Imbong v. Ochoa 4.

The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity
Requisites of Judicial Review:
5. The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
1. There must be an actual case or controversy

- This means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for

determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.
- The controversy must be justiciable – definite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
- The pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on
the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other.
- It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue.

“Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitioners present a justiciable
controversy”[Imbong v. Ochoa]

“Medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally

prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.” [ibid]

2. It must be ripe for adjudication

- The act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.
- It is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as
a result of the challenged action.

3. The petitioners must possess locus standi

- A personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.
- It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
Does the Court of Appeals have the authority to issue a temporary restraining Section 7 provides:
order against the implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman? (read
Binay case) Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES INTRODUCED IN DISINI CASES: amended, or special laws.

STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD – According to this standard, a legislative Thus, a single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code.
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. Exception:
1. Online libel. There should be no question that if the published material on
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE – a proper governmental purpose constitutionally print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical
subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a
its subject broadly, thereby invading the are f protected freedoms. violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation
of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and
ZONES OF PRIVACY- Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of are in fact one and the same offense. online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not
privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4)
the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication.
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the
into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a proscription against double jeopardy.
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion. 2. Child pornography. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as
to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed,
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of
level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of “electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.”
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.

“AS APPLIED” CHALLENGE OR PROHIBITION AGAINST THIRD-

PARTY STANDING - the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional
right can raise any constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice,
lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It
prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court.

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a “facial”
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own
rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter
the “chilling effect” on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid
being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.
MALICE IN LAW V. MALICE IN FACT

In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime. The law
presumes that every imputation is malicious; this is referred to as malice in law. The
presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the imputations
were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved that the
imputation is true and published with good intention and justifiable motive.

There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance,

Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when: (Privileged)

1. a private communication made by any person to another in the performance

of any legal, moral or social duty;
2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
of their functions;
3. fair commentaries on matters of public interest; and
4. remarks directed against a public figure.

In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the

prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were made or published with
actual malice or malice in fact – the knowledge that the statement is false or with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. These privileged communication
has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in law and
consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.