NO: 12345678

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA

_________________________________________

STEVEN MOUSE MOUSE Applicant

vs

ANGELYNN HOE

ERIC HOE Respondents

__________________________________________________________________

SUPERIOR COURT STONE MOUNTAIN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Number:

Honorable Judge Seeliger Presiding

_______________________________________________

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

Steven Mouse Mouse

123 Atlantic Station
Foreign Park, GA 00000
(404) 000-0000
[email protected]
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPLY TO APPELLEES’ BRIEF………………………………………. 1

A. Mr. Mouse Filed Into Magistrate Court.................................... 1

B. The Hoes Allegations Concerning the “Vacant Lot”................. 3

B. The Requests for Admissions……………………………………… 4

C. Allegations That Mouse Suffered No Monetary Expenses…… 4

E. Fraud Upon the Court……………………………………………. 6

F. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5............................................................................ 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................................................... 16

i
 Table of Cases

Case Page

Barnum v. Coastal Health Services, 288 Ga. App. 209(Ga.Ct.App. 2007)... 10

Bells Ferry Landing, Ltd. v. Wirtz, 188 Ga.App. 344, 345, (1988)............... 14

Bicknell, 171 Ga. App. at 898-899................................................................. 10

Didio v. Chess, 218 Ga.App. 550, 551, 462 S.E.2d 450 (1995)..................... 13

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 251,

64 S. Ct. 997, 1004, 88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944).......................................... 8

Howard v. City of Columbus, 239 Ga. App. 399, 416, 521 S.E.2d 51, 69...... 14

Lanier v. Burnette, 245 Ga.App. 566, 570–571(3), 538 S.E.2d 476 (2000).. 5

Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1545 (11th Cir. 1993). 10

Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, 307 F.3d 1332

(11th Cir. 2002)...................................................................................... 10

Matthews, Wilson & Matthews, Inc. v. Capital City Bank,

614 Fed. Appx. 969, 5-6 (11th Cir. 2015)............................................. 9

Meagher v. Quick, 264 Ga. App. 639, 643, 594 S.E.2d 182, 186 (2003)....... 6

Miccosukee Tribe v. South Florida Water Management District,

280 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 2002).................................................. 10

Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199, 647 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2007).................. 5

Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 158, 106 S. Ct. 988, 990,
89 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1986)......................................................................... 6

ii
O'Donnell v. Durham, 275 Ga. 860, 861(3), 573 S.E.2d 23 (2002).............. 5

Potter v. American Medcare Corp., 225 Ga.App. 343, 346, 484 S.E.2d 43... 14

Power Indus. v. Avant, 134 Ga.App. 952, 956–957(2), 216 S.E.2d 897......... 14

Resource Network Intl. v. Ritz–Carlton Hotel Co., 232 Ga.App. 242(1),

501 S.E.2d 573 (1998)........................................................................... 14

Rickett v. State, 276 Ga. 609, 610(2), 581 S.E.2d 32 (2003).......................... 5

Setlock v. Setlock, 286 Ga. 384, 385 (Ga. 2010)............................................ 1,4

Simpson v. Southwire Co., 249 Ga.App. 406, 409, 548 S.E.2d 660 (2001).... 6

Smith v. Nat. Bank of Ga., 182 Ga.App. 55, 58, 354 S.E.2d 678 (1987)........ 13

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985)............ 9

Wright v. Wilcox, 262 Ga. App. 659, 662, 586 S.E.2d 364, 366 (2003)......... 5

Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007)................ 9

Other Authorities

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5........................................................................................... 10,11

OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) and (6)............................................................................ 1,4

OCGA § 51–9–1............................................................................................... 5

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 APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

COMES NOW, Appellant, Steven Mouse Mouse, who respectfully files

Appellant’s Reply Brief.

REPLY TO APPELLEES’ BRIEF

The Hoess have requested judicial notice of the Discretionary Application

and Response. That being the case, Mr. Mouse requests that the Court to take

Judicial Notice of the Discretionary Appeal, as well, shown by Rule 42(c) so that

he may counter to statements made within Appellees’ (“The Hoe s”) Brief, and

have considered, issues from the Application.

A. Mr. MOUSE Filed Into Magistrate Court With Actual Knowledge

Mr. Mouse , filed his action into Magistrate Court with actual knowledge

of the limit to $15.,000.1

“Each magistrate court and each magistrate thereof shall have

jurisdiction and power over . . . [t]he trial of civil claims . . . in which
exclusive jurisdiction is not vested in the superior court and the
amount demanded or the value of the property claimed does not
exceed $15,000.00 . . . [and] [t]he . . . issuance of writs and judgments
in dispossessory proceedings. OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) and (6).
Setlock v. Setlock, 286 Ga. 384, 385 (Ga. 2010).
Mr. Mouse , due to his health, not wanting a long drawn out case. He also

did not wanting discovery, and didn’t plan on winning Millions of Dollars. The case

1
It is odd, but the Index shows the transfer as an Appeal. The rules on appeal from
Magistrate Court are different form Appeals from Superior Court. One would have
to wonder how and why the transfer had been mislabeled.

1
in Magistrate Court was cut and dry. Mr. Mouse just wanted The Hoee s to leave

him alone, quit stealing from him and stop exploiting him for financial gain. Mr.

Mouse filed into Magistrate Court, and was willing to allow the Court to decide

the damages, with a cap of $15,000.00,

Mr. Mouse had chosen the magistrate court and filed his complaint into that

Court, Case No. 18M92478. The Hoes s had the case transferred. The Hoe es

stated: “May 30, 2018 the Magistrate Court case, because of the relief demanded,

was transferred to DeKalb Superior Court Civil Action File No. 18-CV-6135, the

underlying case of this appeal. [VI-5]”. [V1-10@12]. A lie.

The Civil Cover Sheet from Magistrate Court shows that Mr. Mouse had

sought $14,999.00 in damages. Mr. Mouse does not have the documents from

the Magistrate Court, but the Civil Cover Sheet would be one of the first documents.

The magistrate court docket report shows on 05/21/2018 “Magistrate Civil

Hearing Notice”. On 05/30/2018 “Order to Transfer to DeKalb County Superior

Court”. On 06/13/2018 “Transfer to Other Jurisdiction Superior Court of DeKalb

County”. That same day “Miscellaneous Transferred to Superior Court”. Why

would The Hoe s lie to this Court? Deceit, misrepresentation.

The trial Court’s Summary Judgment Order [V-1, p. 402], started with “This

case was originally filed in Magistrate Court”. At the end of page 402, the trial court

stated “Mr. Mouse’s negligence claims seeks damages to the cable …loss of business,

2
and qui[te] enjoyment of property, although Mr. Mousegives no value to the alleged

damages. The case was transferred to this Court” [V1-402]. Why would the trial

court lie, stating that Mr. Mouse had given no value to the alleged damages? Mr.

Mouse sought $14,999.00, on the Civil Cover Sheet from Magistrate Court.

An attorney, with actual knowledge that his clients were guilty of the

allegations within a complaint filed into a Magistrate Court ($15,000 cap), would

have kept the case in Magistrate Court, where they would not have to pay damages

of more than $15,000.00. The Hoes ’ attorney instead, had the case transferred to

Superior Court, lied about it, claiming that the case was transferred because of the

amount of damages. Why?

B. The Hoe s’ Allegations Concerning the “Vacant Lot”

The s bring up “the vacant lot”. Mr. Mouse did a word search within

his Opening Brief, for “lot”, “vacant lot”, “back lot” comes up with NO RESULTS.

Therefore, Mr. Mouse addresses the “vacant lot”, referring to the Statement of

Facts within the Application for Discretionary Appeal. The bottom of page 3, to the

middle of page 4 gives a quick explanation, that remains undisputed by The Hoe s.

The “vacant lot”, “back lot” that The Hoe s address on pages 7-8, 13, and 22 of

Appellees’ Brief were addressed in the Discretionary Application on pages 3-4, 9-

11, to the Discretionary Application filed with the Court. The Hoes brought up

“vacant lot” on page 8, twice on page 13, and twice on page 22. “Law school” was

3
brought up on pages 12, 15, and 25. The Hoe s have admitted that Mr. Mouse

has not acted at any time and/or practiced law as an attorney.

C. The Requests for Admissions

“Request for Admissions”, is the only grounds for which The Hoe s could

prove their case on. They use the Request for Admissions in this Court to prove

their right to excessive attorney’s fees and awards. In their Appellee Brief, twelve

(12) times The Hoe s used the phrase “Request for Admissions”; see Appellees’

Brief, pages 7-8 ¶¶ 1-2; page 10 ¶ B 1; page 12 ¶9; page 15 D. First, Second, Third

and Fourth ¶¶; page 16 First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth ¶¶.

The Hoe s admit through dependence on the Request for Admissions, that

without such Requests being admitted due to default in responding, that they could

have prevailed no other way. Due to Mr. Mouse's default by failing to timely

respond, the Requests, all requests were admitted as true. That is not a ruling on the

merits. And default Admissions, does not result in “the truth”.

D. Allegations That Mr. Mouse Suffered No Monetary Expenses

“Each magistrate court and each magistrate thereof shall have

jurisdiction and power over . . . [t]he trial of civil claims . . . in
which exclusive jurisdiction is not vested in the superior court and
the amount demanded or the value of the property claimed does not
exceed $15,000.00 . . . [and] [t]he . . . issuance of writs and
judgments in dispossessory proceedings. OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) and
(6). Setlock v. Setlock, 286 Ga. 384, 385 (Ga. 2010).

The Hoes had trespassed.

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 “When a landowner has demonstrated that a trespass has occurred,
general damages do not have to be proven with any ‘amount to
an absolute certainty’ for recovery of such damages. When there
has been a tortious invasion of the property of another, i.e.,
trespass, such tortious conduct gives rise to the right to recover
nominal damages to vindicate such right. As to general damages,
where there is such a wrongful interference with the comfortable
enjoyment of property by a person in possession, no precise rule for
ascertaining damage can be given; therefore the [jurors] are left
to say what, in their judgment, the defendant ought to pay, in
view of the discomfort or annoyance to which the plaintiff and his
family have been subjected by the trespass. (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) Lanier v. Burnette, 245 Ga.App. 566, 570–
571(3), 538 S.E.2d 476 (2000); see also OCGA § 51–9–1 (‘The right
of enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every
citizen, every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such
enjoyment is a tort for which an action shall lie.’). Wright v.
Wilcox, 262 Ga. App. 659, 662, 586 S.E.2d 364, 366 (2003).

This Court has stated “every act of another which unlawfully interferes with

such enjoyment is a tort for which an action shall lie”.

The word shall is of mandatory import. The Supreme Court of Georgia has

stated: “We agree with the Court of Appeals that, as a rule of statutory construction,

‘[s]hall’ is generally construed as a word of mandatory import.” O'Donnell v.

Durham, 275 Ga. 860, 861(3), 573 S.E.2d 23 (2002). Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga.

197, 199, 647 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2007).

‘“In its ordinary signification ‘shall’ is a word of command, and

the context ought to be very strongly persuasive before that word
is softened into a mere permission.’ (Citations and punctuation
omitted.) Rickett v. State, 276 Ga. 609, 610(2), 581 S.E.2d 32

5
 (2003)”. “Where a ... statute is plain and susceptible of but one
natural and reasonable construction, the court has no authority to
place a different construction upon it, but must construe it
according to its terms.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Simpson v. Southwire Co., 249 Ga.App. 406, 409, 548 S.E.2d 660
(2001).
Meagher v. Quick, 264 Ga. App. 639, 643, 594 S.E.2d 182, 186 (2003).

E. Fraud Upon the Court

Why do the Appellees and the trial court insist that Mr. Mouse had not

placed a monetary amount on the damages? Why would the Appellees make it sound

like the Magistrate Court on a whim transferred the case? Mr. Mouse still

suggests that The Hoess’ attorney and the trial court were personal friends, or that

there was a fraud upon the court with or without participation of the court.

The US Supreme Court has held:

“Counsel’s duty of loyalty to, and advocacy of, the defendant’s cause
is limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very
nature of a trial as a search for truth. Although counsel must take all
reasonable lawful means to attain his client’s objectives, counsel is
precluded from taking steps or in any way assisting the client in
presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the law. Moreover,
accepted norms require that a lawyer disclose his client’s perjury
and frauds upon the court.

Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 158, 106 S. Ct. 988, 990, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1986)

The Hoes’s Appellees’ Brief, on page 18 states: “ Mr. Mouse suffered no

monetary expense as a result of Mr. Hoes having cut the AT&T cable. Defendants

First Request for Admissions…” [Ae.Brg., p.18]. Then on page 19 speaking of the

6
Summary Judgment states: “ Mr. Mouse recites a great deal of law but this issue

must be decided on the undisputed facts of the case [Ae.Brf, p.19].

There has never been undisputed facts of the case. Further:

The Hoess and the trial court commented that it was only 3 inches onto Mr.

Mouse ’s property like it was no big deal. But considering the length of the

property on that side is 278 feet, where the 3 inches was encroached upon, the

County Code states that there is a set back of 10’ on each side. Plus it was a heck of

a lot more than 3”. 278 feet x three inches comes up to 834 inches = 69.5 square

feet. Had the shed stayed on Mr. Mouse ’s property, The Hoes would have

claimed adverse possession, and stolen more property from Mr. Mouse than they

had already stolen.

Mr. Mouse , knowing the limit of $15,000 in Magistrate Court, requested

$14,999.00, was willing to allow the Magistrate Judge determine the amount of his

damages.

A lay person, reading this would conclude that the Magistrate Court on its

own, transferred the case. That is not what happened, and the record on appeal will

show (unless that document was removed prior to, or after transfer), that The Hoes

had filed “Answers, Defenses and Motion to Transfer”. So why do they lie?

The Hoe s address the transfer to this Court in Appellees’ Brief, pages 11,

12, the case was transferred “because of the relief demanded…” [Ae.Brf.,p.9@12].

7
That was a knowingly, willingly, wantonly made lie to perpetrate a fraud upon this

Court. The Hoes and the trial court had already stated that Mr. Mouse had “not

stated an amount for damages”, which too was a knowingly, willingly, wantonly

made lie. Mr. Mouse had filed into the Court that he intended to hear the matter.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS. “No fraud is more odious than an attempt to subvert

the administration of justice”. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322

U.S. 238, 251, 64 S. Ct. 997, 1004, 88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944).

“It is complained that members of the bar have knowingly participated in the

fraud. Remedies are available to purge recreant officers from the tribunals on whom

the fraud was practiced”. Id.

Mr. Mouse filed an action to fight for his rights, in a court where cases

move quickly through the Court, not looking to get rich, and not looking for a case

to cause his health to decline. The Hoes removed the action to Superior Court, so

that they could perpetrate a fraud upon the court through illusions. First the Hoes

got rid of two of Mr. Mouse ’s claims on default summary judgment. Next, after

creating the illusion of a continuing discovery dispute, that Mr. Mouse had

refused to participate, and had ignored the Court’s Order. They then filed Motion for

Sanctions. Mr. Mouse ’s case was apparently dismissed for missing the sanctions

hearing, and through the false claims about discovery.

8
 Along with the discovery dispute2 there were numerous problems concerning

this case. Looking at everything that happened, including Mr. Mouse not

receiving Motions, Notices, Orders, etc., the case had been transferred by The

, and they got rich from that transfer.

‘“Fraud upon the court’ should, we believe, embrace only that

species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or
is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial
machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of
adjudging cases that are presented for adjudicatio..”. Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985).
Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir.
2007)Matthews, Wilson & Matthews, Inc. v. Capital City Bank, 614
Fed. Appx. 969, 5-6 (11th Cir. 2015).
7 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 60.33

One reading the Briefs filed, would conclude that the case was transferred by

The Hoes for the reason that the case turned out the way it did. The intent, was to

prevent Mr. Mouse ’s receipt of what they filed into the Court. Mr. Mouse

could not respond to that which he did not know had been filed.

While there is very little case law to fulfill what has happened in the case at

bar, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has made numerous rulings on some of these

types of issues. Georgia procedures, rules, and statutes are based on the Federal

2
The hoe s had the case transferred from Magistrate Court, they immediately filed
Discovery requests. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mouse had filed an Emergency Leave
for Health related issues or a stay, which has never shown on the Docket Report.
The proof that he filed it, is the Hoes filed a response to it.

9
procedures, rules and statutes.

“In determining the meaning ... look to federal law for persuasive
authority. We have emphasized that the Georgia Civil Practice Act
was taken from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with
slight immaterial variations its sections are substantially
identical to corresponding rules. Because of this similarity it is
proper that we give consideration and great weight to constructions
placed on the Federal Rules by the federal courts. (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Bicknell, 171 Ga. App. at 898-899.
Barnum v. Coastal Health Services, 288 Ga. App. 209, 215 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).

Our courts have also held, when ruling on sanctions:

“Sanction orders must not involve amounts that are so large that they
seem to fly in the face of common sense, given the financial
circumstances of the party being sanctioned. What cannot be done
must not be ordered to be done. Miccosukee Tribe v. South Florida
Water Management District, 280 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 2002).
(discussing injunctions). And, sanctions must never be hollow
gestures; their bite must be real. For the bite to be real, it has to be a
sum that the person might actually pay. A sanction which a party
clearly cannot pay does not vindicate the court's authority because it
neither punishes nor deters. Cf. Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1545
(concluding that sanctions imposed under court's inherent power
“justly punished” the offending parties and would hopefully deter
others from engaging in similar conduct).
Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, 307 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2002).

F. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5

The Appellee Brief, page 10, @ 1 states: “There is no indication in the record

that Mr. Mouse complained of or suffered any consequences from any issues

concerning the filing of pleadings or receipt of copies of filed pleadings…

10
Defendants' First Request For Admissions…undisputed by The Hoes [Vl-287]”.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5 (a) Service--When required. Except as otherwise

provided in this chapter, every order required by its terms to be
served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless
the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every
written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and
similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. (Ga. Code
Ann. § 9-11-5 (West)).
Mr. Mouse did not have to complain. The rules themselves state “every

order”, “every pleading”, “every written motion”, and “every written notice,

appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper SHALL be served…”. It

has been undisputed that Mr. Mouse was not served with every order, pleading,

motion, notice…etc.

The facts clearly show that there was something improper going on in the trial

court, to which the Court may or may not have been a party. Another thing that is

extremely odd, is why would someone serve First Request for Admissions on

11/12/2018 [Vol.1, 190-288] (98 pages), then two days later, on 11/14/2018 serve

Second Requests for Admissions [Vol.1, 289-333] (44 pages); then two weeks later,

on 11/28/2018 serve Third Request for Admissions [Vol.1, 334-390] (56 pages)?

Within at two week period, The Hoe s allegedly sent to Mr. Mouse 198 pages of

Request for Admissions. That seems a bit excessive. Mr. Mouse contends that

he had not received Requests for Admissions. Of course, he can’t prove he never

got them, still, he never received them

11
 Looking at the Index on Appeal:

10/12/2018: Def Mtn For Summary Judgment;

10/12/2018: Notice of Filing Ex.s 1 & 2 for Def Summary Judgment
10/16/2018: Notice of Filing Exs. 3 & 4 for Def Summary Judgment
10/23/2018: Motion to Recuse
10/23/2018: Brief in Support of Mtn to Recuse
11/12/2018: Def. 1st Request for Admissions
11/14/2018: Def. 2nd Request for Admissions
11/28/2018: Def. 3rd Request for Admissions
Out of the numerous things filed into the record, most of what Mr.

filed is not on record. Motion to Recuse is showing, Motion to Extend Discovery is

showing, but even the Hoe s have commented that the Motion for Emergency

Leave that Mr. Mouse filed, is not on the Docket or the Index for Appeal.

“ MR. MOUSE ’S Plaintiff’s Health Related Emergency Leave of Absence Or

in the Alternative, Emergency Motion to Stay was dated July 7, 2018. Although

there is no indication the motion was filed with the court, Hoes did receive a copy

and filed a response…. Mr. Mouse makes no showing that he suffered any injury

as a result” [Ae.Brf., page 10 ¶2].

The Hoe s are wrong about whether or not Mr. Mouse sustained injuries

for the Court ignoring and not even docketing the Motion. That was the grounds for

the Motion to Compel, the grounds for sanctions, and the grounds for summary

judgment. Mr. Mouse ’s responses to the discovery filed to him on July 03, 2018.

Mr. Mouse , who had been very ill, and requested a medical leave of absence, was

12
ignored, so when he untimely responded to the requests served upon him, they were

late. On 08/21/2018 The Hoe s filed Motion to Compel Discovery.

The Hoe s reference this on page 11 @ 4: “Although Mr. Mouse denies

knowledge of Defendants' Motion For Sanctions filed on January 28, 2019 [Vl-397],

Mr. Mouse on February 4, 2019 filed a Motion For Extension of Time For

Discovery, [Vl-401] …requested a ‘30 day extension’ and was moot before the court

could rule”. The Hoe s fail to reference where Mr. Mouse made such statements.

Just like ¶ 6 on page 11, of Appellees’ Brief: “ Mr. Mouse states he had no

knowledge that his Complaint had been dismissed until he received Hoe S’

objection to his Application for Discretionary Appeal A20D0162 ….Enumeration

of Error #2 seeks appeal from the grant…”.

Since The Hoe s refuse to reference where they take Mr. Mouse ’s alleged

statements from in the Appellant’s Brief, he goes to The Discretionary Application

and finds #2. Looking back at the Discretionary Application, to Error #2, what Mr.

Mouse a ctually stated was on page 11: “The trial Court erred when the court

Granted Motion for Sanctions against Mr. Mouse ”.

“Dismissal of the answer and entry of a default judgment against a

defendant who is in wilful, in bad faith, or in conscious disregard of
an order compelling discovery are an appropriate sanction. Didio v.
Chess, 218 Ga.App. 550, 551, 462 S.E.2d 450 (1995); Smith v. Nat.
Bank of Ga., 182 Ga.App. 55, 58, 354 S.E.2d 678 (1987). Neither
the movant nor the trial court need find actual wilfulness, but only a
conscious or intentional act in disregarding the duty to make

13
 discovery is necessary for imposing the sanction of default.
Resource Network Intl. v. Ritz–Carlton Hotel Co., 232 Ga.App.
242(1), 501 S.E.2d 573 (1998); Potter v. American Medcare Corp.,
225 Ga.App. 343, 346, 484 S.E.2d 43 (1997); Bells Ferry Landing,
Ltd. v. Wirtz, 188 Ga.App. 344, 345, 373 S.E.2d 50 (1988); Sta–
Power Indus. v. Avant, 134 Ga.App. 952, 956–957(2), 216 S.E.2d
897 (1975)”.
Howard v. City of Columbus, 239 Ga. App. 399, 416, 521 S.E.2d 51, 69 (1999).

Having knowledge that there had been a ruling in favor of The Hoe s, did not

mean that Mr. Mouse had actual knowledge of what the sanctions were, or what

the Order stated. The facts were, the case continued.

On page 10 of Appellees’ Breif, they state 2 ¶ 1: “There is no indication in

the record that Mr. Mouse complained of or suffered any consequences from any

issues concerning the filing of pleadings…To the contrary…”. No matter if they

claim that Mr. Mouse (admitted thereto by Request for Admissions, which are all

false). The fact remains, one cannot oppose that which one does not know has been

filed.

In the case at bar, the Requests for Admissions, would have never been

admitted as true. The truth is opposite from what the Request for Admissions sought.

There is no other reason that The Hoe s would have had Admissions that Mr.

could not admit to, unless they knew Mr. Mouse would never be

allowed to respond to the requests. The Hoe s were granted “judgment based on

false admissions”.

14
 Rather than honor the duty of candor to the Courts, The Hoe s twist their

knowledge of any facts, with knowledge that what they have offered to the Court are

misrepresentations. To tell selected parts of the truth, but not the whole truth, is not

being truthful to this Court.

Appellees Brief, pages 7, 8 @ ¶¶ 1-2 refer to issues, opposing counsel knows

is not true. The Hoes apparently, profiting greatly from what they claim are

“Admissions”. When an elderly, disabled adult cannot retain legal counsel, they are

forced to represent themselves. Mr. Mouse attempted to take care of the matter

through the courts. It didn’t work. The allegation that “ Mr. Mouse is a law school

graduate with substantial experience in the state and federal courts”

[Ae.Brf.,p.12@9], is a lie. Mr. Mouse ’s has been pro se.

Respectfully submitted, this 3rd day of March, 2020,

This submission does not exceed the page

limit imposed by Rule 24(f)(2); This Reply
Brief contains 15 countable pages.

______________________________
Steven Mouse Mouse
1234 Park PL
Lala Land, Ga

15
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby Certify, that I have, this 3rd day of March, 2020, prior to filing this
Reply in this Court, served a true and correct copy of this Reply Brief, upon
Respondents, through their attorney on file, by causing to be deposited with USPS,
First Class Mail, proper postage affixed and addressed as follows:

Mark Cheater Man

0000 Peachtree Dunwoody Rd.
Scumbag, GA 00000

______________________________
Steven Mouse Mouse

16