G.R. No.
118649 March 9, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAIME REYES y
AROGANSIA, Accused-Appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Jaime Reyes y Arogansia seeks the reversal of the
decision 1 of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, dated
October 5, 1994, declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder as then punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, be fore
its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659.
By way of backdrop, appellant was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation in Parañaque pursuant to a warrant of arrest 2 issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and was turned over to the custody of
the Philippine National Police of said province. On May 2, 1990, appellant was
admitted to bail. The criminal complaint was later amended to change his middle
name stated therein from "Bautista" to "Arogansia." 3
Appellant failed to submit his counter-affidavit as ordered by the municipal trial
court, hence he was deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.
The records of the case were then forwarded to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna which filed an information on July 2, 1990 charging herein
appellant with murder and alleging
That on or about February 15, 1990, in the municipality of Santa Cruz, province
of Laguna, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused while conveniently armed with a
handgun and motivated by hate and revenge with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation, by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot at MEYNARDO ALTOBAR y MENGUITO
with the said weapon, thereby the latter suffered gunshot wound which directly
caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the crime the qualifying circumstances were present:
(1) evident premeditation & treachery. 4
During his arraignment with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 5 The pre-trial conference was terminated
on November 28, 1990 and, thereafter, trial proceeded. In the course of the
proceedings, the bail of appellant was cancelled and he was ordered arrested by
virtue of a bench warrant for failure to appear on a scheduled hearing.
Prosecution witness Iluminado Broas testified that on or about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of February 15, 1990, he and the victim, Meynardo "Jun Boy" Altobar,
Jr., together with another prosecution witness, Joel Apundar, were seated in front
of the sari-sari store of Edwin Laborde at M.H. del Pilar Street, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They were talking with each other when suddenly a "bemoustached"
man approached them and asked Altobar, Jr., "Ikaw ba si Jun Boy?" When the
latter replied by nodding his head, the man, who was later identified as herein
appellant, immediately pulled out a gun from something which looked like a book
tightly held under his left armpit and shot the victim, hitting him in the neck.
< victim Meynardo Altobar, together with Joel were seated in front of the sari-
sari store of Edwin. A man approached them and asked Altobar, Jr., "Ikaw ba si
Jun Boy?". When the victim was identified appellant, immediately pulled out a
gun held under his left armpit and shot the victim, hitting him in the neck.,>
Broas was able to push the wounded victim aside before the assailant pulled the
trigger for a second shot. Thereafter, appellant pointed the gun at the group and
pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed and did not fire. Appellant thereupon ran
towards the opposite direction, obviously to avoid being caught or identified by
them. 6 The group rushed to the aid of the victim who sat slouched on the
pavement, bathed in his own blood, about a meter away from where they were
seated. They hailed a tricycle and brought the victim to the hospital where he
expired. 7
Prosecution witness Joel Apundar corroborated the testimony of Broas in its
material points. He testified further that when appellant escaped by running
towards the direction of the P. Guevarra Memorial High School, he shouted,
"Habulin ninyo iyan, habulin ninyo!" which was heard by several persons within
the vicinity. 8 Broas and Apundar both testified that the man was wearing a piece
of lady's stocking as a mask, RayBan type sunglasses, a "surefit" cap, 9 black
pants and a white t-shirt. 10
Another prosecution witness, Johnny Abao, testified that at around 7:00 o'clock in
the evening of February 15, 1990, he was in the company of Felix Herbosa and
Jun Laborte at Del Pilar Street in the same town. They heard two gunshots and
somebody shouted, "Habulin ninyo." Then, he saw a man running away from the
direction where the gunshots and shouts emanated and going towards them.
Their group was about 30 meters away from the Laborte store. The man ran
along Del Pilar Street, turned right to Kamatoy Street, and then right to P.
Guevarra Street. As he ran after the man, he picked up something for his
defense. He only gave up the chase when he saw that the man had boarded a
slow moving tricycle waiting along P. Guevarra Street. He later helped witnesses
Apundar and Broas in bringing the victim to the hospital on board a tricycle driven
by Martin Buena. 11
Dr. Guia G. Abad, a medico-legal officer, conducted an autopsy on the body of
the victim. Her findings were set forth in a Medico Necropsy Report, marked as
Exhibit "G" by the prosecution, as follows:
1. One circular wound measuring 2 mm x 2 mm penetrating located 2 cm above
the medial insertion of the left clavicle directed rightwards to a wound with
irregular edges measuring 1 cm x 1 cm located 12 cm from midspinal on right
upper back at a level 4 cm below the lower border of nape, just above the upper
edge of right scapular bond.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shock due to hemorrhage due to penetrating wound. 12
Another prosecution witness Manolito A. Manuel testified that, while riding on his
racer-type bicycle passing along P. Guevarra Street on his way home to
Barangay Sto. Angel Sur in the same town, he heard two gunshots which he
ignored. Upon reaching the corner of P. Guevarra and Kamatoy Streets, he fell
from his bicycle because he was nearly sideswiped by a passenger jeep. While
sprawled on the street with his bicycle, he saw a man running towards a slow-
moving tricycle and who then boarded the same. Inside the tricycle, the man
removed his mask and put a gun on the passenger seat. 13 When Manuel stood
up and rode his bicycle again, he noticed that the man was staring at him. He
was more or less five meters away from the said tricycle and the place was
illuminated by a lamppost.
Just as he reached the big bridge, he noticed that the said tricycle, with the same
driver and passenger, was moving behind him. Upon reaching a street corner, he
made a full stop and again he noticed the driver and the passenger of the said
tricycle giving him an intimidating look. He thereafter proceeded towards his
home and the tricycle went in the direction of Patimbao. 14 He later identified the
passenger as appellant, 15 and the driver as Ernan Reyes, a son of Ely Reyes
who is a cousin of appellant. 16
Appellant, as expected, denied having killed Altobar, Jr. He testified that on the
date and time in question, he was at the Parañaque Cockpit owned by Rolly
Ligon, together with Obet Legasto and Raul Reyes, on a painting job. The Said
cockpit is reportedly 85 to 90 kilometers away from Sta. Cruz, Laguna and it
would take more than two hours to travel from one place to the
other. 17 Appellant's alibi was corroborated by his relative, Raul Reyes, who
testified that he and appellant were together the whole night of February 15,
1990 and they never left the cockpit compound. 18
However, the prosecution presented two rebuttal witnesses, Serafin
Nepomuceno and Eleodoro Anibersaryo to refute this alibi of appellant. Witness
Nepomuceno testified that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of February 15, 1990,
he was at the house of witness Anibersaryo at Green Village Subdivision, also in
Sta. Cruz. They were having a celebration when appellant arrived together with
Felix Mercado, Anibersaryo's half-brother. Appellant left after drinking a bottle of
beer. The celebration did not last long because the group had to attend to
important matters in the public market. On their way thereto aboard an owner-
type jeep, they saw appellant walking along Taleon Street 19 which was a few
blocks away from the scene of the crime.
The other rebuttal witness, Eleodoro Anibersaryo, corroborated the testimony of
Nepomuceno. He testified that they saw appellant on February 15, 1991 at
around 5:30 in the afternoon, first, when appellant arrived in Anibersaryo's house
and, second, when appellant was walking along Taleon Street. 20 In fact, their
group greeted appellant but could not accommodate him in their jeep which was
already full. 21
Based on the evidence introduced by the prosecution vis-a-vis what was
adduced by the defense, which will hereafter be discussed, the trial court
concluded that it was appellant Jaime Reyes who shot and killed victim
Meynardo Altobar, Jr. Thus, on October 5, 1994, the court below rendered the
following judgment:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused JAIME REYES
y AROGANSIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified
by evident premeditation defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with the attendant generic circumstance of nocturnity and hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Meynardo Altobar y
Menguito the amount of P90,000.00 for and as actual and compensatory
damages inclusive of expenses incident to the burial, P100,000.00 for and as
moral damages, P50,000.00 for and as exemplary damages and the further sum
of P200,000.00 for expenses of litigation inclusive of attorney's fee, all without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
<The trial court ruled that the accused is guilty of murder>
<Issue: are there presence of evident premeditation and treachery >
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period
of his preventive imprisonment. 22
Hence, this appeal wherein appellant imputes four supposed errors to the trial
court, namely, (1) in finding that treachery attended the killing of the victim
Meynardo Altobar, Jr.; (2) in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation to qualify the crime to murder; (3) in appreciating nocturnity
as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime; and (4) in
convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 23
Appellant faults the trial court for holding that the killing of victim Altobar, Jr. was
attended by treachery. He contends that when he openly approached the victim
and asked him, "Ikaw ba si Jun Boy?" the latter must already have been alerted
and forewarned of an impending attack. Moreover, the attack was frontal as
shown by the fact that the victim was hit near the neck 24 above the left clavicle.
The Court disagrees.
The prosecution evidence meets the requisites for appreciating alevosia in the
commission of the crime, viz.: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) appellant consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or forms of the attack employed by him.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.
< The prosecution evidence meets the requisites for appreciating alevosia in the
commission of the crime >
<The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself>
As argued by the prosecution, the fact that appellant approached the victim and
asked him if he was "Jun Boy" could not have served as a warning to the victim
of an impending harm. It could not have taken appellant more than three seconds
to ask the question and immediately after getting a positive response, he fired at
the victim. 26 This is sustained by reliable eyewitness accounts.
< As argued by the prosecution, the fact that appellant approached the victim and
asked him if he was "Jun Boy" could not have served as a warning to the victim
of an impending harm. It could not have taken appellant more than three seconds
to ask the question and immediately after getting a positive response, he fired at
the victim. Therefore he is guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery>
Prosecution witness Iluminado Broas lucidly explained:
Q: Do you recall of (sic) any unusual incident which happened on that particular
occasion while in the process of telling stories among yourselves?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you tell the Court what happened?
A: While we were telling stories at that time, a certain man came and then asked
who this Jun Boy is.
Q: Will you tell the court if you recall the exact words of this man, what was (sic)
the exact words?
A: The exact words uttered by the man was (sic) "ikaw ba si Jun Boy?" and then
he pulled out a gun from something like a book pressed between his left armpit
and then he fired a shot at Jun Boy.
Q: Was Jun Boy hit by that first shot?
A: He was hit, sir.
Q: Did you notice on what part of his body as Jun Boy hit?
A: Jun Boy was hit near the neck.
Q: Before he was shot by this man, was Jun Boy able to answer or utter any
remarks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his answer?
A: He just nodded his head.
Q: After Jun Boy nodded if as you mentioned that he was the Jun Boy being
sought by this man, this man suddenly pulled out a gun from what appeared to
be a book pressed between his left armpit, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir. 27
This was corroborated by witness Joel Apundar:
Q: While you were there at that time in the store of this Laborde, do you recall of
(sic) any unusual incident that happened?
A: There was.
Q: What happened?
A: We were sitting on a wooden bench and while we were sitting on a wooden
bench, somebody approached us and asked who among us is Jun Boy and after
knowing who was Jun Boy, he immediately fired a gun at us. 28
We can infer from the foregoing testimonies of these prosecution witnesses that
the suddenness and mode of the attack adopted by appellant placed the victim in
a situation where it would be impossible for him to foresee any impending harm
and to resist the attack or defend himself. It has repeatedly been held that even if
the attack on the victim was immediately preceded by a cry or signal from the
accused, such attack is no less treacherous 29 since the immediacy of the assault
prevents the victim from evading the same or defending himself therefrom. Even
a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the
victim was unarmed, 30 as what happened in the case at bar.
Apropos to the foregoing, the rule is that the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity is ordinarily deemed absorbed in treachery 31 because it forms part of
the treacherous means and manner specifically employed by the accused to
insure the execution of his criminal act. Nocturnity is appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance only when it is purposely sought by or affords some
degree of impunity to the offender, which does not appear to be so in this case.
The prosecution witnesses testified that although the crime was committed at
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, the locus criminis was well lighted 32 and the
face of appellant could easily be seen through his transparent mask. 33 The
circumstances of treachery and nocturnity may well be regarded then as
complementing each other, with the latter absorbed by treachery thus creating a
single circumstance qualifying the killing as murder.
It is also worth mentioning that while appellant reportedly had a sort of a mask
and was using sunglasses, these clumsy accouterments could not constitute the
aggravating circumstance of disguise. Legally, disfraz contemplates a superficial
but somewhat effective dissembling to avoid identification. Here, even if it is true
that he assumed that masquerade, appellant was readily recognizable because
his face could easily be seen together with the identifying feature of his
mustache. Thus, there was no mention of his having used a disguise, whether in
the information or by the trial court, the prosecution or the Solicitor General. Why
appellant resorted to that juvenile gaucherie is an example of the delusive quirks
of the criminal mind which defy rational explanation.
What is instead in issue is the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in appreciating this as
another qualifying circumstance, on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove all the requisites thereof. 34 Appellant is correct. The prosecution failed to
prove (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a
sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution of the crime to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 35 These elements of
evident premeditation must be established with equal certainty and clarity as the
criminal act itself before it can be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
The testimony of prosecution witness Jonas Soriano that on February 7, 1990
Mercy Reyes, daughter of appellant, told him to inform the victim to be careful
because appellant had a gun and was looking for him; 36 and the testimony of
Perla Ramos that on February 8, 1990, appellant went to her house looking for
his daughter 37 and, before leaving, he stated, "Huwag lang mayroong
mangyayari sa anak ko wala kayong narinig, wala kayong nakita," 38 cannot be
taken against appellant as evidence of his intent or plan to kill the victim.
Mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable they
might be, would not be enough to sustain a finding of this qualifying
circumstance. 39 For that matter, absent the elements thereof as earlier noted,
neither can it be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Nonetheless,
appellant is still liable for the crime of murder as the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was present and proven by the prosecution.
Appellant faults the lower court in convicting him of the crime charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 40 This submission is not only too generalized an averment but is likewise
devoid of merit. Although the prosecution's eyewitnesses, Broas and Apundar,
initially failed to reveal or disclose the name of appellant in their preliminary
affidavits, the physical description and identification of the gunman as narrated
by them matches the identity of herein appellant.
Moreover, during the trial, appellant was positively identified by Broas and
Apundar as the man who shot Altobar, Jr. Broas explained that the delay in his
disclosure of the name or identity of appellant was because he was afraid to
mention the name of the person who shot the victim and he was so afraid
because he definitely knew the assailant. 41 Apundar, in turn, confessed that the
delay in his revelation of the identity of appellant was because he was "afraid that
Jaime might return" to him. 42
The failure of the prosecution witnesses to immediately name or identify herein
appellant as the culprit is understandable. It is common for witnesses to delay or
vacillate in disclosing the identity of the offender after the startling occurrence for
fear of reprisal, more so since they were townmates and one of them is related to
appellant. Incidentally, prosecution witness Manuel, on his part, positively
identified appellant as the man who ran towards a slow-moving tricycle, boarded
the same, placed his gun on the passenger seat, removed his mask, and gave
him an intimidating look. 43
It is a jurisprudential doctrine of long standing that, aside from its intrinsic
weakness, the defense of alibi and denial invoked by herein appellant cannot
prevail over the positive identification by these prosecution witnesses who had no
improper motive whatsoever to falsely testify against him. 44 This decisional rule
applies squarely to demolish appellant's pretensions.
As to the trial court's award of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of
deceased Meynardo Altobar, Jr., the Court finds the same to be excessive with
respect to moral damages and unwarranted with regard to exemplary damages.
Consistent with our jurisprudence, the award of moral damages in the present
case has necessarily to be limited by the Court to the maximum amount of
P50,000.00. 45
Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases where the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. 46 In the instant case, no
aggravating circumstance is present to warrant the award of exemplary damages
since treachery has been used to qualify the killing to murder, nocturnity has
been absorbed by treachery, and evident premeditation has not been proved.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, but with
MODIFICATION of the civil liability of accused-appellant Jaime Reyes.
Conformably with the foregoing discussion, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs
of Meynardo Altobar, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P90,000.00
as compensatory damages for funeral expenses, P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages, and P20,000.00 as actual damages for litigation expenses inclusive of
attorney's fees, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
< victim Meynardo Altobar, together with Joel were seated in front of the sari-
sari store of Edwin. A man approached them and asked Altobar, Jr., "Ikaw ba si
Jun Boy?". When the victim was identified, appellant immediately pulled out a
gun held under his left armpit and shot the victim, hitting him in the neck.,>
<The trial court ruled that the accused is guilty of murder>
<Issue: Is there presence of treachery. >
< The prosecution evidence meets the requisites for appreciating alevosia in the
commission of the crime >
<The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself>
< As argued by the prosecution, the fact that appellant approached the victim and
asked him if he was "Jun Boy" could not have served as a warning to the victim
of an impending harm. It could not have taken appellant more than three seconds
to ask the question and immediately after getting a positive response, he fired at
the victim. Therefore he is guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery>
