Common Country Analysis for Sudan

Desk Review
Draft - April 2016

This Common Country Analysis for Sudan collates four issues papers commissioned by the UN and drafted
by the Development Studies and Research Institute of the University of Khartoum, summarizing the
findings of a desk review of relevant existing documents. The topics of the four issues papers are: (i)
Economic development and poverty reduction; (ii) Social services and social protection; (iii) Environment,
climate change and disaster risk management; and (iv) Governance and institutional capacity
development. UN agencies, funds and programmes in Sudan complemented the information in the issues
papers with additional available information. UN staff and key government partners reviewed and
commented on various versions of the draft. The documents that formed the basis of the desk review are
mentioned in footnotes across the document. In some cases data are scarce, and the most recent data
available are used for the various indicators in the analysis, which results in different years reported for
different indicators. For purposes of the UNDAF prioritization, the information in this document will be
complemented by that in the Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 to be launched in 2016.
Similarly, the results on the analysis of the UN’s comparative advantage will help the strategic
prioritization for the UNDAF.
Contents
1. Overview ................................................................................................................................................... 2
2. Economic Development and Poverty Reduction ....................................................................................... 6
2.1 Economic Growth ................................................................................................................................ 6
2.2 GDP Structure ...................................................................................................................................... 7
2.3 Development Patterns and Constraints .............................................................................................. 7
2.4 The External Sector and Integration into the International Economy .............................................. 12
2.5. Priority Areas .................................................................................................................................... 13
3. Social Services, Social Protection and Infrastructure .............................................................................. 15
3.1 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) ............................................................................................ 15
3.2 Education ........................................................................................................................................... 17
3.3 Health................................................................................................................................................. 19
3.4 Nutrition ............................................................................................................................................ 22
3.5 Social Welfare and Social Protection ................................................................................................. 24
3.6 Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................................... 27
3.7 Priority Areas ..................................................................................................................................... 29
4. Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management ............................................................. 32
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 32
4.2 The Non-Sustainable Nature of Sudan’s Environment ...................................................................... 33
4.3 Eroded Environmental Governance .................................................................................................. 38
4.4 Environmental Actors and Their Capacities and Mandates .............................................................. 39
4.5 Priority Areas ..................................................................................................................................... 40
4.5.1 Land Degradation....................................................................................................................... 40
4.5.2 Support to Environmental Governance ..................................................................................... 40
4.5.3 Support to Environmental Dialogue .......................................................................................... 41
4.5.4 Migration Issues ......................................................................................................................... 41
4.5.5 Water Resources Development ................................................................................................. 42
4.5.6 Environmental Data and Knowledge Management of Climate Evidence .................................. 42
4.5.7 Support to implementation of the Paris Agreement ................................................................. 42
5. Governance and Institutional Capacity Development ............................................................................ 43
5.1 Persistent Conflicts ............................................................................................................................ 43
5.2 Civil Service and Fiscal Decentralization ............................................................................................ 43
5.3 Public Expenditure Management and Procurement ......................................................................... 45
5.4 Competitive and Responsible Private Sector..................................................................................... 45
5.5 Rule of Law and Human Rights .......................................................................................................... 46
5.6 Corruption.......................................................................................................................................... 47
5.7 Data, Information Management and Results-Based Management................................................... 48
5.8 Priority Areas ..................................................................................................................................... 48
Annex A. Mapping of priorities identified in this analysis to SDGs ............................................................. 51

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1. Overview
As of 2015 Sudan had an estimated population of approximately 38.4 million. High population growth in
the country (2.5 percent) implies enormous challenges in terms of service provision, acceleration of
economic growth, environment sustainability, resource management and social equity. In spite of the
rapid pace of urbanization (from 8.3 percent in 1956 to 30.9 percent in 20081), Sudan remains largely rural
as far as its social, economic and cultural outlooks are concerned, with the majority of the country’s total
population living in rural areas. Overall, 58 percent of the population lives in rural areas2, with some states
having a higher or lower proportion of rural population. However, Sudan is experiencing a phenomenal
rural–urban migration, driven in part by conflict, drought and desertification, as well as by the better living
conditions and service provision to be found in urban areas.

More than 40 percent of Sudan’s population is below 15 years of age3, which represents a typical feature
of a developing country. Sudan is experiencing a seismic demographic shift towards a youth-based
population. According to the most recent census results (2008), adolescents between 10 and 19 years of
age constituted about 24 percent of the population.4 The importance of this age cohort has not been
adequately reflected in current programming or services.

Sudan has witnessed massive population movements caused by natural disasters and conflicts. Internally
displaced persons (IDPs), essentially the product of war and conflicts especially in Darfur, Blue Nile and
Abyei, are largely living in camps (Darfur) while others are either in squatter settlements (Khartoum) or
invisible to the outside world (Nuba mountains and Blue Nile). The IDPs are vulnerable to issues of
complex human security. In addition, Sudan is both a temporary and long-term host country to an
extensive population of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, including unaccompanied and separated
children. Sudan is also a country of origin for migration because of its conflicts, insecurity and its economic
situation, marked by widespread unemployment.

Sudan's performance in the social sector has been greatly affected by protracted conflicts and institutional
deficiencies. The robust GDP growth over the past decade has not been broad-based enough to make a
substantial reduction in poverty. The adoption of the federal system (see below), introduced in 1992 to
address regional disparities in the country, in the presence of inadequate institutional and human
capacities, has limited the ability of the Government to render local social services, especially in terms of
nutrition, social welfare, social protection and protection services.5

Sudan’s score on the Human Development Index (HDI) has gradually increased over the years. Still, in
2014, Sudan ranked 165th among 188 countries and territories with respect to the HDI.6 The difference
between Sudan’s rank according to its Gross National Income (GNI) and its HDI rank is -27, suggesting that,
compared to other countries, Sudan has lower human development than would be expected given its GNI.

Humanitarian needs in Sudan are considerable and remain important in scope. These are predominantly
caused by conflict, which, in turn, drives displacement and food insecurity. Humanitarian challenges are

1 Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008 Census.

2 Ibid. Census results also indicate that approximately 9 percent of the population is nomad.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 African Development Bank Group, ‘Sudan: Country Brief—2010/2011’, Regional Department, East II (OREB), October 2010.
6 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development’, New

York, 2015.

2
not limited to conflict areas, and needs are also driven by poverty, underdevelopment, and climactic
factors.

The exploitation of oil since 1999 has created a remarkable shift in the structure of the Sudanese economy,
from one predominantly reliant on agriculture for growth and exports, to one reliant on the oil sector.
However, the strong economic expansion generated by oil has been unbalanced. Inherited regional
inequalities and disparities in the provision of services remain striking, while exports of key products have
fallen in large part because of reduced competitiveness, leading to ‘jobless growth’. In 2015, the country
remained in possession of a substantial external debt amounting to about $45.1 billion in nominal terms
(more than 70 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)). Although data gaps are substantial, it is believed
that the majority of those who are economically active are involved in informal economic activities.7

The governance system in Sudan is adopting a federal structure that comprises three levels of
government: federal (central), state and locality. The federal includes the presidency of the republic with
the national assembly as legislative organ, and includes ministries such as defence, interior and foreign
affairs. The state level consist of 18 states headed by a governor and each state has a legislative council
and a ministers’ cabinet. Each state is divided into a number of localities headed by a commissioner.

In the past decade Sudan has faced a challenging political process prompted by the signing of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was largely supported by international and regional efforts
and ended the prolonged era of civil war between northern and southern Sudan. Following the secession
of South Sudan several issues remained unresolved, including the demarcation of borders, the Abyei area,
oil processing and exportation fees, responsibility for external debt and the future of the remaining
northern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) armed forces in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan.
These issues have led to instability and tensions across borders and the resumption of conflict in the states
of Blue Nile, South Kordofan and the Abyei area. In Darfur, Aybei and East Sudan, peace agreements were
signed that contributed to some stability in those three regions. In response to the numerous challenges
facing Sudan, the National Congress Party, the winner of the 2010 and 2015 elections, has formed a wider
government with the participation of several political parties. Recently, the President initiated a dialogue
with all political parties with the objective of forming a unified national vision to address the numerous
challenges confronting Sudan internally and externally.

Moreover, the secession of South Sudan has resulted in the movement to South Sudan of some 8.26
million of Sudan’s population, as well as a 25 percent (619,745 km²) shift in the total land area of the
original territory from northern Sudan to South Sudan, including the loss of 68 percent of forest and
woodland areas, and 47 percent of reserved and protected wildlife areas. Moreover, the area classified
as arid increased from 65 percent to 90 percent. Of critical importance to pastoral areas, even though the
country’s livestock population fell by only 28 percent to 104 million heads, the natural rangeland
resources upon which they depend decreased by 40 percent. Also of significance was the loss to South
Sudan of 75 percent of the country’s oil revenue. All these factors posed substantial challenges to the
economy in a country where most (approximately 70 percent) of its population directly or indirectly draw
their living from agriculture.

Diversity in Sudan has been sustained by historic, cultural, linguistic and geo-climatic disparities that
influence attitudes and practices among the communities. A large proportion of the population in Sudan
that is vulnerable to poverty and impoverishing shocks is concentrated among specific groups. Such

7 UNCT in Sudan, ‘United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sudan 2009–2012’, Khartoum/Juba, 2008.

3
groups include those who have been affected disproportionately by conflict and displacement, people
with disabilities, people with HIV, women-headed households, victims of violence, the elderly, orphans8,
among others. These groups sometimes face multiple shocks and a lack of access to resources and coping
strategies for dealing with risks. For example, the findings of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)
2014 have shown that 0.82 is the ratio between the school attendance rate of orphaned children and that
of non-orphaned children. Further analysis is needed, however, to understand the interaction between
social exclusion and vulnerability. Moreover, adolescents groups of the population, particularly girls, the
internally displaced and those who are out of school, are in the most vulnerable situations and
circumstances with regard to their knowledge of sexuality and reproductive health, HIV/AIDS, life skills,
and resources to provide for their protection and participation.

Social relations suggest that women have a lower status than men. Despite noticeable progress in efforts
to address gender inequality, formal and informal educational institutions do not consistently promote
gender equality in all aspects of social, economic and political life. While women in Sudan are economically
active, and while gender attitudes are changing, significant variations exist across states and between
rural and urban environments, and categories of vulnerability and noticeable gender inequalities continue
to persist in the society, as reflected in the rankings (167th) that Sudan receives on both the Gender-related
Development Index (GDI, 0.830)9 and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM, 0.428), prompting the
need to identify those elements that discriminate against women and are the root causes of women’s
disadvantaged position in areas such as education, employment, and public and political life. In addition,
social norms and cultural beliefs and practices around child marriage, female genital mutilation (FGM),
sexual and gender-based violence and abandoned babies continue to be some of the biggest underlying
causes of protection concerns in Sudan. Gender discrimination contributes not only to the pervasiveness
of violence against girls, but also to its acceptability by some. MICS results show the high prevalence of
the use of violent discipline (63.9 percent)10 and the positive attitude among many women towards
domestic violence (34 percent).11 Other gender-based and child protection concerns include the high
percentage of women aged between 15 and 49 years who report to have undergone any form of female
genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) (86.5 percent) and who state that the practice should be continued
(40.9 percent); the percentage of daughters aged between 0 and 14 years who have undergone FGM/C
according to their mothers (31.5 percent); and the percentage of women aged between 20 and 49 years
who were first married before the age of 18 (38.0 percent) and before the age of 15 (11.9 percent).

Women are key agents of change and when women and men are equal, economies grow faster, less
people remain in poverty and the overall well-being of people increases. Harnessing women’s potential
as economic actors, leaders and consumers results in higher levels of industrialization and more sustained
growth rates. It is estimated that global GDP could increase by more than 25 per cent by 2025 if women
played the same role in labour markets as men.12

8
According to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2014 results, a total of 5.3 percent of children aged between 0 and
17 years, approximately 2 million children, are single or double orphans.
9 UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 2015’.
10 MICS 2014 indicator 8.3: Percentage of children age 1–14 years who experienced psychological aggression or physical

punishment during the last month.

11 MICS 2014 indicator 8.12: Percentage of women age 15–49 years who state that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his

wife in at least one of the following circumstances: (i) she goes out without telling him, (ii) she neglects the children, (iii) she
argues with him, (iv) she refuses sex with him, (v) she burns the food.
12 UNIDO, ‘Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women Strategy 2016-2019’, www.unido.org/fr/gender.html.

4
Equal access to and the quality of basic services in Sudan remain big challenges to overcome in the coming
years. Differences between urban and rural areas in terms of the services provided are marked and affect
all sectors. Unequal wealth-sharing and resource distribution, and decentralization are factors that have
created a number of disputes across the country. In spite of efforts, ongoing conflict continues to
challenge the already weak basic infrastructure across regions. MICS 2014 findings revealed that social
indicators are worst in the conflict-affected areas in comparison to the non-conflict-affected areas
regarding child survival, learning and protection.13

Some vulnerable groups in Sudan are more acutely affected by child deprivations than others, including
the poorest families, children living in rural areas, youth, women and children. These groups are likely to
face increased difficulties in benefiting from services such as education, water and sanitation.

In some parts of the country, trust and social cohesion have been eroded by years of conflict and people
are still generally suspicious of different forms of organization. Time will be needed to rebuild trust, which
has implications for the levels of genuine participation that can realistically be expected.

Economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to employment and decent work, education, health,
and social protection are to be progressively implemented by the Government, ensuring that scarce
resources are used in the most effective and equitable way to support steady progress in the enjoyment
of rights by all rights holders, in particular the most marginalized. Important issues here are the level of
budgetary allocations, oversight and accountability in the delivery of health, education, social welfare and
protection, and other services. The need to strengthen civil and political rights, fundamental freedoms
and rule of law are sources of concern.

Sudan is affected directly or indirectly by global and regional challenges that have an impact on its policy,
economy, opportunities for peace and the well-being of its population. Those external influencing factors
are mostly: (i) the decrease in the global demand for primary natural resources due to the decrease of
economic growth in China and low economic growth in Europe; (ii) the decrease in the price of oil, which
has reduced the fiscal space of South Sudan and Arab countries that usually contribute to Sudan’s
revenue, and the potential impact of low capital investment for infrastructure and social sectors; (iii) the
migration crisis caused by the civil war in Syria; (iv) the regional emergencies caused by armed conflicts in
Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and South Sudan that impact negatively on the prioritization of financial aid to
Sudan for humanitarian assistance and development, and the increasing influx of refugees to Sudan.
Sudan is also involved in the geopolitical tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which resulted in the
suspension this year of diplomatic relations between Sudan and Iran.

The new realities and dynamics of the post-Arab spring era pose a number of unprecedented
opportunities and challenges for achieving sustainable human development in Sudan and the region. In
this context, south-south cooperation is viewed as one of the effective drivers for change that offers a
unique framework for the identification, matching and exchange of solutions to common problems.
South-south cooperation as the driver for development, including its dimensions directly or indirectly
related to or coinciding with Sudan’s national priorities, is a process that started many years ago and will
continue its evolution over time. Support in further clarifying Sudan’s priorities in partnership through
south-south cooperation is an important step towards achieving development in Sudan.

13 ‘MICS 2014 Final Report’, 2015.

5
2. Economic Development and Poverty Reduction
2.1 Economic Growth
From 1960 to 1998, Sudan experienced alternating periods of positive and negative growth. The negative
growth periods were longer with relatively low negative growth rates while the positive growth periods
were shorter with relatively high per capita growth rates. However, the entire period was marked by a
growth trend that was generally positive.14 From the late 1990s, and continuing for about a decade, the
Sudanese economy recorded good GDP growth, but even though the country witnessed periods of high
growth rates, they could not be described as generating sustained development or being pro-poor.
Growth was, and still is, it could be argued, sectorally unbalanced, geographically concentrated, and
coupled with widespread poverty and structural distortions in the economy.

This last recorded episode of high growth coincided with the era of oil production and exportation. Since
1999, oil had gradually assumed a cornerstone position in the Sudanese economy, as indicated by its
contribution to the GDP, foreign trade and government revenues. The significance of the contribution
made by oil to one or all of these economic indicators equated with the sector’s considerable impact over
almost all aspects of the economy and society. It could be argued that oil revenues had contributed
substantially to maintaining a stable exchange rate and external balance; increasing government revenues
and improving the fiscal situation; and cutting down inflation to the single digits.

These achievements could not be maintained after the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the
associated loss of oil revenues due to the fact that most of the oil-producing fields are located in South
Sudan. Sudan lost 75 percent of oil production, 36 percent of budget revenues, more than 65 percent of
foreign exchange revenues and 80 percent of total exports. The result was a decline in its annual growth
rate in 2011–2012, with a partial recovery since.

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Real GDP Growth Rate (percent)
5.2 1.9 1.4 4.4 3.6 3.5 4.4
(projection) (projection)
Inflation Rate (percent)
13.0 18.1 35.6 36.5 36.9 16.9 13.0
(projection)
Source: Real GDP Growth 2010–2014, Central Bank of Sudan (2015), ‘Fifty-fourth Annual Report: 2014’; Real GDP
Growth 2015–2016, IMF (2015), ‘Regional Economic Outlook—Middle East and Central Asia’, available from
www.imf.org; Inflation Rate 2010–2014, Central Bank of Sudan (2015), ‘Fifty-fourth Annual Report: 2014’; Inflation
Rate 2015 calculation based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics; Inflation Rate 2016, IMF (2015) ‘Regional
Economic Outlook—Middle East and Central Asia’.

Inflation, which fell to the single digits during the high growth period, started to climb at unprecedented
rates in 2012–2014. In a positive development, inflation fell to 16.9 percent in 201515 and is projected by
the IMF to be less than 13 percent in 2016.16

14 Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, ‘On the Challenges of Economic Development in Post-Conflict Sudan’, Arab Planning Institute, Kuwait,
November 2004.
15 Calculation based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics.
16 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Regional Economic Outlook—Middle East and Central Asia’, Washington, D.C., October

2014, www.imf.org.

6
The agricultural sector is one of the most important economic sector in the country. As derived from the
data records of Sudan’s Central Bureau of Statistics, the sector contributed an average of approximately
34 percent of the country’s GDP from 2009 to 2013.

2.2 GDP Structure

At least three trends in the composition of the Sudanese GDP accompanied the oil boom, namely: (i) an
increasing contribution of the oil sector to the GDP (from less than 1.9 percent in 1998 to more than 18.6
percent in 2007) followed by a decline after 2011 and the secession of South Sudan, where the bulk of oil
fields are located, to 6.7 percent in 2011 and 3.4 percent in 2014;17 (ii) a declining contribution of the
agricultural sector to the GDP (from about 50 percent in 1999 to 28.2 percent in 2014); 18 and (iii)
insignificant change in the contributions of the other sectors (manufacturing and services) during the first
half of the period under discussion, with services ranging between 39.7 and 34.8 percent and
manufacturing in the range of 8.3 to 10.8 percent. Both sectors experienced expanding trends thereafter,
especially after the secession when services reached 47.8 percent and manufacturing about 24 percent in
2014.19 The structure of the economy during 1999–2014 changed from seeing dominance in agriculture
to the petroleum sector, then the deterioration of the oil sector and the expansion of the services sector.
The manufacturing sector contribution continues to be relatively low and unstable.

2.3 Development Patterns and Constraints

The dependency of the economy on a single or a few commodities/products, namely agriculture, oil or
other minerals, with all the associated risks, vulnerabilities and instability, is characteristic of the story
behind development in Sudan. The story goes back to the colonial era when the British administration
initiated and developed the Gezira Scheme as a cotton producing and exporting project. Government
institutions and in fact the whole structure of the Sudanese economy and society were more or less
dependent on the Gezira Scheme and cotton.20 Independence brought no dramatic change in
governmental growth or aspiration as far as emphasizing one product or another. All executed strategies
are extractive in nature and create, augment or sustain manpower, institutions and infrastructure that
revolve around the extractive goal, be it mechanized agriculture to produce sorghum or cotton, the
production of oil, or the mining of gold,21 etc. There remains a lack of backward and forward linkages and
an ‘enclave’ nature within the country’s development projects. Among other factors, this has led to
uneven growth and the underdevelopment of whole regions.

Unbalanced development has prevented broad-based development for the vast majority of the
population, and the policies of successive national regimes have widened economic disparities among the
regions even further. The country’s inability to change the colonial development approach and the
institutions created to support it has resulted in continued poverty and deprivation.22

17
Central Bank of Sudan, ‘Annual Report’, various issues.
18
Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 See Ali, ‘On the Challenges of Economic Development in Post-Conflict Sudan’.
21 Of course, there are variations between different resources and products, e.g., agricultural and mineral, renewable and non-

renewable, etc.
22 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), ‘Volume I, Synthesis: Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication’,

18 March 2005.

7
Sudan has been plagued by a series of civil wars, armed conflicts, and organized and non-organized acts
of violence. This situation may be classified as one of the major outcomes of the path of development
adopted by the country. It also serves to deepen and intensify Sudan’s dilemma and represents a major
obstacle to sustained development. Solving the root causes of the recurring violence is among the
necessary conditions for achieving development goals.

The economy’s vulnerability is a result of dependency on one exportable product, including the associated
fluctuations in demand and price as well as production instability. This continues to have an impact on the
balance of payments, exchange rate, and public revenue and expenditure; and thus on economic and
political progress. Some important features of this type of economy need to be touched on in this analysis,
namely, the extension of the country’s public sector and distortions in its fiscal philosophy and systems.

Growing Public Sector

One economic challenge facing Sudan’s development is the country’s large and rapidly growing public
sector. This sector has grown in response to many factors: (i) early development strategies—advocated
and backed by international organizations—lending the leading role in development to the public sector;
(ii) socialist tendencies, nationalizations and confiscations, etc.; (iii) the weak nature of the private sector
and its inability to provide sufficient employment opportunities; (iv) the parental nature of the State and
political pressures burdening the Government with the responsibility of providing employment, especially
for the educated population; (v) the education system and the development path discussed above; (vi)
the expansion of administration systems due to the implementation of various decentralization projects;
and (vii) growing needs for administering the expanding systems of levies.

The growth of the public sector has continued and in fact escalated in the present era. During the last 10
years, the public sector’s share in GDP has increased from 6 to nearly 40 percent, and the sector became
the principal contributor to the growth process, while private sector growth has been considerably weaker
and even negative in three of the last six years. Government investments and other expenditures
escalated, resulting in competition with the private sector over resources on the one hand and the
accumulation of arrears in the public sector on the other.23

The poor expansion of real sectors, limitations in the capacity of the economy to generate value added,
the expansion of the public sector/state apparatus, and the ever-expanding demand for public services
have imposed great pressure on public revenue sources. This, among other factors, has shaped the
Sudanese fiscal system.

Public Finance

A study looking at the composition of the sources of the country’s total ordinary revenue and the outlets
of its total ordinary expenditure during the period 2001–2013 found that:24
 Both revenue and expenditure are increasing.

23 World Bank, ‘Sudan: Toward Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth’, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa
Region, Report No. 52514-SD, Washington, D.C., December 2009.
24 El-Battahani, Atta and Gadkarim, Hassan, ‘Governance and Fiscal Federalism in Sudan, 1989–2015: Exploring Political and

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Unstable Polity’, forthcoming.

8
  Up to 2009, the non-tax revenue exceeded the tax revenue and in some years doubled it. This was
apparently due to the revenue accruing from the production and exportation of oil. Since most of
the oil-producing fields are located in what used to be the southern part of the country, the
secession of South Sudan in July 2011 could explain the decline in revenue.
 The bulk of tax revenue accrues from indirect taxes. Value added tax (VAT) has become the largest
source of revenue, approaching 50 percent of total tax revenues. It is followed by revenues from
custom duties. The contribution of both increased dramatically after the secession. High VAT and
custom duties have implications on the prices of goods and commodities (inflation), as well as the
living standards of the already burdened population.
 The composition of revenue also shows the modest contribution of both the income tax and the
business profit tax. This reflects the high magnitude of the informal sector, the modest level of
economic activities, and the prevalence of tax evasion.
 Encouraged by the tremendous increase in total expenditure, which was mainly triggered by oil
revenues, chapter one of public expenditure (i.e., wages, salaries and social subsidies) was found
to be escalating in absolute terms. Its share in expenditure remained high and rising.
 Development expenditures and contributions in capital are modest. This is sustained by the fact
that this item includes many expenditure components that do not belong to development
expenditures in the real sense.
 The decentralized fiscal system is characterized by the dependency of the states on the centre,
and the presence of wide vertical and horizontal disparities.

Unemployment

According to data from 2009, labour force participation was only 48 percent.25 The level of economic
activity was particularly low for women, at 23 percent, compared to men, at 73 percent.

As mentioned, the expansion of the public sector is partly a reflection of the responsibility of Government
to provide job opportunities. This, among other factors, inflated chapter one of the budget expenditure.
As such, and due to the fact that the country’s population is predominantly young, the issue of countering
unemployment became central, particularly in the face of widespread poverty (about 46 percent of the
population was poor in 200926). However, the rapidity of the expansion raises a structural workforce
problem, as the rate of the increase of the workforce is almost half that of population growth. The
expansion of the absorptive capacity of the economy is too limited to accommodate the increasing
numbers of jobseekers, resulting in an annual growth rate of unemployment of 4.1 percent per year, while
the rate of population growth is estimated at 2.4 percent annually during the period 1993-2011.27

It should be mentioned that according to the 2008 Census results about 53 percent of the total population
was under 20 years of age. Those aged between 5 and 14 years comprised about 28 percent of the
population and the group that was aged less than five years constituted 15 percent. This implies a growing
need for employment opportunities in the near future.

25 Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Sudan National Baseline Household Survey 2009, North Sudan—Tabulation Report’,
Khartoum, 2010.
26 Ibid.
27 Suliman, Elnaeem, ‘Labour Force in Sudan 2011’, 2013; paper presented to the workshop on analyzing results of the labour

force survey 2011, Corinthia Hotel, Khartoum, December 2013.

9
Although agriculture is still an important source for employment, the role of agriculture has been
weakened by long-term conflicts; rural–urban migration; inconsistent agricultural and macroeconomic
policies, such as excessive agricultural taxation and unstable exchange rates; and the emergence of gold
mining opportunities attracting masses of people, especially young people from rural—and particularly
war-affected—areas.28

The total unemployment rate was estimated in 2008 at 16.8 percent29—13.9 percent for males and 24.7
percent for females. Disparities also appear between rural and urban areas, with unemployment rates of
17.5 and 12.3 percent, respectively. Youth are disproportionally affected by unemployment, pointing
partially to a mismatch between the skills of new graduates and those demanded by the labour market.30
There is also a lack of market-oriented skills training, a missing link between technical and entrepreneurial
skills, and limited access of the urban poor to existing training facilities.

The inability of the economy to create job opportunities to match the growth in the population and
workforce is demonstrated by: (i) the high rate of unemployment growth due to high rates of population
and workforce growth, and (ii) the low rate of growth in employment (0.9 percent). The current low rate
of economic growth, the non-conducive environment for private investments, the congested and
burdened public sector, and the lack of a clear policy for creating income-earning opportunities for the
unemployed make the unemployment issue one of the critical challenges facing the country.

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Income Poverty

The MDGs targeted the creation of employment in relation to poverty as well the promotion of gender
equality and the empowerment of women. For the former, the employment rate of those within the
population aged 15 years and above is low, and disparities are noticeable among regions. The national
rate is about 41.4 percent, with the highest rate among the regions reaching about 48.5 percent and the
lowest being 35.9 percent. For the latter—namely, MDG 3.2, the employment goal for gender equality—
the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector is also low (17 percent for the
whole country) and varies among regions (12 percent being the lowest regional rate and 22 percent being
the highest).31

Regarding poverty (MDG 1), its incidence for the whole country was 46.6 percent32 in 2009. Sudan was far
from achieving the poverty-related MDG. In fact, poverty increased and spread, though unequally and
with disparities between regions, genders, and the urban–rural and other categories of the population.

Poverty in Sudan varies significantly by region and state. The Khartoum region has the lowest incidence
of poverty followed by the Northern region, while Eastern and Central are the third lowest. The Darfur
and Kordofan regions are the poorest, with the highest poverty rate in the state of North Darfur (69.4
percent). The poorer states are predominantly rural, but there are exceptions. The Red Sea state has the
second highest urbanization rate after Khartoum yet is among the poorest five states. Conversely, the
Northern state has the lowest urbanization rate and the third lowest poverty rate. Nevertheless, it can be

28 Ministry of Mining, ‘Socioeconomic Survey for Artisanal Mining’, 2015; study done by the Geo-Service Company.
29 Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008 Census.
30 African Development Bank Group, ‘Sudan Country Brief 2014–2016 and Country Portfolio Performance Review’, September

2014.
31 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’, Washington, D.C., 2013, see table 4, p. 8.
32 Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Sudan National Baseline Household Survey 2009, North Sudan—Tabulation Report’.

10
concluded that poverty in Sudan is predominant in rural areas and among those whose income derives
from farming and livestock.33

The wide poverty disparity between urban areas (recording 26.5 percent) and rural areas (at 57.6 percent)
reflect the historical bias of national development policies towards urban areas. There is a clear
correlation between income sources and poverty status. Most of the poorest households—those in the
bottom quintile—rely on agriculture such as crop farming and animal husbandry (59 percent). Meanwhile,
most of the people in the wealthiest households—those in the top quintile—rely on wage-based and
salaried employment (47 percent).34 Finally, the incidence of poverty is marginally lower (44.2 percent)
among the small number of households headed by women (17.3 percent) compared to households
headed by men, with an incidence rate of 47.2 percent.35 The risk of being poor also correlates with the
level of education of the main provider. The main provider has no education in 60 percent of all poor
households, while only 9 percent of the poor have a main provider with a higher education level. The
rising unemployment problem coupled with low rates of employment growth and low levels of
productivity contribute significantly to the high and persistent levels of poverty in Sudan.

Food deprivation36 is higher in female-headed households (37 percent)37 than in male-headed ones (31
percent), reflecting differences in gender, incomes and education. However, income remains the most
important determinant of food deprivation.

There are many factors that account for persistent poverty in the country, which include the long and
drawn out civil conflicts in southern, western and eastern Sudan that have diverted resources from
development to fighting wars; impaired social capital and good governance; and destroyed human and
physical capital. Additional factors include the lack of durable peace and security that dissuaded
households and firms from making investments in human and physical capital for the future; the urban
bias of development policies and programmes in the past, which neglected efforts to broadly increase the
productivity of rural production, particularly in the sphere of rain-fed agriculture; the lack of a coherent
poverty reduction effort and a sustained reform to promote shared growth and diversify the economy,
hence the issue of rising unemployment; the low allocation of public resources to poverty reduction
priorities, particularly agricultural development and human development, and the absence of
development partners to compensate for the underspending; the concentration of socioeconomic
development in only a few areas; and the burden of an unsustainable external debt, long-held economic
international sanctions, including unilateral coercive economic measures, and isolation that has held up
access to international debt relief initiatives such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative
and to concessional financial assistance.38

Moreover, analysis of the evolution of poverty in the 1990s, which traced the relative influence of
consumption growth and inequality as the two poverty determinants, suggested that, as expected in a
growing economy, consumption per capita grew (at rates ranging from 1.6 to 2.8 percent) but inequality

33 Ibid.
34 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.
35 Ibid.
36 Food deprivation refers to the proportion of the population whose dietary energy consumption is below the minimum dietary

energy requirements, which is defined in Sudan at 1751 kcl.

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.

11
worsened at a much higher rate (4.5 percent). The net effect is that poverty increased,39 as reflected by
both slow development and the obstruction of further development.

However, though most of the factors impeding development are internal, the country’s level of
integration into the international economy, with its positive and negative aspects, is an important
consideration, as discussed in the following section. Traditionally, such integration is reflected in foreign
trade, capital flows (aid, loans and other transfers, and foreign direct investment (FDI)).

It is important to mention that the Government has initiated a number of programmes/interventions in

order to deal with the negative impact of macroeconomic reforms, including Zakat support, microfinance
projects, social funding and direct support for poor families. These initiatives proved effective in
enhancing the access of the poor to financial resources, reducing poverty and enhancing food security.
However, their coverage and adequacy remain limited. Thus, the outreach of these programmes needs to
be expanded, especially in rural and disadvantaged areas. Moreover, the realization of peace remains a
prerequisite for reaching poor households in conflict-affected areas.

2.4 The External Sector and Integration into the International Economy
In relation to foreign trade, though in theory barriers against Sudanese exports are not prohibitive, the
failure to expand and diversify exports is mainly due to factors related to production and productivity,
various types of charges and fees, obsolete capital, unskilled manpower and excess capacity in the
manufacturing sector, high transport costs, and, recently, exchange rate appreciation. Sudan’s export
composition in 2014, for example, shows that gold contributes about 29.2 percent of total exports,
followed by oil products, which comprise about 28.8 percent, then livestock (19.7 percent) and
agricultural products (15.3 percent), of which sesame only contributes 10.7 percent to the total.40

On the imports side, Sudan faces the problem of inelastic demand for most of its imports. In 2014, food
products constituted 24.4 percent of total imports (wheat represented 11.8 percent), while machinery
and equipment formed 16.8 percent, raw materials about 19.1 percent, and chemicals 10 percent.41 This
dependence on imports is partly due to the limited production base of the economy and its inability to
provide for most of the country’s needs in terms of final and intermediate products as well as oil needs,
Furthermore, the Sudan import tariff regime is among the world’s most restrictive, and has led to high
domestic prices. By discouraging imports of inputs that could raise productivity, the tariff regime also
discourages exports, and thus limits the country’s ability to integrate into global supply chains.42

In addition, the problematic position of Sudan’s external capital flows is apparent. It is characterized by
the country’s heavy burden of an unsustainable external debt and international economic sanctions,
including unilateral coercive economic measures and isolation, which, among other repercussions, hinder
access to international debt relief initiatives such as HIPC and concessional financial assistance. Moreover,
the Government has failed to attract the savings of Sudanese working abroad through the formal banking
system, as they are instead channelled through the more lucrative parallel market. These factors have a
negative impact on the development of the country. A resolution to the debt problem would improve

39 JAM, ‘Volume I, Synthesis: Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication’, 2005.
40 Central Bank of Sudan Statistics Directorate, ‘Foreign Trade Statistical Digest, October–December 2014’, Khartoum, 2014,
www.cbos.gov.sd/sites/default/files/digest_q4_14.pdf.
41 Ibid.
42 ‘Revitalizing Sudan’s Non-Oil Exports: A Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) Prepared for the Integrated Framework

Program’, December 2008.

12
prospects for sustained growth and poverty reduction. It is unlikely that Sudan will achieve a sustainable
external debt position without generous debt relief within the framework of available international
initiatives.

Nevertheless, FDI has become a very important source of external financing for Sudan, and an important
source of foreign exchange to support the country’s recent and current account deficits. FDI grew
substantially during the period from late 1990s up to the separation of the South. Main sectors involved
have been the oil, telecommunications and banking sectors. However, there is general concern that such
flows are unlikely to be sustained with the absence and/or decline of oil production, which had
encouraged investments in the non-oil sectors, thus boosting the economy, assisting with bridging
external and domestic financing gaps, and stabilizing the foreign exchange reserves and rates. Thus, FDI
in the non-oil sectors will likely experience a decline due to the difficulties confronting the economy
because of shrinking oil revenues.

Sudan’s investment climate could also be described as unattractive and unconducive, which could
discourage foreign investment. In general, Sudan is characterized by economic and political instability,
undeveloped physical infrastructure43, and a lack of qualified and efficient manpower, which affects not
only its appeal to foreign investors but also the condition of the Sudanese private sector.

Sudan has been increasingly crippled by the accumulation of a large, unresolved external debt that will
have a direct impact on its development. Current external debt has reached more than $45 billion,
representing about 71.4 percent of GDP.44 The bulk of the debt (69 percent) is bilateral (Paris and non-
Paris Club) while multilateral debt represents only 13 percent. Commercial bank debt and supplier credit
represent 13 and 5 percent of total debt, respectively. The Government has taken steps to meet the
requirements of the HIPC criteria, such as: (i) satisfactory macroeconomic performance, within the
framework of IMF staff-monitored programming, and (ii) the release and approval of the interim poverty
reduction strategy in June 2012. However, the issue of external debt has remained unresolved due to a
number of reasons.

2.5. Priority Areas

The following priority areas stem from the preceding analysis; the development priorities of the
Government, as spelled out in official documents, plans and strategies;45 and recent speeches of the
President:46
 As stated in the Government’s Five-Year Programme for Economic Reforms (2015-2019), it is of
high priority to achieve economic stability and progress in all economic fields; increase production
and productivity; and provide employment opportunities by utilizing resources (human and
capital) and economic partnership opportunities. Increasing revenues and cutting and/or
rationing expenditures to maintain fiscal balance, expanding exports and reducing imports to
offset the balance of payment deficits, and maintaining the exchange rate are likewise priorities.

43 This is explored in more detail in Section 4.

44 Central Bank of Sudan, ‘Annual Report’, 2014.
45 Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Five-Year Program for Economic Development 2015–2019; National Council for

Strategic Planning, Twenty-Five-Year National Strategy 2007–2031, etc.

46 The President’s speech (in Arabic) to the legislative body (National Council) on the occasion of his inauguration in April 2015;

and his speech to the National Council on 19 October 2015 (also in Arabic).

13
 The strategy for the future should aim at restructuring the economy to one that is diversified and
self-sustaining, and in which forward and backward linkages as well as vertical and horizontal
integration can be created. It should be pro-poor and pro-production and aim to expand the role
of the private sector. This should be in contrast with the prevailing strategy of dependency on
(non-renewable) extraction activities and on few agricultural products and/or exports. The
utilization of non-renewable resources must be assumed with consideration for the finite nature
of such reserves, future generations, value-added opportunities, and, most importantly, how to
use the revenues for diversifying the economy.
 Agriculture can be the locomotive for eradicating poverty and unemployment as well as for
compensating for lost opportunities due to war and conflicts. The industrial sector remains one
of the main pillars of development and the main supporter of any agricultural leap. Efforts are
needed to exploit unutilized capacities, reach self-sufficiency and achieve food security. Linkages
between agriculture and manufacturing—agro-industry—need to be developed, too; e.g., food
industries and textiles.
 The stabilization and expansion of the oil sector should continue to be main goals. This includes
the exploration and production of gas and the securing of local demand for oil products. Exploiting
mineral resources, promoting their value added and manufacturing, and integrating traditional
mining into the economic cycle and developing local communities is similarly important. All such
measures should be assumed with consideration for the environment and sustainable
development.
 There is a need to further develop human capital, engaging educational institutions and the
business community to build capacities for income-generating activities and encourage the
creation of news businesses and jobs, with special attention to gender equality and vulnerable
social groups.
 Improving infrastructure (e.g., roads, water and electricity) to implement efforts in the agriculture
and manufacturing sectors is a priority. In this regard, the expansion and optimum use of water
sources should be sought and shortages in water supplies in some areas need to be resolved The
transport sector, affecting all of the production and consumption sectors, should be developed.
 There should be consideration of economic migration as a relevant factor in poverty reduction
and economic development through labour regulation and regional cooperation frameworks to
protect the rights of migrant workers going abroad and attract the necessary labour force at
home; to enable and facilitate remittances; to maximize diaspora and internal migrants’ skills and
knowledge; to engage educational institutions and the business community in partnerships for
awareness, job creation and to build capacities and income-generating activities.

14
3. Social Services, Social Protection and Infrastructure
The provision of basic social services and social protection systems represents one of the core elements
and pillars of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP). These services are much needed to
empower people and build their capacities and make communities and families resilient to vulnerabilities.
In fact, poor people face challenges in terms of acquiring human capital in the form of knowledge,
information and health. This constrains, to a large extent, their ability to take advantage of the
opportunities offered by economic growth. Therefore, access to education, health and nutrition, social
welfare and protection services, water, sanitation and hygiene, as well as to physical and financial capital
such as land and credit, would reinforce sustained economic growth.

Sudan has made progress in a number of MDG indicators, particularly those related to health and
education. Available evidence suggests that education, health, gender equity, social protection and
standards of living have expanded in spite of the numerous challenges facing Sudan both internally and
externally. However, progress has been slowed by the eruption of violent conflict and the resulting impact
on institutional stability and social capital.47

In spite of international sanctions, including unilateral coercive economic measures imposed on Sudan,
Sudan continued to receive support from the international community, including UN agencies,
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the World Bank and the African Development
Bank, especially in the areas of poverty, capacity building and social safety networks. The support from
Qatar for implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy and Kuwaiti support to the East Sudan
Development Fund established under the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement are sizable, though not
sufficient. Although the development assistance provided by different development partners has been
considerable, the bulk of resources are humanitarian in nature. In this regard, UN development assistance
is to some extent in harmony with the national development agenda according to UN General Assembly
resolutions.

3.1 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

Access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities is one of the important development issues in Sudan
because of the necessity of such services and the challenges facing the Government in providing them to
the whole population.

Presently, the capacity for the provision of water services in Sudan is insufficient to meet the growing
demand caused by population dynamics and growth, which has resulted in a high total water demand
deficit. Moreover, many rural and semi-urban inhabitants pay a considerable portion of their family
income for water alone (which in most cases is of low quality). In addition to the impact on displacement
and conflict, the poor WASH conditions in rural areas in Sudan are correlated to malnutrition, both
stunting and wasting. The graph below shows correlation between poor access to improved water point
and stunting.48 In rural Kassala, acute malnutrition was found to be related to diarrhoea rather than poor
diet diversity: children who had had diarrhoea disease in the two weeks before the survey were 4½ times
more likely to have severe acute malnutrition than those who had not had diarrhoea.49 Besides, both

47 Sudan National Population Council, ‘Sudan National Voluntary Report’, presented at the 2014 Annual Ministerial Review of the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, New York, July 2014.
48 Federal Ministry of Health and Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Sudan Household Health Survey’, 2010.
49 ‘Nutrition Causal Analysis in the State of Kassala, Eastern Sudan, MoH, UNICEF and Goal, 2010.

15
morbidity and mortality are largely affected by water-related diseases and other routes of disease
transmission.50 Lack of access to water for nomads and farmers, and IDPs or refugees, and the general
lack of water services in-country constitute some of the most important drivers of forced displacement
and conflict.

percent

According to the findings of the MICS 2014, the proportion of the population with sustainable access to
an improved water source reached 68 percent, and the proportion with improved sanitation51 stood at
32.9 percent. A small proportion of the population uses improved flush toilets, the concentration of which
is in Khartoum. A large proportion of household members use mostly private or shared pit latrines without
slab (traditional pit latrines). In spite of modest progress, Sudan has retained one of the worst sanitation
rates in sub-Saharan Africa. This indicates that there has been limited improvement compared with that
which took place at the beginning of the 1990s when the percentages of access to drinking water and
sanitation were 64 and 33 percent, respectively.52

The regional disparities regarding access to safe drinking water and sanitation are significant. For instance,
access to safe drinking water ranges from over 93.8 percent in Northern state to an average of 31.2
percent in the states of Red Sea, White Nile and Gedarif. Access to water and sanitation also varies
according to patterns and standards of living, with a huge gap in favour of urban areas and the wealthy
segments of the population. The wealthiest households have more than twice as much access to improved
drinking water sources compared to the poorest households. Additionally, only 5.4 percent of the poorest
households have access to sanitation services compared to 78.1 percent for the wealthiest.53 There are
also significant variations in relation to other elements of accessibility such as proximity to water sources,
availability of sources of water and cost. The availability of water from safe groundwater sources is
inadequate, especially in areas with high demand and low groundwater storage capacities, such as certain
IDP areas in Darfur. The issue of water quality is one of the most important, particularly in rural and
remote areas.

The distribution of sanitation services according to patterns of living reveals that 57 percent of urban area
inhabitants enjoy sanitation services compared to only 22.1 percent of the rural population. Regional

50 JAM, ‘Volume III, Cluster Reports’, UNDP, World Bank and Government of Sudan, Khartoum, 18 March 2005.
51 Improved sanitation facilities for excreta disposal include: flush or pour flush toilet connected to a piped sewer system or
septic tank; ventilated improved pit latrines; pit latrines with slab; and composting toilets.
52 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.
53 Ministry of Cabinet, Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Sudan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2014, Key Findings’, April

2015.

16
variations are also apparent with regard to the availability of sanitation facilities. The percentage of
households enjoying sanitation services varies significantly, from as high as 79.4 percent in Northern state
to as low as 9.8 percent in Gedarif. Furthermore, about 29 percent of Sudan’s population still practice
open defecation, with wide disparities ranging from about 2 percent in Khartoum and Northern states to
about 45 percent in Kassala, Central Darfur and North Kordofan states. Moreover, only about 26 percent
of Sudan’s population practices handwashing with soap at critical times, with considerable disparities
spanning from as low as 2 percent in Gedarif to about 55 percent in North Darfur.

The major challenges relating to water and sanitation include the vastness of the country, shortage of the
existing facilities and personnel, limited management capacities, inadequacy of infrastructure,
maldistribution of the existing facilities and cadre, increasing cost of services, widespread poverty, weak
coordination between sector ministries, lack of sector policy, shortage of funds (there is no dedicated
formal budget provision for sanitation and hygiene within the national or state budgets) and prolonged
conflict and violence. In spite of these challenges, there are opportunities for improved sector
performance. The Ministry of Health is now formally leading on sanitation and hygiene issues. It is
providing leadership in the establishment of clearly defined high-level coordination bodies and sanitation
and hygiene teams at national and state levels. Furthermore, progress is being made in the development
of a strategic framework and in the building of national capacity for sanitation through a partnership
between the Government, UN and civil society. Sudan is an active member of the global Sanitation and
Water for All (SWA) partnership (a global forum providing a framework for stronger emphasis to improve
sector financing, scale up WASH services and lend focus to sanitation) and has participated in and made
commitments at all SWA high-level meetings in Washington, D.C. The SWA framework will help ensure
more robust and equity-focused sector management and effective coordination. It also embraces and
provides balance between the humanitarian and development components of the broader sector.

Furthermore, sector institutional reforms planned for the next four years, with funding from the African
Development Bank, will support the development of sector policies and build the capacity of current
institutions at all levels. They will also streamline and reinforce sector coordination and provide the basis
for progress towards sector-wide approaches.

3.2 Education
Inclusive basic education plays a key role in strengthening human capabilities and reducing poverty.
Accordingly, lack of education and a low-skilled workforce are identified as two of the structural factors
impeding growth. In fact, national education trends have served as the driver of human development
progress in Sudan over the last three decades. Combining gross enrolment ratios at all school levels and
adult literacy, the education index for Sudan has grown at nearly twice the rate of other HDI
components.54

Gains in primary and tertiary enrolment are largely behind the education progress. Between 2005 and
2009, the gross enrolment rate in basic education rose from 65 to 72 percent and the gross intake rate in
the first grade rose to 81.2 percent. With regard to secondary education, the fastest relative growth during
the last 10 years was recorded in 2008–2009, reaching 6 percent. Higher education witnessed significant
expansion during the period 1990–2011. In 1990 there were a limited number of institutions (five
universities, two private colleges and 12 technical colleges). In the year 2011, the number of higher
education institutions rose to 30 government universities, six private universities, 44 colleges and higher

54 Ministry of Welfare and Social Security and UNDP, ‘Sudan National Human Development Report 2012’, UNDP, Khartoum, 2012.

17
institutes and 20 technical colleges. Accordingly, the intake capacity of higher education institutions
reached more than 500,000 students, representing 10 percent of the population in the age group 17–23
years.55 Therefore, one of the important causes of the expansion in education has been tertiary-level
enrolment.

Government policies are geared towards the provision of free and compulsory basic education for all. This
commitment is reflected in the Interim National Constitution as well as in the Twenty-Five Year National
Strategy 2007–2031. In addition, the National Plan for Education for All was developed in 2003 with
detailed activities, programmes and an estimated budget. Also developed was an interim national
Education Sector Strategic Plan (2012–2016), along with 18 state-level plans. The national- and state-level
Education Sector Plans for 2017–2021 are under development. There is a need, however, for the adoption
of a sector-wide approach and considerable investment in an evidence-based education information
management system to inform planning and policymaking.

Different indicators show that educational attainments in relation to needs are rather low. For instance,
2009 data indicated that the literacy rate among young women remains low.56 Nationwide, only 45.2 per
cent of women aged 15–24 years were literate. Since then, however, the women’s literacy has increased
to 59.8 percent in 2014, but the rate in the richest households is roughly three times higher than that of
the poorest households.57 The literacy rate also varies significantly across states, ranging from 81 percent
in Khartoum state to 44 percent in Western Darfur.

In basic education, and in spite of the progress made in the primary school net attendance ratio, large
numbers of children are still out of school in conflict-affected areas, rural areas, and non-accessible areas
as well as among nomadic populations and girls. The net attendance rate increased from 68.4 percent in
2006 to 71.8 percent in 2010 and 76.4 percent in 2014.58 Furthermore, although the Gender Parity Index
in primary school improved from 0.94 in 2010 to 0.98 in 2014,59 there is a gap of more than 10 percentage
points in the primary school completion rate between boys (84.8 percent) and girls (74.3 percent).60
Additionally, the proportion of children out of school has remained high, particularly in conflict-affected
areas, as evidenced by remarkable regional disparities (42.5 percent in the state of Blue Nile compared to
5.7 percent in Northern).61 The number of those who never attended school is also high, with the gross
enrolment rate at only 70.9 percent in 2012–2013.62

Quality of education in Sudan is a concern. For instance, 21 percent of primary schools are without
adequate water and sanitation facilities, which negatively impacts upon female school attendance and
enrolment.63 Moreover, the availability of textbooks is a real difficulty in many schools in remote rural
areas, and the lack of trained teachers in basic school is another barrier to the provision of quality
education. Equity issues pose serious problems in the educational system in terms of income, rural–urban
location and gender.

55 National Population Council, ‘Sudan Population: Changes and Challenges’, Khartoum, 2012.
56 Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Sudan National Baseline Household Survey 2009, North Sudan—Tabulation Report’.
57 Ibid.
58 Sudan MICS 2014.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ministry of Education, ‘Education Statistics Report 2012–2013’.
63 United Nations and the Government of Sudan, Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) Reports, Khartoum, 2005.

18
There are several vulnerable societal groups, including cultural minorities, nomads, out-of-school
children, IDPs and the disabled. Out-of-school children account for low enrolment in the Darfur, Abyei,
Kordofan and Eastern regions. The war, along with the devastation of HIV/AIDS, has left many children as
orphans and household heads. These children are less likely to attend school and more likely to drop out
if already enrolled. Children from displaced families often must contribute to the family’s income.
Nomadic people, who account for 8.5 percent of the population, are also disadvantaged.64

One of the major challenges to achieving inclusive access and quality basic education, given the above-
mentioned reasons, is the lack of school feeding and nutrition, which leads to immediate short-term
hunger among children at schools, resulting from: (i) students staying at school with empty stomachs
because they do not have money to buy breakfast at the school canteen, or (ii) students going back home
for breakfast, but either they do not find food at home or they find their parents farming and/or working
in day labour at other farms or elsewhere, and thus they either do not come back to school or come back
to school and stay with empty stomachs and are unable to comprehend and benefit from lessons. Both
situations lead to low educational indicators and results, including low retention, attendance, gender
parity, completion and attainment.

The finance of education remains one of the major challenges facing the Government, particularly after
the secession of South Sudan, which resulted in the reduction of general budget revenues. Sudan spent
relatively less on education as a share of GDP, 2.7 percent, compared to 3–7 percent of GDP for
neighbouring countries Chad, Ethiopia and Kenya. Currently, household out-of-pocket payments must
cover a large share of school running costs, in particular for basic education. The cost of education
accounts for a larger share of the consumption of poor rural households than non-poor rural households,
with implications for equity in access to education.65

At the community and household levels, socioeconomic and other factors affect access to education.
Education is very costly for households and is often unaffordable. There are also limited livelihoods and
economic opportunities to increase the income status of households, especially for women where low
household-level income discourage girls' enrolment in education. In fact, the pressing need for children
to contribute to household income, particularly in rural areas, has negatively affected children’s
educational attainment. In addition, the high cost of education, resulting from the curtailment of public
spending and the introduction of the co-payment mechanism, has affected the accessibility of education
services for the poor. Low educational attainments, partially caused by conflict and poverty, contribute to
the general persistence of poverty by limiting the population’s productive capacities and competitive
capabilities.66

3.3 Health
The health indicators in Sudan are generally low, with significant urban, rural, regional, gender and
socioeconomic disparities. Average life expectancy at birth was estimated at around 63.8 years for both
sexes in 2014. Sudan is still prone to epidemics including measles, meningitis, and acute watery diarrhoea.
The epidemiological profile of the country is dominated by common communicable diseases and a wide
range of neglected tropical diseases that can be prevented and treated relatively cheaply. Moreover, most
are associated with a lack of hygiene, deteriorating environmental and living conditions, the status of

64 Ibid.
65 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.
66 United Nations, Government of National Unity and Government of Southern Sudan, ‘Sudan Country Analysis’, Khartoum, 2007.

19
education and gender disparities, and poor health service coverage for conditions such as measles,
dengue fever, dysentery, tuberculosis and malaria. In addition, child health indicators, which are known
to be very sensitive to the prevailing socioeconomic conditions, reflect the deteriorating situation of
children.

In spite of the numerous health-related risk factors prevailing in Sudan such as conflict, natural disasters
and environmental hazards, some progress has been made in health indicators, namely in malaria, infant
mortality, child mortality and maternal mortality, but more efforts are needed to make further gains in
these areas. Sudan has continued to maintain its polio-free status and relatively high rate of vaccinations,
although inadequate coverage levels in specific localities have sporadically led to outbreaks of measles.
Malaria is considered a major health problem in Sudan. Estimates show that the rate of new infections in
2009 reached about 7,430/100,000 people. The Ministry of Health and UN partners have exerted efforts
to curb the epidemic, and there has been a noticeable reduction in clinical cases and deaths from malaria.
Between 2010 and 2014, reported malaria cases decreased by 60 percent and reported deaths dropped
by 53 percent, largely due to the increased availability and use of insecticide-treated nets and the free
availability and use of the Artesunate combination treatment These had a positive impact in reducing
infection rates and the national average fell from 33 percent in 1990 to about 5 percent in 2010.67

Sudan has a concentrated HIV epidemic with an estimated prevalence rate of 0.2 percent among adults
aged 15–49, though much higher rates of up to 7.7 percent are reported among key populations in some
areas.68 The country also has the second highest number of new HIV infections in the Middle East and
North Africa region with an estimated 4,400 new infections annually69 and 2,000 among youth, according
to 2015 spectrum estimations. The country is vulnerable to the spread of HIV due to high rates of poverty;
vast and open borders; risky sexual behaviours associated with the presence of the gold mining sector;
extensive population mobility and displacement; and the continued instability in several parts of the
country caused by conflicts. Limited knowledge about the epidemic remains a real concern, with available
statistics indicating that only 8.5 percent of young women aged 15–24 years can correctly identify ways
of preventing HIV and reject major misconceptions about the virus.70 In addition, the risk of HIV is known
to be greater in conflict settings and data suggest higher levels of HIV and sexually transmitted infections
in some areas of Darfur.71

The burden of non-communicable diseases causes 33.9 percent of all deaths and is steadily increasing.
Cardiovascular diseases account for 11.6 percent, cancers 5.2 percent, respiratory diseases 2.4 percent
and diabetes mellitus 1.8 percent of all deaths.72 More than 9 percent of students73 (13–15 years of age;
13.7 percent of boys, 5.1 percent of girls) have ever smoked cigarettes, while 27.6 percent of students
aged 13 to 15 years report exposure to passive smoking. Mapping of the prevalence of the main non-
communicable diseases is needed to guide an integrated multisectoral approach with a focus on
behavioural change.

67 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.

68 Sudan National AIDS Program, University of Gezira, UNFPA with support from the Global Fund Office-UNDP, ‘Integrated Bio-
Behavioural HIV Surveillance Survey’, 2011-2012.
69 Ibid.
70 ‘MICS 2014 Key Findings’, April 2015.
71 UNAIDS, ‘An Overview of HIV and AIDS in Darfur, Sudan’, May 2015.
72 World Health Organization (WHO), ‘Global Status Report on Non-Communicable Diseases’, WHO, Geneva, 2014,

apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/148114/1/9789241564854_eng.pdf.
73 World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, Global Youth Tobacco Survey 2009 Country Fact

Sheet, Cairo, 2010.

20
As expected in a protracted conflict context, mental health and substance abuse are emerging health
priorities, yet little supporting information is available. Mental health services are centralized and mainly
hospital-based, lacking integration at the primary and especially community levels.

With regard to child mortality indicators, estimates show that the rate in Sudan is relatively high when
compared to other countries with a similar socioeconomic and cultural status. The infant mortality rate is
estimated at 52 per 1,000 live births and more than half of these are neonatal deaths. The Under-5
Mortality Rate is estimated at 68 per 1,000 live births with substantial gender and standard of living
disparities. The rate for boys is estimated to be 78.7 per 1,000 live births compared to 57.6 per 1,000 live
births for girls. The MICS 2014 shows that the mortality rate among the poorest households is more than
double that of the richest households. Under-5 mortality is also higher in conflict-affected states with the
worst affected states being East Darfur at 112, West Darfur at 91 and North Darfur at 90 per 1,000 live
births.74

Regarding the Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR), the national figure remains high, estimated at 311 deaths
per 100,000 live births75, which reflects an observed decline from the 1990 estimates of 744 deaths per
100,000 live births76. However, the latest MICS figures indicate that antenatal care coverage (at least four
times by any provider) is still low at 50.7 percent, with only 27.7 percent of deliveries taking place in health
facilities. Postnatal care coverage is also low and estimated to be 27.7 percent. Use of family planning
methods is similarly low with a 12 percent contraceptive prevalence rate (19 percent urban, 9 percent
rural).

Despite the existence of laws, policies and programmes, violence against children (VAC) and women
(VAW)77 is an issue of concern in Sudan. Of particular concern are FGM and early marriage. The MICS 2014
results show that FGM is highly prevalent, with a rate of 86.6 percent among women aged 15–49 years.
This prevalence varies across states. Prevalence of FGM among girls aged 0-14 years is currently at 31.5
percent, noting however that girls in this age cohort are still at risk of experiencing FGM, with the average
age at which the practice is carried out being between 5 and 7 years. FGM is driven by social norms and
there is still a lack of evidence on the dynamics surrounding the practice and what works to change it. The
challenges to collect such data include the traditional, cultural and social norms surrounding the practice,
social stigma, and lack of willingness to report cases.

Overall coverage of basic health services is about 45 to 50 percent. Differences between urban and rural
areas in health and nutrition outcomes and service utilization persist, although they seem to have
narrowed over the past decade, possibly partially due to significant migration to cities. There are
significant urban–rural and regional disparities in the availability of health resources and services. The
total skilled workforce is large, but is also concentrated in urban and better-off regions.78

74 Sudan MICS 2014.

75 UN Statistics Division, MDG Indicators Data, mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx.
76 Ibid.
77 According to Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, violence against women

(VAW) is defined as ‘Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm
or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or
private life’. VAW is prevalent in Sudan, cutting across divisions of age, social status, ethnic group and community. It continues
to be a pervasive societal problem and it has multidimensional forms, from verbal abuse to honour killings. VAW has direct health
impacts on women, such as through physical injuries (wounds, contusions, burns and other body lacerations), psychological or
emotional abuse (verbal insulting), as well as death.
78 World Bank, ‘Sudan: Toward Sustainable and Broad-Based Growth’, 2009.

21
Responsibility for basic health service provision was decentralized in the 1990s to the state and local
levels, but the necessary funding transfers from the central Government have remained insufficient.
Provision of basic health services has been a major challenge, particularly in poorer states and rural areas.
Total health expenditure is very low as it represents about 6.5 percent of the GDP and $115 per capita for
the year 2013.79 The health financing system is thus characterized by a high share of out-of-pocket
expenditure at 75.8 percent (2013), an increase from 60 percent in 200580, which exposes many to
unaffordable health expenditures. This compares with an average of 35 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, 32
percent in the Arab world and 55 percent in lower-middle-income countries.81 In addition, the allocation
of health spending is skewed towards curative and hospital care, and most of the allocation is for salaries.
As a consequence, primary and first-referral care, particularly in the poorer states, suffers from a lack of
resources.82

Financial resources are required in order for Sudan to meet its obligations as a signatory to the
International Health Regulations (IHR) framework agreement. Until integrated disease surveillance is
established, which should include a list of notifiable diseases, the early warning and response system
remains the most reliable mechanism of alert for public health threats; this, however, is largely dependent
on external support through the humanitarian funding mechanism, which is not as reliable as it once was.
Therefore, IHR is an important priority in the context of social cohesion as well as outbreaks, both of which
can heavily impact national security.

In sum, health services suffer from a number of challenges: weak health system with very strong vertical
programming approach, with little window for effective integration that could lead to huge opportunities
to reach the ‘most in need’. Deficiencies are also noted in the services delivery modes as well as the
referrals system, insufficient financial resources and lack of a sustainable health financing strategy, poor
distribution and retention of a qualified health workforce, lack of implementation of standards of care,
weak infrastructure and distribution, few health facilities constructed to code, and low quality and
unaffordability of tertiary services leading to patients seeking treatment abroad. Endemic to health
services in Sudan is also poor integration between curative and preventive services, and generally limited
vision, planning and implementation.83

3.4 Nutrition
Sudan has some of the highest rates of malnutrition in the world.84 The rates of malnutrition have not
improved for the last 30 years; global acute malnutrition has remained largely unchanged at 15.8 and 16.3
percent in 1987 and 2014, respectively, while stunting continues to show an upward trend from 32
percent in 1987 to 38.2 percent in 2014.85 Currently Sudan is one of the 14 countries where 80 percent of
the world’s stunted children live and 128 of Sudan’s 18486 localities have a stunting rate classified as high87

79 WHO, ‘Global Health Expenditure Database’, apps.who.int/nha/database.

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid. Lower-middle income countries are those whose Gross National Income per capita is between $1,046 and $4,125,

calculated using the World Bank Atlas method.

82 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.
83 Ministry of Welfare and Social Security and UNDP, ‘Sudan National Human Development Report 2012’.
84 UNICEF, ‘State of the World’s Children 2012: Children in an Urban World’, UNICEF, February 2012.
85 Sudan MICS 2014.
86 Ministry of Health, ‘Sudan National Simple Spatial Surveying (S3M) Method’, 2013.
87 WHO Expert Committee, ‘Physical Status: The Use and Interpretation of Anthropometry’, WHO Technical Report Series No.

854, Geneva, 1995, ch. 5, pp. 208 and 212. Stunting cut-offs: very high = >40%; high = 30-40%; medium = 20-29%; low = <20%.

22
(>30 percent). In addition, levels of acute malnutrition remain above the WHO emergency threshold in 11
out of the 18 states. Child malnutrition is one of major causes of child mortality and also has an impact on
GDP. Evidence has shown that management of severe acute malnutrition according to WHO guidelines
reduces the case-fatality rate by 55 percent in hospital settings. Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH)
database information reveals that only 104 centres reported implementation of treatment services for
complicated cases of malnutrition in 2015.

The key drivers for the high malnutrition are protracted complex emergencies as a result of continued
conflicts and displacements, recurrent droughts, poor water and sanitation conditions and high
communicable disease prevalence. However, locality-level data analysis revealed that the areas of
greatest depravation are not solely within humanitarian and conflict zones in Sudan. For example,
evidence shows that the non-conflict states of Gezira, Gedarif and Khartoum are among the five top states
with the highest prevalence of severely malnourished children. This is because the causes of malnutrition
in Sudan are multi-sectoral and are not only related to conflict. A study on causal factors for malnutrition
in Red Sea revealed that diarrhoea, fever and early introduction of water to children under the age of six
months were strongly associated with malnutrition. For every one month, the early delay in the
introduction of water has a protective effect on malnutrition.

Proxy indicators for micronutrient status show a poor situation, with 16 out of 18 states (and 76 percent
of localities) recording a prevalence of night blindness during pregnancy (proxy for vitamin A deficiency)
of more than 5 percent. A survey in four localities in Kassala state, East Sudan, highlighted that 73 percent
of children under 5 years of age and 49 percent of pregnant women are anaemic,88 while a mere 7.6
percent of households across Sudan use iodized salt. These indicators suggest that the child and maternal
micronutrient status in Sudan is of serious concern.

Contributing to the high levels of child malnutrition are the high levels of maternal undernutrition across
the country. The Sudan National Simple Spatial Surveying Method (S3M) showed that up to 62 percent of
mothers in some locations are undernourished, a scale which is classified as ‘extreme’.89 While there has
been an improvement in the proportion of infants exclusively breastfed for six months (from 41 percent
in 2010 to 55 percent in 2014), 45 percent of infants are still not exclusively breastfed. FMoH has
developed a national action plan for maternal, infant and young children to protect, promote and support
maternal and infant and young child feeding in collaboration with UN entities, NGOs and partners.

The availability of services to address malnutrition remains very low. For example, in 2015, 70 percent of
children needing treatment for severe acute malnutrition did not receive it due to a lack of services.
Determinant analysis has identified supply factors linked to a limited availably of treatment services for
acute malnutrition and limited availability of community support services and trained human resources
for improved child feeding and care practices as being the most critical bottlenecks impeding accelerated
progress in combating malnutrition.90

Sudan was officially accepted as part of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement in October 2015,
becoming country number 56 to join the SUN network, signifying greatly increased support and
commitment from the Government to address the underlying and basic causes of malnutrition. The

88 The UNICEF/World Food Programme (WFP)/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Joint Resilience Project baseline survey,
Kassala, 2014.
89 The incidence of those with a Mid-Upper-Arm Circumference (MUAC) of <23cm being more than >50% is classified as extreme;

Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit—Somalia, www.fsnau.org/.

90 Government of Sudan–UNICEF Midterm Review, 2014.

23
National Nutrition Directorate, with support from UN and other partners, has developed and endorsed
the Multi-Sector Strategy to Address Malnutrition 2014–2018. In addition, the federal Ministries of Health
and Agriculture have recently developed a comprehensive food security and nutrition policy. A Food
Security and Nutrition Council, to oversee implementation of the plan, has been endorsed by the
President (May 2015) and is currently being legalized (2016).

The federal Ministry of Health and UN partners have developed a costed nutrition investment case for
increasing investment in nutrition in Sudan.91 The nutrition investment case proposes an integrated
multisectoral package of interventions designed for the prevention of child malnutrition (both acute and
chronic), the reduction of child mortality, and interventions to improve maternal nutrition. It is largely
focused on nutrition-sensitive interventions that can be more cost-effective than treatment options. This
investment case is due to be officially launched by the Office of the President in 2016. It presents an
unprecedented opportunity to redouble efforts to prevent and treat malnutrition in Sudan. The
Government of Sudan is already increasing investment in fighting malnutrition, and in 2015 it allocated
cash resources to support the National Scale-Up Plan for the treatment of acute malnutrition and
purchase of therapeutic food supplies. FMoH, UN entities and the Sudan Association of Paediatricians
(SAP) developed a project collaboration agreement to enhance the scale-up of inpatient care of severe
acute malnutrition. The agreement focuses on the contribution of treatment and prevention of severe
acute malnourished children with complications. There has also been progress made on legislation for salt
iodization with the signing of the Red Sea Declaration (FMoH, federal Ministry of Interior, UN entities,
GIAD motors and the Wali of Red Sea state), bringing together Government, UN and private industry
partners to ensure the nationalization and quality iodization of all salt produced in Red Sea state. FMoH,
in collaboration with UN entities and partners, is developing guidelines for the monitoring of quality
control of salt iodization. This is an important step as Red Sea state produces 95 percent of the salt
consumed in Sudan.

3.5 Social Protection

Poverty, limited economic opportunities and conflict affect the ability of vulnerable families to meet their
daily needs. Families and social structures in conflict areas have been disrupted. Social services targeting
youth and adolescents, who face many challenges such as high numbers out of school and high
unemployment, are weak and policies do not address their particular needs. The well-being of children in
need of protection is compromised by overstretched social services and support systems.

It is important to strengthen the protection approach in a systematic way to ensure availability of

prevention and protection interventions, policies, legislations and services to address a wide range of risk
factors and vulnerabilities in the lives of children, adolescents and their families. The approach requires
dealing with a wide and diverse range of elements mainly by the social welfare, but also across many other
sectors, such as education, health, security, labour, youth and justice in order to prevent and respond to
protection-related risks.

While Sudan has drafted and developed a number of progressive plans and strategies to support
vulnerable populations and address gender inequality and violations against women and children, there
is a need to enhance investment in these areas to achieve the established priorities, strengthen
coordination and address the needs in a systematic manner. Despite efforts by the Government in
partnership with the UN and civil society organizations to address protection issues, many challenges still

91 UNICEF and WFP, ‘The Case for Investment in Nutrition in Sudan’, February 2016.

24
confront the national social welfare and protection systems, especially in terms of the provision of services
for vulnerable populations, including women, youth, adolescents and children. This calls for enhancement
of the availability and capability of social workers and professionals to meet the growing demand for
public social and child welfare systems, especially at the state level, and for increased budgetary
allocations at national and state levels for public social welfare service providers and professional social
workers to perform their duties.92

Challenges remain, in spite of the significant progress that has been observed in terms of the development
of protective legislation to enhance the rights of children and women. The challenges are mainly related
to the absence of a comprehensive body of subsidiary legislation, mechanisms and regulations, services
and coordination. This absence has rendered many government agencies unable to effectively implement
the protective legislation.

Social security is a human right, as postulated in Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
but achieving this pillar is difficult in Sudan, with a considerable portion of the population displaced in
camps and over 46 percent living under the poverty line. Moreover, a large segment of the population is
lacking access to services such as clean water and basic medical and education facilities.

Social protection in Sudan is classified under social development and is dealt mainly by the Ministry of
Welfare and Social Security. The system includes central Government contributions to pensions; social
insurance, e.g. pensions (to ensure a minimum income in old age); health insurance (to protect the well-
being of households in the face of adverse events); social assistance through targeted programmes (to
increase the access of vulnerable groups to basic services); as well as labour market policies and
programmes (to promote employment, productivity and microfinance). The system includes central
Government contributions to the pension and social security funds, as well as to social subsidies that
directly benefit the poor, and which are mainly directed towards subsidizing electricity, free medication
in emergencies only, and free medicine for kidney dialysis and heart disease. There is also direct support
for poor students enrolled in higher education and primary and secondary education, and for the provision
of medical staff for all health units.93

Social protection programmes can be a powerful tool in the battle against poverty and inequality as they
can tackle multiple dimensions of poverty and exclusion. Social protection should ensure that all people
have access to essential goods and services by removing social and economic barriers and thereby
fostering social equality and solidarity.

Social protection, including cash transfers and family support services, can go a long way to support
vulnerable families; women and children; and victims of violence and trafficking. It can also prevent family
separation. Over the longer term, another key social protection instrument that has proven universally
effective in addressing vulnerability and poverty among children and the elderly is social pensions for the
elderly. This is especially important in the context of an increasing elderly population on one hand, and
an increasing number of children being left behind in the care of grandparents on the other (on account
of outmigration).

92 Federal Ministry of Social Welfare and Social Security and the National Council for Child Welfare, ‘Child Protection
Mapping/Assessment (with a focus on social welfare)’, 2016.
93 Ali, Hisham Mohamed Hassan, ‘Social Protection and Economic Growth in the Sudan: Trends and Perspectives’, University of

Khartoum, March 2011, ssrn.com/abstract=1530582.

25
An important and primary social protection mechanism in Sudan is Zakat, which is an Islamic measure for
wealth distribution and the building of productive capabilities, and is playing an important role as a source
of social assistance for the poor. Expenditure on the poor from the Zakat Fund as a percentage from total
government pro-poor spending94 constituted about 3.2 percent in 2004. The Zakat contribution as a
proportion of government pro-poor spending declined steadily thereafter and reached 1.4 percent of the
total pro-poor expenditure in 2008, mainly due to an increase in the absolute value of government pro-
poor spending.95

One of the social support schemes adopted by the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security is the Social
Initiative Programme (SIP), which consists of eight components. The programme is aimed at the provision
of an integrated package of services for 500,000 families from the poorest households. It also aims to
provide a diverse range of health services, and education- and income-generating activities for other poor
households. However, social protection schemes in Sudan are challenged by the fiscal adjustments being
carried out in response to the reduction of oil revenues following the secession of South Sudan. This has
led to the suspension of subsidies for key commodities in addition to other austerity measures, which,
coupled with the pressures on the country’s foreign reserve position, have aggravated the situation of the
poor.

Like any other developing country, the pension system in Sudan is facing a number of difficulties. One
shortcoming is that the pension scheme was not designed to protect the beneficiaries from inflation,
which reduces the purchasing power of pension entitlements. Therefore, pensioners are subject to
impoverishment and vulnerability. As a way of compensation, the Pension Fund has provided additional
payments to poor pensioners for food, health, and education expenditures. However, as the pension
system covers only the formal sector while the majority of retirees are from the agricultural and informal
commercial sectors, overall pension coverage is very limited and many have to depend on avenues of
support such as savings, family members and relatives.96

Large streams of humanitarian aid flowing into Sudan as support from UN agencies, international NGOs
and other organizations have been helpful in allowing vulnerable populations to be reached. The provision
of basic services to an estimated 2.5 million IDPs comprises the key intervention as far as humanitarian
assistance. However, the link between humanitarian and development assistance has been inadequate,
and an important priority of the Government is to begin to reorient resources towards more sustainable,
developmentally-oriented activities.

The Sudanese system is characterized by having three major loopholes. The first one is limited coverage.
The coverage of the social protection system in Sudan is still limited as it focuses on workers in the public
and private formal sector. The challenge here is the extension of coverage to include workers in the
informal economy, who comprise about two thirds of the workforce, especially in light of the prevailing
circumstances that gave rise to the expansion of the informal economy such as internal rural–urban
migration and the influx of displaced populations as a result of conflict and climatic conditions.

The second loophole relates to the coverage of hazards. The social security system in Sudan covers five
elements, including aging, death, health insurance, occupational diseases and work-related injuries and

94 Pro-poor spending could be defined as that which gives priority to: (i) Agriculture and natural resources; (ii) Infrastructure
(roads, railways and irrigation dams); (iii) Education; (iv) Health; (v) Water; and (vi) Social welfare (transfers, excluding subsidies),
including IDPs, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
95 Government of Sudan, National Population Council, ‘Sudan Millennium Development Goals Progress Report’, Khartoum, 2010.
96 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.

26
disability. Therefore, there are four components that are still outside the coverage of the social security
system in Sudan. These are: unemployment, social assistance, family allowances and maternity. Current
economic conditions make it difficult to deal with these requisites, leaving a clear gap in the social
protection system.

The third gap facing the social protection system in Sudan is the suitability and adequacy of the support
provided. The minimum required coverage in the social system implies that people of all ages be able to
buy and acquire all essential goods and services. However, this requirement seems to be unattainable
under the prevailing socioeconomic conditions, which are characterized by a high levels of poverty,
widespread unemployment, violent conflicts, and the difficult economic situation in general.

Moreover, the social protection system in Sudan is facing four major barriers.97 These are:

Lack of social protection policy

The absence of a clear policy of social protection is a key impediment to the improvement of the social
protection system in Sudan. It is difficult, in the absence of such a policy, to plan, implement and
coordinate social protection interventions required for the advancement of social protection.

Lack of coordination and poor information

There are a number of governmental and non-governmental bodies that play different roles within the
social protection system. However, poor coordination and lack of information concerning the labour
market, particularly the informal economy, can cause the effectiveness of the roles played by different
actors to be weakened and lead to overlaps that result in the waste of already limited resources.

Lack of funding
The social protection system suffers from limited financial resources, especially in light of the tremendous
pressures on government spending to offset the costs of dealing with armed conflicts, in addition to the
scarcity of resources caused by the secession of South Sudan. Additional financial challenges include the
decline in foreign aid resulting from economic sanctions, including unilateral coercive economic measures,
and the accumulation of external debt.

The steadily growing informal economy

The informal economy is witnessing steady expansion due to a number of factors, including high
unemployment rates, steady rural–urban migration and the high number of displaced persons. Therefore,
the provision of social protection services for this sector will remain a real challenge for several reasons.
Foremost among these are: the lack of information and data, the large geographical distribution of the
activities of this economy, the presence of large numbers of people in need of additional services, and
shortages of the necessary financial and human resources.

3.6 Infrastructure
Inadequate infrastructure is a major barrier to growth in internal and external trade and to the
competitiveness of the Sudanese economy in global markets. Weak infrastructure is also a factor
hindering connectivity and the dissemination of the benefits of growth to all parts of the country. For
instance, areas that are disadvantaged due to poor infrastructure suffer from high costs of goods and

97Elias, Abdul Hameed, ‘Social Protection Systems in Sudan’, in the Sudan chapter of ‘Annual Arab Economic Rights Monitor in
the Arab Countries: Social Protection, the Other Face of the State Dilemma’, Arab NGO Network for Development, Beirut, 2014.

27
services, lack of investment due to unwillingness on the part of investors, and the reluctance of competent
professionals—teachers, health workers, etc.—to work there, leading to poor social services and a
reinforcement of poverty and political grievances.98

The most disadvantaged areas as far as infrastructure include conflict-affected and rural areas. Generally,
these areas lack access to affordable basic services and connectivity with other parts of the country and
face constraints in terms of the availability of financial resources for attaining the required level of
infrastructure. Further challenges include inadequate implementation capacity and human resources as
well as difficulties in coordinating policies among different levels of government.99

Inland transport services in Sudan are dominated by the use of road transport, which provides over 90
percent. The total road network in Sudan is estimated to be 32,425 km, including both paved and unpaved
surfaces for all types of roads (national highways, state roads, and urban roads), except for tracks in rural
areas. Road density, at just 1.3 km per 100 km2, is lower than in some of the comparable neighbour
countries. The poor quality of existing roads negatively affects the efficiency of road transport services.
Estimates show that about half of paved roads require rehabilitation or overlay. Inadequate funding for
road maintenance and lack of cost recovery is causing rapid deterioration of the quality of the existing
roads.100

Access to adequate and secured housing is also an issue facing the poor segments in towns and cities. This
is mainly due to the high cost of housing and limited financial resources available to poor households.

Despite the significant increase in electricity generation and distribution following establishment of the
Merowe Dam, electricity supply in Sudan is still only enjoyed by 22 percent of the population, either from
the national grid or isolated electricity networks. The existing national grid covers only nine of Sudan's
former 25 states. Most of the consumers are in Khartoum where 57 percent of the available electricity is
consumed. The reliability of the public grid service is low and varies widely across the country. Not only is
access to power service a problem, but the efficiency of the service has spatial variation within Sudan,
with the capital cities in Darfur and Kordofan experiencing frequent power outages.

Other sources of energy like gas for cooking and lighting are enjoyed by a limited number of the
population. According to 2009 data, only 29 percent of households use gas for cooking (50 percent in
urban areas and 20 percent in rural areas) while about 70 percent of households use firewood and
charcoal. Moreover, about 80 percent of rural households still depend on firewood and charcoal for
cooking. Regional disparities are also evident regarding sources of energy for cooking and lighting. For
instance, 82 percent of households in Khartoum state use gas for cooking compared to a proportion of 12
percent of the households in the Darfur states. Likewise, Khartoum, River Nile, Northern and Gezira states
are the most advantaged regarding the use of electricity for lighting, while the disadvantaged states
include North Kordofan, South Kordofan some Darfur states and the Abyei area, within which there are
significant disparities.101

Besides being a contributor to environmental degradation and the heavy burden on women and girls (as
the main collectors of firewood in rural areas) and violence against them (when collecting firewood),

98 World Bank, ‘Sudan: Toward Sustainable and Broad-based Growth’, 2009.

99 Ibid.
100 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.
101 For details on sources and uses of energy, see Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Sudan National Baseline Household Survey

2009, North Sudan—Tabulation Report’.

28
domestic energy has turned out to be one of the main absorbers of household income due to the growing
scarcity of biomass resources.

3.7 Priority Areas

Priorities are set based on the objective of realizing equitable and adequate sustainable basic services for
all people as well as realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); providing a capacity
development–oriented context for a better development environment; the finalization and activation of
sectoral policies and strategic plans; and managing social development with maximum efficiency and
effectiveness. The globally adopted SDGs are of relevance to the national development agenda, founded
on the Quarter Century Development Strategy 2007-2031. Support for improved coverage and quality of
basic services, improved institutional capacities for service delivery, and enhanced accessibility to the
unreached are also prioritized.

General
 Providing accessibility to quality basic social services is a major priority area due to the numerous
associated challenges, including: the vastness of the country, shortages of facilities and personnel,
inadequacy of infrastructure, maldistribution of the existing facilities and cadre, increasing costs
of services, poor organization of service delivery leading to huge opportunities lost, weak
continuity of care, widespread poverty, shortages of funding/investment, and prolonged conflict
and violence. A pro-poor focus in basic service provision is a top priority.
 Targeting the most in need and focusing on equity is critical. Attention needs to be placed on
those living in low performing localities in terms of access to decentralized basic and protection
services, in particular the most vulnerable such as children, women and elderly groups.
 More emphasis should be placed on the needs of adolescents in social service and social
protection programming, and youth should be mainstreamed in programming.
 It is important to promote cross-sectoral and integrated approaches to programming.
Comprehensive multisectoral programmes to promote positive social changes related to health,
education, water, sanitation and hygiene, protection (FGM/C and child marriage) and nutrition
are needed.
WASH
 With regard to WASH, the important priorities are: to increase the coverage of safe water and
sanitation services, including the stoppage of open defecation; to increase the uptake of improved
hygiene behaviours, especially handwashing with soap; to strengthen the management of WASH
services; to build sector capacity; to improve sector coordination; to reform and streamline sector
institutions; to ensure dedicated budget for WASH services, including sanitation and hygiene; and
to encourage community ownership and sustainability. There is a need to develop a clear vision
and strategy for WASH services in protracted crises with a focus on strengthening the
humanitarian and development nexus and forging a balanced nationwide WASH programme that
delivers equitable services.
 Addressing water access for nomads, farmers, IDPs and refugees, and the lack of water services
that constitutes a forced displacement and conflict driver, are top priorities. Competition for the
safe water sources between host community and new IDPs, protracted IDPs and refugees will
increase tensions. The situation can deteriorate as existing water supply systems break down due
to long periods of operation and inability to respond to the rising demand for water. This requires
additional funding for the development of sustainable safe water source for the host

29
 communities, IDPs and refugees, and specific operation and maintenance strategies for water
supply system in the IDP and refugees camps.
Education
 The main issues and immediate needs in education are to: extend the coverage of basic education,
including technical education; reduce inequities through the better distribution of facilities and
cadre; strengthen out-of-school education; build institutional and management capacity for
better planning and strategy implementation; and utilize education planning as a social cohesion
mechanism in urban and rural areas, and between nomads and farmers, IDPs, refugees and host
communities.
 More emphasis needs to be placed on improving access to education in rural areas, to utilize
education planning as a social cohesion mechanism in urban and rural areas between nomads and
farmers, IDPs, refugees and host communities.
Health
 In health, the important and pressing need is to achieve and increase service coverage to reach
the ‘most in need’ while also including the majority of the population, particularly those in
disadvantaged conflict-affected and rural areas. A specific focus should be put to scale up the
access to selected interventions with high impact in reducing child and maternal mortality. The
facilitation of access for specific vulnerable groups such as nomads, IDPs, returnees and refugees
is likewise a high priority. In this respect, investment in infrastructure and human resources, as
well as financial and technical support for service delivery, are essential. Moreover, policy reforms
for sustainable health financing and capacity-building need to be considered. It will also be
important to strengthen the health system itself and to expand health insurance coverage to
include remote areas and individuals who do not have permanent work with the Government or
in the private sector.
 Improving the equitable coverage and accessibility of integrated primary health care and ensuring
high-quality primary, secondary and tertiary health care are major priorities. Ensuring a stable and
equitably distributed health workforce with an appropriate mix of skills to meet agreed health
sector needs is essential.
 Strengthening an integrated and multisectoral approach for combating communicable diseases
(including neglected tropical diseases), including through prevention and control programmes
with full capacity to meet international health regulations is a top national, regional and
international health priority.
 It is important to ensure a good combination of fixed, outreach and mobile delivery modes to
improve access to basic health services for specific vulnerable groups (in concurrence with mobile
populations), especially nomads, IDPs, returnees and refugees.
 Improving the real-time monitoring of interventions is important as a mean to better identify and
address the major bottlenecks limiting health service delivery at all levels.
Nutrition
 There is an overarching need for a comprehensive and combined multisectoral approach to
prevent malnutrition in all its forms and treat life-threatening acute malnutrition, including
stunting and wasting in children under five years of age, and address the nutritional needs of
adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, and older persons. This approach must take into
account the multi-causal nature of malnutrition in Sudan.
 Developing a national Home-Grown School Feeding Programme that is linked to local agriculture,
is needed as part of the country’s sustainable longer-term development, through the
strengthening of government capacities so that it is contemplated in government policy and legal
frameworks geared towards educational attainment and ending hunger.

30
Social welfare and protection
 Social protection and productive safety nets are not able to cope with the growing number of
people in need and vulnerable groups. Financing, management, innovation, coordination and the
graduation of persons receiving assistance are among the main priorities. Also prioritized are the
requirements associated with an increased population, namely the provision of hazards coverage
and the enhancement of the quality and adequacy of services provided.
 The challenges facing the ever-growing informal sector (not covered by social protection
measures), constituted mainly by rural, internal socioeconomic migrants (rural–rural or rural–
urban) and IDPs, need to be taken into consideration for immediate actions.
 Specific protection issues need to be considered, including gender-based violence, the use of
violent child discipline, and discrimination in terms of access to services and in educational access
for women.
 Targeted programmes are needed to strengthen social welfare and protection systems to address
the multiple vulnerabilities of women and children.
Infrastructure
 The development agenda for the infrastructure sector is mainly comprised of: infrastructure
maintenance, the development of capacity and systems, and reforms to improve safety, security
and performance.

31
4. Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management
4.1 Introduction
Sudan is a semi-arid country situated across the Sahelian zone with its characteristic low amount of
rainfall, scarcity of water, and short agricultural season (3–4 months). Drought is a recursive phenomenon
and frequent drought cycles extending over 2–3 years are common. Out of the country’s total area (1.87
million km2), 1.13 million km2 (60.2 percent) is desert and semi-desert; the remaining 0.687 million km2
(39.8 percent) is divided between low-rainfall savannah (300–500 mm of annual rainfall) and the rich
savannah (over 500 mm of annual rainfall) that extends extensively into the Republic of South Sudan.102
The figures challenge the Sudanese perception as having an abundance of renewable natural resources.103
The impacts of climate change are also evident in Sudan. Rainfall records from El Fasher, North Darfur,
show a marked drop beginning with drought in 1972. More significantly, droughts have become more
frequent. Sixteen of the 20 driest years recorded have occurred since 1972. Climate change models also
predict a more than 20 percent reduction in the length of the growing period between 2000 and 2020,
with similar reductions across nearly all of Darfur by 2050.104 Environmental and climate issues featured
heavily in the SDGs are particularly relevant to Sudan with direct linkages related to sustainable
consumption (SDG 12), climate action (SDG 13), protection of marine life (SDG 14), and ecosystem
conservation (SDG 15), with close linkages to other goals including poverty (SDG1) and food security
(SDG2).

The Government of Sudan has made some progress in adopting international agreements linked to
climate. Along with the SDG’s, two other international agreements have been endorsed by the
Government of Sudan under the Post-2015 Development Agenda related to promoting action on climate
and sustainable resource management. Namely the Sendai Framework for Action (2015-2030), which
focuses on making investment towards DRR a priority, and the COP21 Paris agreement under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in which Sudan has committed to address the impacts
of climate change. In 2015, Government of Sudan also submitted the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDC) ahead of the COP21 negotiations, which outlines how the country will take action
related to climate change and its impacts.

However, Sudan is facing other critical situations driven by the global El Niño weather phenomenon and
its climatic manifestation. Below-average overall rainfall has been observed in Sudan throughout 2015, as
well as an interruption of rainfall patterns marked by both the delayed onset of rains and intermittent dry
spells. With the majority of Sudan’s population depending on rainfall to either meet their daily water
needs and livelihood strategies or recharge their water sources, the widespread impact of El Niño has
severely affected some regions in Sudan.

In spite of a century of modernization, Sudan remains rural in its social, economic and cultural outlooks,
with the majority of the country’s total population living in rural areas and pursuing livelihood systems
based on environmentally extractive activities. Natural resources are also the main base of the country’s
GDP, for which the agricultural sector accounts for around 30.6 percent.105 Natural resources are also the
backbone of other sectors of the economy, especially manufacturing, mining, transport and trade. This is

102 FAO and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘Land Cover in Sudan’, FAO, Sudan.
103 UNEP, ‘Environmental Governance in Sudan: An Expert Review’, UNEP, Nairobi, November 2012.
104 Brendan, 2008
105 Central Bank of Sudan, ‘53rd Annual Report’, 2013.

32
in addition to the fact that the environment provides the main sources of domestic energy, building
materials and local industries in rural areas.

The diversity of environmental conditions in the country, especially in relation to water availability, rainfall
and soil type, has given rise to a wide variety of habitats, livelihood options, land tenure arrangements
and large-scale land acquisition. On the lands away from the Nile, where water availability is a limiting
factor, environmental management and human adaptation are centred on pastoralism and traditional
rain-fed farming as the two fundamental economic systems and lifestyles, but with great variation due to
local environmental, technical and market access constraints. Gum arabic production also contributes to
local and national economies. This type of adaptation has affected cultural and political boundaries
between groups, however, and territorial mobility between ecological zones has contributed to the
forging of intergroup relationships, both violent and peaceful. Close symbiotic relations—amounting to
alliances—forged through negotiations between tribal leaders, were historically common 106 and
constituted important mechanisms for maintaining resilience among both pastoral and farming
communities.

In spite of their profound differences, traditional crop and livestock production systems in the country
share common characteristics in the sense that: (i) they both evolved as specific forms of adaptation to
prevailing environmental conditions; (ii) both systems were founded on common customary
property/land tenure arrangements; (iii) both are essentially rainfall-based activities; (iv) both systems
are based on a low level of technological input; (v) both are characterized by a low level of productivity
and yields, which is particularly conspicuous in the farming sector; and (vi) both systems are vulnerable to
shocks.

Sudan’s natural resources are inadequately managed and the potential to transform these resources into
broad-based socioeconomic development has not been realized. Recently, Sudan’s environment has been
under pressure from the growing population of both people (with a 2.5 percent annual growth rate) and
livestock and the rapid transformation to a market economy under conditions of global climate change.
In addition, the context for environment and natural resource management in the country is changing:
following the loss of over 70 percent of oil revenue to the Republic of South Sudan, there are new
demands on land from the mining and petroleum sectors; domestic and foreign agribusiness investors;
and the Government. To offset lost energy resources due to secession, alternative and renewable energies
including solar-powered energy have also been seen as a viable option to increase access to energy. This
is in addition to the need to relocate a population of returnees from South Sudan, particularly in the states
of White Nile, Sennar and Blue Nile, that have driven up the need for energy.

4.2 The Non-Sustainable Nature of Sudan’s Environment

The non-sustainable nature of Sudan’s environment is reflected in the following:

i. Land Degradation

In spite of the absence of detailed and up-to-date studies, there is a general consensus among planners,
decision makers and land users that land degradation is a serious problem and one of the major challenges

106 Manger, Leif, ‘Root Causes of Conflict over Natural Resources in Sudan’, Report to UNDP Reduction of Resource-Based Conflict
Project, 2002.

33
facing contemporary Sudan. According to Ayoub (1998),107 out of the country’s total agricultural land,
pasture, forests and woodlands (170 million hectares), nearly 75 million hectares (45 percent) have been
severely to very severely degraded in recent history. Recent evidence108 suggests that since the 1930s
there has been a 50–200 km southward shift of the boundary between desert and semi-desert terrain.
Empirical evidence from Darfur suggests that the conflict has resulted in the unprecedented destruction
of environmental resources.109 According to a recent UN report on Darfur, Sudan has lost more forest
cover than any other country in Africa, with Darfur a major contributor to that trend.110 Emelie Dahlberg
and Daniel Slunge (2007)111 noted that most of the remaining semi-arid and low-rainfall savannah,
representing approximately 25 percent of Sudan’s agricultural land, is at considerable risk of further
degradation, and the trend is projected to continue southwards due to climate change and changing
rainfall patterns that are causing an estimated 20 percent drop in food production. The annual removal
rate of forests, estimated at 2.4 percent, is considered the highest rate of deforestation among developing
countries112 and has resulted in the loss of about 11 percent of Sudan’s forest cover between 1990 and
2005.113 In Darfur, a third of the forest cover was lost between 1973 and 2006. In the state of Gedarif, the
area described as grazing land has declined from 28,250 km2 (78.5 percent of the state’s total area) in
1941 to 6,700 km2 (18.6 percent of the state’s area) in 2002.114 Due to the secession of South Sudan in
2011, the forest cover ratio to land area in Sudan declined from 29.4 to 11.6 percent.

Water resources are also severely degraded. Groundwater is depleted and the main Nile is threatened by
the combination of encroaching sands and riverbank erosion. With the exception of the Jebel Aulia Dam,
all the reservoirs of the country’s existing dams are seriously affected. It is estimated that siltation has
reduced the storage capacities of the Roseires, Khashm el-Girba and Sennar Dams by 60, 54 and 34
percent, respectively. The hundreds of smaller wetter regions inspected in Sudan’s deserts (oases and
wadis)115 were found to be moderately to severely degraded.

Severe pressures on the environment in the border areas have been created by the secession of South
Sudan, and land acquisition for oil and semi-mechanized farming under conditions of large population and
livestock numbers. Border areas accommodate 30.4 percent of the human population and 40.3 percent
of the livestock population in Sudan.116

The study entitled ‘Sustainable Development of the Semi-Mechanized Farming Sector in Sudan’,
commissioned by Government of Sudan in 2008, identified the semi-mechanized farming sector as a major
cause of land degradation and biodiversity loss on the central clay plains of Sudan as a result of its role in
the wholesale clearance of vegetation, the acceleration of water and soil erosion, the perpetuation of

107 Ayoub, Ali Taha, ‘Extent, Severity and Causative Factors of Land Degradation in the Sudan’. Journal of Arid Environments 38,
no. 3 (1998), pp. 397–409.
108 UNEP, ‘Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment’, Nairobi, 2007.
109 Ibid.
110 United Nations Sudan, ‘Beyond Emergency Relief: Longer-Term Trends and Priorities for UN Agencies in Darfur’, Khartoum,

September 2010.
111 Dahlberg, Emelie and Slunge, Daniel, ‘Sudan Environmental Policy Brief’, Department of Economics, Göteborg University,

Sweden, 5 December 2007.

112 Sudan National Forests Corporation, ‘Forests National Corporation Report’, 2013.
113 Dahlberg and Slunge, ‘Sudan Environmental Policy Brief’, 2007.
114 Babiker, Mustafa, ‘Mobile Pastoralism and Land Grabbing in Sudan: Impacts and Responses’, paper presented at the

International Conference on the Future of Pastoralism, Feinstein International Centre, University of Tufts, 2011.
115 UNEP, ‘Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment’, 2007.
116 Ijaimi, Abdelatif Ahmed, ‘Agricultural Potentialities in Sudan Melting Pot States (in Arabic)’, 2010; paper prepared for the Unity

Support Fund.

34
monocultural practices and the lack of investment in land capital. In addition to drought, land degradation
is exacerbated by human activities, particularly the dependence of poor households on firewood and
charcoal as major sources of domestic energy and income. The poor planning of water sources, especially
in North Kordofan during the anti-thirst campaigns of the mid 1970s, has been widely recognized as major
source of land degradation in that part of the country.

Reduced crop yield associated with degraded land capability remains a serious problem in the country. A
study from North Kordofan117 maintained that the average dura grain (sorghum) yield per feddan has
declined from 630 kg in early 1970s to 270 kg in 2002. A recent study118 from the Gedarif state of East
Sudan shows that the average dura yield per feddan has declined from 720 kg in the 1960s to 180 kg in
2013. An immediate result of such a reduction is the dramatic expansion of cultivated land by farmers to
compensate for the declining yield from their existing land, which further contributes to the clearance of
land cover, increased competition over land, and, eventually, the proliferation of conflicts. The vast
decline in farmland yields was also documented by the Government of Sudan’s 2008 study on the
mechanized farming sector.119

Land degradation has had a disastrous impact on food security and the incomes of the rural population.
In many cases women are made disproportionately worse off by environmental degradation. The
increasing scarcity of fuelwood and water adds to the workload of women, and in conflict-affected areas
land degradation remains a major cause of violence against women. The resulting resource scarcity has
also heightened the demand and competition for land and other natural resources across Sudan with far-
reaching implications for land tenure regimes, access to resources and relations between social groups.
The situation of Darfur is a vivid exemplification.

ii. Environment and Population Instability

Population instability associated with massive dislocation and debasement has been a characteristic of
Sudan since the early 1980s as a result of the combined effects of land degradation, drought, the
disintegration of rural economies, and, more importantly, conflict, especially in Darfur. This has resulted
in a conspicuous shift in the population landscape with far-reaching socioeconomic, environmental,
political and security repercussions. The increase in the share of the population living in urban areas from
just 8.1 percent at the time of independence in 1956 to above 30 percent in 2008120 has made Sudan one
of the fastest urbanizing countries in the world.121

117 Omer Egemi et al., ‘Towards a Local Peace: SOS Sahel’s Experience of Conflict Transformation between Pastoralists and
Farmers at El Ain, North Kordofan State, Sudan’, IIED, April 2003.
118 Omer Egemi, ‘Livelihoods and Food Security Strategies of Pastoralists and Small Farmers in Gedarif State, East Sudan’, Maan

Organization and Oxfam Novib, 2014.

119 Government of Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, ‘Study of the Sustainable Development of the Semi-Mechanized

Farming Sector in Sudan’, 2008.

120 Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘2008 Census’.
121 Assal, Munzoul Abdalla, ‘Urbanization and the Future of Sudan’, Social Science Research Council Blog, 2008

35
The 1984–1985 disaster, associated with large-scale land degradation,
Displacement in 1984–
drought, and famine and which displaced approximately 1.8 million
1985
persons, particularly along the edges of the Sahara in Darfur and Kordofan,
Darfur 500,000
will remain a landmark in the social, economic and political history of
Kordofan 425,000
Sudan during the 20th Century. Dealing with the disaster from a
Eastern 400,000
humanitarian perspective set in motion many of the processes with which Central 420,000
Sudan and its partners continue to struggle, especially in relation to Northern 55,000
poverty and the proliferation of resource-based conflicts.

Because of large-scale land degradation and the decreasing resilience to climate change, Sudan is
witnessing a remarkable shift in its population and economies southwards towards the relatively wetter
and richer savannah areas in South Kordofan and South Darfur. This is leading to intensified competition
over resources and the proliferation of local-level conflicts, especially between pastoralists and farmers
in areas that are already affected by extreme population pressures and a wide range of human security
risks complicated by the secession of South Sudan.

iii. Poverty and Food Insecurity

Smallholder producers, who are both pastoralists and farmers and who are the major environmental users
and, historically, the main contributors to food security in the country, are currently facing a persistent
state of crisis that manifests itself most dramatically in high levels of rural poverty, child and maternal
malnutrition, and food insecurity; the proliferation of resource-based conflict; progressive shifts in
livelihood systems; depopulation of the rural areas; and decreasing resilience to even slight fluctuations
in rainfall amounts or price levels in the markets. Wide disparities in the incidence of poverty between
urban (26.5 percent) and rural (57.6 percent)122 areas indicate a strong correlation between poverty
incidence and direct dependence on the environment. In the course of recent history, pastoralists have
lost control over their lands and customary rangelands and livestock migration routes are shrinking under
the expansion of agriculture and heavy capital investment. Women and children have been particularly
affected by environmental degradation, especially through fuelwood and water scarcity and the
accelerating food insecurity problem, both of which have serious implications for health and nutrition.

Land degradation in the country is strongly linked to poverty in rural as well as urban areas. Unsustainable
urban growth is manifested in the spread of squatter settlements and immense pressures on already weak
infrastructure for the provision of services in the urban centres.

iv. Conflict over Land and Resources

Conflict, a defining feature of Sudan’s social landscape, is globally recognized as a major cause of poverty
and human insecurity in Sudan. Most community-based conflicts are of a resource-based nature between
pastoralists or nomads on the one hand, and farmers on the other, or among pastoralist communities
over land, water, and/or grazing and forest resources. They also include competition within and between
tribal groups over community boundaries, mining resources and livestock routes that become major zones
of conflict. These conflicts can range in intensity, from ad hoc, occasional skirmishes to large-scale violent
conflicts between entire population subgroups. What follows are just several examples of such conflicts:
the Beni Hussein-Al Mahameed conflict over mining resources in Jebel Amir of North Darfur; the Awlad

122
Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Sudan National Baseline Household Survey 2009, North Sudan—Tabulation Report’,
Khartoum, 2010.

36
Sirur and Awlad Hiban conflict in West Kordofan over land and oil compensations; the Nuba and Misseriya
conflicts in Lagawa area; the Rezeigat and Missiriya conflict along the border between South Kordofan
and South Darfur states; the Awlad Omran and al-Ziyoud conflict in West Darfur; the Hammar and Ma’alia
in East Darfur; and the al-Zayyadia and Berti in North Darfur. Whilst Abyei remains in the books of Sudan,
it is contested between Sudan and South Sudan and in it is conflict between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya
over, inter alia, land ownership and water/pastures for Misseriya nomads. A UNDP report identified 21
resource conflicts in North Kordofan in 2002. Increased vulnerability to climate change in recent years has
resulted in the progressively increasing movement of populations and economies towards relatively richer
areas in Central Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. This has led to intensified pressures on
resources, rising stakes and competition over land, and the fuelling of conflicts that have started to take
on ethnic dimensions. Continued and severe land degradation in combination with climate change and
the increased demand for resources from a growing population and increased numbers of livestock are
contributing to the conflict dynamics.

A wide range of conflicts have been fuelled by capital from large-scale investments in land, water and
natural resources—especially those involving dam construction, mechanized agriculture, oil exploration
and drilling. Such conflicts are symptomatic of a wider lack of capacity on the part of the respective state
and other stakeholders to ensure that large-scale investments in land and natural resources take into
account local needs and rights, and that wealth generated by these resources is equitably shared, yielding
dividends for the affected communities. Land degradation has also contributed to displacement and
inroads by semi-mechanized agriculture into both community farming and the movements of pastoralist
and nomadic communities have incited conflicts in many parts of the country through the debasement
and displacement of many rural populations, the appropriation of pastoral resources and the closure of
pastoral routes.

Although quantifiable statistical data are not available, there is wide recognition that the social, economic
and political costs of conflicts in the country have been extremely high.123 These involve the loss of human
lives, enormous human insecurities, the erosion of governance and economic resources, the derailing of
development interventions and a wide sense of social despair. Links between environmental, conflict-
related and political instability in the country are also evident and the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue
Nile is concrete evidence. Here it should be noted that the various Sudan peace agreements (CPA 2005;
Abuja 2006; East Sudan 2006, Abyei 2011 and Doha 2011) together with the numerous peacemaking
efforts by national and international actors have represented a limited initial response to violent conflicts
in the country.

v. Climate Change Risks

The Sudan INDCs indicate that risks associated to climate change are increasing.124 A national report
commissioned by the Ministry of Environment further documents evidence of the occurrence of climate

123 The study proposal on the 'developmental burden of violent conflicts in Sudan 1956–2015’, including environmental cost, was
prepared by the Peace Research Institute (PRI) to bridge the existing gap in knowledge. It shows the harsh face of conflict in the
country and aims to use the study’s results in the advocacy for peace. The proposal was presented to a wide range of national
and international actors in the Shariqa Hall (University of Khartoum) and at UNDP. It was also presented in December 2015 at the
Al Jazeera Centre for Learning in Qatar, where recognizable Sudanese experts in the diaspora participated in the discussion of the
proposal and the development of research methodology. PRI has commenced its development of the project document, which
will be used as fund-raising mechanism.
124
Sudan Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), November 2015.

37
change.125 The report outlines increased temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, as well as extensive
climate related impacts through the increased frequency and intensity of weather events such as droughts
and flooding.

Sudan's First National Communications to the UNFCC indicates that average temperatures are expected
to rise significantly relative to recorded baselines. Projected forecasts show that there will be an increase
between 1.5 and 3.1 degrees during August to between 1.1 and 2.1 degrees during January by the year
2060.126 Rainfall projections also show sharp deviations. Models indicate that decreased rainfall will
impact various sectors dependent on water (agriculture, health, livestock, settlements and
infrastructure).127 Rising average temperatures and reduced annual rainfall will also affect current
agricultural production systems and the efficacy of current water resource management strategies.

Communities have also been heavily affected by changing climate conditions. Community capacities for
sustainable crop production have been affected by climate change due to changes in temperature and
precipitation.128 Additional climate impacts that communities have faced include a decline in biomass
production and Gum Arabic yields, changing dates of planting seasons and harvests of annual crops, and
a decrease in available lands suitable for cultivation in forest and rangelands areas.

Changing climate conditions have also impacted the livelihoods of various groups Farmers and herders
are among the groups vulnerable to climate shocks in Sudan. Nearly 80 percent of the population in Sudan
are dependent on farming and livestock as a means to support household food security and their
livelihoods.129 Climate change is also projected to act as a risk multiplier to food security by 2030,
particularly around issues of water security, the rapid expansion of informal urban areas, and conflict and
instability around Sudan and the region.130 Changing climate patterns are contributing further to delayed
and failed harvests, and further risking disruption of livelihood opportunities.

4.3 Eroded Environmental Governance

Challenges associated with environmental governance include weak legal frameworks, policies and
institutional structures and, in particular, the existence of multiple and parallel systems of natural
resource management and governance. There are also ambiguous and confused land laws combined with
distortions of power between the federal and state governments. These issues have created an
environment in which resource rights are open to dispute, where confusion over claims to natural
resources is common, and in which conflicts can emerge and play out in a destructive manner. Governance
on national legislation at state level related to logging and wildlife trade has been sporadically
implemented. Indeed, natural resource issues have played a major role in sparking many of the local
conflicts in the country. Diffuse and ill-defined governance arrangements have also contributed to serious
environmental degradation, reduced resilience to drought, and increased vulnerability to environmental
disasters and the effects of global climate change. In addition, there is increasing recognition that an ill-
defined and weakly enforced governance regime has created a powerful disincentive for investors in land

125
Sudan’s National Climate Change Policy and Measures (Draft), October 2015.
126
Sudan Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), November 2015.
127
Sudan’s First National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
128
Sudan’s National Climate Change Policy and Measures (Draft), October 2015.
129
Sudan National Adaptation Programme for Action (NAPA), July 2007
130
Food in an uncertain future - The impacts of climate change on food security and nutrition in the Middle East
and North Africa, 2015, Overseas Development Institute & WFP

38
and natural resources to manage the environment effectively and sustainably. Sudan is taking steps to
play an active role in regional initiatives such as the IGAD Drought Resilience and Sustainability Initiative
(IDDRSI) to help address these issues. Efforts (led by GoS) are also underway to incorporate disaster risk
management with focus on community-based multi-hazard early warning systems to help reduce disaster
impact and community preparedness. Nonetheless, all these factors—conflict, environmental
degradation and economic disincentives—hurt the most vulnerable households (often in rural areas)
disproportionately. Wide policy gaps also exist. These include:
 Weak enforcement of recognizably declared policy to combat land degradation.
 Inadequacy of clear, nationally owned, and articulated policies to deal with drought and climate
change impacts.
 An absence of appropriate and coherent policies for sustained natural resource management.
 Unclear perspective on a nationally driven and agreed upon long-term vision for smallholder
producers.
 Lack of policy frameworks to address inequalities in access to land and natural resources.
 Mismanagement as far as clarity over the semi-mechanized farming sector. Policy
recommendations made by the study ‘Sustainable Development of the Semi-Mechanized Farming
Sector in Sudan’—prepared for the Government of Sudan and funded by the World Bank Multi-
Donor Trust Fund—have not been implemented.
 Absence of clear and legitimated policies that sanction the rights of smallholder producers to land
and natural resources.
Delayed endorsement of the NAP and related action plans.

4.4 Environmental Actors and Their Capacities and Mandates

The structure of environmental management in Sudan is characterized by the multiplicity of actors. The
key structures are the Ministry of Environment and Physical Development (MEPD) and the Higher Council
for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR), which is mandated with the implementation of
international environmental treaties and agreements. Other key institutions include: the Ministry of
Tourism and Wildlife, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (Forests National Corporation and Natural
Resources Administration), the Range and Pastures Administration of the Ministry of Animal Resources
and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Industry. These are in addition to the Environment Units of the
Ministries of Health and Energy, and the National Population Council, which also holds special
environment-related mandates and responsibilities.

Civil society in Sudan is an important player in the field of environmental management. Its history dates
back to the early decades of the 20th Century when the Native Administration System (NAS) was
established and institutionalized during the 1920s and 1930s. Among the powers and responsibilities of
the NAS were the administration of land at the community level, and the management and conservation
of natural resources, including the reporting and resolution of natural resource–related conflicts and
disputes. Since its dissolution from 1971–1986, there has been a weakening of the system with most of
its mandated responsibilities absorbed by modern governance structures.

The main modern civil society groups focusing on the environment are the Sudanese Environment
Conservation Society (SECS), established in 1976 as the first Sudanese civil society group concerned
primarily with the environment; the Environmentalists Society, which is another active civil society group
established in the early 1980s within the premises of the Institute of Environmental Studies of the
University of Khartoum; the Sudanese Social Forestry Society, which is a charitable voluntary society

39
aiming at promoting the concerns about and practices in relation to community forests through
networking and the linkages between local communities and extension departments; the Sudanese Soil
Conservation Society; the Al-Massar Organization for Nomads and Environmental Conservation; and SOS
Sahel Sudan with its particular focus on pastoral issues, land rights and water harvesting for environmental
rehabilitation and food security.

In their present situation, environmental actors in Sudan are weak given the scale, magnitude and
complexities of the country’s environmental problems. Government institutional structures suffer as a
result of confused and overlapping roles and mandates, and adherence to culture of minimal coordination
and information-sharing. Commitment to participatory planning processes is also limited and the top-
down approach remains prevalent in practice. Years of underfunding and a lack of articulated training and
capacity development plans together with the loss of skilled personnel to brain drain and the
humanitarian sector have created serious human resource capacity gaps and mechanisms for oversight,
accountability and quality control that are weakly constituted. Critical capacity gaps in terms of
competencies for designing, implementing and monitoring programmes are also apparent. Information
gaps are also acute and available information is fragmented and disorganized.

Although some capacity-building has been acquired over the years and many Sudanese civil society
organizations have gained international and regional recognition, the influence of civil society remains
weak, suffering from a lack of technical capacity and extensive funding gaps. Consequently, civil society
actors are largely urban-based and therefore biased towards urban issues and have a limited rural
reach.131. This is in addition to the web of structural constraints they face, including exclusion, banning
and containment.

4.5 Priority Areas

Several priority areas for intervention have emerged based on the current environmental and climate
situation and taking into account projected outlook in Sudan. Key priority areas where action should be
taken to reduce impending environmental consequences include environmental governance, dialogue on
environmental issues and climate change throughout various governing levels, climate impacts on
migration, water resource management, environmental data and knowledge management and research
on climate change, as well as support to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, Sendai and other
relevant global and regional agreements.

4.5.1 Land Degradation

Addressing land degradation in its various forms is crucial for poverty reduction and improved food
security; enhancing the resilience of smallholder producers; the minimization of resource-based conflict;
revitalization of the national economy,; and broadening of the taxation base at the local level.

4.5.2 Support to Environmental Governance

Good environmental governance constitutes the entry point for environmental sustainability, and
achievement of the SDGs. The realization of effective and transparent environmental governance requires

131 UNDP Sudan, ‘Mapping and Capacity Assessment of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Darfur’, 2009.

40
a broad holistic approach rooted in the link between environmental sustainability, peacebuilding, security,
and development. This involves:
 Adequate regulatory mechanisms for equitable and inclusive environmental management,
including the uptake of best practices in state and federal environmental policies, legislation and
plans;
 Empowering and building the capacities (technical, financial, human) of institutions for effective,
transparent and socially responsible resource management;
 An adequate regulatory framework for private and public sector investments in extractive natural
resources and resource-based industries founded on the principles of corporate social
responsibility;
 Supporting the emergence of a vibrant civil society to advocate environmental sustainability, and
promote and sustain social dialogue while assisting with post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding;
 Securing access to land and water as the most fundamental assets to the livelihoods of rural
populations;
 Facilitating the creation of natural resource based co-management models (water committees,
community forests, etc.) and uptake in state and federal level legislation;
 Supporting and building the capacity of local government structures, including the power of tribal
leaders and chiefs to function in their role as facilitators for conflict transformation, local
development agents and community mobilizers;
 Establishing a recognizable, accessible and capable institution for rural land policy and
administration, branched down to the states and localities.

4.5.3 Support to Environmental Dialogue

Dialogue over environmental issues, especially land rights issues, is an important vehicle for
communication, cooperation and confidence-building. This requires initiating and supporting forums and
platforms for inclusive and sustained dialogue at the federal, state and local levels that brings together
communities (men and women), tribal chiefs and leaders, youth, and government officials. Such dialogue
is critical to redefining the terms of debate over the sharing of and access to natural resources, and to
creating and enhancing spaces and mechanisms for negotiating the diverse interests among various social
groups, including the state. In the process, a long-term and nationally agreed upon vision for small-scale
farming and pastoralism could be worked out. To sustain and inform popular discussion, more research
must be directed towards how drought and climate change, together with structural factors (policies and
legislation, the transition to a market economy, oil, mechanized farming, the spread of arms, local militias,
etc.), are factored into poverty and local instability. Examining the historical relationships between
communities and the broader processes affecting society could make it possible to identify the most
fundamental problems and address them by formulating alternative social discourse and means of
environmental cooperation.

4.5.4 Migration Issues

Recognizing the fact that migration dynamics in the country are directly affected by environmental issues,
there is a crucial need to: (i) improve capacity-building for safe and orderly migration management,
particularly in the border areas; (ii) create an enabling environment to facilitate sustained return and
reintegration to reverse exaggerated and unsustainable urban trends; and (iii) promote resilience and
disaster risk reduction and management initiatives.

41
4.5.5 Water Resources Development

Although meagre, rainfall is a valuable water resource away from the Nile and its tributaries. Its utilization
is an important potential vehicle for environmental enhancement and providing support for resilient
livelihood systems. According to a recent study from Western Kordofan, the effective and efficient
development and management of water resources is an essential measure for enhancing the practice of
pastoralism132 and contributing to the reduction of resource-based conflicts.

4.5.6 Environmental Data and Knowledge Management of Climate Evidence

Sudan suffers from acute environmental knowledge and information gaps, particularly in relation to
climate change issues. Basic research has been discontinued for decades. Existing information, mostly in
the form of reports, is scattered and inaccessible and of limited value for environmentally sound decision-
making processes.

Climate change is considered to be one of the greatest challenges to modern human civilization. It has
and will continue to have profound socioeconomic and environmental impacts and Sudan is one of the
most seriously affected countries. Accordingly, it is essential to develop a portfolio of climate change
strategies that identifies appropriate measures for adaptation, mitigation, technological development and
research.

4.5.7 Support to implementation of the Paris Agreement

Following the UNFCCC COP-21 and the historic Paris Agreement the next step for Sudan is the
implementation of the proposed Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). These national
mitigation goals to contribute to combating global warning should be revisited and a monitoring system
should be designed in preparation for the verification exercise in 2020. Once adopted, the roll-out at State
level of the National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (NAP) needs to be supported.

In order to assist Sudan to finance the necessary climate related activities, climate and environment
financing should be leveraged into the country through accessing international funding mechanisms like
the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)
funds and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

132Pantuliano, Sara and Egemi, Omer et al., ‘Put Out to Pastures: War, Oil and the Decline of Misseriyya Humr Pastoralism in
Sudan’, ODI Publications, London, March 2009.

42
5. Governance and Institutional Capacity Development
Sudan is a country in which there are three levels of authority: the national level, the state level, and the
locality level. The Sudan Interim Constitution 2005 defines the competencies of each of these levels. The
turbulent history of Sudan since independence has left the governance agenda at a crossroads between
focusing on the development of sustainable government capacity and handling the pressure for crisis
management.

5.1 Persistent Conflicts

Sudan entered the 21st Century mired in several conflicts that have had enormous political, social,
economic and human security costs. The persistence of conflict, especially in Darfur, Abyei, South
Kordofan and Blue Nile, is considered to be the most significant factor impeding the long-term sustainable
development and transition to robust democracy in Sudan. Conflict has seriously contributed to impeding
the ability of the Government to adopt and implement a long-term development vision due to its
continuous draining away of the country’s human, natural and financial resources and creation of an
environment that constrains the attraction of capital investment, both foreign and domestic.

Moreover, conflict has resulted in many lives being lost and large-scale forced population mobility—
migration that has led to unprecedented urbanization and brain drain in addition to the destruction of
environmental assets and economic infrastructure. Conflict is also largely responsible for the disruption
of Sudan’s external political and economic relations, which has had far-reaching and destructive impacts
on the overall development of the country. Along with its contribution to the erosion of social capital and
institutional capabilities, conflict is responsible for the damage rendered to the rural economy, especially
in areas that are directly affected by conflict.

Overall, insecurity and bureaucratic impediments continue to limit the space for effective and efficient
humanitarian and development actions. Since the beginning of 2014, conflict continued to flare across
much of North and South Darfur, with spill-over effects in West, Central and East Darfur. New waves of
violence have led to the internal displacement of around 430,000 people and deterioration in
humanitarian conditions.133 The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2015 states that 5.4 million people
were in urgent need of assistance. The armed conflict erupting in South Sudan since December 2013 has
also resulted in approximately 125,000 refugees crossing into Sudan (HRP projected figure for December
2014), placing additional pressure on scarce resources in the border regions. This forced movement of
populations continued into 2015, from South Sudan to the bordering states in Sudan and within Darfur.
However, despite the worsening security situation in the Darfur region, during 2014 close to 150,000
people chose to return to their areas of origin in Darfur.

5.2 Civil Service and Fiscal Decentralization

Many efforts have been exerted by partners and the Government in the hope of improving civil services
for citizens in Sudan. These efforts involve capacity development for decentralization, public expenditure
management, fiscal decentralization and regulations. Nevertheless, the difficulties associated with
providing civil services and the immaturity of the country’s federalism remain burdensome and present
challenges across the governance system.

133 HCT in Sudan, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2015’, 2015.

43
The public service in Sudan has experienced considerable weaknesses over the previous four decades. A
reversal of the difficulties facing public service will remain a real challenge for the Government. Currently,
the public service is characterized by poor productivity, inefficiency and inadequate service delivery in
addition to administrative and financial deficiencies, as reflected in the annual reports of the Auditor
General. Although some of the problems have technical solutions, the real challenge is to change the
institutional environment in which the public service functions. In this regard, the state institutions need
to be configured or reconstituted to ensure that the political process supports long-term planning and
long-term development policy.134 This will involve the identification and implementation of a feasible
strategy focused on key priorities.

Progress with regard to decentralization and de-concentration of the political power from national to
subnational and local levels is a key element in the future development of Sudan. There are ongoing
efforts to adopt regulations and policies in support of administrative and financial decentralization. Sudan
is undergoing of a major reform and restructuring process in terms of public administration. While formal
structures are to a large extent in place, challenges remain in the areas of policy management,
administrative capacity, financial management systems, human resources and coordination between the
central and state levels. The problem is acute in remote states and rural areas facing hardship. The states
and localities were given public sector responsibilities but without sufficient revenues to undertake their
commitments. Strategies for improving the performance of Sudan’s civil servants at federal, state and
local levels have not been implemented.

Some of the major issues relating to public service and fiscal decentralization in Sudan could be
summarized as follows:
 On account of immaturity of the process of decentralization in Sudan, it has failed to proceed to
a robust devolution of authority to the states and localities. The process of federalism has also
conveyed capacity deficits of a physical as well as human nature at the state and locality levels.
 An overstretched civil administration at all levels under conditions of brain drain and limited
capacity development opportunities has resulted in the loss of institutional memory or the
inheritance of counterproductive institutional cultures and practices.
 There are confused roles and mandates between the different institutions associated with the
shuffling of the ministries and departments.
 Institutional structures, especially at the state and local levels, suffer structural and systemic
problems, including weak systems of planning, budgeting and management, and distorted
delegation of authority.
 Years of underfunding in the social sectors, compounded by conflict-related damage, a weak
revenue base, and dependence on fiscal transfers from the centre have left key parts of the
administration at the state and local levels under-equipped to deliver core services. This has also
resulted in a wide sense of mistrust in government institutions as service providers.
 Complications have emerged in community governance structures, namely the native
administration system where the power of tribal leaders has become increasingly contested by
the newly emerging forces led by the youth. This is particularly visible in the conflict-affected
regions of Darfur, Abyei, the East, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

134Elbadawi, Ibrahim, ‘An MDG-Based Strategy for Rebuilding the Post-Conflict Sudanese Economy’, paper presented at the
workshop on ‘Rebuilding Devastated Economies in the Middle East’, sponsored by the G.E. von Grunebaum Center for Near
Eastern Studies, UCLA, 3–5 February 2005.

44
  The ability of the institutions to fill the kind of participatory planning, management and delivery
roles essential for peacebuilding and socially driven recovery and development processes is
limited.
 Legal and administrative constraints on civil society and the media limit its role.
 The success in providing for broad-based employability and equitable access to economic
opportunities is limited.
 There is an absence of proper public-private partnerships that could improve service delivery.
 There are human rights challenges in the country.
 Challenges exist related to women and youth as far as access to public services and local
governance rules and regulations that oversee their livelihoods and the ease with which they do
business.

5.3 Public Expenditure Management and Procurement

An important reality revealed by the first public expenditure management report prepared by the World
Bank135 is that the fiscal and decision-making autonomy of states and localities is very limited due to the
heavy reliance on federal transfers and central control over a significant share of these transfers. Budget
credibility also appeared to be a major problem. In this regard, the report referred to three causal
elements of poor budget performance: data limitations, weak capacity to estimate a budget constraint,
and political pressure to exaggerate budgets. Inadequate state- and local-level financial management has
also been identified, as reflected in the lack of information on the effectiveness of public expenditure,
which compounds the budget credibility problem and may also be partially responsible for reduced local
tax collection since taxpayers cannot see what comes from the taxes they pay. Limitations in financial
management also result from the unclear guidelines for financial management and intergovernmental
coordination.

Procurement capacity, including the management of donor-funded procurement, has been affected by
the many years of conflict. The private sector’s ability to perform and meet the demands of government
procurement has also been affected due to the accumulation of government debt with the private sector.
Restoring confidence in the system is a major challenge. Successful reform will require changes to the
legal system and a shift towards practices that encourage adherence to procurement rules, greater public
awareness, and a more transparent and participatory approach that includes all levels of government, the
private sector and civil society.

5.4 Competitive and Responsible Private Sector

The State is responsible for creating the enabling environment for producers in the economy. Although
Sudan is open to investment in almost all sectors and it protects and ensures the rights of investors to
obtain land and repatriate profits, enterprise-level obstacles remain. In terms of regulations, the existence
of multiple and overlapping taxes and regulations between federal, state and local governments remains
an important impediment to small- and medium-sized enterprises.136 There is limited know-how and
scarcity of modernized approaches that would otherwise attract foreign and domestic private sector
participation through direct or indirect investment. Consequently, there is reduced direct investment into

135 World Bank, ‘Sudan Public Expenditure Review: Synthesis Report’, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa
Region, Report No. 41840-SD, Washington, D.C., December 2007.
136 JAM, ‘Volume III, Cluster Reports’, 2005.

45
the crucial and potentially productive state- or rural-based sectors such as agriculture, irrigation, and small
industry.

Furthermore, in the 2008 Sudan Productivity and Investment Climate Survey (PICS), private firms in Sudan
cited political instability, lack of transparency and economic uncertainty as the top three constraints to
growth. Strong commitment from the Government to address both the perceptions and reality about lack
of transparency is crucial for realizing the growth and poverty reduction agenda.137

Challenges in the private sector include the ineffectiveness of private sector involvement in the
development and preservation of the natural resource base; the limited role and impact of scientific
research and technology transfer in the productive sector; the inadequacy of rules and regulations that
could otherwise maximize the benefit of the productive sector (land use and land tenure regulations, and
quality control regulations); and enhancement of the investment climate.

Another challenge of the private sector in Sudan is the regulatory framework of doing business. In this
respect, a recent World Bank report ranked Sudan 160th out of 189 economies across the globe. 138
Specifically, this report indicated an improvement in the scores between 2013 and 2014, which means an
overall improvement in the business environment. However, Sudan was not among the countries who
reported the implementation of important reforms to allow for an effective environment to do business.
This means more work is needed on the regulatory framework for business and investment in the country
towards satisfying local investment sustainability and encouraging the flow of FDI.

5.5 Rule of Law and Human Rights

Access to formal justice in Sudan is not equal and effective in all cases, thus perpetuating vulnerability.
Formal systems of justice, if inaccessible, contribute to a widening of existing disparities. There is a
perception that the judicial system has significantly improved in recent years, yet there are still gaps
regarding courts as institutions of justice, especially within the decentralized system. The limitations of
the judicial system in Sudan are linked to issues of extended delays, limited capacities, lack of awareness
of newly adopted legislation, enforcement difficulties, lack of legal aid, and corruption. The Government
of Sudan has made considerable efforts in establishing specific measures, procedures and mechanisms to
provide child-friendly justice services to child victims, witnesses and offenders. However, the coverage of
such services, which includes legal aid and social and psychological services, is restricted to the state
capitals and a limited number of localities and the quality needs to be improved.

There has been a history of conflict in Sudan since it gained independence, based in part on competition
over oil, land, ethnic identity and political power. The CPA 2005 presented an opportunity for peace and
is thus a foundation for sustainable development in Sudan. Despite the CPA and other legal frameworks,
however, there continue to be conflicts and unrest in various parts of Sudan, with Darfurians having
experienced conflict and displacement for sustained periods of time. Certain border states and Abyei also
experience intermittent outbreaks of conflict. As a result, citizens of these regions face increased
challenges to the fulfilment of their rights, displacement and the lack of access to justice sector institutions
to seek remedy. Women, in particular, have been subject to sexual and gender-based violence, while
internally displaced persons face increased susceptibility to insecurities of their person and property and
to the kinds of rights denial endemic amongst displaced communities.

137 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.

138 World Bank Group, ‘Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency’, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2014.

46
Justice sector institutions have also been affected in their ability to deliver services, and hence their
capacity to provide access to justice. Notably, infrastructure investment for prisons, police stations and
the judiciary has not been prioritized, and, as such, physical access to justice with respect to prison and
police jail conditions and the availability of courts has been negatively impacted. In terms of human
resources, large-scale displacement and insufficient investment in capacity development have left justice
sector institutions with limited capacity to deliver effective services where they do exist. Many current
staff are overstretched, working under harsh conditions, and lacking the awareness and knowledge of
approaches concerning human rights in order to deliver on their mandates, all of which impedes the
availability and acceptability of services.

Human Rights: Recent analysis of the human rights situation in Sudan indicates that human rights
awareness has improved across the different government sectors and relatively among the people of
Sudan.139 Since 2011, the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), among other processes, has resulted in a
number of initiatives aimed at improving the human rights situation in Sudan. As of January 2016, 85
percent of UPR recommendations have been implemented, and the Ministry of Justice has submitted
Sudan’s Second UPR Report (2016) to OHCHR.

Notable commitments of the Government of Sudan to comprehensive national legal reform to further
guarantee the full compliance of Sudan with its constitutional and international human rights obligations
include: the promulgation and implementation of the Combating of Human Trafficking and Smuggling of
Persons Act (2014); the Anti-Corruption Act (2015); the Act on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;
revision of the Press Act; the Community Protection Law; amendment of the Election Act; the Refugee
Act; the Access to Information Act (2015); and the Public Prosecutor Bill (2015).140 Furthermore, a concrete
step in the fight against impunity for violence against women in Sudan is exemplified in the amendment
of Article 149 of the Sudanese Criminal Code, which made a substantive and legal distinction between
rape and adultery.

In spite of some progress made in legislative reform, according to the report from 2015 of the Independent
Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, Sudan continues to face human rights challenges in
securing basic fundamental rights, in particular the rights to freedom of expression and opinion, freedom
of the press, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and freedom of religion. 141 Impunity for
violations, including sexual violence, has also been identified as an issue.142

5.6 Corruption
Corruption has a negative impact on growth and development through various means. For historical and
cultural reasons, corruption is not rampant in Sudan. However, with the acquisition of oil and gold
revenues, foreign aid and private investment, the risk of corruption increased to become a major issue.
There is a growing concern that corruption in Sudan is becoming a real threat, an image that is

139 See the ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan’, September 2013 (A/HRC/24/31)
and August 2015 (A/HRC/30/60).
140 Sudan Ministry of Justice, Monitoring Visit of Minister of Justice in November 2015. The Prosecutor Bill in the progress of

public hearing.
141 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan’, August 2015 (A/HRC/30/60).
142 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur’, 26 May 2015 (S/2015/378),

p. 5, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/378, and ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights on Impunity and Accountability in Darfur for 2014’, August 2015.

47
counterproductive for Sudan’s efforts to attract FDI and obtain debt relief and concessional assistance.143
The destructive impact of corruption has been widely recognized at the highest level of the State and
therefore the establishment of an anti-corruption commission is underway. Given its deeply rooted nature
and variety of manifestations, combating corruption remains a challenge.

In Sudan, some anti-corruption initiatives have been founded by civil society, academia and the
Government. Among civil society actors, some NGOs, such as the Consumer Protection Society, the Union
of Journalists and the Union of Lawyers, advocate for greater transparency and anti-corruption measures
in Sudan. A number of academic institutions are also concerned with transparency, integrity and anti-
corruption issues, including two universities: the Faculty of Economics at Nilein University and the Faculty
of Law at the University of Khartoum. In practice, their focus is mainly the production of research and
policy papers in addition to advocacy. It is worth noting that these institutions conceptualize means for
targeting corruption using findings gleaned from research and the analysis of best practices. The UN has
partnered with some of these universities; for example partnerships were forged with these institutions
during campaigns carried out on the International Anti-Corruption Days of 2012, 2013 and 2015.

The governmental initiative on anti-corruption started with various efforts of the National Audit Chamber
and Ministry of Justice. In January 2012 an anti-corruption commission directly linked to the Presidency
was announced and a chairman named. However, that commission was dissolved with the justification
that the existing institutions and mechanisms were enough and capable of fighting corruption in the
country. Later on, and in 2015, the President announced the intention to establish an anti-corruption
commission in Sudan that would report directly to the Presidency. Currently there is no fully functioning
institution mandated for anti-corruption, but the law for the anti-corruption commission has been
approved by the Parliament, with steps towards its operationalization pending.

Despite the aforementioned initiatives taken by civil society, academia and the Government, this scenario
cannot be considered a systematic strategy for fighting corruption, although it succeeded in breaking the
silence on the issue. The challenges to developing a strong, independent and competent anti-corruption
commission and mechanisms remain.

5.7 Data, Information Management and Results-Based Management

Sudan is facing challenges with regard to its lack of evidence-based policy and strategy formulation and
decision-making and accountability, which are critical for good governance. The challenges are attributed
to the following bottlenecks: (i) inadequate capacity for data collection (institutions, human resources,
infrastructure) and lack of a national plan for strengthening statistics and routine information systems; (ii)
the irregularity of and/or limited access to data; (iii) the gap of real-time monitoring systems using new
technology; (iv) gaps in national capacities for monitoring and evaluation and the lack of a culture of
results-based management; (v) data discrepancies; and (vi) the lack of mapping and/or coordination of
information systems.

5.8 Priority Areas

143 IMF, ‘Sudan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012’.

48
 The transition to democratic, transparent and accountable systems of governance is an important
vehicle for addressing Sudan’s conflicts, chronic inequalities and limited success in managing
diversity.
 Relevant national capacities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the country need
strengthening.
 Early economic revitalization (early local economic recovery, livelihoods stabilization,
reintegration, restoration of basic infrastructure at the local level–peace dividends) is needed.
 Fostering social cohesion and resilience (societal transformations, conflict analysis, dialogues and
consensus) is important.
 Sudanese civil society, a legitimate actor in peace and stability with the potential to offer
important support, needs to be supported to further develop its capacity, including in terms of
organizational and technical capacities, and increase its awareness of civic rights and democratic
practices.
 Strengthening the policy framework at the federal level on the delegation of power and agency
functions to subnational levels of Government is important. In line with the principle of
subsidiarity, subnational Governments are in an autonomous but not sovereign relationship with
the Government at the federal level.
 The process of federalism has brought to light capacity deficits of an institutional, human and
physical nature. There is need develop the capacities to strengthen financial accountability and
reporting, transparency, and monitoring of the utilization of budgetary allocations and revenue
mobilization (public administration reform).
 Support to local governance in areas of taxation, state- and locality-level planning, budgeting and
the management of government assets is a priority.
 There is need to enhance ongoing efforts to strengthen the justice system to respect human rights
and strengthen the rule of law, with specific emphasis on addressing the needs of children and
women in a child-friendly and gender-sensitive manner.
 Newly adopted/amended legislations and decrees that promote human rights, specifically for
women and children, need to be widely disseminated, ensuring that they reach the most
vulnerable populations.
 The capacity of justice sector actors (e.g., lawmakers, police, lawyers, judges, and native
administrations) needs to be developed through the establishment of a comprehensive
sustainable training modules system that can be updated in accordance with the advancement
of the justice sector.
 The institutional capacity of the juvenile and family courts, especially at the locality level, needs
to be built, as well as the capacity of law enforcement, judges, social workers and lawyers,
especially those dealing with women and children.
 Genuine engagement of individuals and communities, as well as formal and informal justice and
security institutions, in rule of law and access to justice interventions is required.
 The creation of an environment that is conducive for private sector development is a priority. The
sector needs to be supported and encouraged through the reduction of excessive regulatory
burdens and the creation of a competitive environment.
 There is a need to improve the equitable access to basic services and service delivery for
communities and participation of communities in governance processes at local levels.
 National information systems need to be strengthened for the timely availability and use of
reliable data and knowledge disaggregated by sex, environment, disabilities, and geographic area
to ensure evidence-based policy advocacy, strategic planning and monitoring of progress on the
SDGs, national and sector strategic plans and programmes, and the UN Development Assistance

49
Framework (UNDAF). Efforts should be made to support the operationalization of the National
Strategy of Statistics; strengthen national information systems for SDG monitoring and reporting,
and for UNDAF monitoring and evaluation (databases and knowledge-sharing); ensure capacity-
building for results-based management, monitoring and evaluation; support national population-
based surveys (population census, MICS, agriculture and crops survey, Food Vulnerability
Assessment, S3M, household expenditures survey); and invest in new technology (real-time data)
and network development.

50
 Annex A. Mapping of priorities identified in this analysis to SDGs
Priority area SDG
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction
As stated in the Government’s Five-Year Programme for Economic Reforms (2015-2019) it is of high priority to achieve SDG8 SDG9 SDG10
economic stability and progress in all economic fields; increase production and productivity; and provide employment SDG12 SDG17
opportunities by utilizing resources (human and capital) and economic partnership opportunities. Increasing revenues
and cutting and/or rationing expenditures to maintain fiscal balance expanding exports and reducing imports to offset
the balance of payment deficits and maintaining the exchange rate are likewise priorities.
The strategy for the future should aim at restructuring the economy to one that is diversified and self-sustaining and in SDG1 SDG2 SDG7
which forward and backward linkages as well as vertical and horizontal integration can be created. It should be pro-poor SDG8 SDG9 SDG12
and pro-production and aim to expand the role of the private sector. This should be in contrast with the prevailing
strategy of dependency on (non-renewable) extraction activities and on few agricultural products and/or exports. The
utilization of non-renewable resources must be assumed with consideration for the finite nature of such reserves future
generations value-added opportunities and most importantly how to use the revenues for diversifying the economy.
Agriculture can be the locomotive for eradicating poverty and unemployment as well as for compensating for lost SDG1 SDG2 SDG6
opportunities due to war and conflicts. The industrial sector remains one of the main pillars of development and the SDG7 SDG8 SDG9
main supporter of any agricultural leap. Efforts are needed to exploit unutilized capacities reach self-sufficiency and SDG10 SDG12 SDG15
achieve food security.
Linkages between agriculture and manufacturing—agro-industry—need to be developed; e.g. food industries and SDG1 SDG2 SDG7
textiles. SDG8 SDG9 SDG12
The stabilization and expansion of the oil sector should continue to be main goals. This includes the exploration and SDG8 SDG9 SDG12
production of gas and the securing of local demand for oil products; exploiting mineral resources promoting their value
added and manufacturing; and integrating traditional mining into the economic cycle and developing local communities.
All such measures should be assumed with consideration for the environment and sustainable development.
 Improving infrastructure (e.g. roads, water and electricity) to implement efforts in the agriculture and manufacturing SDG6 SDG7 SDG8
sectors is a priority. In this regard the expansion and optimum use of water sources should be sought and shortages in SDG9 SDG10 SDG11
water supplies in some areas need to be resolved. The transport sector affecting all of the production and consumption SDG12
sectors should be developed.
 There is a need to further develop human capital engaging educational institutions and the business community to build SDG1 SDG2 SDG4
capacities for income-generating activities and encourage the creation of news businesses and jobs with special attention SDG5 SDG8 SDG9
to gender equality and vulnerable social groups. SDG10

51
Priority area SDG


There should be consideration of economic migration as a relevant factor in poverty reduction and economic SDG8 SDG2 SDG10
development through labour regulation and regional cooperation frameworks to protect rights of migrant workers going SDG16
abroad and attract the necessary labour force at home; to enable and facilitate remittances; to maximize diaspora and
internal migrants’ skills and knowledge; to engage educational institutions and the business community in partnerships
for awareness job creation and to build capacities and income-generating activities.
Social Services, Social Protection and Infrastructure
General
Providing accessibility to quality basic social services is a major priority area due to the numerous associated challenges, SDG1 SDG2 SDG3
including: the vastness of the country, shortages of facilities and personnel, inadequacy of infrastructure, maldistribution SDG4 SDG5 SDG6
of the existing facilities and cadre, increasing costs of services, widespread poverty, shortages of funding/investment, SDG7 SDG8 SDG9
and prolonged conflict and violence SDG10 SDG11 SDG12
SDG13 SDG16 SDG17
The pro-poor focusing of basic service provision is a top priority. SDG1 SDG2 SDG3
SDG4 SDG6 SDG8
SDG10 SDG16 SDG17
More emphasis should be placed on the needs of adolescents in social service and social protection programming. SDG1 SDG3 SDG4
SDG11
Comprehensive multisectoral programmes to promote positive social changes related to health, education, water, SDG3 SDG4 SDG5
sanitation and hygiene, protection (FGM/C and child marriage) and nutrition are needed. SDG16
WASH
With regard to water, sanitation and hygiene, the important priorities are: to increase the coverage of safe water and SDG3 SDG6 SD10
sanitation services, including the stoppage of open defecation; to increase the uptake of improved hygiene behaviours, SDG11
especially handwashing with soap; to strengthen the management of WASH services; to build sector capacity; to improve
sector coordination; to reform and streamline sector institutions; to ensure dedicated budget for WASH services,
including sanitation and hygiene; and to encourage community ownership and sustainability.
There is a need to develop a clear vision and strategy for WASH services in protracted crises with a focus on strengthening SDG6 SDG10
the humanitarian and development nexus and forging a balanced nationwide WASH programme that delivers equitable
services
Addressing water access for nomads and farmers, and IDPs and refugees, and the lack of water services that constitutes SDG1 SDG2 SDG3
a forced displacement and conflict driver, are top priorities. SDG6

52
Priority area SDG
Education
The main issues and immediate needs in education are to: extend the coverage of basic education, including technical SDG1 SDG4 SDG5
education; reduce inequities through the better distribution of facilities and cadre; strengthen out-of-school education; SDG10
build institutional and management capacity for better planning and strategy implementation; and utilize education
planning as a social cohesion mechanism in urban and rural areas, and between nomads and farmers, IDPs, refugees and
host communities.
More emphasis needs to be placed on improving access to education in rural areas, to utilize education planning as a SDG1 SDG4 SDG10
social cohesion mechanism in urban and rural areas, between nomads and farmers, IDPs, refugees and host
communities.
Health
In health, the important and pressing need is to achieve and increase service coverage to include the majority of the SDG1 SDG3 SDG9
population, particularly those in disadvantaged conflict-affected and rural areas. The facilitation of access for specific SDG10
vulnerable groups such as nomads, IDPs, returnees and refugees is likewise a high priority. In this respect, investment in
infrastructure and human resources as well as financial and technical support for service delivery, are essential.
Moreover, policy reforms for sustainable health financing and capacity-building need to be considered. It will also be
important to expand health insurance coverage to include remote areas and individuals who do not have permanent
work with the Government or in the private sector.
Improving the equitable coverage and accessibility of integrated primary health care and ensuring high-quality primary, SDG1 SDG3 SDG10
secondary and tertiary health care are major priorities. Ensuring a stable and equitably distributed health workforce with SDG11
an appropriate mix of skills to meet agreed health sector needs is essential.
Strengthening an integrated and multisectoral approach for combating communicable diseases (including neglected SDG3 SDG10
tropical diseases), including through prevention and control programmes with full capacity to meet international health
regulations is a top national, regional and international health priority.
Access for basic health services for specific vulnerable groups (in concurrence with mobile populations), especially SDG3 SDG2 SDG11
nomads, IDPs, returnees and refugees, needs to be prioritized. SDG10
Nutrition
There is an overarching need for a comprehensive and combined multisectoral approach to prevent malnutrition in all SD1 SDG2 SDG3
its forms and treat life-threatening acute malnutrition. This approach must take into account the multi-causal nature of
SDG4 SDG6 SDG10
malnutrition in Sudan. SDG 11 SDG13
SDG17
Developing a national Home-Grown School Feeding Programme that is linked to local agriculture, is needed as part of SDG1 SDG2 SDG4
the country’s sustainable longer-term development, through the strengthening of government capacities so that it is SDG11 SDG16
contemplated in government policy and legal frameworks geared towards educational attainment and ending hunger

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Priority area SDG
Social welfare and protection
Social protection and productive safety nets are not able to cope with the growing number of people in need and SDG1 SDG2 SDG3
vulnerable groups .Financing, management, innovation, coordination and the graduation of persons receiving assistance SDG4 SDG5 SDG9
are among the main priorities. Also prioritized are the requirements associated with an increased population, namely SD10 SDG11
the provision of hazards coverage and the enhancement of the quality and adequacy of services provided. SDG17
The challenges facing the ever-growing informal sector (not covered by social protection measures), constituted mainly SDG1 SDG2 SDG3
by rural, internal socioeconomic migrants (rural–rural or rural–urban) and IDPs, need to be taken into consideration for SDG4 SD10
immediate actions
Specific protection issues need to be considered, including gender-based violence, the use of violent child discipline, and SDG3 SDG4 SDG5
discrimination in terms of access to services and in educational access for women SDG16

Targeted programmes are needed to strengthen social welfare and protection systems to address the multiple SDG1 SDG2 SDG3
vulnerabilities of women and children SDG4 SDG5 SDG10
SDG16
Infrastructure
The development agenda for the infrastructure sector is mainly comprised of: infrastructure maintenance, the SDG9 SDG11
development of capacity and systems, and reforms to improve safety, security and performance
Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management
Land degradation SDG11 SDG 2 SDG13
SDG15 SDG5, SDG1,
SDG12
Support to environmental governance SDG2, SDG5, SDG6,
SDG11, SDG12,
SDG13 SDG14 SDG15
SDG17
Support to environmental dialogue SDG1, SDG2, SDG5,
SDG12, SDG13
SDG14 SDG15 SDG17
Migration issues SDG10 SDG11 SDG13
SDG17
Water resources development SDG6 SDG11 SDG12
SDG13 SDG14 SDG15

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Priority area SDG
Environmental Data and Knowledge Management of Climate Evidence SDG11 SDG2 SDG13
SDG14 SDG15 SDG17
Support to implementation of the Paris Agreement SDG13, SDG17
Governance and Institutional Capacity Development
The transition to democratic, transparent and accountable systems of governance is an important vehicle for addressing SDG16
Sudan’s conflicts, chronic inequalities and limited success in managing diversity.
Relevant national capacities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the country need strengthening. SDG5 SDG10 SDG16
Early economic revitalization (early local economic recovery, livelihoods stabilization, reintegration, restoration of basic SDG8 SDG16
infrastructure at the local level – peace dividends) is needed.
Fostering social cohesion and resilience (societal transformations, conflict analysis, dialogues and consensus) is SDG16
important.
Sudanese civil society, a legitimate actor in peace and stability with the potential to offer important support, needs to SDG16
be supported to further develop its capacity, including in terms of organizational and technical capacities, and increase
its awareness of civic rights and democratic practices.
Strengthening the policy framework at the federal level on the delegation of power and agency functions to subnational SDG16
levels of government is important. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, subnational governments are in an
autonomous but not sovereign relationship with the Government at the federal level.
The process of federalism has brought to light capacity deficits of an institutional, human and physical nature. There is SDG16
need develop the capacities to strengthen financial accountability and reporting, transparency, and monitoring of the
utilization of budgetary allocations and revenue mobilization (public administration reform).
Support to local governance in areas of taxation, state- and locality-level planning, budgeting and the management of SDG16
government assets is a priority.
There is need to enhance ongoing efforts to strengthen the justice system to respect human rights and strengthen the SDG5 SDG16
rule of law, with specific emphasis on addressing the needs of children and women in a child-friendly and gender-
sensitive manner.
Newly adopted/amended legislations and decrees that promote human rights, specifically for women and children, need SDG5 SDG16
to be widely disseminated, ensuring that they reach the most vulnerable populations.
The capacity of justice sector actors (e.g., lawmakers, police, lawyers, judges, and native administrations) needs to be SDG16
developed through the establishment of a comprehensive sustainable training modules system that can be updated in
accordance with the advancement of the justice sector.
The institutional capacity of the juvenile and family courts, especially at the locality level, needs to be built, as well as SDG5 SDG16
the capacity of law enforcement, judges, social workers and lawyers, especially those dealing with women and children.

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Priority area SDG
Genuine engagement of individuals and communities, as well as formal and informal justice and security institutions, in SDG16
rule of law and access to justice interventions is required.
The creation of an environment that is conducive for private sector development is a priority. The sector needs to be SDG9 SDG16
supported and encouraged through the reduction of excessive regulatory burdens and the creation of a competitive
environment.
There is a need to improve the equitable access to basic services and service delivery for communities and participation SDG1 SDG2 SDG3
of communities in governance processes at local levels. SDG4 SDG16
National information systems need to be strengthened for the timely availability and use of reliable data and knowledge SDG16 SDG17
disaggregated by sex, environment, disabilities, and geographic area to ensure evidence-based policy advocacy, strategic
planning and monitoring of progress on the SDGs, national and sector strategic plans and programmes, and the UN
Development Assistance Framework. Efforts should be made to support the operationalization of the National Strategy
of Statistics; strengthen national information systems for SDG monitoring and reporting, and for UNDAF monitoring and
evaluation (databases and knowledge-sharing); ensure capacity-building for results-based management, monitoring and
evaluation; support national population-based surveys (population census, MICS, agriculture and crops survey, Food
Vulnerability Assessment, S3M, household expenditures survey); and invest in new technology (real-time data) and
network development.

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