U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ANTITRUST DIVISION

The views expressed do not purport to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice

Anticompetitive Agreements
PCC Lecturers Training Program

Mark J. Niefer, J.D., Ph.D. (Econ.)

Deputy Chief Legal Advisor-Civil
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice
 https://phcc.gov.ph/press-releases/pcc-enforcement-insurance-pool-nhmfc-anti-competitive-agreements/
Overview of Discussion
I. Background

Three broad behaviors that harm consumers preserve or enhance market power

1. MERGER – PERMANENT COMBINATION OF TWO Business under a single owner which threatens to enhance market power and harm consumers
2. Abuse of Dominant Position- PREDATRORY or exclusionary acts by a single busines owner that already has market power ( ALREADY DOMINANT )
which threathen to enhance/increase or entrench that market power

Agreements – involves understanding between two or more business who coordinate their actions in a way that treathen to reduce competition and, increase
market power harm consumers
Most common example price fixing an agreement between competitors at a price higher than what it used it to me.

Difference of Agreements between merger – in Agreements, two busines remain independent

Dominance- concerns actions by one business and agreements consider more than one

All three areas- aim to prevent SLC

When analyzing agreements- the trick is to determine which agreements which harm consumers, illegal; benefit consumers, permissive – lowering cost,
increase innovation, better quality

Broad range of agreements

Detailed fact specific examination
Agreement between manufacturers and suppliers
• Key Terms: Horizontal/Vertical, Interbrand/Intrabrand

• Basic Legal Analysis: Agreement, Per Se /Rule of Reason – some agreements hold out some benefit to comsumer and are judged under the rule of reason
balancing of harms and benefits

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 • Per Se- are so harmful, agreement automatically results Agreements with no value
Detailed fact specific
II. Horizontal Agreements
Competition office likes businesses to go head to head to lower prices, seeking to get customers from one another by lowering prices, innovation; some are so
harmful, they are automically illegal. However, Rule of Reason for some, balancing of harm and benefit
Some horizontal agreement are so harmful that they are illegal per se. but some are treated under a rule of reason.
• Price Fixing, Output Limitation, Market Division, Bid Rigging
A JV between competitors to produce a new product may call for agreements that will limit some element of competition between, agreements ancillary to
a procompetitive activity – they arguably are necessary to advance a a procompetitive consumer advantage- typically treated under the rule of reason; calls
for balancing of harm and benefit
- Which requires a balancing

III. Vertical Agreements

Agreement between entitles in the different steps in supply chain such as input supplier and manufacturer or as manufacturer and distributors. Not
between direct competitors , not as suspect as horizantal, so they are judged under Rule of Reason.
Resale Price Maintenance
And exclusive dealing

• RPM, Exclusive Dealing

I. BACKGROUND
Basic Competition Law & Economics
• Competition law focuses on consumer welfare – preserve competition so consumers can benefit from lower prices greater output and better quality, innovation

• Price
• Output
• Quality
• Innovation
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 • Consumer Harms > Consumer Benefits Illegal
• Consumer Benefits > Consumer Harms Permissible

Difficult thing some behavior both benefit and harm consumers, true for merger and true in case agreements figuring when it harms

Why Do We Care About Agreements?

• The Sherman Act, § 1
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.
• Unreasonable restraints (i.e., unreasonable agreements) reduce competition and harm consumers
• However, many agreements hold out the promise of consumer benefits

A Useful Diagram (mountain bike, giant, specialized, treck)

MANUFACTURERS M1 M2
M3

WHOLESALERS W1 W2 W3 W5
W4 W6

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 RETAILERS
Horizontal Agreement- R1 R2 R3 R9

M1 M2 M3
MANUFACTURERS

Horizontal
agreement among
manufacturers

WHOLESALERS W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6

RETAILERS R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9

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 Wholesaleres Agreemenet on certain mountain bikes, price, distribute a certain a band, Agreements between retailers- schedule
of opening of stores. M-f, sell bikes at fixed price.

Vertical Agreement: Mfg-Whl

M2 M3
MANUFACTURERS M1

R1 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9
R2

WHOLESALERS W3 W4 W5 W6
RETAILERS W1 W2
MANUFACTURERS

M2 M3
WHOLESALERS

RETAILERS

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W1 W3 W4 W5 W6
 giant and wholesellers agreement that only giant bikes will be sold. Manufacturing and retailer- only direct to a group of retailers
exclusive and price at dictated by manufacturers. Vertical Agreement: Mfg-Ret (dual distribution
system, manufacturer sell direct to retailers Agreement: manufacturer will only sell
M! and R1 R2R3 – can have RPM
M1
direct to retainer, exclusive agreement; agremenet that R1 – R3, that they will sell products of M

What is an “Agreement”? How Prove it?

It seems to be a simple matter. Intuitively, meeting of the minds. It seems to be a simple matter. Under
competition law, figuring out when there is a meeting of minds, whether an agreement, for purposes of
figuring out whether an agreement is illegal under the competition law is not easy matter.

Easy- if there is an document proof.That memorialize an agreement , however not easyr when We observe only
behavior and no such documents
in competitive markers, price tends towards an equilibrium price that equals cost. As cost change, so
will Prices charged in a competitive market change. So though we may observe similar
prices of similar changes in price among competitors in a market, these actions may be taken
independently in reaction to a change of cost.

Wheels increase of price

Action independently by business and even independent of cost
Requiring that the evidence of independent action.
Law differentiates between Actions that result from agreement or result from
independent action. Firms independently changing price as a result of cost. This is not enough to prove agreement.
Monsanto vs. sprayright
• R1 R2 R3
More than just parallel conduct; direct or circumstantial evidence

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 -
Direct evidence- communication between competitors, memorilzing the agreement
Circumstantial – series of communications followed behavior that they simultaneously raise prices.
“There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action by the [parties]. That is, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence
that reasonably tends to prove that [the parties] had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” Monsanto
(1984)
Interbrand Competition
• Competition among brands of the same product
• Example: Bicycles
E.g., bike shop R1 may sell brands G, T, and S → there is competition within the shop among the brands
E.g., bike shop R1 may sell G, R2 may sell T, and R3 may sell S → competition across shops among brands

Intrabrand CompetitionI

Between giant, track, if three brands in one store, there is Interbrand competition in one store. Competition of sellers of the same brand, sale of giant brand.

I mention this because this is a key point, even if if there is intrabrand competition (one brand) is limited by a vertical agreement, there might still be Interbrand competition among brands such
that consumers are not harmed.even if one sotre carries giant brand bikes and there is no intrabrand competition but consumers may still have a brand. So there is Interbrand competition

One store may just choose to sell giant brand bikes, because of a vertical agreement and no intraband competition- but consumers may have any other chose there is inter-brand competition
such that no harm to consumers.

A lose of inter-brand competition generally treated more skeptically than lose of intrabrand.

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 • Competition to among the sellers sell the same brand
• Example: Bicycles
Competition within brands may take place across retail bicycle shops
E.g., bicycle shops R1 and R2 may both sell G (giant) brand bikes →
Intrabrand competition for G brand sales between R1 and R2

The Default Mode of Analysis: The Rule of Reason (RoR)

• The RoR weighs the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of an agreement

“The true test of legality is whether the restraint (Agreement) imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition.” Chicago Board of Trade (1918)

Rule of Reason (cont’d)

• RoR is a highly fact-intensive inquiry
“[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business . . . Its conditions before and after the restraint (Agreement) was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probably. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained are all relevant facts.” Chicago Board of Trade (1918)

The Exception: Per Se Rule

• Some agreements do not benefit consumers, we can condemn them without an extensive inquiry (Factors in Chicago Board), the agreement → illegality

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 “There are certain agreements . . . which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.” Northern Pac. Ry.
(1958)
Per Se Rule (cont’d)
• The per se rule saves time and effort
“[The per se rule] avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved . . .
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable – an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.” Northern Pac.
Ry. (1958)

II. HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS

Price Fixing
Naked restraints

• Generally treated as per se illegal: Price plays a critical role in a market economy
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“Protection of price competition from conspiratorial restraint is an object of special solicitude under the antitrust laws.” General Motors Corp. (1966)
Restrictions on price pose an “actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy.” Socony-Vacuum (1940)
Price
Fixing
Example

FOUR GAS STATIONS, EACH SELLING A DIFFERENT BRAND

assumer: relevant market and no possibility of entry
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 EXPRESS AGREEMENT THAT IS PER SE
ILLEGAL: “WE ALL AGREE TO CHARGE PHP 60 PER LITER”
BUT SUPPOSE WE OBSERVE
SIMULTANEOUS CHANGE IN PRICE BUT NO EXPRESS
AGREEMENT:
IS THERE AN AGREEMENT? IS IT PER SE
ILLEGAL? ILLEGAL UNDER A RULE OF
REASON? ARE CONSUMERS HARMED?
Price

Fixing
• hen there is direct evidence, no problem. If thre is identical price increase and same= change merely reflect change in wholesale price of gas. If there is no identical
price in increase but there is not wholesale price of gas, but no direct agreement- implicit agreement? If firms react unilaterally react to the prices of compettors,
the way they are acting seems like there is an agreement. There is no remedy for this, we cannot tell stations to stop positng prices. Reduces search cost. We cant
tell them to stop responding to srateygy of ompetitors. We cannot tell them to stop responding to competitioners. Will prohibitcompetitor to lower prices. stations
should be free to respond to competitors- we cannot tell competitors not to respond. One possible answer: competition law does not reach such tacit agreement.
Or maybe something going on. Trade association- suggested retail prices? Attack the trade association activity. There should be more evidence
More evidence than parallel conduct to establish an agreement.

Case: Trenton Potteries (1927; Trenton toilet case, bathroom fixtures)

• Makers of toilets and other bathroom fixtures belonged to an association that fixed prices of their goods
• Defendants were convicted of price fixing in the lower court; the court of appeals reversed because the jury was not allowed to consider the “reasonableness” of
prices charged
• The issue: Whether reasonableness was a defense to price fixing

• The Court rejected the defense that the prices fixed were reasonable
“The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably
exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. . . . Agreements which create such power may be held to
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 be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry into whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable
. . . .”
IF EFFECTIVE?
Output Limitation
• Economics tells us that restricting output has the same effect as a restricting price
oOutput lower → market price higher, harms consumers
• Examples of per se illegal output limitation
s oProduction limits – suppliers agreement to limit total output supply to the market
oProduction quotas – each supplier to limit each own output to a fixed amount
oDiscontinue production
oBusiness hours limits

Output Limitation (inditect way to affect price) Case: Socony (1940)

• Oil and gas industry: standard oil company of new york
• Oil extracted from ground and refined to produce gasoline, sold to wholesalers, then to retailers
• Two types of firms operating: Vertically integrated “majors” and non-integrated “independents”
Depression,demand plummtted oil and gas prices up. There was a law that was discontinued: Majors agreed to purchase “excess” oil from independents to
keep it off the market and keep oil and gasoline prices up

• A per se illegal agreement need not directly affect price

An agreement that merely “tampers with the price structure” is per se unlawful
• Market power is not necessary to find a per se violation
A “conspiracy to fix prices violates [Section 1] of the [Sherman] Act though no overt act is shown, though it is not established that the conspirators had the means
available for the accomplishment of their objective.”
Market Division
• Competitors may divide or allocate markets by
• oTerritory (Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao)
• oCustomer (small or large customers reduces competiion

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• oProduct (allocation, industrial grade, residential grade- reduces sellers from 4 to 2, tend to reduce output and raise prices)
• Like output limitations, a horizontal market allocation indirectly affects price by restricting competition and is per se illegal
• All methods inhibit competition, increasing prices to consumers
Customer Allocation Example new customers in East Company A, customers, West (insurance; each company has customers in deiffernet
customers) each business will have a monopoly in each area- per se illegal customer to allocate

Territorial Allocation Case: Palmer v. BRG (1990)

• Palmer a law student
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• BRG and HBJ (Bar/Bri) were bar exam review companies
Outside Georgia:
• BRG and HBJ agreed that HBJ Only, In Georgia:
• BRG shall has exclusive license to provide HBJ course in Georgia
BRG Will Not Compete BRG Only,
• HBJ will not compete with BRG in Georgia
• BRG will not compete with HBJ outside Georgia
HBJ Will Not Compete
Palmer (cont’d)
• Horizontal territorial allocations per se illegal
“[H]orizontal territorial limitations . . . are naked restraints of trade (not ancillary)
with no purpose except stifling competition. Such limitations are per se violations
of the Sherman Act.”
“[A]greements among competitors not to compete within the other’s territories are
anticompetitive regardless of whether the parties split a market within which both
do business or whether they merely reserve one market for one and another for
the other.”

Bid Rigging PerSe

• Frequently arises in the context of government procurement auctions
• Harms the government/taxpayers by forcing them to pay higher prices/taxes
• May arise in private sector procurement auctions with similar effects: higher costs to firms, higher prices to consumers
• Treated harshly: Per se illegal, defendants frequently prosecuted criminally, subject to fines and jail terms

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 Bid Rigging Example
State solicits bids to Types of possible bid rigging:
demolish three old bridges,
four bidders (B1, B2, B3) 1. Bid allocation (take turns; allocate the projects)
2. Complementary or cover bids (bids so high that will be rejected) to allow one to win
3. Bid suppression or limitation (will not post a bid) to allow to win

Bid Rigging Case: Reicher (10th Cir. 1992)

• Los Alamos National Lab sought bids to build a specialized structure for laser testing
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 oTwo independent bids necessary for the contract to be awarded
oReicher submitted a bid, but no one else
• Giolas agreed with Reicher to submit a bid at price determined by Reicher
oExample of a “cover bid”: Bid(Giolas) > Bid(Reicher)
• Court deemed the agreement per se illegal
Reicher (cont’d)
• “Despite its ultimate inability to perform the contract, Giolas held itself out as a competitor for the purposes of rigging what was supposed to be a competitive
bidding process. This is exactly the sort of ‘threat to the central nervous system of the economy,’ . . . that the antitrust laws are meant to address.”
• “[I]n a bid rigging conspiracy, the determination of a per se antitrust violation depends on whether there was an agreement to subvert the competition, not on
whether each party to the scam could perform.”

III. VERTICAL AGREEMENTS

Vertical Agreements
• Divided into two categories: price and nonprice oPrice restraints: e.g., minimum resale pricing, maximum resale pricing oNonprice restraints: e.g., restraints on
distribution, tying
• Price fixing treated harshly in horizontal- vertical agreements restrain intra-band competition; if giant has rpm – consumers might turn to specialized or track
• Treated under RoR (with perhaps one exception)
• oTypically restrain intrabrand competition, not interbrand competition
• oHave plausible procompetitive justifications- increase in price of Giant may be justified, with free tune up, better sales and service. Instead of just competing price,
quality of after sales service, sale experience
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM)
• The Supreme Court deemed RPM per se illegal in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
• Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), overruled Dr. Miles, extending RoR treatment to RPM in federal cases
• Leegin one in a line of decisions that has given RoR treatment to practices that long had been considered per se illegal

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 RPM Example
MANUFACTURERS M1 M2 M3
RETAILERS

R9
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8

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 M1 (mountain bikes) sells its product/brand only
through R1, R2, and R3 and requires sales of its
product/brand at a price it determines (RPM)

R1 to @# might charge higher prices, consumers have choices, so R1-R3 have to offer value for increase price, better sales experience or better service (along non-price
dimensions)
Enhance interbrand competition

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 U.S. D

ANTITRUSTEPARTMENT OF
J
D USTICEI VISION ,
RPM Case: Leegin (2007)
• Leegin manufactured leather goods, including under the “Brighton” brand (women belts)
• Leegin policy was to refuse to sell goods to retailers who sold its RPM necessary to guarantee profits
“Brighton” below suggested prices (Pro competititve effects, to ensure profit to retailers so they can have profit to improve stores, better sales
experience)
• PSKS sold “Brighton” brand goods at a discount, and Leegin stopped selling to PSKS pursuant to its policy
• PSKS sued, arguing that Leegin engaged in per se illegal RPM
• Leegin Court determined Dr. Miles failed to consider economic effects of RPM.
• Found that RPM, like other vertical restraints, could be procompetitive, stimulating interbrand competition
oEncourage nonprice competition
oDiscourage free riding oFacilitate entry

Potential Anticompetitive Effects of RPM

• Facilitate manufacturing cartel
Anti-comppetitive, cartel members can monitor prices.
• oA price fixing cartel needs to monitor prices to make sure no one is cheating
• oRPM may make it easier for manufacturers to identify manufacturers who
cheat on the agreement
• Facilitate retail cartel
• l oRetailers in a cartel may enlist the help of manufacturers to implement RPM
at the cartel’s preferred price

Court did not find the anti-competitive effects outweighed pro-competitive effects

Potential Procompetitive Effects of RPM

• Encourage nonprice competition by retailers – competition for aftermarketer sales, after sales, better show room
• o Ensuring a minimum price

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 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ANTITRUST DIVISION

• → Ensures higher profits per unit sale

• → Expend greater effort to make sale through, e.g., a nice showroom, enhanced after sale service
• Discourage “free riding” by discount sellers
o If Seller A spends money to provide high quality customer service, but Seller B does
not and sells at a discount, then a customer may go to Seller A to learn about the good but buys from Seller B
→ Seller A has no incentive to provide high quality service
Seller B is free riding on quality pre sales service of A
• Facilitate entry by newcomers
o Higher per unit profit → Greater incentive to promote sales
•
Exclusive Dealing
Appears on its face to be anti-competitive, but however on closure scrutiny has procompetitive effects.

• Arrangements that induce buyer to buy from one supplier or induce seller to sell to one buyer, e.g.,
oBuyer may not buy from supplier’s competitors oBuyer must purchase a substantial share of its requirements from supplier (like 70%)
oPricing that induces buyer to buy most or all of its requirements from supplier(buyer may get discount of 30% if exclusive purchase from supplier)
• Courts generally consider pro- and anticompetitive effects under RoR
• oAnticompetitive: Foreclosure, rising rivals’ costs
if a single seller will lock up biggest manufacturer

oProcompetitive: Lower costs by reducing the need to search for supply or

enter into multiple contracts

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 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ANTITRUST DIVISION

Exclusive Dealing Example: Mfg-Dist (M1 – mountain bikes) exclusive dealing, M2 and M3 cannot sell through D1, might foreclosure getting
products to the consumer. D2 may be more expensive to use. Alternative has extensive distribution network, M2 and M3 might not be
harmed.
Agrement may make it harder to enter or alternatively manufacturer will make her own distribution network.

Pre-competitive effect: may give sellers an assured outlet for their products, sellers does not continually search for customers and a buyer does not have to continually search for
sellers, les transactional cost; stronger incentive to promote brand if only one brand carried. More effective; prevents free riding. Giant engages in national marketing to drive
customers to retailer but then retailer carrying multiple brands might have incentive to sell track or specialized, free riding.

Manufacturer to distributor: bars distributor to distribute the product of other competitors M1 gian, M2. Track and M3 Specialized

M2 and M3 will have to find other distributor

Diagram helsp to keep relationship into perspective.

Anticompetitve: might be difficult for new entry; if D1 best distributor, or new entrant might be able to do it own its own?

If there are no good alternatives, it may inhibit entry

Pro-competitive effects:

Exclusive dealing: assured market to get to the retailers. If distributor carries only one brand, stronger incentive to promote that brand and enhance inter brand competition. Third,
prevents free riding.

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 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ANTITRUST DIVISION

MANUFACTURERS M1 M2 M3

DISTRIBUTORS D1 D2

RETAILERS
Exclusive Dealing Example: Supp-Mfg R2 R6 R8 R9
R1
AGREEMENT BETWEEN S1 AND M1
M1 MUST BUY ALL INPUTS FROM S1,
M1 MAY NOT BUY
SUPPLIERS FROM S2 OR S3 S1
(makers for derailers, mechanism S2
for S3and M3)
bike; A forecloses S! to sell M2

S2 & S3 NOT PART OF AGREEMENT

If sale to M1, only constitutes a small market. If M2 and M3 remain robust markets, S2 and S3 not affected
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 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ANTITRUST DIVISION M1 M2 M3
MANUFACTURERS

Diagram reminds that there are other actors, alternative customers. Share of market forclosed, key

Exclusive Dealing Case: Tampa Elec. (1961)

• Tampa Electric an electric utility
• oUsed coal as boiler fuel to generate electricity
oEntered into 20-year contract with Nashville Coal for its coal
requirements
oNashville refused to perform, argued contract was illegal exclusive dealing
• Court considered agreement under RoR
oAnticompetitive effect: Foreclosed competing coal sellers
oProcompetitive effect: Assurance of steady and ample supply

Was there foreclosure of competing coal sellers?

• 700 coal producers could serve Tampa Electric
• Producers sold in a broad “Appalachian coal area,” encompassing more than just Florida (relevant product geographical market was large)
• Exclusive contract was less than 1% of sales in the relevant market
→ Coal producers had plenty of potential customers
→ No foreclosure, no effect on competition
Structured RoR: 3-Step Burden Shifting Framework
1. Plaintiff must prove substantial adverse anticompetitive effects
• Nature of restraint, proof of effects or market power
2. Defendant must produce evidence of procompetitive effects
• E.g., increase output, reduce costs, facilitate new products, increase service
3. Plaintiff must show
a. Conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve objectives
• E.g., could achieve procompetitive effects through “less restrictive alternative”
b. Or anticompetitive effects outweigh procompetitive effects
SUMMARY

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 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ANTITRUST DIVISION

Focus on Effects on Competition and Consumers

• Is the agreement of the type that almost always harms competition and consumers?
oIf yes → Per se illegal, inquiry ends
oIf no → Inquire into harm/benefit to competition/consumers under RoR
• Under RoR, consider whether agreement
oHarms consumers by, e.g., raising price, reducing output, inhibiting innovation oBenefits consumers by, e.g., promoting interbrand competition, increasing
service, increasing output, or reducing costs that lower prices oBalance consumer harms and benefits
APPENDIX
Statutes & Cases Discussed
Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Svc. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1 (1958)
United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966)
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990)
United States v. Reicher, 983 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1992)
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961)

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