Ulep v.
The Legal Clinic
B.M. No. 553
June 17, 1993
Regalado, J.
Tickler: Paralegal
Doctrine:
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar,
he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, is the establishment of
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct."
Facts
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from Issuing advertisements similar to or
of the same tenor as that of Annexes 'A' and 'B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen v. State Bar of Arizona. United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Issue
1. WON the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law.
2. WON, in either case, the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Held
1. YES.
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business go an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes practice of law. One who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
In the recent case of Cayetano v. Monsod, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute
“practice of law,” thus:
Black defines “practice of law” as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of ' another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to .actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law."
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he: "x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and,
communication, such as computerized, legal research; encoding and reproduction of. documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption
laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for
the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services."
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client,
and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so-called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends
to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry «out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which
thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused
to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts, sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a
client may-avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client and the bar from the 'incompetence or dishonesty' of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
2. NO.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or
in return for, publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to
be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement, of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests
on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar,
he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.) That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda.
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions.
The first of such exceptions, is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent, with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. Considering that
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc.
is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
Ciocon-Reer v. Judge Lubao
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ
June 20, 2012
Carpio, J.
Tickler: Attorney-in-fact, agent or representative
Doctrine:
“[a]ssuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority,”
Facts
Complainants are the plaintiffs in a civil case for unlawful detainer, damages, injunction, etc., which is appealed
from MTC of General Santos City, Branch 3. Complainants alleged that Judge Lubao issued an Order directing the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within 30 days from receipt of the order. Complainants further
alleged that on 30 September 2008, a copy of the order was sent by registered mail to the defendants, which they
should have received within one week or on 7 October 2008. Complainants alleged that the 30- day period within
which to submit memoranda expired on 6 November 2008. Since the defendants failed to submit their
memorandum on 6 November 2008, complainants alleged that they should be deemed to have waived their right
to adduce evidence and Judge Lubao should have decided the case. Yet, four months passed from 6 November
2008 and Judge Lubao still failed to make his decision.
In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda on
12 September 2008. The Order was sent to the parties through registered mail on 30 September 2008. Judge
Lubao alleged that the plaintiffs submitted their memorandum on 10 November 2008 but the court did not
receive the registry return card on the notice to the defendants. On 10 December 2008, the branch clerk of court
sent a letter-request to the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12
September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. However, the court did
not receive any reply from the Post Office.
Respondent further explained that on 20 May 2009, for the greater interest of substantial justice, the defendants
were given their last chance to submit their memorandum within 30 days from receipt of the order. In the same
order, he directed the plaintiffs to coordinate with the branch sheriff for personal delivery of the order to the
defendants. However, the plaintiffs failed to coordinate with the branch sheriff and the order was sent to the
defendants, again by registered mail, only on 17 June 2009.
Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Karaan is engaging in the practice of law even though he is not
a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked this Court to require Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt
for unauthorized practice of law. Karaan disclaimed respondent’s allegations and averred that Judge Lubao’s
failure to submit his comment on time to complainants’ administrative complaint is a violation of the existing
rules and procedure and amounts to gross ignorance of the law.
OCA: a verification from the Docket and Clearance Division of its Office revealed that Karaan also filed numerous
administrative complaints against judges from different courts, all of which were dismissed by this Court. There
was no evidence to show that the orders issued by Judge Lubao were tainted with fraud, dishonesty or bad faith.
The OCA stated that the matters raised by complainants could only be questioned through judicial remedies
under the Rules of Court and not by way of an administrative complaint.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao for lack of merit. The OCA further
recommended that Karaan be required to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for
violation of Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This Court dismissed the complaint against Judge Lubao for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit. This
Court likewise directed Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for violating Section 3(e),
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Karaan reiterated that he never represented himself to anyone as a lawyer or officer of the court and that his
paralegal services, rendered free of charge, were all for the public good. He stated that he assists organizations
which represent the interests of senior citizens, the indigents, and members of the community with limited
means.
The OCA recommended that Karaan be declared liable for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve a term of
imprisonment for 10 days at the Manila City Jail and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that a repetition of any
of the offenses, or any similar or other offense, against the courts, judges or court employees will merit more
serious sanctions.
Issue
1. WON the dismissal of the complaint against respondent was proper.
2. WON Karaan was engaged in the practice of law.
Held
1. YES.
Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. We
agree with the OCA that the remedy of the complainants in this case is judicial in nature.
As the OCA stated, Karaan could not make assumptions as to when the defendants received the copy of Judge
Lubao’s order without the registry return receipt. While Karaan claimed that he knew when one of the parties
received a copy of the order, this claim was unsupported by evidence and was not in the records of the case, The
records would also show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as his branch clerk of
court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12
September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence
that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith.
2. YES.
In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court ruled that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law
is to render any kind of service. Here, the OCA was able to establish the pattern in Karaan’s unauthorized practice
of law. He would require the parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them
as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other pleadings
“acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative” of the parties. The fact that
Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorney’s Roll, or MCLE
Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of
law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person “[a]ssuming to be an attorney or an
officer of a court, and acting as such without authority,” is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7
of the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or
a court of equivalent or higher rank “may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.” If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed
against a lower court, he “may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) month, or both.”
Karaan was found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and was imposed upon a fine of 10,000 pesos.
Bonifacio v. Attys. Era & Bragas
A.C. No. 11754
October 3, 2017
Tijam, J.
Tickler: SPA, illegal dismissal case
Doctrine:
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine
Rebuilders Corporation. Complainants therein (Abucejo Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law
Office through Atty. Era. The Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and,
consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th
month pay. Bonifacio and the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme Court but they suffered the
same fate as their appeals and motions were decided against them. Thus a Writ of Execution was issued to
implement the Decision. As well as a Notice of Garnishment and two alias writs.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests
entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era. this Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.
The scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the business establishment
was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public
auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the same day, a certificate
of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and employees who were there at
that time. Armed with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but eventually
stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of pulling out the
auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to continue with the negotiation in his law office.
On behalf of his clients, their counter-offer for the satisfaction of the judgment award went from P6 Million to
P9 Million.
As the parties were not able to settle, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business establishment
together with their clients and several men and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned
properties which prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and
trespassing. The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict the respondents for grave
coercion.
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime in
February and April 2014 with regard to the subject labor case. On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant
administrative complaint.
In their Answer, respondents averred that Bonifacio has no personal knowledge of the alleged acts which
constituted the criminal case against them as Bonifacio was not present therein at that time. Hence, his
allegations of force, threat, and intimidation in the execution of the judgement is without basis. In his defense,
Atty. Era furthered that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he merely
acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to an SPA. It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SPA, he was not
engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He added that
he never signed any document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being
an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's
clients.
Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera: Recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative
complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Found nothing wrong with the indication of a suspended lawyer's name
in a pleading considering that the same was not signed by the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading
was prepared by Atty. Era. On the other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the
pleadings. There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a
pleading. Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and the negotiations was an implication or
proof that Atty. Era was engaging in the practice of law during his suspension.
IBP Board of Governors: Reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions. The
invoked SPA gave Atty. Era the authority to appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006
auction and did not include the November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive payment
on behalf of his clients, the SPA specifically stated that said payments should be made in the form of checks and
not machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era had no authority under the SPA to represent his clients during the
November 28, 2013 auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's machines as payment of the judgment
award. At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in having the
judgment award satisfied. The Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage
in an unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts
during the satisfaction of the alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing.
Issue
WON Atty. Era’s acts constituted practice of law.
Held
YES.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent...”
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. One who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions."
“Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning
clients in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3)
secured the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees
present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the subject
properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6)
negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with
interest instead of pulling out the properties.
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be
exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the
Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal
effects and consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgement award. Such trained legal
mind is what his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the fact that
they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter
being their lawyer.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. As mentioned, Atty. Era was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. He performed the above-cited acts on the same
year. Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule
138 of the ROC is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to
circumvent the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his disrespect to this
Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else, are called upon to obey
court orders and processes. Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. We also adopt the Board's recommendation as to
the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years suspension from the practice of law, taking into
account that this is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be
reproved. There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of
law and yet, she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated
the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law.
Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to
individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice
could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence,
she should have not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual
circumstances of the case clearly show that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or
the law firm's clients during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was
the one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
Both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of
another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Santos v. Llamas
A.C. No. 4749
January 20, 2000
Mendoza, J.
Tickler: Senior Citizen
Doctrine:
Respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is
"limited."
Facts
Complainant Soliman M. Santos, a member of the bar, alleged in a letter-complaint that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three
years already as shown by the sample pleadings in various courts I 1995, 1996 and 1997.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member
of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10
which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Complainant seeks, among others, clarification and appropriate action on the bar standing of respondent both with
the Bar confidant and the IBP. He also noted that while respondent indicates “IBP Rizal 259060” sometimes, he does
not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax. Finally, he noted the track record of respondent: dismissal as
Pasay City Judge and conviction of estafa in RTC of Makati. He further filed a certification from the president of the
IBP, that respondent’s "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount
to cover his membership fees up to the present."
In his comment-memorandum, respondent alleged, as regards his dismissal as a Judge, the Supreme Court dismissal
decision was set aside and reversed, and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional
Trial Court Judge of Makati. As to his conviction of estafa, the decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is
still pending. He further stated that respondent himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law even if
the dismissal case was not set aside and reversed and also had his conviction of estafa by RTC been affirmed by the
CA.
As to the payment of IBP dues, respondent alleged that since 1992 up to the present, he had publicly made it clear
per his ITR that he had only a limited practice of law, being a farmer as his principal occupation. Moreover and more
than anything, being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he alleged that he is legally exempt in the payment of taxes. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he
never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon. Nonetheless of such belief, he averred that
he is willing at any time to all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties.
IBP Board of Governors: found respondent guilty and ordered his suspension from practice of law for 3 months and
until he pays his IBP dues.
Issue
WON Respondent’s suspension was proper.
Held
YES.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues.
He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-
Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting
that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He
claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it
does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he files in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and
plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of 1 year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.