See Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, ‘The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanc-
tions on India and Pakistan’.
56 Barnett. R. Rubin, ‘Post-Cold War State Disintegration: The Failure of International
Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan’, Journal of International Affairs 46:2 (1993):
469–492.
57 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2011).
58 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
116 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
59 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 170–182 and 144–156.
60 Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
61 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 157–182.
62 John Ward Anderson and Kamran Khan, ‘Pakistan Shelters Islamic Radicals’, Wash-
ington Post, 8 March 1995, A21-A22; Edward W. Desmond, ‘Pakistan’s Hidden
Hand’, Time, 22 July 1991, 23; Hon. Jim McDermott ‘It’s Time To Take a Second
Look at Pakistan’, Extension of Remarks – 22 September 1994, http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r103:1:./temp/~r103wQWInK::, accessed 16 February 2012.
63 Statement released by the State Department on 8 January 1993 in ‘United States and
Pakistan Relations’, House of Representatives, Congressional Record 103rd Con-
gress (1993–1994), 25 May 1993; www.fas.org/irp/congress/1993_cr/h930525-
terror-pak.htm, accessed 12 March 2011.
64 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
65 ‘Decision by Secretary Christopher on Pakistan’, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Extension
of Remarks, House of Representatives, 2 August 1993, Congressional Record, 103rd
Congress (1993–1994) www.fas.org/irp/congress/1993_cr/h930802-terror-pak.htm,
accessed 16 February 2012.
66 See James M. Lindsay, ‘Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of
Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy’, Presidential Studies Quarterly,
33:3 (September 2003): 530–546; James M. Lindsay, ‘The New Apathy: How an
Uninterested Public Is Reshaping Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs 79:5 (September–
October 2000): 2–8; Arthur Schlesinger Jr. ‘Back to the Womb? Isolationism’s
Renewed Threat’, Foreign Affairs 74:4 (July–August 1995): 2–8; James M. Lindsay,
‘Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters’, Political Science Quarterly
107:4 (Winter 1992–1993): 607–628, 608.
67 See Congressional Record 103rd Congress (1993–1994), 104th Congress (1995–1996),
105th Congress (1997–1998) and 106th Congress (1999–2000), http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record, accessed 17 July 2011; John Dumbrell,
‘Evaluating the Foreign Policy of President Clinton – Or, Bill Clinton: Between the
Bushes’, The Second Eccles Centre for American Studies Plenary Lecture, British
Association of American Studies Annual Conference (2005); William Clinton, ‘Why
Bosnia Matters to America’, Newsweek, 13 November 1995, 55.
68 Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 121–122, 122.
69 Jason A. Kirk, ‘Indian-Americans and the US–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolida-
tion of an Ethnic Lobby?’, Foreign Policy Analysis 4:3 (July 2008), 275–300.
70 Interview with Talat Masood (6 September 2011).
71 Larry Pressler, ‘The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons
Program’, Senate, 31 July 1992, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress,
(1991–1992), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=102,
accessed 4 December 2011; Hon. Fortney Pete Stark, Extension of Remarks, 10
October 1990, in the House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 101st Con-
gress (1989–1990), ibid.; Hon, Jim McDermott, ‘It is Time to Take a Second Look
at Pakistan’, Extension of Remarks, 22 September 1994, Congressional Record,
103rd Congress (1993–1994), Ibid.
72 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
73 The Reuter Transcript Report, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, 23
March 1994, Congressional Record, 103rd Congress (1993–1994), http://thomas.loc.
gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=103, accessed 4 December 2011.
74 R. Jeffery Smith, ‘The United States Proposes Sale of F-6s to Pakistan’, Washington
Post, 23 March 1994.
75 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011); Robert Einhorn’s interview with
Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 477.
76 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (New Delhi:
Viking Penguin Books, 2004): 32.
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 117
77 Interview with a former army chief.
78 Steven A. Holmes, ‘Clinton Plans Change in the Law Banning Military Aid to Paki-
stan’, New York Times, 27 November 1993, www.nytimes.com/1993/11/27/world/
clinton-plans-change-in-the-law-banning-military-aid-to-pakistan.html, accessed 17
July 2010.
79 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 32.
80 Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Iden-
tity (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2004): 290.
81 Washington Post, 8 February 1996.
82 New York Times, 21 March 1996.
83 Robert G. Wirsing, ‘Pakistan’s Security in the “New World Order”: Going from Bad
to Worse?’ Asian Affairs: An American Review 23:2 (Summer 1996): 105.
84 Financial Times, 26 May 1994, 4.
85 Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really
Make Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000): 92–93.
86 Interview with Dennis Kux (18 March 2012).
87 Interviews with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011) and Sarwar Naqvi (12 October
2011).
88 James M. Lindsay, ‘Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp Ameri-
ca’s Foreign Policy Style?’ Brookings Review 20:1 (Winter 2002): 37–40.
89 Interview with Sardar Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
90 Interview with Admiral Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
91 Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 114.
92 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
93 Robert. G. Wirsing, ‘Pakistan’s Security in the ‘New World Order’, 104–105.
94 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
95 Financial Times, 27 August 1993, 4; see also Hon. Maurice D. Hinchey, ‘Pakistan
Continues Missile Purchases from China and Escalates Tensions in South Asia’,
Extension of Remarks, House of Representatives, 28 September 1994, Congres-
sional Record, 103rd Congress (1993–1994), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/Legislative
Data.php?&n=Record&c=103, accessed 5 December 2011; Bill Gertz, ‘China
Nuclear Transfer Exposed’, Washington Post, 5 February 1996, A1.4; ‘China’s
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wisconsinproject.org/countries/china/china-missile-sales.html, accessed 12 Novem-
ber 2012; R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘China Linked to Pakistani Missile Plant’, Washington
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96 Senate Resolution 278, 27 October 1994, Congressional Record, 103rd Congress
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accessed 5 December 2011.
97 The Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, House Republican
Research Committee Report, House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 24 August
1994, http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S__Archives,
accessed 15 June 2011.
98 See Senator Thad Cochran, ‘Security of Israel’, Congressional Record, 103rd Con-
gress, 30 March 1993, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r103:8:./temp/~r1037
muUaq::, accessed 15 June 2011.
99 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 97.
100 Document ID 98ISLAMABAD2617, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Pakistan Tests
“Ghauri” Missile’, 6 April 1998, www.wikileaks.org, accessed 25 February 2012;
William G. Hyland, Clinton’s World, 192–194.
101 Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to
the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Second Session of the Conference,
Geneva, 14 May 1998, http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/statemnt.htm,
accessed May 2011.
118 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
102 Gohar Ayub Khan, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, 299.
103 Ibid.; Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram.
104 James Risen and Tim Weiner, ‘US May Have Helped India Hide its Nuclear Activ-
ity’, New York Times, 25 May 1998, www.nytimes.com/1998/05/25/world/us-may-
have-helped-india-hide-its-nuclear-activity.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, accessed
15 June 2011; also Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 1–3.
105 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 56–66.
106 Ibid., 60–63; quotations on 61–62; Gohar Ayub Khan, Glimpses into the Corridors
of Power, 299.
107 Bruce Riedel, ‘American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House’,
Policy Papers Series, Centre for Advanced Studies of India, 2002, 6.
108 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
109 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 57–59.
110 Interview with a former army chief.
111 Document ID 98ISLAMABAD33966, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Prime
Minister Succumbs to Domestic Pressure and Pakistan Conducts Five Nuclear
Tests’, 28 May 1998, www.wikileaks.org, accessed 25 February 2012.
112 Interview with Rasul Bakhsh Rais (12 August 2011).
113 Feroz Hasan Khan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture; the Case of Pakistan’, www.
defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/12084-pakistan-strategic-culture.html,
accessed 19 April 2012.
114 Conversation with the naval officer.
115 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 311, 320.
116 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, interview ‘Late Edition’, Cable News
Network, 14 June 1998, 11.
117 Hon. Lee Hamilton, ‘US Sanctions Policy’, Extension of Remarks, House of Repre-
sentatives, 14 July 1998, Congressional Record, 105th Congress (1997–1998),
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=105, accessed 12
November 2011.
118 Richard N. Haass, ‘The Squandered Presidency’, 136–140.
119 Christine Fair, ‘Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating US Relations with Pakistan’,
The Washington Quarterly, 32:2 (April 2009): 149–172, 167.
120 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, 127; William G. Hyland, Clin-
ton’s World, 194.
121 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
122 Strobe Talbott, ‘US Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report’, Remarks given
at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 12 November 1998, 4.
123 T.V. Paul, ‘Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive
Sanctions’, International Journal 51:3 (Summer 1996): 441–465, 454–455.
124 Farzana Shaikh, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime’,
International Affairs 78:1 (January 2002): 29–48.
125 Christine Fair, ‘The US–Pakistan F-16 fiasco’, Foreign Policy, 3 February 2011,
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/03/the_f_16_fiasco?wp_login_redirect
=0, accessed 13 June 2013.
126 Senator John Glenn, ‘International Security and Development Act of 1981’,
Congressional Record, 21 October 1981, 12.
127 Document ID 98ISLAMABAD4003, US Embassy Cable, ‘Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif ’s Letter to President Clinton’, 29 May 1998, www.wikileaks.org, accessed 25
February 2012.
128 Robert G. Wirsing, ‘Pakistan’s Security in the “New World Order”: Going from Bad
to Worse?’ Asian Affairs 23:2 (Summer 1996): 101–126, 104.
129 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
130 General K.M. Arif, ‘Signing the CTBT with Care’, Dawn, Karachi, 25
November 1998.
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 119
131 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2001): 168.
132 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 43.
133 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
134 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
135 Mullah Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban (Gurgaon: Hachette India, 2010): 104–106,
123–126.
136 Interviews with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011), Hamid Gul (13 July 2011),
Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011), Aslam Beg (2 July 2011), Marvin Weinbaum (2 Febru-
ary 2012), Seth Jones (15 February 2012), Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012) and
Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
137 Interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai (19 October 2011).
138 Interview with Siraj-ul-Haq (19 October 2011).
139 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
140 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 144–156.
141 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
142 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 46–47; Document ID 243042, US Depart-
ment of State Cable, ‘A/S Raphael’s October 4 Meeting with Assef Ali on Afghani-
stan’, 13 October 1995, ‘Pakistan: The Taliban’s Godfather?’, Document 3, http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/3.pdf, 14 December 2011.
143 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
144 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
145 Fax sent to Ron McMullen, Afghanistan Desk, US Department of State by Unidenti-
fied Sender, 5 December 1994, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/1.
pdf, accessed 15 December 2011; see also Document ID 1994ISLAMA11584, US
Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘––––-[Excised] Believes Pakistan Supporting the
Taliban’, 6 December 1994, ‘The Taliban File’, Document 5, http://nsarchive.gwu.
edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal5.pdf, accessed 15 December 2011.
146 No. 12705932, Department of State Memo, ‘Pak Foreign Minister asks US
Cooperation on Afghanistan’, 21 February 1996, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB97/tal13.pdf, accessed 15 December 2011.
147 Armitage Interview with Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 299.
148 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
149 No. 12705932, Department of State Memo, ‘Pak Foreign Minister Asks US
Cooperation on Afghanistan’.
150 For instance, when they took over Kandahar in 1994 the Taliban banned chess and
marbles and ordered women to stay at home with no access to education or male
doctors. Female professionals considered their livelihood to be under threat. A
female doctor is quoted as expressing her fear of the Taliban, the ‘ignorant thugs’
who are wilful and capricious. ‘The Taliban: What We’ve Heard’ Document
ID1995ISLAMA00966, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, 26 January 1995, http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal6.pdf www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB97/index4.htm, accessed 15 December 2011.
151 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 49.
152 Glyn Davies, State Department Regular Briefing, 27 September 1996, http://dosfan.
lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960927db.html, accessed 4
April 2012. Najibullah was living in the UN Compound in Kabul since 1992.
153 US Department of State Cable, 1996STATE203322, ‘Dealing with the Taliban in
Kabul’, 28 September 1996, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal17.
pdf, accessed 11 December 2011.
154 Robin Raphel’s interview with Gutman, How We Missed the Story, 78.
155 Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, 174–175.
156 Amnesty International News Release, ‘Afghanistan: International Actors Have a
Special Responsibility For Ending the Human Rights Catastrophe’, London, 18
120 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
November 1999. Amnesty International News Release, ‘Afghanistan: Civilians in a
Game of War They Have Not Chosen’, London, 27 May 1999.
157 Document ID 168281600, US State Department Memo, 13 December 1996,
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm, accessed 25
December 2011.
158 Interview with Rahimullah Yousufzai (19 October 2011).
159 Document ID Islama01792, US Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, ‘Finally, A Talkative Talib:
Origins and Membership of the Religious Students’ Movement’, 20 February 1995,
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal8.pdf, accessed 25 December 2011.
160 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America between the Wars, 58.
161 Document ID ABUDHABI7350, US Embassy Abu Dhabi Cable, ‘Tehran Sees
Taleban [sic] as US Tool against Iran’, 11 November 1996, www.wikileaks.org;
Document ID 11995 STATE291940, Case No. 200104110, US Department of State
Memo, ‘Discussing Afghan Policy with the Pakistanis’, 22 December 1995, http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/7.pdf, accessed December 2011.
162 US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, ‘Afghanistan: Russian Embassy Official Claims
Iran Interfering More Than Pakistan’, 30 November 1995, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/6.pdf, accessed 14 December 2011.
163 Document ID 11208406, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Victory Impact’, National Intelli-
gence Daily, CIA/CPAS/NID 96–229CX, 30 September 1996, Ibid.
164 Document ID 11995 STATE291940, US Department of State, Cable, ‘Discussing
Afghan Policy with the Pakistanis’.
165 Document ID 2292754, American Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘A/S Raphel Dis-
cusses Afghanistan’, 22 April 22 1996, Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Interview with a former army chief.
168 No. 12705932, Department of State Memo, ‘Pak Foreign Minister Asks US
Cooperation on Afghanistan’.
169 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
170 Document ID 2003414, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Senator Brown and Congress-
man Wilson Discuss Afghanistan with Pakistani Officials’, 14 April 1996, http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal14.pdf, accessed 16 December 2011.
171 Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (29 August 2011).
172 Interview with Mumtaz Gul (18 October 2011).
173 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
174 Statement by Robin Raphel Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, 7 March 1995, file:///C:/Users/win7/Desktop/TESTIMONY%20%20R.%20
RAPHEL%20ON%20U.S.%20POLICY%20TOWARDS%20SOUTH%20ASIA.htm,
accessed 11 November 2011.
175 Robin Raphel, Statement at UN Conference on Interested Parties in Afghanistan,
New York, 18 November 1996.
176 Glyn Davies, State Department Regular Briefing, 27 September 1996, http://dosfan.
lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960927db.html, accessed 21
April 2012.
177 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012); No. 1997STATE231842,
Department of State Memo, ‘Afghanistan: Meeting with the Taliban’, 11 December
1997, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal24.pdf, accessed 17
December 2011.
178 State 291940, US Department of State, Cable, ‘Discussing Afghan Policy with the
Pakistanis’, 22 December 1995, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/7.
pdf, accessed 11 December 2011.
179 Quoted in Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, 77.
180 Interview with Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 121
181 Raphel’s interview with journalist Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, 57.
182 Defence Intelligence Agency, Cable, ‘IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveller’s
Analysis of AlQaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses’, 2 October 2001, http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal28.pdf, accessed 17 December 2011.
183 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
184 Interview with a former army chief.
185 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
186 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 170–182, 180.
187 Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
188 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
189 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
190 ‘Who are the Kashmir Militants’, BBC News Asia, 1 August 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-asia-18738906, accessed 1 May 2013.
191 Interviews with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011) and Shahid Iqbal (6 August 2011).
192 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
193 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
194 Interviews with Pakistani officials B and D.
195 Interview with Pakistani official B.
196 Interview with Zahid Hussain (21 July 2011).
197 Interview with Pakistani official D.
198 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 67.
199 US Department of State, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Address at the Institute of Stra-
tegic Studies, ‘Pakistan, the US, and the Quest for Common Ground’, Islamabad,
Pakistan, 2 February 1999.
200 ‘Kashmir-Nuclear Linkage seen as Unavoidable’, The Frontier Post, 5 May 1994.
201 Document ID ISLAMA01054, ‘Pakistan Counterterrorism: Ambassador’s Meeting
with [Excised] on State Sponsor Designation’, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, 6 Feb-
ruary 1997, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/16.pdf, accessed 1
February 2012.
202 Document ID 961ISLAMABAD5972, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, 14 July 1996,
http://wikileaks.org, accessed 3 January 2012; US Embassy Cable, ISLAMA 09994,
‘Afghanistan: British Journalist Visits Site of Training Camps; HUA Activity
Alleged’ 26 November 1996, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/19.
pdf, accessed 22 December 2011.
203 Document ID ISLAMA05010, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Bad News on Pak
Afghan Policy’, 1 July 1998, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/talib8.
pdf, accessed 22 December 2011.
204 Decaptioned Secret Nodis, ‘US Engagement with the Taliban on Usama [sic] Bin
Laden’, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal40.pdf, accessed 23
December 2011.
205 Document ID 96PESHAWAR1059, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Stall in Permitting Jour-
nalists Access to Usama [sic] Bin Laden’, 11 November 1996, www.wikileaks.org/
plusd/cables/96PESHAWAR1059_a.html, accessed December 2012.
206 No. 12705932, Department of State Memo, ‘Pak Foreign Minister Asks US
Cooperation on Afghanistan’.
207 Document ID ISLAMA01054, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, 6 February 1997.
208 Interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai (19 October 2011).
209 No. 1998ISLAMA01805, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, March 1998, http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/talib6.pdf, accessed 23 December 2011.
210 UNSCR 1214 and UNSCR 1193 direct that Afghanistan’s neighbours cease interfer-
ence in the country’s internal affairs.
211 Undated State Department Information Memorandum, ‘Pushing for Peace in
Afghanistan’, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/33.pdf, accessed 17
December 2011.
122 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
212 US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, ‘SITREP 6: Pakistan/Afghanistan Reaction to US
Strikes’, 25 August 1998, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/
Doc%204.pdf; William Clinton, My Life (London: Hutchinson, 2004): 799.
213 Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
214 Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 226.
215 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, 170–182, 144–156; John Foster, ‘A Pipeline through a
Troubled Land: Afghanistan, Canada, and the New Great Energy Game’, Foreign
Policy Series 3, 19 June 2008, 1–17.
216 Document ID 2292754, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘A/S Raphel Discusses
Afghanistan’, 22 April 1996, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal15.
pdf, accessed 25 December 2011.
217 Phillip Knightly, ‘US Gave Silent Backing to Taliban Rise to Power’, Guardian, 8
October 2001.
218 Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, 74.
219 No. 1197STATE231842, ‘Afghanistan: Meeting with the Taliban’, Department of
State Memo, 11 December 1997, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/
tal24.pdf, accessed 27 December 2011.
220 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
221 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 240–256.
222 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
223 ‘Taliban Take Trip to Texas for Pipeline Negotiations’, Agence France Presse, 6
December 1997; ‘Taliban in Texas for Talks on Gas Pipeline’, BBC News, 4
December 1997; Financial Times, 23 October 1995; Michael Davis, ‘Unocal
Tangled in Pipeline Squabble’, Houston Chronicle, 27 June 1996, 3; Charles Clover,
‘Oil Companies Battle for Pipeline Rights’, Financial Times, 4 April 1997, 4;
‘Unocal Consortium Plans to Build Pipeline to Ship Natural Gas’, Wall Street
Journal, 14 August 1996, C19.
224 Conrad Schetter and Bernd Kuzmits, ‘The Revival of Geopolitics: US Policies in
Afghanistan and Central Asia’, in Jurgen Rutland, Theodore Hanf and Eva Manske
(eds), US Foreign Policy toward the Third World: A Post-cold War Assessment
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006): 165–167.
225 Including members from CIA, NSC and State Department – Ahmed Rashid, Taliban,
162–163.
226 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
227 Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Afghanistan: Time to Reengage’, Washington Post, 7 October
1996, A21.
228 Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (12 August 2011).
229 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 407.
230 No. 96STATE237921, ‘INR Assessment of Iran’, 17 November 1996, www.wikileaks.
org, accessed 17 December 2012.
231 Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘Afghanistan: Time to Reengage’, Washington Post, 7
October 1996.
232 Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011), Asad Durrani (24 April 2012) and Fasih
Bokhari (15 July 2011).
233 Interviews with Seth Jones (15 February 2012), Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012),
Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012), Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012) and Joseph
Nye (7 March 2012).
234 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
235 Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, 244–245.
236 Statement of Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, Senate Foreign Relations Subcom-
mittee on South Asia, 14 April 1999, www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/535202/
posts, accessed June 2011.
237 Quoted in Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, 174.
238 Document ID11208406, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Victory Impact’, National Intelligence
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 123
Daily, CIA/CPAS/NID 96–229CX, 30 September 1996, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/11.pdf, accessed 23 December 2011.
239 Stephen Cohen, Idea of Pakistan, 364.
240 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011); Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 292.
241 Document ID 19ISLAMABAD27305, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, 17 December
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242 Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, ‘Opposing Inclusion of Pakistan on the State Depart-
ment’s List of Terrorist States’, Extension of Remarks, 28 May 1993, Congressional
Record, 103rd Congress (1993–1994); Congresswoman Barbara-Rose Collins,
‘United States and Pakistan Relations’, 25 May 1994, Congressional Record, 103rd
Congress (1993–1994), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=
Record&c=103, accessed 4 July 2011.
243 Interview with Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
244 Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
245 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
246 Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’, Foreign Affairs 73:2 (1994): 45–55.

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Kirk, Jason A. ‘Indian-Americans and the US–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation
of an Ethnic Lobby?’ Foreign Policy Analysis 4:3 (2008): 275–300.
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Science Quarterly 107:4 (1992–1993): 607–628.
Lindsay, James M. ‘The New Apathy: How an Uninterested Public is Reshaping Foreign
Policy’. Foreign Affairs 79:5 (2000): 2–8.
Lindsay, James M. ‘Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-
Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy’. Presidential Studies Quarterly 33 (2003):
530–546.
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 125
O’Grady, Joseph. ‘An Irish Policy Born in the USA: Clinton’s Break with the Past’.
Foreign Affairs 75:3 (1996): 2–7.
Paul, T.V. ‘Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanc-
tions’. International Journal 51:3 (1996): 441–465.
Rice, Condoleezza. ‘Promoting the National Interest’. Foreign Affairs 79:1 (2000):
45–62.
Rubin, Barnett R. ‘Post-Cold War State Disintegration: The Failure of International Con-
flict Resolution in Afghanistan’. Journal of International Affairs 46:2 (1993): 469–492.
Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. ‘Back to the Womb? Isolationism’s Renewed Threat’. Foreign
Affairs 74:4 (1995): 2–8.
Shaikh, Farzana, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime’.
International Affairs 78:1 (2002): 29–48.
Tellis, Ashley J. ‘The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining US Success in Engaging
India and Pakistan’. The Washington Quarterly 31:4 (2008): 21–42.
Wirsing, Robert G. ‘Pakistan’s Security in the ‘New World Order’. Asian Affairs 23:2
(1996): 101–126.
Wirsing, Robert G. ‘Precarious Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to US Security Pol-
icies’. Asian Affairs: An American Review 30:2 (2003): 70–78.

Newspapers/periodicals
Amnesty International News Release. ‘Afghanistan: Civilians in a Game of War They
Have Not Chosen’. London, 27 May 1999.
Amnesty International News Release. ‘Afghanistan: International Actors Have a Special
Responsibility For Ending the Human Rights Catastrophe’. London, 18 Novem-
ber 1999.
Anderson, John Ward and Kamran Khan, ‘Pakistan Shelters Islamic Radicals’. Washing-
ton Post, 8 March 1995.
Arif, K.M. ‘Signing the CTBT with Care’. 25 November 1998.
Clinton, Bill. ‘Why Bosnia Matters to America’. Newsweek, 13 November 1995.
‘Clinton Remarks on Punjab’. Patriot, 2 February 1994.
Clover, Charles. ‘Oil Companies Battle for Pipeline Rights’. Financial Times, 4 April 1997.
Davis, Michael. ‘Unocal Tangled in Pipeline Squabble’. Houston Chronicle, 27
June 1996.
Desmond, Edward W. ‘Pakistan’s Hidden Hand’. Time, 22 July 1991.
Gertz, Bill. ‘China Nuclear Transfer Exposed’. Washington Post, 5 February 1996.
Holmes, Steven A. ‘Clinton Plans Change in the Law Banning Military Aid to Pakistan’.
New York Times, 27 November 1993.
‘Kashmir-Nuclear Linkage seen as Unavoidable’. The Frontier Post, 5 May 1994.
Knightly, Phillip. ‘US Gave Silent Backing to Taliban Rise to Power’. Guardian, 8
October 2001.
Lindsay, James M. ‘Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America’s
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Morrow, Daniel and Michael Carriere, ‘The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on
India and Pakistan’. The Nonproliferation Review 6 (1999): 1–16.
‘Nawaz Sharif in Washington’. Frontline 15 (1998–1999). Accessed 17 December 2012.
www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1420/14200040.htm.
Risen, James and Tim Weiner. ‘US May Have Helped India Hide its Nuclear Activity’.
New York Times, 25 May 1998.
126 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
Smith, R. Jeffery. ‘The United States Proposes Sale of F-6s to Pakistan’. Washington
Post, 23 March 1994.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. ‘China Linked to Pakistani Missile Plant’. Washington Post, 25
August 1996.
‘Taliban in Texas for Talks on Gas Pipeline’. BBC News, 4 December 1997.
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‘Who are the Kashmir Militants?’ BBC News Asia, 1 August 2012. Accessed 1 May 2013.
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18738906.
‘Unocal Consortium Plans to Build Pipeline to Ship Natural Gas’. Wall Street Journal, 14
August 1996.
‘US Remarks Angers Indians’. New York Times, 10 March 1994.
‘US Urged to Ask Islamabad to Stop Meddling in Kashmir’. Anandabazar Patrika, 28
January 1994.
Khalilzad, Zalmay. ‘Afghanistan: Time to Reengage’. Washington Post, 7 October 1996.

Speeches/lectures/conferences
‘Clinton Addresses Pakistani People’. CNN.com, 25 March 2000. Accessed 25 August
2010. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0003/25/bn.01.html.
Clinton, William J. Address to UN General Assembly. 27 September 1993.
Clinton, William J. Remarks on Foreign Policy. San Francisco. 26 February 1999.
Dumbrell, John. ‘Evaluating the Foreign Policy of President Clinton Or, Bill Clinton:
Between the Bushes’. The Second Eccles Centre for American Studies Plenary Lecture,
BISA Annual Conference, 2005.
Raphel, Robin. Statement at UN Conference on Interested Parties in Afghanistan. New
York. 18 November 1996.
Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram. Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the
United Nations Conference on Disarmament. Second Session of the Conference,
Geneva. 14 May 1998.
Strobe Talbott. ‘US Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report’. Remarks given at the
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 12 November 1998.
US Department of State. Deputy Secretary Talbott, Address at the Institute of Strategic
Studies, ‘Pakistan, the US, and the Quest for Common Ground’. Islamabad, Pakistan. 2
February 1999.

Primary documents
Bruce Riedel ‘American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House’. Occa-
sional Papers, 2002.
Decaptioned Secret Nordis. ‘US Engagement with the Taliban on Usama [sic] Bin
Laden’. undated.
Declassified Government Documents. Accessed between June 2011 and April 2013.
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/index.html.
Declassified Government Documents. Accessed between June 2011 and December 2012.
www.wikileaks.org.
Defence Intelligence Agency, Cable, ‘IIR [Excised]/Veteran Afghanistan Traveller’s
Analysis of AlQaeda and Taliban Exploitable Weaknesses’, 2 October 2001.
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 127
Document ID 1994ISLAMA11584, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘–––– [Excised]
Believes Pakistan Supporting the Taliban’. 6 December 1994.
Fax sent to Ron McMullen, Afghanistan Desk, US Department of State by Unidentified
Sender, 5 December 1994.
Frank Carlucci, Robert E. Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad, (eds.). ‘Taking Charge: A
Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security’.
RAND, 2001.
Glyn Davies, State Department Regular Briefing. 27 September 1996. Accessed 4 April
2012. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996/9609/960927db.html.
Leslie Aspin, Report on the Bottom-up Review (1993).
No. 19ISLAMABAD27305, US Embassy Islamabad Cable. 17 December 1989.
No. 94ISLAMABAD10894, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Pakistan: 1994 Annual Ter-
rorism Report’. 17 November 1994.
No. Islama01792, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Finally, A Talkative Talib: Origins and
Membership of the Religious Students’ Movement’. 20 February 1995.
No. 243042, US Department of State Cable, ‘A/S Raphael’s October 4 Meeting with
Assef Ali on Afghanistan’. 13 October 1995.
No. 11995 STATE291940, Case No. 200104110, US Department of State Memo, ‘Dis-
cussing Afghan Policy with the Pakistanis’. 22 December 1995.
No. 12705932, Department of State Memo, ‘Pak Foreign Minister Asks US Cooperation
on Afghanistan’. 21 February 1996.
No. 2003414, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Senator Brown and Congressman Wilson
Discuss Afghanistan with Pakistani Officials’. 14 April 1996.
No. 2292754, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘A/S Raphel Discusses Afghanistan’. 22
April 1996.
No. 774357, US Embassy Cable Moscow, ‘A/S Raphel Consultations with Deputy FM
Chernychev’. 13 May 1996.
No. ID 961ISLAMABAD5972, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, 14 July 1996.
No. 11208406, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Victory Impact’. National Intelligence Daily, CIA/
CPAS/NID 96–229CX, 30 September 1996.
No. 96PESHAWAR1059, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Stall in Permitting Journalists Access to
Usama (sic) Bin Laden’. 11 November 1996.
No. ABUDHABI7350, US Embassy Abu Dhabi Cable, ‘Tehran Sees Taleban (sic) as US
Tool against Iran’. 11 November 1996.
No. 96STATE237921, ‘INR Assessment of Iran’. 17 November 1996.
No. ISLAMA 09994, US Embassy Cable, ‘Afghanistan: British Journalist Visits Site of
Training Camps; HUA Activity Alleged’. 26 November 1996.
No. 168281600, US State Department Memo, 13 December 1996.
No. ID ISLAMA01054, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Pakistan Counterterrorism:
Ambassador’s Meeting with [Excised] on State Sponsor Designation’. 6 Febru-
ary 1997.
No. ISLAMA01054, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, 6 February 1997.
No. 1197STATE231842, ‘Afghanistan: Meeting with the Taliban’. Department of State
Memo, 11 December 1997.
No. 1997STATE231842, Department of State Memo, ‘Afghanistan: Meeting with the
Taliban’. 11 December 1997.
No. 1998ISLAMA01805, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, March 1998.
No. 98ISLAMABAD2617, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Pakistan Tests “Ghauri”
Missile’. 6 April 1998.
128 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
No. 98ISLAMABAD33966, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Prime Minister Succumbs to
Domestic Pressure and Pakistan Conducts Five Nuclear Tests’. 28 May 1998.
No. 98ISLAMABAD4003, US Embassy Cable, ‘Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s Letter to
President Clinton’. 29 May 1998.
No. ISLAMA05010, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘Bad News on Pak Afghan Policy’. 1
July 1998.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, interview ‘Late Edition’, Cable News Network, 14
June 1998.
State 291940, US Department of State, Cable. ‘Discussing Afghan Policy with the Paki-
stanis’. 22 December 1995.
Statement of Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on South Asia. 14 April 1999. Accessed June 2011. www.freerepublic.com/
focus/f-news/535202/posts.
Statement by Robin Raphel Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs before
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Near Eastern And South Asian Affairs. 7
March 1995. Accessed 11 November 2011. file:///C:/Users/win7/Desktop/
TESTIMONY%20%20R.%20RAPHEL%20ON%20U.S.%20POLICY%20TOWARDS
%20SOUTH%20ASIA.htm.
Undated State Department Information Memorandum, ‘Pushing for Peace in Afghanistan’.
US Department of State Cable, 1996STATE203322, ‘Dealing with the Taliban in Kabul’.
28 September 1996.
US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘The Taliban: What We’ve Heard’. Document ID1995IS-
LAMA00966, 26 January 1995.
US Embassy Islamabad Cable. ‘Afghanistan: Russian Embassy Official Claims Iran Inter-
fering More Than Pakistan’. 30 November 1995.
US Embassy Islamabad Cable. ‘SITREP 6: Pakistan/Afghanistan Reaction to US Strikes’.
25 August 1998.

Congressional record
‘Decision by Secretary Christopher on Pakistan’. Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (Extension of
Remarks) House of Representatives, 2 August 1993, Congressional Record, 103rd
Congress (1993–1994). Accessed 16 February 2012. www.fas.org/irp/congress/1993_
cr/h930802-terror-pak.htm.
Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, ‘Opposing Inclusion of Pakistan on the State Department’s
List of Terrorist States’. Extension of Remarks, Congressional Record, 103rd Congress
(1993–1994), 28 May 1993; Congresswoman Barbara-Rose Collins, ‘United States and
Pakistan Relations’. Congressional Record, 103rd Congress (1993–1994), 25 May
1994. Accessed 4 July 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?
n=Record&c=103.
Hon. Jim McDermott ‘It’s Time To Take a Second Look at Pakistan’. Extension of
Remarks, 22 September 1994. Accessed 16 February 2012. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?r103:1:./temp/~r103wQWInK::.
Hon. Lee Hamilton, ‘US Sanctions Policy’. Extension of Remarks, House of Representa-
tives, 14 July 1998, Congressional Record, 105th Congress (1997–1998). Accessed 12
November 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=105.
Hon. Maurice D. Hinchey, ‘Pakistan Continues Missile Purchases from China and
Escalates Tensions in South Asia’. Extension of Remarks, House of Representa-
tives, Congressional Record, 103rd Congress (1993–1994), 28 September 1994.
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 129
Accessed 5 December 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?
&n=Record&c=103.
Larry Pressler, ‘The Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program’.
Senate, 31 July 1992, Congressional Record, 102nd Congress (1991–1992). Accessed 4
December 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=102;
Hon. Fortney Pete Stark, Extension of Remarks, House of Representatives, Congres-
sional Record, 101st Congress (1989–1990), 10 October 1990, Ibid.; Hon, Jim McDer-
mott, ‘It is Time to Take a Second Look at Pakistan’, Extension of Remarks,
Congressional Record, 103rd Congress (1993–1994), 10 October 1990, ibid.
Remarks by Senator Helms, ‘Genocide in Kashmir’. Congressional Record, 103rd Con-
gress, 7 June 1993. Accessed 12 June 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
D?r103:45:./temp/~r1039HtkNv::.
Senate Resolution 278, 27 October 1994, Congressional Record, 103rd Congress
(1993–1994). Accessed 5 December 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/Legislative-
Data.php?&n=Record&c=103.
Senator John Glenn, ‘International Security and Development Act of 1981’. Congres-
sional Record, 21 October 1981.
Senator Thad Cochran, ‘Security of Israel’. Congressional Record, 103rd Congress, 30
March 1993. Accessed 15 June 2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r103:8:./
temp/~r1037muUaq::.
Statement by Warren Christopher, Confirmation Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, 13 and 14 January 1993. Accessed 13 January 2012. www.archive.org/stream/
nominationofwarr00unit/nominationofwarr00unit_djvu.txt.
The Reuter Transcript Report, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, Congres-
sional Record, 103rd Congress (1993–1994), 23 March 1994. Accessed 4 December
2011. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=103.
The Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research
Committee Report, House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 24 August 1994.
Accessed 15 June 2011. http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S__
Archives.
Thomas Lum, US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients, Congres-
sional Research Service (CRS), April 2002. Accessed 3 August 2011. www.iwar.org.
uk/news-archive/crs/9661.pdf.
‘United States and Pakistan Relations’. House of Representatives, Congressional Record,
103rd Congress (1993–1994), 25 May 1993. Accessed 12 March 2011. www.fas.org/
irp/congress/1993_cr/h930525-terror-pak.htm.

Interviews
Ali, Sardar Assef Ahmad. Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan in Benazir Bhutto’s
Cabinet, 1993–1996 (Islamabad, 19 September 2011).
Amin, Dr Tahir. Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, former Head of the
Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and author
(Islamabad, 12 July 2011).
Aurakzai, Lt General Ali Jan (Retired). Commander XI Corps Western Military
Command 2001–2004 and former Governor of North West Frontier Province (Khyber
Pakhtunkhawa), 2006–2008 (Rawalpindi, 4 August 2011).
Bokhari, Admiral Fasih (Retired). Former Chief of Naval Staff, 1997–1999 (Islamabad,
15 July 2011).
130 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan
Beg, General Mirza Aslam (Retired). Former Chief of Army Staff, 1988–1991
(Rawalpindi, 2 July 2011).
Durrani, Lt General Asad (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence,
1990–1992 (Islamabad, 24 April 2012).
Gul, Lt General Hamid (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence,
1987–1989 (Rawalpindi, 13 July 2011).
Gul, Lt General Mumtaz (Retired). Inspector General Frontier Corps, 1992–1994 and
Commander XI Corps Western Military Command, 1994–1996 (Peshawar, 19 October
2011).
Haq, General Ehsan-ul (Retired). Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, 2004–2007 and Director
General Inter-Services Intelligence, 2001–2004 (Islamabad, 7 July 2011).
Haq, Siraj-ul. Right-wing politician and Vice President Jamaat-i-Islami (Peshawar, 19
October 2011).
Hussain, Dr Riffat. Head of the Defense and Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-i-Azam
University and former Press Counselor, Pakistan Embassy Washington, DC,
1933–1997 (Islamabad, 7 August 2011).
Hussain, Zahid. Journalist, political analyst and author (Islamabad, 21 July 2011).
Inderfurth, Karl F. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia in the Clinton administra-
tion, 1997–2001 (Telephonic Interview, 2 February 2012).
Iqbal, Lt General Shahid (Retired). Former Commander V Corps Karachi, Secretary
Defense Production in the Ministry of Defense Production and Former President
National Defense University (Rawalpindi, 6 August 2011).
Islam, Dr Mohammad. Director Iqra University, Islamabad and Former Director Area
Study Center, Quaid-i-Azam University. (Islamabad 12 July 2011).
Jones, Seth G. Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and author (Telephonic Inter-
view, 15 February 2012).
Khattak, Afrasyab. Senator, left-wing, pro-Soviet Politician and former President Awami
National Party (Peshawar, 18 October 2011).
Khokhar, Riaz Hussain. Former Ambassador to New Delhi, 1992–1997 and to Washing-
ton, 1997–1999, and Foreign Secretary, 2002–2005 (Islamabad, 28 July 2011).
Krepon, Michael. Arms Control Official in the Clinton administration and Co-founder of
the Stimson Center and political/ defence analyst (Skype Interview: 3 February 2012).
Kux, Dennis H. Former US Ambassador to Pakistan and author (Telephonic Interview,
18 March 2012).
Lodhi, Dr Maleeha. Former Ambassador to Washington, 1993–1996 and 1999–2002,
journalist (Islamabad, 25 October 2011).
Masood, Lt General Talat (Retired). Former Chairman Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Wah
and Taxila Heavy Industries, Taxila and defence analyst (Islamabad, 6 September
2011).
Mirza, Professor Ashfaq Saleem. Director South Asia Free Media Association (Islama-
bad, 24 October 2011).
Murshed, Iftikhar. Career diplomat and Special Envoy to Afghanistan, 1996–2000, author
(Islamabad, 12 August 2011).
Musharraf, General Pervez (Retired). Former President of the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan and Chief of Army Staff, 1998–2007 (Telephonic Interview, 16 July 2012).
Naqvi, Sarwar. Deputy Chief of Mission, Washington, DC, 1991–1995 (Islamabad, 12
October 2011).
Nawaz, Shuja. Director South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council and author (Telephonic
Interview, 19 January 2012).
 Clinton’s foreign policy and Pakistan 131
Nye, Professor Joseph S. Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Clinton administration,
1993–1994 and political scientist/author (Telephonic Interview, 7 March 2012).
Qazi, Lt General Javed Ashraf (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelli-
gence, 1993–1995 (Rawalpindi, 17 August 2011).
Rais, Dr Rasul Bakhsh. Professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Man-
agement Sciences and author (Islamabad, 12 August 2011).
Riedel, Bruce O. Former Director National Security Council, 1997–2001, Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense, 1995–1997 and National Intelligence Officer for Near East
and South Asian Affairs at the National Intelligence Council, 1993–1995 in the Clinton
administration; author and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (Telephonic Inter-
view, 2 February 2012).
Siddiqa, Dr Ayesha. Author and defence analyst (Islamabad, 19 July 2011).
Weinbaum, Professor Marvin G. Former analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan, US
Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Clinton and George
W. Bush administrations, 1999–2003 (Telephonic Interview, 2 February 2012).
Yusufzai, Rahimullah. Journalist and former BBC correspondent with access to the
Taliban and Osama Bin Laden (Peshawar: 19 October 2011).
4 Coping mechanisms
Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s
foreign policy

The truth is that the US too often used its aid as a lever. We did not succumb in
the past and we [did] not give up our principles for the sake of American aid or
fear of war [with India].
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan1

The defiance in President Ishaq’s words characterizes the Pakistani attitude

towards US foreign policy throughout the 1990s. In 1991, the Cold War ended
with the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War did not
significantly change the regional threats that Pakistan faced – a fact that caused its
leadership to remain inflexible on the issue of its pursuit of PFP’s goals. Pakistani
decision-makers found themselves in an increasingly difficult position after the
Soviet withdrawal and US disengagement from Afghanistan. Continued instability
in Kabul in the wake of the power struggle between Rabbani and Hekmatyar had
serious implications for PFP’s security paradigm. This was aggravated by US
nuclear sanctions that hurt Islamabad’s military capabilities. Accordingly, Pakistan
responded by hardening its position on its nuclear program and Afghan policy.
Once the Pakistan-friendly Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, the Pakistani
military establishment was not going to let go of their proxy at the command of
a distant superpower. With the Taliban regime facilitating the infiltration of
fighters into Kashmir to attack Indian security interests and access to nuclear
weapons a real possibility, for the first time since 1947 the military establish-
ment felt that it could counter India’s power despite its disadvantages. It was at
this critical moment in Pakistan’s history that the Clinton administration’s con-
tinuation of the Pressler Amendment’s nuclear sanctions and its tilt towards
India threatened to undermine everything Pakistan had gained. From the Paki-
stani perspective, its policies towards Afghanistan, Kashmir and nuclear
weapons were all motivated by the Indian threat. Accordingly, the military estab-
lishment – through its empowered intelligence outfit, the ISI – tightened its grip
on the foreign policy process.
Clinton’s unfocused approach reinforced the effects of Bush’s Pakistan pol-
icies while simultaneously creating space for Pakistan to pursue certain regional
policies. To understand Pakistan’s coping strategies in the face of Clinton’s
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 133
foreign policy, it is necessary to understand Pakistan’s policy-making process in
the 1990s and the key perceptual drivers behind it.

The making of a policy

Pakistan has been ruled by military governments for thirty-two of its sixty-seven
years of existence. Historically, politics in Pakistan has been dominated by the
military–bureaucratic elite – who emerged from the colonial institutions of
British India – interrupted occasionally by the election of weak, civilian govern-
ments. The military has continued to exert strong influence on PFP for geopoliti-
cal and strategic reasons, but also because over the years it has emerged as a
powerful stakeholder with political and economic interests. That the military–
bureaucracy nexus remained functional throughout the 1990s therefore should
not come as a surprise. Meanwhile political bickering and rampant corruption
during this period led to public disenchantment with politicians.
During the eleven years of his rule (1977–1988), Zia-ul-Haq had retained the
offices of both the COAS and the President and had picked loyal individuals to
be installed in the Parliament, the military and the civilian bureaucracy. His
trusted bureaucrat Ghulam Ishaq Khan was Chairman of the Senate when Zia
died and took over as President, in accordance with the Constitution. In 1998
General Mirza Aslam Beg – the new COAS – opted not to continue military rule
and general elections were held, which resulted in civilian governments between
1989 and 1999. Given the political power of the military establishment, however,
it continued to exercise control of Pakistan’s foreign policy.2
Despite multiple (mostly) free elections between 1988 and 1997,
democratically-elected civilian governments were removed by indirect military
intervention. Zia-ul-Haq had introduced the 8th Amendment to the Constitution,
giving himself the presidential power to dismiss civilian governments and dis-
solve Parliament. These powers were inherited by the pro-military President
Ishaq Khan and provided the army with an indirect method of removing elected
governments in the early 1990s.
Benazir’s first government was dismissed in 1990 primarily because of her
failure to establish a close relationship with the military. The Sharif Government
was reinstalled by the Supreme Court in May 1993 after being dismissed by the
President in April 1993. The incumbent army chief General Abdul Waheed
applied pressure to extract resignations from both Ishaq Khan and Sharif in July
1993 to resolve the political stand-off. The COAS was focused on security
issues, especially Pakistan’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons – domestic dis-
turbance at this juncture was not something that the military was willing to toler-
ate. Thus, Ishaq Khan was told by Waheed to go because ‘not only the civilians
but the military also hates your guts! Ishaq Khan actually began to tremble’.
Such was the power of the COAS.3
With help from the bureaucracy, the army was able to influence both domestic
politics and shape PFP, particularly the nuclear, Afghan and Kashmir policies.
Civilian governments were often eager to appease the military.
134 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
In her first term (1988–1990), Benazir agreed to give the army a direct role in
foreign policy-making by retaining the military’s preferred Sahibzada Yakub Ali
Khan as Foreign Minister and by supporting the candidacy of Ghulam Ishaq
Khan as president. In her second term (1993–1996), she created a civil–military
core group – comprising the president, the prime minister, the foreign minister
and director general of the ISI – and granted it the power to contribute to the
formulation of foreign policy. The two terms of Nawaz Sharif (1990–1993 and
1997–1999) also illustrate that the military retained firm control over PFP, as
reflected in the nuclear tests of 1998, the Kargil conflict in 1999 and continued
support to the Taliban regime in Kabul; this regime was later formally recog-
nized by Pakistan during Sharif ’s second term.
The key response of Islamabad to US nuclear sanctions was an acceleration
of its nuclear program. As the President and the army chief, Zia-ul Haq had kept
nuclear command and control strictly under his authority while Aslam Beg, Zia’s
Vice Chief of Army Staff, had not been granted access. Upon Zia’s death the
authority passed to President Ishaq Khan. When midterm elections were called
under an interim government in 1993 after the joint resignations of Ishaq Khan
and Nawaz Sharif, Khan – who did not trust the interim setup – handed over
nuclear responsibility and relevant records to the army.4
According to Musharraf, Benazir sought to regain control of the program
during her first term; Aslam Beg was also included in the system because ‘Ishaq
Khan being a civilian brought the new army chief General Beg into the loop
after Zia’s death’.5 Thus was laid ‘the foundation of a new system of government
in Pakistan, the so-called Troika, providing a modicum of checks and balances
to the political system’ but always keeping the three main actors – the president,
the prime minister and the COAS – at the forefront.6
In theory, the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), created in 1976, was
the primary defence policy-making body. However, it rarely functioned as an
effective entity and met only a few times during the 1990s. Discussing Benazir’s
first term in office Beg argued:

There was no foreign policy mechanism . . . there was no institutionalized

approach . . . I never found any [well defined] policy on Kashmir or Afghan-
istan or Iran . . . all hit and run approach.7

Ashraf Qazi – who was the ISI chief in the mid-1990s – maintained that ‘at the
operational level it was [Benazir’s] core group that took the decisions’. The
COAS General Waheed, who was averse to getting embroiled with ‘bloody
civilians’, was not a member. ‘I was the bouncing ball between the civil and
military leadership’, recalled Qazi.8
Assef Ali who was Benazir’s Foreign Minister maintained that there had been
a civil–military consensus before Benazir’s Government was dismissed.

Nawaz Sharif had no interest in Afghanistan and it was then that the ISI
took over the whole policy . . . the nuclear issue was left to me; the ISI never
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 135
understood the international issues; it was not running the show. I was in
touch with the military and also reported to the Prime Minister.9

Ali’s comments have an element of political rhetoric. Critics, such as Riffat

Hussain, view the core group as a ‘showpiece’ rather than an actual vehicle for
civilian control over foreign policy.
The Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS) was set up in 1997
by President Farooq Leghari during Benazir’s term. It comprised the army, navy
and air force chiefs, relevant government ministers and foreign policy experts.
However independent sources suggest that key decisions were taken by the
Troika.10 Admiral Fasih Bokhari, the naval chief at the time and a member of
the CDNS, supports this view. Recalling CDNS meetings, Bokhari narrates how
the president, the prime minister and the COAS would assemble in a separate
room to take decisions before they walked in together and ostensibly opened the
issue for debate:

I’d say, ‘why do you invite me? Just hang my uniform on the chair . . . you
don’t listen to others, you just want a photo opportunity’ . . . it was a kind of
oligarchy, a distorted decision making chain comprising the political leader-
ship and the army. The job of the foreign office was [only] to collate polit-
ical data and pass it on to the ISI which had its own sources but got a wider
picture this way.11

The exclusion of chiefs of the smaller military services from the Troika’s real
decision-making process is compelling proof that civilian representatives
within the Troika were there largely to support the choices of the true decision-
makers.
Former Foreign Secretary and career diplomat Riaz Khokhar however
contended that:

The foreign office studies and presents policy options to senior leadership
and then implements their decision . . . it does not take positions although we
do say our piece . . . it is nonsense [to say] that the army was the only
decision-maker in the 1990s.12

A Pakastani academic and political analyst endorsed Khokhar’s argument,

saying, ‘I do not agree that the army alone was making [PFP] decisions . . .
Benazir and Sharif dealt independently with India which shows the military was
not controlling them’. Yet in answer to another question during his interview,
the academic maintained that he strongly believed that ‘[the military] removed
[the conservative] Nawaz Sharif Government in 1993 and brought in [secular]
Benazir to keep Pakistan off the US Terror Watch list’.13
It is unlikely that a civilian government – operating with the knowledge that
the military had the power to dismiss the government – could have been inde-
pendent enough to meaningfully influence security policies. In his memoir,
136 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
Sharif ’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz recalls that when Sharif – in response to
Clinton’s demands – applied pressure on Mullah Omar to have Bin Laden
ejected from Afghanistan, the Taliban leaders were not overly concerned because
they knew that real political power in Pakistan flowed from the military and not
the civilian government.14
The creation of a civil–military decision-making oligarchy allowed the
military to ‘pass the buck when approached by US officials’ regarding the
nuclear issue. The military could refer US officials to President Ishaq Khan who
– working in close coordination with the army on the nuclear and Afghan issues
– ‘guarded the nuclear treasure like a snake’.15
This leads us to the conclusion that despite the presence of a civilian Parlia-
ment the army was able to wield influence on PFP through the use of the tradi-
tional political power of their position; through the 8th Amendment – the
presidential power to dismiss the government –and through the manipulation of
the political process by the ISI. Given the military’s dominance of security pol-
icies it is highly unlikely that decisions crucial to their threat perception were
left to the politicians whose parochial agendas, according to military and civilian
interviewees, rendered them not only untrustworthy but also incapable of creat-
ing a counter-narrative to the military’s political power.
Interestingly, Beg was keen to draw a distinction between the role of the
army and the ISI in the formulation of Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan,
arguing that it had ‘nothing to do with the army’ as the ISI and not the army
was the executor of Zia’s Afghan strategy in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the
policy to support proxies like the Taliban was ‘the brainchild of the ISI–Bena-
zir government’. Beg also explained that the botched Jalalabad offensive of
1989 – a plan by the ISI to use the Mujahedeen to win Afghan territory in
order to gain US recognition of the Pakistan-based AIG – was given the go-
ahead by Benazir while he was on a tour abroad.16 Endorsing Beg, Gul also
claimed that he was following Benazir’s orders; he was especially critical of
her short-sightedness in ‘ordering’ him to carry out the Jalalabad offensive. It
is more likely that the two interviewees did not want to take responsibility for
an operation gone wrong.
Beg and Gul’s argument is difficult to accept because as an institution, the ISI
does not operate outside the army’s control even in domestic politics. For
example, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), a coalition of right-wing politicians,
was formed in September 1988 by the ISI to oppose the liberal Pakistan’s People
Party (PPP) in the elections of 1990. The IJI was able to form a government in
the centre in 1990. Hamid Gul, Director General ISI (1987–1989), confirmed his
role in forming the IJI during his interview.17 Under orders from the army chief
Aslam Beg and President Ghulam Ishaq, large sums of money were disbursed to
the IJI by Asad Durrani, the ISI chief in 1991.18 Beg denied this allegation during
his interview and instead held the late President Ishaq responsible for the act.19
While explaining the army’s control over the ISI, Durrani confirmed during the
interview that the ‘army chief exercises more clout over the ISI than either the
president or the prime minister’.20
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 137
The formation of the IJI in the early 1990s was clearly connected to Paki-
stan’s Afghan policy. A conservative government was deemed more supportive
of the ISI’s involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir as compared to Benazir
who – in the words of Gul – was advancing the US agenda at the cost of Paki-
stan’s.21 This is substantiated by Sharif ’s refusal to interfere with private groups
supporting the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir after becoming Prime Minister
in 1990.22
The ISI was deeply involved with both the implementation and creation of
Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan throughout the 1980s. This suited the
Pakistani military and civilian elite as many ISI officials, being Pashtun, knew
Afghanistan well having served in Pakistan’s FATA. Their knowledge and ana-
lyses helped policy-makers in devising an informed Afghan strategy. In this
sense the ISI, like any other intelligence agency in the world, served as a legiti-
mate tool of Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Intellectuals and academics also did not exert much influence over foreign
policy.23 This trend is not specific to the 1990s; ‘the policy-makers have never
been interested in our views or recommendations’, argued academics Tahir
Amin and Mohammad Islam at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, pointing
out that ‘academics playing the ISI’s game by writing in favour of the nationalist
narrative are usually given prominence’.24 The military preferred to exclude out-
siders to ensure that their agenda would be implemented because, as Siddiqa
contended, ‘the military elite do not trust the civilian to attain strategic
objectives’.25
The 1990s was thus a time when control over Pakistan’s foreign policy was
either directly in the hands of the military or heavily influenced by it. The civil-
ian governments of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif were in place from February 1989
to October 1999, and while they made some independent contributions to the
formulation of Pakistan’s foreign policy, they did so in the shadow of the mili-
tary’s power. To understand why the military was determined to maintain this
control, we first need to examine the way in which the military viewed the
American approach towards Pakistan.

Perceiving US actions
We helped them defeat the Soviet Union. We should have been rewarded,
not ditched.
General Pervez Musharraf26

We always knew that India was their first love . . .

Lt General Asad Durrani27

The language of the two quotations above is revealing. It reflects a perspective

that is simultaneously romanticized and pragmatic – similar sentiments defined
US–Pakistan relations during the Cold War years. There is also an element of
self-importance that betrays a rigid military mindset. It is precisely such a
138 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
mindset that defined Pakistan’s security perceptions in the post-Cold War era in
the 1990; perceptions that were focused on the unreliability of great power pol-
itics and consequently, fears of a shift in the regional balance of power.
The American approach to Pakistan’s nuclear program was primarily per-
ceived within these parameters. Thus, the Clinton administration’s failure to lift
the sanctions imposed by the Pressler Amendment was seen as an effort to facil-
itate India’s regional hegemony. Academic Tahir Amin reminisced about his
interaction with Clinton’s adviser Joseph Nye in the 1990s. He spoke of his
‘amazement’ at Nye’s ‘simplistic’ assumption that ‘the Americans could prevail
upon the Pakistan military to roll back its nuclear program’. Terming as equally
futile Clinton’s efforts to stop Pakistan from responding after 1998, Amin
emphasized ‘the truth is that the day India conducted nuclear tests nobody
answered the phone in Islamabad’.28 Clinton’s outlook was seen as discrimina-
tory by former Director General ISI and Chairman of the Joint Services General
Ehsan-ul-Haq:

[The Indian nuclear] position was recognized by the West while Clinton put
pressure on Pakistan not to respond; again, miscalculating the centrality
of Pakistan’s existential requirements and a disregard for our total security
paradigm.29

Ehsan’s response highlights Pakistan’s – not entirely unfounded – objection that

the US had no regard for Islamabad’s genuine security concerns. A 2001 US
report on the Indo-Pakistan rivalry concedes that Islamabad’s nuclear weapon
tests in 1998 and its missile tests in 1997 and 1999 were likely ‘a means of bol-
stering its own deterrent’. It also states that Pakistan will likely test in the future
‘only if India tests first’.30 This reality on the ground endorses the position taken
by a former COAS that ‘should Pakistan have agreed to American non-
proliferation regime formula in view of the Indian threat? No leader would!’ He
saw the invoking of the Pressler Amendment by Bush as a ‘tacit agreement to
bolster India as the regional power’.31 The Pakistani argument that the prolifera-
tor in South Asia was India – which had tested first – is therefore worthy of
attention.
Hamid Gul saw a link between US disengagement, Pakistan’s nuclear
program and the American approach towards Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The late
spymaster held deeply religious views about Pakistan’s identity. He had pro-
pounded the idea of a Pakistan–Afghanistan confederation in 1989. He viewed
Pakistan first as a member of the Islamic ‘Ummah’ [community], maintaining
that ‘state boundaries are indispensable for [a] national identity but not for trade
or ideological affiliation’. Postulating that the US supported India and Israel but
‘did not want us to take advantage of the potential economic opportunities that
the CARs could provide us’, Gul maintained that the US was opposed to the idea
of Pakistan as an economically successful regional power.32
This line of argument implies a nexus between non-Muslim India, Israel and
the US in opposition to Islamic Pakistan and mirrors Pressler’s concern about an
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 139
‘Islamic bloc’ and the ‘Pakistan–China–nexus’. It also supports the ‘civiliza-
tional fault-lines’ argument offered by Pressler and other Congressional
members and a section of US academia and media. Notably, both sides appear to
see each other as a monolith, demonstrating a tendency to over-simplify complex
phenomena. The divergent security interests of the various parties involved have
clearly created mistrust and a tendency to see conspiracy in one another’s
actions.
From another perspective, US sanctions were a blessing in disguise for Paki-
stan as they provided greater liberty of action. ‘The US governments exhausted
their pressure tactics . . . Pakistan leadership had greater freedom to act’, argued
Durrani ‘we reached out to Iran, we reached out to [former Afghan King] Zahir
Shah to [try] resolve the Afghan imbroglio’. The idea was that:

If you are going to terminate military aid and target our nuclear program,
things will change in Pakistan too . . . when [pro-India Senator] Solarz was
coming to Pakistan [the US diplomat] Bob Oakley begged me to meet him.
I refused.33

Durrani’s words reveal a hidden resentment at American policies in the 1990s –

a sentiment shared by many in Pakistan. Reading between the lines, his words
also imply that America’s actions impacted Pakistan’s security options. Interest-
ingly, there is a competing view in Pakistan that appears to endorse American
concerns.
This school of thought condemns the military’s goals as being expansionist in
nature, suggesting that Pakistan’s political and territorial ambitions extend into
Afghanistan and beyond. ‘Pakistan is a middle sized nuclear power with power-
grabbing ambitions that are restricted by India in the east and Iran in the west’,
contended Siddiqa, ‘so that leaves Afghanistan and the CARs’.34
Such claim lacks hard evidence and is largely speculative. In the 1990s, using
proxies as a coping strategy was a practical option in the disputed territory of
Kashmir or in an unstable Afghanistan where Pakistan had been politically and
operationally active for a decade in the 1980s. On the other hand, anti-Taliban
CARs were former Soviet states where Pakistan’s influence was negligible, if
not non-existent.
A less conspiratorial explanation is that Pakistan’s interest in the CARs was
largely trade-oriented and its search for strategic depth in Afghanistan was prim-
arily aimed at countering India and was not intended to extend the Pakistan mili-
tary’s foothold into Central Asia. According to a senior retired military officer,
‘War games are usually reflective of the military’s strategic mindset. Never in
my thirty-five years of service did I witness a war game that focused on Paki-
stan’s territorial or ideological expansion into the CARs’.35
Every intelligence agency in the world contains individuals who take
advantage of the covert nature of their work to pursue their own agenda. To hold
the entire institution responsible for the thinking of a few rogues is reductionist.
Javed Nasir, the former ISI chief, commonly associated with such expansionist
140 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
aspirations, was removed from his job prematurely demonstrating that his
‘vision’ was not acceptable.36
In a Pakistani television show, the former US Ambassador to the UN Zalmay
Khalilzad argued that Pakistan had pan-Islamic designs in the 1990s. He cited an
intercepted message to ISI HQ in Islamabad from the ISI representative in Herat
when the city fell to the Taliban. The message read: ‘Today Herat, tomorrow
Tashkent’, the capital of Uzbekistan. However, when another participant,
Senator Akram Zaki, asked Khalilzad if he had any proof to endorse his argu-
ment, Khalilzad backtracked saying ‘this was the perception’.37
It is revealing that those painting Pakistan as an aspiring regional hegemon
neglect to mention that India, a much larger and militarily more powerful state,
is seen as just such a hegemon by the smaller countries in the region such as
Nepal and Sri Lanka. Indian security strategy has always focused on using
Afghanistan against Pakistan militarily while preventing Pakistan from gaining
access to the CARs. New Delhi also views a foothold in Afghanistan as a useful
tool in India’s rivalry with China.
Pakistan’s perception of the unwillingness of the US to resolve the Afghan
situation after 1989 is shaped by the fact that Indian manipulation of an unstable
Afghanistan had the potential to weaken Pakistan to the point of collapse. Balk-
anization of Pakistan would be useful for many actors: India may get direct access
to Afghanistan and the CARs; landlocked Afghanistan could directly access the
Arabian Sea and the US would find it easier to roll-back or take-over Pakistan’s
nuclear program. That such arguments regarding the possible strategic ambitions
of powerful states such as India or the US are dismissed as conspiracy theories
while a smaller and less powerful Pakistan is accused of eyeing Afghanistan and
Central Asia as part of its hegemonic ambitions suggests the presence of bias.
Siddiqa further posited that the Pakistani military is ‘constantly focused on
Indian capabilities without analysing which capability will translate into aggres-
sion’.38 However, accepting the risk of a potentially incorrect analysis goes
against the basic precepts of the security dilemma, in which adversaries are
inclined to anticipate worst-case scenarios. Moreover, Siddiqa’s argument can
be replicated and extended to Pakistan’s perceived expansionist ambitions into
the CARs and its actual aggressive military or economic capabilities to under-
take such a mission.
In the same vein, defence analyst Talat Masood argued that ‘Pakistan behaves
like a regional hegemon without actually having the resources to become one’.39
Masood’s words are self-contradictory. How can a state behave like a regional
hegemon without the capability to back its stance? Military strategies are not
based on dreams but hard facts regarding one’s actual capabilities, whether con-
ventional or unconventional. The fact is that Pakistan’s military strategy emerges
from its India-centric threat perceptions. As a Pakistani general argues, ‘the
whole raison d’être of the army is to defend against India’.40
The role of the ISI in this regard cannot be overstated, given the Pakistani mil-
itary’s preference for proxy warfare to engage comparatively larger Indian forces
indirectly. The US strategy of Soviet containment during the Soviet–Afghan
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 141
conflict created space for the ISI to expand its reach into Afghanistan. Under-
standably then, the major US concern was the emergence of the ISI as a com-
petent intelligence outfit in the wake of the Soviet–Afghan War of the 1980s.
Accordingly, the US tried to limit the ISI, said Durrani as ‘an efficient intelli-
gence agency from a country that no longer shared American objectives could
indeed be a pain in the neck’.41
US pressure on the intelligence outfit manifested as internal changes in the
institution during the 1990s, when extremist elements of the ISI were ‘purged’.
The first purge, according to Gul, was carried out during Benazir’s first term
when she removed him as the ISI chief. However, this could very well have been
the result of an unrelated power struggle42 during Benazir’s first term. Benazir’s
ISI chief in her second term, Ashraf Qazi, confirmed that the second ‘purge’ was
conducted under his watch. He agreed that Pakistan was under a great deal of
American pressure because of Indian allegation of ISI involvement in the
Bombay bombings of 1993.
The Americans feared that Qazi’s predecessor Javed Nasir was acting inde-
pendently to further an Islamic agenda in the region. Qazi confirmed that under
Nasir’s command ‘the ISI had gone berserk’ and was ‘in the doghouse’ adminis-
tratively. Thus, Waheed as the army chief ordered Qazi to cleanse the ISI of
extremist elements ‘with deep links in Afghanistan’ and said, ‘I threw out thirty-
seven officers in two weeks’.43 Having said that, the extent to which the institu-
tion acted independently is debatable. Reportedly, it acted independently of the
foreign ministry when it sent ‘advisers’ into Afghan combat zones in early
198944 when Hamid Gul was in charge. Moreover, some retired ideological ISI
officials remained active in Afghanistan in a personal capacity. Gul confirmed
that he remained involved in Afghanistan after his retirement:

I used to be on a peace mission to Afghanistan in my private retired capacity

during the 1990s. I pulled out in 1995 and got in touch with the Taliban later
only after my own secret delegations vouched to its good conduct.45

It is possible that such an arrangement worked well for the ISI as it created
plausible deniability. However, it is absurd to accuse the entire military estab-
lishment of pursuing a pan-Islamic agenda on this basis alone.
British academic Anatol Lieven posits that since the Afghan War, the ISI had
shown a willingness to pursue new tactics and some retired ISI officials had
joined militant outfits. Yet, there was no mass disobedience and the ISI followed
the orders and policies of the army high command.46 Former ISI chief Ehsan-ul-
Haq correctly noted that, ‘the ISI is as much a state institution as CIA or MI6;
there is deliberate disinformation about ISI’, emanating from internal and exter-
nal sources.47
Notably, the purges did not mean that the fundamentals of the Afghan and
Kashmir strategy had changed. ‘Whether the purges ever led to changes in policy
is another matter’, argued Durrani. ‘When it came to taking decisions, the new
guard had no choice but to follow on-going policies’.48 While explaining why
142 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
Clinton was unable to repeal the Pressler Amendment, Michael Krepon argued
that inertia was a powerful force in US politics.49 Clearly, inertia was an equally
powerful force in the ISI in terms of its Afghan and Kashmir policies.
It was interesting to note during the interviews that there appeared to be a broad
consensus on PFP’s strategic choices in the 1990s. Nationalists like Musharraf and
religiously orthodox Siraj-ul-Haq of Jamaat-i-Islami were as proud of Pakistan’s
nuclear capability as former Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ali with his western
education and feudal background. Similarly, seasoned diplomats like Iftikhar
Murshed, Riaz Khokhar and Maleeha Lodhi – no religious fundamentalists – were
unanimous in their views on India’s hostility towards Pakistan and the American
short-sightedness in opposing Pakistan’s Taliban policy. Despite their diverse
views on Musharraf’s regime, they all agreed with his analysis that Clinton had
committed a ‘huge blunder’ by failing to engage the Taliban leadership in order to
moderate their actions. Criticizing America’s approach, Musharraf asserted:

What Clinton neglected to understand was that the erstwhile Mujahedeen,

hailing from diverse Muslim countries, had not been rehabilitated. They
were armed to the teeth. Finally, it was the same Mujahedeen that coalesced
and became Al-Qaeda.50

In other words, the Mujahedeen, nurtured by the CIA with the help of the ISI in
the 1980s, emerged as the first cogent transnational threat to American interests.
Qazi confirmed that there were many Algerian, Egyptian and other Arab fighters
who were not rehabilitated mainly because their governments refused to accept
them for fear of the potential instability the returning fighters could cause. They
had settled in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan’s North West Frontier (later
Khyber Pakhtunkhawa) province that subsequently became the ‘headquarter of
Al-Qaeda’.51 American policy-makers’ short-sightedness was evident in their
failure to gain leverage over the Taliban by exploiting its economic vulner-
ability. ‘[Bill] Richardson promised them $4 million [for female schools] but the
funds were never given’, added Murshed.52
Yusufzai criticized the American propensity to see the Taliban movement as
a single entity as narrow and their failure to exploit internal differences, such as
the disagreement on the subject of female education, as unimaginative.53 The
assumption behind this line of argument is that the US could have engaged with
the Taliban to – in the long term – temper its tendency towards rigidity. To
modify Taliban behaviour it was necessary to engage its leadership diplomatic-
ally and exploit its need for financial assistance; bargaining and negotiating a
compromise on issues important to the US would have been a more mature
policy. It is noticeable that there was a tendency from within Pakistani power
circles to view the Americans as a monolithic entity; this is ironic considering
that many in the Pakistani civil–military elite criticized the US perception of the
Taliban movement as indivisible and fossilized.
Many from within these power circles also perceived the ISI’s support for infil-
tration into Kashmir as a legitimate strategy. Musharraf argued, the international
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 143
border or ‘the Line of Control (LOC) is violable’.54 His premise was supported by
Ehsan who also justified military intrusion in ‘disputed territory’.55 Michael
Krepon appeared to endorse this view. ‘Clinton was hesitant to place Pakistan on
the terror list because there was no clear-cut international border [in Kashmir]’, he
argued, ‘and the grievances were legitimate’.56
Pakistan’s narrative on Kashmir, depicting Muslims in Indian Kashmir as
second-class citizens, forced to live separately from their natural kith and kin in
Pakistan by the Hindu state and its armed forces, has deeply influenced not only
the strategic mindset of the country but also society at large through curricula,
literature, and print and electronic media.57 It is therefore not surprising that such
attitudes were common among those that were interviewed for this book. Those
who speak against this mindset are usually labelled ‘un-Pakistani’. In spite of
this ideology however, most Pakistani decision-makers remain pragmatists.
The emotional outburst by Musharraf quoted at the beginning of this section
does not adequately explain Pakistan’s military perceptions of the implications
of the US disengagement. Musharraf therefore qualified his sentimental response
with, ‘but then this made us look for market diversification. We knew things had
changed and we could no longer rely on American aid’.58 Durrani added:

The US had changed its policy direction and so had we . . . both states acted
as pragmatists . . . it was clear to us that in order to woo India the US had to
prove how much pressure they could put on Pakistan.59

This would however impact upon PFP, as Aurakzai pointed out, ‘any cozying up
of US–India is seen by the military as [a] partnership at the expense of Pakistan
since it gives India more confidence, more opportunity, trade [and] economic
benefits’.60
Michael Krepon’s comment that Pakistan’s strategic outlook ‘feeds on griev-
ances and threat inflation’61 is one-dimensional. Pakistani strategic thinking is
influenced and formed by its India-specific security threat, which emerges from
a combination of geographical and historical factors. Riaz Khokhar, who served
as Ambassador to India and the US in the 1990s (besides spending ten years in
India earlier as a junior diplomat), stated:

I never sensed a sincere desire on their [the Indians] part [to resolve out-
standing issues]. They are willing to talk to us but they are not willing to
negotiate . . . let us be very clear here . . . why is Pakistan India-centric? Well,
where else is the threat coming from?62

Clinton’s reaching out to India was a foregone conclusion after the Cold War
and it did not come as a surprise to Pakistan since ‘we always knew that our alli-
ance was tactical and not strategic’.63 Regarding Clinton’s de-hyphenating India
and Pakistan, Ehsan-ul-Haq argued that ‘this was not a surprise . . . the US
approach has always been the same [since the 1950s] . . . always discrimina-
tory’.64 Assef Ali maintained that, ‘We knew the Clinton administration was not
144 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
prepared to say a word about Kashmir or the Kashmiri people for fear of upset-
ting India. This they told us very frankly’.65
According to Talat Masood, Pakistan has never accepted the reality of a
patron–client relationship with the US.66 From this standpoint, the logical course
for Pakistan would be to come to terms with the status quo power of India, but,
as defence analyst Feroz Hassan argues, Pakistan’s strategic mindset demands a
‘never-say-die–attitude’ and subservience to India remains a non-option.67 It is
one of the reasons why Pakistan did not re-align its foreign policy in the 1990s.
Siddiqa offered another reason, ‘there is a huge gap of strategic thinking in
both Indian and Pakistani military institutions’ which did not evolve over time
but were instead inherited from the British.68 While this analysis cannot be
rejected out of hand it is also important to remember that the institution has not
remained static over time. A more compelling reason for the military to refuse to
readapt its Afghan policy was that the Indian threat remained intact after the
Cold War ended.
Liberal politician Afrasyab Khattak argued that the pro-Soviet Najibullah
regime was ready to have good relations with Pakistan in the 1990s but the
‘Pakistan military’s polarized Cold War mind-set’ was not ready to open up and
the religiously orthodox ISI chief Javed Nasir refused to talk to ‘the “infidel”
Communists’.69 Interestingly, Nasir’s orthodoxy is reminiscent of the members
of US Congress, who shunned talks with the Najibullah regime in Kabul to
resolve post-conflict issues because they did not want to negotiate with
communists.
Emotional outbursts at the outset of this section notwithstanding, it is clear
that a pragmatic approach marked the Pakistani strategic mindset in the 1990s.
This called for self-help as a means to ensure security in an anarchic environ-
ment by adjusting Pakistan’s strategies to cope with the implications of Clinton’s
foreign policy.

Survival of the ‘unwilling’

They [the Americans] want to play masters . . . we sometimes play slaves
but we are not always willing slaves.
Lt General Hamid Gul70

Gul’s comment can be interpreted at three levels; it sums up the patron–client

nature of US–Pakistan relations and it depicts a Pakistan that is willing to both
acquiesce to and challenge the global objectives of the US in order to protect its
regional goals. In a nutshell, Gul’s remark embodies Pakistan’s assessment of its
relationship with the US. It is revealing that a partnership which began with
Pakistan being hailed as America’s ‘most allied ally’ in 1954 should now be
seen through the master–slave lens. Journalist and author Zahid Hussain argued
that in the 1990s ‘US disengagement had a negative impact that accelerated
Pakistan’s drift towards strategies that were at odds with the US and added to
policy inflexibility’.71
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 145
One might add that policy inflexibility also marked the securitized approach
of the Clinton administration, which mostly revolved around the Pressler legisla-
tion. In response, Pakistan adopted coping strategies that the policy-makers per-
ceived as rational choices.

Looking for new supply sources

US nuclear sanctions suspended the supply of a large amount of military equip-
ment, including F-16 fighter jets, tanks, guns, helicopters and other military
hardware which Pakistan had already paid for. The US Government suspended
the lease of ships, which put Pakistan at a serious disadvantage against the much
superior Indian Navy as the leased ships accounted for more than half of the
navy’s major surface combatants.
The cut-off of spare parts, Karamat told Talbott, resulted in eleven air force
crashes in one year alone.72 Finding new spare parts was a serious issue, argued
Ehsan, ‘an item [that] through direct supply was $10, for instance, in black
market or through indirect supply [was worth] $50. Economic sanctions pro-
vided an extra burden that affected military preparedness’.73
Simultaneously, India’s allocation of $11 billion for its defence budget in
1989–1990 and plans for the development of a supersonic Air Force, a blue
water navy, an advanced ballistic missile program, the enhancement of its con-
ventional capacity, the construction of a super port for submarines, surface ships
and an aircraft carrier added to Pakistan’s alarm. The construction of India’s air-
craft carrier was scheduled to begin in 1991, to be commissioned in 1997. As the
world’s largest arms importer, India had already purchased $5.2 billion worth of
weapons from diverse sources in 1987; this was twelve times more than Paki-
stan.74 This build-up was seen in Islamabad as being aimed squarely at Paki-
stan.75 According to Jervis, once a particular image of an adversary is formed
intentions, with their inherent ambiguity, remain one of the core sources of
tension between adversaries.76
Pakistan Ordnance Factory was built at Wah in 1951 to manufacture small
arms, ammunition and explosives. The Heavy Industries Complex at Taxila and
the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, at Kamra were both constructed in the
1970s with Chinese assistance. Now Pakistan took several steps to enhance its
defence industry, to enable it to manufacture conventional weapons and mis-
siles.77 The Ministry of Defense Production was created in September 1991 to
promote and coordinate military production and establish research and develop-
ment facilities.78
The National Development Complex (NDC) was established in 1993, with
the objective of developing infrastructure for indigenous weapons development
to achieve self-reliance, particularly in missile technologies. In 1995, the NDC
initiated the Shaheen missile program. The M-11 and No Dong missiles from
China and North Korea respectively were reverse-engineered to develop and
produce ballistic missiles in 1998 and 1999 and ‘this is how we were able to
manufacture the Ghauri missile in answer to the Indian Prithvi’.79
146 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
The 1990s witnessed considerable improvement in Pakistan’s missile capabil-
ities. Islamabad and Beijing signed agreements for thermal power plants and
tried to obtain French financial assistance in upgrading its nuclear power plant in
Karachi.80 Sea and submarine-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles and
a variety of short-range air-launched tactical missiles were also purchased from
China and France.81 By developing its indigenous capabilities and relying on a
powerful ally – China – Pakistan was able to remain relevant in the regional
security competition.
Pakistan had built up its military capacity over the years with US financial
and material assistance. It would be incorrect to assume that because Pakistan
had secured Chinese assistance, it did not need superior US weapons. Pakistan
continued to be dependent on the US for spare parts for its existing American
systems, and had gained a lot from US military training programs and joint exer-
cises. Moreover, Siddiqa argued that Pakistan still needed US military assistance
because ‘no-one else would give you free goodies’.82 This however is a sweep-
ing statement; the US used its Cold War alliance with Pakistan to construct anti-
Soviet bases in Pakistan, elicited its assistance in building relations with China
and, as Weinbaum argued, without Pakistan’s help it would not have been pos-
sible to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan.83
According to Aslam Beg however, the US ‘provided weapons but never tech-
nical know-how or transfer of technology’, whereas China was more generous.84
Feroz points out that Islamabad’s relations with Beijing draw on a common
‘ “Islamic–Confucian” cultural value of not abandoning friends, unlike the US’.85
Pakistan’s national narrative includes appreciation for China’s help – if not
rescue – in time of economic hardship such as in the 1970s when it helped build
Pakistan’s weapon production facilities. In interviews, senior policy-makers
described how Chinese leaders offered them both material help and sound advice
in the 1990s: ‘if you are going to defy the US then do so at the strategic and not
the tactical level’.86
In keeping with this Chinese advice, Pakistan took several tactical steps to
remain off the US terror watch list in 1993–1994 – extraditing persons wanted
for terror acts to America and showing a willingness to help curtail the narcotics
trade that was benefitting anti-US militants. Moreover, Pakistan sent peace-
keepers to Somalia, contributed forces to Bosnia and ‘this is how we kept them
[the US] in good humour’.87 When it came to the US strategy of preventing the
rise of new nuclear states however, Pakistan was ready to defy the sole
superpower.

Acceleration of the nuclear program

The 1990s witnessed the development of a potent, long-ranged Pakistani missile
arsenal with nuclear capability. Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capabil-
ity by 1987, but its primary means of delivery was US F-16 aircraft. The US
embargo on the delivery of F-16s thus weakened Islamabad’s nuclear weapons
posture. In view of India’s integrated missile development program, a speedy
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 147
development of a competitive Pakistani missile arsenal was deemed imperative
and the nurturing of the Islamabad–Beijing strategic nexus assured access to the
required technology. American media reports soon emerged discussing Paki-
stan’s acquisition of the Chinese M-11 missile and the purchase of 5000 ring
magnets from China which could allow Pakistan to effectively double its
uranium-enrichment capacity.
Pakistan remained steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT unless India did so
as well. Consequently, its nuclear facilities remained out of the jurisdiction of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards. Assef Ali
narrated how ‘we refused to enter into negotiations on the FMCT, unless we got
the provision in the treaty to equalize [Indian levels]’. Ali recalled, ‘Strobe
Talbott, Sandy Berger and Robert Einhorn kept approaching us with letters and
demarches from President Clinton’. They were simply told ‘we are in this game
because of India’. The difficulty was that unlike India that possessed local sup-
plies of nuclear weapons material, Pakistan lacked indigenous resources. Clinton
and Al Gore were told, ‘India has a huge plutonium stock and . . . we have a huge
psychological issue’.88
This psychological issue – a product of existential fears – could only be
addressed by the achievement of nuclear parity with India. According to a Troika
member, with the Americans breathing down our necks, ‘we knew there was no
time to lose’. Subsequently, by the mid-1990s, ‘Pakistan’s middle-order nuclear
capability status was comparable to India’s’. Narrating the ‘nuclear saga’ with
enthusiasm nearly 17 years on, he provided an insight into General Waheed’s
priorities and determination in the 1990s, underlining the military’s single-
minded devotion to the goal.
It needs to be remembered that Pakistan did not give up on nuclear ambiguity
until India tested its weapons in May 1998. In accordance with the historically
personalized nature of US–Pakistan bilateral relations, Commander US Central
Command General Joseph Hoar told Waheed that during Hoar’s visit to India:

. . . the incumbent Indian army chief pointed to a ceremonial board bearing

names of successive Indian army chiefs saying ‘soon this will be the only
board for the sub-continent. [Hoar] said he got worried and sent a message
to the State Department.

This is when Waheed decided ‘it was now or never’.89

In the pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, many in the military establish-
ment mistrusted not only external powers but also domestic politicians. There-
fore, Benazir’s efforts to gain access to the army’s nuclear domain were not seen
kindly by certain military policy-makers. Gul justified the ISI’s formation of the
IJI to prevent Benazir’s re-election as necessary ‘to block the American
agenda’.90 Beg endorsed his view by adding that ‘both [of] the ISI “purges” took
place during her tenures. She was obviously furthering US interests’.91 Those
working closely with Waheed however, found Benazir to be ‘very supportive’.92
It is possible that both perspectives are tenable.
148 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
In her first term (1989–1991), Benazir tried to take control of the foreign
policy establishment and the nuclear program. Waheed served as the COAS
during her second term (1993–1996) when she was more willing to appease the
army in order to stay in power.93 According to a member of the Troika, Waheed
was more suspicious of the Americans and was convinced that the US was ready
to employ deceit to unravel Pakistan’s nuclear program. Arguing that Talbott
and Lake had tried hard to drive a wedge between Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto and the military, the Troika member narrated Talbott’s efforts to meet
Benazir separately by circumventing military officials during his visit to Paki-
stan. Again, Waheed was asked to attend an unscheduled meeting with the CIA
chief during his 1993 visit to Washington:

[The] CIA Director [and later Tony Lake] tried to goad him into taking over
the country! ‘You should bring a secular government in Pakistan.’ They
wanted to inspect our nuclear facilities and the Director kept asking General
Waheed, ‘Please, please [original emphasis] tell us what you would like us
to do for you?’ The Americans were shamelessly trying to bribe him.94

Considering that his late predecessor – General Asif Nawaz – had also expressed
such reservations about the CIA,95 Waheed’s experience cannot be dismissed
lightly; the US’s historical preference for dealing with military dictators is well
known. Indeed, it is suspicious that Waheed was asked to attend an unplanned
meeting with the CIA chief at all given that it was the State Department that was
conducting the dialogue on the nuclear issue. It is fair to say that American
security interests trumped Clinton’s professed support for democracy enlarge-
ment in the case of Pakistan.
Waheed’s mistrust of Clinton’s team was shared by the civilian politicians as
well. For example, Benazir’s Foreign Minister Assef Ali spoke of Talbott’s
secret efforts to manipulate both Pakistan and China. In a meeting in New York
in 1996, Talbot asked him to confirm that China had indeed supplied M-11
missile launchers, and ‘we will take you off the [MTCR] sanctions list unilater-
ally’. When Assef shared the offer with his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen,
he confirmed that Talbott had made a similar offer to him that ‘if China con-
fesses, [MTCR] sanctions will be lifted against China!’96
Interestingly, Strobe Talbott is none too happy with Waheed and uses uncom-
plimentary words when referring to Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed and
other Pakistani interlocutors. The only Pakistani he admires is Riaz Mohammad
Khan, a career diplomat married to a US foreign service officer.97 His irritation
reveals hidden resentment over Waheed’s refusal to give in. The idea that Paki-
stan – a small developing country – could have the audacity to defy the ‘benevo-
lent hegemon’ is clearly a source of frustration for him.
Upon completion of Waheed’s three-year tenure in 1996, General Jahangir
Karamat took over as the new COAS. Karamat was just as determined as his
predecessor in the pursuit of enhanced nuclear capabilities. After the Indian
nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, he maintained that the incumbent Indian
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 149
right-wing government of the BJP was anti-Muslim and that India’s nuclear tests
were the first logical step in its strategy ‘to intimidate Pakistan into solving the
Kashmir problem once and for all’ by forcing it to give up all claims to the dis-
puted territory.98 In view of its economic problems, Pakistan could ill afford to
lose American aid;99 yet Riedel maintains that once India went nuclear, Nawaz
Sharif refused to cooperate despite ‘promises of enormous US aid’.100 Thus, the
fears of more sanctions were not enough to modify Pakistan’s behaviour because
nuclear deterrence was synonymous with Pakistan’s survival.
India was a huge threat that justified the beg-steal-borrow-policy. This was
how ‘we played our [emphasis added] little double-game’, boasted Hamid
Gul.101 Clandestine activities were employed on ‘all is fair in love and war’ logic
and so ‘we rose to the occasion’ argued Ehsan-ul-Haq. He maintained that Paki-
stan had an adequate ‘scientific base’ and ‘infrastructure’ and Chinese technical
help was sought only in case of a bottleneck. He denied Pakistani nuclear sci-
entist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s involvement in extensive proliferation, saying ‘only
some key components may have come from abroad – we were way beyond the
expected nuclear threshold of technology’.102 Beg maintained that ‘stuff was
available in the nuclear black market . . . that is where they [the American intelli-
gence] took Khan’s pictures with other buyers who had come for the same
purpose and used them against him in 2004’.103
Musharraf expressed a different view of Khan, criticizing the ‘free hand by
successive civilian governments’ given to his organization and support for his
‘shady deals’ because of his contribution to the nuclear program, although ‘he
was just a metallurgist lacking sophisticated knowledge of the process’. Mushar-
raf claimed that ‘Khan took independent decisions . . . no evidence was ever
found’ of government involvement. Musharraf lamented, ‘he is our national hero
but he is a liar and a cheat’.104 Musharraf ’s perspective, which is very critical of
Khan and the civilian leadership’s handling of the process of developing nuclear
weapons, is not convincing given the military’s control of Pakistan’s nuclear
program. A former military chief was more generous: ‘sure he was a shady char-
acter who ate money [sic] . . . he got the job done, didn’t he?’105
Khan played a major role in acquiring nuclear technology and components
for Pakistan’s early nuclear weapons and missiles.106 Pakistan was determined to
protect its program as the only force multiplier against India that it possessed.
Thus, it is not beyond belief that Khan may have participated in the transfer of
some technical known-how to third parties – such as Iran, Libya and North
Korea – to secure missile technology and funding for the program.107
Feroz Hassan identifies three common themes among nuclear aspirants: national
humiliation, international isolation and national identity.108 For Pakistan’s civil–mil-
itary leadership, the military’s surrender to India and the subsequent creation of
Bangladesh in 1971 was the watershed moment. International isolation in the 1990s,
caused by the disparity in US–Pakistan security goals, accelerated the process.
National consensus developed and solidified because of the regional security
dilemma and became a ‘symbol of national determination’.109 The Clinton adminis-
tration, however, lacked the required level of strategic interest to understand such
150 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
psychological nuances in Pakistan’s choice to develop nuclear weapons. Their coer-
cive diplomacy not only contributed to Islamabad’s hardened stance, it also dimin-
ished US leverage on its erstwhile ally.
It is important to ponder academic Islam’s insightful argument that PFP’s
reliance on the US:

. . . emanated from the ground reality that only the US – as a great power –
could assuage Pakistan’s India-centric security dilemma. That is why it was
during periods of estrangement that Pakistan initiated its nuclear program in
the 1970s and tested nuclear weapons in the 1990s. As long as the US
remained a partner, Pakistan stuck to nuclear ambiguity.110

When discussing Pakistan’s emotional grievance over ‘US abandonment’, there-

fore, it may be of academic value to take into account this factual aspect as well.
The assumption is that if the Bush and Clinton administrations wanted to prevent
Pakistan from crossing the nuclear ‘red-line’, constructive engagement might
have been a better option than coercive diplomacy.
Constructive US–Pakistan engagement at this point may also have diminished
Islamabad’s desire and capability to employ its third coping strategy: support of
proxies in Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir.

Supporting proxies in Afghanistan

According to Weinbaum, the Pakistani leadership wanted Afghanistan to avoid
civil strife and focus on state-building so that Pakistan could unburden itself of
the Afghan refugees that it had taken on during the Afghan–Soviet War and the
law and order issues related to that community such as the narcotics trade and
weapons smuggling.111 As the Afghan power struggle continued, Pakistan was
‘sucked into the unfolding events in Afghanistan’.112 It was not possible for
Islamabad to stabilize Afghanistan. ‘The question was what were the instruments
available to us to stabilize Afghanistan?’ argued Riffat Hussain. Pakistan could
not rebuild Afghanistan economically and as Musharraf argued, ‘The US had no
Marshall Plan for Afghanistan’.113 Moreover, the UN could not be effective
unless key members, especially the US, ‘supported its efforts with funds and
peace-keepers’.114 This was difficult to accomplish due to a lack of US strategic
interest as well as post-Cold War Congressional opposition to the provision of
American financial and manpower support to the UN.115 Clearly, addressing the
economic dimension of the conflict was beyond the scope of Pakistan’s
resources. From the security angle however, it was possible for Islamabad to
utilize the porous Pakistan–Afghanistan border to manoeuvre for strategic depth
in Afghanistan116 by first supporting the Pashtun Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami
faction117 and later the Taliban movement.
Asad Durrani denied that Hekmatyar was bolstered as a favourite by the ISI,
attributing his popularity to his leadership qualities. His fighters were loyal to
him because even during the Afghan–Soviet confrontation ‘he spent foreign aid
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 151
on his outfit’s training and needs, unlike other Mujahedeen commanders’.118 That
Pakistan was backing the Hekmatyar faction was confirmed by Hamid Gul, who
had been Director General ISI between 1987 and 1989.119 The CIA too continued
its, somewhat diminished, support to the anti-communist Pashtun Islamists, such
as the Afghan commander Gulbadin Hekmatyar, through the ISI during the Bush
presidency.120 Apparently, the ISI continued its support until the mid-1990s. The
ISI, according to Weinbaum, gave up on Hekmatyar after his forces failed to dis-
lodge the Rabbani Government in Kabul.121 In view of the ISI’s support for his
rival Hekmatyar, argued Seth Jones, President Rabbani turned to India. This in
turn exacerbated Pakistan’s security fears.122
According to Ahmed Rashid – whose narrative has received wide coverage –
the ISI bolstered the Taliban with recruits from madrassahs and refugee camps
in Pakistan with financial assistance from private religious groups and political
parties such as the JUI.123 Rashid is criticized by a section of the Pakistani
academia and military elite for writing for a western audience.124 A US diplo-
matic cable also describes him as being ‘somewhat conspiratorial minded’.125
Former ISI chief Javed Ashraf Qazi was contemptuous of Rashid’s assessment,
emphasizing his lack of factual information.

The Taliban leaders Mullah Rabbani and Mullah Ghaus visited Islamabad
around 1994–95 asking us to remain neutral and not support any faction
against them. Other than that they requested neither weapons nor manpower
. . . they had plenty of both . . . the JUI’s head Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman came
to my office twice begging me to introduce him to them. Until then the
Taliban leaders had never heard of him . . . Ahmed Rashid said what the
American and western audience wanted to hear!126

The existence of different perspectives on the ISI’s initial role in the rise of the
Taliban demonstrates the murkiness of the situation in Afghanistan, which was
interpreted differently by different actors for personal or institutional reasons. It
also suggests that hindsight influenced the decision-makers’ perspective of these
events. Such ambiguity also surrounds Islamabad’s goal of attaining strategic
depth in Afghanistan.
Aslam Beg had begun to propound his philosophy of strategic depth around
the same time as he prescribed ‘strategic defiance’ against the US in the first
Gulf War and ‘till the end of his term was discussing collaboration with Iran’s
visiting delegations’.127 The idea, according to Ashraf Qazi, was that by ‘tying-
up with Afghanistan’ Pakistani military forces could retreat into Afghan territory
and operate from there to offset its geographical disadvantage in the event of war
with India.128 It was a flawed idea, argues Shuja Nawaz, because:

. . . allowing India to capture key Pakistani cities and then retreat into
Afghanistan or eastern Iran . . . ran counter to every policy of [the] Pakistani
government’s war directive, which insisted that the army defend every inch
of the border. [It would mean] ‘Game Over’ for Pakistan.129
152 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
To this, former governor of the frontier province Ali Jan Aurakzai, who hails
from FATA, recounted what an Afghan leader said to him during his official
visit to Kabul in 2006: ‘what do you mean by strategic depth? We are not your
fifth province’. Aurakzai rejected the concept as an ‘absurd idea’ that ‘sowed
doubts in the fiercely independent Afghan mind to our discredit’, arguing that
‘there was no question of ceding territory; this has never been our strategy . . .
this is not our training’.130
The concept of strategic depth has received significant attention in the post-
9/11 period. Ehsan-ul-Haq maintained that the concept has been abused. ‘No
country wants a two front war. We seek security on our border with Afghani-
stan but this does not mean that the Pakistan military wants to occupy
Afghanistan’.131
Beg’s own explanation was:

In Pakistan there was democracy after eleven years [of Zia-ul-Haq’s military
rule]. Iran–Iraq war was over and the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghani-
stan. Conditions were therefore ripe for Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan to
create a Joint Security Organization. I was seeking the depth of relations,
named as Strategic Depth. The idea was distorted by some scholars, as if I
was seeking physical depth in Afghanistan, which was preposterous to think
of, because Pakistani armed forces would fight for every inch of territory,
than seeking depth in Afghanistan.132

Beg’s explanation is most likely suffused with hindsight. However, it must be

pointed out that the military was aware of the problems associated with a theor-
etical retreat to Afghanistan even if ‘the army high command, being a discip-
lined lot, did not challenge its Chief ’.133 Strategically, it was not possible for
Pakistan to hold Afghan territory.
Vacating mainland Pakistan to take advantage of strategic depth in Afghani-
stan went against the very grain of Pakistan’s operational strategy, training and
the military’s strategic mindset. Surrendering Pakistani territory to Indian forces
and retreating into Afghanistan to regroup may sound like a practical military
tactic, but this could not be an easy idea to sell to the nationalist army rank and
file who perceive Pakistan–India hostility as a heroic struggle between David
and Goliath.
Nevertheless, some US and Pakistani political and defence commentators
ascribe a territorial dimension to the concept. For instance, Khalilzad and Byman
view it as a viable military option with ideological, pan-Islamic and territorial
angles.134 Siddiqa saw it as the ‘military’s grandiose vision’135 Pakistani defence
analyst Talat Masood, argued that the military rethought the policy after it was
discredited,136 while Riffat Hussain posited that ‘back in the early 1990s, it had a
territorial dimension to it’. He explained that:

Pakistan’s geographical dispersal is very limited. If Afghanistan is secured

it could be used [not only for troops but for] weapons storage, as well. It
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 153
was sub-imperial thinking towards Afghanistan, seeing it as our province,
which was at the heart of this idea.137

It is revealing that during the 1990s the military’s war gaming in the National
Defense College revolved around proxy warfare in Indian-held Kashmir and
strategic depth in Afghanistan.138 This lends credibility to the argument that there
was a physical dimension to the concept – the stationing of troops and storing
weapons during war – although this is not tantamount to declaring a desire to
occupy Afghanistan to fulfil some ‘grandiose vision’. As Durrani argued:

We may see Afghanistan in terms of forward depth, buffer zone, strategic

depth or maybe also relief zone . . . there are many examples in military
history where neighbouring territory was used for such purposes during war
. . . but if anyone ever believed we would occupy Afghan territory then he
has no idea about Afghan history and [its] culture of fierce independence.139

These competing premises therefore cannot be dismissed out of hand. Military

strategists sometimes do come up with outlandish ideas; even if Beg’s philo-
sophy had a territorial dimension there is no evidence to suggest that the Paki-
stani military was going to follow this in letter and spirit. Post-9/11, the concept
has been blown out of proportion.
According to Siddiqa, because the civilian government may have differed
with the military’s discourse, ‘a new intermediary’ – the militant proxy – was
brought in who agreed with the military’s ideological nationalist narrative’140 in
Afghanistan. Interestingly, while the question of why and how Pakistan seeks to
supports proxies in Afghanistan for strategic benefit has been discussed enthusi-
astically post-9/11, the fact that Kabul sought strategic depth in Pakistan well
before Beg’s idea has received less attention. It is worth remembering that Paki-
stan’s initial support for violent Islamist groups in Afghanistan in the 1970s was
spurred directly by the Afghan Government’s sponsorship of Pashtun and Baluch
nationalist groups in Pakistan by the Soviet-installed Mohammad Daoud regime
(1973–1978).
This was in keeping with the perennial Afghan demand for an independent
‘Pashtunistan’, comprising Pashtun tribes in Pakistan’s North West Frontier and
Baluchistan regions. Kabul’s Pashtunistan idea claimed nearly half of West
Pakistan; the demand was in fact irredentist in nature. If created, Pashtunistan,
sandwiched between Pakistan and Afghanistan, would not have had the
resources to remain independent and would have been incorporated into Afghan-
istan. This would have solved one of landlocked Afghanistan’s major strategic
weaknesses by granting it access to the Arabian Sea through Baluch majority
areas. Kabul’s support for Pashtunistan strained relations between the two neigh-
bours and diplomatic ties were severed in 1955 and 1962.
In the 1970s, Daoud took this demand to a new level by providing sanctuary,
arms and ammunition to nationalist groups operating in Pakistan in a bid to
support separatism. This escalation came when Pakistan had already lost its
154 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
eastern wing in 1971. With India in the east and a Soviet-installed Daoud regime
in the west feeding Pakistan’s security dilemma, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto devised and
implemented the policy of supporting anti-Communist Islamist factions inside
Afghanistan. This was in response to Daoud’s support for Pashtun and Baluch
nationalists. Ironically, Afghan Islamists who received covert aid from Pakistan in
the 1970s included Gulbadin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani.141
A friendly government in a stable and independent Afghanistan through the
proxy strategy would have provided Pakistan with a psychological and as stra-
tegic advantage against India. Above all, the use of proxies in the west helped
enable the ISI’s strategy of training, arming and facilitating the infiltration of
fighters into Indian Kashmir.

Supporting the Kashmir insurgency

In 1989, Pakistan began to manipulate an indigenous uprising against the Indian
Government in Kashmir. It is likely that Islamabad saw it as an opportunity to
exact revenge for India’s role in supporting anti-Pakistan forces in Bangladesh
in 1971. Given that Pakistan was subject to US sanctions, the strategy was cost-
effective and was implemented without committing Pakistan military troops –
thereby preventing military casualties. Musharraf and former ISI chief
Ehsan-ul-Haq maintained that this was not so much a military strategy as the fact
that ‘many private groups had sprung up’ in Pakistan in support of the indi-
genous uprising in Kashmir in 1989. Ehsan explained that ‘there was a huge
Kashmiri diaspora in Pakistan which had taken part in [the] Afghan Jihad and
now wanted to join the fighters in Indian Kashmir’.142 Steve Coll maintains,
however, that to drain Indian military resources and force them to reduce their
troops on the Pakistani border the ISI-trained Kashmiri and Arab recruits with
the support of Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami (JI).143
Fasih Bokhari minced no words: ‘We learnt the power of asymmetrical
warfare [during the Afghan–Soviet conflict] where the human himself becomes
the weapon . . . and we used it in Kashmir’.144 Another interviewee, on condition
of anonymity, also confirmed that there were plenty of motivated individuals in
JI seminaries but no formal training. The ISI therefore stepped in to train
recruits, first in Azad Kashmir and later in FATA.145
JI leader Siraj-ul-Haq did not deny helping the cause, arguing that, ‘Kashmir
is part of Pakistan and it is our moral duty to actively support the Kashmiri [right
of] self-determination’.146 Certain knowledgeable interviewees confirmed that
the ISI redirected Afghan resources to Kashmir in the early to mid-1990s.147
Levy and Scott-Clark also point out that as Director General Military Operations
(DGMO) in the early 1990s, Musharraf had planned this operation.148 Musharraf,
however, insisted that the Taliban–Kashmiri nexus came about only after 9/11.149
But competing statements cast doubt on this assertion.
According to US diplomat Alexander Evans, ‘in 1988, the ISI was surprised at
the scale of response by Kashmiris in Indian-held Kashmir’.150 In 1989, Jahangir
Karamat as General Beg’s DGMO was tasked with creating an impression for
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 155
Indian consumption ‘through carefully orchestrated’ war games that ‘the victori-
ous fighters from Afghanistan would be organized into Pakistan-officered brigades
and used in Kashmir’.151 Given the scale of Kashmiri opposition to New Delhi in
1988 and the above-mentioned war games in 1989, one can discern a covert
strategy in this move.
Primary US records from 1989 to 1994 suggest that some elements of the ISI
and private extremist groups actively supported HUA, a Kashmiri militant group
with links to Pakistan’s JUI, a religious political party. However, ‘hard evidence’
of state involvement ‘was lacking’ although private anti-Indian groups were
‘free to raise funds and find recruits in Pakistan’.152 US intelligence reports quote
Yusufzai as confirming Osama Bin Laden’s presence in Taliban-controlled Jala-
labad153 and that the ISI supported the Taliban primarily because it allowed the
HUA training camps to function in their area.154 Thus, as noted in the previous
chapter, it is probable that there was a link between Bin Laden, ISI, the Taliban
and the Kashmiri militant group HUA as established by the US.155 After all, as
Siraj pointed out, the self-determination of the Kashmiris was as just a cause for
Pakistan as the Afghan struggle against the Soviet Union was for the US.156 It is
even suggested that Nawaz Sharif ’s Government – as claimed by senior politi-
cian Afrasyab Khattak – was overthrown in 1999 by Musharraf because Sharif
had promised to deliver Bin Laden to Clinton during the Blair House meeting.157
Shuja Nawaz posited that ‘the ISI preferred the radicals because they were
cost-effective and their ideological fervour was operationally useful’.158 Shuja
has a point. A conventional conflict was outside the economic and operational
prowess of the military. The Mujahedeen, which included Afghan, Arab and
Kashmiri fighters, on the other hand, were battle hardened and motivated; the
covert nature of the strategy also provided the ISI with plausible deniability.
The strategy in Kashmir served the purpose of maintaining the regional
balance of power in two ways. First, the use of proxies for low-intensity conflict
tied down a sizeable chunk of India’s forces in Kashmir thus ‘bleeding India’
and easing pressure on the eastern border. Human rights abuses by Indian forces
further alienated the Kashmiris to Pakistan’s advantage. Second, Pakistan’s
efforts to push the Kashmir dispute onto the world stage distracted India from its
efforts in Afghanistan. By keeping both borders relatively secure the military
leadership could concentrate on the acceleration of the nuclear program. Paki-
stan’s nuclear tests in May 1998 changed the regional context, allowing Islama-
bad to support its proxies with renewed confidence.159
Market diversification; the enhancement of nuclear weapons capability and
the provision of support to proxies were military choices aimed at countering the
implications of Clinton’s foreign policy. As we shall see, this coping mechanism
also had a diplomatic dimension.

Diplomatic efforts
Major diplomatic efforts were made during the 1990s to try to have the
Pressler Amendment repealed and to negotiate for the release of the F-16s or
156 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
get reimbursement, to convince the US to accept the Taliban, to safeguard the
nuclear program and to defuse tensions in Kargil. These were all security
related issues and important to the military policy-makers. Throughout the
1990s Pakistani diplomats, such as Sahibzada Yaqub Ali, Akram Zaki, Aziz
Khan, Iftikhar Murshed, Maleeha Lodhi, Riaz Khokhar, Shahryar Khan, Sham-
shad Ahmed and Najmuddin Sheikh, remained involved, at various points in
time, with the developments in and around Pakistan.
While Sharif assisted the military in negotiating with the commanders of the
Mujahedeen to formulate the AIG, Benazir’s Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ali
searched for regional solutions to the Afghan problem. Benazir also reached out
to Iran for this purpose; Beg’s overtures to Tehran in 1989–1991 may be seen in
the same context. However, from 1994 onwards, in view of the support of both
Benazir and the ISI for the Taliban movement – which was anti-Shia – there was
a ‘hardening’, of the Iranian position. To Iran, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban
appeared to be part of a plan by the US, which was opposed to Iran’s revolu-
tionary government.160
Assef Ali visited Rome to convince ex-Afghan monarch Zahir Shah to return
to Afghanistan to unify the country, since he was largely acceptable to all fac-
tions. He could have helped to convene a Loya Jirga (a council of elders, in
keeping with the tribal traditions of the Afghans) that could have brought all fac-
tions to the negotiating table. Ali maintained that even the Taliban supported this
effort, but the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Saudi Intelligence
chief Turki Al Faisal refused to get involved because of Zahir Shah’s closeness
to Iran.
Clearly, the plan also did not work because ‘the ISI was not happy in view of
Zahir Shah’s anti-Pakistan stance on Pashtunistan in the past, although Benazir
and President Leghari supported the plan’. Explaining his approach to US–Paki-
stan relations during his tenure, Assef Ali stated that:

[Pakistan’s US policy] was not a policy; it was a grievance. We had to

create an environment for a multidimensional policy where we could have
many points of contact . . . [for this,] Benazir’s persona was a great asset.161

The strategy involved engaging the US administration in dialogue while reach-

ing out to the US public, Congress and the State Department through media and
inter-personal contacts such as Hank Brown, Bob Oakley and Robert Hathaway.
In her first official visit to Washington in June 1989, Benazir addressed the joint
session of Congress and received massive support in the US, mainly due to her
image as a democracy-loving politician who had defied the dictatorship of Zia-
ul-Haq. Independent of the military’s input she, rather unwisely, discussed the
possibility of a freeze on uranium enrichment with George H.W. Bush even as
she was encouraged by the Americans to take control of the nuclear program
from the military.162 She made efforts to improve relations with India and invited
the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Pakistan. During his visit, in Decem-
ber 1988, the two leaders signed the Non-Nuclear Aggression Agreement, which
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 157
came into force in January 1991. She also showed interest in resolving the
Siachen dispute. The Bombay bombings in 1993, however, undermined her
efforts as India blamed the ISI for the incident.
In her second term, Benazir also tried to tap into the commonality between
US–Pakistan economic interests in the trans-Afghan gas and oil pipeline. This
was seen by the American diplomats as an attempt ‘to bring potentially helpful
actors onto the Afghan stage’.163
During her official visit to Washington in April 1995, Benazir argued that
Kashmir had contributed to the development of a nuclear arms race between
India and Pakistan.164 Her efforts bore fruit in the form of the passage of the
1995 Brown Amendment that allowed a one-time waiver on military supplies to
Pakistan, although it was not applicable to the F-16s.165
The Brown Amendment created hope that a renewal of economic aid was
possible, but increasing US concern over Pakistan’s purchase of the M-11
missile equipment from China made this impossible.166 The refusal of the US to
deliver the F-16s remained a major source of resentment for Pakistan throughout
Clinton’s second term. The money Pakistan had paid was reimbursed due to the
Pakistani diplomatic offensive under Riaz Khokhar during Nawaz Sharif ’s
second term (1997–1999) when Pakistan threatened to seek legal recourse. As
noted earlier, the assignment of low-level officials to deal with Pakistan had also
posed challenges for Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts during the Clinton era. In
keeping with the primarily security-oriented relationship that Pakistan had with
the US, Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts were mainly focused on resolving military
issues, such as reimbursement for F-16s, the nuclear tests, Kargil and the Tali-
ban–Bin Laden connection.167
Between 1989 and 1991, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif denied in public that
Pakistan wanted to go nuclear or was supplying nuclear technology to third
parties and argued that Pakistan was willing to accept inspections of its nuclear
facilities and international safeguards if India also did so.168 This approach was
consistent with the military’s efforts to circumvent the Pressler Amendment and
reopen US aid channels. By 1992, however, statements from Pakistani officials
such as Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan began to openly claim that Pakistan
had developed advanced nuclear capabilities.169
This coincided with General Beg and Abdul Qadeer Khan’s contradictory
statements on Pakistan’s cold tests in 1987 and its possession of advanced
nuclear technology. Such statements were likely aimed at the US, with a view
towards possibly striking a bargain over the issue. They were also designed for
Indian consumption, as throughout the 1990s the two states continued to engage
in allegations and counter-allegations over Kashmir, Afghanistan and one anoth-
er’s efforts to build-up militarily.170
Interestingly, Beg later denied making the statement attributed to him
saying, ‘There is no such thing as a cold-test’.171 Khan denied he had any
knowledge of Beg’s nuclear test claim.172 It should be noted that in his 2011
interview with the author, Beg confirmed that Pakistan had indeed conducted
nuclear cold tests in 1987.173
158 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
Nawaz Sharif had proposed the creation of a nuclear free zone in South
Asia.174 This proposal coincided with a Pakistani delegation’s visit to Washing-
ton DC to discuss the halt of American aid.175 Therefore, it is likely that Sharif ’s
proposal was in support of the military agenda to dispel American doubts on
Pakistan’s nuclear intent in order to facilitate the resumption of aid. Rejecting
the proposal as a ploy, the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, refused to
participate in ‘an arrangement in which no one knows what the other country is
going to do in spite of the agreement’.176 Rao was alluding to India and Paki-
stan’s unwillingness to allow inspections of their nuclear facilities.177
Sharif, however, did succeed in inviting Rao’s successor Atal Bihari Vaj-
payee to Pakistan in his second term. By inviting Vajpayee to Pakistan and
signing the Lahore Declaration with him in January 1999, Sharif appeared to
have put the rivals on the road to improved relations after the 1998 nuclear
tests. Afrasyab Khattak maintained that the military was not prepared to trust
the Nawaz–Vajpayee talks.178 General Musharraf, who was then the army
chief, denied this charge arguing that the military did not oppose Sharif ’s over-
tures to India. ‘But we wanted him to make sure that Kashmir remains the
central focus of his talks with Vajpayee’.179 The fact that the joint Lahore Dec-
laration does not highlight Kashmir as the central issue180 shows that this was
not the case.
Sharif ’s position was further undermined when he visited Washington to
request Clinton’s help in defusing the Kargil crisis in July 1999. Musharraf
maintained, ‘I told him he can take whatever political decision he may think
appropriate. After all, he had been duly informed before the launch of the opera-
tion and had allowed us to go ahead’.181 Conversely, as mentioned earlier, Fasih
Bokhari – who was present during the high-level meetings on Kargil – did not
support Musharraf ’s version during the interview.
As noted earlier, Khattak was of the view that Sharif was ousted by Mushar-
raf in October 1999 for making a deal with Clinton during the Blair House
meeting to force the Taliban to extradite Bin Laden if Clinton would help him in
dealing with Pakistan’s military. Khattak supported this premise by arguing that,
‘The corps commanders who assisted Musharraf ’s coup – Generals Mahmud,
Aziz and Usmani – were known Taliban and Bin Laden sympathizers’. The
reason for this was that HUA camps were being run in Taliban-controlled areas
and it was strategically important to keep the Taliban regime ‘on the right
side’.182 In his memoir, Clinton does not mention the deal – if indeed there was
one – but does confirm Sharif ’s fears of a possible military take-over.183 Khat-
tak’s views demonstrate the murky nature of Pakistan’s political process and the
complexities of civil–military relations.184
Sharif, as we know, also made diplomatic efforts to formulate the AIG. Assef
Ali, apparently to distance Benazir’s Government from the Taliban phenom-
enon, pointed out: ‘Remember, we never recognized the Taliban [in 1996] nor
asked others to do so’.185 However, it was Benazir’s Interior Minister Naseerul-
lah Babar who had initially supported the Taliban movement to gain commercial
access to the CARs.186
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 159
Benazir had earlier recommended a US diplomatic presence in Afghanistan
after Kandahar and Jalalabad were secure under the Taliban, urging an active US
role in stabilizing the region.187 This was part of her administration’s efforts to
normalize relations with the US in order to minimize the impact of the Pressler
Amendment. However, Ali’s contention is correct in that the Taliban regime was
recognized during the Nawaz Sharif administration.
The Taliban victory in Mazar-i-Sharif effectively put it in control of 85 per cent
of Afghanistan; Pakistan was the first country to recognize it on 25 May 1997 fol-
lowed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Diplomat Sarwar Naqvi confirmed that the
foreign office had recommended against recognizing the Taliban regime during
Nawaz Sharif’s tenure. ‘The Taliban is isolated, we said, and will be seen as our
surrogate. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub was summoned to the
Prime Minister House and two hours later, Pakistan recognized the Taliban’.188 As
we know, a Pakistani official maintained that the recognition came about under US
pressure as a result of Clinton’s ambivalent approach towards the Taliban.
At the same time, Gohar Ayub Khan, recalls that the ISI chief Lt General
Naseem Rana was ‘breathing down’ our necks to recognize the Taliban.189
Apparently, the ISI was not averse to following the American instructions on
this issue – if indeed there were any. Clearly, the recognition of the Taliban
regime by Pakistan had more to do with the military’s desires rather than any
democratic process involving the Parliament. As Musharraf, reflecting on the
military’s stance on this issue, stated, ‘I told Bill Clinton [during his visit to
Pakistan] that the only way to curb Taliban extremism is to recognize them’.190
There is evidence that the military was interested in bridging the gap between
the Taliban and the US. From 1997 to 2000, the US expected Pakistan to use its
leverage with the Taliban to have Bin Laden expelled. It was to achieve US goals
that Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth, UN Permanent Representative
Bill Richardson and Ambassador William Milam remained engaged with the
Taliban with the assistance of Pakistani diplomats, such as Najmuddin Sheikh, Ift-
ikhar Murshed and Aziz Ahmed.191 Riffat Hussain, who had served as Press Coun-
sellor in the Pakistan embassy in Washington (1994–1997) recalled that Pakistan’s
Defence attaché in Washington, Brigadier Javed Hassan, acting on behalf of the
military establishment, facilitated the Taliban’s visit to the US and had worked to
arrange their appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Taliban delegation was invited by Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi for

dinner where it privately met with members of the Senate Committee such
as Hank Brown and Robert Hathaway. This delegation consisted of most of
the members of the future Taliban Council. Our effort was to take the
Taliban out of isolation and bring it into the mainstream diplomatically.192

This time period, as confirmed by Hussain, coincides with Benazir’s second term
in office (1993–1996). Hence, this contradicts Assef Ali’s claim that Benazir
was not furthering the military’s Taliban agenda. The foreign office, despite its
own stance on these issues, was influenced by the military establishment. The
160 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
military’s dominance of the diplomacy pertaining to the Taliban–US narrative
can be judged from an official’s assertion that ‘most of the noting that Ambas-
sador Lodhi did for the foreign office was first sent to the GHQ (General Head-
quarters of the Pakistan army). The military was happy with her because she
shared everything with them’.193
In early 2000, Hussain recalled, there was a meeting of Pakistani envoys in
Islamabad, who expressed their ‘deep disappointment with the Taliban for not lis-
tening to the concerns of Pakistan and through Pakistan that of the international
community’. But the military and the ISI insisted that the Taliban had grown too
independent in its decision-making regarding American concerns and demands.194
Siddiqa argued that Islamabad had a great deal of leverage over the Taliban since
landlocked Afghanistan is dependent on Pakistan for trade and supplies.195 Siddiqa
and Hussain have a point when Durrani’s confirmation is taken into consideration:
‘we were the only one with clout in Afghanistan’.196 However, reality cannot be
understood in binary terms. The Taliban was dependent on Pakistan for trade, fuel
and cash so the ISI certainly had some leverage; however, the Taliban’s leadership
could be intransigent and uncompromising, as confirmed by those in direct contact
with it – such as Murshed, Gul and Yusufzai. Moreover, a State Department com-
munication that shows that the Americans were ‘unconvinced’ of the scale of Paki-
stan’s leverage over the Taliban. It says, ‘Pakistan surely has some influence on
the Taliban, but it falls short of being able to call the shots’.197
Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts were driven mainly by its military’s strategic
compulsions, a fact that displeased Clinton. He made this clear during his 2000
visit to Islamabad. ‘During his stop-over’, recalled diplomat Sarwar Naqvi who
was part of the reception committee:

Clinton did not shake hands with Musharraf . . . I had met him in Washing-
ton and knew him to be a voluble and friendly person but here he was
‘dheema’ [pensive] and his conversation was ‘wajibi’ [restrained].198

Summary
In response to Clinton’s foreign policy, Pakistani civil–military leadership tried
to look for workable coping strategies. These included market diversification and
the acceleration of the nuclear program as a force equalizer; this, to a large
extent, allowed Pakistan to cope with the negative implications of US sanctions
on its military capabilities.
PFP’s efforts to support proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir were perceived
by the civil–military elite as a strategically viable and economically cost-
effective option. The strategy in Kashmir served the purpose of maintaining the
regional balance of power by tying down a section of the Indian military and
reducing pressure on the eastern border. By bolstering the Taliban regime,
Islamabad denied India space to influence developments in Afghanistan or
foment trouble in FATA. By keeping both borders relatively secure the military
leadership could concentrate on the enhancement of nuclear weapons capability.
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 161
The civilian government also undertook diplomatic efforts as part of PFP,
imbuing the process of policy-making with a semblance of democracy. However,
in practice such efforts were largely aimed at furthering the military’s security
objectives. Overall, the military establishment retained its control over Paki-
stan’s foreign policy and continued its pursuit of regional goals that were largely
at variance with Clinton’s foreign policy agenda.
In keeping with the Cold War mindset, the Pakistani elite perceived the
American approach from both pragmatic and romanticized perspectives. Regard-
less, Pakistan’s strategies drew upon a mainly pragmatic approach towards the
implications of Clinton’s foreign policy. The Pakistani response to Clinton’s
approach can thus be explained by the increase in the intensity of the security
dilemma in South Asia and the reduction of American leverage over Pakistan
during this period.

Notes
1 Quoted in Iqbal Akhund, Trial & Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000): 234.
2 Interview with Mumtaz Gul (19 October 2011); Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State
and Society in Pakistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000): 2–18.
3 Interview with a former army chief.
4 Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management’,
www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1156&rid=6, accessed 13 September 2013.
5 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
6 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Sword, 422.
7 Interview with Aslam Beg.
8 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
9 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
10 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, PILDAT Citizens Monitoring Report, ‘Performance of the
Defense. Committee of the Cabinet: Civil-Military Relations’, Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development and Transparency – PILDAT, 10 March 2012, www.pildat.
org/publications/publication/CMR/PerformanceoftheDefenceCommitteeoftheCabinet
_Report_March2012.pdf, accessed 10 October 2012.
11 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
12 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
13 Interview with academic.
14 Sartaj Aziz, Between Dreams and Realities (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2009): 212–213.
15 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
16 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
17 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
18 A petition was filed against the ISI by Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan in 1996. In
2012 the Supreme Court of Pakistan found it maintainable and ordered the govern-
ment to take action against Beg and Durrani, ‘1990 Election was Rigged: SC’, The
News, 19 October 2012, www.thenews.com.pk/article-72104–1990-election-was-
rigged:-SC-, accessed 2 January 2013.
19 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
20 ‘Mehrangate: Durrani Says Beg was on Board’, The News, 16 May 2012, www.
thenews.com.pk/article-49363-Asghar-Khan-case:-Durrani-says-Beg-was-onboard,
accessed 1 August 2012.
21 Ibid.
162 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
22 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
23 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011) and Ashfaq Saleem Mirza (24 October
2011).
24 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011) and Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
25 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
26 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
27 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
28 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
29 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
30 Report issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Proliferation: Threat and
Response’, January 2001, 27, 30, www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf, accessed 3
July 2012.
31 Interview with a former army chief.
32 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
33 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
34 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
35 Interview with the official.
36 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
37 Talk Show, ‘Platform’, Dunya TV, Lahore, 13 September 2011, video at www.
youtube.com/watch?v=ogynVi5xftU, accessed 23 August 2012.
38 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
39 Interview with Talat Masood.
40 Lt General Tanvir Hussain Naqvi quoted in Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard
Country (London: Penguin Books, 2011): 186.
41 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
42 See Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 423–427.
43 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
44 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East and South Asia, 2
February 1989, 70, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA334252, accessed 17
May 2012.
45 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
46 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, 185–187.
47 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
48 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
49 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
50 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
51 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
52 Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (29 August 2011).
53 Interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai (19 October 2011).
54 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
55 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
56 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
57 Interview with Director South Asia Media Association (SAFMA) Professor Ashfaq
Saleem Mirza (9 October 2011).
58 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
59 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
60 Interview with Ali Jan Aurakzai (4 August 2011).
61 Michael Krepon, ‘Pakistan’s Decline’, 24 March 2011, www.stimson.org/spotlight/
pakistans-decline/, accessed 12 July 2012.
62 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
63 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
64 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
65 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
66 Interview with Talat Masood (6 September 2011).
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 163
67 Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture’; also Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Paki-
stan’s Strategic Culture: A Theoretical Excursion’, Strategic Insights 4:10 (2005),
www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/lavoyOct05.pdf, accessed 4 July 2014.
68 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
69 Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October 2011).
70 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
71 Interview with Zahid Hussain (20 July 2011).
72 Jahangir Karamat quoted in Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 110.
73 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
74 Iftikhar H. Malik, ‘The Pakistan–US Security Relationship: Testing Bilateralism’,
Asian Survey 30:3 (March 1990): 284–299; Ross Munro, ‘Superpower Rising’,
Time, 3 April 1989, 7; Editorial daily Jang, Rawalpindi, 7 April 1989; Thomas P.
Thornton, ‘The New Phase in US Pakistani Relations’; Evan R. Pilling, ‘Indian
Surface Combatants: Sea Power for the 1990s’, Naval Postgraduate Thesis,
(Monterey, CA: September 1991): 22, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=
ADA246185, accessed 2 June 2012.
75 Interview with a former army chief.
76 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976): 75.
77 Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011) and another former army chief.
78 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Civil–Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan’, Survival
40:2 (Summer 1998): 96–113.
79 Interview with Pakistani official A.
80 ‘Pakistan to Obtain Thermal Power Plants’, Xinhua, Beijing, 9 September 1991, in
‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Chronology’, www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=
1316466791, Reuters, 10 June 1992, accessed 23 April 2012; ‘French Bid for
KANUPP Contract’, www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791,
accessed 23 April 2012; ‘French Nuclear Plant for Pakistan Seen Unlikely’, Reuters,
10 June 1992, www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791,
accessed 23 April 2012; ‘France Said To Renege on Nuclear Plant Deal’, The
Muslim, Islamabad, 11 June 1992, www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.
pdf?_=1316466791, accessed 23 April 2012.
81 Department of Defense Report, ‘Proliferation: Threat and Response’, January 2001,
www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf, accessed July 2012.
82 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
83 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
84 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
85 Feroz Hassan Khan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture’.
86 Interview with Pakistani official A.
87 Interview with a former army chief.
88 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
89 Interview with a former member of the Troika.
90 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
91 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
92 Interview with senior military official.
93 Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
94 Interview with a member of the Troika.
95 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 452.
96 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
97 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, 105 – The only Pakistani he admires is Riaz
Mohammad Khan, a career diplomat married to a former State Department official.
98 Karamat Quoted in Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 418–419.
99 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
100 Bruce Riedel, ‘American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House’, 6.
164 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
101 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
102 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
103 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
104 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
105 Interview with a former army chief.
106 See Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012): 162–173, 359–376.
107 Libyan leader Kaddafi admitted paying millions of dollars to Pakistan. Pakistani
Journalist Najam Sethi in ‘Aapas Ki Baat’, GEO News Channel, Islamabad, 19
September 2012.
108 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Prees, 2012), Book Review by Maleeha Lodhi, www.indepthnews.
info/index.php/global-issues/1132-how-pakistan-made-the-atomic-bomb, accessed
22 December 2012.
109 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass, 2.
110 Interview with Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
111 Marvin G. Weinbaum, ‘The Politics of Afghan Resettlement and Rehabilitation’,
Asian Survey 29:3 (March 1989): 287–307.
112 Interview with Zahid Hussain (20 July 2011).
113 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
114 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
115 See Congressional Record, 104th Congress (1995–1996), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query, accessed 5 August 2011.
116 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 320–330.
117 Interviews with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012) and Hamid Gul (13 July
2011).
118 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
119 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
120 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 226–228.
121 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
122 Interview with Seth Jones (15 February 2012); Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of
Empires, 41–52.
123 Ahid, Taliban, 18–80.
124 Interviews with Dr Tahir Amin (12 July 2011), Ambassador Iftikhar Murshed (12
August 2011), Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011) and Lt General
Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
125 US Embassy Islamabad Cable, No. ISLAMA05010, 1 July 1998, http://nsarchive.
gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/talib8.pdf, accessed 2 January 2012.
126 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
127 Javed Qazi quoted in Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 440.
128 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
129 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 419.
130 Interview with Ali Jan Aurakzai (4 August 2011).
131 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
132 Ibid.
133 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 419.
134 See Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman, ‘Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a
Rogue State’, The Washington Quarterly, 23:1 (Winter 2000): 65–78; Eqbal Ahmed,
‘A Mirage Misnamed Strategic Depth’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 27 August–2
September 1998.
135 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
136 Interview with Talat Masood (6 September 2011).
137 Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
138 Interview with a Pakistani official G.
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 165
139 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
140 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
141 See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, ‘The Forgotten History of Afghanistan–
Pakistan Relations’, Yale Journal (March 2012), http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/04/Article-Gartenstein_Ross-and-Vassefi.pdf, accessed February 2015.
142 Interviews with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012) and Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
143 Interview with US Officials in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 221.
144 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
145 Author interview.
146 Interview with Siraj-ul-Haq (19 October 2011).
147 Interview with Pakistani officials.
148 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States and
the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2007): 398.
149 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
150 Alexander Evans, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture & US–Pakistan Relations’, Lecture,
Kluge Centre, Washington, DC, 11 November 2011.
151 Jehangir Karamat quoted in Crossed Swords, 418–419.
152 American Embassy Islamabad Cable, 19ISLAMABAD27305, 17 December 1989;
American Embassy Islamabad Cable, 94ISLAMABAD10894, ‘Pakistan: 1994
Annual Terrorism Report’, 17 November 1994, http://wikileaks.org, accessed 9
January 2012.
153 Department of State Memo, No. 12705932 ‘Pak Foreign Minister Asks US
Cooperation on Afghanistan’, 21 February 1996, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm, accessed 23 December 2011.
154 ISLAMA 05010, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, 1 July 1998, http://nsarchive.gwu.
edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/talib8.pdf, accessed 11 December 2011.
155 Islama001054, US Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, ‘Pakistan Counterterrorism:
Ambassador’s Meeting with [Excised] on State Sponsor Designation’, 6 February
1997, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/16.pdf, accessed 11 Decem-
ber 2011.
156 Interview with Siraj-ul Haq (19 October 2011); Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 322–323.
157 Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October 2011).
158 Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
159 US Embassy Islamabad Cable, No. ISLAMA 05010, 1 July 1998, http://nsarchive.
gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/talib8.pdf, accessed 11 December 2011; see also
‘Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay’,
International Security 21:2 (Fall 1999): 76–107.
160 96ABUDHABI7350, US Embassy Abu Dhabi Cable, ‘Tehran Sees Taleban [sic] as
US Tool against Iran’, 11 November 1996, www.wikileaaks.org; 11995
STATE291940, Case No. 200104110, US Department of State Memo, ‘Discussing
Afghan Policy with the Pakistanis’, 22 December 1995, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/7.pdf, accessed 22 December 2011.
161 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
162 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception, 190–191; interviews with Aslam
Beg (2 July 2011) and Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
163 US Embassy Islamabad Cable, ‘A/S Raphel Discusses Afghanistan’, Document ID:
2292754, 22 April 1996, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal15.pdf,
accessed 21 December 2011.
164 ‘The President’s News Conference with PM Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan’, 11 April
1995, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J Clinton 1993,
Book 1, 518.
165 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
166 Financial Times, 27 August 1993, 4; Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011);
See also Hon. Maurice D. Hinchey, ‘Pakistan Continues Missile Purchases from
166 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
China and Escalates Tensions in South Asia’, Extension of Remarks, House of Rep-
resentatives, 28 September 1994, Congressional Record, 103rd Congress
(1993–1994), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record&c=103,
accessed 7 January 2012.
167 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
168 ‘Pakistan Warned on Nuclear Parts’, Washington Post, 14 January 1992, A12; ‘Paki-
stan Won’t Build the Bomb’, Asia-­Pacific­ Defense­ Reporter (February–March
1992): 39; ‘Pakistan Rejects Iran Cooperation’, Nuclear Engineering International
(February 1992): 7; ‘No Iraqi Uranium from Pakistan’, Nuclear Engineering Inter-
national (February 1992): 7, www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=
1316466791, accessed 14 May 2012.
169 ‘Pakistan Tells of Its A-Bomb Capacity’, New York Times, 8 February 1992, A5.
170 News items from Indian and Pakistani newspapers of the 1990s, http://docs.news-
bank.com.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/s/HistArchive/fbisdoc, accessed 17 November 2011.
171 Quoted in Jang, Lahore, 23 July 1993.
172 The News, Islamabad, 26 July 1993, 4; ‘Nuclear Expert Does Not Know of Beg’s
Nuclear Test Claim’, New York Times, 26 July 1993, A2.
173 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
174 His regional regime for South Asia included Pakistan, India, China, the US, and the
CARs to be sponsored by the US, USSR and China.
175 ‘Sajjad: Nuclear Proposal Not for US Aid’, Radio Pakistan Network, Islamabad, 13
June 1991.
176 ‘Rao Cool to Nuclear Talks with Pakistan’, The Hindu (Madras), 14 July 1991, 1;
www.pakistanaffairs.pk/pakistan-strategic-forces/726-nuclear-chronology-pakistan-9.
html, accessed October 2012.
177 ‘Kahuta Remains Secret . . . And Israeli Doubts Continue’, Nuclear Engineering
International, July 1991, 8; in NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, 1 July 1991,
Nuclear and Missile Developments, www.pakistanaffairs.pk/pakistan-strategic-
forces/726-nuclear-chronology-pakistan-9.html, accessed October 2012.
178 Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October).
179 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
180 Available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptlahore.pdf, accessed August 2013.
181 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
182 Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October 2011).
183 William Clinton, My Life, 900–903.
184 See Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2000); The Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy
(London: Pluto Press, 2007).
185 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
186 Interviews with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012) and Fasih Bokhari (15 July
2011).
187 US Embassy Islamabad Cable, No. 2003414, ‘Senator Brown and Congressman
Wilson discuss Afghanistan with Pakistani Officials’, 14 April 1996, http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal14.pdf, accessed 16 December 2011.
188 Interview with Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).
189 Gohar Ayub Khan, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, 289–291.
190 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
191 Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (12 August 2011).
192 Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
193 Interview with a former government official F.
194 Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
195 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
196 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
197 State 291940 – US Department of State, Cable, ‘Discussing Afghan Policy with the
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 167
Pakistanis’, 22 December 1995, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/7.
pdf, accessed 11 December 2011.
198 Interview with Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).

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Interviews
Ali, Sardar Assef Ahmad. Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan in Benazir Bhutto’s
Cabinet, 1993–1996 (Islamabad, 19 September 2011).
Amin, Dr Tahir. Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, former Head of the
Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and author
(Islamabad, 12 July 2011).
Aurakzai, Lt General Ali Jan (Retired). Commander XI Corps Western Military
Command, 2001–2004 and former Governor of North West Frontier Province (Khyber
Pakhtunkhawa), 2006–2008 (Rawalpindi, 4 August 2011).
Beg, General Mirza Aslam (Retired). Former Chief of Army Staff, 1988–1991
(Rawalpindi, 2 July 2011).
170 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy
Bokhari, Admiral Fasih (Retired). Former Chief of Naval Staff, 1997–1999 (Islamabad,
15 July 2011).
Durrani, Lt General Asad (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence,
1990–1992 (Islamabad, 24 April 2012).
Gul, Lt General Hamid (Retired). Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence,
1987–1989 (Rawalpindi, 13 July 2011).
Gul, Lt General Mumtaz (Retired). Inspector General Frontier Corps, 1992–1994 and
Commander XI Corps Western Military Command, 1994–1996 (Peshawar, 19 October
2011).
Haq, General Ehsan-ul (Retired). Chairman Joint Chief of Staff 2004–2007 and Director
General Inter-Services Intelligence, 2001–2004 (Islamabad, 7 July 2011).
Haq, Siraj-ul. Right-wing politician and Vice President Jamaat-i-Islami (Peshawar, 19
October 2011).
Hussain, Dr Riffat. Head of the Defense and Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-i-Azam
University and former Press Counselor, Pakistan Embassy Washington, DC,
1933–1997 (Islamabad, 7 August 2011).
Hussain, Zahid. Journalist, political analyst and author (Islamabad, 21 July 2011).
Inderfurth, Karl F. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia in the Clinton Administra-
tion, 1997–2001 (Telephonic Interview, 2 February 2012).
Islam, Dr Mohammad. Director Iqra University, Islamabad and Former Director Area
Study Center, Quaid-i-Azam University (Islamabad, 12 July 2011).
Jones, Seth G. Political scientist at the RAND Corporation and author (Telephonic Inter-
view, 15 February 2012).
Khattak, Afrasyab. Senator, Left-wing, pro-Soviet Politician and former President Awami
National Party (Peshawar, 18 October 2011).
Khokhar, Riaz Hussain. Former Ambassador to New Delhi, 1992–1997 and to Washing-
ton, 1997–1999, and Foreign Secretary, 2002–2005 (Islamabad, 28 July 2011).
Krepon, Michael. Arms control official in the Clinton administration and Co-founder of
the Stimson Center and political/defence analyst (Skype Interview, 3 February 2012).
Kux, Dennis H. Former US Ambassador to Pakistan and author (Telephonic Interview,
18 March 2012).
Lodhi, Dr Maleeha. Former Ambassador to Washington, 1993–1996 and 1999–2002,
journalist (Islamabad, 25 October 2011).
Masood, Lt General Talat (Retired). Former Chairman Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Wah
and Taxila Heavy Industries, Taxila and defence analyst (Islamabad, 6 September 2011).
Mirza, Professor Ashfaq Saleem. Director South Asia Free Media Association, (Islama-
bad, 24 October 2011).
Murshed, Iftikhar. Career diplomat and special envoy to Afghanistan, 1996–2000, author
(Islamabad, 12 August 2011).
Musharraf, General Pervez (Retired). Former President of the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan and Chief of Army Staff, 1998–2007 (Telephonic Interview, 16 July 2012).
Naqvi, Sarwar. Deputy Chief of Mission, Washington DC, 1991–1995 (Islamabad, 12
October 2011).
Nawaz, Shuja. Director South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council and author (Telephonic
Interview, 19 January 2012)
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gence, 1993–1995 (Rawalpindi, 17August 2011).
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agement Sciences and author (Islamabad, 12 August 2011).
 Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy 171
Siddiqa, Dr Ayesha, Author and defence analyst (Islamabad, 19 July 2011).
Weinbaum, Professor Marvin G. Former analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan, US
Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Clinton and George
W. Bush administrations, 1999–2003 (Telephonic Interview, 2 February 2012).
Yusufzai, Rahimullah. Journalist and former BBC correspondent with access to the
Taliban and Osama Bin Laden (Peshawar, 19 October 2011).
Conclusion

The primary goal of this book has been to examine the role of the United States
in the evolution of PFP’s strategic objectives between 1989 and 2001. By doing
this, it has examined the extent to which Clinton’s foreign policy impacted Paki-
stan’s strategic choices in the 1990s. Accordingly, it has investigated the
assumptions underlying the hypothesis that Clinton’s foreign policy created
space for Pakistan’s military establishment to further its regional goals while
impeding the global objectives of the United States.
Clinton’s eight years as the first post- Cold War president in the 1990s are the
focal point of this book because of the impact his foreign policy had on Pakistan.
Not only did Clinton’s presidency span almost the entirety of the period of
interest to this book, but his administration was able to formulate foreign policy
free from the compulsions of the Cold War. As a result, Clinton was relatively
less obliged to perform a balancing act between India and Pakistan. The foreign
policy hard-line adopted by Bill Clinton perpetuated and reinforced the Bush-era
catalysts for the bilateral relationship.
By the end of the 1990s, Clinton’s foreign policy had clearly failed to achieve its
goals in Pakistan: Islamabad tested nuclear weapons in 1998, actively aided the
fundamentalist Taliban regime in Kabul and continued to support militancy in Indian
Kashmir. Furthermore, the US had clearly failed to promote democracy; Clinton’s
policies had succeeded only in strengthening the political role of the military in Paki-
stan and at the end of the decade, a military coup dislodged the civilian government.
A key theme running through this book is that the US has played a role in the
evolution of Pakistan’s post- Cold War strategic choices. The role played by the
US has been demonstrated in its approach to Pakistan’s nuclear program during
and after the Cold War. US efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
demonstrate a desire to prevent the rise of new nuclear states that could in any
way challenge American power. The US also feared the possibility that nuclear
weapons could fall into the wrong hands. This was an era where amorphous,
non-state actors were beginning to emerge as threats to American security. This
is a threat that is – by definition – shadowy and vague, and can spawn mutual
mistrust in inter-state relations.
The Clinton administration’s apparent inability to discern how US actions
affected Pakistani policy-makers stemmed from the differences between the
 Conclusion 173
self-image of the US and how others perceived it. Coercive sanctions – seen by
Pakistanis as discriminatory – failed to modify Islamabad’s behaviour and inad-
vertently motivated it to accelerate its nuclear program. Essentially, an all sticks
and no carrots approach aggravated Pakistan’s security dilemma. By terminating
aid to Pakistan and freezing its existing arms deals – such as the purchase of
F- 16s – the US sacrificed the leverage it had over Pakistan’s decision- making.
Under threat and abandoned by its ally, Pakistan saw developing nuclear
weapons as its only option.
All states fear betrayal in a world that is essentially anarchic; trust and
cooperation – especially among hostile neighbours – is always in short supply. In
the wake of US disengagement from the region following the Soviet–Afghan War,
instead of moving towards conflict resolution like the two superpowers, Islamabad
and New Delhi continued to indulge in brinkmanship. The eruption of Afghan civil
war (1993–1996) after the collapse of the Najibullah Government added fuel to fire.
Western and Afghan analysts often hold the ISI responsible for perpetuating
the Afghan civil war by supporting Hekmatyar. The question is, was the CIA–ISI
joint covert operation against the Soviets not interference in that country? Once
involved in Afghanistan with the blessings of the US – and empowered because
of this involvement – it was naive to expect that the ISI would let go of the stra-
tegic advantage it had gained for Pakistan once the war was over. No rational
actor would.
The ISI’s support for Hekmatyar was not the sole cause that fed the civil war;
it was fought for more reasons than one. Tribalism, ethnicity and the involve-
ment of criminal elements must not be ignored as indigenous factors that fed the
conflict. Other regional actors – including India and Iran – supported rival fac-
tions and the CIA played a double game by supporting Pashtun and non-Pashtun
groups simultaneously.
Before the ISI’s role in Afghanistan is condemned, it is perhaps pertinent to
ask some relevant questions: Why did the US – the godfather of the Afghan
Mujahedeen – not help to establish a broad-based and representative AIG before
disengaging from the region? If the Mujahedeen were trained and equipped
through CIA–ISI joint operations; why was Islamabad left to its own devices to
deal with the aftermath of the war while it was burdened by millions of Afghan
refugees? At the closure of the war, a Soviet puppet regime ruled Kabul;
Afghanistan was littered with abandoned weapons; and was flooded with battle-
hardened fighters such as Osama Bin Laden. He, among many others, sought
refuge in Pakistan, as they were unwelcome in their countries of origin. Why did
the US not help devise and implement a plan for their rehabilitation?
Why did the US not support UN efforts in Afghanistan whole- heartedly?
Why did the Clinton administration not have a strong and unambiguous policy
towards the Pakistan–Taliban connection? Why did the US and its allies not
employ diplomatic methods to deal with the Taliban regime, first by understand-
ing the phenomenon and then deftly exploiting its tribal mindset?
When asked why the US lost interest in Pakistan after the Soviet defeat in
Afghanistan, many American interviewees argued that it was due to a change in
174 Conclusion
security priorities. The US therefore acted as a realist power would, but let us
not forget that when faced with the security dilemma, states as rational actors
resort to self-help to secure their national security interests. Pakistan too acted as
any realist state would.
During the Cold War the Kashmir dispute became progressively less solvable
through diplomatic means, partly due to Indian intransigence but also because of
the security interests of the two superpowers of the world. During the Clinton
era, some US officials saw the Kashmir issue as a legitimate dispute that needed
to be addressed; however this began to change by 1994. Despite rhetorically
encouraging the erratic dialogue between India and Pakistan in 1997, no mean-
ingful effort was made by Clinton to push the two nuclear aspirants towards con-
flict resolution.
The insurgency in Kashmir was largely an indigenous, political phenomenon
that was fed by human rights abuses committed by the Indian forces during the
1990s. Thus, the ISI’s support of the dissidents was not the only reason for its
perpetuation. The Bush administration did not pay heed to Indian complaints
against Pakistan at the right time. The issue of human rights abuses by the Indian
forces also did not elicit an effective US response. Clinton did evince some
interest in this regard initially, but his concerns were later trumped by the eco-
nomic interests of the US. This became apparent in the Clinton–Rao meeting in
1994, when neither the human rights issue in Kashmir nor the suppression of the
Sikh movement in Indian Punjab was raised by President Clinton. Holding the
ISI solely responsible for the perpetuation of the insurgency is therefore a reduc-
tionist approach.
Pakistan supported the rise of the Taliban as an opportunity to balance India’s
power. The ISI exploited the indigenous uprising in Indian Kashmir, with the
Taliban regime providing training camps and manpower. By tolerating the
Taliban initially for economic reasons, the Clinton administration’s foreign
policy managers later did not take advantage of opportunities to wean Pakistan
away from the movement before it captured Kabul and before Pakistan became a
nuclear state. Once there was a friendly Taliban Government in Kabul, Islama-
bad viewed it as a strategic gain acquired at the cost of much blood and treasure;
it would not give up on this advantage willingly.
In order to modify Pakistan’s behaviour, the US needed to address the under-
lying causes of Pakistan’s existential anxieties while taking into account its focus
on India-centric fears. How short-sighted it is to dismiss such fears as paranoia
is substantiated by the recent public admission of the incumbent Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi that the Indian forces played an active role in the cre-
ation of Bangladesh in 1971. Speaking at an official ceremony in Dhaka, Bang-
ladesh, in June 2015, he asserted that the establishment of Bangladesh – in other
words the break-up of Pakistan – ‘was a desire of every Indian’ and therefore
India’s forces ‘fought along with the Mukti Bahini’, the anti-Pakistan rebel
group, to create Bangladesh. Modi elaborated that as a young volunteer in 1971
he participated in the Satyagraha Movement launched by Jana Sangh to gather
support for Mukti Bahini.1
 Conclusion 175
Under the influence of the security dilemma, states act on the basis of pre-
conceptions and base their assessment of enemy intentions on visible material
capabilities. Indian efforts at achieving nuclear weapons capability continued
unabated and unchecked by the United States while New Delhi also continued to
add to its conventional military capacity. Indian claims that its nuclear arsenal
was for defence against China were inadequate for Pakistan because ‘weapons
have meanings in relation to the context and the beliefs of the relevant actors’2
pertaining to their offensive or defensive purposes.
PFP’s post- Cold War regional strategies were therefore practical choices cor-
responding to Islamabad’s threat perception. Pakistan’s efforts to achieve nuclear
technology through third parties were also in congruence with this premise.
These choices were made to ensure policy outcomes that maximized self-interest
in keeping with the concept of states as rational actors in the international
system.
In the early 1990s the ideological supremacy of democratic values over
Soviet-style communism brought into focus the ‘end of history’ and America’s
role as a potential benevolent hegemon. This was in line with the traditional
American self-image of being a force for global good. In an era that saw a
growth in both economic interdependence and ethnic fragmentation, American
global leadership was seen by both Bush and Clinton as integral to global peace.
Clinton in particular focused on the spread of American democracy through mul-
tilateralism. Yet, Clinton’s ‘democracy enlargement’ excluded the democratic
process in Pakistan.
Clinton emphasized the need for ‘concentrated American effort’ to support
Nigeria and Indonesia due to hold elections in 1999 but neglected to urge any
such support for Pakistan that, after eleven years of military rule, had already
held its first elections in 1988. That the Clinton administration was interested in
lucrative Nigerian and Indonesian markets makes it less surprising that the bene-
fits of Lake’s democracy enlargement were not extended to economically unat-
tractive Pakistan. Clinton’s foreign policy towards Pakistan therefore remained
deficient in people- friendly policies. Despite easing some of the economic sanc-
tions in 1995 under the Brown Amendment, bilateral aid programs were not re-
established and grants to Pakistani Non-Governmental Organizations, working
for the general uplift of the people, remained modest. There is no denying the
fact that the corruption and political immaturity of the civilian leadership was
largely responsible for undermining Pakistan’s democratic experience between
1989 and 1999. However, by continuing to view US–Pakistan relations through
the lens of security alone, the Clinton administration strengthened the hand of
the Pakistani military establishment in a country with a history of prolonged
periods of military rule. Imposing ‘democracy sanctions’ after the military coup
in 1999 on Islamabad merely added to the isolation of the country without fur-
thering the cause of democracy.
In order to support Pakistan’s democracy, the US would have needed to focus
on civilian areas of common bilateral interest with a commitment to providing
mutual economic benefits. This was difficult as long as Pakistan was under
176 Conclusion
sanctions. Since the American approach was purely security-oriented, the US
continued to deal directly with the military leadership in Pakistan thereby rein-
forcing its political role. Hence, the bilateral relationship was between a liberal
democracy and a powerful illiberal institution with political powers. Such an
interaction, in the words of Michael Doyle, ‘can increase the prospect that a
single conflict will determine an entire relationship’.3
The story of Pakistan–US relations in the 1990s is a reflection of wider
changes in US strategic thinking after the Cold War. This narrative is also the
story of how the collaboration between the CIA and the ISI during the 1980s
resulted in changes in Pakistan’s strategic thinking. It is thus the story of how
two states and erstwhile allies chose to optimize post- Cold War outcomes to
protect their self-interest as pragmatic actors. In some ways, the patterns in the
relationship between the two states were a continuation of those from the Cold
War. In other ways the collapse of the Soviet Union changed both the world
order and this relationship in irrevocable ways.
The aim of this narrative has not been to gauge the ethical dimensions of the
approaches of either Washington or Islamabad. It has, however, attempted to
show that Islamabad’s behaviour in the 1990s needs to be examined and under-
stood, not blindly condemned.
Not all rational choices lead to positive outcomes. In the aftermath of 9/11
and US–Pakistan re-engagement, more than 60,000 Pakistanis – a majority being
civilians – have lost their lives in terrorist violence. At the time of writing, Paki-
stan’s military is fighting a war against terrorist groups in the tribal areas, and
the costly and dangerous nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan continues
unabated. Since 9/11, terrorist networks have mutated and branched into ever
more brutal outfits. What started as a struggle to prevent Soviet domination in
Afghanistan in the 1980s is now impacting the lives of millions in Asia, Africa,
America and Europe. The unintended consequences of the US War on Terror
have resulted in the entanglement of the American military in various parts of
the world in a seemingly unending fight against transnational terrorist networks.
Pakistan continues to pay the price for its strategic choices in the 1990s. So
does the United States.

Notes
1 ‘Indian Forces Fought along Mukti Bahini: Modi’, The News, 8 June 2015; ‘Modi’s
Remarks in Bangladesh Aimed at Fanning Hatred against Pakistan’, The Times of
India, 10 June 2015. Jana Sangh (1951–1977) was the political arm of the extremist
Hindu right-wing organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).
2 Ken Booth and Nicholas J Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 43.
3 Michael Doyle, ‘Liberal Internationalism: Peace, War and Democracy’, Nobelprize.
org, www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/doyle/, accessed May 2012.
Index

Afghan: analysts 173; civil war 83, 173; Albright, Madeleine 45, 69n41, 85, 95, 98,
commanders 63; conflict 49, 62, 141; 102, 118n116
council 47; demand 153; expert 110; Algerian 142
fighters/militia 49, 62, 64, 107; Ali, Foreign Minister Assef 19, 22, 32n66,
government 27, 40, 104, 109, 153; 33n90, 57, 70n61, 73n148, 74n169, 94,
groups 47; imbroglio/issue/problem 54, 103–4, 110, 116n75, 117n89, 119n142,
105–6, 136, 139, 156; interim 120n169, 120n173, 122n222, 134,
government 47, 54, 70n63, 75n203, 142–3, 147–8, 156, 158–9, 161n9,
81, 104; Islamists 154; Jihad 154; 162n65, 163n88, 163n96, 165n141,
leaders 11; mujahedeen 27, 62, 173; 165n161, 165n165, 165n166, 166n185
policy 7, 84, 90, 100, 120n161, All Party Afghan Conference 103
120n164, 120n178, 121n203, 132, Al-Qaeda 111, 142
137–8, 144, 165n160, 166n197; power American military aid 9
struggle 150; refugees 45, 70n50, 84, Amin, Tahir 17, 24, 32n51, 34n101, 55,
150, 173; rehabilitation/resettlement; 61, 65, 73n132, 73n143, 74n184,
63, 70n51, 78, 164n111; strategy 75n219, 101, 119n139, 137–8, 162n23,
136–7; Taliban 7; territory 91, 136, 162n24, 162n28, 164n124
151–2 Amnesty International 102, 119n156,
Afghan–Soviet War 1, 26–7, 40, 46, 66, 120n156
141, 173 Arab 9, 18, 24, 55, 142, 154–5
Afghanistan 1–3, 7, 11, 19, 21, 24–9, Arab–Israel 9, 11, 24
34n107, 34n109, 34n120, 34n121, Aspin, Leslie 44, 114n10
34n123, 40–1, 45–54, 60–6, 70n58, Aurakzai, Lt General Ali Jan 46, 62,
70n59, 70n60, 70n62, 70n66, 70n67, 70n52, 74n194, 129, 143, 152, 162n60,
72n127, 73n150, 74n189, 75n202, 84, 164n130
90–2, 95, 100–11, 113, 115n56, Awami National Party 26, 39
119n142, 119n145, 119n146, 119n149, Ayub, Foreign Minister Gauhar 55, 96
119n156, 120n156, 120n162, 120n163, Azad Kashmir 23, 106, 112, 154
120n165, 120n168, 120n170, 120n175, Aziz, Foreign Minister Sartaj 136, 161n14
120n177, 121n182, 121n202, 121n205,
121n206, 121n210, 121n211, 122n212, Babar, Maj General Naseerullah 100, 103,
122n214, 122n215, 122n16, 122n19, 158
122n224, 122n227, 122n231, 122n235, Badaber 12
122n238, 132, 134, 136–41, 146, Baghdad Pact 11, 14, 18, 32n53
150–60, 164n134, 165n141, 165n153, Baker, James 43, 59, 61, 64, 74n173, 91,
165n163, 166n187, 173, 176 112
Ahmad, Shamshad 96, 148, 156 ‘Balkanization’ 140
Akram, Munir 96, 117n101, 118n103 Balkans 83, 90, 92, 111
Alavi, Hamza 13, 30n27 Baluch 11, 153
178 Index
Bangladesh 2, 23–4, 58, 60, 149, 154, 174, Byman 152, 164n134
176n1 Byroade, Henry 9, 17, 29n6
Bartholomew, Reginald 57
Bay of Bengal 23 Caroe, Sir Olaf 13, 31n30, 35
Bearden, Milt 64, 75n206 Casey, William 26
Beg, General Aslam 26, 34n115, 47, 49, Caspian Sea 95
60, 70n57, 71n94, 71n96, 71n100, Central Asia 13, 41, 46, 48, 63, 87, 90,
71n104, 72n112, 72n116, 73n146, 110–13, 122n224, 139–40
73n153, 74n178, 75n204, 109, 114n19, Central Asian Republics (CARs) 90, 95,
119n136, 122n220, 122n232, 133–4, 138–40, 158, 166n174
146, 151, 161n7, 161n16, 161n19, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 6,
163n77, 163n84, 163n91, 164n103, 25–7, 34n105, 36, 40, 49, 52, 55–6,
165n162, 166n173 60–5, 70n59, 72n108, 100, 103, 108,
Beijing 22–3, 54, 60, 95, 146–7, 163n80 112, 120n163, 122, 127, 141–2, 148,
Belarus 45 151, 173, 176
Bengali 18, 23, 58 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 11,
Berger, Sandy 45, 94, 110, 147 14–15, 17, 31–2, 32n53, 37–8
Berlin Wall 41 Chace, James 44
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 96, 149 Cheney, Richard 43, 59
Bhutto, Prime Minister Benazir 39, 50, 53, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) 4, 39, 46–7,
59, 61, 71n89, 85, 94, 100, 103–4, 107, 60, 82, 93, 96–7, 108, 130, 133–5, 138,
110, 112, 129, 133–7, 141, 147–8, 148
156–9, 161n1, 165n164 China 3, 6, 8, 12–16, 20–4, 28–9, 41, 45,
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 3, 19, 22, 24–5, 154 48, 54–5, 57, 59–61, 66, 72n126, 86,
Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement 89–90, 94–5, 97, 117n95, 139–40,
14–15, 22 145–8, 157, 166, 175
Blair House meeting 155, 158 Christopher, Warren 43, 83, 91, 114n5,
Blumenthal, Sidney 44 116n65, 156
Bogra, Mohammad Ali 8, 18 CIA–ISI 25, 27, 29, 62–3, 65, 173
Bokhari, Admiral Fasih 26–7, 34n116, civil–military: consensus 134; decision-
34n119, 34n125, 53, 72n121, 75n205, making oligarchy 136; elite 142, 160;
87, 115n39, 115n43, 115n58, 117n90, leadership 53, 58–9, 97, 149, 160;
122n232, 135, 154, 158, 161n11, policy-makers 109; relations 87, 158,
165n144, 166n186 161n10, 163n78
Bombay bombings 91, 141, 157 Clinton, William Jefferson 1–2, 4–7, 41,
Bosnia 89, 116n67, 125, 146 44–5, 66; administration 4, 7, 44, 47,
Bottom-up Review (BUR) 44, 114, 127 84–5, 89, 90–111, 113, 132, 138, 143,
Brahimi, Lakhdar 140 145, 149–50, 172–5; approach 2, 4, 6,
Bridas (Argentinean firm) 90 66, 84, 89–91, 100, 106, 109–11, 113,
British India 133 161; foreign policy 4–7, 7n1, 66, 69n34,
Brown Amendment 85, 90, 93–5, 112, 69n42, 84, 90–3, 110, 113, 144, 155,
157, 175 160–1, 172, 175; presidency 66, 84, 87,
Brown, Hank 85, 104, 156, 159 108
Brown, Ron 87 Cogan, Charles G. 61, 70n59, 74n186
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 43, 47, 68n25, Cohen, Senator William 58
69n46, 70n65, 75n208 Cohen, Stephen P. 7n2, 15, 30n15, 30n24,
Bulganin, Premier Nicolai 20 31n38, 33n75, 33n76, 34n102
Bundy, MacGeorge 21, 33, 38 cold tests 52, 157
Burma 83 Cold War
Bush George H.W. 4, 6–7, 27, 40–4, Coll, Steve 34n104, 34n105, 34n111, 62,
46–66, 68n20, 68n21, 68n22, 68n23, 64–5, 73n162, 74n170, 74n190, 75n198,
68n24, 68n26, 69n47, 74n168, 74n193, 75n206, 75n215, 122n221, 122n229,
83–4, 91, 112–13, 116n67, 132, 138, 123n240, 154, 164n120, 165n143
150–1, 156, 172, 174–5 ‘Commerce Forum’ 87
 Index 179
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Federally Administered Tribal Areas
45, 86, 107, 118n130 (FATA) 11, 45–6, 49, 62, 112, 137, 152,
conventional weapons 107, 145 154, 160
Cordovez, Diego 27, 34n123, 70n58, Feinstein, Dianne 92
70n66 Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
Council for Defense and National Security 45, 147
(CDNS) 135 France 24, 105, 122n223, 146, 163n80
Cox, Michel 42 Fuerth, Leon 44
Cranston, Senator 49–50, 58
Cuban Missile Crisis 20–1 Gandhi, Prime Minister Rajiv 156
Gates, Robert 60
Daoud, Mohammad 153–4 Gelb, Leslie 83
de-hyphenating India 143 General Headquarters of the Pakistan
Defense Policy Guidance 1992 (DPG) 43 Army (GHQ) 160
‘disputed territory’ 10, 85, 139, 143, 149 Geneva Accords, The 27, 40, 47, 54, 60,
Dulles, John Forster 9, 12–13, 16–18, 64
30n20, 30n21, 31n28, 75n202 Ghauri missile 117n100, 145
Dumbrell, John 1, 7n1, 68n22, 68n27, Ghaus, Mullah 151
68n30, 69n42, 116 Glenn Amendments 49, 57, 86
Durand Line 11, 30n11 Glenn, Senator John 49, 50, 52–3, 58,
Durrani, Lt General Asad 25, 34n110, 46, 71n79, 71n86, 72n113, 72n122, 92, 99,
48, 50, 62, 64, 70n54, 70n69, 71n84, 118n126
74n191, 75n210, 105, 107, 111, Gore, Al 45, 147
121n183, 122n232, 136–7, 139, 141, Graham, Frank 16
143, 150, 153, 160, 161n15, 161n18, Gul, Lt General Hamid 26, 27, 34n114,
161n20, 162n27, 162n33, 162n41, 34n122, 46, 50–1, 63–4, 70n56, 70n70,
162n48, 162n59, 162n63, 164n118, 71n88, 71n91, 72n105, 73n131, 73n153,
165n139, 166n196 74n180, 75n199, 75n201, 112, 119n136,
123n245, 136–8, 141, 144, 147, 149,
Eagleburger, Lawrence 43, 45 151, 160, 161n17, 162n32, 162n45,
East Asia 90 163n70, 163n90, 164n101, 164n117,
East Pakistan 8, 10, 18, 23, 29, 113 164n119, 164n124, 165n162
Egypt 9, 14, 18, 56 Gul, Lt General Mumtaz 63–4, 104,
Egyptian (fighters) 142 120n172, 161n2
Einhorn, Robert 93, 116, 147 Gulf War (1990–1991) 42–3, 48, 53, 56,
Eisenhower, President 9, 12, 14–15, 92, 151
17–20, 30n7, 31n29, 31n32, 31n34, Gutmen, Roy 75–6, 109, 119n154, 119n155,
31n44 120n179, 121n181, 122n218, 122n237
En Lai, Zhou 23 Gwadar Port 90
Europe 11, 20, 51, 65–6, 67n9, 67n10,
69n48, 90, 92, 176 Haass, Richard N. 41, 60, 76–7, 98,
Evans, Alexander 80, 154, 165n150 118n118, 67n3
Haiti 45, 111
F-16 (fighter jets) 90, 93–4, 97, 113, Haq, General Ehsan-ul 53, 56, 71n76,
118n125, 145, 157; acquire/purchase 58, 72n117, 73n145, 74n177, 74n179,
90, 173; bargaining chip/exchange 59, 95, 74n195, 106, 119n136, 121n191,
93, 97; decline to transfer 56; problem/ 121n192, 138, 141, 143, 149, 152, 154,
dispute/issue 85, 92, 97; reimburse/ 162n22, 162n29, 162n47, 162n55,
release/delivery/non-delivery 85–6, 95, 162n64, 163n73, 164n102, 164n131,
97, 146, 155, 157; sale of 50, 94 165n142
Fair, Christine 98, 118n119, 118n125 Haq, General Zia-ul 18–19, 24–5, 27, 52,
Faisal, Turki Al 156 61, 133–4, 152, 156
Farah (province on Pakistan–Afghanistan Haq, Siraj-ul 58, 73n159, 100, 119n138,
border) 101 142, 154, 165n146, 165n156
180 Index
Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA) 106–8, 121n202, 95–100, 102–3, 105–7, 109–10, 112–14,
155, 158 114n14, 117n95, 117n100, 118n111,
Hassan, Brigadier Javed 159 118n127, 119n145, 119n150, 120n159,
Hathaway, Robert 156, 159 120n162, 120n165, 120n170, 121n199,
Heavy Industries Complex 145 121n201, 121n203, 121n207, 121n209,
Hekmatyar, Gulbadin 47, 62–3, 100, 106, 122n212, 122n216, 123n241, 132, 134,
132, 150–1, 154, 173 137–8, 140, 145–7, 150–1, 154–5, 160,
Helmand (province on the Pakistan– 163n80, 164n107, 164n125, 165n152,
Afghanistan border) 101 165n154, 165n155, 165n163, 166n172,
Henderson, Loy 16 166n175, 166n187, 172–6
Hersh, Seymour 50–1, 71n85, 71n103, 79 Islamabad Accord 47
Hezb-i-Islami 150 Islami, Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) 136–7, 147
Hezb-ul Mujahedeen 106 ‘Islamic bloc’ 54–6, 60, 63, 95, 97, 139
‘Hindu Bomb’ 54 ‘Islamic Bomb’ 54, 56, 73n130, 94
Hindus 10, 17 Ispahani, Mirza Abol Hasan 12
Hoar, General Joseph 147 Israel 9, 11, 18, 24, 54–7, 65, 95–6,
Hollen, Chistopher van 12, 23, 30n17, 110–11, 117n98, 138, 166n177, 168
34n97
Huntington, Samuel P. 67n7, 68n13, 93, Jalalabad 107–8, 136, 155, 158
117 Jamaat-i-Islami 24, 58, 82, 100, 107, 130,
Hussain, Riffat 91, 105, 108, 116n60, 142, 154
121n187, 122n213, 135, 150, 159, Jammu and Kashmir 2, 10, 16, 21, 31n47
164n137, 166n192, 166n194 Jervis, Robert 11, 30n12, 73n155, 145,
Hussain, Syed Mushahid 48, 71n78 163n76
Hussain, Syeda Abida 65, 75 ‘Jewish Bomb’ 54
Hussain, Zahid 48, 57, 71n77, 73n149, ‘jihad’ 26, 32n64, 154; Jihadists 26
107, 121n196, 144, 163n71, 164n112 Jinnah, Fatima 18
Hyderabad 10 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali 12
Hyland, William G. 43, 68n26 Johnson, President 15, 21–2
Jones, Seth 73n150, 83, 111, 114n4,
Inderfurth, Karl 47–8, 70n64, 70n68, 119n136, 119n142, 122n233, 151,
87–90, 95–6, 98, 101, 108–9, 111, 164n122
115n45, 115n52, 115n57, 118n121, Junagarh 10
119n136, 119n143, 122n233, 159, Junejo, Prime Minister 27
164n114
India-centric 2, 5, 7–8, 12, 18, 25, 28, 98, Kabul 2, 7, 11, 26–7, 40–1, 46, 49, 53,
140, 143, 150, 174 60–4, 84, 87, 101–6, 109–10, 119n152,
India–Pakistan war 16, 23, 32 119n153, 132, 134, 144, 151, 152–3,
Indian (occupied/administered) Kashmir 172–4
2–3, 41, 65, 84–5, 91, 106–7, 112, 143, Kahuta 24, 166n177, 168
154, 172, 174 Kandahar 64, 100–1, 104, 106, 119n150,
Indian Punjab 85, 91, 113, 174 158
‘indispensable nation’ 44 Kansi, Aimal 112
Indo–China War 15, 21 Kanter, Arnold 65
Indo-Pakistan War (1971) 23 Karamat, General Jahangir 96–7, 104, 108,
International Atomic Energy Agency 145, 148, 154, 163n72, 163n98,
(IAEA) 147 165n151
Indonesia 3, 84, 175 Kargil 86–9, 113, 115n40, 118n107, 134,
Iqbal, Lt General Shahid 106, 121n191 156–8, 163n100
Islam, Mohammad 32n58, 61, 74n181, Kashmir 1–4, 6, 13, 16, 20–1, 28, 31n47,
74n185, 137, 162n24, 164 32n47, 41, 46, 48–9, 59, 61, 64–6, 84–5,
Islamabad 2–7, 24, 26–7, 29–30, 34n110, 88–92, 96, 100, 106–9, 112–14, 114n14,
40–1, 45–52, 54, 57–60, 62, 64–6, 114n21, 114n38, 114n190, 114n200,
70n67, 71n78, 75n214, 84, 86–92, 132, 137, 143–4, 150, 153–5, 157–8,
 Index 181
160, 165n159, 172, 174; accession 16, Knowland, Senator William F. 15
20; dispute/issue 11, 14, 16, 20–1, 28, Kolbe, Jim 58, 73n165, 81
86–9, 98, 107, 155; disputed territory Kosovo 83
139; human rights abuses 85, 174; Krepon, Michael 19, 32n67, 74, 80, 84–5,
insurgency 64–5, 85, 107, 112–13, 137, 87–8, 114n9, 114n13, 115n37, 115n41,
154, 174; muslims 31, 143; policy/ 130, 142–3, 162n49, 162n56, 162n61
strategy 4, 6–8, 64, 91, 133–4, 141–2, Kureishi, Omer 54, 73n130
155, 160 Kuwait 54
Kashmiri 64, 106–7, 144, 154–5 Kux, Dennis 17, 29n6, 30n20, 30n21,
Kazakhstan 45–6 31n40, 31n42, 32n49, 32n54, 32n56,
Kennan, George F. 8, 29n1, 33n79 32n69, 34n106, 50–1, 61–2, 71n83,
Kennedy, President 15, 20–1, 28, 33n71, 71n89, 71n92, 71n95, 73n140, 73n151,
33n80, 33n88 74n166, 74n167, 74n187, 74n192,
Kenya 108 74n197, 75n217, 82, 94, 114n18,
Keohane, Robert O. 13, 22, 30n26, 33n92, 114n20, 115n33, 117n86, 119n147,
68n14 164n116, 165n156, 170
Kerr, Richard 60, 63 Kyrgyzstan 46
Khalilzad, Zalmay 43, 63, 70n63, 75n203,
81, 110–11, 114n22, 122n227, 122n231, Laden, Osama Bin 75n202, 75–6, 108,
140, 152, 164n134, 167 111, 121n204, 121n205, 126–7, 131,
Khan, Abdul Qadeer 51, 53, 72n118, 149, 136, 155, 157–9, 173
147 Laghman 102
Khan, Aziz 156 Lahore 9–10, 22, 26, 72n127, 162n37,
Khan, Farah 26 166n171
Khan, Feroz Hassan 98, 144, 149, 161n4, Lahore Declaration 158
163n85, 164n106 Lake, Anthony 44–5, 67n4, 69n32, 69n34,
Khan, General Yahya 18, 23 113, 123n246, 148, 175
Khan, President Ayub 11–12, 15, 18, Langley, Ambassador James 14
21–2, 24, 30n20, 33n80, 33n82, 33n84, Langley, Virginia 108
33n86 Lantos, Tom 112
Khan, President Ghulam Ishaq 50, 56–7, Leffler, Melvyn P. 29n4, 42, 67
132–4, 136 Leghari, President Farooq 87, 135, 156
Khan, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali 12, 17, Lieven, Anatol 141, 162n40, 162n46
35 Line of Control (LOC) 143
Khan, Riaz Mohammad 148, 163n97 Lippmann, Walter 17, 32n55
Khan, Sahibzada Yaqub Ali 59, 74n167, Lipset, Seymour 42, 68, 76
134, 156 Lodhi, Maleeha 73n156, 85, 94–5, 111,
Khan, Shahryar 53, 57, 156–7 114n12, 114n24, 116n64, 117n87,
Khattak, Afrasyab 26, 34n117, 130, 144, 117n92, 118n129, 122n234, 142, 156,
155, 158, 163n69, 165n167, 166n178, 159, 164n108
166n182, 170 Loya Jirga 15
Khobar Towers 108
Khokhar, Riaz 55, 73n134, 85, 114n12, M-11 missile 54–5, 145, 147–8, 157
115n31, 115n42, 115n44, 115n46, McConaughy, Ambassador 15
115n51, 117n94, 118n108, 135, 142–3, Mcmahon, Robert 12–15, 17, 30n7, 30n9,
156–7, 161n12, 162n62, 166n167 30n16, 31n46, 32n52, 33n71
Khost 107–8 Macmillan, Prime Minister Harold 21, 38
Khrushchev, President Nikita 20 Masood, Ahmed Shah 63
Kimitt, Robert 61 Mazar-i-Sharif 159
Kissinger, Henry 20, 23–4, 33n79, 33n94, Middle East 2, 8–9, 13–14, 17, 23, 31n34,
34n96, 34n97, 34n100, 34n103, 47, 34n107, 48, 55, 66, 71n81, 85, 95–6
69n42 Middle East Defence Organization
Knight, Ridgway B. 12, 30n17, 38, (MEDO) 9
122n217 Milam, Ambassador William 159
182 Index
Military Assistance Program (MAP) 21 Nehru–Liaquat Agreement 10
military coup 18, 172, 175 Nepal 140
Mirza, President Iskander 18 New Delhi 11, 13, 46, 54, 58, 86–9, 94,
Missile Technology Control Regime 114n16, 130, 140, 155, 173, 175
(MTCR), 86 New World Order 43, 117n83, 117n93,
Mogadishu 45 118n128
Moscow 12, 21–2, 115n34, 127 New York Times 43, 67n8, 68n26, 68n28,
‘most allied ally’ 11, 144 69n34, 69n45, 72n126, 74n171, 74n188,
Moynihan, Patrick 92 115n38, 117n78, 117n82, 118n104,
Mujahedeen 27, 41, 47, 54, 60, 62–4, 100, 166n169, 166n172
106, 136, 142, 151, 155–6, 173 Nigeria 84, 175
Mukti Bahini 174, 176 Nimitz, Chester 16
Murshed, Iftikhar 47, 70n62, 70n67, 104, Nishtar, Sardar Abdur Rab 18
108, 110–11, 120n171, 122n214, Nixon, President Richard 13, 23–4, 29,
122n228, 122n235, 142, 156, 159–60, 31n29, 33n94, 34n97, 34n99, 34n103
162n52, 164n124, 166n191 Niyazov, President 91
Musa, General Mohammad 18 No Dong missiles 145
Musharraf, General Pervez 40, 46, 51, 47, non-aligned India 21–2
62, 66n1, 70n53, 71n97, 73n147, Non-Nuclear Aggression Agreement 156
74n196, 87–8, 105–6, 110, 121n185, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 45, 59, 96,
121n193, 122n226, 134, 137, 142–3, 147
149–50, 154–5, 158–61, 162n26, Noon, Feroz Khan 18
162n50, 162n54, 162n58, 163n99, Noorani, A.G. 20, 32n57, 33n74
164n104, 164n113, 165n142, 165n149, North Korea 95, 145, 149
166n179, 166n181, 166n190 North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 12,
Muslim 3, 8–10, 18, 24, 26, 31n47, 41, 46, 82, 169
54–5, 96, 142–3, 149 Northern Ireland 89
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 12 Northern Tier 9, 13, 17
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 11 nuclear: arms race 157, 176; arsenal 45,
Mutual Security Act 12, 30n13, 33n70 107, 175; bomb 93, 118n124, 125;
capability 3, 26, 29, 53–4, 58, 60, 142,
Naghman 102 146–7; conflict 59–60; deterrence 45,
Nairobi 108 149; domain 147; explosive device 49,
Najibullah, President Mohammad 26–7, 52; parity 7, 9, 24, 54, 147; policies 4, 6;
40, 47, 61–2, 64–5, 90, 102, 119n152, powers 45, 172; processing plant 24;
144, 173 program 1, 4, 6–7, 16, 25, 27, 34n118,
Nangarhar 102 40–1, 48–59, 61, 66, 84, 98–100, 112,
Naqvi, Sarwar 56, 73n142, 85, 94, 105, 132, 134, 138–40, 146, 148–50, 155–6,
114n11, 117n87, 120n180, 159–60, 160, 172, 173; proliferation 43, 54, 59,
162n40, 166n188, 167n198 66, 69n48, 71n97, 84, 96–9, 113;
Nasir, General Javed 107, 112, 139, 141, responsibility 134; sanctions 6, 49, 56,
144 98, 132, 134, 145; state 2, 60, 146, 174;
National Development Complex 145 technology 41, 51, 53, 66, 93, 95–6,
National Security Strategy (NSS) 44, 113, 149, 157, 175; test 2, 24, 29, 86,
69n38 88, 96–7, 99, 113, 115n29, 118n111,
Nawaz, General Asif 112, 148 134, 138, 148, 155, 157–8, 166n172;
Nawaz, Shuja 21, 29n3, 33n87, 33n91, weapons 2–4, 24, 27, 29, 34n112,
112, 116n75, 123n244, 151, 155, 161n6, 40–1, 45, 49–50, 52–5, 57, 59–60, 66,
162n42, 163n93, 163n95, 163n98, 69n48, 71n93, 71n99, 72n107, 72n124,
164n127, 164n129, 164n133, 165n158 73n158, 74n172, 84, 92–4, 96–7, 99,
Nawaz-Vajpayee talks 158 109, 111, 113, 116n71, 132–3, 146–7,
Nazimuddin, Khawaja 17–18 149–50, 155, 160, 165n148, 172–3,
Nehru, Jawahalal 10, 12–13, 15–16, 20–1, 175
30n10 Nye, Joseph 111, 122n233, 138
 Index 183
Oakley, Robert 51, 56–7, 74n167, 139, 156 Qichen, Qian 148
Omar, Mullah 110, 136 Quaid-i-Azam University 137
Operation Brass-tacks 59 Quetta 26, 46
Operation Gibraltar 22
Rabbani, Mullah 151
Pakistan Foreign Policy (PFP) 2, 22, 24, Rabbani, President Burhanuddin 47, 154
26–9, 40–1, 56–7, 60–1, 65–6, 84–5, 92, Rahman, Maulana Fazl-ur 151
100, 113–14 Rais, Rasul Bukhsh 97, 118n112
Pakistan Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) 1, Ralston, General Joseph 108
3–4, 6, 25–7, 29, 40, 46–7, 49, 52–3, Rana, Lt General Naseem 159
61–5, 71n101, 85, 91, 100–9, 112, 132, RAND report 86
134–42, 144, 147, 150–1, 154–7, Rao, Prime Minister Narasimha 158
159–60, 161n18, 173–4, 176 Raphel, Robin 85, 87, 101–5, 109–10, 113,
Pakistan Ordnance Factory 145 115n34, 119n154, 120n165, 120n174,
Pakistan People Party (PPP) 136 120n175, 121n181, 122n216, 126–8,
Pakistan–Afghanistan border 46, 101, 112, 165n163
150 Rashid, Ahmed 26, 34n113, 70n60, 71n81,
Pakistan–China nexus 139 91, 101, 105, 109–10, 116n59, 116n61,
Pakistan–Iran 41 119n140, 119n151, 121n186, 122n215,
Palmer, Norman 20, 33n73 122n225, 151
partition of India 2, 10, 20, 31n47, 106 Reagan, Ronald 19, 25–7, 34n99, 34n118,
Pasha Dump 64 47, 49–53, 63, 67n8, 71n81
Pashtun 11, 31n47, 45–7, 62–3, 137, Richardson, Bill 110, 142, 159
150–1, 153–4, 156, 173 Riedel, Bruce 32n64, 55–6, 61, 73n133,
‘Pashtunistan’ 11, 20–1, 46, 153, 156 73n144, 74n183, 91–2, 96–7, 99, 102,
‘peaceful bomb’ 56 106, 111, 114n20, 115n40, 116n72,
Perry, William 85, 87, 94 118n107, 119n133, 119n136, 119n148,
Persian Gulf 3, 8–9, 13, 25, 69n47 121n188, 122n233, 149, 163n100
Peshawar 12, 21, 26, 30n14, 47, 63, Rizvi, Hasan Askari 46, 70n55, 76, 161n2,
73n137, 130–1, 142 161n10, 163n78, 166n184
Peshawar Accord 47 Rohrabacher, Dana 111–12, 122n236
Pickering, Thomas 85, 88, 108 Rosner, Jeremy 44
‘Politicized Islamic influence’ 111 Rostow, Walt 21
post 9/11 1, 5, 52, 55, 152–3 Russia 12, 17, 42, 45, 57, 90, 120n162
post-Cold War 2, 4, 6, 41–3, 45, 51, 55,
61, 68n18, 77–8, 84–7, 89, 92, 115n32, Sagan, Scott 58
115n35, 115n56, 122n224, 124–5, 138, San Francisco 83, 114n1
150, 172, 175–6 Sangh, Jana 174, 176
Pressler Amendment 34n112, 38, 49–51, Sattar, Abdul 14, 18, 31n33, 31n36, 31n45,
53, 56, 58–9, 65, 72n122, 72n124, 32n59, 33n72, 33n95, 73n139
74n172, 85, 90, 93, 97, 100, 116n71, Satyagraha movement 174
132, 138, 142, 155, 157, 159 Saudi Arabia 18, 23, 25–6, 48, 101, 105, 159
Pressler, Senator Larry 49, 53–6, 58–9, Scowcroft, Brent 34n103, 43, 50, 59, 62,
71n97, 72n124, 72n128, 72n129, 68n24, 74n192, 74n193
73n136, 73n137, 74n172, 74n175, 86, Shah, King Zahir 104, 139, 156
92–4, 116n71, 138–9 Shaheen missile program 145
Prithvi (missile) 145 Shaikh, Farzana 3, 7, 99, 118n124
Punjab 10, 46, 85, 91, 112–13, 114n16; s174 Sharif, Nawaz 3, 47, 54, 58–9, 86–9, 95–8,
107, 112, 115n49, 118n127, 134–5, 137,
Qadir, Foreign Minister Manzur 14 149, 155, 157–9
Qazi, Lt General Javed Ashraf 34, 64, Sharma, D.P. 65, 75n216
75n211, 112, 119n136, 123n240, 134, Sheikh, Najmuddin 103, 156, 159
141, 151, 161n8, 162n36, 162n43, Shia 25, 27, 53, 101, 111, 156
162n51, 164n124, 164n126, 164n128 Siachen 25, 34n108, 48, 157
184 Index
Siddiqa, Ayesha 9–10, 30n7, 137, 139–40, Taliban–Pakistan connection/nexus 4, 101,
144, 146, 152–3, 160, 162n25, 162n34, 103, 111
162n38, 163n68, 163n82, 164n135, Taliban–US 110, 160
165n140, 166n195 Tashkent, Uzbekistan 140
Sikh 85, 113, 174 Taxila 145
Simla, Agreement 17 ‘Tehran-led Islamic Bloc’ 95
Simons, Thomas 103 terror watch list 91, 108, 112, 135, 146
Sind 10 terrorist state 65, 75n212, 91, 112, 114n15,
Sino–India War/conflict 20, 22 123n242
Smith, Stefan 105 terrorists 4, 91
Solarz 59, 139 Thornton, Thomas P. 23, 34n98, 48,
Solarz Amendment 51 70n75, 73n163, 163n74
Somalia 3, 45, 111, 146 training camps 91, 107–8, 112, 121n202,
South Asia 7, 9, 20, 24, 30n7, 30n11, 155, 174
30n15, 30n16, 31n44, 32n48, 32n53, ‘Trans Asian Axis’ 95
33n71, 33n75, 33n78, 33n85, 34n97, 52, ‘Troika’ 4, 134–5, 147–8, 163n89, 163n94
58–9, 70n55, 71n78, 71n97, 72n128, Truman 9, 16, 31n31, 67n11
74n174, 83, 85–7, 93, 99, 113, 114n25, Turkmenistan 46, 87, 90–1, 104, 109
115n29, 117n95, 118n122, 120n174, Tuscun, Arizona 59
122n236, 138, 158, 161, 162n44, Tyler, Patrick 43, 68n28
162n57, 166n166, 166n174
South East Asia 8, 11, 13 Ukraine 45
South East Asian Treaty Organization UN Security Council 20, 96
(SEATO) 11, 14, 22 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 105
Soviet puppet regime 173 United Nations (UN) 11, 32, 117n101
Soviet–Afghan War/conflict 1, 6, 26–7, 40, Unocal (an American oil company) 90–1,
46, 49, 51, 66, 141, 173 105, 109–10, 122n223
Spin Boldak (province on the Pakistan US economic aid 15, 89
Afghanistan border) 101 US Foreign Relations 42, 44
Srinagar 65 US Military Advisory Group (USMAG)
Steinberg, Donald 44 19
‘strategic defiance’ 151 US military aid 3, 13, 19–20, 28, 48, 57, 86
strategic depth 139, 150–3, 164n134 US sanctions 4, 19, 29, 40–1, 50, 56–9, 61,
‘strategic military intimidation’ 54 66, 71, 80, 86, 90, 93–4, 98, 99, 100,
Suez Crisis 18 109, 113, 115, 118, 138–9, 148–9,
Suhrawardy, Prime Minister Hussain 154–60, 173, 175–6; Bush 54–5;
12–13, 18 economic 145, 175; MTCR 148; nuclear
Sunni 25, 27, 53 6, 40, 49, 56, 98, 132, 134, 145;
Sununu, John H. 59 selective 99
Symington Amendments (1976) 49, 57 US–China relations 29
Symington law 99 US–India/India–US 4, 55, 87, 89, 91, 97,
100, 113, 116n69, 143
Tahir-Kheli, Shirin 31n37, 32n68, 98, US–Pakistan alliance 10, 18, 20
118n120 Uzbekistan 46, 110, 140
Tajikistan 46
Talbott, Strobe 86, 93, 96–7, 99, 107–8, Vajpayee 88, 158
115n27, 116n76, 117n79, 117n99, Vandenberg, Hoyt 14
118n104, 118n105, 118n109, 118n122, Vietnam 22, 24, 44
121n198, 121n199, 145, 147–8, 163n72,
163n97 Waheed, General Abdul 93, 103–4, 133–4,
Taliban: movement 100, 102, 111, 142, 141, 147–8
150, 156, 158; regime 2, 91, 105, War on Terror 5, 176
109–10, 132, 134, 158–60, 172–4 Washington 6, 12, 19, 23, 33n80, 33n83,
Taliban-Kashmiri nexus 154 33n85, 34n100, 49–50, 55, 57, 59, 61,
 Index 185
65, 67n4, 68n20, 69n32, 69n41, 85, Wirsing, Robert G. 33n78, 34n108, 93,
87–8, 91, 93–4, 101, 105–6, 109, 117n83, 117n93, 118n128
112–13, 115, 117n95, 117n97, 118n122, Woolsey, James 103
148, 156–60, 165n150, 176 World Bank 90
Washington Post 34n105, 34n111, 52, World Trade Centre 108, 112
67n5, 68n12, 70n66, 70n72, 71n87,
72n109, 72n114, 72n123, 73n160, Yemen 108
74n170, 116n62, 116n74, 117n81, Yousaf, Brigadier Mohammad 64
117n95, 122n227, 122n231, 166n168 Yousaf, Ramzi 112
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) 4 Yusufzai, Rahimullah 100, 102, 108,
Webster, William H. 49–50, 71n82 119n137, 121n208, 142, 155, 160,
Weinbaum, Marvin 162n53
Western Asia 23, 85
White House 23, 34n96, 34n100, 41, 44–5, Zaeef, Mullah 100, 119n135s
63, 92, 94, 109 Zaki, Akram 59, 140, 156
Wilson, Charlie 104, 120n170, 166n187 Zinni, General Anthony 96
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